Sudan

Jean-Nicolas Bach and Clément Deshayes

Sudanese internal politics remained tense, both within the regime and in its rela- tions with many sectors of society. Within the regime, President Omar al-Bashir announced the formation of a new government emerging from the ‘National Dia- logue’. But the composition of and participants in this Government of National Accord (or Consensus) were far from representing a solid basis for peaceful political competition. Tensions also remained very high within many segments of society, particularly student movements and (armed) groups in peripheral regions. Hun- dreds of political prisoners remained in jail. Tensions reached their peak in Darfur in May, when a joint attack was launched by rebel groups based in Libya (SLA/Minni Minawi) and South (SLA/Transi- tion Council). They were repelled but the attack sent a message to the international community that the Darfur war was not over. An end to the war was one of the preconditions raised by the US in 2016–17 for lifting its sanctions on Sudan, imposed back in 1997. The negotiations during the year and the eventual lifting of the sanc- tions in October made 2017 a very important year. Sudan had a broader policy aimed at normalising Khartoum’s foreign relations. Thus, al-Bashir’s regime remained an important partner with the EU regarding migration policies (it hosted a thematic

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:��.��63/9789004367630_041 378 Bach and deshayes meeting of the Khartoum Process) and skilfully managed to remain neutral towards the Gulf crisis, in which Saudi Arabia and the UAE opposed Qatar. The socioeconomic situation remained very precarious. High inflation and repeated shortages of basic needs fuelled social contestation in the capital and the regions. The state budget remained unbalanced and biased towards the security apparatus at the expense of social services and education. A widespread and acute watery diarrhoea epidemic probably killed some 1,000 people across the country.

Domestic Politics

After a very tense end of 2016 marked by strong social conflicts, 2017 started with the last jolts of the general strike of November and December 2016. Several political leaders and activists were arrested at the beginning of January, while those arrested in November-December 2016 remained in jail. The political atmosphere eased fol- lowing two events that occurred at the end of January: the release of some of the political detainees and the return to Sudan, on 25 January, of Sadiq al- – former prime minister of the elected government overthrown by the 1989 coup. He led one of the most prominent opposition parties, the National Umma Party. His return put an end to a period of political exile that had started in August 2014, after a one-month detention by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). The return of al-Mahdi came after the cessation of hostilities between the regime and the armed movements – some of them allied with the National Umma Party within the broader Sudan Call. Following the conclusion of the National Dialogue process during the autumn of 2016, President Omar al-Bashir dissolved the Sudanese government on 3 March and appointed Lieutenant General Bakri Hassan Saleh as prime minister, the first prime minister of Sudan since the abolition of the position after the 1989 coup, in which he had been deeply involved. Bakri had previously been first vice presi- dent of the Republic and a member of al-Bashir’s inner circle. The government of National Accord (or National Consensus) was announced during May. But it was quite a disappointment for the political actors involved in the National Dialogue. The extensive government of 31 ministers and more than 40 secretaries of state was very similar to the previous one, with the exception of the inclusion of the Popu- lar Congress Party (PCP), which had been in opposition since it had its separation from the National Congress Party (NCP) in the late 1990s. Key positions were still held by NCP politicians and many other positions were distributed as a ‘reward’ for the groups who had agreed to participate in the National Dialogue. In addition, 65 parliamentary seats were created specifically for participants in the National Dialogue. Most of the opposition had, however, boycotted the National Dialogue and were very critical of the new government. Even voices of NCP allies showed