International Political Economy
Semester: Spring 2016 Program: International Master’s Program in International Studies (IMPIS) Time: Tuesday, 9:10AM~12:00PM Classroom: TBA Number of Credits: 3 Course Type: Core course, required
Instructor: Chienwu (Alex) Hsueh 薛健吾 Email: [email protected] Office Hour: Tuesday 2:00~4:00PM, by appointment, or walk-in welcome
Course Objectives
International Political Economy (IPE) studies the political battle between the winners and losers of global economic exchange, addressing how political factors affect economic outcomes and how economic factors influence political outcomes at both the domestic and the international levels of analysis. Two abstract and considerably broader questions typically shape IPE scholarship. First, how exactly does politics shape the decisions that societies make about how to use the resources that are available to them? Second, what are the consequences of these decisions? Therefore, the mainstream IPE examines the interaction between “societal interests” and “political institutions” in order to understand how economic and political policies are ultimately made and how these policies may further shape the welfare of both the society and the state.
This course is composed of two parts. The first part provides introduction to the basic background knowledge, which contains the scientific research method and the
1 traditional schools of IPE. The second part introduces important topics of the contemporary IPE research, which includes international cooperation, international trade system, international monetary system, international financial system, international integration, economic coercion, and globalization. Students are expected to learn to know how to use the IPE theories and analytical frameworks to analyze (describe, explain, and forecast) the important developments shaping the contemporary world.
Course Description
The course will proceed as follows. The instructor will do the lecture for the first three weeks. Then, since the fourth week, there will be weekly exams in the beginning of each week’s class from 9:10AM to 9:40AM. The questions in the weekly exams will cover the reading assignments of that week as well as students’ presentation in the previous week. There will be about 10 weekly exams and I will count your best 8 to calculate your final score. Students will be grouped into four groups and each group take turns to present the material the instructor assigned during the second hour of each week’s class. The instructor will lead the discussion based on the weekly reading assignments in the second and the third hour. The instructor will require students who do not do well in the weekly exams to take the final exam to pass this class.
Course Requirements
1. Weekly Exams: 80%
2. Class Participation: 20%
3. Final Exam: For those who do not do well in the weekly exams or who want to pursue a higher final score.
Note:
1. Students who are enrolled in the class but do not show up in the first week are not allowed to take this class.
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2. Students who are absent for more than three weeks are failed automatically with no exceptions, despite any reason. You do not have to ask for leave in advance if you plan to be absent.
3. The instructor can and is more than happy to fail students who are not hard- working in their studies.
4. The instructor will ask students who come to class late to sing a song at the beginning of next week’s class as punishment. If you are frequently tardy, you will have to sing a song in a second language.
5. This class requires you to do lots of readings, so please do not enroll in this class if you do not plan to spend your valuable time on the readings.
6. To make sure the classes will be productive for everyone, please do not enroll in this class if you do not agree to any of the previous rules and requirements.
Supplementary Materials
Recommended Books (Not required to buy)
Robert Gilpin. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Joseph M. Grieco and G. John Ikenberry. 2003. State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and J. Lawrence Broz, eds. 2009. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, 5th edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Thomas Oatley. 2012. International Political Economy, 5th edition. New York. NY: Routledge.
John Ravenhill, ed. 2014. Global Political Economy, 4th edition. New York. NY: Oxford University Press.
Thomas L. Friedman. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
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Thomas L. Friedman. 2007. The World Is Flat 3.0: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Satyajit Das. 2016. The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth is Unattainable and the Global Economy is in Peril. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Recommended Journals (you can download the articles for free through NCCU’s ip address)
International Organization
Review of International Political Economy
Review of International Organizations
World Politics
New Political Economy
Journal of Political Economy
The Journal of Economic History
Journal of International Economics
International Studies Quarterly
International Studies Review
Comparative Political Studies
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Peace Research
Conflict Management and Peace Science
International Interactions
International Security
Security Studies
Defense and Peace Economics
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American Political Science Review
American Review of Political Science
Annual Review of Political Science
Foreign Policy
Foreign Affairs
International Affairs
The Economist http://www.economist.com/
The International Interest http://intlinterest.com/
The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/
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Class Schedule
(The class schedule is subject to change according to students’ performance and interest or the instructor’s schedule.)
Part I: Basic Background Knowledge
Week 1: (2/21) Introduction
Week 2: (2/28) National Holiday — No class
Week 3: (3/7) Scientific Research Method
Week 4: (3/14) What Makes the World “Tick”
Part II: Important IPE Topics
Week 5: (3/21) Is Hegemony Important or Not in International Cooperation?
Week 6: (3/28) Why Is International Regime Important? Complying and Pathology
Week 7: (4/4) National Holiday — No class
Week 8: (4/11) What are the Determinants of States’ Trade Policy? (Part I)
Week 9: (4/18) Midterm Exam Week (for Flexible Use)
Week 10: (4/25) What are the Determinants of States’ Trade Policy? (Part II)
Week 11: (5/2) What are the Determinants of Regional Integration?
Week 12: (5/9) What are the Determinants of States’ Monetary Policy?
Week 13: (5/16) How Do Major Powers Win the Wars against Other Major Powers?
Week 14: (5/23) Is Economic Coercion a Useful Tool?
Week 15: (5/30) National Holiday — No class
Week 16: (6/6) What is Globalization?
Week 17: (6/13) Why are There Contentment and Discontentment with Globalization?
Week 18: (6/20) Final Exam Week
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Part I: Basic Background Knowledge
Week 1: (2/21) Introduction
(No classwork.)
Week 2: (2/28) National Holiday — No Class
(No classwork.)
Week 3: (3/7) Scientific Research Method
Topic: Scientific Research Method
Papers for Discussion: None
Recommended papers:
William H. Riker, “The Future of a Science of Politics,” American Behavioral Scientist 21, no. 1 (September 1, 1977): 11–38.
Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 645–85.
Jeffrey Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company), pp: 118-146.
David A. Lake, “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” Review of International Organizations 4, no. 3 (September, 2009): 219-244.
Thomas Oatley, “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy,” International Organization 65, no. 2 (Spring, 2011): 311-341.
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Week 4: (3/14) What Makes the World “Tick”
Topic: Internationalization and Domestic Politics
Papers for Discussion:
Robert Gilpin, “Three Models of the Future,” International Organization 29, no. 1 (1975): 37–60.
Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States,” International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976): 1–45.
Peter Alexis Gourevitch, “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8, no. 2 (1977): 281–313.
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32, no. 4 (October 1, 1978): 881–912.
Part II: Important IPE Topics
Week 5: (3/21) Is Hegemony Important or Not in International Cooperation?
Topic: Public Goods and the Evolution of the World Trade System
Papers for Discussion:
Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–47.
[Book] Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984; 2005). Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6.
Scott C. James and David A. Lake, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43, no. 01 (December 1989): 1–29.
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Week 6: (3/28) Why Is International Regime Important? Complying and Pathology
Topic: Why States Cooperate to Supply Global Public Goods
Papers for Discussion:
Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 1–24.
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (December 1, 1994): 5–49.
Ronald B. Mitchell, “Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,” International Organization 48, no. 3 (July 1, 1994): 425–58.
Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations,” International Organization 53, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 699–732.
Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform,” International Organization 57, no. 02 (March 2003): 241–76.
Xinyuan Dai, “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 363–98.
David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, “Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence,” International Organization 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 703–33.
Week 7: (4/4) National Holiday — No Class
(No classwork.)
Week 8: (4/11) Why Are the Determinants of States’ Trade Policy? (Part I)
Topic: A Society-Centered Approach to Trade Politics
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Papers for Discussion:
David R. Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978): 1243–61.
John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (April 1, 1982): 379–415.
Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Why State Subsidies? Evidence from European Community Countries, 1981-1986,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1, 1997): 341–54.
Dani Rodrik, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 5 (1998): 997–1032.
Michael J. Hiscox, “Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade,” International Organization 55, no. 1 (2001): 1–46.
Andy Baker, “Why Is Trade Reform So Popular in Latin America?: A Consumption- Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences,” World Politics 55, no. 3 (April 2003): 423– 455.
Jude C. Hays, Sean D. Ehrlich, and Clint Peinhardt, “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 473–94.
Sean D. Ehrlich, “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies,” International Organization 61, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 571–605.
Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga, “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade,” International Organization 63, no. 3 (July 1, 2009): 491–531.
Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg, “How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?” International Organization 66, no. 02 (April 2012): 311–28.
Robert Urbatsch, “A Referendum on Trade Theory: Voting on Free Trade in Costa Rica,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 197–214
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Week 9: (4/18) Midterm Exam Week (for Flexible Use)
Week 10: (4/25) What are the Determinants of States’ Trade Policy? (Part II)
Topic: A State-Centered Approach to Trade Politics
Papers for Discussion:
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 427–60.
Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin, “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 603–32.
Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 107–43.
Daniel Yuichi Kono, “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.” American Political Science Review 100(3) (August 2006): 369–84.
Wen-Chin Wu, “When Do Dictators Decide to Liberalize Trade Regimes? Inequality and Trade Openness in Authoritarian Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 4 (December 1, 2015): 790–801.
Week 11: (5/2) What Are the Determinants of Regional Integration?
Topic: The History of the European Union and the Brexit
Papers for Discussion:
HeeMin Kim and Dale L. Smith, “Blocs or Rounds? An Analysis of Two Approaches to Trade Liberalization,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 3 (1997): 427–49.
Anne O. Krueger, “Are Preferential Trading Arrangements Trade-Liberalizing or Protectionist?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, no. 4 (1999): 105–24.
Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,” 11
International Organization 53, no. 3 (July 1, 1999): 589–627.
Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt, “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements,” International Organization 57, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 829–62.
[Book] Finn Laursen, ed. 2010. Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2010). Chapter 1 and Chapter 13.
[Book] Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012). Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Week 12: (5/9) Is Resource A Curse?
Topic: A Society-Centered Approach to Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
Papers for Discussion:
Patrick J. McDonald, “The Purse Strings of Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 569–82.
Michael L. Ross, “Oil, Islam, and Women,” The American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (2008): 107–23.
Jeff D. Colgan, “Oil, Domestic Conflict, and Opportunities for Democratization,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 3–16.
Week 13: (5/16) How Do Major Powers Win the Wars against Other Major Powers?
Topic: A State-Centered Approach to Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policies
Papers for Discussion:
Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 04 (December 1989): 803–32.
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Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, “Institutions, Reforms, and Country Risk: Lessons from Japanese Government Debt in the Meiji Era,” The Journal of Economic History 60, no. 02 (June 2000): 442–67.
David Stasavage, “Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2002): 155–86.
Quan Li, “Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 8 (August 1, 2009): 1098–1127.
Week 14: (5/23) Is Economic Coercion a Useful Tool?
Topic: Various Economic Coercion Tools
Papers for Discussion:
R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1988): 461–83
Robert Mark Spaulding, “German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage,” International Organization 45, no. 3 (July 1, 1991): 343–68.
[Book] Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Chapter 1.
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 643–59.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, “Power or Plenty: How Do International Trade Institutions Affect Economic Sanctions?” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 213–42.
Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 7–45.
Chi-hung Wei, “China’s Economic Offensive and Taiwan’s Defensive Measures: Cross-Strait Fruit Trade, 2005–2008,” The China Quarterly 215 (September 2013): 641–
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62.
Week 15: (6/6) National Holiday — No Class
(No classwork.)
Week 16: (6/6) What is Globalization?
Topic: The Formation of the 1998 and the 2008 Financial Crises
Papers for Discussion:
Geoffrey Garrett, “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization 52, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 787–824.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization: What’s New? What’s Not? (And So What?),” Foreign Policy, no. 118 (2000): 104–19.
Daniel W. Drezner, “Globalization and Policy Convergence,” International Studies Review 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 53–78.
Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Foreign Policy, no. 134 (2003): 28–37.
Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,” International Organization 60, no. 4 (2006): 781– 810.
Axel Dreher, “Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a New Index of Globalization,” Applied Economics 38, no. 10 (June 10, 2006): 1091–1110.
Week 17: (6/13) Why are There Contentment and Discontentment with Globalization?
Topic: Governance on Global Warming
Papers for Discussion (pick up to five):
Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World ‘Presidential 14
Address’, ‘American Political Science Association, 2000,’” The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 1–13.
Helen V. Milner, “Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives,” Perspectives on Politics null, no. 04 (December 2005): 833–54.
Erik Wibbels, “Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World,” International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 433–68.
Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne Sandholtz, “Women and Globalization: A Study of 180 Countries, 1975–2000,” International Organization 60, no. 02 (April 2006): 293–333.
Dani Rodrik, “How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders?” The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 1, no. 2 (Fall, 2007): 1–33.
Lloyd Gruber, “Globalisation with Growth and Equity: Can We Really Have It All?” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 4 (May 1, 2011): 629–52.
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” An IIGG Working Paper, Council on Foreign Relations Press (2012).
Week 18: (6/20) Final Exam
(No classwork.)
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