Land & Liberty Issue 1251 (Summer 2020)
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An Analysis of the Graded Property Tax Robert M
TaxingTaxing Simply Simply District of Columbia Tax Revision Commission TaxingTaxing FairlyFairly Full Report District of Columbia Tax Revision Commission 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 550 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 518-7275 Fax: (202) 466-7967 www.dctrc.org The Authors Robert M. Schwab Professor, Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, Md. Amy Rehder Harris Graduate Assistant, Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, Md. Authors’ Acknowledgments We thank Kim Coleman for providing us with the assessment data discussed in the section “The Incidence of a Graded Property Tax in the District of Columbia.” We also thank Joan Youngman and Rick Rybeck for their help with this project. CHAPTER G An Analysis of the Graded Property Tax Robert M. Schwab and Amy Rehder Harris Introduction In most jurisdictions, land and improvements are taxed at the same rate. The District of Columbia is no exception to this general rule. Consider two homes in the District, each valued at $100,000. Home A is a modest home on a large lot; suppose the land and structures are each worth $50,000. Home B is a more sub- stantial home on a smaller lot; in this case, suppose the land is valued at $20,000 and the improvements at $80,000. Under current District law, both homes would be taxed at a rate of 0.96 percent on the total value and thus, as Figure 1 shows, the owners of both homes would face property taxes of $960.1 But property can be taxed in many ways. Under a graded, or split-rate, tax, land is taxed more heavily than structures. -
Taxation of Land and Economic Growth
economies Article Taxation of Land and Economic Growth Shulu Che 1, Ronald Ravinesh Kumar 2 and Peter J. Stauvermann 1,* 1 Department of Global Business and Economics, Changwon National University, Changwon 51140, Korea; [email protected] 2 School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Laucala Campus, The University of the South Pacific, Suva 40302, Fiji; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-55-213-3309 Abstract: In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or con- sumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy. Keywords: taxation of land; land rents; overlapping generation model; land property; endoge- nous growth Citation: Che, Shulu, Ronald 1. Introduction Ravinesh Kumar, and Peter J. In this paper, we use a growth model to theoretically investigate the influence of Stauvermann. 2021. Taxation of Land different types of land tax on economic growth. Further, we investigate how the allocation and Economic Growth. Economies 9: of the tax revenue influences the growth of the economy. -
An Analysis of a Consumption Tax for California
An Analysis of a Consumption Tax for California 1 Fred E. Foldvary, Colleen E. Haight, and Annette Nellen The authors conducted this study at the request of the California Senate Office of Research (SOR). This report presents the authors’ opinions and findings, which are not necessarily endorsed by the SOR. 1 Dr. Fred E. Foldvary, Lecturer, Economics Department, San Jose State University, [email protected]; Dr. Colleen E. Haight, Associate Professor and Chair, Economics Department, San Jose State University, [email protected]; Dr. Annette Nellen, Professor, Lucas College of Business, San Jose State University, [email protected]. The authors wish to thank the Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento for their [email protected]; Dr. Colleen E. Haight, Associate Professor and Chair, Economics Department, San Jose State University, [email protected]; Dr. Annette Nellen, Professor, Lucas College of Business, San Jose State University, [email protected]. The authors wish to thank the Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento for their funding. Executive Summary This study attempts to answer the question: should California broaden its use of a consumption tax, and if so, how? In considering this question, we must also consider the ultimate purpose of a system of taxation: namely to raise sufficient revenues to support the spending goals of the state in the most efficient manner. Recent tax reform proposals in California have included a business net receipts tax (BNRT), as well as a more comprehensive sales tax. However, though the timing is right, given the increasingly global and digital nature of California’s economy, the recent 2008 recession tabled the discussion in favor of more urgent matters. -
Financial Transaction Tax: a Discussion Paper on Fiscal and Economic
Financial transaction tax: A discussion paper on fiscal and economic implications June 2013 The political debate surrounding the financial transaction tax has become fixated on the simplistic common denominator: collecting money, penalising banks, assuaging the markets and establishing justice. These winsome and appealing demands currently enjoy broad support in Germany. With public approval at 82% according to the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey, positive sentiment is highest in Germany ahead of both France and Greece, where approval is at 75%. And so it appears that the political common denominator has been found! However, from a macroeconomic perspective the crux is whether it would ultimately be possible to satisfy regulatory and fiscal demands by introducing the financial transaction tax. Doubts are not unwarranted in this regard. Is the financial transaction tax capable of fulfilling the necessary functions of financing, distribution and steering? Although the specific embodiment of the financial transaction tax remains nebulous for the time being, if one takes a long-term, holistic view, the direct and indirect costs of introducing such a tax appear to outweigh the benefits. The following observations summarise the manifest flaws in the concept, as well as the financial and real economic ramifications of those flaws, which have not been given sufficient consideration. In June 2012, the German federal government and the opposition published a green paper, in which they promised "to assess the impact the tax would have on pension assets, retail investors and the real economy, and to avoid negative consequences".1 It is becoming clear that this promise is untenable. In fact, a financial transaction tax is incapable of sensibly and expediently fulfilling any of the three necessary functions of a tax: financing, distribution and steering. -
Whose 'Treasure Islands'? the Role of Tax Havens in the Global Economy
(C) Tax Analysts 2012. All rights reserved. does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content. Whose ‘Treasure Islands’? The Role of Tax Havens in The Global Economy by Robert T. Kudrle Robert T. Kudrle is the Orville and Jane Freeman Professor of International Trade and Investment Policy with the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the Law School at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. A version of this article was presented at the 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Asso- ciation in San Diego on April 1-4, 2012. wo recent works with the same title suggest radi- In movies and novels, tax havens are often set- Tcally different views of the role of tax havens in tings for shady international deals; in practice the global economy. In late 2010, James R. Hines Jr. they are rather less flashy. Tax havens are coun- (2010) made the case for a largely beneficial role. Ac- tries or territories that offer low tax rates and fa- cording to Hines, the tax havens improve markets: they vorable regulatory environment to foreign inves- facilitate direct investment by improving the attraction tors....Taxhavensarealso known as ‘‘offshore of high-corporate-tax states for real investment, and centers’’ or ‘‘international financial centers,’’ they may shore up rather than degrade corporate tax phrases that may carry slightly differing connota- collections by high-corporate-income states such as the tions but nonetheless are used almost inter- U.S. They also seem to improve the competitiveness of changeably with ‘‘tax havens.’’ [P. 104.] national financial institutions and hence facilitate port- folio capital provision in both rich and poor countries. -
Select Progressive Revenue Policies
SELECT PROGRESSIVE REVENUE POLICIES Including Options Identified by the Center for American Progress and the Progressive Revenue Task Force Seattle City Council Central Staff - 2/1/2018 Tax Policy Examples by Tax Area Current Status and Outlook Reform Property Taxes 1 Provide homestead exemptions sheltering a limited - State law provides for property tax deferrals for seniors. amount of home value. -The City's authority to enact the other provisions is 2 Provide tax credits based on income level or tax burden as unclear. a share of income ("circuit breakers"). 3 Offer tax deferrals. Reform Sales & Use Taxes 4 Eliminate or reduce reliance on sales & uses taxes (use - State law exempts food and medicine from sales and use other revenue sources instead). taxes. 5 Exempt necessities such as food, medicine, lower cost - The City could reduce its share of the sales & use tax rate, clothing items, etc. although (a) the revenue may then be collected by other 6 Provide a sales tax credit to lower income households. jurisdictions and (b) the City would need either to decrease spending supported by such revenues or to identify an alternative revenue source. - The City could reduce the Seattle Transportation Benefit District's share of the sales & use tax rate, although the City would the City would need either to decrease spending supported by such revenues (principally bus service hours purchased from King County Metro) or to identify an alternative revenue source. - The City's authority to enact the other provisions is unclear. Reduce Reliance on "Sin" Taxes 7 Reduce additional taxes (effectively sales taxes) on -Specific taxes collected in the city on alchohol, tobacco, "disfavored" products except other policy benefits and marijuana are state taxes. -
1 Virtues Unfulfilled: the Effects of Land Value
VIRTUES UNFULFILLED: THE EFFECTS OF LAND VALUE TAXATION IN THREE PENNSYLVANIAN CITIES By ROBERT J. MURPHY, JR. A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2011 1 © 2011 Robert J. Murphy, Jr. 2 To Mom, Dad, family, and friends for their support and encouragement 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my chair, Dr. Andres Blanco, for his guidance, feedback and patience without which the accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Dr. Dawn Jourdan and Dr. David Ling, for carefully prodding aspects of this thesis to help improve its overall quality and validity. I‟d also like to thank friends and cohorts, such as Katie White, Charlie Gibbons, Eric Hilliker, and my parents - Bob and Barb Murphy - among others, who have offered their opinions and guidance on this research when asked. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. 4 LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................... 9 LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... 10 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................... 11 ABSTRACT................................................................................................................. -
Slovenia Ecotax Rates Green Budget Germany
SLOVENIA ECOTAX RATES GREEN BUDGET GERMANY Environmental tax rates in Slovenia: Tax rate natio- Tax rate - Eu- Name Type General Tax-base Specific Tax-base nal currency ro Slovenia CO2 tax Tax Coal Black coal 7.50 SIT per kg 0.03 € per kg CO2 tax Tax Coal Brown coal 3.60 SIT per kg 0.02 € per kg CO2 tax Tax Coke Coke 8.10 SIT per kg 0.03 € per kg 9.10 SIT per 0.04 € per CO2 tax Tax Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil litre litre 7.80 SIT per 0.03 € per CO2 tax Tax Light fuel oil Light fuel oil litre litre CO2 tax Tax Coal Lignite 3.00 SIT per kg 0.01 € per kg 5.70 SIT per CO2 tax Tax Natural gas Natural gas m3 0.02 € per m3 Waste management 10.00 SIT per 0.04 € per kg End-of-life vehicles - individual pro- kg of a new of a new ve- tax Tax ducts New vehicles vehicle hicle Other fuels for sta- 5.70 SIT per 0.02 € per Fuel excise tax Tax tionary purposes Gas oil for heating litre litre Gas oil for industrial Other fuels for sta- and commercial 35.40 SIT per 0.15 € per Fuel excise tax Tax tionary purposes purposes litre litre Gas oil, used as pro- 70.80 SIT per 0.30 € per Fuel excise tax Tax Diesel pellant litre litre Fuel excise tax Tax Heavy fuel oil Heavy fuel oil 3.00 SIT per kg 0.01 € per kg Other fuels for sta- 5.00 SIT per 0.02 € per Fuel excise tax Tax tionary purposes Kerosene for heating litre litre Kerosene for indus- Other fuels for sta- trial and commercial 31.30 SIT per 0.13 € per Fuel excise tax Tax tionary purposes purposes litre litre Kerosene, used as 62.60 SIT per 0.27 € per Fuel excise tax Tax Light fuel oil propellant litre -
Finland Ecotax Revenues Green Budget Germany (Gbg)
FINLAND ECOTAX REVENUES GREEN BUDGET GERMANY (GBG) Million Nat. Name Type Year Million $US Curr. Finland Charge on agricultural inputs Fee/Charge 1998 1.12 1 Charge on fishing licence Fee/Charge 1994 9.4 8.3 Charge on hunting licence Fee/Charge 1998 9.4 8.4 Charge on municipal waste collection / treatment Fee/Charge 1998 224.7 202 Charge on nuclear waste Fee/Charge 1998 1029.9 925.9 Chemicals registration fee Fee/Charge 2002 0.2 0.21 Excise on fuels Tax 1994 1878.8 1650.8 Excise on fuels Tax 1995 2662.7 1955.7 Excise on fuels Tax 1996 2767.5 2138.3 Excise on fuels Tax 1997 2679 2337.1001 Excise on fuels Tax 1998 2863.5 2574.3 Excise on fuels Tax 1999 2846.7 2651.5 Excise on fuels Tax 2000 2392.6001 2596 Excise on fuels Tax 2001 2374.2 2652 Excise on fuels Tax 2002 2597.5 2756 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1994 393.2 345.5 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1995 614.8 451.8 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1996 786 607.3 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1997 811.6 708.1 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1998 983.9 884.5 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 1999 1104.2 1028.5 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 2000 975.8 1059 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 2001 825.4 922 Excise on motor cars (Car tax) Tax 2002 964.2 1023 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1994 161.6 142 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1995 153 112.3 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1996 202.2 156.2 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1997 188.7 164.7 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1998 194.9 175.3 Motor vehicle tax (Diesel tax) Tax 1999 198.8 185.2 Motor -
The Use of Land Value Taxation in New Zealand (1891 – 1991)
THE USE OF LAND VALUE TAXATION IN NEW ZEALAND (1891 – 1991) By Dylan Hobbs A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Accounting and Commercial Law, Victoria University of Wellington 2019 Contents List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. v Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ vii List of Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... xi Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Research Design .................................................................................................................. 3 1.2 Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 3 1.3 Research Justification.......................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Thesis Structure .................................................................................................................. -
A Land Value Tax for London?
Appendix 1 A Land Value Tax for London? Summary This paper proposes a short rapporteur review to look at the potential role of introducing a Land Value Tax in London to encourage landowners to release more sites for housing development. The aim of the tax would be to reduce the amount of land in ‘sub-optimal’ uses, such as vacant or underused sites, or land being held back speculatively in the hope of increased land values. Encouraging more land to come forward would meet London’s housing need in terms of numbers and have an impact on affordability. The review would aim to provide the new Mayor with a balanced assessment of the potential contribution of a Land Value Tax to accommodate growth and a significant contribution to the Mayor’s evidence base in future discussions with Government on further devolution of powers to London, as recommended by the London Finance Commission. The housing challenge London’s overriding priority is housing. The shortage and affordability of new homes will feature at the top of the next Mayor’s policy agenda and will likely dominate the election. London is expected to grow by a further million over the coming ten years and is predicted to grow by a further 500,000 in the decade after. The implications of this growth on the demand for new housing are significant: London will require between approximately 49,000 (2015-2036) and 62,000 (2015- 2026) more homes a year- but; London only has capacity for around 42,000 additional homes per annum (2015-2025). -
Africa Rising? Inequalities and the Essential Role of Fair Taxation
Africa rising? Inequalities and the essential role of fair taxation MNCS POST-2015 RESOURCES TAX JUSTICE TAX AVOIDANCE SOUTH AFRICA REDISTRIBUTION TAX JUSTICE INEQUALITY SECRECY SIERRA LEONE TAX SYSTEMS VAT ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS TAX JUSTICE GHANA REDISTRIBUTION TAX INCENTIVES TAX HAVENS TAX INCENTIVES SECRECY TAX JUSTICE INEQUALITYREDISTRIBUTION SIERRA LEONE NIGERIA TAXATION SIERRA LEONE GHANA TAX HAVENS DODGING KENYA POST-2015 BEPS SECRECY TAX JUSTICE INEQUALITY ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS TAX INCENTIVES MNCS INEQUALITY SIERRA LEONE VAT POST-2015 DODGING TAX HAVENS GHANA BEPS ZAMBIA DODGING SOUTH AFRICA GHANA SECRECY ZIMBABWE TAX JUSTICE DODGING TAX AVOIDANCE VAT POST-2015 TAX HAVENS DODGING MALAWI DODGING MNCS RESOURCES ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS TAXATION MNCS TAX HAVENS VAT February 2014 2 Africa Rising? Inequalities and the essential role of fair taxation Contents List of Acronyms 4 Acknowledgements 5 Executive Summary 6 Introduction 9 Chapter 1: Inequality in sub-Saharan Africa 12 1.1: Why inequality matters 12 1.2: Income inequality trends in sub-Saharan Africa 13 1.3: Horizontal inequalities in sub-Saharan Africa 21 1.4: Conclusion 23 Chapter 2: Addressing Inequality through Taxation 24 2.1: Why tax matters 24 2.2: Aggregate tax revenue trends in sub-Saharan Africa 26 2.3: Illicit financial flows and inequality in sub-Saharan Africa 28 2.4: Tax equity and the impact of the tax consensus in sub-Saharan Africa 36 2.5: Trends in direct and indirect taxation in selected countries 39 2.6: Personal income taxation 40 2.7: Corporate income