Tarasoff and Duty to Protect in North Carolina By

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Tarasoff and Duty to Protect in North Carolina By Tarasoff and Duty to Protect in North Carolina By: A. Keith Mobley, Eugene Naughton Mobley, A. K., & Naughton, E. (2011). Tarasoff and duty to protect in North Carolina. NC Perspectives, 4, 5-14. Made available courtesy of North Carolina Counseling Association (NCCA): http://nccounselingassociation.org/publications/journal/ ***© NCCA. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written permission from NCCA. *** ***Note: Full text of article below NC Perspectives • Fall 2011• Volume 4 Tarasoff and Duty to Protect in North Carolina A. Keith Mobley, PhD, LPC and Eugene Naughton, JD A counselor’s duty to warn and protect third parties of threats made by their clients has been a complex, frightening, and confusing topic since the landmark Tarasoff case in 1976. Although the implications of this case has been interpreted by a variety of state courts and legislatures, the tension between a counselor’s ethical and legal re- sponsibilities creates consternation for many counselors in North Carolina. This arti- cle reviews the background and implications of the duty to warn concept to counsel- ors specifically in the state of North Carolina and provides both proactive and reac- tive suggestions for managing encounters with potentially violent clients. Keywords: duty to warn, confidentiality, ethics In 1976, the California Supreme Court and who do not fully understand the limits of handed down its landmark decision in Tarasoff confidentiality in their state (Walcott, Cerun- v. Regents of the University of California, and the dolo, & Beck, 2001), including those in North effects of that decision are still felt today Carolina. across the nation in both the legal and coun- The extensive implications of the Tarasoff seling professions. Because any case decided decision is further complicated by the fact that by a state or federal court can create legal rip- neither the North Carolina Court of Appeals ples that extend beyond the original jurisdic- (the highest court in the state) nor the state tion of the court, one state’s court could be legislature has squarely addressed the Tarasoff applied to another state’s cases. Conse- decision. Our intention with this article is to quently, courts, scholars, and mental health ease some of the confusion by revisiting what professionals have struggled to understand the the Tarasoff decision entails, how courts and implication of the case and its impact on the legislatures across the country digested Tara- daily practice of counseling in the years since soff, and how North Carolina has dealt with Tarasoff. This case was such an important one issues raised in that decision to date. We also that the crux of that decision – that a clinician hope to discuss the ethical and practical impli- has an overriding legal duty to break confiden- cations raised by Tarasoff and suggest how tiality when a client makes a viable threat counselors in North Carolina can avoid ethical against a third party – remains problematic for pitfalls that Tarasoff-like situations might raise many counselors who are untrained in the law and ensure they are implementing best- Dr. Keith Mobley is a Clinical Associate Professor and Clinic Director in the Department of Counseling and Educational Development at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. He is both a Licensed Pro- fessional Counselor and Approved Clinical Supervisor. Eugene Naughton has a law degree and practiced in the DC Metro area for 12 years and is currently a child/adolescent clinician with Daymark Services in Lex- ington, NC. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Keith Mobley at (336) 334- 5215 or at [email protected] 3 NC Perspectives • Fall 2011 • Volume 4 practices in a proactive fashion. Moore requested that the police commit Pod- The goal of this article is to help counsel- dar to a mental hospital for observation. Cam- ors in NC understand the history and the im- pus police stopped and questioned Poddar but plications of Tarasoff case in our state and to released him after he denied any violent inten- differentiate legal requirements from ethical tions. The police advised Poddar to stay away imperatives in similar situations to that case. from Tarasoff. Poddar had no further contact We first provide a background of the Tarasoff with the police or the University Health Ser- case, describe the implications of the case de- vices. Subsequently, Poddar began stalking cision across the nation, and then discuss the Tarasoff, and in October 1969, Poddar en- interpretation of the case in the state of North tered Tarasoff’s home and murdered her with Carolina. We conclude this article with sugges- a kitchen knife. He was convicted of second- tions of how a mental health professional in degree murder, a conviction later reduced to NC can be proactive in dealing with situations manslaughter and ultimately reversed on error. involving threats of harm made by a client and The victim’s parents brought suit against review steps one can engage in if risk of harm the University of California, the campus po- toward others is assessed. lice, and the University Health Service clini- cians. In their complaint, the Tarasoffs alleged The Tarasoff Decisions: Case that the University clinicians ―did in fact pre- and Analysis dict that Poddar would kill and were negligent in failing to warn‖ (Ref. 2, p. 345). The trial To most, the Tarasoff case is shorthand for court dismissed the suit, ruling that no law a simple ―duty to warn‖; however, it is much imposed a duty on a clinician to warn a third more. In fact, there are two Tarasoff decisions, party of a danger revealed during confidential and ―duty to warn‖ was only the first obliga- therapy. The Tarasoffs appealed and the case tion imposed on clinicians in California. As eventually worked its way to the California seen below, the California Supreme Court ex- Supreme Court. On December 23, 1974, the panded the obligations imposed on a clinician Court overturned the dismissal and remanded to a burdensome degree, with many other the case for trial against the University clini- courts following the California Supreme cians and police (Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer- Court’s lead and applying the same obligations sity of California, 1974). In essence, the Court in their own states. imposed a new duty on clinicians to warn po- The facts are well known. In 1968, Prosen- tential victims of a threat posed by a client- jit Poddar, a graduate student at the University patient: of California, Berkeley, met fellow student Tatiana Tarasoff at a school dance. Poddar When a doctor or a psychotherapist, misinterpreted a casual kiss as evidence of a in the exercise of his professional skill serious relationship, and soon he became fix- and knowledge, determines, or should ated with Tarasoff, who rebuffed Poddar’s determine, that a warning is essential romantic overtures. Distraught, Poddar to avert danger arising from the medi- sought counseling at the University Health cal or psychological condition of his Services. During eight weeks of therapy, Pod- patient, he incurs a legal obligation to dar revealed to a staff psychologist, Dr. give that warning. (Ref .7, p. 555) Moore, that he intended to kill an unnamed woman who was readily identifiable as Tatiana Here, the Court assumed that a clinician Tarasoff. Moore consulted with supervisors could accurately discern if a threat was viable about a course of action and notified campus and foresee the harm. Thus, a clinician could police of the threat. In a letter to the police, be liable if he or she recognized the danger or 4 NC Perspectives • Fall 2011• Volume 4 should have recognized the danger and did Again, the Court required clinicians to accu- not warn the potential victim (Weinstock, rately discern the violent intent of their clients Vari, Leong, & Silva, 2006). and identify potential victims. How? The The Court’s decision (known as Tarasoff I) Court relied on clinicians to exercise a prompted strong responses from the mental ―reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and health community. The American Psychiatric care ordinarily possessed and exercised by Association (APA) and other professional or- members of that professional specialty under ganizations filed with the Court an amicus curiae similar circumstances‖ (p. 349). brief (i.e., a petition from a third party in- How the Court arrived at its decision has tended to persuade or otherwise influence a been a matter of considerable debate, espe- court to act in a certain manner) and requested cially since the decision has broad implications a rehearing of the matter. In its brief, the APA for all mental health practitioners, regardless argued that clinicians could not accurately of the state in which they are licensed. Com- foresee future acts of violence, nor could they mentators have described the Court’s reason- guess all of the potential victims of the client- ing as ―convoluted‖ and ―opaque‖ (Herbert, patient. In addition, the APA argued that the 2002) and in disagreement with the basic ele- decision eroded the critical tenet of confiden- ments of tort law (i.e., civil, not criminal law) tiality, widely assumed to be a precondition (Walcott et al., 2001). for the development of a therapeutic rapport. At its heart, the Tarasoff II decision rests on In an unusual decision, the California Su- two fundamental ideas. First, the Court relied preme Court agreed to re-hear the case. In its on a quasi-Good Samaritan argument, holding second opinion (known as Tarasoff II, 1976), that it was good public policy for a clinician to the Court increased the scope of the clinician’s break confidentiality and warn a potential vic- liability, creating a ―duty to protect‖ in place tim where a client makes a viable threat of the narrower ―duty to warn.‖ Warning a against them.
Recommended publications
  • Can Bystanders Make Failure-To-Warn Claims in Toxic Tort Cases? by Stephen D
    THE OLDEST LAW JOURNAL IN THE UNITED STATES 1843-2019 PHILADELPHIA, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2019 VOL 259 • NO. 38 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Can Bystanders Make Failure-to-Warn Claims in Toxic Tort Cases? BY STEPHEN D. DALY STEPHEN D. DALY is an Special to the Legal attorney with the environ- Despite the mental, energy and land failure-to-warn claim is a use law and litigation firm similarities in staple of products liability of Manko, Gold, Katcher the strict liability and A litigation. The basic premise & Fox, located just outside is that a manufacturer or seller of Philadelphia. He can be negligent failure-to-warn failed to warn a consumer about an reached at 484-430-2338 unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm or [email protected]. theories, the court associated with the use of a product. Plaintiffs pursuing toxic tort cases liability or negligence theories, although dismissed the strict have begun to rely on failure-to-warn the distinction between the two theories liability claim but claims outside the strict consumer/ is murky. The Pennsylvania Supreme seller context. Specifically, several Court, in the context of addressing not the negligence personal injury lawsuits relating to product design defects, has instructed the emerging contaminant per- and that the theory of strict products liability claim. polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) “overlaps in effect” with the theory of have relied on failure-to-warn theories negligence, although the court has tried against manufacturers of PFAS. These to maintain a distinction between the defendant owed a duty to provide lawsuits are distinct from many failure- two theories, as in Tincher v.
    [Show full text]
  • Volk V. Demeerleer Study
    Volk v. DeMeerleer Study Commissioned by: Washington State Legislature House Judiciary Committee December 1, 2017 UW School of Law Center for Law, Science and Global Health Volk v. DeMeerleer Study Research Team Tanya E. Karwaki, JD, LLM, PhD Research Associate, Center for Law, Science and Global Health Jaclyn Greenberg, JD, LLM (candidate) Annemarie Weiss, LLM Gavin Keene, JD (candidate) Faculty Supervisors Patricia C. Kuszler, MD, JD Charles I. Stone Professor of Law Faculty Director, Center for Law, Science, and Global Health Terry J. Price, MSW, JD Executive Director, Center for Law, Science, and Global Health VOLK V. DEMEERLEER STUDY TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................... 3 II. Comprehensive Review of the “Duty to Warn” and the “Duty to Protect” ............................................ 5 A. Background: The Tarasoff Case and the Duties to Endangered Third Parties ............................... 5 B. Review of Case Law and Legislative Provisions Across the United States ..................................... 7 1. Terminology with Respect to the “Duty to Protect” and the “Duty to Warn” ......................... 7 2. Summary of the National 50-State (plus District of Columbia) Legislative and Case Survey .. 8 a) Description of the Duty to Third Parties ............................................................................. 8 b) Who Has a Duty to Third Parties in the Context of Mental Health Care .........................
    [Show full text]
  • Duty to Warn of Naturally Occurring Hazards at Recreational Facilities
    www.rbs2.com/ltgwarn2.pdf 30 Sep 2007 Page 1 of 59 Legal Duty in the USA to Warn of Naturally Occurring Hazards At Recreational Facilities Copyright 2007 by Ronald B. Standler Keywords act of God, Breaux, cases, control, danger, dangerous, duty, flood, golf, golfers, hazard, hazardous, hazards, invitee, invitees, law, legal, liable, liability, lightning, MacLeod, Maussner, natural, naturally occurring, ocean, Pacheco, protect, protection, recreational, reliance, relied, rely, ripcurrent, riptide, safety, Sall, shelter, surf, thunderstorm, undertow, warn, warning, water, weather, wind Table of Contents Introduction . 3 Old Legal Rule . 3 invitees, licensees, trespassers . 5 a few cases . 5 reliance . 6 State Statutes . 7 California . 7 Louisiana . 7 New York . 8 Ohio . 10 Pennsylvania . 10 Texas . 11 Act of God . 12 Case Law: Lightning at Recreational Facilities . 14 Davis (golf) . 14 Bier (picnic shelter) . 15 Schieler (National Park) . 16 Hames (golf) . 16 Pichardo (baseball) . 17 McAuliffe (swimming at lake) . 18 Dykema (outdoor basketball game) . 19 MacLeod (mountain peak at National Park) . 20 Maussner (golf) . 22 Blanchard (picnic in park) . 23 www.rbs2.com/ltgwarn2.pdf 30 Sep 2007 Page 2 of 59 Grace (golf) . 24 Jaffe (golf) . 24 Chapple (state park) . 25 Seelbinder (beach) . 25 Patton (after rugby game) . 26 Sall (golf) . 29 reliance in Sall . 30 Mack (softball game at prison) . 32 conclusion . 32 Case Law: Other Natural Hazards at Recreational Facilities . 32 Butts (swimming) . 33 Tarshis (swimming at beach) . 34 Gonzales (riptide) . 34 reliance in Gonzales . 36 Missar (skiing) . 38 Mostert (theater has duty to warn of flood) . 39 Fuhrer (possible duty to warn of riptide) . 41 Caldwell v.
    [Show full text]
  • Duty to Protect Or Warn What Those Situations Are (Striefel, 2003, 2004)
    Biofeedback ©Association for Applied Psychophysiology & Biofeedback Volume 36, Issue 3, pp. 86–89 www.aapb.org PROFESSIONAL ISSUES Duty to Protect or Warn Sebastian “Seb” Striefel, PhD Department of Psychology, Utah State University, Logan, UT Keywords: duty, warn, protect, risk assessment, confidentiality Violence is a fact of life. As such, virtually every state has Health care professionals—by virtue of being pro- laws specifying that health care professionals have a duty fessionals—are holding themselves out to the public as to protect or warn, and the specific legal requirements having special knowledge and skills in the form of services vary from state to state and discipline to discipline. Every for which some clients and some third parties are willing biofeedback practitioner providing mental health care to pay. Being a professional means that one has special and related services should be familiar with the relevant obligations and responsibilities to those served and often laws of the state in which he or she practices and with to others as specified in ethical principles (Association for the court precedents related to that law. Being able to Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 2003), practice deal appropriately with the relevant issues surrounding guidelines and standards (Striefel, 2004), and laws. This confidentiality and the ability to assess for, predict article will focus primarily on health care professionals’ dangerousness to self and others, and deal with the same are responsibilities as specified in the duty to protect and/or expected standards of care that can vary in implementation warn laws. from state to state. Consultation with colleagues and/or an attorney can be important.
    [Show full text]
  • A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty to Warn Third Parties
    A PLURALISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE THERAPIST/PHYSICIAN DUTY TO WARN THIRD PARTIES W. Jonathan Cardi* Following Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California1 and a majority of jurisdictions,2 section 41 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm imposes a duty on mental-health professionals (“therapists”) to warn foreseeable victims of a risk posed by one of their patients.3 The Restatement (Third) “takes no position,” however, as to whether a non-mental- health physician owes a similar duty to warn foreseeable third parties of a risk, for example, of communicating disease, posed by one of the physician’s patients.4 This brief Article explores both the accuracy and the viability of this distinction and its theoretical underpinnings. Specifically, the Article takes three positions: (1) as a purely descriptive matter, the Restatement (Third) ought to recognize a physician’s duty to warn foreseeable third parties, (2) as a normative matter, the question is more nuanced perhaps even than the courts and the Restatement (Third) recognize, and (3) the courts’ and the Restatement (Third)’s analysis of the issue is best captured by a pluralistic understanding of tort law. I. EVALUATING THE DESCRIPTIVE ACCURACY OF SECTION 41 Suppose that during the course of treatment, a patient tells his therapist that he intends to harm his ex-girlfriend. Should the therapist have a duty of reasonable care to warn the ex-girlfriend? This was the question in the Tarasoff case, and the California Supreme Court answered that a therapist does owe a duty to use * Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
    [Show full text]
  • Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers
    TORT LIABILITY OF OCCUPIERS OF LAND: DUTIES OWED TO TRESPASSERS FLEMING JAMES, JXt THE scope of duty in negligence cases ' is coming increasingly to be mea- sured by the famous formulation: "Whenever one person is placed by circumstances in such a posi- tion in regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a 2duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger." One of the situations in which the application of this test has been con- ventionally denied, however, is where plaintiff has voluntarily placed himself within reach of the effects of defendant's failure to take precautions3 The chief example of such a situation is the case where plaintiff voluntarily comes upon land occupied by defendant, and is injured there by a dangerous con- dition of the premises or by some activity of the occupier.4 The judicial approach to this problem, formulated during the course of the 19th century and still providing the point of departure for modern reason- ing, divides persons entering land into classes, and graduates accordingly the duties owed by the land occupier.5 Under the conventional approach, the three classes of entrants onto land are trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Those who enter land without the occupier's permission or any other right to do so, are trespassers. To them, the occupier owes no duty with reference to the condition of the premises, save this: he must refrain from intentionally tLafayette S.
    [Show full text]
  • Negligence - Duty of Due Care-Invitee/Liscensee/Trespasser Distinction Abolished - Rowland V
    William & Mary Law Review Volume 10 (1968-1969) Issue 2 Article 16 December 1968 Negligence - Duty of Due Care-Invitee/Liscensee/Trespasser Distinction Abolished - Rowland v. Christian, __Cal. 2d__ , 443 P. 2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1968) Douglas Bergere Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Torts Commons Repository Citation Douglas Bergere, Negligence - Duty of Due Care-Invitee/Liscensee/Trespasser Distinction Abolished - Rowland v. Christian, __Cal. 2d__ , 443 P. 2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1968), 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 495 (1968), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss2/16 Copyright c 1968 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 1968] CURRENT DECISIONS Since the employee must bear the risk that the official issuing the instructions does not have the proper authority, no government em- ployee implementing orders can tell with certainty whether or not he will receive absolute immunity for his acts. Such uncertainty was noted by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the standard formulated in Barr v. Matteo.2" Still unanswered under this formula is at what echelon of governmental duty the privilege inures. Perhaps this recognition of the privilege for the subordinate, the un- certainty among scholars as to the reach of the absolute privilege, and! the deliberate choice by the CIA of defamation as an instrument of national policy 2 will lead to a reexamination by the Supreme Court -of the language as well as the rationale of Bavr v.
    [Show full text]
  • Guidelines for Practitioners: a Social Work Perspective on Discharging the Duty to Protect
    Guidelines for Practitioners: A Social Work Perspective on Discharging the Duty to Protect Karen Tapp, BSW, MSSW, JD, Assistant Professor [email protected] Darrell Payne, BSW, MSW, JD, Assistant Professor [email protected] Northern Kentucky University, Social Work Program Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, Volume 8, Number 2 (2011) Copyright 2011, White Hat Communications This text may be freely shared among individuals, but it may not be republished in any medium without express written consent from the authors and advance notification of White Hat Communications. Abstract California 345, 1976). When a duty to protect issue arises in practice, social In situations in which a client is deemed to workers may experience ambivalence and present a serious risk of violence to another, uncertainty with respect to the need to a responsibility arises for the counselor to reconcile and integrate the professional use reasonable care to shield the anticipated ethics of confidentiality and legal mandates victim from such danger. Guidelines are of the duty to protect. This article reviews a provided to assist social workers in ethical brief history of the Tarasoff decision. The practice in “duty to protect” situations while Tarasoff duty to protect standard and the avoiding malpractice. ensuing uncertainty about the standard’s meaning and application based on Keywords: duty to protect, social work, inconsistent court opinions will be explored. ethical mental health practice, ethical Social workers’ ethical obligations are dilemma, client danger to third parties addressed as they relate to the duty to 1. Introduction protect standard. Finally, guidelines are set forth to assist social workers in ethical The Tarasoff doctrine directs that when the practice in duty to protect situations while therapist determines, or ought to determine, avoiding malpractice.
    [Show full text]
  • Personal Tort Law
    SMU Law Review Volume 64 Issue 1 Article 22 2011 Personal Tort Law Meredith J. Duncan Jacquelyn Craig Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Recommended Citation Meredith J. Duncan & Jacquelyn Craig, Personal Tort Law, 64 SMU L. REV. 451 (2011) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol64/iss1/22 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. PERSONAL TORT LAW Meredith J. Duncan* Jacquelyn Craig** I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 451 II. DUTY OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS ........ 452 A. DUTY OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES OR PREMISES O WNERS .............................................. 452 B. DUTY OF THE SOVEREIGN ............................. 456 1. Premises Liability and the Recreational Use Statute ............................................. 457 2. Ordinary Premises Liability ....................... 460 C. DuTY TO WARN UNDER THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE ............................ 462 III. REPOSE STATUTE AS ABSOLUTE BAR IN ALL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS ................. 463 IV. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE ............................. 465 A. No LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES ............ 465 B. AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ................ 466 V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 468 I. INTRODUCTION HIS Survey period, the Texas courts were busy shaping and refin- ing personal tort law with the greatest development focusing on the legal contours of the duty of care in negligence actions. This article begins by discussing various cases defining one's duty of care in premises liability actions, including duty of private businesses and prem- ises owners,1 as well as duty of the sovereign. 2 It next discusses cases considering duty to warn within the context of the learned intermediary doctrine.
    [Show full text]
  • Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their Rp Emises a Duty of Reasonable Care Under Heins V
    Nebraska Law Review Volume 76 | Issue 1 Article 6 1997 Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their rP emises a Duty of Reasonable Care under Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996) Kristin K. Woodward University of Nebraska College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Kristin K. Woodward, Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their Premises a Duty of Reasonable Care under Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996), 76 Neb. L. Rev. (1997) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol76/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Note Owners and Occupiers of Land Now Owe Those Lawfully on Their Premises a Duty of Reasonable Care Under Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996) TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .......................................... 184 II. Background ........................................... 185 A. Policy Reasons .................................... 188 B. The New Nebraska Position ....................... 189 III. Analysis .............................................. 190 A. Rigid Application of Common Law Distinctions ..... 190 B. Defining Licensees/Invitees ........................ 192 C. Social Guests ...................................... 195 D. What About Trespassers? . 195 E. Effect Heins Will Have on Nebraska Law .......... 201 IV. Conclusion ............................................ 202 I. INTRODUCTION Throughout its relatively short history, American law has placed a special value on the rights of real property owners.
    [Show full text]
  • Torts: Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land Mark A
    Marquette Law Review Volume 58 Article 6 Issue 3 1975 (Number 3) Torts: Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land Mark A. Peterson Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation Mark A. Peterson, Torts: Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 609 (1975). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol58/iss3/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTES LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND Several jurisdictions have recently abolished the traditional dis- tinction between trespassers, licensees and invitees in determining whether owners or occupiers of land are liable to persons who come upon the land and receive injuries. In these jurisdictions ordinary negligence rules will determine whether the owners or occupiers are liable for the injuries.' Other jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, still adhere to the traditional approach of separate and distinct duties of care owed to trespassers, licensees and invitees. 2 However in these jurisdictions recent decisions point toward a potential change in judicial attitude.3 Whether the traditional approach creates problems of interpre- tation and classification should be evaluated to determine if a change in the law is necessary. If such a change is needed, a deter- mination must be made as to the form that change should take and as to the kind of entrants on land to which that change should apply.
    [Show full text]
  • Danger Ahead: the Changing Face of Failure to Warn Claims
    DANGER AHEAD: THE CHANGING FACE OF FAILURE TO WARN CLAIMS By Michael Drahos, Mark Greene, Jeffrey James, and Larry Smith Failure to warn claims are a standard part of Defense attorneys involved in product Language-Related Issues and liability litigation are familiar with claims al- Adequacy of Product Warnings product liability leging failure to warn against a manufac- litigation, and the turer or seller. The typical failure to warn The sufficiency of a warning may law governing claim is fairly straightforward: the plaintiff be attacked on the basis of negligence those claims is asserts that the defendant placed inad- and strict liability in tort. To recover on equate warnings of potential hazards on a warnings claim in negligence, the well developed. or with the product and the lack of proper plaintiff must establish that the manufac- However, plaintiffs warnings was a proximate cause of harm turerfailed to exercise reasonable care sometimes assert to the plaintiff. Not all failure to warn to provide information in a reasonable about creative theories claims are so basic, however. Many such manner to an appropriate person claims have wrinkles that do not allow the a foreseeable risk that was significant about a failure to standard analysis to be used, whether enough to justify the costs of providing warn. This article it involves a unique argument for insuf- the information.' Meanwhile, the duty to describes three ficiency or the targeting of an uncommon warn in a strict liability cause of action is that a prod- such theories: defendant. Plaintiffs try to assert these based on the simple notion non-traditional claims in the hope of find- uct is defective if the warning is insuffi- warnings involving ing additional sources of recovery, even if cient.2 In contrast to a negligence claim, language barriers, the outlook for success may appear bleak.
    [Show full text]