2013 VISION – SEEING DOUBLE AND THE DEAD A PRELIMINARY AUDIT OF ZIMBABWE’S VOTERS’ ROLL By Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit.
20131 VISION – SEEING DOUBLE AND THE DEAD A PRELIMINARY AUDIT OF ZIMBABWE’S VOTERS’ ROLL By Derek Matyszak, Research and Advocacy Unit.
Introduction. The registration of voters and the compilation and maintenance of an accurate national voters’ roll has been recognized as an essential and key part of the electoral cycle.2 Since the voters' rolls record who may or may not vote, they may ultimately have a determining effect on who wins the poll. Equally importantly, it is imperative that the voters' rolls, being the cornerstone of the administration of a democratic election, be accurate and up to date. While an incomplete voters' roll may disenfranchise those who might otherwise be entitled to vote, an inflated roll containing duplicate entries, names of persons who have emigrated or of dead voters, lends itself to electoral fraud. For if the roll is inflated a false and increased ballot count can be effected (through ballot box stuffing, multiple voting or manipulation of the figures on returns) without appearing blatantly implausible against the number of registered voters. Inaccurate voters' rolls have a knock-on effect on the delimitation of constituencies, portraying an inaccurate number of voters for each area. In a first-past-the-post system, such as that adopted by Zimbabwe for all elections other than the presidential, this assumes increased importance as the number of “wasted votes” may be increased due to wrongfully delimited areas based on a false presentation of the number of voters in a particular area. In the same way, an inflated roll acts as the justification for printing an excessive number of ballot papers, further opening possibilities for electoral fraud.
1 At the time of the signing of Zimbabwe’s Global Political Agreement statements were made to the effect that the new constitutional arrangement was a temporary one. A new constitution was to be drafted following a constitutionally provided timetable, and elections were to be held once the new constitution was in place 18 months later. In fact, there is nothing in the GPA which requires that the transitional arrangement may not last more than two years, and, furthermore, the timetable for the drafting of a new constitution was quietly dropped from constitutional amendment 19 which gave legal force to the GPA. The author’s view is that present indications suggest that the next general elections will be in 2013, rather than 2010.
2 Most recently in Zimbabwe at a conference reviewing the 2008 elections and electoral reform, hosted by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) and the Electoral Institute for Southern Africa (EISA) in Victoria Falls in April, 2009.
- 2 - Background. The question of the (in)accuracy of the voters’ rolls is a contentious issue and has been raised as a basis for the allegation that successive elections in Zimbabwe do not meet the requirement of being “fair” in accordance with internationally accepted democratic standards.3 All elections from 1985 onwards have been conducted under the auspices of successive electoral supervisory bodies and the same Registrar-General perceived by some observers and opposition candidates to be extremely partisan.4 As a result the voters' rolls, under the control of these bodies, have also been perceived as being deliberately inaccurate and inflated to facilitate manipulation of the vote count. Such criticism has appeared in reports on elections published by NGOs and independent observer groups.5 This suspicion and taint to the claim of a democratic mandate by the winners of the elections could have been, and can be, easily dispelled by an independent audit of the criticized voters' rolls and their subsequent rectification - an exercise made that much easier with the advent of powerful and easily accessible computer technology. It is one which should be welcomed by electoral management bodies and the Registrar-General in the interests of transparency and to support any claim of a fair election. In fact, the contrary has been the case. The Registrar-General has repeatedly hindered people trying to inspect the voters’ rolls.6 This obstructionist attitude has been abetted by supine Electoral Commissions which have done nothing to curb the Registrar-General's behaviour and by successive changes to the Electoral Act designed to reverse the small victories in the courts which facilitated access. It is instructive to track these changes to the legislation as they form a record of deliberately opaque governance and a persistent governmental stance that the voters' rolls should not be subjected to scrutiny by the public. In 2002 the relevant section of the Electoral Act [then Chapter 2:01] section 18 read: 18 (1) The voters roll for every constituency shall be open for inspection by any person, free of charge, at the office of the constituency registrar during office hours. (2) A person inspecting the voters roll for a constituency may, without payment, make copies thereof or extracts there from during office hours. The ability to “make copies” of the rolls was not one with which the Registrar-General was comfortable - particularly as such copies of the rolls that were made exposed defects in the roll.
3 See for example Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Food for Thought – It’s the Count that Counts: Reviewing the Pre-election Period In Zimbabwe March 2005.
4 Ibid.
5 See for example footnote 3 above.
6 See for example EISA Election Mission Report No 28 p 33 which reported on the 2008 “harmonised” elections and presidential run-o ff (the EISA Report).
- 3 - Furthermore, following an electoral petition challenging the results of the presidential election, copies that had been obtained of the rolls were used to expose electoral irregularities.7 Clerks within the offices of the Registrar-General were instructed not to allow copies of the roll to be made.8 Since this instruction was in violation of the Act and exposed the Registrar-General to legal action, government proceeded to change the relevant section of the Act. Chapter 2:01 was repealed in its entirety and replaced by Act 25 of 2004, which became Chapter 2:13. The relevant section is now section 21, which provided:
21 (1) The voters roll for every constituency shall be open to inspection by the public, free of charge, at the office of the constituency registrar during office hours. (2) A person inspecting the voters roll for a constituency may, without removing the voters roll, make written notes of anything contained therein during office hours. Accordingly, the right to make copies of the roll was removed, merely allowing a person to make written notes of anything contained therein. All these successive Acts also allowed any person to apply for a copy of a voters' roll for a particular constituency upon payment of a prescribed fee. In 2002 an application was brought before the High Court to compel the Registrar-General to provide the rolls for all constituencies, the common roll, in electronic form. The application was successful.9 As a result the Registrar- General provided a copy of the roll in an electronic format contained on five CD-ROM discs. However, in order to prevent this from happening again, the new Electoral Act of 2004 was amended to make it clear that henceforth only printed copies of the rolls had to be provided by the Registrar-General. The amended section read: 21(4) Any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, request the Commission to provide him or her with a printed copy of the voters roll for any constituency, and the Commission shall thereupon cause the roll to be printed and provided to that person within a reasonable time. The prescribed fee for the printed roll was always prohibitively high10, though the 2004 Act provided that the cost of a roll should not exceed reasonable costs that might be incurred in its
7 This emerged after a physical inspection of electoral residue from the 2002 presidential poll which was conducted after a series of court cases to compel the same, commencing with Morgan Tsvangirai vs The Registrar-General of Elections (HC 8225/2002) (Guvava J.)
8 Interview by RAU, September 2009 with persons involved in the inspection of the residue. See footnote 7 above.
9 Granted by Adam J – see M. Tsvangirai v Registrar-General and Others HH-29-2002.
10 EISA Report p33.
- 4 - preparation.11 However, even this obligation to provide printed copies of the roll was on occasion ignored by the Registrar-General.12 As a result of negotiations between the MDC and ZANU PF in 2007, several legislative amendments were introduced designed to open democratic space in Zimbabwe - which they did to a very limited extent. As part of this process, electoral laws were again changed and several changes were made to section 21 of the Electoral Act, the section which deals with the inspection and provision of copies of the voters' rolls. The new section now provides: 21 Inspection of voters’ rolls and provision of copies (1) Every voters roll shall be a public document and open to inspection by the public, free of charge, during ordinary office hours at the office of the Commission or the constituency registrar where it is kept. (2) A person inspecting the voters roll for a constituency may, without removing the voters roll, make any written notes of anything contained therein during office hours. (3) The Commission shall without delay provide any person who requests it with a copy of the voters roll, upon payment of the prescribed fee: Provided that— (i) the prescribed fee shall not exceed the reasonable cost of preparing the copy; (ii) the Commission may impose reasonable conditions upon the provision of a voters roll in terms of this subsection, to prevent the roll from being used for commercial or other purposes unconnected with an election. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), the Commission shall, upon payment of the prescribed fee, not later than seven days after the calling of the election concerned, provide to every political party and candidate contesting the election, and every accredited observer group, one electronic copy of every voters roll to be used in the election: Provided that in the event of any discrepancy between an electronic copy of a voters’ roll and a voters’ roll prepared in terms of subsection (3), the latter roll shall be deemed to be the authentic record of the voters roll. Several important changes were thus introduced. For the first time, provision is made for the issuance of the entire common roll as an electronic copy. However, only political parties and candidates contesting the election or accredited observer groups can apply. Furthermore, there is
11 Section 21(3)(i).
12 EISA report p33.
- 5 - a limited period in which an application may be made for the roll. While the intention may have been to require that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) issue the electronic copy of the roll with appropriate expedition (that is, within seven days), the effect is that applicants may not apply for an electronic copy of the roll outside this period – an unnecessary restriction which has been used by ZEC to deny applicants electronic copies of the roll.13 ZEC claims to have complied with its obligation to provide electronic copies of the roll in terms of this section for the 2008 elections. ZEC reports: In keeping with Section 21(3) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13], the Commission provided a copy of the voters’ roll to any person who formally requested for it, as soon as the prescribed fee was paid.14 ZESN15 however, reports that it only received copies of the rolls after the elections.16 Very few electronic copies of the roll were issued as provided for by section 21(4). More importantly, the whole point of supplying an electronic copy is so that the roll can be subjected to a computer audit. The roll was supplied in “TIFF” format (Tagged Image Format File) on 210 CD-ROM discs in an apparent deliberate attempt to prevent such an audit from taking place. It is doubtful that supplying the roll in this format constitutes an electronic copy as section 21(4) requires. The TIFF format is effectively a digital photograph of the printed roll rather than an electronic copy of the roll itself. It required considerable effort on the part of the Registrar-General’s office in order to supply the discs in this format. The process was time consuming and applicants had to collect the 210 discs in batches. With ZEC charging US$50 per disc the national roll cost US$10 500, an unnecessarily large amount.17 Furthermore, the process was often inaccurate so that entire portions of several constituencies were omitted from some of the discs supplied, thus violating the obligations imposed on ZEC by section 21(4). ZEC has responded to complaints raised in this regard by stating that they are “attending to” the matter, without actually replacing the defective discs.18 However, prior to the 2008 elections, the MDC-T as a party and individual candidates applied for and received several copies of the discs in TIFF format purporting to be the electronic copies of the voters' rolls for the nation.
13 Letter from ZEC 07/09/09 stating “..the Commission is only obliged to provide a copy of an electronic voters roll to a political party or candidate pending an election”.
14 Page 40 Part III.
15 The Zimbabwe Election Support Network.
16 ZESN Report p 24.
17 Information supplied by MDC official involved in collection of the rolls, interview Harare September, 2009.
18 Letter from ZEC dated 01/09/09.
- 6 - The Research and Advocacy Unit was able to put together a complete set of these discs free of omissions and free of the defects on some which had obviously arisen in the process of creating TIFF files. These discs were used for the purpose of undertaking an audit of the roll.19 Methodology. The basic principle adopted by RAU for the audit was to ensure both transparency in the methodology adopted and to ensure that the exercise may be replicated by any interested party with the same result. Accordingly, the manner in which the data was processed can be closely scrutinized for accuracy or error. In keeping with this principle, all data capture and data “cleaning” were done by computer using customized programs, thus eliminating the possibility of human error had these processes been done manually. The first step was to convert the files from TIFF format into text files and in a format which would allow the data to be entered into a customized database. To do so required the use of optical character recognition (OCR) software and, to continue the transparency of the process, open source software which can be examined or used by any computer expert, was deployed. Two computer experts were engaged for this purpose, which took approximately one month. OCR programs are not infallible. The programme may read a badly printed “S” as a “5”, an “O” as a “Q” etc. A computer program was written to “clean” these errors. The process was assisted by the fact that all identification numbers have a “check” letter. The number is divided by 23 (the total number of letters of the alphabet, less I, O, and U – which may be confused with digits in faintly or badly printed documents). The location of the letter of the alphabet which corresponds to the resultant remaining number forms a suffix to the national identification number. Hence if, after dividing by 23 the reminder is 5, the number at the end of the string of digits will be “E” the fifth letter of the alphabet. If it is not, the identification number is false. With a computer program utilizing this formula, RAU was able to check the accuracy of all identification numbers transferred into the database. The identification numbers entered on the database were found to be error free. In this regard, it should also be noted that identification numbers each bear a two digit prefix and suffix. The former is the place where the holder of the national identity card registered, the latter the “home area” of the holder. Persons regarded as not having “home areas” are given a “00” suffix. Into this latter category fall people of Malawian and Mozambican origin and white Zimbabweans. Complete details of the technical processes adopted to capture the data on the TIFF files and enter them into the database are attached as Annexures A and B. The main data on the TIFF files and entered into the database comprised:
• The name of the voter • The voter’s address. • The voter ID number • The voter’s date of birth.
19 The discs for several constituencies which had been supplied to the MDC-T were defective (i.e. had portions missing) and the MDC-T set initially obtained was not complete. RAU was thus obliged to use a second set of copies of for 32 constituencies which had been supplied by ZEC to an MDC official. RAU is confident that the data on these discs is as supplied by ZEC.
- 7 - • The block number for the ward in which the voter is registered. • The ward in which the voter is registered. This is not part of the data on the roll. This information had to be determined by checking the block numbers against the Delimitation Report issued prior to the 2008 elections. The electronic roll for 2002 was also entered into the database for comparative purposes. This roll does not contain the dates of birth of the voters.20 Interrogating the database. Having captured the data in the database specific important information could then be extracted. Delimitation and Registration. Inaccurate numbers of registered voters skew the delimitation process which should ensure a rough parity of voters in each constituency, if not ward.21 Obviously, if a constituency were created with only a third of the average number in other constituencies the ballots of these voters would effectively carry 200% more “weight” than the average voter’s ballot. Similarly, the effectiveness of a ballot within a constituency with a much higher number of voters than average is diluted, and unless the constituency is evenly split between contesting parties, is essentially a wasted ballot that could be effectively deployed in another constituency. The delimitation of constituency and ward boundaries is now the responsibility of ZEC.22 ZEC is obliged to give public notice before undertaking a delimitation exercise and to entertain representations from interested parties though it is under no duty to take these representations into account. Although the report must be tabled in parliament,23 this is for noting and not approval. The President, however, may require that the Commission give the report “further consideration”.24 It seems undesirable that the President, an interested party, should have the final say over the process. There was extensive re-delimitation before the 2008 elections, with the number of House of Assembly seats increased from 150 to 210.25 Furthermore, since the elections for local government were to take place simultaneously, some 1 958 wards required delimitation, with each to fall wholly within single local authority and constituency. The exercise was conducted in
20 The Report on The Delimitation Exercise for the 2008 Harmonised Elections Zimbabwe Electoral Commission 21/01/08 (The Delimitation Report).
21 It is a specific constitutional requirement that there be a rough parity of the number of voters in each constituency – see section 61A(4) of the Constitution. The variation may be no more than 20% of the average [section 61A(5)].
22 Section 61(4)(h1) of the Constitution – previously a separate Delimitation Commission was established for this purpose.
23 Section 61A(8)(d) of the Constitution.
24 Section 61A(9) of the Constitution.
25 The increase was by way of constitutional amendment 18, Act 11 of 2007.
- 8 - haste and with little public input as required. No public hearings were held or submissions accepted before the report was finalized by way of a presidential proclamation.26 Parliament adjourned the day after the Commission tabled its report, so no discussion of the Report took place in the House of Assembly.27 When the Presidential proclamation announcing the elections was made at the end of January28 only the President was in possession of the preliminary report, and thus only the ZANU PF Presidential candidate was officially privy to its contents. The same proclamation also announced the date for the first sitting of the nomination court. Opposition parties were thus initially compelled to begin the selection of their candidates for each seat and wards without any knowledge as to how the boundaries had been delimited – i.e. without knowing the location of the seats.29 Delimitation relies on the entries in the voters’ rolls. Any error in the number of registered voters or the area in which they are resident thus affects the accuracy of the delimitation. ZEC divided the number of registered voters at the time of delimitation (5 612 464) by the number of constituencies (210) and determined constituencies on the basis of an average of 26 726 voters per constituency.30 The variation of registered voters in any constituency may not be more than 20% of the average.31 The discs supplied by ZEC show that there should be an allocation of an average of 27 276 voters per constituency, based on 5 727 902 registered voters. A 20% variation amounts to 5 455 voters, making a constitutional maximum of 32 731 and minimum of 21 821 for the purposes of delimitation. There are eight constituencies below the constitutional minimum32 and 14 above33 the constitutional minimum. These constituencies, in which voters are over or under represented respectively, are not divided along party political lines.34
26 See Zimbabwe 2008 Harmonised Elections Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights March 2008 p14.
27 The report was tabled on 17/01/08.
28 24/01/08 under Statutory Instrument 7A of 2008.
29 The Delimitation Report was finally officially published on 01/02/08.
30 Delimitation Report p viii.
31 Section 61(A)(4) of the Constitution.
32 Chakari, Chirumanzu-Zibagwe, Gutu North, Kambuzuma, Masvingo West, Mberengwa East, Mufukose (21 800) and Shurungwe South. The majorities in these constituencies split evenly between MDC and ZANU PF though ZANU PF gained one more seat as in Chirumanzu-Zibagwe MDC-T split their majority between two different MDC-T candidates standing in the same constituency.
33 Buhera West (ZANU PF), Blilima East (MDC-T), Gokwe-Sengwa (ZANU PF), Hwange-East (MDC-T), Kariba (MDC-T), Makoni South (MDC-T), Mangwe (MDC-M), Masvingo Urban (MDC-T), Mkoba (MDC-T), Mwenezi West (ZANU PF), Rushinga (ZANU PF), Umguza (ZANU PF), Umzingwane (MDC-M), Zvishavane-Runde (ZANU PF).
34 See the 2 footnotes immediately preceding.
- 9 - Over 300 000 voters were added to the rolls between December 2007 and February 2008,35 the equivalent of over 11 constituencies. The distribution of most of these new voters is not known. However, a ZESN report suggested irregularities in Hatcliffe, part of Harare North Constituency where “people were using letters from…the Ernest Kadungure Housing Cooperative as proofs of residence even though they did not live in that constituency”.36 Nearly 8 000 people were alleged to have been registered in Harare North on this basis.37 ZEC was confronted with this information by an international observer mission. The Mission reports38 that ZEC responded that the Act provides for “a communal address system whereby the community members can be registered using the same address.” There is no such legislative provision, and if there were, as the Mission rightly points out, this could lend itself to electoral fraud. The audit confirms that 7 199 people were registered as voters residing in Harare North (ward 42) as part of housing co-operatives, with some 6 086 registered within a single block.39 This block constituted nearly one third of the constituency for delimitation purposes. Delimitation is required to take into account “any community of interest as between registered voters”.40 It is doubtful that members had more affinity with the predominantly urban Harare North constituency than the peripheral rural area. They had been allocated State land for the purposes of the co-operatives and ZANU PF may have assumed that this would be sufficient to secure fealty to the ruling party. The inclusion of such a large number of voters as a block within the constituency thus seems to have been an attempt to wrest control of this constituency from the MDC. If so, the attempt failed. The MDC secured the seat by 6 710 votes to 3 135 for ZANU PF. The position in Harare North may have been an attempt to replicate the situation in Harare South in 1995, where a large number of voters also were “added” to the constituency in an apparent attempt to undermine a challenge to the ZANU PF candidate by Margaret Dongo.41 In 2008
35 ZESN Report p23.
36 It is unlawful to register as an ordinary voter in a constituency in which one is not resident – section 23 of the Electoral Act.
37 The Registrar-General has some discretion in how proof of residence is established. While section 4(1)(e) of the definition of “proof of residence” under the Electoral Act requires “a sworn written statement by a property owner on whose property the voter or claimant resides” indicating that a mere letter by the Housing Co-Operative would be insufficient, 4(1)(d) allows “any other satisfactory documentary evidence reasonably establishing the place of residence of the voter or claimant”. The Registrar-General thus has the option of applying these criteria as broadly or narrowly as he deems fit, allowing for political bias in the process. 38See the Report of the Pan African Parliament Observer Mission p2.
39 The mean number of voters per block is 1381, though the number varies between extremes of 1 and 8874.
40 Section 61A(6)(d).
41 Margaret Dongo founded the Zimbabwe Union of Democrats, and stood for Harare South against Vivian Mwashita in 1995. The election was allegedly rigged, and Dongo challenged the result in court. The subsequent case revealed serious defects in the electoral roll, including the registration of many non-resident voters, suggesting that at least 41% of the names on the roll were inaccurate.
- 10 - ZANU PF won this constituency with 7 111 to 5 208 for the combined MDC formations. A map of Harare North is attached as Annexure C. While it is a constitutional requirement that constituencies have a rough parity of numbers of voters, there is no such requirement for the wards. Large disparities exist in the number of voters for each ward. A local government councillor may thus represent a ward of as few as 29 voters or as many as 23 599. A schedule of wards with an unusually large or small number of voters is set out in Annexure D. Finally under this head, it should be noted that it is difficult to generally determine multiple voters at a single address from the database, due to the various different ways of entering an address e.g. 61 Marlborough Drive, Harare or 61 Marlb Dr. Hre or any combination of these abbreviations. Registration The Delimitation Report proceeded on the basis of 5 612 464 voters.42 There are 5 727 902 voters registered on the computer discs supplied by ZEC and used for this preliminary audit. Some 206 866 voters were added to the rolls after the discs had been supplied (the equivalent of nine constituencies) to bring the total number of voters to 5 934 768.43 This number of voters, given the size of the population in Zimbabwe, is statistically implausible. The CIA World Fact Book estimates Zimbabwe’s population to be 11,350,111. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimated Zimbabwe’s population as 13 010 00 in 2005.44 Zimbabwe’s last census was in 2002 and put the population at 11 664 663.45 The population growth rate is extremely low, however, and estimates indicate that the rate has declined from 1.1% in 200246 to 0.59% at present47. The age distribution of the population is as set out in Annexure E.48 This indicates that some 7 728 026 people would have been eligible to register as voters in 2008.49 Surveys reveal that the number of eligible voters who actually register to vote,
42 Page viii of the Delimitation Report.
43 Number of Zimbabwe's Voters Up, Electoral Commission Monsters and Critics 19/03/08.
44 WHO Country Health System Fact Sheet 2006.
45 Census 2002 Zimbabwe Preliminary Report. Central Statistical Office (2002 Census Report) These figures are not incompatible as it is well known that a large number of Zimbabweans have left the country since 2000, and more particularly since 2005 due to an economic and political crisis in the country. It is difficult to accurately assess the number of Zimbabweans living in the “diaspora” – see Migration From Zimbabwe: Numbers, Needs and Policy Options Centre for Development and Enterprise April 2008 (CDE Report).
46 2002 Census Report. In numerical terms this adds about 70 000 people to the population each year.
47 CIA World Fact Book: Zimbabwe.
48 These statistics appear in Report on the Age Distribution in Zimbabwe’s Population Ms. F. Matarise Department of Statistics, University of Zimbabwe, October 2003 (Matarise 2003).
- 11 - internationally, has never exceeded 80%.50 Zimbabwe’s voter population of 5 934 768 gives a registration percentage of over 76%. Given the number of Zimbabweans lacking the necessary documentation to register as voters, those in the diaspora51 and the large number of non- Zimbabweans within the eligible age group, such a high registration percentage is improbable. Furthermore, of those under the voting age in 2002, a maximum of some 1 657 489 people would have attained the age of 18 and been eligible to register as new voters in 2008.52 Between January 2002 and 2008, 1 100 66353 voters were added to the rolls. Of this figure 41 485 are entered again in a different constituency, and are thus repeat entries. Nearly 66% of the 1 100 663 voters are individuals who recently attained voting age, a plausible figure.54 The registration process for the 2008 elections did not appear impartial. Voter registration is voluntary and continuous.55 Registration for any particular election is allowed until 24 hours before nomination day.56 The Registrar-General’s office conducted various voter registration drives through mobile registration stations, though this process was perceived to have been undertaken in a manner which favoured ZANU PF in its timing, advertising and the areas and manner in which it was carried out. For example, the Voice of America Reported: The Movement for Democratic Change faction led by MDC founder Morgan Tsvangirai cited imbalances in the distribution of voter registration units and charged that this was by design to register more voters in areas controlled by the ruling ZANU-PF party and leave voters unregistered in parts of the country
49 The figure is arrived at by adding in three fifths of those in the 10-14 and 15-19 age groups (using totals for these groups as indicated by Matarise) and adding the sum of these two figures to Matarise’s total of 6 070 537 eligible to vote in 2002 (Matarise p17). Population growth is not statistically relevant here as new births since 2002 would not have reached voting age and emigration would have exceeded immigration. Zero mortality has been assumed, meaning that the 76% is understated to the extent that the total voter population (the numerator) is overstated by the failure to include mortality figures and is thus a minimum.
50 Matarise 2003 p12.
51 See footnote 45.
52 This assumes a zero mortality rate in this group. The figure has been arrived at by assuming that the populations in the age groups are evenly distributed between each year, and adding in three fifths of the 10-14 and 15-19 age groups i.e. the years 12,13,14, 15, 16 and 17.
53 This is the figure determined by comparing the electronic roll for 2002 with that for 2008. A further 200 000 were added to the voters’ rolls after the discs had been supplied.
54 It is probably inappropriate to extrapolate this percentage for the eligible voter population as a whole, since registering to vote may be a function of increasing maturity.
55 Section 17A of the Electoral Act.
56 Section 26A of the Electoral Act. Nomination day is the day set by the President in terms of section 38 of the Act as the date upon which the nomination courts may receive the nominations of candidates.
- 12 - where the MDC is strong. MDC sources said Mashonaland East with 11 constituencies has been allocated 470 mobile registration centers. Mashonaland West with 10 constituencies was allocated 379 while Mashonaland Central with 10 constituencies was given 335 centers. All three Mashonaland Provinces are dominated by Zanu PF. By comparison, Harare-Chitungwiza Province, with 18 constituencies, has been allocated just 79 registration centers, while Masvingo with 14 constituencies has 259 and Manicaland with 16 constituencies has been allocated 264 centers.57 Of the total number of registered voters, 3 845 897 are registered as voters in purely rural constituencies, and 1 381 026 in purely urban constituencies.58 The Mashonaland provinces have 1 811 954 registered voters. This means that the average number of voters per constituency in purely rural constituencies is 27 247 while in purely urban constituencies the average is 27 079, suggesting a slight, but insignificant, over-representation for urban voters. The average in Mashonaland provinces is 27 044. While there does not appear to be any clearly manifest bias in the number of registered voters per constituency, there is a bias in the percentage of the population registered as voters in particular areas. The population spread by province in the 2002 Census report showed 28.76% of the population to be in the Mashonaland provinces (traditional ZANU PF strongholds) and 16.36% in Harare Metropolitan Province (an MDC stronghold). Using the number of eligible voters by province based on the 2002 census figures and adding in those who would have become eligible to register as voters since that date, Harare has an eligible voter population of 1 255 042 and the Mashonaland Provinces 2 217 755.59 With 780 152 and 1 811 954 registered voters in each province respectively, the percentage of the population registered as voters is 62.1% in Harare against an implausible 81.7% in the Mashonaland Provinces. These figures assume no rural-urban drift since 2002.60 If such drift has
57 This lack of impartiality was reported elsewhere. During the registration drive of 14th June 2007 to 28th August, 2008 an MDC-M legislator reported that Harare North constituency had five centres for people to register in 20 days - and shared one team with Harare East, Mabvuku, Harare Central and Chitungwiza - whereas Zvimba district was provided with 95 centres and was given 60 days for the public to register and three teams. Marondera district had 72 centres and three teams (to cater for about 250,000 voters) compared with Harare, which had 48 centres to cater for 1, 5 million voters. (The Zimbabwean, July 12-18, 2007). Urban areas are MDC strongholds, where as rural areas, such as Zvimba, are regarded as ZANU PF strongholds. While some disparity in the number of centres could be justified by the greater distances those wishing to register need to travel, the difference in number is still inordinately large and does not explain the disparity between Mashonaland Provinces and others. See also EISA report p32; Inspection Exercise for the 2008 elections: June 14th - August 28th 2007 Buhlebenkosi Moyo (paper 2007 published by Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe); ZANU PF Coerces Youths to Register as Voters Zim Online 15/06/07.
58 In some instances constituencies comprise a mix of urban and rural wards, these are omitted and hence the total of rural and urban voters does not add up to the total number on the database.
59 This compares with total populations of 1 903 510 for Harare and 3 346 201 for the Mashonaland Provinces. The disparity arises from the far greater number of eligible voters in mainly the 20 – 44 year age groups in Harare Metropolitan Province.
60 The United Nations has estimated that once the economic crisis began to be felt in Zimbabwe after 1997, urbanisation increased at 6%-8%. Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe To Assess the Scope and Impact - 13 - occurred, as is believed61, the disparity would be even greater.62 The disparity thus appears to support allegations of bias in voter registration and ghost and duplicate voters in the Mashonaland Provinces. De-registration Since 2002 some 676 887 voters have been permanently removed from the voters’ rolls, an exceptionally large number if this does not include the deceased (see below). It is not possible to determine the age distribution of those removed (and thus whether they were removed as deceased) as birth dates do not appear on the 2002 voters’ rolls. Of the 676 887 removed 35 829 bore “00” suffixes. The significance of this arises from the fact that “00” suffixes denote those of non-Zimbabwean ancestry and from legislative changes after 2001 in relation to citizenship. Legislation63 enacted in 2001 prohibited dual citizenship.64 In terms of this law, any person holding citizenship of another country ipso facto forfeits citizenship of Zimbabwe.65 The Registrar-General (mis)interpreted this legislation to mean that people with a mere entitlement to citizenship of a foreign country, automatically lost Zimbabwean citizenship unless they undertook formal procedures to renounce that citizenship, i.e. regardless of whether they actually held such citizenship.66 He then further determined that only Zimbabwean citizens were entitled to vote and those who did not renounce a potential foreign citizenship were summarily removed from the voters’ rolls.67 The motivation for this appears to be the perception by the then ruling party that the defeat in a referendum on constitutional reform in February 2000 was largely due to the votes of some 450 000 farm labourers and their families voting negatively influenced by their white commercial farmer employers. A large percentage of these farm workers are of Malawian or Mozambican origin and thus possibly entitled to claim foreign citizenship. The
of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka 2005.
61 See footnote 60.
62 The fact that there are far less people in the 20-44 year age groups in the Mashonaland Provinces in fact suggests that this age group tends to drift into Harare from rural areas.
63 Acts 12 and 23 of 2001.
64 Section 9 of the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 4:01].
65 Ibid sub section 9(4).
66 See Mudede’s Office Apologises for Disenfranchising Whites Daily News 11/04/02. The apology came too late for the poll, and may be seen as insincere as it continued with enthusiasm once legislative imprimatur had been gained.
67 This was initially done without informing many the voters as required by section 33(4) of the Electoral Act until court action Tsvangirai v Registrar-General of Elections and 1 Other, and Tsvangirai v Registrar-General of Births and Deaths and 10 Others HH-22-2002 brought this to a temporary halt. The Registrar-General appealed this ruling and the Supreme Court, under Registrar-General of Elections and Seven Others v Morgan Tsvangirai (S-12-02) effectively disenfranchised permanent residents who were not Zimbabwean citizens. The legal reasoning, as the dissenting judgement of Sandura JA showed, was weak.
- 14 - citizenship laws and a Supreme Court judgment68 effectively disenfranchised many falling into this group. The number of those removed from the roll with “00” suffixes, as revealed by the audit, supports this contention. The Deceased and Departed? In terms of the law, all deaths must be reported and entered into a register of deaths.69 For the purposes of this project an application was made in terms of the Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIPPA)70 to the Registrar-General for an electronic copy of the Register of Deaths. The intention was to ascertain that deceased persons registered as voters had been removed from the voters’ rolls.71 AIPPA requires a response from the Registrar-General within 30 days, either complying with the request or indicating a refusal to comply with the request.72 Any refusal must indicate on which of several prescribed grounds the refusal is based. In breach of the Act, the Registrar-General has failed to respond to the request, within the statutory 30 days, and, at the time of writing, at all. Accordingly, it is not possible to state with absolute certainty as to who on the roll may be deceased simply by analyzing the database. However, inferences may of course be made in some instances and with almost complete accuracy on the basis of the age of the voter, since the dates of birth of voters are now included on the rolls. The graph below indicates the age distribution of voters.
68 See footnote 67..
69 Section 20 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act [Chapter 5:02].
70 Chapter 10:27.
71 This is a legal requirement – see section 33(1) of the Electoral Act. A constituency registrar must remove any person he “has reason to believe” is dead. Being aged 108 may be sufficient reason.
72 Section 8 of AIPPA.
- 15 - AGE Distribution as per data extracted from CD's supplied 2000000
1800000 3411 170
1600000
1400000 5
1200000 56 108541 10059 1000000
800000 47592 7
600000 1379 45
400000 298397
200000 160962 456 021 82 74 21670 0 133 1-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 100+ AGE Groups
The number of registered voters in the various age groups appears consistently overstated when compared with Annexure E. In addition a large number of voters in the most populous section the 20-29 and 30-39 age groups are believed to have left the country to seek work in South Africa, the United Kingdom and other mainly Anglophone countries.73 If these people had been removed from the roll one would have expected this section to be under populated rather than overstated. The graph below indicates the age distribution of those aged over 60.
73 800 000 to 1 000 000 Zimbabweans mostly between the ages of 19 and 40 are estimated to be working in South Africa. Although the press commonly cites the figure of 3 million, more carefully researched studies suggest the lower figure – CDE Report p2. A constituency registrar is obliged to remove any person from the roll who has been continuously absent from his or her constituency for more than twelve months, or has left Zimbabwe with the intention of remaining outside the country permanently – section 33(2) of the Electoral Act.
- 16 - AGE Distribution of over 60's - Total = 1 014 421 500,000
450,000 5 98,58 400,000 3
350,000 8,397
300,000 29
250,000
200,000 0,962 16 150,000 6 1 2 100,000 82,45 74,0
50,000
0 39.3% 29.4% 15.9% 8.1% 0.7% 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 100+ AGE Groups
In numerical terms there are 1 014 421 people over the age of 60 on the voters’ rolls.
AGE Distribution of over 65's 400,000
350,000 397
300,000 298,
250,000
200,000 147 962 175, 160,
150,000
100,000 82,456 74,021
50,000
0 65-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 100+ AGE Groups
- 17 -
In numerical terms there are 790 983 people over the age of 65 on the voters’ rolls.
There are also 134 202 people aged over 90 registered as voters.
These figures must be considered in view of WHO statistics which record the average life expectancy as being 34 for women and 37 for men.74 Zimbabwe’s population is probably growing at only about 0.59% per annum75, about 70 000 per year (not compounded). The WHO, using figures from 2004, estimates that 853 out of 1 000 people die between the ages of 15 and 60.76 Put another way only 14.7% of people live beyond 60. Yet the percentage of people on the roll over 60 is over 17%. Using figures extrapolated from the 2002 Census it is estimated that the number of people aged over 65 is 359 486 or 3%.77 The CIA World Fact Sheet puts the number of people in Zimbabwe aged over 65 at 3.5% of the population, or 431 758.78 If 80% of this group were registered as voters, the maximum number on the roll should be 345 406. There is more than twice this number. It is a simple matter to determine the number of people aged over 90 on the roll. Almost all of these may be presumed dead. Yet some 134 202 people over 90 appear on the roll. Some 30 044 of these all have the birth date 01/01/1901. There are also large numbers of entries of people aged over 90 with birth dates of the 1st January in successive years after 1901 i.e. 01/01/1902, 01/01/1903 etc. It seems likely that many elderly voters registering in the rural areas may not have known their date of birth and the 1st January was simply entered against their presumed year of birth. In any event those believed to have been born as early as 1901 should presumably no longer appear on the roll. There are also people who have died and whose deaths have been well publicized. An obvious example is that of David Stevens, one of the first of many white farms to be murdered in the course of land invasions. He remains as a registered voter. The Electoral Act requires that constituency registrars remove from the roll any person they have reason to believe dead.79 It is a simple matter to ascertain whether those presumed dead are in fact dead and to remove those who are known to be dead from the roll. The question therefore arises as to why the Registrar-
74 Country Heath System Fact Sheet, 2006 Zimbabwe World Health Organisation, Africa (WHO Report).
75 WHO Report and CIA World Factbook respectively.
76 WHO Report.
77 Matarise Report p15.
78 The estimate was made in 2007 and based on a population of about 11.4 million. The WHO statistics are based on a 2005 estimate of a population of 13 million.
79 Section 33(1) of the Electoral Act.
- 18 - General has not done so. In the absence of any other explanation, the only reasonable conclusion is that there is either a deliberate policy not to remove deceased voters or the simple procedures necessary to ensure that entries onto the death register are automatically removed from the voters roll, have deliberately not been implemented. If this is the case, the number of dead persons on the roll identified by extreme old age represents merely the tip of an iceberg (since those dying of other causes are not represented) and would partly explain why the percentage of the population registered as voters is exceptionally high. At the other end of the scale there are 715 voters on the rolls aged under 18 with the youngest voter a mere one year old. While these entries are obviously clerical errors, it is difficult to see how, in a computer age, such entries can either be made or go undetected. Duplicates The database was queried as to the number of duplicate voters appearing on the roll by searching for repeated ID numbers. Given that computer technology can easily locate duplicate entries it is difficult to see why there should be any on the voters’ rolls. Indeed, in an Opposing Affidavit filed as part of court papers in 200280, the Registrar-General attested that:
There is no way an I.D. number can appear twice in the same roll as alleged…
However, the audit revealed 182 564 instances of entries relating to people with the same identification number who appear in the rolls more than once, usually in two or more different constituencies simultaneously but also, in some instances, and contrary to the Registrar- General’s protestation, in the same constituency more than once (see annexure F). Initially this suggested that the cause of the duplication was a migration from one constituency to another, and a failure thereafter to remove the name from the exited constituency. Over the years there has been a considerable rural to urban shift.81 One would therefore expect to find, if the hypothesis is correct, that the duplicates are dyads comprising one entry in a rural constituency and one in an urban. In fact 66.7% of multiple entries in more than one constituency are in purely rural constituencies. A distinction must be made between double registration and copies. In many instances entire blocks of voters appear in two constituencies, and given that the addresses of the voters remain the same, have thus clearly been added wrongly to a second constituency. For example 8 320 voters in block number 010913 of Chipinge East are copied and repeated in Chipinge South. An example of a double registration duplicate entry appears as Annexure F and the cross reference against the original TIFF file as Annexure G.
80 Morgan Tsvangirai v Robert Gabriel Mugabe, The Registrar-General of Elections, Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Electoral Supervisory Commission Case No H.C. 3616/2002 2nd Respondent’s Opposing Affidavit p 708 of the papers.
81 See footnote 60 above.
- 19 - The large number of duplicates can impact adversely and severely on the delimitation process and voting statistics.82 Falsely inflating the roll in this manner also presents possibilities for electoral fraud, through the printing of excess ballots and/or ballot box stuffing. After following prescribed procedures,83constituency registrars are legally obliged to remove duplicates from the rolls.84 Election Results The voters’ rolls can also provide interesting psephological statistics when matched with election results. Unfortunately, ZEC has refused to release the detailed results for the presidential polls both for the election of the 29th March, 2008 and 27th June, 2008. Following an application for these figures from ZEC in terms of the AIPPA, ZEC disingenuously claimed that the schedules of these results constituted election residue and have been destroyed in terms of the law.85 Only the returns by province for the presidential election have been released to the public by ZEC. The totals of these returns are inherently implausible. The June 27th run-off results claimed victory for Mugabe with 85.3% or 2 177 559 votes (up from 1 079 730 in March), and gave Tsvangirai 9.4% or 239 008 votes (down from 1 195 562 in March) with 5.3% spoiled papers or 135 806 ballots. The voter turn-out was given as 43.01%. These figures beg some explanation of a supposed swing in voter preference on what is probably a historically unprecedented scale within such a short period. Bearing in mind that the voter turn- out was recorded as being slightly more than the first round, there are several logical possibilities:
• That 956 554 people86 who had voted for Tsvangirai in the first round, changed their allegiance and voted for Mugabe in the second round, without any of Mugabe’s supporters switching allegiance. Zimbabwe's political terrain suggests that this is a far- fetched explanation; • That an additional 1 097 829 Mugabe supporters who had not bothered to vote in the first round turned out to vote in the second round. This means that an equivalent of 40% of the electorate was suddenly inspired to vote in an effectively uncontested election when they had not bothered to turn up to vote for Mugabe in the first fiercely contested round. This is implausible and the more so given that observers noted a marked drop in voter turnout,87 which was to be expected given the withdrawal of Tsvangirai.
82 See below under Election Results.
83 As set out in sections 27, 29 and 30 of the Electoral Act.
84 Section 32(2) of the Electoral Act.
85 Letter from ZEC dated 07/09/09. ZEC seeks to rely on section 70(3) of the Electoral Act. The record of the results is not “election residue” as defined in section 70(1).
86 This is the decrease in Tsvangirai’s vote. A further 141 275 voters would still be required to make up Mugabe’s total.
87 The Electoral Commission Forum of SADC Observer Mission p 4.
- 20 - • That violence, the withdrawal of Tsvangirai and reduction of electoral monitors (partly due to the violence; due to the withdrawal of one candidate; and by the actions of ZEC itself88) meant that polling and polling station returns were not monitored allowing for the submission of fraudulent returns on a massive scale. This explanation is not only plausible but is supported by the fact that figures for the voter turnout remained the same as those for the first round despite an observed drop in the number of voters. The implausibility of returns on the basis of deductive reasoning can be supported by comparison with the voters’ rolls and in particular by confirming that the tally of votes in any particular ward, or the totals for any constituency are commensurate with the number of registered voters. ZEC has refused to release the results of the 27th June Presidential poll and 29th March poll at ward and constituency levels. However, the exercise can still be undertaken in regard to the March 29th results using unofficial results collated by MDC. Although these figures are incomplete and, in some instances, inaccurate, they are still worth some consideration. Unfortunately, for the reasons stated (the inability to monitor), no MDC tallies for the June 27th election are available. Given the overstatement of actual voters, the voter turnout against registered entries should be low, notwithstanding the fact that all elections since 2000 have been fiercely contested. The poll of around 42% in the presidential election is replicated in the other simultaneously held elections.89 However, despite the inflated voter base there were still wards in the 2008 election where the percentage poll exceeded the number of registered voters or was implausibly high.
y
d s
enc t ere t Poll titu mber Cas Block Voters % Ward No Nu Regis No of Votes Cons Norton 2 28 050632 138 493%
Muzvezve 15 78 021924 177 227%
Bikita West 23 191 010404 154 81%
Hwange West 3 39 110279 150 385%
Bubi 6 103 080335 230 223%
88 ZEC reduced the number of ZESN Observers from the 8 667 in the first election to 500 – ZESN Report p55. ZESN felt that it was impossible to carry out its observation efficiently under the circumstances and withdrew from observing the election.
89 Compare the United States presidential election of 2008 with a turnout of around 62%. Although the highest number of votes in US history were cast, the percentage poll was not-http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/United_States_presidential_election,_2008#cite_note-180.
- 21 - Beitbridge East 3 60 020302,020402 339 565%
Bulilima East 17 186 020856 189 102%
Bulilima West 12 197 050456 443 225%
Gwanda Central 10 163 130128 226 139%
Gwanda North 10 111 010439,030439 243 219%
It should however, be borne in mind that over 200 000 voters were added to the voters’ rolls after the computer discs were compiled. These supplementary voters are sufficient to make up the excess of votes over registered voters on the electronic rolls. A summation of errors leads to some curious voter statistics elsewhere, some of which can be determined from Annexure H. One of the most egregious arises from Mhondoro-Ngezi constituency in Mashonaland West Province. This constituency has the smallest number of registered voters with only 20 063. Of these, 5 947 are duplicates, where entries are replicated in one or more other constituencies. Yet ZEC claimed 25 516 voters as registered in this constituency, of whom 5 689 voted for MDC-T and 7 191 for ZANU PF. What is to be done? Legislative Reform It is clear that further reform to Zimbabwe’s electoral laws is required, and, for the purposes discussed here, the requirements for registration as a voter need to be adjusted to remove the flexible discretion the Registrar-General currently enjoys. The process of inspecting and obtaining copies of the voters’ rolls, particularly electronic copies, clearly needs to be made more transparent and liberalized. ZEC ZEC has the responsibility to keep and maintain the voters’ rolls.90 Unless ZEC comprises competent persons prepared to undertake or supervise this task without political bias, the integrity of the rolls is likely to be compromised. Despite having been informed of inadequacies in the voters’ rolls prior to the 2008 election, ZEC failed to take any action to correct this (such as an audit of the nature undertaken by RAU).
90 Section 20(1) of the Electoral Act.
- 22 - The establishment of ZEC has now been changed, as a result of constitutional amendment 19, from seven to nine members, though the mechanism for the appointment of Commissioners remains the same and is set out in section 100B of the constitution: 100B (1) There is91a Zimbabwe Electoral Commission consisting of: (a) a chairperson appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission and the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders; and (b) eight other members appointed by the President from a list of not fewer than twelve nominees submitted by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. (2) The chairperson of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission must be a judge or former judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, or a person qualified for appointment as such a judge. (3) At least four members of the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission, apart from the chairperson, must be women. (4) Persons appointed to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission must be chosen for their integrity and their experience and competence in the conduct of affairs in the public or private sector. This body is yet to be established. When it is, past experience demonstrates that it is vital that in submitting the list of nominees to the President, the Parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders pays the utmost regard to subsection (4) above. The Registrar-General While ZEC has statutory responsibility to keep and maintain the voters’ roll, the duty of making and removing entries from the rolls lies with the Registrar-General.92 The implication is therefore that the Registrar-General carries out these duties with the assistance of deputy and constituency registrars, under the instruction of ZEC. The audit indicates that the task of making and removing entries has not been properly executed and that the manner in which the Registrar- General has been carrying out his duties is questionable. The current Registrar-General has been responsible for entries onto and off the roll from before the elections of 1985 to the present. The office of the Registrar-General is a public office and thus part of the Public Service. The Registrar-General thus holds office in terms of the Public Service Act93 and the regulations pertaining to conditions of service thereunder. For most public servants there is a compulsory
91 The wording is peculiar. The usual terminology is “there shall be” imputing a future imperative. The actual wording states that there “is” an Electoral Commission established in the manner indicated, when, at the time of writing, manifestly there is not. The last Commissioners were appointed in terms of the Constitution before the 19th amendment, in February 2005. Since these appointments are not in terms of the current constitution, the previously established body may be said to be defunct.
92 Sections 24 et seq of the Electoral Act.
93 Chapter 16:04.
- 23 - retirement age of 65.94 The Registrar-General of voters, Tobaiwa Mudede, was born on 04/03/40 (it is presumed, not with absolute confidence, that his own entry on the roll in that regard is accurate) and is thus over 69. The Regulations also provide that public servants are required to “place the whole of their time at the disposal of the State”.95 Mr. Mudede is known to own a farm which has involved him in law suits in Zimbabwe’s courts. This presumably takes up a portion of Mr. Mudede’s time and attention.96 In view of the fact that Mr. Mudede is past the retirement age, may not spend the whole of his time engaged in the task for which he is paid by the taxpayer and given the state of the voters’ rolls, the question arises as to why he has been allowed to continue in his post. Given that, between them, ZEC and the Registrar-General of Voters have been unable to ensure that voters’ rolls for elections have been compiled properly, remedial steps are required. It does not appear that, given the extent of the deficiencies in the roll, piecemeal and ad hoc amendment of the rolls is a practical means of rectifying the rolls. Constructing New Rolls RAU has identified a South African company, Waymark (Pty) Ltd, which specializes in voter registration. This company has experience in voter registration in numerous African countries, assisting with registration of voters and election processes in South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi, Zambia and Rwanda, to name but some, from 1994 onwards. For example, working under a contract awarded by the UNPD, Waymark registered 18 million voters in Tanzania between July, 2004 and December 2004. Waymark uses a registration kit consisting of a camera, a printer, battery charger, two sets of batteries for the camera, two batteries for the printer and an additional 12V battery that can be used to charge both the camera batteries as well as the printer batteries. The equipment is used to take a photograph of the applicant, print it out and affix it to a laminated registration card. In conjunction with political parties and officials involved in the electoral process Waymark customizes registration forms compatible with optical mark recognition (OMR) software, which is read and entered together with the voter’s fingerprints into a database. Various fail safe mechanisms and cross check references enable this data to be entered uncorrupted by computer into a central registry. Fingerprint recognition software ensures the impossibility of double registration. Each voter is issued, at the time of registration, with the laminated registration card which bears the voter’s photograph and a bar code number. The voter’s photograph also appears alongside other personal details on the printed voters’ rolls allowing a secure identification check. Security features on the registration card prevent any possibility of forgery. Where online computer access is available, the bar code can be used during the voting process to prevent double voting. In remote rural areas the cards can be clipped as evidence of having cast a vote.
94 Section 17 of Statutory Instrument 1 of 2000.
95 Section 6(10) of the Regulations.
96 Mudede Kicks out Farm Workers The Zimbabwe Standard 05/09/09.
- 24 - This system not only expedites the voting process, but has the spinoff of immediately providing many people with an acceptable form of photograph confirmed identity. Waymark believes that, once all equipment, training and infrastructure is in place, re-registration of the entire country can take place within a 90 day period. There are obvious advantages for all political parties where the registration process is orchestrated by an independent body. The suspicions about the process mentioned above, which inevitably arise where one party is seen to have control over the process, are diminished. The turnkey cost of this operation, including supply of all equipment is in the region of 20 million dollars. Experience shows that the donor community has been willing to fund initiatives such as this on the basis that the amount expended is fully justifiable against the democratic return of transparency in the electoral process and consequent increased likelihood of acceptance of the outcome by the political players. There is an important caveat to starting the construction of the voters’ rolls afresh. The estimated one million97 Zimbabweans in the diaspora will need to be included. The failure to include them in such an exercise would effectively disenfranchise those diasporan Zimbabweans who come into the country during election periods. The Waymark quote includes the cost of registering these voters. Conclusion The current state of the voters’ rolls indicates that piecemeal repair is neither desirable nor practical. A re-registration process for the entire country before the next general election by an independent electoral specialist such as Waymark, is not only feasible but would be an important step towards ensuring democratic, universally acceptable and procedurally transparent elections in Zimbabwe.
97 See footnote 73 above.
- 25 -
ANNEXURE A
Converting graphics-format voters’ roll files to plain-text format
Objective
The objective of this exercise was to convert graphics-format voters’ roll files to plain-text format to facilitate analysis.
Methodology
Converting a graphics-format file to plain-text format is a two-stage process. In the first stage we recognize the characters in the graphic image using an optical character recognition (OCR) program. We used the Tesseract OCR program, firstly because it is very highly regarded in the OCR community (see http://code.google.com/p/tesseract-ocr) and secondly because it is an open- source program whose source code is publicly available for inspection and verification. This means that we can verify the integrity of the OCR process. In the second stage we correct any characters which have been misrecognized by the OCR program. In practice OCR programs systematically misrecognize characters in the graphics representation, such as 5 versus S, 0 versus O versus Q, and so on. The proportion of characters misrecognized depends on such factors as the quality and clarity of the original graphics representation, the type of font used in the original text, etc. We believe that this correction process must be completely explicit and entirely automatic so that every change in the original file can be predicted in advance and every correction can be accounted for. We met these requirements by writing an open-source program called cleanup to make these corrections. This program is written in the Perl programming language and its source code is provided for inspection and verification. Every correction made can be accounted for by specific statements in the source code of the cleanup program. This means that we can verify the integrity of the post-OCR correction process. It is, of course, possible that there are still undetected errors in the plain-text files generated from the graphics files but when any such errors are identified they can be corrected by modifying the source code of the cleanup program and applying it again to the original files. We have already completed a large number of such iterative improvements to the program. The open-source nature of this program makes this iterative correction procedure completely transparent and verifiable. In summary, we convert graphics-format voters’ roll files to plain-text format files as follows: Graphics file Æ Tesseract Æ cleanup Æ Plain text file
- 26 - Process
The original files were supplied to us in compressed Tagged Image Format File(TIFF). Each TIFF file was first processed by the Tesseract OCR program. The output OCR files contain the optically recognized characters of the original TIFF files but do not preserve the layout of the file due to the difficulty in, for example, recognizing the number of spaces represented by blank space in a graphical image. Each OCR format file was then processed by the cleanup program to generate files in plain-text (TXT) and comma separated variable (CSV) format. The TXT format files are laid out as closely as possible to the original TIFF files. However, we did not include the original page headers and footers in these files so that they could be concatenated together to produce a single unified constituency file. We also did not include the line numbers from the original files. We added the constituency number given in the original page footers to the end of each line so that constituency files could be concatenated together for analysis while at the same time allowing for the recovery of the original constituency files by sorting the combined files on the appended constituency number. The voter record fields are ordered as follows: Surname Other name Sex Birth date Registration Number Address Block Number Constituency Number
The CSV files include the same fields as the TXT format files but are in standard comma- separated variable text format suitable for opening in spreadsheet and database programs. Fields which exceed the defined width in the original text files are truncated so that they can be safely opened in database programs. The cleanup program checked the validity of each voter national registration number to detect any bogus numbers. The national registration number includes a number of digits and a check character which partially verifies the integrity of these digits. Consider, for example, a hypothetical national registration number including the text “12-345678P.” The character "P" is the check character. There are 23 alphabetic check characters drawn from the characters A - Z less the characters I, O and U. The remainder when 12 345 678 is divided by 23 is 14 and we note that the 14th character in the check-character alphabet is "P" which verifies the integrity of
- 27 - the digits. The cleanup program also verifies other components of the national registration number. Every correction made by the cleanup program is logged and separate log files are generated for each voters’ roll file. Optional Ward Data
Each voter record line includes the number of the block in which the voter resides. To increase the utility of the plain-text files the cleanup program optionally appends additional ward data to each voter record line. The location of blocks in wards and constituencies is described in the official constituency delimitation report. We were unable to obtain a digital copy of the delimitation report so we had to extract the ward information from this report by inspection. We also noted a number of omissions and contradictions in the delimitation report. The cleanup program optionally appends the following values to each voter record line: Ward number Local authority name Parliamentary constituency name Parliamentary constituency number Senatorial constituency name Senatorial constituency number Ward population We currently have ward information for 4118 blocks. We have no ward information on 200 block numbers which appear in the voters’ roll. We provide the table showing ward information for each block as a CSV format file open for inspection and verification. Deliverables
We received 630 TIFF format files, 3 files for each of the 210 parliamentary constituencies, divided by surname (A-L, M and N-Z). We generated 630 corresponding OCR, TXT, CSV and LOG files, a total of 630 x 4 = 2,520 files. We provided these files chiefly for reference. To make analysis more convenient we concatenated the 3 surname-divided component files for each constituency to provide 210 constituency files in TXT, CSV and LOG format, a total of 630 constituency files. We provided these files in separate folders arranged by both file type (for example, a folder containing 210 TXT files) and by constituency (for example a folder for each constituency, containing files of TXT, CSV and LOG format). We also included the source code for the cleanup program.
- 28 - Since each voter record includes the constituency code number the separate constituency files can be further combined if necessary since the original constituency files can be recovered if required by sorting the combined files on the constituency code.
- 29 -
ANNEXURE B Objective To design and develop an application that allows users and owners of the application to interrogate voter rolls of Zimbabwe for accuracy, and allow user defined queries and searches to be made. Overview
The application has been built using a client/server model where clients using the Microsoft Access RDMS platform, submit queries to a database sitting atop Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Relational Database Management System software.
Design & Development
The front-end client sits atop Microsoft Access and is the window/interface through which users submit queries and searches to the back-end database. The front end is made up of Form, Table, Query, Report and Module objects which are wired together by the Visual Basic for Application programming language, and bring an automated experience to end users.
Desktop and notebook systems would need to have the Microsoft Access RDMS software or a run-time version of this software to be able to run the front-end client. Though Microsoft Access is a full blown relational database management system in its own right, Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Express edition was the preferred back end database solution as it is a fully dedicated database server platform suited to handling demanding and concurrent queries and searches from multiple clients.
The application can be configured such that multiple clients on a LAN can submit queries and searches against the back-end database, hosted on a dedicated workstation as and when requirements dictate this. On the other hand desktop and mobile systems have been configured so that both the front-end and back-end database platforms sit on the same operating hardware platform. This is ideal for mobile users who want to have access to the application and its data on the road.
The Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Express RDBMS houses database objects – Tables, Stored Procedures, Triggers and Functions necessary for responding to queries and search requests from clients. Each roll sits in a database of its own on the database server. This design approach distributes queries and search requests amongst a number of databases rather than having only one physical database house all the rolls. And in any case, Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Express Edition comes with a 4GB file cap for any database built on it. Data in some rolls if combined together can easily exceed this file size limit hence the need for multiple physical databases. For installation, Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Express edition requires the target workstation to have the following software preinstalled.
- 30 - Microsoft .Net Framework 3.51 Microsoft Powershell Microsoft Windows Installer 4.5 Microsoft Windows Update 3.5 sp1 (MS Windows XP platform)
Presently, the application has been implemented and runs satisfactorily.
- 31 - 296000.000000 300000.000000 304000.000000 308000.000000 312000.000000
HARARE NORTH PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCY 2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Gwangwari 0 0 0
. # . 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
4 Hatcliffe 4 0 0
8 # 8 Open Space along Glen Forest Road near cooperatives Hatcliff 1 Hatcl!iff " !hatcliff 2 Science Park # Hatcliffe Community Centre Hogerty Hill 42 # ZRP Bording Luna " GF #
Brooke Ridge # Philadelphia # Borrowdale Brook # Borrowdale Brooke Carrick CreaghUmwinsidale Teviotdale # # 0 # 0 0 WinchendonSherwood 0 0 0
0 # New March Shopping Centre 0 0 Heritage 0
0 Heritage 0 . ! . 0 " 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 8 Harare_North 8 Helensvale # RumbabvuRumbavu # Quinnington 18# Hel#lensvale Phinnie Shopping Centre
Glen Lorne Shopping Centre Wallace Block Glen Lorne # # LEGEND Open Space Chishawasha Turn off Mon Abri #Ryelands Greystone Park BGreystone Park # ! polling stations #Greystone Glenavon Est GF # # Greystone ParkGreystone A Settlement Mtendere Glenwood # # •
0 GF 0
0 Health Centre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 Dungarven 0 . " Kingsmead Colray . 0 Secondary School # ## Gletwyn 0 0 # # 0
0 Borrowdale 0
6 Borrowdale Estate 6 3 ! Primary School 3 0 0
8 Kambanji 8 # Road St Johns BSt Johns Preparatory ! St Johns Ward "
St Machaels Preparatory WARDNUMBER ! Borrowdale 0 2 4 Kilometers 18 42 296000.000000 300000.000000 304000.000000 308000.000000 312000.000000 Parliamentary Schedule of Wards with unusually large or small number of registered voters. Annexure D
VOTER POPULATION as VOTER WARD per Delimitation POPULATION CONSTITUENCY NUMBER Report BLOCK NUMBERS as per CD's Variance % Variance Norton 228050632 29 -1 -4% Muzvezve 15 1 021924 1867 -1866 -186600% Bikita West 23 191 010404 193 -2 -1% Hwange West 339110279 39 0 0% Bubi 6 103 080335 103 0 0% Beitbridge East 360020302,020402 4201 -4141 -6902% Bulilima East 17 186 020856 202 -16 -9% Bulilima West 12 197 050456 204 -7 -4% Gwanda Central 10 163 130128 163 0 0% Gwanda North 10 111 010439,030439 1872 -1761 -1586%
011063,021063,031063,041063,0 Harare North 42 13961 51063,061063,071063,081063 15448 -1487 -11%
011008,021008,031008,041008,0 Emakhandeni 10 17350 51008,061008,071008 17351 -1 0% 010963,010963,020963,030963,0 40963,050963,060963,070963,08 0963,090963,100963,110963,120 963,130963,140963,150163,1509 Harare east 9 17715 63,151363 17926 -211 -1%
011963,181963,281963,291963,3 Mbare 3 18148 01963,311963,321963,331963 12361 5787 32%
011263,161263,171263,181263,1 91263,201263,211263,221263,23 Hatfield West 26 18869 1263,241263 18612 257 1%
010263,020263,030263,040263,0 50263,060263,070263,080263,09 0263,100263,110263,120263,130 Budiriro 33 19620 263,140263,150263,220263 18537 1083 6%
112563,121163,122563,131163,1 32563,141163,151163,161163,17 Harare South 1 23999 1163,230763,280863 24698 -699 -3%
252163,242163,072163,062163,0 Mabvuku-Tafara 19 24302 11563,271563 7212 17090 70%
120763,130763,140763,150763,1 60863,17063,180863,190863,200 863,210863,230863,240863,2508 Glen View North 30 25914 63,260863,270863 23599 2315 9% Annexure E
Age Group Total Male Female 0 - 4 1,719,485 852,630 866,856 5 - 9 1,618,033 801,330 816,702 10 - 14 1,314,171 651,696 662,475 15 - 19 1,448,312 717,121 731,191 20 - 24 1,249,975 624,776 625,199 25 - 29 1,028,700 518,146 510,554 30 - 34 784,937 378,130 406,807 35 - 39 559,231 268,230 291,001 40 - 44 473,427 219,418 254,009 45 - 49 377,619 175,801 201,818 50 - 54 278,346 131,932 146,414 55 - 59 217,766 108,124 109,631 60 - 64 205,184 94,729 110,454 65 - 69 122,356 61,991 60,365 70 - 74 106,116 54,567 51,549 75 - 79 49,451 23,807 25,643 80 + 81,563 36,200 45,363 Total 11,634,663 5,718,628 5,916,031
Statistics from Matarise report page 15 4.2.1 Examples of Multiple entries
ref Last Name First Name Sex DOB National ID Block Constituency Address CHAUKE ELVIS PRESLEY M 29/01/1964 08-316040-Y-54 020608 BULAWAYO SOUTH 101 DERBY ROAD, BELLEVUE, BULAWAYO 1 CHAUKE ELVIS PRESLEY M 29/01/1964 08-316040-Y-54 010179 HWANGE CENTRAL 14A HOSPITAL RD HWANGE
AARON FUNGAI F 10/10/1943 67-056772-V-03 050622 MASVINGO WEST SPRINGSPRUIT FARM MASHAVA MASVINGO 2 AARON FUNGAI F 10/10/1943 67-056772-V-03 031103 MBERENGWA NORTH VIL MSINDO HM KWATA CH MAZIOFA MBERENGWA
AKIMU BONFACE M 03/11/1982 43-120751-F-43 010815 MAZOWE SOUTH HEYSHOTT FARM VILL GLENDALE MAZOWE 3 AKIMU BONFACE M 03/11/1982 43-120751-F-43 170147 MUREHWA WEST KADENGE VIL HDM MUSHANINGA CH MANGWENDE
BALENI LUKA M 16/03/1966 29-105633-G-38 050129 GWERU URBAN 7-5TH STR GWERU 4 BALENI LUKA M 16/03/1966 29-105633-G-38 050129 MKOBA 7-5TH STR GWERU
BITI ANDREW M 20/12/1986 47-163971-K-47 410147 MUREHWA WEST VIL MUSHAYI CH MANGWENDE MUREHWA 5 BITI ANDREW M 20/12/1986 47-163971-K-47 410147 HWANGE WEST VIL MUSHAYI CH MANGWENDE MUREHWA
RWAFA AGIFA F 06/04/1986 18-108786-M-07 010718 CHIKOMBA EAST MAZOKERA TRADING STORE QUARTERS SADZA G/ 6 RWAFA AGIFA F 06/04/1986 18-108786-M-07 010718 BUHERA WEST MAZOKERA TRADING STORE QUARTERS SADZA G/
NAHORO NYARAI F 10/04/1976 27-131585-C-27 012824 MHONDORO NGEZI ZVIHWATI VIL CH NYIKA KADOMA 7 NAHORO NYARAI F 10/04/1976 27-131585-C-27 012824 MHONDORO NGEZI ZVIHWATI VIL CH NYIKA KADOMA
Note 1 to 3 Same ID and Name - different address in a different constituency = Duplicate 4 to 6 Same ID, Name and Address in a different constituency with the Same Block number indicating the whole Block is duplicated in a wrong Constituency = Copy 7 Same ID, Name and Address in the SAME Constituency with the Same Block number where the whole file on the CD supplied is mis-named = Copy
Annexure F
ZEC Number Mixed Registered New Voters Dups on Urban- Mixed Mixed Province Constituency Code Voters Count frm CD's Duplicates Copies since 2002 NEW 2002 Constituencies Struck OFF Jan 2002 Rural Urban Rural Rural Urban Mat South Beitbridge East 001 28886 29152 58 1 4515 3 BEITBRIDGE 5156 45683 29152 3236 22095 Mat South Beitbridge West 002 22919 23173 11 3804 2 23173 Masvingo Bikita East 003 28509 31309 152 6619 104 BIKITA EAST 2 1349 34600 31309 Masvingo Bikita South 004 30524 30948 107 1 6874 90 BIKITA WEST 2243 40144 30948 Masvingo Bikita West 005 29792 30353 182 1 6190 132 30353 Mash Central Bindura North 006 30867 29165 467 6 5354 208 BINDURA 8791 56440 29165 9876 17167 Mash Central Bindura South 007 29899 30115 492 1 4229 108 30115 Mat North Binga North 008 30943 31635 141 1 6921 45 BINGA 4651 48548 31635 Mat North Binga South 009 26295 29686 98 5 8000 29 29686 Mat North Bubi 010 31706 26365 25 1 4508 4 BUBI UMGUSA 6211 50204 26365 Harare Budiriro 011 29805 29784 338 2 4048 44 BUDIRIRO 6293 51647 29784 Manicaland Buhera Central 012 30519 31208 102 1 7345 52 31208 Mash East Buhera North 013 25847 26366 152 3 5654 48 BUHERA NORTH 3601 47687 26366 Mash East Buhera South 014 26515 27178 70 7034 29 BUHERA SOUTH 2880 45793 27178 Mash East Buhera West 015 29427 34411 4615 4401 7702 2059 34411 Bulawayo Bulawayo Central 016 27646 29398 1364 40 3114 227 BULAWAYO NORTH EAST 7102 46169 29398 Bulawayo Bulawayo East 017 22746 22745 225 14 1623 30 22745 Bulawayo Bulawayo South 018 23210 23226 148 5 1572 18 BULAYAYO SOUTH 5979 48342 23226 Mat South Bulilima East 019 31625 35218 36 5504 5 BULLIMAMANGWE NORTH 5619 49893 35218 3666 24502 Mat South Bulilima West 020 31305 29431 10 1 5041 0 BULLIMAMANGWE SOUTH 4684 40851 29431 Mash West Chakari 021 21639 25586 289 34 6251 52 25586 Mash West Chegutu East 022 31226 25059 177 39 5031 58 CHEGUTU 10428 51659 25059 Mash West Chegutu West 023 26120 26190 260 3806 53 26190 19606 6439 Mash East Chikomba Central 024 26520 24203 165 24 10355 71 CHIKOMBA 25091 52592 24203 Mash East Chikomba East 025 22597 23299 7285 6690 7754 2488 23299 Mash East Chikomba West 026 30297 32133 236 2 13370 96 32133 Manicaland Chimanimani East 027 27865 28669 61 1 6662 21 CHIMANIMANI 4034 45401 28669 Manicaland Chimanimani West 028 26329 26765 90 6818 38 26765 Mash West Chinhoyi 029 27108 27110 611 8 3213 102 CHINHOYI 5169 35163 27110 Manicaland Chipinge Central 030 23120 23229 105 6385 28 23229 9216 14013 Manicaland Chipinge East 031 24491 21756 8576 8553 5284 2189 CHIPINGE NORTH 10526 48753 21756 Manicaland Chipinge South 032 30241 31110 8577 8553 8035 2194 CHIPINGE SOUTH 4008 50931 31110 Manicaland Chipinge West 033 24325 25013 50 5894 15 25013 Masvingo Chiredzi East 034 26344 24127 159 24 4253 22 24127 Masvingo Chiredzi North 035 30688 30597 54 1 6579 20 CHIREDZI NORTH 3331 46941 30597 Masvingo Chiredzi South 036 26112 27278 514 37 5122 91 CHERIDZI SOUTH 2633 46867 27278 Masvingo Chiredzi West 037 29450 30290 211 1 3494 26 30290 11276 19014 Midlands Chirumanzu 038 25705 25960 140 5 4122 34 CHIRUMANZU 3324 37999 25960 Midlands Chirumanzu-Zibagwe 039 21707 22366 171 5337 45 22366 Harare Chitungwiza North 040 27583 27564 304 3983 44 CHITUNGWIZA 6700 50866 27564 Harare Chitungwiza South 041 27831 28698 1081 803 4166 137 28698 Masvingo Chivi Central 042 29691 31146 871 680 5057 111 31146 Masvingo Chivi North 043 26489 26895 169 4375 47 CHIVI NORTH 2097 38526 26895 Masvingo Chivi South 044 31909 29760 104 3 4298 25 CHIVI SOUTH 1648 41093 29760 Midlands Chiwundura 045 30548 30874 345 13 5322 48 30874 12820 16609 Manicaland Dagamvura-Chikanga 046 27215 27288 241 2 5552 50 GWERU RURAL 4550 40295 27288 Harare Dzivarasekwa 047 22596 22668 273 2 3032 38 DZIVARASEKWA 8293 49668 22668 Bulawayo Emakhandeni-Entumbane 048 27586 27651 126 1955 18 MPOPOMA 4906 39373 27651 Harare Epworth 049 30462 30377 309 2 5018 51 MBARE WEST 6488 37305 30377 Harare Glen Norah 050 22399 26862 325 2 3989 40 GLEN NORAH 7795 49159 26862 Harare Glen View North 051 25914 25866 330 2 2829 41 GLEN VIEW 6229 47997 25866 Harare Glen View South 052 27689 29943 2575 2222 3762 361 29943 Midlands Gokwe Central 053 22669 24172 0 2657 6517 0 GOKWE CENTRAL 3875 39495 24172 6216 17200 Midlands Gokwe-Chireya 054 27261 29324 13668 12234 9773 4185 GOKWE EAST 10101 42389 29324 Midlands Gokwe-Gumunyu 055 29321 7525 6367 8895 2169 GOKWE NORTH 2537 39674 29321 Midlands Gokwe-Kana 056 28397 23699 164 2 7339 57 GOKWE SOUTH 2770 37658 29387 Midlands Gokwe-Mapfungautsi 057 29947 29387 315 12 6936 85 GOKWE WEST 2573 41708 32383 Midlands Gokwe-Nembudziya 058 27261 32383 6353 5871 7087 2115 28899 Midlands Gokwe- Kambuyuni 059 28899 27 1 8352 3 23699 Midlands Gokwe-Sasame 060 31905 28462 2162 1764 7224 397 35034
Annexure H ZEC Number Mixed Registered New Voters Dups on Urban- Mixed Mixed Province Constituency Code Voters Count frm CD's Duplicates Copies since 2002 NEW 2002 Constituencies Struck OFF Jan 2002 Rural Urban Rural Rural Urban Midlands Gokwe-Sengwa 061 24809 35034 2890 2632 8191 765 28462 Mash East Goromonzi North 062 29264 29269 264 4 3912 42 GOROMONZI 5801 52934 29269 Mash East Goromonzi South 063 28086 31328 1956 7 7622 377 31328 11338 15482 Mash East Goromonzi West 064 27980 28045 233 2 4449 41 28045 Mash Central Guruve North 065 27421 27698 82 4604 16 GURUVE NORTH 5457 42399 27698 Mash Central Guruve South 066 31711 29556 88 3666 18 GURUVE SOUTH 4438 41130 29556 Masvingo Gutu Central 067 23961 24188 209 4516 59 24188 Masvingo Gutu East 068 24208 24490 125 2 4550 52 24490 Masvingo Gutu North 069 21600 21901 113 4056 40 GUTU NORTH 2704 50182 21901 Masvingo Gutu South 070 25941 26203 163 4231 54 GUTU SOUTH 2357 49694 26203 Masvingo Gutu West 071 22491 22809 132 4762 53 22809 Mat South Gwanda Central 072 23063 23272 58 3555 5 23272 7193 16079 Mat South Gwanda North 073 23848 22657 20 3377 4 GWANDA NORTH 5863 36953 22657 Mat South Gwanda South 074 23848 24074 12 3477 1 GWANDA SOUTH 5302 36312 24074 Midlands Gweru Urban 075 28589 29473 4184 2741 5434 694 GWERU URBAN 6478 37859 29473 Harare Harare Central 076 25411 26406 1574 682 3864 225 HARARE CENTRAL 6889 38443 26406 Harare Harare East 077 30132 30765 1094 13 4768 187 HARARE EAST 9656 43242 30765 Harare Harare North 078 24678 26314 660 4 7172 119 HARARE NORTH 9747 48610 26314 Harare Harare South 079 23999 24698 331 4 6196 68 HARARE SOUTH 5608 36674 24698 Harare Harare West 080 26161 26213 373 3328 41 26213 Harare Hatfield 081 28106 29552 1316 9 5103 207 HATFIELD 7608 41689 29552 Manicaland Headlands 082 25563 28222 1369 26 7483 265 28222 Harare Highfield East 083 30479 30546 718 10 4903 150 HIGHFIELD 7614 39219 30546 Harare Highfield West 084 26278 25982 548 6 4106 132 25982 Mash West Hurungwe Central 085 22562 26904 1272 16 6690 278 26904 9731 15813 Mash West Hurungwe East 086 25834 31251 910 9 6953 201 HURUNGWE EAST 5741 41194 31251 Mash West Hurungwe North 087 24654 26309 386 5 6683 79 HURUNGWE WEST 2598 48283 26309 Mash West Hurungwe West 088 25834 26879 625 14 6392 159 26879 Mash West Hwange Central 089 21792 23146 5036 3804 3847 702 23146 17877 4348 Mat North Hwange East 090 22539 34136 6751 6206 5223 973 HWANGE EAST 6667 41856 34136 Mat North Hwange West 091 22965 29970 15248 14757 3950 2439 HWANGE WEST 7511 40049 29970 11492 1861 Mat South Insiza North 092 22034 22488 33 5054 7 INSIZA 5157 38174 22488 Mat South Insiza South 093 24820 25072 23 4751 6 25072 Mash West Kadoma Central 094 28484 29100 966 37 5807 182 KADOMA CENTRAL 8678 40882 29100 Harare Kambuzuma 095 21650 21638 244 1 2392 19 KAMBUZUMA 5358 35446 21638 Mash West Kariba 096 31036 33062 695 5 8191 189 KARIBA 4903 51301 33062 14736 16095 Harare Kuwadzana 097 23076 23006 261 2 3777 47 KUWADZANA 5529 41801 23006 Harare Kuwadzana East 098 24302 24289 254 1 3379 29 24289 Midlands Kwekwe Central 099 23326 24131 2814 1770 5661 518 KWEKWE 7954 47322 24131 Bulawayo Lobengula 100 27566 27566 75 1546 7 27566 Mat North Lupane East 101 25010 25254 46 4182 4 LUPANE 5459 45741 25254 Mat North Lupane West 102 22362 22625 48 3697 9 22625 Bulawayo Luveve 103 24710 24730 135 1772 9 KADOMA WEST 4245 34968 24730 Harare Mabvuku-Tafara 104 31755 31636 9 6 3227 61 MABVUKU 9880 46347 31636 Mash West Magunje 105 26067 27402 675 10 5832 165 27402 Bulawayo Magwegwe 106 26307 26318 82 1 1574 14 LOBENGULA MAGWEGWE 5402 44649 26318 Bulawayo Makokoba 107 27285 27285 136 1 1578 12 MAKOKOBA 5705 38721 27285 Mash West Makonde 108 29087 30486 1171 16 6993 245 MAKONDE 10132 39867 30486 Manicaland Makoni Central 109 22793 23012 536 17 4769 106 MAKONI EAST 5779 35768 23012 9372 13640 Manicaland Makoni North 110 26490 27010 387 8 6634 98 MAKONI NORTH 4974 38175 27010 Manicaland Makoni South 111 30859 33035 1217 15 7955 240 MAKONI WEST 4237 42316 33035 Manicaland Makoni West 112 24888 25115 256 7 4565 68 25115 Mat South Mangwe 113 31587 32986 5 5603 2 32986 Mash East Maramba Pfungwe 114 28995 23816 245 6468 93 UZUMBA MP 6946 48854 23816 Mash East Marondera Central 115 26225 28342 1472 14 7490 370 28342 Mash East Marondera East 116 26155 26341 615 11 5782 149 MARONDERA EAST 7709 44941 26341 Mash East Marondera West 117 25191 25280 151 2 3698 44 MARONDERA WEST 3752 37201 25280 Masvingo Masvingo Central 118 25365 25551 190 4 4083 48 MASVINGO CENTRAL 5225 42191 25551 Masvingo Masvingo North 119 23530 21696 671 335 3674 146 MASVINGO NORTH 5107 36267 21696 Masvingo Masvingo South 120 26977 27100 98 3 3684 16 MASVINGO SOUTH 1709 36861 27100
Annexure H ZEC Number Mixed Registered New Voters Dups on Urban- Mixed Mixed Province Constituency Code Voters Count frm CD's Duplicates Copies since 2002 NEW 2002 Constituencies Struck OFF Jan 2002 Rural Urban Rural Rural Urban Masvingo Masvingo Urban 121 31489 33871 2201 17 8632 572 33871 Masvingo Masvingo West 122 21470 22601 1184 339 4822 246 22601 Mat South Matobo North 123 23508 23237 24 1 2474 5 MATOBO 6293 46974 23237 Mat South Matobo South 124 23508 23631 10 2529 1 23631 Mash Central Mazowe Central 125 25924 26299 107 1 3572 21 26299 Mash Central Mazowe North 126 25924 22912 109 5 3644 26 MAZOWE EAST 4458 48973 22912 Mash Central Mazowe South 127 24826 25011 193 1 4119 27 MAZOWE WEST 8295 45720 25011 Mash Central Mazowe West 128 28651 22546 167 2 3618 18 22546 Harare Mbare 129 29781 30914 217 7916 32 MBARE EAST 7029 37616 30914 Midlands Mberengwa East 130 21660 22024 55 3839 18 MBERENGWA EAST 4175 48554 22024 Midlands Mberengwa North 131 23981 24542 68 10199 25 MBERENGWA WEST 2652 27630 24542 Midlands Mberengwa South 132 28283 29003 60 1 5616 14 29003 Midlands Mberengwa West 133 22163 22821 31 10547 14 22821 Mash Central Mbire 134 30424 30820 71 1 5862 15 30820 Midlands Mbizo 135 24707 24901 459 7 5154 76 KADOMA EAST 12260 34266 24901 Mash West Mhangura 136 27404 21175 266 5 4299 42 21175 Mash West Mhondoro-Mubaira 137 29713 29786 98 1 4564 27 MHONDORO 7670 51611 29786 Mash West Mhondoro-Ngezi 138 25516 20063 5947 3 4439 1343 20063 Midlands Mkoba 139 30794 32901 2413 1918 4595 278 MKOBA 5384 39433 32901 Mash Central Mt Darwin East 140 29618 22478 340 6 5336 107 22478 Mash Central Mt Darwin North 141 29726 31404 671 16 8669 152 MT DARWIN NORTH 4181 39447 31404 Mash Central Mt Darwin South 142 22015 23818 888 10 7192 250 MT DARWIN SOUTH 4817 41370 23818 Mash Central Mt Darwin West 143 28651 28713 400 16 6433 130 28713 Harare Mt Pleasant 144 22238 22245 365 2311 39 22245 Mash East Mudzi North 145 29608 32027 117 1 6651 34 MUDZI 3974 55410 32027 Mash East Mudzi South 146 23976 22061 69 1 5311 19 22061 Mash East Mudzi West 147 23951 24335 94 5279 32 24335 Harare Mufakose 148 21800 21749 224 2 2002 24 MUFAKOSE 7813 39030 21749 Mash East Murehwa North 149 28616 25284 261 5 4996 69 MUREHWA NORTH 3246 35471 25284 Mash East Murehwa South 150 27130 28386 12386 11427 7325 2171 28386 Mash East Murehwa West 151 31026 32314 6533 5740 6023 987 MUREHWA SOUTH 3772 35327 32314 Manicaland Musikavanhu 152 25262 25982 36 6453 11 25982 Manicaland Mutare Central 153 28068 28026 150 2 4281 22 MUTARE CENTRAL 7046 47722 28026 Manicaland Mutare North 154 29237 30198 205 2 7486 55 MUTARE NORTH 5501 39980 30198 Manicaland Mutare South 155 30591 31334 28 6771 85 MUTARE SOUTH 3623 35463 31334 Manicaland Mutare West 156 29091 30116 71 1 6795 26 MUTARE WEST 3629 39865 30116 Manicaland Mutasa Central 157 26949 27387 111 1 5694 36 MUTASA 4279 39595 27387 Manicaland Mutasa North 158 29627 30203 78 1 7676 20 30203 Manicaland Mutasa South 159 25194 25331 258 4866 55 25331 Mash East Mutoko East 160 25698 27528 103 6400 37 27528 Mash East Mutoko North 161 29596 28281 88 1 5594 25 MUTOKO NORTH 2995 37422 28281 Mash East Mutoko South 162 25803 26459 238 2 7888 85 MUTOKO SOUTH 2204 36119 26459 Mash Central Muzarabani North 163 24945 27115 148 6180 42 MUZARABANI 5140 41295 27115 Mash Central Muzarabani South 164 23642 22248 128 1 4694 36 22248 Mash West Muzvezve 165 22283 23192 312 10 5016 77 23192 8391 14177 Masvingo Mwenezi East 166 29958 32681 134 1 5612 22 MWENEZI 1443 51728 32681 Masvingo Mwenezi West 167 32091 33282 69 5742 14 33282 Mat North Nkayi North 168 25886 26258 32 4559 7 NKAYI 6461 51519 26258 Mat North Nkayi South 169 27651 28207 23 1 4362 1 28207 Bulawayo Nketa 170 25125 25143 126 2145 16 25143 Bulawayo Nkulumane 171 27358 27372 122 1 1923 7 NKULAMANE 6253 50532 27372 Mash West Norton 172 25760 25783 198 2 4114 37 25783 18700 5659 Manicaland Nyanga North 173 29990 30810 95 8698 37 NYANGA 3953 48860 30810 Manicaland Nyanga South 174 29177 29633 164 2 6222 42 29633 Bulawayo Pelandaba-Mpopoma 175 28476 28483 100 2 1786 10 PELENDABA 6303 45487 28483 Bulawayo Pumula 176 25444 25454 88 1 1558 11 PAMULA LUVEVE 6161 49993 25454 Midlands Redcliff 177 27565 31554 271 4 6289 65 31554 17583 13383 Mash Central Rushinga 178 31355 33973 642 9 8468 152 RUSHINGA 7854 37142 33973 Mash West Sanyati 179 22090 22638 142 1 5008 38 22638 Mash East Seke 180 30558 29404 150 5948 37 SEKE 7100 48180 29404
Annexure H ZEC Number Mixed Registered New Voters Dups on Urban- Mixed Mixed Province Constituency Code Voters Count frm CD's Duplicates Copies since 2002 NEW 2002 Constituencies Struck OFF Jan 2002 Rural Urban Rural Rural Urban Mash Central Shamva North 181 27798 28904 654 6 6430 124 28904 Mash Central Shamva South 182 24725 26574 742 5 6999 197 SHAMVA 6354 48574 26574 Midlands Shurugwi North 183 23836 24120 139 2 3767 26 24120 Midlands Shurugwi South 184 21701 22141 98 3514 25 SHURUGWI 6041 47573 22141 Midlands Silobela 185 28551 26590 85 4 5545 21 SILOBELA 5692 43393 26590 Harare Southerton 186 23246 23240 230 3 3104 25 23240 Harare St Marys 187 26440 26863 199 1 3635 25 ST MARY'S 8228 55327 26863 Harare Sunningdale 188 23405 23321 313 1 2892 37 23321 Mat North Tsholotsho North 189 26646 27539 12 5064 2 TSHOLOTSHO 5047 44949 27539 Mat North Tsholotsho South 190 29757 30533 14 1 4102 4 30533 Mat North Umguza 191 31712 37868 273 2 7278 103 37868 Mat South Umzingwane 192 31876 33192 62 4992 14 UMZINGWANE 5650 34178 33192 Mash East Uzumba 193 31236 31706 226 6852 70 31706 Midlands Vungu 194 26555 27029 74 5 4565 18 27029 Harare Warren Park 195 30586 30602 369 1 4335 42 30602 Mash East Wedza North 196 23180 22036 221 2 3857 39 HWEDZA 3882 50133 22036 Mash East Wedza South 197 22942 23245 140 1 3879 35 23245 Masvingo Zaka Central 198 27639 27839 159 4 4240 41 27839 Masvingo Zaka East 199 22877 23485 44 4038 11 ZAKA EAST 1568 45901 23485 Masvingo Zaka North 200 28359 28815 174 4150 46 ZAKA WEST 2042 49182 28815 Masvingo Zaka West 201 21735 22069 68 2 3474 18 22069 Harare Zengeza East 202 30888 30543 312 4 4962 50 ZENGEZA 5284 44974 30543 Harare Zengeza West 203 27938 28228 284 1 4328 38 28228 Midlands Zhombe 204 30999 32058 152 7234 43 ZHOMBE 4388 40113 32058 Mash West Zvimba East 205 27349 27333 292 6172 62 27333 Mash West Zvimba North 206 27057 27183 157 1 4971 33 ZIMBA NORTH 9790 45267 27183 Mash West Zvimba South 207 27017 27258 197 1 4805 45 ZIMBA SOUTH 6487 52452 27258 Mash West Zvimba West 208 26602 26633 154 2 4548 41 26633 Midlands Zvishavane-Ngezi 209 28230 24664 209 2 4214 32 24664 Midlands Zvishavane-Runde 210 28575 32837 132 1 6763 45 ZVISHAVANE 4926 47760 32837 28696 4141
Totals do not agree because some Blocks were not able to be segregated - Urban / Rural and were therefore ommitted 5569968 5,727,902 182,564 113937 1,100,663 41,485 676,887 5,229,538 532,350 231,021 257,717 3,814,526 1,381,026
Avg 26779 27276 869 735 5241 198 5641 43579 28018 12159 13564 27247 27079 Min 21470 20063 0 1 1546 0 1349 27630 23012 3236 1861 20063 21638 Max 32091 37868 15248 14757 13370 4185 25091 56440 35218 28696 24502 37868 33871 Duplicates 1084 121700 8330 0.6% 66.7% 4.6% Bulawayo Twelve Constituencies 313459 315371 2727 22146 379 52056 398234 315371 Harare Twenty Nine 766628 780512 15430 118527 2353 138041 835060 7199 780512 Manicaland Twenty Three 627884 640452 22763 148323 5753 66139 553124 46241 46241 46241 538897 55314 Mash Central Eighteen Constituencies 498122 489349 6389 99069 1647 59785 442490 29165 29165 29165 460184 Mash East Twenty Six Constituencies 706419 713077 38085 167293 9547 82953 628064 31328 31328 31328 653407 28342 Mash West Twenty Three Constituencies 602234 609528 20836 123625 4210 71596 457679 158277 158277 158277 395041 56210 Masvingo Twenty SixConstituencies 699199 711284 8257 127127 2106 35456 610177 30290 30290 30290 647123 33871 Mat North Twelve Constituencies 323472 350076 22711 61846 3620 42007 322866 29970 29970 29970 320106 Mat South Thirteen Constituencies 342827 347583 362 54676 55 43724 329018 87642 87642 87642 259941 Midlands Twenty Eight Constituencies 689724 770670 45004 178031 11815 85130 652826 95265 95265 95265 563999 111406 Totals 5,569,968 5,727,902 182,564 1,100,663 41,485 Totals 676,887 5,229,538 508,178 508,178 508,178 3,845,897 1,381,026
Annexure H