DOCSLIB.ORG

National Security Agency (NSA) Document: a History of U.S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
National Security Agency (NSA) Document: a History of U.S Description of document: National Security Agency (NSA) document: A History of U.S. Communications Security Post World-War II – released under Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Released date: February 2011 Posted date: 07-November-2011 Source of document: National Security Agency Declassification Services (DJ5) Suite 6884, Bldg. SAB2 9800 Savage Road Ft. George G. Meade, MD, 20755-6884 Note: Although the titles are similar, this document should not be confused with the David G. Boak Lectures available: http://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdf The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. -----------------------------------------------------------------------~~) '; I .:· ! _k:::._,.l COMitfll A HISTORY OF U.S.. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY , POST-WORLDWA:RU P.L. 86~36 _ ... ·· .. -··' peclassified and approved for release by NSA. NSC. OSD. the Joint Staff. DIA. the U.S. ~tate Department. the U,S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Air Force on 02-04-2011 b_ursuantto E.O. 13526. MDR 59142 SfER:E'f corv11fff) SEeftET ,\dmowl<ulgenwnl~ The ;.;ourtr!s used in compilin~ this history arc many and ,·aricd. We an~ f!SJJecially undclitcd to l-lr. Gf~lrgc II owe, r-.;sA II istoriun from 19 to 19 , f11r I he significant contrihuti(ms he htts made to t.he l\gcncy's heritage in his lh·e vdume draft of The. Narrative /lis tory of AFSA . .VS:\ ~ The portion of I he II istor·y covering most :1Hpccts of wirt!d rotor dcvclopnumt is hasf!O on A Sun·ey of Wired /lotors whi<~h was prci#'~d hy a long time expert in that fiP-Id, :\tr. Ryun Page ::\.lr. Po1gc's survey is pr·cscntly being rcvicwt.>d and updul.cd, and will he published in due cour!-'c ns an acljuncllo this llistory ofCommuni<:at.ions &.-eurity. Additionally, an cxt!lnsiv<J work h. years to , has h(!CO used as a sprinnbmtrd for tiw Iimitml entries hen• in on S<!curc vnice rnattcn;. This work will be published at some ful.urc date also. P.L. 86-36 . ·· Alhil'd and mostJmporlant hisloril:al study in trucking the development of critical This work rcvinws the major technical and managnrial problems which were cncounlcn.>d in the 14- dc,·clopmcnL of a widcband voice security system for tactical airborn<!, ,-chicular, and manpa9f applications. This prognnn covcn.'<l about twenty years and resulted in the highly acclaimed y"i TSEC/KY-8, I·'Y -28, and K Y-:i8 syshmts. 'l'his historical study will also be publh:hed in due coursn as a further adjunct to this II is tory . .:\lany thanks go, also, to the numerous pa:;t and J>rc,;cnt employees of the S Or·ganizalion for their valuable ad\·ice and assistance. SECRET SECRET l•"oreword In his trcati;.:e entitled "The Fir·st SIGI:\T Organization,"! :\Jr. Htli :.hlh,nrd. u lt•rm<!r ••wmlwr 11f thl! Dir·ccl.orale or GCilq,:z dr• ... :rtbmlthc.> M!CIIt! inllrnry V • ..\r·lll. Scene II, whi<:h showed Shakespl'<li'C's awareness oflhc po;.:sihi!itim~ ofSIGI:'\'1'. In that scene, a conspiracy led by th(! Earl of Cambridge is unmasked when a Lord, in an aside, nhscrves that "the King hath nol.e of' all that they intend, by interception which they dream not of." 'I' he King addresses the conspirators, and hands each om! a slip of paper purporting to be a commission. Each, upon reading his paper·, turns puh! and falls to his knees, pleading forgiveness. According to 1\lr. :Millward, the slips of paper were quite likely hits '/ ofSlGI.:'\'1' end-product bused on the King's int~rccplions. '!'hi~; story is import-ant he<:am;c it dramati;.ws what may he the lirsl known, dtx:unHmlcd, uncc1uivocally re~ogni.,;ahlc ahscnce of prudnnt communkalions security practices. I I ad the conspirutors the good sense to apply CO:\ISEC principles t.o l.h{~ir t~onspiritorial noh!S, writs, Idlers, nnd other communications, and th<Jrchy prevented the King from learning of their plots, thct·c is no way of knowing what. ciTcct their dastardly actions might have had on fl('nry V's reign nor on Shakespeare's telling of it. For all of that, it. was still many years before lhc art of communications security reached the point of being a much used and accepted looJ. I Contact., 19 . 2~tr. W. :\-t iII ward, C. B., C.B.E. was formerly Di r<.'Clor of l~cquirements at GCI f(.l SECRET ·: .... SECRET Introduction The history of the i.nvention, development, and appl'ication of cryptographic devices, machines, and associated apparatas and material is long and int-eFesting. Attempts to keep secure , · o·-y~n,:t-afto1? the contents of the various communications passing between and among Civil and military~- ~ . hav.e gone through many vissicitudes over the yeaz:s, not always with a great deal of saccess. This is .. ~-·· . r.<.':"' P .. ··- .; evideneed•from the·~fiest days in the ebservations ef Sir F-rancis Bacon who, in 1623, noted that " ... many times the greatest matters are committed to fatur-e and weak ciphers. "1 Until the advent of electr.anic/eipher machines, most cryptagraphic devices were built upon or around concentric circular rotating aumaers such as cipher wheels, cipher d~cs, e~. One of the earliest developments of such deVices appeared in Italy areund 1476 in a paper written by an Italian cryptologist named Alberti. There we;e a few mod-ifications made from time to time, but the basic methods of trying to keep -··---- --- - - ----·---- ·- .. ---------------·-···· - --- -- --··-·--------.. ~---·- -·----- lin Gifu_er.t-W.atts~tr:~l.!.~!atiohs (1640,. p;270~ of Bacon's Oe Augmeats Scierttarium, Landen, ____ / .~/ --···--··-····--·-········ ....... ··-····-·······-----·· ·····- -. .............. ~----·~···· -··· ·- ··-· -· ·····•· ... - ...... / ~$e £rom tim.e to time, h\il. tbe ba-sie methods of"tqing to ID>eep the underlying plain text I i communications "~ecure" remained. I I Progress in the development of cryptographic equipments and devices kept pace,. and I apparatus for protecting all manner of commuaications WeFe develaped and coatinaaUy perfected. ! These included machiJ:les aad keying device$ to secure Iiteral communications .whlch employed letters of the alphabet; ciiax transmi.ssians--which were picture oF facsimile traasmissions; a-ad · · t 1 h · "'" .. · · · · · · \ ctPhone~.inlr-8":2trr ansmtssxons-- e ep OQlc w.a-nsmissums. · I Early twentieth century communications ·se¢urity devices, such as those used 1,:1p to the t i 1930's, had been based prima-rily an tna,nual techniq.aes. This iacluded code .books, traasposition ! r I I processes, auxilliary devices for use with printed tables and books, strip-ciphers, and similar pr-ocesses ! I for disguising plain text messages. Additive tape machines had been used to a lim·ited degree. A few I j mechanical (i.e., non-electrical) ciphers such as the GeFman Ktyha aad the Hage.Ua devices had I 1 appear.ed h·ut had bee·n e·mployed a-nly ve:ry selec•tively or nc;>t at a,H b-y the U.S.. i \.--........,...i <::"'··· 1 SEC'R.ET §ECRET Eaciphering and deciphering were teQious, time consliming processes. The wired rotor, which became practicable for secure maclii:nes in the late '30s, was to revolutionize the encryption/decryption processes ofthe era. By early 1942 rotor machines were b@nnittg ta ease the l~ad on manlial sy.stems and to lower the time between filing of a message and delivery to its· inteaded recipient. At least this was . • ~ <• ••• ""~· · true·for;'majoi"rniHtary· bases·~··--As·World Wa,r·n prl)gressed; rotor n'iaehines··became flifr backbbn€fof·"" ·r.,, .·. · ''".'"··"· ··· the cipher networks at flXed plant levels for Army and Navy alike. (The Ak Foree had no~ yet been established a1:1 a separate service.) The use of rotors continued to grow through the 1941fs and early 1'50's. About that time techn·iques to supplant rotor;; became practicable and affordable. Miniature tubes came f:trSt, followed elosely by magnetic hinar.ies (BI-MAGS) and tra·nsistors_. Development of these, and of the later min-iat~rized technol&gj.es, spelled the eventaalend foF rotars in U.S. Cryptography. -Eeg/rt Even in the light of rapidly advancing technology, keeping our communications secure continues to be a difficult and challengiAg task. We have heeB emiBently successfwl so far, and our EO 1.4. (c) goal is to maintain that status. · P • L. 8 6-3 6 There are a number of reasons why this task ·graws even. more difficu•lt ..For qne, the SOviet Union has a very efficien·t SIGINT service which we must consider to he as dedicated ai.,.d determmed as our own. 'Phey target commun-ications world wide.\ \ \ J Another reason is that our exposure of communications signals increases re~Iarry.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • NSA's Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure
    Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-Sector Telecommunications Infrastructure Susan Landau* INTRODUCTION When Google discovered that intruders were accessing certain Gmail ac- counts and stealing intellectual property,1 the company turned to the National Security Agency (NSA) for help in securing its systems. For a company that had faced accusations of violating user privacy, to ask for help from the agency that had been wiretapping Americans without warrants appeared decidedly odd, and Google came under a great deal of criticism. Google had approached a number of federal agencies for help on its problem; press reports focused on the company’s approach to the NSA. Google’s was the sensible approach. Not only was NSA the sole government agency with the necessary expertise to aid the company after its systems had been exploited, it was also the right agency to be doing so. That seems especially ironic in light of the recent revelations by Edward Snowden over the extent of NSA surveillance, including, apparently, Google inter-data-center communications.2 The NSA has always had two functions: the well-known one of signals intelligence, known in the trade as SIGINT, and the lesser known one of communications security or COMSEC. The former became the subject of novels, histories of the agency, and legend. The latter has garnered much less attention. One example of the myriad one could pick is David Kahn’s seminal book on cryptography, The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet.3 It devotes fifty pages to NSA and SIGINT and only ten pages to NSA and COMSEC.
    [Show full text]
  • Canada's Communications Security Establishment: from Cold War to Globalization
    CANADA’S COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT: FROM COLD WAR TO GLOBALISATION Martin Rudner OCCASIONAL PAPER No 22 – 2000 CANADA’S COMMUNICATION SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT: FROM COLD WAR TO GLOBALISATION Martin Rudner OCCASIONAL PAPER No 22 – 2000 The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 Telephone: 613-520-6655 Fax: 613-520-2889 www.carleton.ca/npsia This series is published by the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the School and supported by a grant from the Security Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the School or the Department of National Defence. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Abbreviations iv INTRODUCTION 1 THE BEGINNINGS OF CANADIAN SIGINT 2 CANADA’S SIGINT COLLECTION EFFORT 6 COLD WAR SIGINT OPERATIONS 8 CANADA AND THE UKUSA AGREEMENT 11 SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND ECHELON 13 SIGINT TECHNOLOGY ACCESS AND SHARING 16 CANADA’S POST-COLD WAR SIGINT AGENDA 18 THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE CONUNDRUM 22 FUTURE CHALLENGES 25 Notes 34 About the Author 41 LIST OF OCCASIONAL PAPERS 42 i ABSTRACT The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada’s largest, best funded and most highly secretive intelligence agency, and is the main provider of foreign intelligence to the Canadian government. CSE collects, analyses and reports on signals intelligence (SIGINT) derived from interceptions of foreign electronic communications, radio, radar, telemetry, and other electromagnetic emissions. In fulfilment of its foreign intelligence function, CSE collaborates closely in a special SIGINT sharing arrangement with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand known as UKUSA.
    [Show full text]
  • KY-58 (Vinson)
    KY-58 (Vinson) The KY-57/58 is a member of the VINSON family. The VINSON family consists of wideband secure voice (WBSV) units developed by the National Security Agency to provide line of sight half-duplex voice and data encryption at 16 Kbps. The KY-57/58 provides security for AM/FM, VHF, UHF, half-duplex PTT combat net radios and tactical wireline systems when used with the HYX-57. Also used by non-tactical users for high-level communications in the local wideband telephone networks and wideband satellite terminals. The KY-57 is the manpack/vehicular model and the KY-58 is the airborne/shipborne version. The KY-57/58 is certified to pass data up to TOP SECRET and accepts key from the family of Common Fill Devices and also incorporates remote keying. KY-57/58 production was completed in 1993. No further production is planned. KY-58 photo by Tim Tyler Tim Tyler comments."The photo above depicts the KY-58 unit inside a USCG HH-65C 'Dolphin' helicopter taken in September 2008. It is currently configured just for use on their 225-400MHz aircraft band radio. Supposedly, they're in the process of upgrading the HH-65 helos into an MH-65 (Special Ops capable) configuration which will have APCO P-25 compliant radios (with AES crypto, for talking to other DHS agencies) as well as ANDVT / KY-100 type crypto for communicating with the military-side of USCG ops". The photo above depicts a KY-58 RCU installation in an A-10 attack aircraft.
    [Show full text]
  • Polish Mathematicians Finding Patterns in Enigma Messages
    Fall 2006 Chris Christensen MAT/CSC 483 Machine Ciphers Polyalphabetic ciphers are good ways to destroy the usefulness of frequency analysis. Implementation can be a problem, however. The key to a polyalphabetic cipher specifies the order of the ciphers that will be used during encryption. Ideally there would be as many ciphers as there are letters in the plaintext message and the ordering of the ciphers would be random – an one-time pad. More commonly, some rotation among a small number of ciphers is prescribed. But, rotating among a small number of ciphers leads to a period, which a cryptanalyst can exploit. Rotating among a “large” number of ciphers might work, but that is hard to do by hand – there is a high probability of encryption errors. Maybe, a machine. During World War II, all the Allied and Axis countries used machine ciphers. The United States had SIGABA, Britain had TypeX, Japan had “Purple,” and Germany (and Italy) had Enigma. SIGABA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIGABA 1 A TypeX machine at Bletchley Park. 2 From the 1920s until the 1970s, cryptology was dominated by machine ciphers. What the machine ciphers typically did was provide a mechanical way to rotate among a large number of ciphers. The rotation was not random, but the large number of ciphers that were available could prevent depth from occurring within messages and (if the machines were used properly) among messages. We will examine Enigma, which was broken by Polish mathematicians in the 1930s and by the British during World War II. The Japanese Purple machine, which was used to transmit diplomatic messages, was broken by William Friedman’s cryptanalysts.
    [Show full text]
  • A History of U.S. Communications Security (U)
    A HISTORY OF U.S. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (U) THE DAVID G. BOAK LECTURES VOLUME II NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755 The information contained in this publication will not be disclosed to foreign nationals or their representatives without express approval of the DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY. Approval shall refer specifically to this publication or to specific information contained herein. JULY 1981 CLASSIFIED BY NSA/CSSM 123-2 REVIEW ON 1 JULY 2001 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREI6N NATIONALS SECRET HA~mLE YIA COMINT CIIA~HJELS O~JLY ORIGINAL (Reverse Blank) ---------- • UNCLASSIFIED • TABLE OF CONTENTS SUBJECT PAGE NO INTRODUCTION _______ - ____ - __ -- ___ -- __ -- ___ -- __ -- ___ -- __ -- __ --- __ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ iii • POSTSCRIPT ON SURPRISE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I OPSEC--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS ___ -------- --- ___ ---- _______________ ---- _ --- _ ----- _ 7 THREAT IN ASCENDANCY _________________________________ - ___ - - _ -- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9 • LPI _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I I SARK-SOME CAUTIONARY HISTORY __ --- _____________ ---- ________ --- ____ ----- _ _ 13 THE CRYPTO-IGNITION KEY __________ --- __ -- _________ - ---- ___ -- ___ - ____ - __ -- _ _ _ 15 • PCSM _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
    [Show full text]
  • AR 380-40 Safeguarding and Controlling Communications
    FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Army Regulation 380–40 Security Safeguarding and Controlling Communications Security Material Distribution Restriction Statement. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to Government agencies or their contractors. Requests from outside the Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act will be referred to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, (IACSF–FI), Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755–5995. Requests from outside of the Government for release of this publication under the Foreign Military Sales program must be made to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 (DAMI–CDS), 1000 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310–1000. Destruction Notice. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Rapid Action Revision (RAR) Issue Date: 24 April 2013 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 9 July 2012 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUMMARY of CHANGE AR 380–40 Safeguarding and Controlling Communications Security Material This rapid action revision, dated 24 April 2013- o Updates responsibilities for Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command; Commanders, Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units; command security officers; commanders at all levels; and individual users (paras 1-8, 1-11, 1-12, 1-13, and 1-16). o Provides expanded policy and guidance for administering the Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph Program in support of the Department of the Army Cryptographic Access Program (chap 7). o Requires use of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Historical Cryptography 2
    Historical cryptography 2 CSCI 470: Web Science • Keith Vertanen Overview • Historical cryptography – WWI • Zimmerman telegram – WWII • Rise of the cipher machines • Engima • Allied encryption 2 WWI: Zimmermann Telegram • 1915, U-boat sinks Lusitania – 1,198 drown including 128 US – Germany agrees to surface 1st • 1916, new Foreign Minister – Arthur Zimmermann • 1917, unrestricted submarine warfare – Zimmermann hatches plan • Keep American busy at home • Persuade Mexico to: invade US and invite Japan to attack US as well Arthur Zimmermann 3 4 Mechanization of secret writing • Pencil and paper – Security limited by what humans can do quickly and accurately in the heat of battle • Enter the machine Thomas Jefferson's wheel cipher Captain Midnight's Code-o-Graph 5 Enigma machine • Enigma cipher machine – 1918, patented by German engineer Arthur Scherbius Arthur Scherbius – A electrical/mechanical implementation of a polyalphabetic substitution cipher 6 7 Enigma rotors • Rotor (wheel, drum) – Monoalphabetic substitution cipher implemented via complex wiring pattern – One of 26 initial positions – Geared: rotates after each letter • Rotor set – 3 rotors in 3!=6 possible orders • Eventually increased to 3 out of 5 • Navy used even more – Possible keys: • 3! * 263 = 6 * 17,576 = 105,456 8 Enigma plugboard • Plugboard – Operator inserts cables to swap letters – Initially 6 cables • Swaps 6 pairs of letters • Leaves 14 letters unswapped – Possible configurations: • 100,391,791,500 • Total keys: – 17,576 * 6 * 100,391,791,500 ≈ 10,000,000,000,000,000
    [Show full text]
  • CHAPTER 8 a History of Communications Security in New Zealand
    CHAPTER 8 A History of Communications Security in New Zealand By Eric Morgon Early Days “Admiralty to Britannia Wellington. Comence hostilities at once with Germany in accordance with War Standing Orders.” This is an entry in the cipher log of HMS Philomel dated 5 August, 1914. HMS Philomel was a cruiser of the Royal Navy and took part in the naval operations in the Dardanelles during the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign. Philomel’s cipher logs covering the period 1914 to 1918 make interesting reading and show how codes and ciphers were used extensively by the Royal Navy during World War 1. New Zealand officers and ratings served on board Philomel and thus it can be claimed that the use of codes and ciphers by Philomel are part of the early history of communications security in New Zealand. Immediately following the codes to Navy Office, the Senior Naval Officer New Zealand was advised that Cypher G and Cypher M had been compromised and that telegrams received by landline in these ciphers were to be recoded in Code C before transmission by Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) Apparently Cypher G was also used for cables between the Commonwealth Navy Board in Melbourne and he British Consul in Noumea. The Rear Admiral Commanding Her Majesty’s Australian Fleet instructed that when signalling by WT every odd numbered code group was to be a dummy. It is interesting to note that up until the outbreak of hostilities no provision had been made for the storage of code books or for precautions to prevent them from falling into enemy hands.
    [Show full text]
  • Going Dark: Impact to Intelligence and Law Enforcement and Threat Mitigation
    GOING DARK: IMPACT TO INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THREAT MITIGATION Bonnie Mitchell Krystle Kaul G. S. McNamara Michelle Tucker Jacqueline Hicks Colin Bliss Rhonda Ober Danell Castro Amber Wells Catalina Reguerin Cindy Green-Ortiz Ken Stavinoha ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to first thank the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for its generous funding and support for our study and learning journey to the DEFCON hacking conference. We are also very grateful to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for its support during the duration of the program. We could not have completed this study without the unwavering support and dedication of Ms. Bonnie Mitchell, ODNI Deputy National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland, our devoted Team Champion who steered us throughout this study and helped turn an idea into a product. We would like to acknowledge and thank each member of our public-private sector working group for their tireless efforts from around the U.S., which includes Krystle Kaul, G. S. McNamara, Michelle Tucker, Jacqueline Hicks, Colin Bliss, Rhonda Ober, Danell Castro, Amber Wells, Catalina Reguerin, Cindy Green- Ortiz and Ken Stavinoha. We are very thankful for all the unique insight we received from interviewees who contributed to this report by educating our group on the many aspects of ‘going dark,’ and we take full responsibility for any and all errors of fact or interpretation implied or explicit in this paper. Our interviewees include the Village sponsors at DEF CON, private sector industry experts and government officials. We are thankful for the interesting and diverse perspectives particularly from senior government officials and private sector experts.
    [Show full text]
  • History and Modern Cryptanalysis of Enigma's Pluggable Reflector
    History and Modern Cryptanalysis of Enigma’s Pluggable Reflector Olaf Ostwald and Frode Weierud ABSTRACT: The development history of Umkehrwalze Dora (UKWD), Enigma's pluggable reflector, is presented from the first ideas in the mid-1920s to the last development plans and its actual usage in 1945. An Enigma message in three parts, enciphered with UKWD and intercepted by the British on 11 March 1945, is shown. The successful recovery of the key of this message is described. Modern computer-based cryptanalysis is used to recover the wiring of the unknown “Uncle Dick,” which the British called this field-rewirable reflector. The attack is based on the known ciphertext and plaintext pair from the first part of the intercept. After recovery of the unknown reflector wiring and the daily key the plaintext of the second part of the message is revealed. KEYWORDS: Enigma, cryptanalysis, Uncle Dick, Umkehrwalze Dora, UKWD, unsolved ciphers Address correspondence to Frode Weierud, Bjerkealleen 17, 1385 Asker, Norway. Email: [email protected] 1. Introduction Uncle Dick,1 as it was called by the codebreakers of Bletchley Park (BP), or Umkehrwalze Dora (UKWD), as designated by the Germans, was the nickname of a special pluggable reflector,2 used as the leftmost wheel within the scrambler 3 of the Enigma. The electro-mechanical cipher machine Enigma (from Greek αίνιγµα for “riddle”) was the backbone of the German Wehrmacht during World War II. Arthur Scherbius, a German promoted electrical engineer and inventor of considerable standing, invented Enigma in 1918 [14]. Subsequently it was improved and then used by all three parts of the German armed forces, namely army (Heer), air force (Luftwaffe), and military navy (Kriegsmarine), for enciphering and deciphering of their secret messages.
    [Show full text]
  • Revision Date : July 10/2017 Table of Contents
    Revision Date : July 10/2017 Table of Contents 1.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 3 1.2 MAIN W/T OFFICE EQUIPMENT - WWII ERA ................................................................. 4 1.3 MAIN WIRELESS OFFICE EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS .............................................. 6 1.4 MAIN WIRELESS OFFICE - RADIO MANIFEST IN JANUARY 1944 ............................ 12 1.5 THE HEADACHE FUNCTION............................................................................................. 14 1.6 TRAINING RCN TELEGRAPHISTS ................................................................................... 15 1.7 PROJECT ACCUMULATOR ................................................................................................ 17 1.8 DUTIES OF A TELEGRAPHIST .......................................................................................... 19 1.9 HAIDA'S RADIO EQUIPMENT - Mid 1940's ...................................................................... 20 1.10 MAIN WIRELESS OFFICE - 1946 PHOTOS .................................................................... 28 1.11 RADIO 1 EQUIPMENT - 1950’s........................................................................................ 32 1.12 RADIO 1 EQUIPMENT MANIFEST - September 1955 ................................................... 34 1.13 RADIO 1 – 1957 ................................................................................................................... 39 1.14
    [Show full text]
  • Dodi 8523.01, "Communications Security," January 6, 2021
    DOD INSTRUCTION 8523.01 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY Originating Component: Office of the DoD Chief Information Officer Effective: January 6, 2021 Releasability: Cleared for public release. Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels: DoD Instruction 8523.01, “Communications Security (COMSEC),” April 22, 2008 Approved by: Dana Deasy, DoD Chief Information Officer Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5144.02, DoD Instruction 8500.01, and the Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 1, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for managing communications security (COMSEC). DoDI 8523.01, January 6, 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION .............................................................................. 3 1.1. Applicability. .................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. Policy. ............................................................................................................................... 3 SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES ......................................................................................................... 4 2.1. DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO). .................................................................... 4 2.2. Director, Defense Information Systems Agency. ............................................................. 4 2.3. Director, Defense Counterintelligence
    [Show full text]