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Rethinking US Policy Towards Iran’s Nuclear Programme Surulola James Eke Western support for Iran’s nuclear programme gave way to opposition when it was realised that alongside non-military use, the Islamic Re- public was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Driven by Tehran’s policy of aggression in the Middle East and elsewhere, Western states under us coordination intensified the pressure on Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons programme. Rather than halting uranium enrichment in Iran, however, years of stifling economic, scientific and military sanctions have only caused the country to take a more clandestine approach. Though us-led restrictions have slowed down the pace of Iranian nuclear development, they have been unable to make Tehran come clean about its plans. While maintaining the correctness of the us position on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, this work argues that the policy of restrictions must be reshaped in order to limit its effect on ordinary Iranians. These citizens are identified as potential drivers of change. Seeking their support is crucial for the success of global efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons – hence, the need to restructure restrictions. Keywords: Iran, nuclear weapons, United States, policy, sanctions, restrictions Introduction The nature of nuclear activities in Iran suggests that the country is on a path to nuclear weapons production. In heading there, it has taken Scan this article onto your two routes: highly enriched uranium (heu) and plutonium production. mobile device Despite the denials of Iranian government ofcials, components of the 38 state’s programme and the secrecy of its nuclear dealings bolster the claims of world powers that there is a military dimension to the Islamic Republic’s uranium enrichment plans. For decades now, the United States – with the support of the United Nations Security Council (of which it is part) as well as the European Union and other countries such Surulola as Australia, Canada, South Korea, India and China – has been pressuring James Eke Tehran to relinquish its nuclear weapons ambitions. Nevertheless, the country continues to insist that its uranium enrichment is for peaceful purposes only. The pressure mounted on the Islamic Republic of Iran has to date been monumental. Worst hit by the us-led restrictions is the economy. The resulting sky-high prices of goods and services have more impact on ordinary Iranians than on the policy makers who are their real targets. Overall, the consequences in the country have been colossal, and the controversial nuclear programme has also suffered under the weight of us-imposed and -influenced blockades. Despite these visible effects, however, restrictive policies have been ineffective in compelling Iran to jettison its plans to develop nuclear bombs. Thus, although sanctions have succeeded in slowing down Iran’s nuclear development, I argue that they should now be reshaped in order to insulate ordinary Iranians from their effects. This study proceeds by shedding light on Iran’s nuclear history, which it traces through to the current state of nuclear developments and their military indicators. It next outlines the sanctions imposed on the country in order to force the redirection of policy; the analysis goes further to provide justification for the Western opposition to Iran based on the latter’s aggressive conduct in the Middle East and elsewhere. Finally, this work concludes that current sanctions should be restructured in a way that makes them acceptable to ordinary Iranians. This will create cracks from inside the Islamic Republic. Historical Overview of Iran’s Nuclear Programme The current tension around Iran’s plans to go nuclear – that is, to weaponise its nuclear capability – cannot and should not be divorced from the complicated history of the country’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, the intensity of the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear weapons drive 39 can be seen as a product of that complex history. Understanding that history, thus, provides a much needed context for the Western disapproval of Iran’s desire to weaponise its nuclear power. To be sure, relations between Iran and the West have not always been cejiss conflict-ridden. Britain, for instance, is known to have enjoyed excellent 4/2014 relation with Tehran when economics permitted and the public held that Tehran’s dealings with London were not hostile to British interests. The demise of the Anglophone influence created leeway for Washington, which supported Iran’s development of nuclear power in the mid-20th century. Iran’s nuclear history can therefore be divided into three phas- es: Western support for Iran’s uranium enrichment; Western suspicion of an atomic Iran; and the development of the country’s nukes with non-Western input (a stage of conflict). Interestingly, more than four decades of bumpy us-Iranian relations can be traced to the very nuclear programme which the us helped create and which is now at the heart of global controversy. Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear energy date back to 1957; they were linked to a push from the Eisenhower administration which ultimately resulted in the establishment of military-cum-economic ties.1 The apparent honey- moon between Tehran and Washington spanned decades and ostensibly hinged on Iran’s lack of interest in attaining the same status as its us partner when it came to nuclear capability. For its part, Iran was keen to maintain this mutually beneficial situation. Hence, it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 01 July 1968, the day the treaty opened for signatures. Six years later, the state also concluded a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea).2 This points to an attitude of compliance rather than dissent and suggests that at the time Tehran was pursuing a peaceful nuclear programme. This compliance contrasts sharply with the defiant behaviour that has characterised Iran’s relations with the West for much of the last four decades. It also calls into question the country’s nuclear objectives – an issue analysed in-depth further on in this study. Notably, Tehran’s nuclear dealings were not restricted to the us and it also obtained assistance from other Western powers. In the mid-1970s, for instance, Iran signed contracts with Western firms including France’s Framatome and Germany’s Kraftwerk Union on the construction of nuclear plants and the supply of nuclear fuel. Still, the support from 40 the us remained substantial: under the 1957 Agreement for Cooperation in Research in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the United States provided nuclear technology, supported Iran’s scientists and sold the country nuclear reactor fuel. Furthermore, Iran’s first nuclear station in Bushehr was built under us supervision. Iran’s To be clear, this was never a one-sided expression of goodwill. In other Nuclear words, rather than being parasitic, relations were largely symbiotic. The Programme us also stood to benefit from maintaining such close and friendly ties with Iran. In return for its goodwill, the us enjoyed the purchase of Ira- nian oil at favourably low prices. What factors, then, lay behind the shift from Western support for Iran’s nuclear programme to the opposition of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions? To sketch an answer, we need to return to the lead-up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979: Western support for Iran’s nuclear drive began to erode after us special intelligence forces suggested in 1974 that the Shah’s ambitions could lead Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. This concern prompted the withdrawal of Western support for Iran’s nuclear programme. But it was the seizing of us hos- tages and breaking off of diplomatic relations after the 1979 revolution that strained us-Iran relations to the degree assumed in the 21st century. It is widely known that the us is at the forefront of the Western opposition to Iran’s nuclear programme. Washington has used sanctions to try to compel the Iranian government to fulfil its nuclear non-proliferation commitments under international law. Over the years, the case against Iran has been strengthened by the clandestine nature of its nuclear activities. (In contrast, Zarif argues that it was efforts ‘to avoid the us-led restrictions that led Iran to refrain from disclosing the details of its programme.’)3 Such us disapproval of Iran’s nuclear ambitions has significantly slowed their achievement, but it has failed to bring them to a halt; this is in spite of all recent talks. Though Washington has stepped in on several occasions to block nuclear deals between Iran and each of Argentina, China and Russia, these efforts have on the whole achieved minimal results. While Washington’s attempts to frustrate Tehran into holding dia- logue have, for the most part, been unsuccessful – even as us-initiated sanctions undermine Iran’s economy – these moves have developed local capacities with some foreign non-Western assistance. Iran may still be a long while away from producing nuclear bombs, but the state 41 has undoubtedly managed to assemble at least the essential ingredients for nuclear weapons capability. In 2003, Iran Watch reported that the world had realised that Iran had built or was building everything needed to cejiss produce enriched uranium, which could fuel nuclear weapons 4/2014 as well as nuclear reactors…the sites included a uranium mine at Saghand, a yellowcake production plant near Ardekan, a pilot uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a commercial-scale enrichment facility on the same site. In addition, Iran was con- tinuing work on a 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr and was building a heavy water production plant at Arak, next to which Iran planned to build a 40 megawatt heavy water reactor.4 From very modest beginnings, Iran has managed to set up a torrent of nuclear installations.

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