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1933 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH a Critical Analysis of the Employment

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1933 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH a Critical Analysis of the Employment 60 IB - 1933 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH A Critical Analysis of the Employment of Tanke by th» British in the ' rat Battle of Camera! • Submitted "by The Connand and General St&ff Sohool Fort I* avenworth, Kansas Fort Loav^worth , Kansas , 73 May 1933 MEMORANDUM FOR : Th» Director Second Year Class , The Ccroanl and General Stafi Sohool , Fort Leavenvorth , Kansas . A Critical Analysis of the Employment of Pariks by tha British In the First Battle of Cambrai , I, PAKTCS ACCOMPANYING : 1. A Bibliography for this study . 2. Map No.I - (isneral Map : Arras-St.Often* in Front 20 November 1917 • 3. Map No,3 - Tront of the irain British Attack 20 November 1917 . 4 . Map No.3 - Tank detraining points and assembly arttas for Fi»st Battle of Cambrai • II. THE SPOT* PRESEfPED.— A critical analysis of th* enployment of tanks by the British in the Fiwt Battle of Cambrai , 20 Hovem>er - 6 Deceiver 1917 This study inolndas only the main battle between Canal de l'Esoaut and Canal du Nord and , withiii thafc area , the general progress of the battle and the action of other arms and services only insofar as is aeoessary in a consideration of b of tanks • III. HISTORICAL FACES RELATING K) PHE SUBJECT . Reasons for the Battle * During 1917 , until the Battle of Cambrai , while the tank enthusiasts were trying to develop their weapon and arrange for its use as they felt it •ho-.ild be employed , the theory of the annihilating preliminary artillery bambardusat controlled &11 attacks (l) . Surprise , particularly strategical surprise , was forfeited (8) .The long artillery preparation made the tone of advance almost impassable for artillery and transport (3) and that demanded a limited objootive (4) No exploitation was bailed for (5) . (1) LU,I08 and II3j Bat,249 , ' ^IHS SOLUTrO!! t!UST BS RETURtTCD FOR . (2) Bor|I57{iii^Z60) Tu,30I » FILD BY C:CO P.M., ON TH2 DAT"? C'\Otn (3) «n,490| Mar,53; Ik, 6) WH,I60 , PLEASE PLACE YOUR t;&\* c:i ro WR p/.c-S (4! la, 108 and/iwj Bm,249 and 250 . JUMjiHO ^2 W « BUT r? LOV F./.CS YOUR i:.vi**M (5] 8ame a» (4) SCiUriON MIEN RE(iUESTlKa A niv/IEH, - I ­ ixank Corps leaders believed that this weapon was tetter suited than was artillery for destroying the hostile defenses ; that It would not rcake the terrain Impossible for supporting artillery and the movement of supplies ; and'that only by its use would i t be possible to gain surprise (6) .Many of the leaders of the Vank Corps and others not comeo5ed with that branoh fslt , during the suorer of 1917 , that tanks had hover been given a fair chance to prove their value , that they had been used unier bondiUone entirely unfavorable to them (?) . At that time the rank Corps was still on probation (8), Within British GHQ, in franco there was opposition to any further Increase in tarfc produotlon » particularly after their failure at the Phlrd Battle of Tpres (9) , But the Panic Corps felt great oonflCenoa In this new weapon and was anxious to increase the number of machine a available for use in France , and to use them as thejr felt tanks should be employed (10) .I f they were to suooeeed in this , i t was first necessary to convince the authorities of the power and value of the tanlc (IX) , A big tank battle had for a long time been in tttt thoughts of the leader* of the Pank Corps (13) . the original plan for the tank battle at Cambrai was conceived by the Panic Corps which was also largely responsible ",r putting through the plan (13) • Lt.Col.J.T.C.Puller , Chief General Staff Officer of the Corps , states that the general area around Cambrai was seleoted by them as early &s II June 1917 (14) . Phe original plan of the Pank Corps called for a surprise raid , on a large soale , lasting about 24 hour's . PhA object was to be the destruction of the enemy's personnel and guns , the dencoraliaation and disorganisation of his fighting troops and reserves and nc>t the capture of ground . Phe plan 6) Pk,5{ Wil,I60 ; Pu, 135,133 and 30l{ Bae»250 and 352 77)) Doy,344Doy,344jj Bkr,265Bkr,265jj Bnei^49Bnei^49;; WiWiJ.ix,J , 88)) fttf , 64j BBne,5 } BkBkr , 355 00 and 3555 8) 111, I93J Bkr, 349; Bae, 5 10V^l38l) ^'35> ••. (13) En, 491} Wil,I60j Herf 256 (13) BAA,253j Bo, 491; 7a,139 (14) To, 137 and 138 [ths -plan provided for three sueoessivf waves of tanks in the$a&5aok , It WM planned to withdraw , at the end of the raid , to the position which had been previously occupied (15) , In September 1917 , Brigadier General H.I,Bll£s , cotooander of tht British Tank Corps , visited General Sir Julian Byng , commander of the Phird Aray which included the Cambrai area (16) , Phe proposed tank aotion WAS discussed and General Byng who desired to take the offensive, was convinoad of thft featlVnUy of the plan (17) , Undoubtedly he' very soon afterwards approached British <MQf on this natter but learned that no further attacks could be considered , at that time , outside! the Tpres area (16), OHQ later , on &> iotober , did approve the project and the data of attack was set for 20 November (19) , Oat i • • considerasion whioh influenced Field Marshall Sir Douglas Valg in his approval of the attack was that the recent Hussian collapse had already set fret large forces of German troops from the Fast and others would probably very soon bo available on the Western Front , making an Allied attaok there acre difficult (20) » Another faotor which nntt have influence A hi* to some extent was thai the 1'prec offensive , stil l continuing , was certainly not a success and any Brisilflh success would be something of an antidote (21) , British forces , The forces allofctd to General Byng for thii battle wero two corpe of three infantry divisions eaoh t a oavalry corps of two divisions , a little mare khan t thousand guns , and the entire Tank Corps (22) . The two corps shi lit and XV , were already part of his own Third Army and ware then engaged on the defense . No additional Infantry was allotsd to the Phird Army for this attack (23). Moat of the, six divisions hod cow from the Tpres Salient Kttt49ij TJt.C; fiui 16 111,16, 1 jj In*In,, 35 3 11 ti InI , 4^1 j BBne , 2*22*2 ; Bkr, 267 xa 1M, 139} Bkr;3S7| Wii^I6Z and 162; En,491 B5Bae,^533 j 111,161} lu,I400 11,399 and 4C0C0j Bor.ISIBISIj Bow. 223 and 226 In, 400} to, IIOj Doy, 23d and 339j Bne, 253 Bor,I53j ln,49I} 7U.I44; Bne, 265 33 Bor,I52; 1^^ 3 -3­ when they had suffered heavy casualties and had been withdrawn , Their ranks were filled with drafts without experience (24), Some of these divisions , however , were reported to have excellent reputations , namely the 29th (regular), the 6th (regular) and the 51st Highland .Territorial Division (25), The 12ta,20th and 29th divisions were in the III Corps and the 6th , 5I»t , and 62d in the IV Corps (26) « One historian olassed the Cambrai sector at that time as the Uecoa of every wearied and decimated unit withdrawn from the Salient (Yrres) for a rest ,{¥?) The rarfc Corps was organised into three brigades of three battalions each , with a total of 376 fighting tanks and 98 administrat­ ive machines , 4V6 tanks in all (28),The personnel strength of this corps was 690 officers and approximately 3500 enlisted men (39), The Tank Corps was coransnded by Brigaiier General H.J^iles (30) , the first lank Brigade Ijr Colonel C.D.Baker-Carr , the Second Brigade by Brigadier Gene?.tl A,Courage , the Third -y brigadier General J.Hardrese-Lloyd (31), rerraln . A good idea of the terrain may be obtained from Map Ho,3 • Tht ground was'favorable for the employment of tanks , It was well drained and oonsieted of rolling grass overai chalky dowrj« practically untouched by shell fire (32), Phe slopes were n&whera »«eep,(33) The Canal de VSsoeut on the east and t>» Canal du Nord on the west were obstaoUs to anyroovs'tuntacross them , particularly ol tanks , tut were also potential flank protection to any narro* British penetration , to the Wai lrt>l<*t* \v\d# Bfti, 36? »246-^565 Map Ho.I oia1 j • ' .I i Bne,3?0 Tk,l6} fti.IWj Bne,282 30] y, j Wil,r?4lr?4 j ^ (31 Mar,29{ VOtStii Wil.Pe and 106 33] Bor.ISIS j 11,3911399 and 404404) 1^,1441^144 ; V11.I63 33! fl,404{ 511,163; UapJTo.3 34 tl402j Bne,45Bne453 " * * - 4 ­ The Grand Ravin , a gently sloping valley , separated the German from the British poiitien in the sector just east of Canal du Nord . Jfee •mall i»6ream flowed aorose the front M the Canal de 1'Biouut near Maroolng , Co the north of this valley and from 60 to 90 feet higher lay the Tlesquieree - Havrinoourt Ridge , a long narrow spur •standing east towards Marco i$g , From Havrineourt a low ridge extended due north and joined the BourIon Ridge , which was the dominating terrain in chat area (35) . The highest ground wan south of the village of Bourlon , in Bourlon Wood , a thick wooded seotion with dense undergrowth (36) . Phle point overlooked the battlefield to tihe aouth as far as the FUsquleree Ridge and was rore than bO feet higher than the latter .
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