DOCSLIB.ORG

Collection: North, Oliver: Files Folder Title: Terrorism: Libya [05/23/1986- 05/31/1986] Box: 105

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Collection: North, Oliver: Files Folder Title: Terrorism: Libya [05/23/1986- 05/31/1986] Box: 105 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: North, Oliver: Files Folder Title: Terrorism: Libya [05/23/1986- 05/31/1986] Box: 105 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES Withdrawer SMF 11123/2010 File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [05/23/1986-05/3111986) FOIA F95-023/9 Box Number 105 WILLS 34 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 101052 COVER SHEET 1 5/22/1986 Bl B3 D 5/8/2017 M1115/1 101053 NOTE TO NORTH RE LIBYA 5/22/1986 Bl B3 PAR 5/8/2017 M1115/1 101054 REPORT RE LIBYA 9 5/22/1986 Bl B3 D 5/8/2017 M1115/1 101055 REPORT RE LIBYA 5 5/1/1986 Bl B3 PAR 5/8/2017 M1115/1 101056 REPORT RE LIBYA 13 5/14/1986 Bl B3 PAR 5/8/2017 M1115/1 . 101057 CABLE ST A TE 170662 6 5/30/1986 Bl 101058 CABLE BONN 16954 3 5/30/1986 B 1 101059 NOTE TO NORTH RE PAPER 5/30/1986 B 1 B3 D 5/8/2017 M1115/1 101060 PAPER RE TERRORIST THREAT 10 5/2011986 Bl B3 D 5/8/2017 M1115/1 The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA) B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning .the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES Withdrawer SMF 11123/2010 File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [05/23/1986-05/31/1986] FOIA F95-023/9 Box Number 105 WILLS 34 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 101061 MEMO TO PRESIDENT ET AL RE MESSAGE FROM 3 5/30/1 986 B 1 B3 CASEY D 5/8/2017 M1115/1 The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA) B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(S) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA) C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. RO UTING ro I Name and Address Date l 1n 1t 1ais 1 I J. Stark 5/27 ' I 2 I H. Teicher I 5/ 27 3 I v. Cannistraro ' 5/ 27 I 4 R. McDaniE=>l r; 12 7 s R. St . Martin 1 5/ 27 40 2 0 5 NSC/ICS CONTRO L NO . _ _ _ _ _ _____ 6 o. North i 5/ 27 ACTION FILE COPY NO . _1___ 0F __6__ _ APPROVAL x INFORMATION COMMENT PREPARE REPLY CONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION DIRECT REPLY RET U RN DISPATCH SIGNATU RE REMARKS : HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY NSC IN ELLIGENCE DOCUMENT Warning o ice Int el ligence Sources and Methods Involved NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unaut horized Disc losure Subiect to Criminal Sanctions i-0-P---SESRff- WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name Withdrawer North, Oliver: Files SMF 11/23/2010 File Folder FOIA TERRORISM: LIBYA [05/23/1986-05/31/1986] F95-023/9 WILLS Box Number 105 34 ID Document Type No of Doc Date Restric- Document Description pages tions 101052 COVER SHEET 1 5/22/1986 Bl B3 The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs ear Eastern and South Asian Analysis . Directorate of Intelligence 22 May 1986 Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North Deputy Director, Policy Development and Political-Military Affairs National Security Council Dear Colonel North: 3.3(b)(1) '---;;---:;--:;-=---~-,-~~~~~~~~~.---JI Also included are two papers addressiOJ in fuller detail the impact of US-Libyan tensions on Soviet relations with Tripoli. Sincerel 3.5(c) 3.5(c) I ~ocurrent regraded to~ 3.5(c) when separated fran attachment. 3.5(c) I ~ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name Withdrawer North, Oliver: Files SMF 11/23/2010 File Folder FOIA TERRORISM: LIBYA [05/23/1986-05/31/1986] F95-023/9 WILLS Box Number 105 34 ID Document Type No of Doc Date Restric- Document Description pages tions 101054 REPORT 9 5/2211986 Bl B3 RE LIBYA The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. C0632 9074 SECRET NOF'tJRW r~ec~>NTRACT ORCON . - · Central lntdligence Aff:rlo/ () . ~SG/ •1 $SCONJROE ffl)., '-ft> 1..-0 .:-:: ~nc.20sos DIRECTORATE OF INTELLI~ENCE 1 May 1986 D 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 )>25Yrs US Military Action Against Libya: Possible Impl1cations for a US-Soviet Summit Summary Soviet actions and recent private comnents by East Bloc officials suggest that Moscow does not want to escalate tensions with the United States over Libya. Even after the postponement of the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Gorbachev returned to the subject of the SUR111it, stating that one could take place •;t the appropriate international atmosphere• develops. The USSR's rhetorical stance has left open the possibility of further Soviet action, however, including the deferral of this year's SUJ11Rit. In considering such a step, the Soviets would have to weigh the prospects_ for progress on bilateral issues, and on anns control in particular, against their concern about losing prestige by proceeding with preparations for a SUlllllit while Washington was pursuing ·actions perceived as challenging to the USSR .. I I 3.5(c) I This memorandum was prepared by l I of the Office of Soviet_ ____3 .5(c) Analysis. Comments are welcome and may be directed to t qe author on f 3.5(c) or to t he Chief , Strategic Policy Division, on \ J 3.5(c) SOV M 86-20042X DECLASSIFIED IN PART 3.5(c) NLRR P~S" SY PJ0 NARA DA~EiMq C06329074 SECRET NOFO~N NOC8NTRACT ORCO~ · ~ ~-----------------'Moscow's po?tponenient of the · 3.3(b)(1) Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting wa.s largely a symbolic expression of support for Libya and a way to save face with the USSR's Arab allies: -- ·A senior Soviet .official in a major West European embassy said to an American official that in his opi~ion, the US action had embarrassed · the USSR before its Arab allies and had left it with no choice but to cancel the meeting.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Impact of the Collapse of the Soviet Union on Libya Foreign Policy
    The impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Libya foreign policy during the period from 1991 to 2003 By Jumah F. Dakheel A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of The Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2014 School of Arts and Humanities I Abstract One of the most notable events in world politics in the second half of the 20th century was the Soviet Union’s fall in December 1991 which profoundly changed the outlook of the global political scene and the balance of power among its key actors. This thesis studies the impacts and significance of the Soviet demise on Libyan foreign policy between 1991 and 2003. Libyan foreign policy was transformed; the thesis asks how, why and when this occurred and how the changes in foreign policy were managed. While so doing, a set of questions are raised concerning the emerging context and developments in world order which seemed to compel Libya to change its behaviour, changing its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. Three major questions are explored in detail in this thesis. The first question relates to how and why Libya aligned with the Soviet Union. The second question addresses how and to what extent these developments in international order appeared to have affected Libya’s foreign policy behaviour. Finally, the third question sheds light on the reasons and attitudes that led to these changes in Libya’s foreign policy orientations. This is also to engage with an important literature on the scope of foreign policy of small states.
    [Show full text]
  • PART 11 the Diamond Anniversary Decade 1981–1990
    UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION 1910–1995 331 PART 11 The Diamond Anniversary Decade 1981–1990 The eighth decade of Naval Aviation was character- Naval Aviation’s involvement in international ized by a buildup of its forces, the rise of world-wide events—major highlights of the 1980s—began with acts of terrorism and Naval Aviation’s involvement in Iran and the continuing hostage crisis, 1979–1981. response to the various crises throughout the world. Libyan operations in 1981, 1986 and 1989 demonstrat- The decade began with American Embassy person- ed Naval Aviation’s air-to-air and strike capabilities. In nel being held as hostages in Iran. As had been the 1983, a carrier and amphibious task force took part in case since the Cold War began, carriers were on sta- Operation Urgent Fury and the re-establishment of tion in response to the crisis. The latter part of the democracy in the Caribbean island of Grenada. 1970s had seen an increase in the number of carrier Operations in and around Lebanon kept Naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. In the 1980s that Aviation occupied during the mid-1980s. Responding trend was increased and strengthened. Undoubtedly, to hijacking and terrorism in the Mediterranean basin this was the result of the ongoing and increasing prob- was an ongoing requirement for most of the 1980s. lems in the Middle East, eastern Africa and the sub- The other hot spot for Naval Aviation was the Persian continent of Asia. Gulf and the Iran-Iraq war. Naval Aviation was During the 1980s, Naval Aviation saw a resurgence involved in numerous periods of short-lived combat in its strength and capabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • FACT SHEET LIBYA IFK Institute for Peace Support 29.08.2017 – 22.10.2017 NO
    FACT SHEET LIBYA IFK Institute for Peace Support 29.08.2017 – 22.10.2017 NO. 02 and Conflict Management LANDESVERTEIDIGUNGSAKADEMIE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT • 08.09: The UN special envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salamé, announced the • 27.09: Italy, which up to now just communicated with the GNA, invited return of UNSMIL to Tripoli and negated former statements that blue hel- Hafar for talks to Rome for the first time. mets will be deployed to Libya. • 30.09: Haftar offered Europe to monitor the southern borders of Libya but • 13.09: The exterior minister of the Arab League asked the UN to unfreeze demanded military equipment in return. libyan assets abroad and make them available to the Presidential Council • 12.10: Great Britain hosted a meeting between the libyan National Oil (PC). Serraj called for the same thing at the UN general assembly. Corporation (NOC), the central bank of Libya, local delegates, the IMF, the • 22. & 26.09: The US air force bombed in coordination with the Government of UN and representatives of the government and oil companies in Windsor. National Accord (GNA) 2 ISIS-positions in the desert southeast of Sirte 3 4 . A 8-point plan was elaborated in order to guarantee the efficient flow of oil This was the first open US military operation in Libya under president Trump. and keep the NOC out of political affairs. DOMESTIC POLITICS • 25.09: Basit Igtet, international businessman and candidate for the (LPA) which include the reduction of PC members from 9 to 3; the sepa- planned presidential elections in 2018 who has closed ties to Qatar and ration of the PC from the government; the cancellation of §8 of the LPA the Muslim brotherhood, held a rally in Tripoli.
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution
    U.S. Naval War College U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons CIWAG Case Studies 1-2013 Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution John Scott-Railton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies Recommended Citation Scott-Railton, John, "IWS_03 - Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution" (2013). CIWAG Irregular Warfare Studies. 3. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case- studies/14 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in CIWAG Case Studies by an authorized administrator of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CIWAG CIWAG IRREGULAR WARFARE STUDIES number 3 CENTER ON IRREGULAR WARFARE AND ARMED GROUPS I RREGULAR W ARFARE S TUDIES Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution number 3 John Scott-Railton U. S. Naval War College COVER Anti-Mubarak protester takes picture in Cairo, February 2011. Photo by Peter Macdiarmind/Getty Images Revolutionary Risks: Cyber Technology and Threats in the 2011 Libyan Revolution Irregular Warfare Studies In 2008 the U.S. Naval War College established the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG). The center’s primary mission is to bring together operators, practitioners, and scholars to share academic expertise, knowledge, and operational experience with violent and nonviolent irregular warfare challenges. We are committed to making this important research available to a wider community of interest and across Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula.
    [Show full text]
  • LIBYA* a GEOPOLITICAL STUDY Di S A© Rt at I on Presented in Partial
    LIBYA* A GEOPOLITICAL STUDY Di s a© rt at i on Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By ABDUL AMIR MA.JEED, A-B-, M-A- The Ohio State University 1952 Approved by: / Adviser A G K N OVVT jBD GEMEHT S This study could not; have been carried out without the assistance of a number of individuals. The patient, time-consuming, and thorough criticism and assistance of my adviser, Professor John R. Randall, during the progress of this study is gratefully acknowledged. The writer is greatly indebted also to Professor Guy-Herald Smith, Chairman of the Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, for his many helpful suggestions and criticisms through out the course of the work. The aid of Professor Sydney M« Fisher of the Department of History, The Ohio State University, is appreciatedo Thanks are due Miss Genevieve Clark who has done the cartographic work. I must express my gratitude to the staffs of Ohio State University Library and the Library of Congress both of whom gave invaluable aid* TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I NTRODUCTION.................................................. 1 PART I HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT I. LIBYA IN HISTORY ............................................ 5 Early Records ..................... 5 Greek Settlements ................... 7 TRe Roman Period ................... 12 The Arab Invasion 14 Period of* Turkish Rule ................ 17 Conclusion ...... ................ 19 II. THE ITALIAN ACQUISITION OF L I B Y A ......................... 22 Italy and Modem Imperialism ............. 22 The Diplomatic Struggle Over Tripoli and Cyrenaica • • 29 Italian-Turkish Relations and The Tripoli War ..... 35 Italian Colonial Policy in Libya .....
    [Show full text]
  • Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941
    Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941 Mike Bechthold Hons BA, MA (Wilfrid Laurier University) This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW@ADFA 2014 PLEASE TYPE THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet Surname or Family name: Bechthold First name: Blain Other name/s: Michael Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD School: UNSW@ADFA Faculty: HASS Title: Raymond Collishaw, the Royal Air Force and the Western Desert Campaign, 1940-1941 Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This dissertation examines the origins of the British system of tactical air support which significantly contributed to the defeat of Germany during the Second World War. Poor relations between the Royal Air Force and Army early in the war hindered the success of operations. The RAF air campaign during Operation Compass demonstrated the fundamental tenets of the formal Allied tactical air doctrine that would emerge later in the war. The central figure was Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw who directed his small force to overwhelm the Italian air force and dislocate enemy logistics to make a substantial contribution to the first major British victory of the war. Collishaw’s career prepared him well for this campaign. Known primarily as a Great War ace, he was also one of the first specialists in close air support during the Hundred Days campaign. After the war he fought campaigns in South Russia and Mesopotamia, served aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Courageous, policed riots in Palestine and deployed to Sudan during the Abyssinian crisis.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legal Guide for Foreigners in Libya January 2020 Disclaimer All Rights Reserved
    ﺍﻟﻔﺮﻳﻖ ﺍﻟﻮﻃﲏ ﻷﻣﻦ ﻭﺇﺩﺍﺭﺓ ﺍﳊﺪﻭﺩ National Team For Border Management And Security The Legal Guide for Foreigners in Libya January 2020 Disclaimer All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission of the copyright owners. The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person activing on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained there. Acknowledgments The International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) wishes to express sincere thanks to all experts, especially those working at the institutions of the National Team for Border Security and Management (NTBSM), in particular the Head of NTBSM, Dr. Abdunasser Segayer, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Public Prosecution, in addition to the independent experts who have worked under the coordination of Mr. Hussein Hassan. With the help, organization and follow-up of ICMPD, experts have joined their efforts within the framework of a series of constructive discussions and an exchange of ideas and information. This teamwork produced the present guide, which is the direct outcome of yet another comprehensive achievement: an analytical review of the legal framework for migration in Libya, in addition to relevant recommendations, all produced by the same group of experts mentioned above.
    [Show full text]
  • Neame's Armoured Division
    THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL THE “LOST” BATTLE OF MERSA EL BREGA LIBYAN DESERT 31 MARCH 1941 Being a thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the University of Hull BY NORMAN KENNETH MURPHY B.A., M.A. NOVEMBER 2011 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is true to say that this thesis would not have been written without the help and support of several individuals and institutions. I should therefore here like to thank those who assisted me in this endeavor. My first thanks must go to my supervisor Dr David Lonsdale. Without whose unstinting advice and encouragement this work could not have been written. His helpful, and often much needed guidance, kept me focused on the task in hand, when I could so easily have gone astray. I must also pay tribute to my friends who have listened tirelessly to my endless references to the events chronicled in the work. Prominent among these are my work colleague and friend Leigh Emerson who listen patiently to rereads of extracts from the work on an almost daily basis for three years. Also in this regard I must thank Phil Kershaw for his practical help and for at least pretending to be interested in the detailed workings of British, as opposed to Italian, tanks. My thanks must also go to the staff of several institutions. First among these are the staff of Scarborough Library who always went the extra mile to search out some obscure book for me. Likewise gratitude must go to the staff at the Liddell-Centre, Imperial War Museum, and Public Records Office who were all equally helpful.
    [Show full text]
  • General People's Committee Decree No. (247) of 1989 on The
    General People’s Committee Decree No. (247) of 1989 on the executive regulation of Law No. (6) of 1987 on organising the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners in Libya The General People’s Committee Upon review of: Law No. (6) of 1987 on organising the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners in Libya; General People’s Committee Decree No. (481) of 1986 on setting visa fees; The proposal of the director of the General Department of Passports and Nationality in letter of 24 Jumada al-Akhera 1398 FDP corresponding to 31/01/1989 AD; has decreed: Chapter (1) Determining Entry and Exit Points Pursuant to Article (1) of General People’s Committee Decree No. (89) of 1997 on adding two ports of entry into the Great Jamahiriya and exit therefrom: Article (1) Entry or exit from Libyan Arab territory shall be through the following ports: 1. Land ports: a. Ras Ajdir, Musaid, Ghadames, Isin, Ghat, Al Wigh, Qatrun, Al-Owainat, Kufra, Wazzin, Abu Mazid in Wadi Mardi, Al Sara in Baqarat Al Saniyah (Sabtah). 2. Civilian airports: a. Tripoli International Airport, Benina International Airport, Sabha International Airport. 3. Sea ports: a. Port of Tripoli, Port of Benghazi, Qasr Ahmad Port in Misurata, Port of Tobruk, Port of Derna, Port of Zuwara, Port of Khoms. 4. Oil ports: a. Ra’s Lanuf Oil Port, Zuwetina Oil Port, Brega Oil Port, Hariga Oil Port, Sidra Oil Port. Article (2) New points of entry and exit from Libyan territory may be established and determined by virtue of decrees issued by the General People’s Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • Serious Problems for Libyan Rebels the Latest Report
    UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05785853 Date: 01/07/2016 RELEASE IN PART B6 From: H <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, March 9, 2011 7:55 AM To: Huma Abedin Subject: Fw: H: serious trouble for Libyan rebels. Sid Attachments: hrc memo serious problems libyan rebels 030911.docx Can you print for me w/o any identifiers? From: sbwhoeop Sent: Wednesday, March 09, 2011 07:06 AM To: H Subject: H: serious trouble for LIbyan rebels. Sid CONFIDENTIAL March 9, 2011 For: Hillary From: Sid Re: Serious problems for Libyan rebels The latest report: (Source Comment: Private individuals in Europe, with ties to the leadership of the National Libyan Council (NLC), plan to urge the NLC military committee to consider hiring private troops (mercenaries) to support, organize, and train the rebel forces in Libya. These individuals believe that NATO and the Western allies will not make a decision to aid the rebels until they are faced with a humanitarian disaster, and that the revolution is in danger. At the same time, these individuals believe a small number of private troops could turn the battle against Qaddafi's forces, particularly if they are equipped with sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons. These individuals also believe that experienced troops will have little trouble shooting down Libyan aircraft and attack helicopters. In the opinion of these sources, this would have a devastating psychological affect on Qaddafi's troops.) During the afternoon of March 8, individuals with access to Saif al Islam Qaddafi stated in confidence that Muammar al Qaddafi is increasingly confident that his troops can drive back rebel forces attempting to advance on Tripoli from Benghazi.
    [Show full text]
  • The Italian Army in Egypt During World War II
    280 The Italian Army in Egypt during World War II Edmund Hall (ESC 239) I had intended to begin by saying that the Italians were nearly always portrayed unfairly as having a very poor fighting reputation; but nearly all the works I have consulted indicate that this was not the case. This unfair judgment, written mainly from the Allied side during the war, survived in a lot of postwar literature and is unfair to the individual Italian soldiers who in many cases fought bravely when given the chance to do so. In the imagination of the British Army and the Allied press it was the Italian soldier who was lacking in military skill and fighting spirit. Once this reputation for military ineptitude had gained ground after the crushing defeats in 1940 from Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm, it was perpetuated by the British as a propaganda tool. Most of the accounts of Axis forces in the campaigns in North Africa concentrate on the German military, sometimes to the extent that one could imagine that they consisted only of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) commanded by Rommel. This over-simplistic view is wrong on several accounts.Although Rommel was without doubt the most important person for the Axis forces he at times had more Italian troops and tanks under his command than German, while some of his victories were due to the efforts of the Italian tank divisions. Remember also that the DAK, after the initial stages, was only one part of the total German forces in North Africa. This article however is concerned only with the Italian Army (Regio Esercito), those sections of it that were in Egypt, the postmarks used by them.
    [Show full text]
  • A Reassessment of the Tank Battle Between 4Th Armoured Brigade and Panzerregiment 5 During Operation Crusader in North Africa on 19 November 1941
    Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 49, Nr 1, 2021. doi: 10.5787/49-1-1319 A reassessment of the tank battle between 4th Armoured Brigade and Panzerregiment 5 during Operation Crusader in North Africa on 19 November 1941 Andreas Biermann354 SOAS University of London Abstract Operation Crusader took place in the wide context of an integrated, multi-service theatre-level offensive operation in the Western Desert and the Mediterranean from October 1941 through to January 1942. Seen through this lens, Operation Crusader was simply the Army and the Royal Air Force component of a multi-service theatre-level offensive conducted by Allied forces. The operation ended with an almost complete defeat of the Axis troops, the lifting of the seven-month siege of Tobruk and the retreat of the surviving Axis forces to a position on the border of the colonial provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in central Libya. Operation Crusader was the first army-level offensive undertaken by the Allied forces in World War II, lasting from 17 November 1941 to 15 January 1942.355 The aim of Operation Crusader was to trigger a large-scale tank battle with Axis tank forces outside the besieged desert port of Tobruk in Libya, to destroy the Axis armoured forces, and to pave the way to lift the siege of Tobruk, which had been conducted by the Axis forces since April 1941. Operation Crusader was the first step in a set of three operations expected to lead to the clearing of the North African coast from Axis forces and subsequently allow an invasion of Sicily in 1942.
    [Show full text]