60 IB - 1933
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH
A Critical Analysis of the Employment of Tanke by th» British in the ' rat Battle of Camera! •
Submitted "by
The Connand and General St&ff Sohool Fort I* avenworth, Kansas Fort Loav^worth , Kansas , 73 May 1933
MEMORANDUM FOR : Th» Director Second Year Class , The Ccroanl and General Stafi Sohool , Fort Leavenvorth , Kansas .
A Critical Analysis of the Employment of Pariks by tha British In the First Battle of Cambrai ,
I, PAKTCS ACCOMPANYING : 1. A Bibliography for this study . 2. Map No.I - (isneral Map : Arras-St.Often* in Front 20 November 1917 • 3. Map No,3 - Tront of the irain British Attack 20 November 1917 . 4 . Map No.3 - Tank detraining points and assembly arttas for Fi»st Battle of Cambrai •
II. THE SPOT* PRESEfPED.— A critical analysis of th* enployment of tanks by the British in the Fiwt Battle of Cambrai , 20 Hovem>er - 6 Deceiver 1917 This study inolndas only the main battle between Canal de l'Esoaut and Canal du Nord and , withiii thafc area , the general progress of the battle and the action of other arms and services only insofar as is aeoessary in a consideration of b of tanks •
III. HISTORICAL FACES RELATING K) PHE SUBJECT . Reasons for the Battle *
During 1917 , until the Battle of Cambrai , while the tank enthusiasts were trying to develop their weapon and arrange for its use as they felt it •ho-.ild be employed , the theory of the annihilating preliminary artillery bambardusat controlled &11 attacks (l) . Surprise , particularly strategical surprise , was forfeited (8) .The long artillery preparation made the tone of advance almost impassable for artillery and transport (3) and that demanded a limited objootive (4) No exploitation was bailed for (5) .
(1) LU,I08 and II3j Bat,249 , ' ^IHS SOLUTrO!! t!UST BS RETURtTCD FOR . (2) Bor|I57{iii^Z60) Tu,30I » FILD BY C:CO P.M., ON TH2 DAT"? C'\Otn (3) «n,490| Mar,53; Ik, 6) WH,I60 , PLEASE PLACE YOUR t;&\* c:i ro WR p/.c-S (4! la, 108 and/iwj Bm,249 and 250 . JUMjiHO ^2 W « BUT r? LOV F./.CS YOUR i:.vi**M (5] 8ame a» (4) SCiUriON MIEN RE(iUESTlKa A niv/IEH,
- I ixank Corps leaders believed that this weapon was tetter suited than was artillery for destroying the hostile defenses ; that It would not rcake the terrain Impossible for supporting artillery and the movement of supplies ; and'that only by its use would i t be possible to gain surprise (6) .Many of the leaders of the Vank Corps and others not comeo5ed with that branoh fslt , during the suorer of 1917 , that tanks had hover been given a fair chance to prove their value , that they had been used unier bondiUone entirely unfavorable to them (?) . At that time the rank Corps was still on probation (8), Within British GHQ, in franco there was opposition to any further Increase in tarfc produotlon » particularly after their failure at the Phlrd Battle of Tpres (9) , But the Panic Corps felt great oonflCenoa In this new weapon and was anxious to increase the number of machine a available for use in France , and to use them as thejr felt tanks should be employed (10) .I f they were to suooeeed in this , i t was first necessary to convince the authorities of the power and value of the tanlc (IX) , A big tank battle had for a long time been in tttt thoughts of the leader* of the Pank Corps (13) . the original plan for the tank battle at Cambrai was conceived by the Panic Corps which was also largely responsible ",r putting through the plan (13) • Lt.Col.J.T.C.Puller , Chief General Staff Officer of the Corps , states that the general area around Cambrai was seleoted by them as early &s II June 1917 (14) . Phe original plan of the Pank Corps called for a surprise raid , on a large soale , lasting about 24 hour's . PhA object was to be the destruction of the enemy's personnel and guns , the dencoraliaation and disorganisation of his fighting troops and reserves and nc>t the capture of ground . Phe plan
6) Pk,5{ Wil,I60 ; Pu, 135,133 and 30l{ Bae»250 and 352 77)) Doy,344Doy,344jj Bkr,265Bkr,265jj Bnei^49Bnei^49;; WiWiJ.ix,J , 88)) fttf , 64j BBne,5 } BkBkr , 355 00 and 3555 8) 111, I93J Bkr, 349; Bae, 5 10V^l38l) ^'35> ••.
(13) En, 491} Wil,I60j Herf 256 (13) BAA,253j Bo, 491; 7a,139 (14) To, 137 and 138 [ths -plan provided for three sueoessivf waves of tanks in the$a&5aok , It WM planned to withdraw , at the end of the raid , to the position which had been previously occupied (15) , In September 1917 , Brigadier General H.I,Bll£s , cotooander of tht British Tank Corps , visited General Sir Julian Byng , commander of the Phird Aray which included the Cambrai area (16) , Phe proposed tank aotion WAS discussed and General Byng who desired to take the offensive, was convinoad of thft featlVnUy
of the plan (17) , Undoubtedly he' very soon afterwards approached British
three infantry divisions eaoh t a oavalry corps of two divisions , a little mare khan t thousand guns , and the entire Tank Corps (22) . The two corps shi lit and XV , were already part of his own Third Army and ware then engaged on the defense . No additional Infantry was allotsd to the Phird Army for this attack (23). Moat of the, six divisions hod cow from the Tpres Salient
Kttt49ij TJt.C; fiui 16 111,16, 1 jj In*In,, 35 3 11 ti InI , 4^1 j BBne , 2*22*2 ; Bkr, 267 xa 1M, 139} Bkr;3S7| Wii^I6Z and 162; En,491 B5Bae,^533 j 111,161} lu,I400 11,399 and 4C0C0j Bor.ISIBISIj Bow. 223 and 226 In, 400} to, IIOj Doy, 23d and 339j Bne, 253 Bor,I53j ln,49I} 7U.I44; Bne, 265 33 Bor,I52; 1^^3
-3 when they had suffered heavy casualties and had been withdrawn , Their ranks were filled with drafts without experience (24), Some of these divisions , however , were reported to have excellent reputations , namely the 29th (regular), the 6th (regular) and the 51st Highland .Territorial Division (25), The 12ta,20th and 29th divisions were in the III Corps and the 6th , 5I»t , and 62d in the IV Corps (26) « One historian olassed the Cambrai sector at that time as the Uecoa of every wearied and decimated unit withdrawn from the Salient (Yrres) for a rest ,{¥?) The rarfc Corps was organised into three brigades of three battalions each , with a total of 376 fighting tanks and 98 administrat ive machines , 4V6 tanks in all (28),The personnel strength of this corps was 690 officers and approximately 3500 enlisted men (39), The Tank Corps was coransnded by Brigaiier General H.J^iles (30) , the first lank Brigade Ijr Colonel C.D.Baker-Carr , the Second Brigade by Brigadier Gene?.tl A,Courage , the Third -y brigadier General J.Hardrese-Lloyd (31),
rerraln . A good idea of the terrain may be obtained from Map Ho,3 • Tht ground was'favorable for the employment of tanks , It was well drained and oonsieted of rolling grass overai chalky dowrj« practically untouched by shell fire (32), Phe slopes were n&whera »«eep,(33) The Canal de VSsoeut on the east and t>» Canal du Nord on the west were obstaoUs to anyroovs'tuntacross them , particularly ol tanks , tut were also potential flank protection to any narro* British penetration , to the Wai lrt>l<*t* \v\d#
Bfti, 36?
»246-^565 Map Ho.I
oia1 j • ' .Ii Bne,3?0 Tk,l6} fti.IWj Bne,282 30] y, j Wil,r?4lr?4 j ^ (31 Mar,29{ VOtStii Wil.Pe and 106 33] Bor.ISIS j 11,3911399 and 404404) 1^,1441^144 ; V11.I63 33! fl,404{ 511,163; UapJTo.3 34 tl402j Bne45Bne,453 " * * - 4 The Grand Ravin , a gently sloping valley , separated the German from the British poiitien in the sector just east of Canal du Nord . Jfee •mall i»6ream flowed aorose the front M the Canal de 1'Biouut near Maroolng , Co the north of this valley and from 60 to 90 feet higher lay the Tlesquieree - Havrinoourt Ridge , a long narrow spur •standing east towards Marco i$g , From Havrineourt a low ridge extended due north and joined the BourIon Ridge , which was the dominating terrain in chat area (35) . The highest ground wan south of the village of Bourlon , in Bourlon Wood , a thick wooded seotion with dense undergrowth (36) . Phle point overlooked the battlefield to tihe aouth as far as the FUsquleree Ridge and was rore than bO feet higher than the latter . 14 was 100 feet higher than AnneSc and Cantalng and 130 feet hir/ier tk&n fontaine-Kotre-Dsoe (3?). It looked down upon Oaatorai which lay in a depression , and it also commanded the ground to the north to the Settsee River (38) . Ther» were many snail villages in this sootor , strongly fortified (39) . Fho h5.gh ground north of ftumilly and east of Canal de VTlMdiufc overlooked Marco ing t Hoye lies , Cantaing and the area for some distance west of Contains (40), Behind the British lints she numsrous valleys and wooded areas offered facilities for oonoeallng preparations for the at took (41) ,
Qermaa Fortifications and Garrison . The German defenses in the sector salooted for the attack were •• known to the Brl ish as the Hindenburg Line and to the Germans as the Siegfried Line .They consisted of three main trench lines and an outpost line (12)(see Map Ko«2). Uho outpost line was , la many seoti'Vis | as nuoh as 1000 yards away froro the British position • rhe
(36) Map No.2j T7ilrIS2j Bn«,376 and 37?; Bkr,363 36) *i465 VK| 3?) Map »>i3} 38) Bor,I59j 399) I , p (40) Map K0w2 (41) Bor, 151j 11,399 (42) Bor,I53j ?t,403; Her, 145; Pa, 145 main line of resistance was , In genaral , from one to one and a half kilometers froro the British front line . Pho Hindenburg Reserve (or /tine Support), was , in goneral , from one so two kilometers in rear of the main line of resistance , The third line was very incomplete . It ran generally ; within the sone of the main attack , from Creveooeur through the, northern edge of Maenleres and just south of Bourlon (See Map Ho2)» The outpost was well wired as was most of the support line and part of the third line . Che main line of resistance was oovered in , front by a dense belt of bar'ed wire entanglements , really three broad belts separated by narrower irregular lanes .In many sections these entanglements were pushed out even farther to the front to form salients , well oovered by machine guns (43) , British officers felt that never before had they encountered such terrific barbed wire entanglements (44) .th e German trenches were constructed with a view to preventing possible crossing by tanks and were , consequently , very wide and deep , in many places as wide as 16-16 feet (45). Tha British Tank could not cross a trench vrid*r than 10-11 feet (46) , for
Jbi most part ; these trenches wsre on the reverse slopes of t» * main ridges and consequently direct artillery observation upon them , from the British area , was iimpossible (47) » While this position of the. Hindenburg Llne wat verjr strong and solid from the point of view of technical construction it was held by a comparatively week garrison (49) , Field-Marshall von Hindenburg states that , in addition to the saaall numbers of troo?j defending that sector , those units present had been sxhausted by previous battles (49)« The British knew that this line was wea'rly fcwritoiyfi (60), This seotor was Included In General Von dor Marwlti's Seootil Arny(61)
(43) Ti,403j Bkr,263} Bne,264 and 253; Wil, 163 (44) Bkr, 263) Wil, 163 (45) 11,402} Wil, 163} Bkr, 259 (401 Bn*,28I{ Bkr,259{ Wil,I63 471 11,403} 1M, 145} Wil, 163; Bne, 264 48) Hin,391} Doy,241} Map Mb, 1 49) Hin,39I 60) Bor,I5Ij Doy, 241} Bns,252 81) Doy,2?G{ Bne,36S} Map No.I
- 6 General Plan fftr the At back «
The plan for the Carabrai attack t tBtfS^f approved by British OHQ , was quite different from the original plan of the Tank Corpe • The main attack wae bo be made b|t the Third Army , reinforced at explained under "British Forces" above , in the area between the Canal de L'Zscaut on the east and the Canal du Word on the west k At the same hour demonsbrabions wiA gas and smoke and ar tiilery were to b* oarried out along praebibally bhe entire British front with subsidiary or dummy attacks east of Epehy on bhe right and between Bulleoourt and Fontaine-les-Croislllies on the left • Seorecy was held to be vital in order to secure surprise . There was to be no artillery preparation . The tanks were to be responsible for tearing gaps in the German wire entanglements as well as for covering the advance of the infantry by protecting it from hostile machine gun fire (52/ . The artillery was bo asalit wibh oounterbabbery and barrage fire , by putting down smoke screens , particularly along the right flank of the III Corpe , fcnd by speoial concentrations on prearranged localities suoh as benbers of couraunioation and roads likely to be used by the German reserves (53) ,111 three of the German defensive systems were bo be penetrabed on bhe first day , the taiks and infantry working in oloae cooperation . If this break-through wove successful , the high ground around Bonrlon was to be secured and a flank position established ta the eastfitowards Cam^rai , Tiha oavalry wai to pass through for looal exploitation between Bourlon and bhe Sesee River to the northwest and r»ld the German coEorunicablons , damage their railatftAe and intorfere with the arrival of their reinforcements . Tao capture of Cambrai Iteelf was not planned •
It was believed that no large German reinforcements could reach the soeno of this action /or 48 hours . Che Comaander-in-Chief reserved the right to stop the attack at the end of 48 hours , or sooner , unless
(62) Bor, 151-152} Ti, 399-400} 14 (63) Bor,I33; Ti,400} Wil,l66-I6«j Ju, 145-146 - 7 the results and the general Situation Justified its continuance (64), No provision was made by the Third Army for a general reserve , exoept for the Cavalry Corp* of two divisions (56) , No tanks were to be held in general reserve (66) , All available tanks were to go forward in the assault except that each unit planned on holding out a few machines to replace raeohanioal breakdowns . A total of 39 tanks were to be set aside inraidiately for this purpose ,(67) , Tank Tactical Organisation and Allotment , The let Tank Brigade consisted of three battalions , D,K and 0 , eaoh normally with 42 tanks but 0 battalion had sore machines from each of the oilier battalions , giving it a total of 60 , Tht 24 Tank Brigade, had one battalion detached for this attartc and consisted Men of two battalions , B and H , eaoh with 42 tanks . Che 3d Tank Brigade' had its regular three battalions , C , 7 , and I and also A battalion from the 2d Brlgad'i , each battalion with 42 tanks (68) , Eaoh brigade had 18 supply tanks (8ee Supply , page* be low) and 3 wireless tan^s (See Connunlcatlon , page 4,0 below)
Each tank battalion consisted of three companies and eaoh oompanjt of four section* , The normal organisation of tv^ seotlon required four tanks but there were not sufficient maoMnee in Trance to bring seotions up co strength so in this attack* trost sections had only three franks (69). Allotment for the Attagfc , The 1st Tank Brigade operated with the 62d and 51st Divisions , on the lefi flank ; The 2d Dank Brigade with the 6th Division In the oenter } and the 3d Tank Brigade i v i h the 29th , 20th and I2eh Division* on the right flank (60)• The allotment , more in detail , Is given la 64) Bor,I6S-I54j Ltt,II2} Si, 400j Hbw,232J < 68) Xnt49I| Mar, 23) Bkr,263 66) Xa,493| Mar, 23; 111,171 57) 1^146} Bne, 270 168) Taj, 198) Ttt, 146; Bne, 268; Wil, 167 (59) Mar,I4-I6i Bne,269; Taj, 158 60) ToJ, 198} ¥11,1671 Bne,2^8} fa, 146
- 8 the (British) Punk Corps Journal , November 1923 . Froia left 60 right , as there reported , it wat- »**To 62d Division : 0 Battalion | to Diriilon | JC f*nd D Battalions j to 6th Division H and 1 Battalions \ to 29th, ,„ /; . , ' • , ,, M«4 DiriBlot\ :No.3 Company of A Battalion ; to 20th DirUlon A (less Ko.3 Company) and X Battalions \ U I2th Division 7 and C Battalions (6XX pom Details of the Plan . , /. •. Vnasrauo\ h ,/as . the wide,, r trenches Oi V.th*. Hindenbur. .. g v V System we,«e as broad aa 15*16'and inasauoh as the Mark IT tank oould
oross a jrenoh only 10-71 foet wide f(62) sorr.e tnsthod had to be derisel to assltt the tanks in crossing . The depth of the trenches provided as . . . / a* ; • , . . • • '"•'"*'" \ ' great if no v greater obstacle than their width (63). When the forward i ^ ',""''. part of the tank rested on the parados the tall would of course olear the parapet and , unless somehow prevented , would then drop to the bottom of the tre.ich , Fhe tank would remain , resting on its tall ( elrtOBt upright t with the tracks unable to grip and without the power fco climb vertically , Son* device was required which would fill the trench do such a height as to prevent the tall fMsa dropping so low that the tank was unable to pull out . Uhe device developed wae the famine , a high , tightly compressed, bundle of brushwood four and a half feet in diameter and ten feo". long weighing a ton and one half to a ton and three quarters (64). Phese fasceaes were rtada by co-cpresslng together seventyfiva ordinary bundles of bristanood (65). Chains were wound several fciues around theje bundles and tanks , working in pair* , palled ontjii ohaiafl In opposite directions , The completed fasoines were then bound with ohalts (66),Tour hundred of these fasoines were made , at the Central Workshops at Erin , during the three weeks before
th61e ) battlToj,19e (67)8 . Phis hi^ "bridge" was oarried on the nose , or oab, 62) 8ee (45) and (46) above 63) 71,402} Bne,26I (64) Bc,6; 1^4931 fa,I4I; Bn»,36I; f l 1,164 (65) ra,X4I| Bne,26Ij Wil.163 (66) til , 164) Bne,262 (67) ra,I29; Bne,262 of the tank , Fhere was also developed a clever contrivance , operated frpa lnsMe the tank , vrhioh would release and drop the fasoine , from Its carrying position , orer the nose of the ta-fc into the trenoh (68). One tank officer states that the effloieney of these fasoines was proved in tests on the ojd §*front line trenches at the training area at Wailly (69). Detailed Tank Plan ,A careful plm of coordination for the tanks was hsotdsary because there were three broad trenches to be orossed , each tank could carry only one fasoine , and onoe that had been dropped into a trench there was no means of recovering It (70). Each tank section was to consist of three machines , one Advance Ouari Tank and two Infantry (or Main Body) tanks (?ft), Phe advanue guard tank was to precede the others by about 100 yards , and the interval between mala body tanks was to be about 100 yards (72). 3aoh objective was divided Into tank seotlon attack areas according to the number of tactical points In the objective . A separate eohelon of tarfcs was to be alloced to each objective (73}, Che Advance Ouard tank was to go straight forward through the enemy's wire , and , turning to the left (without crossing) move along the trench . Its mission wao to keop down the enemy's fire and to pro tec: the Main Body tanks a? they led the infantry through the wire a;:d over the trench . Both Main Body tanks were to move on one point in the trenoh . Che left one dropping Us fascine into the trenoh , orosslng over and , turning to the left ,was to nov* along the tr*noh and to its objective . The right tank was to orots on this same fasoine , move to the next (support) trench , drop it% fasoine and , crossing , move a\on^ this trenoh • Jhen the Advance
Bkr, 259; 111,164} Fu,I4I} fine, 261 69 I Brie, 263 Wilt 165) Bne,269 Wil| 165) Bne, 269 :?. wa. En,492) Bne,270 73) Bne,259; 111, 165
• 10 Ouord taxk , having acoorfipjinhod It* initial mission , was to cross both tranches , on th* fascines of the Main Body tanks and trove forward with its own fasoincf still in position ready for us* In crossing th* third (and final) line of trenches , Phe two Main Bod/ tanks war* to fom up b«hlnd th« Advanc* Guard tank aivl jwalt further ordtrs (74) « Part for Cavalry • After th» infantry assault had passed ov*r th# wir* , wide gaps were to b« deared to enable the cavalry to pa** through* For this work «aoh wire clearing team was to consist of thro* tank* , •aoh towing a heavy grapnel , rhe first tank was to «o straight through, breaking all the strands . Each of Oh* other two was to roll up ont
flank • Paths 100 yards wid« oould thus to clswsd in a ftw ttirmtss f throutfi the heaviest type wire entangUMnts , leavlftg no trao» of wire on the ground (70) . Plan for the Infantry ptqall Units • lh» strength of the intuntry unite operating la conjunction with each section of ta-Jcs depended upon the strength of th* objective to t>e attacked and the nature of th*
approach** (76)«Fh* forimtion to to used was section COIUMVR (77)#fh*y were to to organised in three forcet.Tt* first were th* trefh clesxer* M operate with th* tanks *nd oobperat* in clearing trench©• and dug-out*. lh$j were co carry amall red flogs with which to aork the path* which tb* tanks had made in th* wire , and tho places where fcaoln** had toen dropf*d . - Ph* second were th* tr**ch stops to block th* trench** at various point* • Ph* third fore* was th* trench garrison fore* - to occupy the trench*s as they were captured (?ft) •
Provisions for Maln^nin^ 8*cr*oy •
On* of th* prlft* requisitea for success in tMs battle wo* be lie red to to eurpfle* • Phose in coim-and realited that (his depsnded largely upon s*or*o^ in preparation (79) «
74I
I Bn*,2W and
- II Ml that to inturo (hit Mcrtoj knonUlg* niot b# withhold intofar M jeaiiblo , for tht ao*>wil itftlf until just Ufor* tho tot* I* (00) • fho preparatory aoaturot wfcioh h*l so b# oorritil out wort •xtontiY* • fboM which node loeroo/ portioulorl/ difficult wtro tho withdraw! of .Urgt Uric unit* from *hrt« «•«»• Along tb« Britiib front and cbtlr oono»ntr»tlon for »j*oUl trAining j th« cocbto«d trAlnlng of t»nk» wiU» Infantry \ tto« fnor#aj*nt of tb« ta*» to «M«i>b)/ *r»«j etof* In rt*r of |ho lln* of d*partur« | th# AittflMing of tank fonpllot boblni th# ffonfc j and tho roooimilitMoii b/ tarfc oo«o«ni«rf • In »44ition to tbii f but */ Ui§ lmtdiat« int#rr#»t In tfclf dltoufil^n » vat tb« aovfpwat into position of tho additional »rtill#ry , th# OMralrr eorpo *nd tbo n«o««iarjr lwrgt add4 that on# or tiro «ir4lo§t *,&&• wtra itfft 9#A1A1 >/ tha Itt Bri^ada, on it* old front , to MAi b^rw flt««a • tt During tha day tho«# tinitt and tup^U** already in a***»r,bly we## w»r# to W hlddon in tha wood* (86) , A t*/fc brig*** ooiwandar infora* u* that aachirvM which feroka down whil* GOT Ing at night , which could not fc# noinfd feofor* daylight and which w#r* rw: conc**l«d by natural oovor w#r# (o b# c«tou/l*i«d b»fcr# dawn un 8«oonnalntn«« t>y (trtk eoimuuviUirt WM «O n^Udl M to WPOUM no Mupielon tux>nt*K ih$ troop* . forfc offic#r» oa rteonAalttww* went dUgulMd a* «r»afc#r» of oth«r fcranch*» , 8«ntor offletr* woro »t#»X b«lir«t* ani tr«noh coau to hid* th«lr intl&iia (87) , Wo p«r*or» v«i told of th* plan w/i^n it c«f Meosiary for bi>% to know of it (68) # In tbo Uginning only fo«r tua>*v of O«rwral Kll«*' staff know of tbt appro«shin« av.ack (89) , fho plan wa« noxt r#T#alod to huttallon , eo*pan/ and r#«onnai*fane« offieora , and 1Mt 0t all , only two or for— 4*y$ Worn 0-day , Motion and tank eo«and«rf w*r# told tbo Me rot (90) • Vo inereaM in air^ano activity for rfcomal«»anoo VorpoMt WAS ftrslttfd (91) • forward fa^c ttoadqpartore waa •ttaollabad with tb# rhird Anay at Albert an& ditgclMd ae "Tbo faifc Corp* Training Offica* (92) . fhora waa to U m artlllary preparation , Xo now OMtorloa *S artlilir/ wart parcittod to roglstor ^for* th« attack actually *tart*A« V*§rt praoavtionwaa ta>»n to aibara rigidly to condition* that hM pr#rlotuly o^tal oad (93) , froopt h>Ulw ±s front lino w«r# to takt no part in tha Initial a;lack tnd w*ra it9t to U lnton+4 of the eontaqpltad attack (94) • a^af1 til, 169 tiijmj Bow,232 $9 ffi^tei! Bat'288 90 M #Jt46| 100,258 91 111,1^ 92; **,1 SortXf&j Bo*#232tn,poj f 1 ,400 94]> VlLId9i 8or(28I For ten days before the attack thsre had been a heavy fog though, the weather was otherwise fine . There had been little or no rain but the lew clouds and mist had prevented airplane observation over the are*,by • A • , •' • either Germans or British (95) .The night 19-20 November was very dark with a dense ground mist (96) • Faoonnaistance » Colonel Fuller states that steps were taken to reconnoiter the Caubrai area even before the battle was sanctioned (97) , Inasmuch at , in the beginning , only four members of the Staff of the Tank Corp* knew of the approaching attack , sihoe no additional airplane reoonnaissanos • was permitted,, an4 as secrecy wa* so important , there was a limit to the amount of reconnaissance of the German position and of the terrain under German control . In spite of these handicaps there were , we are informed by a tank brigade commander , hundreds of airp?.ane photographs taken , masses of material collected , and every source of information tapped (98) , While lank Corps reconnaissance wae started as early at secrecy would permit , it was not until a .few days before 20 November that * tank oorrmanders were permitted to reconnoiter the ground from the British front-line trench system (99) » The watercourse marked on all maps as "Le Grand Savin" und feared as an obstacle was found from & study of airplane photographs to be nottii;ig alarming (100) . One fact of gre,fc, importance was however determined , namely that the German trenches were very broad , as wide In places as 16-16 feet , a broader span than any t&rk could then cross unaided (JOl) , Forward assembly positions for the tanks were selected ana the route of each tank from (95) Rv , 41; Ti tli5t Bkr,26I (96) Bkrt267; Bne,272 (97) Pa ,I39| (98) Bkr,258 99) Fa ,146j 1016,258 (100) Wil.163; Bkri259 (101) 8ee(45) and (46) above - 14 -the area of final deployment to ite position on its 11 nV of departure was reoonnoitered and marked (102) , Concentration in Training Areas . On October 20 , tanks were eoafctered over a wide area . Th» 1st Brigade was in the Ypres Salient , another brigade was at Lens Tort , and the other at Benaicourt (103) • The reasons for concentrating the tanks at training areas are given under "Cooperative Training" , 'below , A tank company coniaander in the 1st Brigade informs us that that brigade received preliminary orders , late in October and final orders about the 1st of November to move to Wallly near Arras ,(just outside the village of Blviere)(lO4) , The entire Tank Corps , consisting of three brigades of three battalions •aoh ,-mor* than 400 machines with gun carriers and supply tanks - was concentrated in training Areas early In November (105) • Cooperative Training . It was felt that the whole Tank Corps must be concentrated at training areas so as to make possible cooperative training with the Infantry . Phis was considered to be very lraptrtanb , not only beoaute of the necessity for developing combined aotion , but chiefly because success dependsd so ouoh upon developing the confidence of the infantry in tanks (106) .Only a short time , about a week , was available for this training and it was therefore impossible for rooro than a small (102 Bkr,267, ftx,l«8,; ; Bns,270 iI4OI4O| Bne,258| 104 Bae,245 105 lu ,143} Bn»,S48 106 111,166; JU ,140 jRBCentage of tho infantry , which was to take put in the attack , to practise with the tanks (107) . A compltt© tyt^m of Unk and Infantry cooperation was worked out by L t. Co l.yulle;*, Chief Qeneral Sfcaff Officer of the 1fank Corps , and daring this short period the two awns rehearsed the exact taotiee they were to use In the at'taok (108) . These taotios are given in detail •under "Some Details of the Plan" above , Every effort was made by tb© Tank Corps to develop the confidence of the Infantry in this new weapon . fhe infantry was called upon to construct their own defenses and nir* entanglements , making them as strong as possible .The tanks were abray* able to push through without Kuoh difficulty (109) « Movement from graining Area. • All Bovement of t^-is and tank supplies frorr. the training area took plac* at night (110) , The movement was made by the Hallway Staff of the Phlrd Anay * Plateau Station , near Albert , was the concentration point selected , More than 400 machines were first concentrated there and then sent forward to the railheads (III) . 12-14 tanks made up a trainload (112) .3 6 trains were required for the almost simultaneous reuoval from Baurcett (the railroad station for Wailly training area) , of the 9 battalions (113) . The movement forward from concentration point required four nights and was postponed as late as praotioablo « 27 train loads were concentrated at Plateau Station by 14 November « These trains were sent forward to detraining areas on the nights 16*17 17*18 and 18-19 November . The other 9 trains , the last loaded , moved ^ j 267; To. ,304; Wil.166 How, 233 j Wil,I65) Bne.263; Kcr,259 169 Bkr,259; Bne,263; Wil, 166 Rv , 40; How,232j Fa ,146; Her, 262 III Bkr,262j Bne,268 112) Wil,166; Bcr,264 ;iI3) Be , 7; Bne,358) Tu ,143 directly from training areae to da braining points on the night 16-16 November (114) , Only nine brains could be moved forward eaoh night , a tank brigade eoranander informs us , because only a single line of track existed in this area and the last train on each ni#it had to arrive at the detraining points at such an hour as td allow the tanks bo reach their place of concealment , 6*6 miles distant , before dawn (116) « lbs difficulties of moving in these slow and heavy trains in so short a time , in addlti-vn to the normal traff io , were great and v«e/«ir«4 an exact schedule was required (126) . Speoial detraining rapt had to b# constructed at the detraining points (II?) . Detraining Points • Fhe detraining points selected were ae follows * let- Tank Brigade t Bertlnoourt and Hayaleourt,$2d Park Brlgade+Sorel * Ttres Id ?adc Brigade t Heudicourt (118) . See Hap No.3 |ark Parks •» Provisions for B the tank parks (ie.tht main supply dumps) , and the assembly areas , listed below , were identical (119) , Among the store/colleoted at the main supply dumps eetabllshad at the assembly areas were x 166,000 gallons of gasoline ; 66,000 pounds 6t grease j 6,000,000 rounds of small arms ansmnltion ; 600,000 rounds of 6->pounder shell (ISO) , Supplies were moved from the railheads to these dumps over light railways , Fhe accunulat ion of the huge amount of supplies needejwaa 114, lu ,143) Bn*,25e W Bkr,262 Ju ,143} Bne,S68 B58 fu .143*1 , Bne,258 fa |I43| Bne,S62 ISO] Bne,2$2| Wi 1,169; Ju ,143 possible, only beoause of the splendid system of light railways behind • • • / ' / •.. • • ' •'••(• • , • . , ' - . x / , ' , • . . ; , - . y ; ••' •.. ;.• ••,;•,•' ..... the Chird Army front (121) . jfhe importance of these railways was increased by the shortage of motor Vmoks , Between 10-25 November 28 lorries oorered between them 19,000 miles or an average of 744 miles each and soae small box oars averaged 1,200 miles apiece (122) . Supply feru«k«-tanks and gun-oarrylng takfee (both older type* machines with guns removed) were to be used to oarry supplies forward from the dumps to rendezvous points as the advance progressed (IS3) , Each brigade had assigned to it 16 supply or gun-carrying tanks (134) . During the three weeks preceding the battle , the Central Workshops at Erin oonstruobed HO heavy timber sledges , to be towed by tanks , chiefly the gun-carrying type , with loads of gasoline and amuuni'tion (125) , rwo tanks were given the task of carrying forward bridging material (125) • Tank Assembly Areas , The assembly are as, of ten referred to as "lying-up places" , for the three brigades were as follows : 1st Tank Brigade -Western end of Havrlneourt Wood , 2d Tank Brigade - Dessu-t Wood • 3d Tank Brigade Villers-Guislaln and Gouteaacourt (127) .See Map H6.&V Havrincourt Wood was extensive and offered good natural concealment and some cover was available in the small Desart Wood • The 3d Brigade ( in the small villages , concealed their machines under brick-coloured camouflage made to represent bricks and tiles , Extensive use was made of camouflage (128) 121 Qc , ?) Ttt ,143; Bne,2&; Wi 1,169 fa ,I2,I29{ { Bae,262 123 Mar, 535 } WilWilt 161699 } Ttt|X43 and 249) Ba», 262| Tk , ? 124 , { Bne,270 125 Wil,I65j Ttx ,I29j Bne.262 126) lu ,I4?{ Bne,2?0 127) ru,I46j Bne,262{ Bkr,262} Wi 1,168 (128) Bne,268j Wil,I69{ In ,112 Approaph , The move from the aesembly area* to the line of departure took place under cover of darkness the ni^t 19-30 Novetrtter . Afeer dark 19 November a wide tape was laid along the track that each tank was to follow to its position behind the line of departure , in order to aroid confusion and make certain that no mistakes might arise In moving up to the exact spot where the supporting infantry was waiting (129)AUok brigade cownander states that tens of thousands of yards of tape were laid by tank corrrcandara , under supervision of the reconnaissance officers and that the result fully Justified the tine and labor expended (130) • The fact thafc the night 19-80 November waa very dark did nit result in confusion because all arrangements were so complete . Each man , so far as1 wa» possible , knew what he hao. to do (131) , Early in the morning lwure of 20 November all the tanks were deployed on line within 800-1,000 yards of the German outposts . More than 360 fighting tanks , probably about 37 J , were in position (132) • How this movement was executed without the Germans being warned by the loud distinctive noite of the tank is difficult to understand . Colonel Baker-Carr report* that the night was qpiiet t "there was hardly a sound , except for the dccasional boom o i a gun ,xxx« (133) .Captain Browne in speaking of this move states s«8o silently had this approach been carried out tfckt many of the infantry , assembling behind gaps in our own wire , heard no tanks at all xxx»(I34) , Certainly the Germans did not hear the machines moving up «(8ee Operations 20-27 November below ) • ^ i Bkr,267j *u ,142 Bkr,267 131 Doy,244j Her, 267; Bae,268 and 372 133 Jtt ,147) Bne,2?2| Wl 1,174; May, 21 133 Bkr,267 134 Bne,272 - 19 Provisions for Conraunloatloq , loch tank brigade had three wire lea* signal tanks « On* tank wa* given the task of oarrying forward telephone cable for the third Army signal service (139) • Operations 20-27 Hbvanfcer , At 6s 10 AM i 20 Hoveh&er , the tanks moved forward , the infantry In «eotim cotanne advancing slowly behind them (136) . At 6t20 (H-hour) the artillery barrage one down on the Oereran outpost line , not only in the front of the main attack but along the whole British front from Arras to 8t.Quentin . Heavy smoVe • nonoentratione were inoludod AS planned (137) (See"General Plat*, page 7 abate), rbe Qerenns were taken absolutely by surprise (136) . Phe German counter* barrage was feeble , slow and Inaourate (139) . Fhe Tank Corpe oomnsader led the attack in a tank of H Battalion , in the center of the line (140), At H-hour there was a thick mist but the sky was rapidly lightening (Ml) • The Oernan outpost position was overrun withVeven oheoking the advance « the small garrisons , dated , were practically anlhilated (142) • Fhe tripfle belts of wire in front of the main line were orossed • Eaoh tank easily crushed down a pathway through which the infantry passed • Fhe main front line - the Hlndenburg Line - gave little trouble (143) • Fasolnes were rolled over the parapet to the trenoh floor and the tanks orossed successfully (144) . Ihe Germans were terror stricken by the X35! fu ,I4?j Bne,2?0; Tk , « M,ti7| Bkr.268; Bne,272j rk.fi Bor.154; Rv,ieanM2,Doy,a47| How,233| a,40« and 407 Rv , I8{ Rca, 61) Hin,39I; How,3?2| ri,407 y, ; , 6i 6 t i ,40, 9 146 91 ,408; Wil.174} fu ,1417 7 I'll It ,4091 Bae,2?2j lu ,147 142 t l ,407| «il t P4) BA«,273 Ul Rv , I9{ Doy,247; U ,406; Bne,2?3 144 Doy,248{ Bne.273; W 11,174 • 20 huge tanks which passed over the wire and across the broad trenches without difficulty . Phey ran away panic-stricken , casting away their arm* and equipment , or else surrendered with little or no resistance |l4f) r/ ... . - . . • The Hinda^urg Reserve Line was rapidly passed through in a similar manner (I4S) , Up to this point the infantry had little to do except to fire at the retreating enemy and to round up groups of half-stupefied prisoners (147) , The garrison of Havrlncourt resisted for eorr.e tin* but tanks closed in on it from the north and. it was cleared by the 6£d Division .La Vacquerie (20th Div.) and Ritecourt (6th Div.) were ectlly captured (148) . It was now broad daylight and the area between the two canals , from Banteux to Havrincourt , the Germans were routed . Th* "Grand Bavin" was c'uoked .vith German soldiers , now an. unorganised and unarmed mob , retreating to the east , having oast away their equipment in order to speed withdrawal (149) . On the tetee* British right flank , at Lateau Wood , a number of German batteries were In portion on a hilltop overlooking L'Escaut Canal , Phis tactical locality resisted during most of the morning but was captured bynthe 12th Division before noon (160) . Tanks and infantry then moved on towards the very Important brldgee over the canal at Marco ing and Masnisres . At Marco ing an A Battalion tank arrived in tlrne to drive off German engineers who were In the act of destroying the bridge , At Masnieres the bridge had already been partially wrecked, an* P Battalion tank , in attempting to cross , completed the destruction and fell into the canal (151) . Phis* delayed the infantry advance on RumIlly and the Klergnles Ridge but the (145) Rv, 19 and 42; Bkr,269; TOL ,148 and 155; 111,174; Baft, 273 146) Bor.IMj How, 233 (147) Bne,2?3| Bkr,269; It ,408 148) Bor, 1354166; Tl,4iajt4II;Wyl249 149) Kn ,492; Bne,273; Tfc ,149 i;i60) Bor,I55j Tl ,410; Wil,I?5 (151) Doy, 253; De ,388; Bor,I55&I56; 91,414 - 21 • tanks gave fire support from positions southwest of the canal (152) • On the British left flank , the 51 st Division was advanced against rieeqruieres as soon as its flanks had been secured by Che capture of RiVecourt and Havrincourt (153) , Here the infantry advanced at son* distance in rear of the tanks , a distance greater than that employed by the other divisions and greater than that used during the preparatory training at Wallly Ii6f) , Here a uenran officer serving , single hence d , a fieid-g.m in ivosision *cMnd a slope out a lie the village of Flesijuieres , knocked out a number of tanks , at point-blank range , as they topped the slope (155) . Sotos British writers place the cumber at not le^s than 16 (156) . As the tanks were pat out , the German machine guns went into operation until threatened by the next tanV: , Fhe Infantry advance was held up by this machine-gun fire (167) , ?anks \i*r* in and out of Fie osier s a throughout the day , driving the Oermana into the cellars } the 51st could do no more than obtain a grip on the outskirts , The backbone of the defense of this village was the Chateau , mrronnded by a stout wall which was impregnable to tanks (168) • flhe attack pushed on , however , to both flanks (159) . A reference to Hap No.2 will show that a ridgo , about one mile east of Plesquieres would shield the advance to the west , Before nightfall Oranicourt was captured by the 62d Division , Some tarica and In fan cry advanced farther forward and. entered Anneux , but that village was not wholly oleared that evening because the 63d Division was then exhausted , Several tanks pushed on towards Bourlon, Wood and the Cembral road without 153) Tu ,148; , 153) Bor,I6B; t i ,411 154) In ,492] 111,17?! Bne, 274| Bkr,369 155) Bor, 155j Doy,250} . Ti ,411 156) Bkr,289{ Ba»,275 167 I In ,492) 91 ,411; la ,149 156 Bor, 135) Ti ,4IIj Bns.375 169 En ,492) Bo r, 156 meeting opposition . Fhe infantry , exhausted , did not follow (160) , Flesquleres now well in rear of the British forward positions to the narrfcfc , and almost surrounded , nevertheless held and , at nightfall was still in German hands (I6l) , A German source states that so:ae of their wire corocunloatlons ware out by tanks early in the attack and that SOT* infantry regiments were thus unable to send back reports of the action (162) • Che tanks especially detailed to out gaps for the oavalry had succeeded In clearing three broad tracks , a cpiarier of a mile or. more wide , one In each seotion of the front (163) . But the cavalry was not there to take advantage of them (164) • It is reported that the Germans were later discovered to have been in confusion in Cambrai and even as far east as Le Oateau (165) , By 4:00 FM twilight was rapidly falling , Phe tank orewe were exhausted because of the extreme heat , oramped quarters and the Jolting • Most of the tanks had been running for at least W hours , All of them wer* out of gasoline , water and atmunltion . Many had developed mechanical troubles and nany machines had been destroyed (166) • One tank officer reports that nearly 40 of the 1st Brigade tanks had been hit and disabled and that , in his opinion , probably not half of the original 378 fighting tanks w*re then in condition for further use (without repalr*)(lS7) , During the night , however , the fittest orewe ware selected , oorcpoelte companion organized , tanks refuelled and restocked and preparations made to continue the a'.tack on the Vj Bor,I56j 11,413; Bne,276; Wll,I77| Ju ,349 161) En ,492} Soy,350 162) Rv ,19 163) liar, 48j Ptt , 150) Bkr, 271} Ik , 9 Z64) Bkr, 271; Bne,S79 165) P»t,465j Bne,278 Wi% _ „ 166) Sn,492| Id ,150; Bne,278,280-88Ij Wll,l77 167) Bn*,28I - 23 21st (168) • 3br 20 November the British casualties were approximately 4000 (169) , 8000 Gorman prl»on»r§ , more than 100 guns and gr«at masses of other material , Quatarmaster stores , oanteens and hospitals had been captured (170) . On the rooming of 2Iet November , the at task was continued (171) • No fresh (rested) troops were , however , available for the attack (172) • Detachments from all three tank brigaiee wen* Into action , Composite companies of tartfcs were employed with new Infantry inlts (ie.unlss with which they hod not been employed on the previous day)(173) , On the British right , Captain Browne reports , tanka of F Batts^tllon attacked from Marcoing against the Beaurevoir-Maanierea Line *?ut the Infantry , a brigade not employed the previous day , and unaccustomed to operating wtch tanks , failed to cooperate and the attack was a failure (l?4) , In the center the 2d Tank Brigade employed 36 machines of B and H Battalions, 13 tanks of B Battalion surrounded Cantalgn and , against serious opposition , captured the village without lnfaniry assistance before noon (l?5) whereupon the infantry of the 51st Division occupied It (176) , Phis battalion also assisted in the capture of Noye lies .12 tank* of H Battalion attacked the village of Fontalne-Hotre-D«fl8 and , after severe fighting , drove out the German defenders late in the day , Phie village was then occupied by the Bristlsh infantry (17?) • On the Britleb left 23 tanks of D and 0 Battalions of the 1st Tank Brigade supported the 62d Division in Us attack to complete the capture of Anntux and to gain Bourlon Wood (I?3) * Annoux was successfully oocupied and part of the «* Beaurevoir -Hasaiiiards XAxm north of that village was gained , Tanks 163 111,181} Tk , 9; Pu ,160; Bne,38I 169 Mar, 67; Wil,I84j Id ,163 170 lu ,I62| Bne,27? and 276 f 111,184 Bor,I57j Ti ,431 173) Bkr, 373} Bne,378{ Wl 1,181 173) Wi 1,181; Bne.280 174) Bn»,2S0 175) Toj,199j,; ; , j 176 Bor, 157; Ti ,421 177) Bor,I6?j Ti ,42Ij I«?J,1M| Wll, 182) Bx»,280 178) ToJ,199 Bne,28X28X ; Ta ,15150 - 24 pushsd into Bourlon Wood , whioh was than pcouplad in forca by th* Oarmans , bat wara foroad to withdraw through lack of infantry fuj>rx>rt (179) , Early on 21 Horaoftar (toman rai/iforcaoants had baan rushad to tha thraatanai points and thair ra si stones stlffsnad throughout tha dafanslca position (160) . By tha night 21-23 Jforaa'sar tha original ilra-li'tdt of 40 hours bad axpirad . 2h» British CorroAndftr-io-Chlaf , who h«4 rcssrva* tha ri^bt to make tha d4«lsloa at that tlcia at to fu^ura action , fait «hat tha positions which ha than oocupiad co-.ild tot 'oa ha Id • It would ba naoassary aithsr to withdraw ttm% tha Tlas^uiaras Rld0» which wa« coiannndad *o/ tha Osrman position on Bourlen Bidgs or to ©ojuiiua tha aayanoo . Poasasslon of Bourlon Rid^a by sha British would gira than control of obsanration v*o ths north ,orar sha ground *.nicb slopsd gantly down to tha 8ans>a BWar \ it tvould probably cinsa tha abandonaat by tha Oarmans of chair positions for a eonsldarabla distanca to tha north • OBI ballavad that tha Oarmns showad so ma slgna of an intantion to withdraw , though th«y wara a*ara tha'; tha 0ar«ana forcas war* inorsaslng . Phs situation In Iialy and tha daslra to hold taraaa divisions from that front was also consldsrad • Two British divisions , prarioualy undar ordars for Italy had , on 21 Vorea'rtr , bsan placaA at Flald Marshalt Haig's disposal • Ba bsllavsi that tha prosptet of ssourlng tha dsolslva grounl around Bourlon was good and so daoldad to continue tha ops rat ion to gain that ground (I8l) • (179) Bor,l87, ft ,421; Bna,2ai (ieO) Doyt258j Her, 272 (Mi) Bor,I69 and 160 | f i |4 24j flow,232 and 233 - 23 ZZ Vortotor vii tpont , *>y sao *ri;ir(#l , *ltb 34 tbt Mt«^r of tfa* 5Ut Division (o r*f*ii tmks of tb» 3d Y«fe Brl^U# *hlch*M t«ft forward » In (hit •«* Mta^k (183) « Ot»p#r*(« fluting # in on! of tb» 24 In of UtfMtr? *al att with th# (op itorlaf of «n! down on thft topt of r'n« *•/&• of tint* tb« infentr/ , folio*l-^j sb«s , 4rlr#r» oat (144) , Too British d -tor115 (165) , At *hlch It it reforfrl that If t* 183 Bor,I69j fi ,4^6; Bno,26I 1«J,Wj f 1 ,427j Bor,I60t 200,381 *64 Ttt.ISOj 111,182; loo, 331 165 ftO U ,427} Ttt ,150 111,182? 167! 166 Botl^82i fi ,160} 111,183 169: *i ,427 and 429 { Bo*, 233 -26 oot'n villu&M r**ali»d in Otr«*nfeAVU'(190 ) , Iu tb0 iritWh ma b«14 » protvnuut.i tallent (••• iUp Io,2) .It had 'bMn rt»wi/ eonMlids^l • On tbt nw55j t wh«r« cott of tb# troop* h*d ***** *nc*&& t it *At h«14 in t(rtn^th ba& on V* tontMMt , »btr« oaly d#«l^>r/ tifrtinz h«d occur* 1 af^«r c'c« firct ligr of tht *rtack v 1» **» t'nlnV t*U (192) , Kott of to* ta-lc* w«ro out (193) . Eovlaad point* out th*^ tbt Covwnltfr-ln-Chitf failtd to orguiso ti» ••li#nt la 4«p$h or #r#n to arrtnm tot troops in t'aet aaui-wr (194) • On 30 Jfar«x"9«r tb« Ofntant laanebid A vi^rout eount«r*«Mck thorU7 af'««r dvli^t . It »M «Tid«i;ly thtlr intontioa to pinch out th# Brici«h iftlUat by coxrorglng attacjce . 0o« Attach »aj l«nnoh«d In ?*c« dlr*c$ioa Boulon - B*rrincourt sod th« otbtr in the g*ntr«l dlroction KMnUrti - Mfts-on-Cottturo , fhi« atfcasfc caw at a turprlM ;o tho BrltUh though a G*r**M coun^rattack *a* oxptet«d b#for« long • Oo tba norvh tb» British lint hold and tho Gevxan* war* rspalMi . On fh* south*a*t , how*r*r , a sorlous brotfedoim occurred . fhtro tbo ootmto rat tack , prododod V a short art! liar/ propagation and assisted b/ a groat aootor of low-flying planes , pas had through rapid 1/ • T111«r*-0ai»laln and Oonnsliou ««r4 oarrlod In tho first rush • Xarl/ In «h# do/ Oon*saacourt also was oapturod « It was a rapotitlon , on (190) foj,199f Bor,!62{ 11 ,429 430 j T* ,151 (191) fd ,I6t| 800,232; 111, I S3 (192) Bor, 163) l i 1,18Sf Tu , 161 (193) 804 (191) (194) Bow, 234 - 27 a smaller scale , of the British surprise of 20 Hovapber . Dumps of supplies and a great number of guns were lost in the first few hours (195)* The roads to the west were , according to one British officer , ehooked with stragglers and transport retreating (196) • The tank brigade neatest this German penetration was the 3d , concentrated at the railhead at Fine • The whole brigade was preparing to entrain for the rear . Almost every machine was at least partly torn down , being refitted , or with its engine undergoing repairs .There were none readym for action . The first notification reoeived by this brigade came by telephone at 9:55 AM from il l Corps , Within about 3 hours 36 ttrice of A and B Battalions wars moving towards Gouaeaucourt and within about two hours more 20 additional rnaohines of H Battalion followed . Gouxeaucourt was , however , reoaptured before fcv* arrival of the tanks which then patrolled beyond the village as a screen to oover the defansa (197) , On T December a composite detachment of A and B Battalions assisted the dismounted 5th Cavalry Division to dear Gauche Wood • Attempts | on the same dnj» , by the Guards , supported by tanks from H Battalion , to recapture Yillers-Ouislin and Gonnelieu were held up by direct machine-gun fire (198) .i n both attacks the units of the boldly 2d Tank Brigade actedfeedtyr and did serious daaage to the strong German forces (199) . Flo Id Marshall Baig reported that a single tank put out 16 German machine-guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Germans (200) • Caere was no further German advanoe in that area * Bourlon Wood was abandoned and the salient contracted to the line indicated on Map 2fo«3« Bor, 164 166} Ftt , 151} Bkr, 274) Wl 1,185} How, 234 [196 Bor, 166; Wi 1,185 186; Fu ,TBI 162 J Bn»,2e3 ior,I68i Wil,I6?j Bne,283j 7a ,152 (199) Bor, 158} Fa ,152} Bne,284; Wl 1,189 (200) Bor,168 - 28 The retirement commenced on the night 4-5 December and was concluded by the morning of,? December (201) , Through faulty distribution of orders the tank units in that area ware late in learning of the plan to withdraw . Numbers of the machine a were dismantled for repairs and could hot be reassembled in time to pul). out , Many tanks , therefore , had to be abandoned (202) . There was no further fighting , in that battle , for the lank Corps . A tank officer states tkat the 2d and 3d Brigades were then withdrawn to winter quarters at Bray and that the 1st Brigade remained flor about two weeks in a defensive position in Dessart Wood and was then withdrawn to the rear (203) . ANALYSIS AMD CRITICISM « The original intention of the rank Corps in planning an attack in the Caribrai seotor was evidently to put on a demonstration to show the power of tarka under favorable conditions , in the hope that thin would prove to the British military authorities their value and mate* possible an increase in the site of that branch (204)« Pro par provision was made , in the OHO. plan , to stop the attack if" it were not progressing satisfaotdrily (205) • it is believed # however , that proper provision was not made for the exploitation which was contemplated , in that the troops alloted to the Third Army wert not sufficient to carry out the entire plan (206) , It it believed that 201 Bor,I69{ Bkr,3?4; ¥11,186; Rv ,176 202 Wil,X68{ Bk?t275 203 .Bae,264 • . , ;,, • , , - . , „ .. .• , , 204 1U ,136 and (6)(?)(9)(IO)(II)(I3) and (16) above (205 Bor,I52{ Xii ,112s *i ,400 (206) Bn ,491; Bor, I68j Ba*,253» Ti ,432 - 29 the Third Army plan was defeotive because ii put all of Its infantry and tank strength into the assault , leaving no general reaerve of either (207) . Oru* historical account states that it was against expert adrice that all of the tanks were put in the assault , aid spread out over the entire froat (208) tut no statentnts are found in the accounts written* by tank officers which show that they had , at that tiae , any idea of holding out a reserve .It would appear that they** accepted the final plftn without reservations and thought that they had at ljfast been given frhe opportunity for whioh they had waited so long (209) . The preparations for the employment of the tartcs * were particularly thorough (210) and were carried out without the knowledge of the Oernans (2Il) • Weather conditions , for some days preceding the ati*ck,were particularly favorable to the British (212) but the maintenance of seoreoy evan with that assistance was in itself a remarkable tohievetosnt • Sonoe of the detraining points were within G kilometers of the German lines (see Map No.3) practically within the range of any 3" guns , inVa position well forward and well within the possible range of larger calibre* . A .' \ S ; ' - <./••• • •• -•••- '•}' i • •• reference to this sane map shows that probably only one (Bertinoou^t) could .. . : > , " . :. •): ;• • :"'%:••• ••. - - • • W . actually be seen from the German position and the tanks were , of course , brought in under cover of darkness . But the area had been oooupied praoticaMy unchanged for many months (213) so that all of these railway have been actually plotted on fire-control traps . The British probably relied upon the fact that bh'.U front was always very (207) Bn ,491 492 ; Mar, 23; Bkr,263 1208) En ,491 209) Bkr,256 257 ; Bv\et254 210) See pa$ea 9 to 19 above . 1211) P* , 18; Bom, 61J Hin,39I; Ti ,407j Hbw,232 (212) Tl .145; Rv , 41) Bkr,26I A 267 (2X3) Bne,25I ('214) Bne, 251 k 252 - 30 from Perrons north (reached from the southwest) and from Bapauice east must have been available (See Map No.l) • The tank assembly areas were within three to six and a half kiloraetars of the British front lines (See Map Ho.3) . They must certainly have be^n within the range of most of the forward German guns , Phe maximum speed for the tanks was only 3.7 miles per hour (115) bub even with that speed the assembly areas could have been much farther to the rear and stil l have 'permitted the tanks to reach the line of departure during the twelve hours or more of darkness (216) . The storage of all tank supplies at the actual assembly areas is considered to be a disadvantage . Not only were they within German artillery range but the accuiailation of such a large mass of supplies so close to the front necessarily made the concealment of the assembly areas that ttuoh more difficult . AUplane observation at that time was , of ocurse , much less effective than now but Che heavy fogs which practically prevented German observation during the period of this forward movement and assembly were probably of greater assistance to the British than even they realised at the tin* . The ground over which the i.bttck was made was favorable for the action of tarka (217) The British attack was a strategical surprise because no attack in that area was even suspected by the Germans until it was Just about ready |m jump off (218) . <)n 16 November the Gerian Saoond Army announced that no major offensive along their front was indicated , that no prepararions had been discovered (219) , On Id November a German (216) Fa 'I 44 (216) S*e (141) and (166) above (317) 8es (32) and (33) above iilB) Hin,39I| Rv , 4Ij Rom, 61; How,232 (219) Rr , il| Wil.IW - 31 raid captured a number of prisoners (320) but they were apparently tent; back bo Array Headquarters , Phe Germane learned of the presence of sort* British tanks but by the time word had been sent to the front lines the attach had started (231) , The attack was also a tactical surprise because the Germans had expected to be warned of any attack |gr a long preliminary bombardment (322) . Farther , the Germans knew that their trenches were vider than the span of the British tanks and felt secure from a successful penetration (223) , Phe initial success of the British was due almost altogether to this surprise attack of the tanks , and tanks alone made this surprise possible (224) • Tanks demonstrated their ability easily to clear passages through the toughest of wire-entanglements , thus to a great extent taking over the mission of the preparatory »rtillery bombardment (225)« With a long preparation surprise would hare bean lost • A tremendous saving of a/munition «Aee resulted also fro-a this substitution . It was estirated that It would have required several weeks bombardment and scores of thousands of tons of ammunition to have cut adequate gaps in this wire b} artillery fire (226) , The detrimental effect upon the morale of the {toman troops caused by the »ase with which the tank3 pushed through the heavy , broad , wire entanglements and over the wide , deep trenches and by the impotence of the Infantry against these machines was very great • It Is safe to say that the panic within the German position on the , • . . . t (220) Rv,A | rvi,147j Wil.173} Bne, 271 (221) til, K \ and 174 | Fa ,147} Bne, 271 (223) HIn,392; Rv 19 I See also (45) and (46) above ;224) Hda,"61J it ,408 and 418 j Bor,I57 V225(225)} E*•»v |, I9**Ji Boy,247sjvjfVMt ; 91,408} Bor, 154 and 167} How,833 (228) Iu ,145} Mar, 5fi -32 first day was due altogether to the operation of the tanks (227) , The helpful effect upon the morale of the British troops was very noticeable (228) , It is worthy of note , however , that during this same battle the fear of the ta fc on the part of the German soldier had been conquered to some extent at leait , On 23 November German infantry , in close combat , repulsed the tank attack against Fontalne-Notrt-Dam* and inflicted heavy casualties upon the tanks (229) , The tanks ware particularly effective in putting out machine* guns and in protecting the Infantry against hostile machine-gun fir* where the Infantry followed olosely behind the tanks (230) , When the infantry followed so far in rear that the German machine-gun/had time , af;«r the tatk had been put out or had passed on and before the arrival of the infantry , to put their guns into action , sever* infantry casualties resulted and the advance was checked .This was well illustrated on 20 November at Fles^uieres (231) . Tanks were shown to be particularly valuable to artillery fir** When struck by direct hits they were destroyed or at least put opt oi action (233) . On 20 November no less than 16 tanks were knocked out by one field gun (233) « tanks wer*Lsuccessful in pushing through Flesquieret on 20 November because of the stout wall around the chateau (234) « On the other hand when they were able to go around a villas* and threaten it from the flanks and rear they were more successful , as at Havrinoourt on 20 November (236) • (227) Rv , 19 and 42 ; Hin,392; Bcr,269 (226) Ti ,408; Bkr,269; Pa , 155 (229) Ta ,150; Wi1,132} Bne.231 r230) fl ,407,408,414} Fa ,137; Bar,168 Bn ,42|acr,269r CIN ! (232 Bor,IfiSBn ,492|acr,269| Doy,250r ; CiM"Ti ,411 ! ; Jfc'il*** Bn*,274-27Bj Wil,177 Bkr.269; Bne,275 234 Bor, 155; Pi ,4II;Bne,375 (236 Wll,182i IV',160; Bne,2ei (236 Bor,l56; fi Ml - 33 If the infantry of the 51 it Division had been following In close support of the tanks in the attack against Flesquleree on 20 November i t seems safe to conclude that the heavy tank losses would not have oocared , Ihey followed too far in rear and there was apparently a lack of cooperation between tanks and infantry (23?) . A few riflenren , working ahead to the crest eouth of Flesquleree should have Veen able to pick off the German gunner and thus enable the tajiks to advance without being engaged by a field-gun at short range (238) , Late in the day , 20 November , the tanks pushed son* distance ahead of the exhausted Infantry but , being unsupported , were forced to withdraw (239) , Some dosage was done by the tanks to German wire conriunications (240) but evidently that was incidental , Accounts by cank officers do not indicate that such a mission was given to any tanks . OapB in the wire entanglements were cade for the oavalry as planned (241) . Consideration of the reasons why the oavalry was not sent through for exploitalon , then or later , is outside the ecope of this study , The olose of the first day's fighting , 20 Novenfcer , left tbt British in control of the Geroan position to a depth of about five miles , at the point of greatest penetration (242) , Over 100 German guns and somewhere between 5000 and 8000 prisoners had been captured (243) . Che total British casualties ware 4000 (244) . This success was the equivalent of months of heavy fighting at the expense of (237) Xn ,492; Ax ,149; M ,411) Wil.I??; Her, 269 (238) Bkr,269j Bne,2?5 (239) Doy, 240 j Bor,I5£; Bne,2?6; Wll»ir? 240) Rv » W 241) Mar, 48; Fu ,150; Bkr,27I 1242} Bor, 167; Fu , 162; Hi 1, lU 243) lu ,152] BMt27?{ Cl ,418 l244) liar, 6?; Fu ,153} Wi 1,184 heavy losses of men , materiel , and ammunition on the Somne and at the Third Battle of Ypres (345) , Many officers felt that on 20 November an opportunity existed , if only some general reserve* had teen available , to make a successful break-through and exploitation , that the Bourion position and eveii Cambral could have been captured (246) • No such reserves were available (247) . Phe Connander-in-Chief, in fels estimate of the situation at the close of fighting on 21 November , emphasised the great importance of the contending terrain - Bourlon Ridge (See page 25 above) , It eeeme reasonable to conclude that with sonre reserves of infantry and tanks this position might easily have been captured on the first day of fighting , Tank casualties on the first day of the attack were heavy , possibly as great as one-half the total number in action (248) . On 21 November the tanks employed were foraed into composite companies ) they operated for the most part with new (Vat not fresh) infantry units , There was apparently eone lack of cooperation between the two branches (249) . As on the preceding day tanks pushed well forward of the tired Infantry but , unsupported , were forced to wlthdra*r(26C), German reinforcements had been rushed to threatened points and on 21 November their resistance stiffened (251) . After 20 November all of the fighting becan* looallted around a small number of Important positions most of which ware finally held by the Germans , Certainly after the morning of 23 November the attack (345 Kn ,492; Mar, 57; IM ,153 (246 Bkr,27I; Bne,27f; Pat, 465 (24? In ,491; Mar, 23; Bkr,263 248 Xtt,,492j Ja ilROj 111,177; Bad, 281 249) Bne,2e0j (260) Bor, 157; fi ,421} Bne,28I 1251) Soy, 258; Bkr,2?2 cannot be considered a coordinated one (252) , Wie tanks employed after 20 November were composite units , sent in wherever It seemed they could do the most good at the time (253) , At a result the team work between tanks ani infantry was not of the best (254) 9 One reason for the initial success of the tanks was that the Germans in this seotor had paid but little attention to anti-tank measures except that they had trade their tranches so broad and deep that they felt reasonable secure against these aachinee • At the tirte of this battle they had no dependable antidote for tanks (255) , Evidently minefields were not employed and anti-tank guns were not available In any quantity (256) . It had been thought, prior to this battle , that if the tanks broke through the main trench systems and the infantry went on through the latter would be able to advance , in the mobile warfare beyond , without the assistance of tanks , Since there was no real break-through with adequate forces , In this battle , no test of this theory was possible but such troops as did paes through were held up quite easily by machine-guns that had been rushed to these gaps (257). , One British officer states that he observed the advance of 21 November from a good OP on Fles^uieres Ridge .I n describing the cooperative action of tanks and infantry he states that when the German machine-guns opened fire , the infantry took cover • Phe tanks then hunted out the maohine guns whloh ceased fire when the tanks earae near them , Phe infantry was then able to advance , even before the noaohine-guns had been destroyed (258) , ;^2 Lu jI12i Xn ,498 253 Bee(249) and pages 24-37 above , 254 Lu ,IJ8{ Bne,28I-283| Ju ,150 Mar, 20,22,34} Bne,25I ,266 Mar,, 2222 anandd 3344 (25?) Hot, 168} liar ,23 (258) Hot,I68-Ift9 Vary little cant* deduced concerning the value of tanks in the defense , in breaking up hostile attacks . ?he tanks , having been withdrawn some distance behind the lines before 30 November , did not arrive on the battle-field until the Gerrtan counterattack had been stopped ; the British infantry , counterattacking in turn , had even regained some ground (Goucecourt)(259) • The initial attack , 20 November , was an overwhelming success , but certainly the battle &s a whole cannot be considered to be a British victory • Fhe part played by the tanks cannot be divorced frotti the action as a whole so son* consideration mist be given that • It seems just to state that a break-through might well have resulted if sons general reserves , including tanks had been available , Field Marshal von Hindenburg writes chat a breach in the German lines appeared to be a certainty , but that the subordinate commanders on the English side had not been equal to the demands and possibilities of the situation . By neglecting to exploit a brilliant initial success they had let viotory be snatched fsem then by troops which were far Inferior to their own in numbers and in quality , Phe British high command seemed to have failed to oonoentrate the resources required to secure the execution of their plans and their exploitation in case of success (260) • Tank officers seok to escape all ->larre for this failure • They conplain tfe«t of the lack of general reserves (261) , and that critiolfitt is Just . Fhey state t'nat at the close of the fighting on 20 November the battle was tactically finished as far as tanks wsre (269) Bor,I65; 111,186} Br»,263 (260) Bin, 392) (261) Bkr,258 and 263; Mar ,28; Bne,?53 and 266 - 37 • coiLerned 'because there were no tank reserves (263) • Britlib QBO; v u undoubtedly at fault In that sufficient troops were not alloted to the Third Arogr for this attack (26ft) , the Fhtrd Army was certainly at fault in having employed its entire strength In tanks ana* Infantry in the assault without balding cut son* general reserve (2*4) » But the Tank Corps also was at fanlt in that they apparently accepted the plan of the Phii4 Aray as their own plan , Sot only does there appear to be no evidence of any protest against this use of the tanks but , on the contrary , tank officers seem to have felt that they finally had Just the opportunity which they desired (265) . Since BourIon Ridge was the decisive terrain feature (266) and since a good approach for tanks existed along the ridge fro^ Havrlncourt north to BourIon Ridge (8ee Map ffo.2) , the tank effort should have been concetrated on the west flank , It was undesirable to etcploy any ta-fce east of the general line Tillers - Pleuich - Marcoing because tb«y would have to operate In a email pooket and would run up against the unfordable Canal de L'Eeoaut within 4500-8000 yards of the line of departure . It was unnecessary to eaploy then in that pocket beoaue* as soon as Flesquleres Ridge wee gained the German position opposite Oomelleu - Tillers - Plouich , threatened from the flank and rear , would have to be abandoned • Any tank plan met necessarily be based upon the general attack plan of the aray • It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the latter in detail but assuring , inasmuch a* the deoleive terrain feature was the Sourlon Ridge and lnasnuoh as the) 262! lu ,160) WU,I77| Bne,2?9 In ,491j fine, 253 26*; In ,491j liar, 23; Bkr,263 265! Bkr, 256-2571 (266) Bor,I59fI60) 11,424 be»t approach to thatwa* by way of the ridge north froat Havrineourt t that the army wa* to sake its *alri effort In that direction , and a**uadng further that ton* general raMrvi wa* to be held out , it It possible &o outline briefly a plan for the employment of taifc* which eeeue preferable to the one actually need . Only *low tank* were available , but there were a cuff ioient naxber of then: eo that it would probably hare been profitable to hare employed eone ae leading tank* . Two battalion* would have been sufficient for tbi* purpoae * fheyw would operate in the tone Tillere- Plouioh * Ifentaine-Hotre-Dane (both inoluelve) on the eaet , and B.U. 107-e( 1000 yarde west of Havrinoourt) - Deligny Mil 1(2000 northweet of Sourlon Tillafi) on the weet , a xone about 5700 yarde wide • Ibey would break through all the organised defenses , attack the artillery position* , important eocmand posts , wire coatf.unication* , and any hostile reserve* located and then atseohle tinder cover eouth of Bourlon Bii ^ . It might even have been possible , ruder the oonditlon* which existed on 20 November , to have driven out any German force oooupying Bourlon Ridge and , by continued attack* , have prevented that force from reoocupying the position until the arrival of the leading Infantry el*cent* , five battalions would have been sufficient a* aecoopanylng tank* , leaving two battalion* in reserve , probably army reserve , for futufre exploitation • (The strength of the tarfc* held in reserve would , of course , 'tepend upon the strength of the Infantry reserve) . This would have required very littl* if any change in the allotment of accompanying taice to the division* attacking weet of Tillers - piculch , becauee the Third Tank Brigade , oon«i»lting of (wr b& eta lion* , operated initially almost altogether eaet of that village . In thla propOMd ohange^hese four battalion* , instead of attacking where tank* were really not needed , would have been put to good tvee . While conclusion* ae to the reeultt to be exp*oted from this proposed pl«a •?• eptculative, It seem* *afe to state that it would have been more effective then the plan actually pat Into operation . IT 0010108X098 OF fHK ADFHOB . That tha British attac'r w#* both a strategical and a text leal aupprie* was do* chiefly to the elimination of tha preparatory artillery bou&ardaant which in torn was Ana altogether eo the substitution for it of tanka to olaar passages for tha Infantry through tha wire enianjleosnts . fhia ia beliered to ba tha outstanding feature of tha Firat Battle of Central . It ia an excellent exaaple of tha principle of surprise . PrTor to ehia battle , during the period of Itabiliiatloa , aurpriiia waa con*li»re^ to ba inpoa tibia bacauaa it vaa ball era d that a long arti)2ary boaAardjtent waa nacasaary to olaar paaaa£fd in tha hoatJla wlra antanglaasanta . fanka dasonatratad thair ability \A daatroy thla wira , ani toarafora to mke potaibla tha alittlnation of all artillary preparation . rhia pr< vad chat aurprita in tha attack agalnat a highly organiied position or *oaa wat faaaibla . fha usa of tarirt along tha antira front of tha attack lad to diiparaion of affort • It aada ioiijostiVla tha holding oat of adequate f*rt9» for posaibla exploitation • While it provided great aasiataa«a to all infantry aaaanlt unite 6n tha firat day , it failed to prorlde tha aaxiousc aasiatanoa to what should hare been tha sain affort • fha attack had no great drlre after tha firat day and aa a result tha daeieive terrain waa neyer entirely ?al.-» - 46 thin battle does not provide sufficient basis for any sound conclusion regarding the advantages which might hare been gained by tbs use of sen* of the available slow tanks as leading tarfct • Ihe overwhelming success on the first day of the attack was doe (aside froa the surprise gained by tanks) ttetlMgreat offensive power of tanks when attacking over ground favorable to their employ cant , and when unopposed by effective anti-tan's measures « Provision Bust be maav , in the defense , to secure adequate anti-tank protection • Lack of such provision on the part of the Geroons violated she principle of security • The only serious check on the first day of the attack , at Flesquieree , was due largely to the lack of cooperation between Infantry and tanks ; the latter require the close support of infantry for chair own protection , Infantry oust be dependei upon to put out the personnel operating anti-tank guns at close range . In open ground the tanks Dad* the advance of the Infantry comparatively easy . Hot only did they clear passages in the wire entanglements but they also put out the oaehine cunt which were endangering the Infantry advance , Where the infantry followed closely enough so that the hostile machine-gunners ware unable to get into action again after the tanfcs had passed , the combination was very, successful , This system was used along crost of the front , and illustrates the principle of cooperation . In the few cases where the •Infantry followed at such a distance that the eneoy machine-gunrars were able to get into action after the tarfes had paesed over and before the infantry arrived , the advance was checked . Close cooperation between Infantry and tanks le therefore essential for the ocn*.u«l protection of the ewo branches . Combir-sd training is a great assistance in obtaining this cooperation , All of the tanks employed by the British were slow tanks . Where they pushed forward , well aheal of the infantry , they were finally forced to withirnr , rank* catnot hold ground . Blow tanks are incapable of indeptndent action for long periods . Ihey ehould therefore be ettployed chiefly as an auxiliary to the lnfarr.ry . - 41 Tanks are not well sullied for employment within stone villages. Finks suffered heavy casualties from artillery fire ; they are r-arfciculijrly vulnerable to such fire . Counterbattery missions of friendly artillery are a vital neocesalty in assisting the advance of tanks , particularly of tanks which mat move slowly within restricted areas as did all of the tanks on the first day of tho battle .(This was due partly to the fact that they were incapable of rooving rapidly and partly to the fact that they were all used as accompanying tarks )• Some confusion resulted within the German position through the disruption of tfire comaunications whioh were incidentally destroyed , Sons talks should have the mission of destroying hostile wire co - 42 Si&fcio2 SAPHY B I« LuoaalLt.Ool,t l!he Evolution of Paobioal Idoas dnPrimoa and Germany During )he War of 1914 - 1918 » L»or«alt , Paris I923(Translated by Major P.V.Xieffer-1925 . 2. Reloheftrtfhit •j«3chlacten das WelBcriegas. Band 31 :«Die Tanksohlaoht bei Carabrai ,20-39 November 191? .* Gerhard Stalling , Berlin 1989 , 3. Boras ton, J.H. j "Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (Deo.I9I5 - April X0Z9) E.P.DuttoaA Co.,New York 1919 , 4, Haig,Field Marshal Sir Douglas * "Features of the War" Transoript published by the War Department Washington D.C, 1919 , 5, Doyle,Conan !"Source Record^ of the Great War , ?ol ? ,"Phe Surprise At took at Cambrai B.Kdicor;C,P.Horn»» National Alu/tni 1923 . 6» Doyle,A.Conan "A History: of the Qreat War Tol.t? Phe British Campaign in France and Flanders Z9I7 ••* Oeorge H, Dor an Co., New York $. 1919 . 7* Ton Bindenburg (Marshal t Source records of the Great War V The Surprise Attack at Cambrai " Kditor:C»T.Rorne .National Alumni 1923 , 8, Buchan, John :"A History of the Great War 7ol 17" Houghfeon.Mifflln Company , Boston 1922 9. Encyclopedia Briitanica •^ew Vol.I 10. Phe ?iE»s*:*rhe Times History of the War Yol.XYI "The Tims , London , 1918 , 11. Hovrland,C.R. »"A Military History of the World War "The General Service Schools Press , Fort Leaverworth,Kansas % IS* Tank Sohool • tfank- History ," British Tan^s in the World War ." Tank School , Camp Meade Md, 13. Willimn-Ellis.MaJor 0 lough and t The Tank Corps" George H.Doran Co» E A, New Tork, 1919 , 14, Fuller, J.F.C. \"Parka in the Great War • I9I4-I9I8" John M|wrr»7 London, 1920 15, Beker-Oarr,0»D.i»Froai Chauffeur to Brigadier" Brnest BtnrtLtd,, London 1930, 16, MArtel,O.Leq.r«In the Wake of the rank • Sifton Prade & Co., London 1931 , 17, Browne,D,G,!"The Pa* in AotionWilliftm Blaokwood and Sons , London 1920 , 18, Tank Corps Journal • - »ta*fe Aotions During NoTettberTank Corpi Jo'Arnal(Br4tish),November 1983 , 19, Milicar - WoohenbUtt* fApplioation of the Ltssone from the T?ark Battle at Oarobrai • Miiitar .- Woohenblatt ,Ho 24/114,20 Deo, 1929» 19• (Continued) Abstracted by Lt.ColiK.L.Ombar , In Beview of Currant Military Writings Ho,37 , page 61 . The Co.tirand and (tonert.l'Staff 8ohool , Fort Jsavenworth Kansas • 30, Pate r*on, General :«rhe Surprise At^aok on Cambrai , 1917 "British Cavalry Journal Vol.XIII , Ootober 1933 (pagtt 464 - 465 ,) 21, Hobblack,Fjl» :"Rocolieotions of Carabrai 1917 • . Tank Corps Journal (British) , Nov«mb«r 1923 « : • Author or compiler not listed K§y i (Iu,H2) s No.I Text (below) , page IIS . I* L*,» Luoas, Lt.Col.r •The EroJtution of Tactical Id*a« In and Germany During the War of I9I4-29I6 " • 2, HT. -Reiohsar«hir ; "Schlaeten des Wertfckrieges.B, and 31 »Die TankschUeht bei Cam'brai,fcO-29 November I9I7, 3, Bor.-Boraston,J.H. j*Slr Douglas H&ig'e Despatches »• 4, Hg ,-Ealg,Field Marshal Sir Douglas !*Featuree of War ." 5, Ptyt Doyle,Conan tThe Surprise Attack at Catnbrai «" 6, Doy,-Doyle, A. Co nan t"A History of the Great War YolIY The British Campaign in France and Flanders 191?,a 7« Hin.-yon Hinderiburg,Marshal !*Ph* Surprise Attack at Canbral • 8« Ba, -Buohan.John, «"A History of the Great War •" 9* Sri, -Encyclopedia Brittanica,new volums I , 10, 71, -lines (London} :"The Tiros History of the War Tol XYI," 11, How.-Howland,C.R. t"A Military History of the World War ." 12, Tkc -Tank Sohool(USA): "Tank History" 13, Wil.-WilliMDt-ElH»,Major Clough ) "The Tank Corps .• 14. Tu, -Fulle>,J.F.Ciiii^. ; Tanks in the) Great War 1914-19IB.« 16, Bkr••Baker-Cars?, 0,D,/1 "Froai Chauffeur to Brigadier • 16, Mar.-Martel.O.teQ.,: "In the Wake of the Tank ," 17, Bne.-Browne,D,0, t«The Tank in Action ," 16, foJ.-Cank Corpb Journal(British) : "Tank Actions Daring November," 19, Bom,-«Applioatlon« of the Lessons fro.-n the Tark Bat4* at Oambral 30. Pat .-Patter son, Oon&ral ; The Surprla* Attack on Cambrai ,1917 .* 21, Hot,-Hotblack t*Reoolleotlon» of Cambrai , 1917 ," dr MAPflOI General Map r Arras - ST.Qnentin Front 20 November Z9I7 Oraphio so ale on sketch Copied frora Karte 3 in "Sohlaohten des WeltkrUges , Band 31 : Die ffankethlaohb Ui Cambral 1917 . RstohiarohtT • Gerhard Stalling , Berlin , 1929 . Only suoh data as seemed of Importance in the Ganbral battle was oopled in the attached sketch » Tank Dttralnlng Points and A*a«uftly Araaa for tb« ?irit BA;6ld of So ale = I i 40,000 8oaro« ! Saa* as for Map No,3 MAP Front of the Main British Attack 20 Kors.aber 1917 - 1:40,000 Photograph of Map No.fi , fro'a Sir Douglas Balg'a DopatobM (D*oaX9I5 April 1919) , by J.R.Bor&oton . F.P.Dation & Co.,New York 1919 • rift****' 9.K. 3 III *>* Crtfl T-**'*7h Btltitli 4s*4»/f JivhUhs