Corrupt Bargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams
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THE "CORRUPT BARGAIN" CHARGE AGAINST CLAY AND ADAMS: AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS BY WILLIAM G. MORGAN Oral Roberts University Tulsa, Oklahoma The election of 1824 provided a substantial portion of the ground- work for the notable political changes which emerged from the some- what misnamed "Era of Good Feelings," while at the same time involv- ing several unusual political phenomena. A cardinal feature of this electoral struggle was the large number of prominent candidates. Early in the contest the serious contenders totaled as many as "16 or 17," in- cluding William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury; John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State; Henry Clay, long-time Speaker of the House; John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War; Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy; Vice-President Daniel D. Tompkins; Governor DeWitt Clinton of New York; Representative William Lowndes of South Carolina; and a comparative latecomer to politics, General Andrew Jackson] As the campaign progressed, several of these men dropped from conten- tion: Lowndes died in 1822, while Thompson, Tompkins, and Clinton fell from the ranks for lack of support, though there was mention of the latter's possible candidacy late in 1823.2 Calhoun subsequently withdrew from the race, deciding to delay his bid for the presidency to accept the second office.8 Of the prominent contenders remaining in the contest, Crawford was the administration favorite, and his position as Treasury Secretary had enabled him to build a significant following in various circles.4 Despite these advantages, Crawford's success proved illusory: among other difficulties, the Georgian suffered a severe stroke in the summer of 1823 and was the victim of the growing antagonism toward the caucus, the very insti- nation on which he was relying to bring him broad party support.5 Adams, Clay, and Jackson fought actively to secure an electoral majority or, failing that, to gain sufficient votes to be included in the top three who would be presented to the House of Representatives for the final decision. Adams did well, as expected, and Jackson finished strongly enough to draw much support from Clay in the West.° Whether the last man of the trio would be Crawford or Clay was unknown for some time. The collapse of Clay's hopes in New York and an electoral fluke in Louisiana enabled Crawford to nose out the Kentuckian.; The 132 1968] •Corrupt Bargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams 133 role of Henry Clay was thus changed from candidate m bystander--a bystander, however, whose position as Speaker of the House would make him extremely influential in selecting the victor,s Clay's standing with the friends of the candidates reached a new high--at least on the surface. He was badgered by attempts to secure his support, and various spoils were mentioned if the appropriate ar- rangements should be made. The "jockeying" for position was phe- nomenal, though perhaps only to be expected in such circumstances. In short, the Kentuckian was welcomed by a multitude of pleadin§ voices when he returned to Washington for the convening of Congress. Clay faced an obviously important decision, but his choice to support Adams appears to have been almost inevitable. Crawford was elimi- nated for a variety of reasons, notably his precarious health. 1° Much ill feeling, moreover, had passed between Clay and Jackson, and the Speaker was also strongly against seeing a military man occupy the White House. 1• A factor which both commended and condemned Old Hickory was that he represented the rising aspirations of the Trans- Allegheny region. As a fellow Westerner, Jackson might have ap- pealed, at least slightly, to the Speaker's sectional pride but certainly not to his self interest: the Hero was an obvious rival for support in the expanding West. Adams seems to have been the best choice--by a process of elimina- tion, if for no other reason. Though bad will between Clay and the Secretary of State went back as far as the Anglo-American treaty nego- tiations at Ghent, their disagreements could be reconciled more easily than those between Clay and Jackson.12 In addition, the domestic and foreign policies of Adams and Clay were similar; both believed in in- ternal improvements and a protective tariff and had similar views toward the new Latin American republics.13 Doubtless the Speaker also believed that his chances to follow a New Englander were greater than if he attempted to succeed a fellow Westerner. What- ever his reasons, Clay appears to have made an early decision to support Adams,•4 and, despite the Kentucky legislature's instructions to the con- gressional delegation to vote for Jackson, he remained true to this determination--though selecting Adams with the dubious distinction of being a "choice of evils.''15 One could scarcely expect Harry of the West to preside with unmixed feelings over the choosing of another man for the office he so ardently desired. A sensation was produced in the House of Representatives in Janu- ary of 1825 by the report that Clay would back Adams; a commotion was natural since the decision had been a guarded secret. TM Shortly after Clay's choice was made public, an anonymous letter accusing the Speaker and the Secretary of State of a bargain appeared in a Phila- 134 The Filson Club Histor• Quarterly [VoL 42 delphia newspaper, the Columbian Observer.1• Clay vigorously denied the charge and demanded that the author identify himself. Represen- tative George Kremer of Pennsylvania acknowledged that the letter was his and indicated his desire and ability to substantiate his position before the House investigatory committee requested by Clay. But when the time for such action arrived, Kremer declined to testify. TM Despite the unsavory allegations, the Kentuckian maintained his de- cision and cast his influence toward Adams, who won in the House on the first ballot. After considerable thought and consultation, Clay ac- cepted the President-elect's offer of the State Department. His decision brought forth more cries of "corruption and sale" from many Jackson supporters, and Old Hickory himself referred to Clay as "the ludas of the West.''•9 One of Clay's friends warned him that because of his support of Adams "a thousand desperadoes, political and military . would think it a most honorable service to foster a quarrel upon and shoot you." He went on to indicate that Clay would have been con- demned no matter which candidate he chose to support: "You prefer Mr. Adams... and for that you are calumniated and so it would have been had you announced your preference for either of the other com- petitors.''2° Some disappointed partisans were arrested in Pittsburgh because of a riot committed in burning the Kentuckian's effigy.2. Such activity was prophetic: Clay and Adams never escaped the charge, and it was one of the Jacksonians' most effective weapons in their victory over Adams in the election of 1828, despite James Buchanan's refusal to corroborate Old Hickory's belief that he was Clay's agent in an at- tempt to bargain with Jackson himself,m Though many totally rejected the idea, Jackson always considered the accusation to be true, as did others. Some, no doubt, were less con- vinced of the truth of the "corrupt bargain" charge than of its utility as a political weapon. Used with great facility in 1828, the allegation provided an obstacle to Clay whenever his presidential fever grew par- ticularly acute.28 In any event, the question is highly controversial, and historians have not always concurred on the point. The purpose of this article is to examine how non-biographical studies present the subject.24 Writers of the multi-volume works have generally dismissed the charges as false; their similar conclusions are often based on rather different sources, however. Hermann Edward yon Hoist is among those commentators to whom political development meant a great deal. In his eight-volume work, The Constitutional and Political History o[ the United States, Clay's conduct throughout the entire election period is staunchly defended. To Von Hoist, the Speaker is exonerated by sev- eral proofs: George Kremer's refusal to'testify before the House investi- 1968] • "CorruptBargain" Charge Against Clay and Adams 135 gating committee after having identified himself as the author of the letter to the Columbian Observer, T. H. Benton's public statement that an early decision had been made to support Adams, and a letter from James Buchanan which refused to corroborate Jackson's insistence that he was the agent of Clay who offered Old Hickory a bargain.2• "Con Hoist admits, however, that the Speaker's position of influence in the House enabled the Jackson forces to use the "libelous charges" with effectiveness. Despite the evidence indicating no corruption, the "base lie remained a great impediment in the way of... Clay .... The accusation was . entirely baseless." The author concludes by ex- pertly refuting the Jacksonians' claim that their chief deserved to win because of his popular and electoral plurality. If such were the case, he suggests, there would scarcely be need of a House election.26 In his multi-volume history, Edward Channing suggests that coopera- tion between Jackson and Clay was virtually out of the question: the Speaker had openly attacked Old Hickory regarding the latter's activi- ties in Florida, and Jackson had never forgiven such an overt affront. On the other hand, it was "entirely natural for Adams and Clay to coalesce." After all, Channing notes, they both believed in the Ameri- can System, distrusted Crawford, and shared a common lack of faith in Jackson's administrative abilities. It was to be expected, therefore, that Adams would receive Clay's support.