No. 43 17 June 2008

rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical ddigestigest

www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de/russland

FEDERALISM

■ ANALYSIS Russian Federalism: Can It Be Rebuilt from the Ruins? 2 By Darrell Slider, Moscow ■ TABLE List of Regional Leaders (Governors) as of June 2008 5 ■ ANALYSIS Russian Territorial Reform: A Centralist Project that Could End Up Fostering Decentralization? 8 By Julia Kusznir, Bremen

Research Centre for East Center for Security Otto Wolff -Stiftung DGO European Studies, Bremen Studies, ETH Zurich rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

Analysis

Russian Federalism: Can It Be Rebuilt from the Ruins? By Darrell Slider, Moscow

Abstract As president, sharply reduced the power of ’s governors, removing them from the upper chamber of parliament and taking the power to appoint them, rather than letting their constituents elect them. However, these moves did not increase the governability of the regions. Minister of Regional Development is now promoting a plan that would return considerable powers to the region. However, this plan has yet to win Kremlin endorsement and therefore has not been implemented.

Reducing Regional Autonomy governors were reappointed, either when their term ex- During his presidency, Vladimir Putin repeatedly em- pired or in advance, but the message that they could be phasized that he was the heir to a Russia that was near removed at any time was clearly communicated. Th at the point of disintegration. From the beginning, he set said, the governor remains the most powerful fi gure in restoring central control over Russia’s regions as his goal. any region, and there has been no mass exodus of gover- His approach was to both create new political institu- nors in search of more powerful or more rewarding posi- tions, early on termed the “vertical of authority,” and tions. Only two governors voluntarily accepted posts in reduce the autonomy of Russia’s governors and republic Moscow that they considered promotions: Yuri Trutnev presidents. Th e Kremlin turned out to be much more left Perm’ to oversee Russia’s energy assets as minister skilled at undermining governors than creating insti- for natural resources, while Sergei Sobianin left Tiumen’ tutions. In the process of recentralization, elements of to head the presidential administration under Putin. a federal system that had been emerging under Yeltsin More recently, he was named fi rst deputy prime minis- were deeply eroded or destroyed. ter in the new Putin-led government with a wide range Putin’s institutional innovations began with the cre- of responsibilities, including regional policy. ation of seven federal okrugs with a presidential repre- Another track for achieving recentralization was a sentative (polpred) assigned to each. Putin’s “eyes and redistribution of powers that took place in 2003–2004. ears in the regions” took on the job of monitoring the Functions that had been within the purview of regional work of governors and the regional branches of federal offi cials or shared with the center were brought under agencies. Th e okrugs were superimposed on the existing federal control. Th e lack of eff ective new institutions administrative structure in an eff ort to improve central meant that the decision-making authority shifted by de- control and coordination, but the polpreds’ ability to fault to existing central institutions – the national min- carry out this assignment was inadequate to the task. istries and their territorial representatives. Tax revenues In the ensuing years the Kremlin attempted to were reallocated from the regions to the center and re- hamstring governors using the full range of levers at turned to the regions only for particular, limited pur- its disposal. Putin removed regional leaders from the poses. Dmitry Kozak, the current minister of regional Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian development, has estimated that the ratio of federal to parliament, depriving the governors of their collective regional powers over regional policy became roughly veto over federal policies toward the regions. Prosecutors 70 percent to 30 percent. Th is shift was accompanied were ordered to initiate criminal proceedings against by a rapid expansion in the number of federal bureau- a large number of governors in 2003–2004, often for crats in the regions Russian Statistical Agency (Rosstat) relatively minor infractions, but which threatened re- data, while omitting many types of federal agencies in moval and possible prison terms. Most of these cases the regions such as law enforcement agencies, indicate were later dropped, though only after the Kremlin had the major trends that took place in the Putin years. End- made its point. of-the-year fi gures for 2001 and 2006 show the num- Perhaps most importantly, in the aftermath of the ber of federal executive offi cials in the regions increased Beslan school tragedy in September 2004, Putin elim- from 348,300 to 616,100. Th is growth far exceeded the inated popular elections of governors. Starting in 2005 number of regional-level bureaucrats both in quantity the president nominated governors, after which they and in the rate of increase. (In 2001 the number of re- were formally approved by regional legislatures. Many gional executive branch offi cials was 169,900; by the 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

end of 2006 the fi gure was around 200,000.) Th e larg- port on human development in Russian regions, the est increase in federal offi cials in the regions took place UNDP found that Moscow and oil-rich Tiumen’ were in 2005, 29.3 percent in one year. at the level of the Czech Republic, St. Petersburg and Finally, Putin put considerable eff ort into creating Tatarstan approached Bulgaria’s level of development, a new, hierarchical structure for political control from while the lagging regions of Ingushetia and Tuva were the center. Th e Kremlin helped the (UR) closer to Mongolia or Guatemala. Th e trend was for bet- party achieve a near monopoly on political activity at ter performing regions to add to their relative advantage, both the federal and regional levels. By 2007 almost while poor regions fell further behind. A 2008 Ministry all governors had joined the party, and it succeeded of Regional Development (Minregion) report found, for in gaining a sizable majority in nearly all regional leg- example, that industrial output in the top 10 regions islatures. In May 2008 the last region with a non-UR exceeded the bottom ten regions by 33.5 times in 2006 majority in its legislature, Stavropol’ krai, fell into line. and 39.1 times in 2007. Poor regional investment cli- As in other regions, this outcome was a product less of mates were the norm. Progress in rebuilding Soviet-era popular support for the party than of pressure on leg- infrastructure was inadequate, particularly in the poor- islators to change their party affi liation. est regions. Small business development in the same re- While the creation of a political monopoly all but de- gions was stalled or deteriorating. From the standpoint stroyed Russia’s emerging party system, United Russia’s of removing bottlenecks to growth and social-economic eff ectiveness as an instrument of centralization was low. development, recentralization was not working. Only now is United Russia beginning to create what Th e shift in functions to Moscow-based ministries it terms a “cadre reserve” to fi ll the top regional posts. produced massive coordination problems. Central Governors were not governors because they were mem- funds were being allocated through Moscow-based bers of UR; they became members of UR because they ministries or agencies, often without taking into ac- were governors, and the Kremlin insisted that they join. count regional needs. Waste and duplication in the use Th e party had few tools, other than the threat of expul- of federal funds, and common bureaucratic pathologies sion, to exercise discipline. Political power within a re- manifested themselves everywhere. A situation emerged gion resided with the governor. As the Russian politi- that could be termed “dual insubordination.” Ministry cal scientist and UR deputy Sergei Markov put it, “Th e territorial representatives were far from Moscow, and head of the Voronezh branch of United Russia does control of subordinates was weak. Lack of formal sub- not give orders to the governor who is a party member, ordination to governors meant they were often free to it’s the governor who gives orders to the head of the do as they chose, and that had little to do with regional Voronezh branch of United Russia.” Still, the relation- interests. (Not coincidentally, the Putin era was marked ship between governors and the Kremlin shifted dra- by a major increase in corruption in the regions.) Th e re- matically in favor of the latter. sult was a situation where governors were now appoint- ed by Putin, but he had taken away from them ultimate Failure to Increase Governability responsibility for much that went on in their regions. Did Putin’s centralizing policies do anything to im- prove the governability of Russia? Th ey certainly helped A New Round of Reforms achieve the reelection of Putin to a second term in It is to Putin’s credit that he sought a change that would 2004, the creation of a United Russia supermajority in address these problems. Late in his second term, he the Duma elections in 2003 and 2007, and the 2008 brought back to Moscow his close adviser Dmitry election of Putin’s choice to succeed him as president, Kozak, who had been serving as polpred in the south- . Governors and republic presidents ern okrug. (After Beslan, Kozak had been sent to try to were reportedly given specifi c targets to meet in turn- restore stability in the region, which includes the trou- out and the percentage of the vote, and they responded bled North Caucasus republics.) In September 2007 with all of the instruments at their disposal. Kozak was named Minister of Regional Development In key respects, however, recentralization was a fail- and given a major role in designing a new policy to- ure. Redistribution of budgetary funds and regional ward the regions. Kozak’s three years in Russia’s south investment (the few “donor” regions providing the re- gave him new insights on how recentralization worked sources) were taking place in a context of high govern- in practice. In speeches and interviews Kozak argued ment revenues generated by oil prices, but the impact that recentralization had gone too far and that a funda- on regional development was negligible. Th e Putin years mental change in regional policy was needed. were marked by a growth in regional inequality, not its While he avoided using the term federalism, in fact reduction. Russia has the widest gap between rich and Kozak’s proposals called for a new relationship between poor regions of any developed country. In its 2007 re- center and regions that would strengthen governors at 3 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

the expense of federal ministries. Th e preference would Th ere has been virtually no public discussion of re- be for decisions to be made at the lowest possible level, suming popular election of governors. Governors would and this would apply as well to municipal authorities, apparently be accountable only to the center, not to who would become less dependent on governors. voters. Kozak’s plan entails the use of statistical in- Th e new approach represents a return to decentral- dicators to assess the performance of regional leaders. ized governance of regions with the main emphasis on Expectations would be higher for regions that received economic performance. Th e federal role would be lim- greater assistance from the center—the poorest, most ited to law enforcement and establishing the “rules of “economically depressed” regions. Th ey would be ex- the game” in the regions. Such an approach would in- pected to produce jobs, housing, increased investment, clude, for example, antimonopoly regulation and fi nan- and small business development at a rate higher than cial monitoring. In the most radical interpretation of the Russian mean. If they fail, not only would the re- Kozak’s program, most federal agencies in the regions gion risk losing budgetary incentives, but governors would be dissolved, and regions would take over the could expect to lose their posts. day-to-day regulation of economic activity. Federal en- Kozak fi rst detailed his proposals in October 2007, tities, such as Minregion and the Ministry of Economic but to date his new regional policy has not received fi nal Development, would award investment funds based on endorsement by the Kremlin and Putin’s government. It regional investment proposals in order to avoid dupli- still requires a legislative foundation. One can assume cation and encourage a division of labor among regions. that most ministries will attempt to block any change It is in this context that Kozak has talked about the cre- in their regional functions. But in his favor, Kozak’s ini- ation of ten “macroregions” in order to view territorial tiative coincides broadly with the priorities that Dmitry economic plans from a broader perspective. Governors Medvedev has promoted from the start of his presidency. would have much more fl exibility in setting economic Radical administrative reform in the regions would be priorities, infrastructure policy, and establishing a fa- consistent with reducing corruption and lowering the vorable investment climate. Budgetary funds would go barriers to small business that are impeding Russian directly to regional and local governments for these pur- economic development. poses, and the most successful reformers would be re- warded with fi nancial incentives for their regions.

About the author Darrell Slider is Professor of Government and International Aff airs at the University of South Florida (Tampa). He is currently conducting research in Moscow.

Recommended Reading • Darrell Slider, “Putin’s Southern Strategy: Dmitriy Kozak and the Dilemmas of Recentralization,” Post-Soviet Aff airs, v. 24, no. 2 (April–June 2008), pp. 177–197. • United Nations Development Program, National Human Development Report Russian Federation 2006/2007 Russia’s Regions: Goals, Challenges, Achievements (2007). • Trud i zaniatost’ v Rossii 2007 g., Moscow: Rosstat, 2008. • Ministry of Regional Development, Osnovnye tendentsii razvitiia regionov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2006–2007 godakh (sbornik materialov)

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Table liation (continued on next page) Since …Since To… 15 April 200815 April - Russia United ing governor) Region Name leader Regional affi Political AdygeiaAltai (Republic)Altai (Region)AmurArkhangelskAstrakhanBashkortostan Aleksandr BerdnikovBelgorod Tkhakushinov Aslan Aleksandr KarlinBryanskBuriatiaChechnya Mikhalchuk Ilya 2006 20 January Chelyabinsk Kolesov Nikolai 2007 13 January Rakhimov Murtaza Aleksandr ZhilkinChuvashia Region Chukotka Autonomous 2005 25 August Dagestan Savchenko Yevgenii Abramovich Roman Ingushetia Denin Nikolai 2008 14 April 2010 January Irkutsk 1990 2007 6 April 1 June Nagovitsyn Vyacheslav 2012 January 2004 5 December Ramsan Kadyrov Sumin Pyotr Ivanovo 2009 August 2000 24 December 1993 October Region Autonomous Jewish Fedorov Nikolai Kabardino-Balkaria 2007 10 July KaliningradVolkov Nikolai 2004 26 December Aliev Mukhu 2012 April 2009 December Russia United Kalmykia Zyazikov Murat 2007 5 April 2011 October Russia United 2011 June Kaluga 2010 October 1996 22 December (temporary act- KamchatkaYesipovskii Igor 1993 26 December 2012 Arsen Kanokov June Russia United Karachaevo-Cherkessia Men Mikhail 2012 October Karelia 2012 July 1991 14 December Russia Kemerovo United 2002 28 April 2006 20 February Boos Georgii Khabarovsk Russia United 2010 April 2011 April Russia United Batdyev Mustafa 2010 August Kirsan Ilyumzhinov Russia United 2005 28 September Kuzmitskii Alexei Anatolii Artamonov 2010 February Russia United 2005 23 December Russia United 2010 February 2010 June Russia United 1993 11 April 2005 28 September 2003 31 August Katanandov Sergei Tuleyev Aman-Geldy 2010 September Ishayev Viktor Russia United Russia United Russia United 2000 12 November 2007 1 July 2010 December Russia United 1997 1 July Russia United 2010 September 1998 26 April 2008 August 2010 October 2010 June Russia United Russia United 1991 24 October Russia United 2012 June Russia United 2011 March 2010 April Russia United 2011 July Russia United Russia United Russia United Russia United Russia United List of Regional Leaders (Governors) as of June 2008 as June of RegionalList of Leaders (Governors) 5 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest liation (continued on next page) Since …Since To… Alexander Filipenko 1991 18 December 2010 February SerdyukovValerii 1999 19 September Russia United 2012 July Russia United Region Name leader Regional affi Political Khakassia Autonomous Khanty-Manssiisk Region KirovKomiKostromaKrasnodarKrasnoyarsk Lebed Alexei KurganKursk Peters- St. around Leningrad (area burg) Shakleyin Nikolai Lipetsk Sliuniaev Igor Torlopov Vladimir MagadanTkachev Alexander 1996 22 December Alexander Khloponin ElMarii Mordovia Bogomolov Oleg (City)Moscow 2003 21 December 2001 16 December (Region)Moscow Aleksandr Mikhailov 2002 22 September 2000 3 December Murmansk 2009 January 2007 25 October Region Autonomous Nenets Korolev Oleg NovgorodNizhnii Dudov Nikolai 2008 December 1996 8 December - Alania Ossetia North Potapenko Valerii 2000 2011 January 5 November Leonid Markelov Luzhkov Yurii 2012 June Novgorod Boris Gromov Merkushkin Nikolai 2012 April Novosibirsk 2012 October Omsk Russia United Yevdokimov Mamsurov Yurii Shantsev Taimusar Valerii Orenburg 1998 12 April 2003 16 February 2009 December Russia United Orel 2010 March 2006 7 August 1995 22 September 2001 4 January Pensa Russia United 1992 12 June 2000 9 January Perm Russia United 2005 7 June Russia United Mitin Sergei Russia United Tolokonskii 1996 1 December Viktor 2005 8 August 2013 February 2010 November Russia United 2010 June 2010 August 2010 January Leonid Polezhayev Chernyshev Alexei Russia United 2012 May 2011 July 2000 9 January 2012 February Stroyev Yegor 2010 June Bochkarev Vasilii 2007 7 August 2010 August Russia United Russia United Chirkunov Oleg 1991 11 November 1999 26 December Russia United Russia United Russia United 2012 July Russia United Russia United 1998 12 April Russia United 1993 11 April 2012 August 2012 May 2010 June 2005 1 December Russia United Russia United 2010 May 2010 April 2010 December Russia United Russia Just Russia United Russia United Russia Just Russia United List of Regional Leaders (Governors) as of June 2008 (continued) as June of RegionalList of Leaders (Governors) 6 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest liation Since …Since To… Yurii NeelovYurii 2005 16 March 2010 March Russia United Region Name leader Regional affi Political PrimoryePskovRostovRyazan PetersburgSt. Samara (Yakutia)Sakha Sakhalin Darkin Sergei SaratovSmolensk Kuznetsov Mikhail Vladimir Chub MatviyenkoStavropol Valentina Kovalev Oleg Sverdlovsk Shtyrov Vyacheslav Tambov Vladimir ArtiakovTatarstan 2001 17 June 2004 17 December 2003 5 October Tomsk Alexander KhoroshavinTula 1996 29 September Ipatov Pavel 2002 13 January Tver Antufyev Sergei 2008 12 April Tyumen Gayevskii Valerii 2007 29 August 2007 11 August Rossel Eduard Tyva 2009 December 2011 December 2010 February Udmurtia Betin Oleg 2010 June Ulyanovsk Shaimiyev Mintimer Vladimir 2012 January 2007 24 December Kress Viktor 2005 5 April Volgograd 2008 23 May 2013 April 2012 August Vologda 2011 August Russia United Dudka Vyacheslav 1995 13 August Voronezh Russia United 1989Yakushev Dmitrii Zelenin Vladimir Russia United Autonomous Yamalo-Nenets Region 2010 December 1999 27 December Volkov Alexander Kara-ool Russia Sholban United Yaroslavl Morozov Sergei Russia United Zabaikalye 2012 May 1995 17 December 2005 29 April 2010 April Vinogradov Nikolai Russia United 2009 November 2005 24 November Maksyuta Nikolai Russia United Russia United 2003 December Posgalev 2010 Vyacheslav July 1995 April Vladimir Kulakov Russia United 2007 6 April 2004 December 2010 March 2012 March 1996 8 December 2010 November 1996 29 December 2010 April Russia United Vakhrukov Sergei Ravil Geniatulin Russia United Russia 1996 United 6 October 2012 July 2000 24 December Russia 2009 2012 April March United 2009 March 2011 April 2009 December Russia United Russia United Russia United 2007 25 December 1996 1 February 2012 June 2009 March Russia United Russia United 2012 December Communist Communist Russia United Russia United Russia United 2013 March Russia United Russia United Russia United Russia United List of Regional Leaders (Governors) as of June 2008 (continued) as June of RegionalList of Leaders (Governors) 7 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

Analysis

Russian Territorial Reform: A Centralist Project that Could End Up Fostering Decentralization? By Julia Kusznir, Bremen

Summary At the beginning of 2000, the federal government initiated a new reform redefi ning Russia’s internal bound- aries as part of the Kremlin’s ongoing campaign to simplify the country’s administrative-territorial divisions and to further tighten federal control over regional budgets and administration. However, recent events have shown that the program of merging existing territorial units has not followed the course which the centre expected. Th e Kremlin’s attempts to pressure the regions to speed up the process have often caused the par- ties to harden their positions. Th e outcome of the process remains unclear. Centralization could continue, leading to the creation of a unifi ed state; alternatively, key regional leaders who command powerful regions might fi nd themselves strengthened, the very opposite of what the Kremlin had originally intended.

Putin’s Territorial Reform Plan tus of regions on an equal footing with other regions; Within the framework of a larger eff ort to limit the re- they won representation in federal politics and pos- gions’ political authority, President Vladimir Putin’s ad- sessed their own budget. At the same time, they could visors developed plans to reduce the number of the exist- remain a part of another region, in the form of a krai ing 89 regions to between 40 or 50. Th e offi cial justifi ca- or an oblast. Th e constitution of 1993 (articles 5 and tion for the planned amalgamation was the presence of 66) confi rmed this dual status. legal, political and economic contradictions within the As a result, the population of the autonomous dis- regions to be merged. In addition, Putin’s team thought tricts elected its own regional parliament, but also took that reducing the number of regions would be a useful part in the parliamentary elections of the surrounding way to increase the competence of the regional leader- region. However, only the autonomous regions’ par- ship and bring the regional elite more closely in line liaments possessed legislative authority on their terri- with Kremlin priorities. Moreover, the plan sought to tory. Th e population of the autonomous region could reduce the number of “poor” regions that received sub- therefore send representatives to the regional parlia- sidies from the federal budget. Th e idea seemed to be ment whose decisions did not aff ect them. At the same to reduce the burden on the federal budget by offl oad- time, neither the division of authority between the au- ing the responsibility for providing subsidies to under- tonomous districts and the surrounding regions, nor developed areas onto neighboring rich regions. the possibility of separation was clearly defi ned. Th is In 2001, the federal government began to imple- ambiguity resulted in acrimonious confl icts between ment the project of amalgamating Russia’s regions. the autonomous districts and the surrounding regions, Putin’s team was above all concerned with the regions which often required Constitutional Court interven- with a so-called “complex structure” that were creat- tion. In 1993, the Constitutional Court allowed the ed at the beginning of the 1990s. In defi ance of logic, Chukotka autonomous district to leave the Magadan these regions contained within them autonomous dis- region. In 1997, it also resolved a power-sharing dispute tricts which had the status as equal and independent between the Tyumen region and the two autonomous regions. Th is “matryoshka-model” of regions within re- districts on its territory. gions applied to nine of the ten autonomous districts Th e governors of the larger regions into which the in Russia. Th e legal position of the autonomous dis- smaller ones would be merged backed Putin’s plans, tricts (avtonomnye okrugi – not to be confused with while many of the governors who would lose their jobs autonomous republics or autonomous administrative initially opposed them. Th e “winning governors” hoped, areas) is one of the most complicated issues in Russian on the one hand, to increase the size of their regions federalism. Th ey were created in the 1920s and 1930s and, on the other, to secure for themselves additional along ethnic criteria, above all for the numerous ethnic subsidies from the federal budget, while also acquiring groups in the north of Russia. At the beginning of the the opportunity to participate in the large investment 1990s, they began to extend their decision-making au- projects in the area. Economic factors played an im- thority. In 1992, autonomous districts gained the sta- portant role in this process because fi ve of the aff ected 8 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

autonomous districts are rich in natural resources: Th e autonomous districts provide 91 percent of Tyumen’s Yamal-Nenets autonomous district provides much of gross regional product and 97 percent of its industrial Russia’s natural gas; the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous production. Th e districts also outperform Tyumen re- districts are the leading sources of precious and non- gion proper in other important economic indicators, for ferrous metals; the Koryak autonomous district is the example investment or per capita income. At the same second largest source of platinum, while the Khanty- time, Tyumen region has more political power: It has Mansii autonomous district supplies half of Russia’s had close links to the Kremlin ever since the 2001 gu- oil reserves. bernatorial elections brought Sergei Sobyanin to power. In 2001, the president signed a federal law regu- He was subsequently appointed head of the presidential lating the procedure for creating new regions consist- administration and now plays an important role under ing of the following steps: First, the regional adminis- Prime Minister Putin. Tyumen has, accordingly, sought trations aff ected had to sign an agreement on a com- the support of the centre for its plan of subsuming the mon administrative structure and regional policy. If two autonomous districts. Th e talks between the three the president approved of the merger, it has to be rati- regions’ administrations on their amalgamation started fi ed by a referendum in the regions to be combined. If in 2002. However, they were repeatedly stalled by the all of these vote in favor, the President refers the pro- autonomous districts. Finally, in June 2004, a compro- posal, in the form of a constitutional law, to the feder- mise was found in the form of an agreement defi ning al parliament. Once the law has been passed, the merg- the separate spheres of authority. Th e agreement guar- er can take place. To ensure that the process proceeds antees the autonomous regions a great deal of autono- smoothly, the federal government provides subsidies for my until 2009. a transition period. Th is support is supposed to smooth over any possible social and economic repercussions A Critical Assessment of the merger. Th e length of the transitional period is It is too early to say whether the mergers have been ben- laid down in the constitutional law and lasts, on aver- efi cial for all parties involved. Only in the Perm region age, about three years. has the transitional period, during which fi nancial se- curity was guaranteed by the federal centre, come to an Th e Current State of the Proposals to Merge end. We must wait until the various regions have stood the Regions on their own feet for a few years before it is possible to To date, the federal government has worked out six see the eff ects. However, recent events have shown that merger projects: (1) Perm Region with the Komi- the program of mergers has not followed the course Permyak autonomous district; (2) Krasnoyarsk terri- which the centre expected. Th e Kremlin’s attempts to tory with the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous districts; pressure the regions to speed up the process have often (3) Kamchatka region with the Koryak autonomous caused the various parties to harden their positions. district; (4) Irkutsk region and the Ust-Ordyn Buryat Th e main obstacle is that a number of issues still autonomous district (5) Chita region with the Agin- have not been defi ned: Th ere are no guidelines setting Buryat autonomous district, and 6) Tyumen region out in which cases mergers are desirable; there is no clear with the Khanty-Mansii and the Yamal-Nenets auton- developmental program for the newly-merged regions, omous districts. Th e fi rst fi ve projects have been imple- and there are no clear criteria by which the federal cen- mented, resulting in the abolition of a total of six auton- tre can measure the benefi ts of the projects. Th e fed- omous districts (see Table 1 on p. 11). As a consequence, eral authorities cannot come to an agreement in many the number of subjects of the Russian Federation has areas. Accordingly, the federal government leaves it to been reduced from 89 to 83. the regional elites to fi nd solutions for the resulting Despite this progress, the Kremlin’s regional merg- problems and confl icts. Th e political authority of the er plans have met with considerable resistance and are governors, their position in the region and their leeway proceeding slowly. In particular, the governors of the for negotiation vis-à-vis the centre are very important economically-powerful autonomous districts opposed here. Consequently, the centre had to increase consid- the mergers. Th e project only began to move forward erably the funds promised to the merging regions, mak- when the Kremlin took on additional powers vis-à- ing this project an expensive undertaking for the fed- vis the regions, including the right to appoint gover- eral budget. nors and new means for exerting pressure through re- At the same time, there are no guidelines from the vised methods of redistributing income among the re- centre regulating the fi nancial relationships within the gions. Th e Tyumen Region best illustrates these prob- new regions. Th e abolition of the district budget and lems. Th is region is one of the most economically pow- the transfer of the funds in question to the regional erful in Russia. Th e Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansii budget, as well as the fi nancing of the municipalities 9 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

in the autonomous districts, are negotiated bilateral- his vision, there will be no changes to the regions them- ly in each case. Th rough the redistribution of regional selves, but ten macro-regions, made up of the existing funds, the fi nancially weak autonomous districts dis- regions and each specializing in an area of economic appear as an eff ect of the amalgamation. Whether the activity, will be created. Th ey will not compete with new regions can or want to compensate for the under- the seven presidential federal districts. Th e Ministry lying social weaknesses of these areas with their own of Regional Development will appoint the heads of the funds is questionable. macro-regions. Th e macro-regions will develop their A further problem is the Kremlin’s concentration on own programs of investment, for which they will re- the political aspect of the mergers. Th e aim is, above ceive subsidies and tax breaks from the federal govern- all, to remove the autonomous districts as centers of ment. Th e governors of the regions within the macro- political power in order to reorganize the redistribu- regions will participate in these projects, thereby grant- tion of regional funds. Th e economic, social and eth- ing them greater authority in the economic sphere, but nic aspects of the amalgamation project have, in con- also placing upon them more responsibility in that the trast, barely received any attention. Th is focus on the receipt of further funds and authority will depend on political concentration of power creates the risk that the their success. Th e Ministry of Regional Development autonomous districts might be economically and so- will work out the criteria governing the creation of mac- cially neglected. Moreover, the ethnic minorities, who ro-regions and measuring the performance of the re- were guaranteed political representation in the auton- gional governors. omous districts, have not been granted such rights in Kozak has argued that his project possesses no po- the merged regions. litical goals. Nevertheless, its successful implementa- Because the Kremlin requires the support of the re- tion would grant the federal government greater polit- gional elites for the mergers, but has only provided lim- ical power because it would receive the right to grant ited incentives to achieve this goal, the merger process is investment programs and fi nancial subsidies. Moreover, progressing slowly. At the moment, new initiatives are it would shift the balance of power within the federal typically coming from infl uential governors who want government. Th e creation of the macro-regions would to expand their regions. Th e 2001 law provides the ba- weaken the authority of the president’s representatives sis for these regional initiatives. Kemerovo Governor in the federal districts, shifting infl uence from President Aman Tuleev would like to merge his region with the Dmitrii Medvedev to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin neighboring Altai Republic and Altai Territory. Moscow via the regional governors. Th e plan has therefore come Mayor Yurii Lushkov suggested merging Moscow city in for criticism from many quarters, including both fed- and Moscow region. St. Petersburg Governor Valentina eral ministries and regional governors, who see it as a Matvienko strongly supports merging her city with threat to their spheres of authority. Leningrad region to form a Baltic Territory (Baltiisky Th ese reforms could go in a number of directions. It krai). Th e representatives of the national republics are is possible that the process of centralization will contin- also putting forward suggestions on possible combi- ue unchecked, fi nally leading to the creation of a uni- nations, for example the proposal by representatives fi ed state. Alternatively, the regional elites might be able of the Chechen Republic to merge with the Stavropol to resist the federal government; the reforms will re- Territory to create a republic. In these cases, however, main a façade behind which the politics of the regions there is no support from the Kremlin, where there seems will continue as usual, albeit within a slightly modifi ed to be a fear that the creation of strengthened mega-re- framework. Th ere is also a less likely scenario whereby gions will undermine the center’s power and the terri- the federal government, with or without the support torial integrity of Russia. of the regional elites, does genuinely reform the fed- Kremlin spokesmen have responded to the gover- eral system. However, as recent experience has shown, nors’ proposals by claiming that the process of amal- neither the federal government nor the regional gover- gamation has exhausted itself. Th ey have come up with nors really want this; anyway, such a reform could only new plans to ensure the power of the federal govern- be achieved after long and diffi cult negotiations. Much ment. Th ese plans focus less on politics and more on will also depend on how power within the federal gov- economics. At the beginning of 2008, Dmitrii Kozak, ernment is distributed between the offi ces of the pres- the minister of regional development, presented a con- ident and the prime minister. cept for Russia’s long-term development. According to Translated from the German by Christopher Gilley About the Author Julia Kusznir is a researcher at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen. One of her major research interests is Russian federalism and the representation of economic interest groups in the politics of post-socialist countries. 10 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

Recommended Reading • Paul Goode, Rossiia pri Putine: ukrupnenie regionov, Logos, Vol. 46, 1/2005, pp. 172–212, http://www.ruthenia.ru/logos/number/46/06.pdf • Natalia V. Zubarevich, Obedinenie avtonomnykh okrugov: preimushchestva i riski, Nezavisimyi Institut sotsial- noi politiki. http://atlas.socpol.ru/overviews/social_sphere/ukr.shtml

Table 1 : Overview of the Completed Amalgamations Regions Process of merging 1Th e Perm region and the Th e treaty on the amalgamation of these two subjects was signed in Komi-Permyak autonomous February 2003 by Perm Governor Yurii Trutnev and Komi-Permyak district autonomous district Governor Gennadii Savelyov and approved two months later by President Putin. On 7 December 2003, a referen- dum with a high turnout was conducted in both subjects in which the merger was approved by a large majority. On 1 December 2005, Perm Territory was created on the basis of a federal law. 2 Krasnoyarsk territory with Negotiations between representatives of the Federal government and the Taymyr and Evenk au- representatives of the administrations of these subjects began at the tonomous districts end of 2003 and were concluded in September 2004 with the sign- ing of a treaty between the governor of Krasnoyarsk region, Alexander Khloponin, and the governors of the Taymyr and the Evenk auton- omous districts, Oleg Budargin and Boris Zolotaryov. On 17 April 2004, the overwhelming majority of the population of the three re- gions voted for the merger of the administrative regions. Offi cially, the new region came into being as Krasnoyarsk Territory on 1 January 2007. 3 Kamchatka region with the Th e fi rst negotiations began in early 2005 between representatives of Koryak autonomous district the administrations of both regions with the direct participation of representatives of the federal government; these negotiations came to a close in May 2005 when the governor of Kamchatka, Mikhail Mashkovtsev, and the governor of the autonomous district, Oleg Kozhemyako, signed the merger treaty. Th e 23 October 2005 refer- endum in both regions resulted in a large majority in favor of amal- gamation. Th e new region came into being as Kamchatka Territory on 1 July 2007. 4 Irkutsk region and the Ust- In October 2005, Aleksandr Tishanin, the governor of Irkutsk region, Ordyn Buryat autonomous and Valery Maleyev, the governor of the Ust-Ordyn Buryat auton- district omous district, signed a treaty merging both regions; together with their respective parliaments, they presented the suggestion to amal- gamate both regions to the Russian president shortly afterwards. Th e referendum on the merger took place on 16 April 2006. Both regions were merged on 1 January 2008 to form Irkutsk region. 5 Chita region with the Agin– Negotiations began in April 2006 between the governor of Chita re- Buryat autonomous district gion, Ravil Geniatulin, and the governor of the Agin-Buryatsky au- tonomous district, Valery Maleyev, and representatives of region- al parliaments and ended with the signing of a treaty. In November 2006, President Putin endorsed the merger. On 11 March 2007, both regions held a referendum resulting in a large majority in favor of amalgamation. On 1 March 2008, the new region came into being as Zabaykalsky territory.

11 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 43/08 ddigestigest

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