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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)

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Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) personality profi le 88 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) by Ng Yi Ming INTRODUCTION and were frustrated with Chiang’s policy of appeasement towards the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek Japanese.5 (30 October 1887 to 5 April 1975) was a Chinese statesman, Director- Although warlords Zhang General of the Chinese Nationalist Xueliang of Manchuria and Yang Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), and Hucheng of Shaanxi province had served as President of the Republic been ordered by Chiang to suppress of China (ROC) from 1948 to his the communists in Xi’an, Zhang 1 death in 1975. This article will instead attempted to form an anti- relate Generalissimo Chiang’s Japanese coalition with the CCP.6 policies and actions as the leader Chiang was taken prisoner when of the KMT and China during the he fl ew to Xi’an to investigate the Second Sino-Japanese War. activities of the warlords and was released only when he agreed to a XI’AN INCIDENT AND SECOND ceasefi re with the CCP and set up a UNITED FRONT United Front against the Japanese. Through technically not part of the Second Sino-Japanese War, MARCO POLO BRIDGE the Xi’an Incident of 1936 played INCIDENT – WAR BREAKS OUT an important part in establishing The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a truce that united both the KMT also known as the Lukouchiao and the Chinese Communist Party Incident,7 marked the outbreak of (CCP) against increasing Japanese the Second Sino-Japanese War. The aggression in northern China relatively minor skirmish between throughout the early 1930s. Japanese and Chinese soldiers 8 Despite the threat posed by quickly escalated to full scale war. Japan, Chiang had decided to After capturing Peiping (Beijing) focus on defeating the CCP fi rst,2 and Tianjin, the Japanese set their creating discontent among the sights on Shanghai. Chiang decided Chinese populace.3 He claimed that to take a stand during the Battle the Japanese “were a disease of the Of Shanghai (August 1937), as he skin” and the communists “were a believed that this would trigger disease of the heart.”4 On the other foreign intervention to expel the hand, CCP rhetoric that “Chinese invaders.9 The battle destroyed don’t fi ght Chinese” won over most of the elite KMT forces, built many supporters who advocated up with German assistance over the active resistance against Japan past decade.10 However, foreign aid POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL. 38 NO. 1 088-090_Personality Profile Chiang Kai-Shek.indd 88 4/17/12 2:38 PM personality profi le 89 Dawei to oversee the evacuation resulted in the execution of three of industrial technology, books, public offi cials and the sacking gold and other items to Chungking of the governor.18 Ironically, the in Sichuan province and set up his Japanese were forced to halt well military headquarters in the city of short of the burning city due to Wuhan in 1938.13 He promulgated logistical problems.19 Furthermore, the strategy of “trading space for the defenders of the city were able time,” which was to delay and to repel three Japanese assaults exhaust the Japanese through between 1937 to 1944, only numerous engagements, allowing succumbing in August 1944.20 China time to recover and regain the initiative.14 After the fall of Wuhan, the ROC government moved to In June 1938, in order to delay Chungking and the city served as http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shanghai1937KMT_chiang_kai_shek.jpg the Japanese advance onwards to its wartime capital from 1939 until Chiang Kai Shek, leader of wartime Wuhan via Zhengzhou, a plan to the Japanese surrender in 1945. China destroy the dikes of the Yellow River The wartime ROC government thus largely did not materialize: only the near Zhengzhou was proposed. became known as the Chungking Union of Soviet Socialist Republics It was hoped that the Japanese government. (USSR) provided assistance to the would be deterred from invading Chinese. Stalin did not want the through northern China by the AMERICAN AID TO CHUNGKING Japanese government to conclude resulting fl oods. Though conscious With the Japanese attack that the USSR was a military ally of of the fact that there would be on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii in the ROC, and thus stopped short of many casualties and refugees, December 1941, America joined providing overt military aid. Chiang nevertheless ordered the the war on the side of the Allies. proposal to proceed; deciding that The Americans promised aid to As a result of the Second the strategic benefi ts outweighed Chungking in the form of loans United Front, the CCP reorganised the costs. The waters ravaged and matériel, although this themselves as part of the National numerous provinces and there were was extremely limited since the Revolutionary Army (NRA) and were almost a million casualties as a Japanese had occupied most of assigned to the Eighth Route Army result.15 Despite the tremendous China’s ports and land routes 11 and the New Fourth Army. These sacrifi ce, the Japanese were able to Xinjiang from Soviet Central two units initially assisted KMT to detour around the fl oods and Asia were too remote.21 The fall units in engagements such as the captured Wuhan just a few months of British Burma in 1942 cut the Battle of P’ingsing Pass, nominally later in October 1938.16 only other land route into China under the command of Yen Hsi- and Chungking could only receive 12 shan. After his defeat, both units Following the capture of Wuhan, supplies fl own in over the Himalayas focused on guerilla warfare against the fall of Changsha, capital of from Assam, northeastern India, to the Japanese primarly in northern Hunan province, seemed imminent Yunnan province.22 China till the surrender of the as the governor of Hunan, Zhang Japanese in 1945. Zhizhong, was told that “Japanese American aid also came with a cavalry were within twenty miles” price; General Joseph W. Stilwell CHUNGKING GOVERNMENT – of the city.17 This report probably was appointed the Chief of Staff TRADING SPACE FOR TIME contributed to the decision to of Chiang’s China Theatre, but After the fall of Shanghai set the whole city ablaze to deny also as “commander of American and the subsequent “Rape Of its resources to the invaders. The forces in the China-Burma-India Nanking,” Chiang ordered Yu offi cial investigation by Chiang theatres and supervisor of Lend- POINTER, JOURNAL OF THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES VOL. 38 NO. 1 088-090_Personality Profile Chiang Kai-Shek.indd 89 4/17/12 2:38 PM personality profi le 90 Lease matériel” in 1942.23 He spoke CONCLUSION 6. Commire, Historic World Leaders, 94 fl uent Mandarin and was one of The Second Sino-Japanese War 7. Chinese Ministry Of Information, the United States (US) Army’s China Handbook: 1937-1945: A had profound consequences for China Experts, having served as a Comprehensive Survey of Major Chiang; it exposed the inadequacies Military Attaché in the US Embassy Developments In China In Eight of the KMT government and Years Of War (New York: Macmillan 24 to the ROC from 1935 to 1939. He drove disaffected peasants and Company, 1947), 299.. was known as “Vinegar Joe,” for his intellectuals into the CCP camp. 8. Commire, Historic World Leaders, 94 caustic remarks and prided himself The cost of eight years of war with on giving “untarnished opinions.”25 9. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang the Japanese reversed most of the Kai-Shek And The Struggle For Modern This proved problematic for Chiang gains made by the KMT during the China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: later on during the war. Nanking Decade (1928-1937). His Belknap Press Of Harvard University policies and decisions must be Press, 2009), 148. Initially, the relationship viewed in light of the desperate 10. Ibid., 150. between the two men was circumstances at the time, as 11. Wu T’ien-wei, “The Chinese rather cordial; Chiang was in Chinese cities fell one after another Communist Movement,” in China’s fact optimistic about the whole to the Japanese. Bitter Victory: The War With Japan arrangement and actually pushed 1937-1945, eds. James C. Hsiung to let Stilwell have supreme The benefi ts, however, were that and Steven I. Levine (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 80. command over both British and China obtained great power status Chinese troops in Burma. Chiang by earning a seat with the great 12. Ibid., 83. lost faith in Stilwell’s abilities powers of the era such as Britain 13. Taylor, The Generalissimo, 152. due to the bungled First Burma and the US. Chiang’s international 14. Ch’i Hsi-Sheng, Nationalist China At Campaign in May 1942, which prestige rose during and after the War: Military Defeats And Political resulted in a general retreat of war and he was recognised as the Collapse, 1937-45 (Ann Arbor, the Allies to Assam and Yunnan.26 legitimate ruler of China until the Michigan: University Of Michigan Press, 1982), 54. Stilwell’s obstinate insistence US withdrew recognition of the ROC on carrying out his own plans in 1979. ß 15. Taylor, The Generalissimo, 154-155. led to a deterioration of the 16. Ch’i, Nationalist China At War, 50. relationship between the two 17. Taylor, The Generalissimo, 159. men.27 Chiang’s brother-in-law T.V. ENDNOTES 18. Ibid., 160. Soong unsuccessfully attempted to 1. Anne Commire, ed., Historic World relieve Stilwell of hid duties from 19. Ibid. Leaders, Vol. 1 (Detroit: Gale command in September 1943.28 20. Ch’i, Nationalist China At War, 77.
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