Orestes Augustus Brownson on the nature and scope of political authority

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Authors Moffit, Robert E. (Robert Emmet)

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318417 .ORESTES AUGUSTUS BROWNSON ON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Robert Emmet■Moffit

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of , MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

1 9 7 1 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfill­ ment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowl­ edgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.

APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below:

^ ^ _ v - n i CURRIH V. SHIELDS Date Professor of Government ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An undertaking of this sort is hardly,'if ever, carried forth alone. I am indebted, first, to the Honorable Robert James Gerstung, Judge of. the Municipal Court of Baltimore City for stirring my original inter­ est in the life and writings of Orestes Brovmson. As this is the culmination of one phase of my academic career, I should note here the kindly advice and instruction of certain members of the University of Arizona faculty, notable Professors Henry Kenski, Philip Chapman, and Lawrence Scaff. My advisor, Professor Currin Shields has pro­ vided me with advice and criticisms on certain aspects' of Brown son’s. political theory and related ideas, all of which have been helpful in the preparation of the final text. Finally, I am most appreciative for the work of the persevering Mrs. Susan Hogan, my typist. TABLE OF CONTENTS . Page ABSTRACi oooooooooooooooooooooooooeoooooooeooooooe "V 1. BROWNS ON IN PERSPECTIVE . 1 2. BROWNS ON ON THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE...... 2S ' 3o A CRITIQUE OF SEVEN THEORIES..L...... ,.o...... 44 The Patriarchal Theory...... 46 The Contract Theory...... 6l Contract and Consent...... oo...... S 0 The Democratic Theory...... e...... SS The Naturalist Theory...... 99 Divine Right of -Kings Theory...... 106 The Papal Theory...... Ill The People as Sovereign...... 113 4. BROWNSON’S CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY...... 120 Ecclesiastical and Political Authority...... 135 The Reconciliation of Authority and -L ah ertye...... 1 4 S 5. THE.BROWNSONIAN THEORY IN PERSPECTIVE...... 155 LIST OF REFERENCES...... o.^...... 1Y1

iv I

ABSTRACT

This thesis will endeavor to present an exposition of Orestes Brownson's ideas concerning the nature and scope of political authorityo Included in this presentation will be the opinions of Brownson’s contemporaries in contrast with his treatment by scholars in our own times<, Moreover, consideration will be allotted to Brownson's notions on the necessity of an ordered study of politics, the primary object of which should be the definition of political authority, the right of government to rule, and obligation in civil society, Brownson attacks the problem of political authority through a logical analysis of seven prominent theories of government. This thesis has sought to elaborate upon those criticisms, explaining in detail the essential points of Brownson’s objections. Finally, there is presented an expo­ sition and analysis of Brownson’s own theory of political authority, a notion of right rule grounded in ontological truth, and applied in accordance with Natural and Divine Law as adjudicated by the Roman Catholic Church, This thesis contends that the Brownsonian theory is, indeed, a ’’theory of balance", a theory comprised of

; ■ .. v . ■ - . vi important elements' of both the liberal and conservative tra­ ditions in Western thought- As a political theorist,. Orestes Brownson has made explicit the necessity of religion (especially as taught by the Roman Catholic Church) as a moral underpinning of the political order. CHAPTER 1

BROWNSON IN PERSPECTIVE

For the serious"student of human events, the past, and the men who made it, can be an endlessly fascinating subject of analysis« This is true, not only for the events and the celebrities the chroniclers record or celebrate, but also for those incidents and personalities barely men­ tioned or largely ignored. The failure of contemporary men to appreciate the positive contributions of those who traveled this earth before them is indeed a tragedy. Doomed to suffer obscurity for their earthly pains, these person- ' alities, on occasion, may come under the scrutiny of select scholars who deal in esoterics in sophisticated academic journals. Again, they may occasion the notice of historians well acquainted with the times in which these personalities once lived. Otherwise, they remain unknown. Perhaps the only existing remnants of these forgot­ ten men may be a number of odd-looking old books, in ancient bindings, accumulating dust somewhere in the attic or cellar of some second-hand book shop. Works long since out of print, they may attract the attention of a casual collector of quaint old volumes, or even a dilettante hardly interested in the deeper contents of those yellowed pages. 2 How is it possible that figures of such great renown, respected talents in their own time, men in the forefront of their professions, can be so utterly lost to contemporary men? Perhaps we should not be surprised that such a negligence is possible<, History, including the his­ tory of ideas, is a human profession. The celebration of heroes, or the identification of villains, is a human affair. Our imperfections, especially the impact of our personal or ideological prejudices, are far too pervasive. : An eminent political scientist, Professor Carl, Friedrich, noting the many difficulties encountered in his discipline, once remarked that the element of bias in such an under— taking is inescapable. Yet, upon reflection, it does seem incredible that,outstanding personalities, men who have made positive contributions to the society in which they lived, could have passed into a state of near oblivion. In some extraordinary cases, certainly for a'variety of rea­ sons, the knowledge of these personalities has also been lost to a great many scholars. If this be doubted, one need only ask: Who was Orestes Augustus Brownson? Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a pioneer in Brownson scholarship, once posed the

1. Carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy [Boston: Ginn and Company, 194-6J, p. 570. question artfully in his book on the subject; "Who in the America of i860 remembered Herman Melville or knew Stendahl or Karl Marx? But who did not know of No P® Willis, of Eugene Sue, or Orestes Brownson?" 2 Schlesinger notes that, "The measure of what is historically important is set by the generation that writes history, not the one that makes it. No historian can entirely escape judging by the stand­ ards of his day; in some sense .he must always superimpose one set of values on another. Only a few figures in each age survive the process of sifting."3 Orestes Augustus Brownson, Vermont-born son of Sylvester and Relief Brownson, a man who was to become one of. America’s most outspoken social critics as well, as an original political theorist, has, for the most part, been lost in the "process of sifting" by a considerable portion of the American academic community. Consider the facts. Examine three recent major text­ books that have been published on American political thought in the last decade. I refer here to Andrew Scott's Politi­ cal Thought in America;^ In Quest of Freedom; American

.2. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Orestes Brownson; A Pilgrim’s Progress [New York; Octagon Books, 1963 j, p. 3 • 3 - Idem. - 4° ' [New York: Rinehart Company, 1959]« Political Thought and Practice by Professors Alpheus T . 5 Mason and Richard Leach; and, most recently, Professor Kenneth Do lb ear e * s Directions in American ■ Political Thought.^1 In none of these otherwise excellent works is the name of Orestes Brownson even mentioned. Other texts to be found are not quite so negligent of Brownson as an American political thinker, David Minar, for example, devotes one sentence in his book, Ideas and Politics: The. American Experience, to Brownson's radicalism during the Jacksonian period, explaining-how Orestes Brownson dissented from the laissez faire doctrine and advocated a kind of mild Christian socialism through which control of the state by the workers could protect workers rights and end the exploitation that accompanied the wage 7 system," In the same vein, a number of older volumes on American political theory exemplify a similar ’’passing refer­ ence” type of treatment regarding Orestes Brownson. Professor Raymond Gettell in his History of American Political Thought^ only makes note of Brownson’s rather interesting theory of constitutionalism, leaving the rest of his thought on poli­ tical science to our imagination. A year later, Professor

5. [New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, I960]. 6 . [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969]. 7. David Minar, Ideas and Politics: The American Experience [Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1961j, p. - "225T ~ ' 8. [New York: The Century Company, 1928]. 5 Charles Merriam, a leading light in modern American politi­ cal science, published a volume entitled American Political Ideas; 1^65—1 9 1 7 Professor Merriam calls attention to / ' the individualism of Henry David Thoreau and the notions of "self-reliance" prominent in the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson, He also gives mention to the ideas of Horace Greeley, Boston's Dr, Channing, and the social experiment at "Brook Farm", but mentions the close friend and colla­ borator of these men, Orestes Brownson, only in reference to his authorship of the theoretical text on politics, The 10 American Republic, Another volume published as recently as 1962, Benjamin F, Wright's American Interpretations of Natural Law; A Study in the History of Political Thought,11 discusses in two pages the peculiar thrust of Brownson's arguments on natural law. More substantial references to Orestes Brownson's contributions are to be found in three rather comprehensive . texts on American political theory. In 1937, Professor Edward R. Lewis published History of American Political Thought: From the Civil War to World War I. 12 This volume

9= [New York: MacMillan Company, 1929]» 10. Charles Merriam, American Political Ideas: IB65- 1917 [New York: MacMillan Company, .1929J, p»,373« . 11. [New.York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1 9 6 2 ]. 12. [New York: MacMillan Company, 19371° 6 sets forth, in fair detail, some of Brownson's major propo­ sitions on political philosophy and the nature of American government, including his ideas concerning the Union, his reasons, for rejecting ’’pure individualism", and his thoughts on "democratic theory"». A decade later, Professor Francis G. Wilson set forth his The Amehican Political Mind: A Textbook in. Poli­ tical Theory."^ In this volume, Wilson takes note of Brovmson’s contributions to the early American labor, move­ ment, his support for the New York Workingmen’s Party in the 1 S3 0 ’s, and his later development of an organismic theory of the state,, the general notion that the state was . to be considered a living organism rather than a mere collection of separate units or individuals. According to Wilson, "In the years following the Confederate War, the organismic theory of the state was an idea which writer after writer picked up and used to explain the principle of national existence in the United States. In general, how­ ever, we must say that Brownson stands alone in the peculiar. 1L ■ emphasis of his thought." Not to be neglected in this connection is one of the more comprehensive, popular texts on American political ideas, Thornton Anderson’s edition of

13 o [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949]» 14° Francis G. Wilson, The American Political Mind: A Textbook in Political Theory [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1,949J, p. 279. - 7 ]C Jacobson’s Development of American Political Thought. In this edition, one may find a basic outline of Brownson’s major ideas during his radical period, his opposition' to industrial capitalism, his affinity with the Boston Trans- cendentalists, and his views, as expressed later on in his life, on federalism and constitutionalism. While Brownson’s thought may not be well known, to a great many members of the academic community, it is not because of any timidity on his part. The collected works of Orestes Brownson reach a total number of twenty volumes. He was neither a quiet philosopher, nor an obscure figure in his own time. According to all available accounts, he was quite a fighter, a master polemicist. The judgments of some of Brownson’s contemporaries are remarkable if only they shed more light, in comparison, on the neglect afforded Brownson by scholars in our own times. As men of letters, certainly these were nothing less than outstanding. Lord Acton, for example, one of Great'. Britain’s leading scholars, saw Orestes Brownson, the rough American, as a real genius, the most powerful mind in Amer­ ica at that time."^ Mr. Theodore Parker, a member of the

15o [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., I960]o 16. Russell Kirk, Orestes Brownson: Selected Essays [Chicago: Gateway Editions Inc., 1955J> pi H . ■ • , ' ■ ■ ■ 8 famed Transcendentalist circle of Boston, and one of New England's more penetrating thinkers, saw him. as an indefat- • . ■ . • . ■ ■ ; ' - igable warrior in concerns of the mind, a true intellectual, and an outstanding controversialist. In Parker's view, he was a man who "looked for battles; he was a man covered with sweat and dust and blood and (he once wrote most descrip- . tively) he was, 'dressed like Daniel with Goliath's sword 17’ in one hand, and that giant's head in the other'." While Parker's analysis of the man's character was fraught with praise, Brownson's contentious conduct, as a seeker for truth in the art of debate, was not well received among a ' number of his acquaintances in the Transcendentalist Club which flourished in the 1040's. At one point, his friend, Ralph Waldo Emerson, remarked, after a verbal clash with the stark, gruff Vermonter, "I feel myself to be in the midst of a truth I do not comprehend, but which comprehends me." IS Emerson was to record later in his journals that this con­ tentious Brownson, "will never stop and listen, neither in conversation, but what is more, not in solitude."19 A third member of the New England Transcendentalist "Club" who was to acquire great fame in the literary world

1?o Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 107. ' \ 10. Ibid., p. '42. Quote taken from Sanborn, "The Genius and Character of Emerson," p. 163• 19- Ibid., p. 43• Here Schlesinger is quoting from Emerson's Journals', Vol. VI, p. 267• ■ ' ; ■ ■ 9 was Henry David Thoreau, one of Browns.on*s close companions and students.. Thoreau had the opportunity in 1336 to spend approximately six weeks studying with Brownson in Canton, Massachusettso It was Thoreau’s first truly intimate acquaintance with him. According to Arthur Schlesinger, "These six;weeks gave young Thoreau his first continuous 20 ■ association with a mature and provocative intelligence." Later, Thoreau himself wrote to Brownson in gratitude; "They [those days] were.an era in my life, the morning of a new liebenstag. They are to me1 as a dream that is dreamt, but which returns from time to time in all its original ' 21 freshness:." Orestes Brownson’s reputation as a philosopher was carried far and wide, and his growing eminence in the intellectual circles of the United States had spread to Europe. In France, for example, the French "Eclectic", Victor Cousin, remarked that Brownson was a character of great "talent", and for his knowledge should be granted the 22 Chair of Philosophy at Harvard. Having become a Roman Catholic in the Fall of 1344, he won the respect and praises of Roman Catholic intellectuals as well. However, his

20. Ibid., p. 32. 2 1 . Ibid., p. 32. The letter here cited by Schlesinger was written from Thoreau to Brownson, December - 30, 1337. 22. . Ibid., p. 129. 10 contentiousness, his inclinations to argue the finer points of philosophy and theology, brought him into acrid conflict with another famous Catholic convert of his time, John.: Newman. Newman was eventually to become a Cardinal in the Roman Catholic Church in Great Britain, and an internation­ ally recognized intellectual leader of Roman Catholicism. Planning to establish a great Catholic University in Ireland, Cardinal Newman took the opportunity to invite Orestes Brownson to teach, but stipulated, no doubt after the bitter contention he had experienced with Brownson on theological - issues, that the recipient of his invitation confine himself 23 to lecturing on geography. Arthur Schiesinger, Jr. has recounted the reaction of Lord Acton to the invitation, quoting Acton’s appeal to Brownson in a letter written in' May, 1$54° The vast field of philosophy will be yours... and I thank God for the good fortune of my coun­ trymen in being initiated in that magnificent science by you of all men living...You alone can _ prepare us for the great controversies by found­ ing among us a school and arming_it with the prin­ ciples of a sound philosophy....In choosing History for my occupation through life I am actu­ ated by a hope of following your example in another field. 24 Such an expression of praise for Brownson’s scholar­ ship was not atypical. He had come to be recognized as an

23. Ibid., p. 216. 24. Ibid., pp. 216-217. 11 irascible, but.brilliant, philosophical light in America, a man who had won the respect and admiration of his outstand­ ing contemporaries, now recognized as intellectual giants in their own time. In the l830's Brownson had become a radical, a friend of the labor movement, and a bitter opponent of modern industrial capitalism. In that same decade, he had become an associate of the Boston Transcendentalists, a Unitarian preacher, and later an atheist. During this earlier period of his life, before he became enamored of Roman Catholicism, he experimented with various organized religions including Congregationalism, Presbyterianism, Universalism, and; Unitarianism. At one point, out of frustration, he.sue-, cumbed to atheism. In a similar vein, his politics demon­ strated an equally marked instability. His close association with Robert Dale Owen and Fanny Wright, two Scottish reformers who traversed America in the l840's preaching their doctrines of "social justice", led him into a peculiar brand of socialism. . At the same time, Brownson showed an attraction for the "State's Rights" contentions of John C. Calhoun, the famed Senator from South Carolina. Again, "faith the opening of the Civil War, he became an.avid defender of the Union cause, devoting a considerable amount of his intellectual energies to its defense, and losing two of his beloved sons on the battlefield in the process. Brovmson*s intellectual meandering is, in itself, a rather fascinating subject of examination. Once an ardent defender of the extreme "State’s Rights" position and an admirer of John C. Calhoun, he moved towards a passionate defense .of the Union, admiring the works of Charles Sumner, 25 and developing a unique doctrine of American Nationalism. As a social critic, the Orestes Brownson,. of the 1830’s switched in the later 1 8 4 0 ’s from a "working class" brand of radicalism:to an unusual variety of conservatism, heav­ ily clothed in Scholasticism. :In the late l840’s and throughout the rest of his later life, he had come to argue consistently that the notion of liberty most popular in his own time was quite perverse, often equated with a lack of proper restraints or authority. This particular problem eventually became one of the most important objects of his theoretical investigations in politics. It is relevant to mention at this point that this stark, imposing, American philosopher was to become one of

25. As a champion of the Union, favoring total repression of the Southern rebellion, Brownson was often critical of President Lincoln and his administration. In Brownson’s Quarterly Review of July, l86l, he wrote., "The fault of the present administration,' if any is to be laid to its charge, is not in the resistance it offers to the rebellion, but in having too long followed the do-nothing policy of its predecessor, or in having been too timid, hes itating, or uncertain, during the first week of its exis­ tence." Henry F. Brownson [ed.], "The Great Rebellion," Brovmson’s Works [New York: AMS Press,. 1966], XVIII, p. .135 Hereafter citation of these volumes will be referred to. as Works, 13 the leading apologists for the Roman Catholic Church in America, The task was thrust upon him, of course, at a difficult time for adherents to the Catholic faith in Amer­ ica , In not a few circles, Catholicism was considered as a rather exotic, foreign, form of worship, an importation by new immigrants from Europe, At.the time that Orestes Brownson became a member of the Roman Catholic religion in 1 &'4 4 > the nation had already experienced the tremors of . the "Know-Nothing" movement, The idea of "Native American­ ism" was often manifest in an extreme anti-Catholic bigotry. The focus of "Native American" contempt centered upon immi­ grants from Ireland,, escaping the ravages of a major famine. An article entitled the "Know-Nothings", first published in Brownson's Quarterly Review for l854> demonstrates our author’s acute awareness of the Catholic difficulty. In this vein, he writes, "For the large masses of the American people, Catholicity is simply the Irish religion, and to become Catholic is regarded as the same thing as to become an Irishman,Brownson, in his discussions of the issue, was also cognizant of the fact that the Irish counter- ' offensive against "Nativist" propaganda was often presented in the form of an Irish nationalism, a counter-productive reiteration of the past glories and achievements of the

26, "The Know-Nothings," Works, XVIII, p. 321, 14 Irish peopleo 27 Often this Celtic propaganda was blended with an insistence that natural-born American citizens recog­ nize the contributions of Irish people to the growth of the United States as a nation. Such was the cauldron of con­ troversy that Orestes Brownson found himself in upon entrance to the Roman Catholic Church in the America of 1844° Brownson contended that the problem could only be solved by recognizing that no necessary connection exists between a religious affiliation and a man’s_geographical 2$ origins. , At the same time, he criticized the Irish for not openly cooperating with the Americanization of the Roman Catholic Church, keeping it a Celtic organization, narrowly 2Q guided, and identified with Irish nationalism. This, he believed, could only confirm the prejudices of a great many Americans. At times, Brownson's differences with the hier­ archy of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as with Irish clergymen and laymen in Boston, resulting from his attacks

27. Idem. 28. In this context, he writes, "We know, humanly speaking, no way of effecting this double object but by dis­ tinguishing between Catholicity and nationality, and having practically understood, on both sides, that our religion is. bound up with no particular nationality, but can coexist, without collision, with any." Ibid., p. 324. 29. Ibid-.., p. 323. 15 on what he considered to be their "narrowness" and self- righteous attitudes, exploded in bitter recriminations.30 This time in Brownson * s life left him with some se­ rious scars. His criticisms of the Irish hierarchy on the finer points of their mode of adapting to America, and on some point of intellectual contention, were often construed as attacks on the immigrants themselves. At the same time, his defense of his religion brought tremendous criticism from the preponderant Protestant sector's of America. Con­ sidering his unfortunate state, he once wrote, "The poor American Catholic, rejected by his countrymen as a Catholic, and by his. Catholic brethren as an American asserting the right of American nationality on American soil, runs but a 31 narrow chance for his life." The importance of considering the Catholicism of this philosopher consists in the fact that his theological position, and the numerous misfortunes which have proceeded from it, has been identified as a reason for his rather mys­ terious neglect in recent years.

30. Arthur Schlesinger has noted how in a.letter to a close friend Brownson remarked that the Irish were "the most deficient class of our community", warning that it is indeed improper to "identify Catholicity with Irish hoodlum- ism, drunkenness, and poverty". Schlesinger, op., cit., pp. 214-215. . Brownson* s general outlook on the Irish was to become more favorable, however, later in life. c 31. "The Know-Nothings", op. cit., p. 324- ' . 16 In this connection, it is well to consider the resurgence of Brovmson scholarship in the twentieth century.• The first major biographical treatment of Orestes Brownson was issued in 1939 under the title Orestes A. Brownson; A Pilgrim’s Progress and authored by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. The work was republished by Octagon Books Incorporated in 1963 « Professor Schlesinger Vs interest in.Brownson and his works should be considered a major source for Brownson scholars. His own opinions on Brownson, considering the fact that he is a famous and respected American historian, are certainly worthy of deliberation. At one point in his vol­ ume, Schlesinger asserts, "His was without question one of 32 the best journalistic styles that America has known." Cer­ tainly, an .outstanding literary figure, Brownson’s clear, crisp prose provides the historian of ideas with an excel­ lent indicator of his intellectual depth. He possessed remarkable skill in the transmission of philosophical com­ plexities. Yet, as an American writer, he sensed that his nation had not achieved any greatness worth speaking about in the literary field. Chester A. Soleta, in an essay entitled "The Literary Criticism of Orestes A. Brownson" takes note of the fact that the American philosopher was deeply concerned with the inadequacy of American literature. Brownson was. fearful that Americans would concern themselves chiefly with

3 2 . Schlesinger, op. pit., p. 2 8 6 . 17 producing literature for its own sake, rather than for the expression of "some great ideals" which may be transmitted to the rest of the world« 33 , While not the equal.of some of his more famous European contemporaries, men. such as Marx or Carlyle., S.chlesinger contends that Browrison had no equal in Ameri­ ca. Indeed, S.chlesinger continues, "His philosophy was an attempt to wrestle with the relation of faith and real­ ity. His observations on the society had a profundity no other American of the time approached." 3 5 However, Brownson suffered from the misfortune, as Schlesinger relates, of being absorbed with problems, and writing about various aspects of these subjects, which were not to garner gen­ eral interest until recent times. Prior to the American Civil War, the issues of labor and the problems endemic to modern industrialism, for example, were not only cause for unpopularity for the man who was to champion the alleviation of these problems, but generally, they received little atten­ tion as major American social problems. In contrast, the burning issues of those days involved the question of slav­ ery, Constitutional construction and federalism, and tariff policies. One gathers from the prefatory remarks in

33« Review of Politics, XVI, [July, 1954], No. 3, p. 350. 34- Schlesinger, op. bit., p. 20B. 35. Ibid., p. 294. a number of his -writings that Brownson was well aware of this particular 'difficulty. In these, one might find a . strong suggestion for the neglect afforded Brownson years later. Nevertheless, concludes Arthur Schiesinger, "Orestes Brownson thus fell victim to the accidents of history and vanished from America's remembrance of her past. His extra- ) ■ _ ' . - ordinary intelligence and profound honesty deserved a richer reward...Perhaps an age more sympathetic with men who could not compromise and would not retreat will accord him his Q /f rightful place. He is part of the national heritage." A second major biographer of Orestes Brownson is Theodore Maynard, a Roman Catholic scholar, who, while tak­ ing issue on a number of points with Professor Schlesinger, is convinced that the neglect of Brownson, a contributor to the American "national heritage", was less an "accident of history" and more an outgrowth of anti-Catholic prejudice. Says Maynard, "The main reason for his neglect is of course that no writer can become a Catholic without having his stand­ ing adversely affected in the eyes of a reading public still so badly informed as to believe Catholicism moribund."37 Another book on Orestes Brownson appeared in 1953 authored by Lawrence Roemer entitled Brownson on Democracy and the Trend Toward Socialism. Roemer's volume is primarily

36. Ibid., p. 297. 37• Theodore Maynard, Orestes Brownson: Yankee, Rad­ ical, Catholic [New York; MacMillan Company, 1943J, pi ix. 19 an exposition of Brownson's political theory. Along with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: and Theodore Maynard, Roemer also considers the treatment of Brownson's thought by the academic community over the years unfairly negligent. . Remarks Roemer, "Brownson was acknowledged by his contemporaries as a master logician, and that his arguments were presented clearly, simply, and conclusively. In view of these facts, it seems- rather strange that his political principles have been . neglected." 3 $ . Roemer, unlike Schlesinger and Maynard, denies that the reasons for Brownson* s neglect may be traced to the unpopularity of his theological or philosophical proposi­ tions. Moreover, this neglect could not possibly spring from the philosopher's propensity to expound strange theo­ ries on esoteric subjects. Says Roemer, "Brownson’s political principles are neglected primarily because he himself mis­ lead his biographers and commentators. He stated that his only systematic exposition on government, which he called the "American Republic", contained his best as well as his final and definitive thought, on political problems. It was, as a matter of fact, neither his last nor his best work." 3 9 Roemer properly calls attention to the fact that this book suffers from the misfortune that it is not presented all that systematically. Within the American Republic, Brownson

3S'. Lawrence Roemer, Brownson on Democracy and the Trend Toward Socialism [New York; Philosophical Library, 1953J, .pV xiv. “ . 39° Ibid., p. xv. 20 cover's a variety of issues, not all of them clearly related. Nevertheless, this volume has a number of keen insights into major theoretical problems in government, serving as an excellent exposition of the finer points of his politi­ cal theory. • Also in 1953> Russell Kirk called attention to Orestes Brownson with the publication of The Conservative . Mind. Kirk attempts to classify Brownson as a conservative in his later life, as he "took up the duty of conservation I Q upon the foundation .of religious principle." .. Furthermore, according tq Kirk, Brownson recognised■that%true authority, theologically grounded, would serve as a stabilizing element in times of rapid change, allowing for continuity and pres­ ervation. Concerning his neglect, Kirk laments the fact that Brownson*s American Republic, "though one of the most penetrating treatises on American political theory, is a LlI book known to almost no one."' Within the discipline of political science there has been a renewed, if not widespread, interest.in Brownson’s . i political thought. In 1942 ? Professors Thomas Ira Cook and Arnaud Leavelle rendered a comprehensive analysis of Brown­ son’ s major work in a two part essay entitled "Orestes

40. Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953J, p. 214. 41. Ibid., p. '217. 21 j 9 Brownson's 'American Republic'. Two other essays in the Review of Politics are also quite helpful to the stu­ dent interested in the detailed elements of Brownson's poli­ tical thought; Mo A. Fitzsimmons’ "Brownson’s Search for the Kingdom of God: The Social Thought of an American Radi- cal";: A3 and Stanley Parry’s "The Premises of Brownson’s Political Theory".^ Both essays are well written and pene­ trating expositions. As contributions to American political theory, they are excellent. In many respects, these authors fill a gap in Brownson scholarship, enlightening students of his thought on the finer points of his metaphysics and his general philosophical development. A philosophical analysis of the nature of Brownson’s break with the Transcendentalists can. be found in an essay entitled "Brownson and Emerson: Nature and History" by A. Robert Caponigri. The author probes the depths of Brownson’s convictions on the relevance of history, and brings to light his perspectives on authority and reason in matters of philosophy and theology. '

42o Review of Politics, Vol. IV [January 1942]. 43» Review of Politics, Vol. XVI [January 1954]. 44- Review of Politics, Vol. XVI [April 1954]• 45o New England Quarterly, Vol. XVIII [September 1945], pp. 368-390. 22 Scholars such.as Sehlesinger, Kirk, Maynard, Cook, Leavelle, and Roomer have all recognized the inadequate treatment accorded Brownson’s thought on social, political, and theological questions. Save for those very rare detailed studies on certain aspects of Brownson’s thought, much of the work accomplished on the subject has been less than satisfactory. Arthur Sehlesinger, Jr. who has written a considerable/biography, dealing "warmly" as M. A. Fitz­ simmons has remarked on.his early radicalism, has not fully developed the major points■of his later political thought. Professor Russell Kirk, perhaps because of the survey-approach of his study, has Only given his readers a severely limited glance at the notions underlying Brovmson’s theories of authority and liberty. There is certainly a need to know Brownson if he is, as Mr. Sehlesinger argues, a "part of the national heritage". Brownson did have a tremendous influence on his contempo­ raries. As a personality, he also increased his renown by his peculiarities. However, these were distinguishing marks which should have commended him to the.future, rather than condemn him to obscurity. His search for truth, and an authority upon which he could rely in instances of doubt, was certainly a tortuous one. He had become acquainted with a great many of the ideas and movements

4 6 . M. A. Fitzsimmons, "Brownson*s Search for the Kingdom of God: The Social Thought of an American Radical," Review of Politics, XVI, [January 1954], p. 23. 23 which marked the turbulent nineteenth century. How and why Brownson attached himself to diverse movements, and the ideas which guided them., from his very young life to his old age, would be a subject of abiding interest to any his­ torian of ideas. The problems of labor and industrialism, the reconciliation of true liberty and proper authority, remain, even, today, as focal points of controversy in this latter half of the twentieth century. Certainly the answers., or the attempt at answers, rendered by one of Americafs intellectual giants is worthy of proper academic . consideration.. In his own. time, he was accused of instability because of his wanderings through one set of ideas to another. As.a "master logician", of course, Brownson followed a premise to its logical conclusion. If he eventually found that conclusion unacceptable from the standpoint of reason, he simply rejected it., and went searching to find another, hopefully, more satisfactory premise. If a constant search for truth, and a recognition of one's past positions, as. erroneous, is "instability", then Orestes Brownson was indeed.guilty as charged. His advance towards Catholic orthodoxy and a settled political position was constantly, throughout his life, repelled by doubt. In . response to the criticisms concerning the theological and. philosophical "instabilities" of his father, Henry. Brownson 24 has written that his.changes of belief, "were a steady progress towards the clear perception of truth, and he is never found returning to an error he had once abandoned, ) n or losing sight of a truth he had once perceived". .' Convinced that he had an element of truth in his grasp, Orestes Brownson was a tenacious, uncompromising debater. He expressed his firm convictions in a passionate, yet clear and logical, prose. . In many respects, his con­ tentious character, and the passion of his writing, likened him to Karl Marx. It might be suggested, upon reflection, that Brownson was indeed the Marx of traditionalist Catholicism.' As a preacher, a writer, a lecturer, he had few equals. As a young preacher of the Gospel to the work­ ingmen of Chelsea, outside of Boston, his eloquent sermons were stirring. Indeed, to some of his critics, he was most contemptible, using-the Gospels to preach "social justice". Upon reflection, it seems reasonable to assume that a man who had gone from a strict New England Protestantism, to atheism, to Roman Catholicism; from a "States’ Rights" enthusiast of the Calhoun variety to an avid defender of the Union cause; from an unrelenting radical.to a hardened conservative, such a man would suffer great pains in main- . taining stable personal relationships with his more famous public acquaintances.

47o Henry F. Brownson [ed.], Brownson’s Works■ [New York: AMS Press, 1966], p. vi. ' ' 25 Of course, men hate betrayal. Unquestionably, many of Brownson's former associates did not savor his desertion to enemy camps. Even after his submission to the teachings of Roman Catholicism, however, the storms of controversy failed to abate. Much of this was .Brownson’s own doing. Upon entering the Catholic Church, he attacked Protestantism savagely, arguing that it was a filure, inadequate, as a religion. No sooner was he a member of the Roman flock when he opened up another front with Cardinal Newman on abstruse theological questions, while maintaining a running battle with the Irish in the American Church. He saw their inor­ dinate influence as debilitating to the mission of Cathol­ icism in the United States. It is possible to suggest, keeping in mind the man’s intellectual curiosity, that Brownson never felt that he I rt was "betraying" anybody. He probably felt that he was simply discarding inadequate ideas. Ideas were his consum­ ing interest. In pursuit of this interest, he often pub­ licly demonstrated his exasperation with those who could not see the error of their ways in lengthy tracts in his Quar­ terly Review.

4 8 . According to Thomas Ryan, "In his passionate search for truth he abandoned one intellectual position after another. But such as the sincerity of his quest, that no pride of opinion ever held him back from relinquishing what he had come to believe was incompatible with truth." • The . Sailor’s Snug Harbor: Studies in Brownson's Thought [West­ minster: Newman Book Shop, 1952J, p. 3. .'26 How is one to explain his neglect? Almost all of the explanations presented by Brownson's biographers and students of his thought appear reasonable« Considering the times in which he lived, Maynard’s argument that the negli­ gence of Brownson’s thought and his contributions to intel­ lectual life in America is a result of his adherence to the Catholic faith may have much more than a grain truth in it. After all, as recently as I960, the late President John F . Kennedy’s religion was an issue of discussion prior to his . election. However, one might argue in retrospect that citizens of the Roman Catholic faith have indeed come a long way from the era of ”Know-Nothingism” in the election of one of their own to the Presidency of the United States. Perhaps the general unpopularity of his stance on questions of theology and political philosophy alone is not the reason for Orestes'Brownson’s neglect. Perhaps, the reasons lie deeper in the character of the man himself. He not only held tenaciously to his convictions once he appre­ hended them to be truthful, but he also utilized his bril­ liant mind and the penetrating power of his pen to attack the positions of his critics with a ferocity. He was not, as his biographer Theodore Maynard notes, a tactful man. Perhaps, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.- suggests, the generation that wrote the history of his times did not think highly of an apparently eccentric personality who wandered from various 27 unorthodox opinions to a Catholic world view quite estranged from, the scientific spirit which pervaded the late nineteenth century. As one scholar of his thought once remarked, "Few, if any, persons can be expected to agree with all of Brown— son’s views„ But possibly the twentieth century,can help exonerate the nineteenth century’s bias by a more objective and dispassionate appraisal of one of America's most contrp- I Q versial, yet most stimulating, thinkers." He would not compromise with the spirit of his age. He thought it to be erroneous, and said so.

49. Americo Lapati, Orestes A, Brownson [New York: Twayne Publishers Incorporated^ 1965J, p. 8 . CHAPTER 2

BROWNSON ON THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ' / . . '

Brownson’s concern with the underdeveloped state of American political.science was first evidenced in an essay he had written for the Democratic Review of Boston in 1B43 entitled "Origin and Ground of Government"e Considering this problem Browns on wrote,. "No work on politics, of the slightest scientific value, written by an American citizen, - has ever, so far as our knowledge extends, issued from the American press« This, all but universal neglect of politics, as a science, is deeply to be lamented, and at first view is truly astonishing; but we are. so engrossed with questions of practice, that it is rare that we ever dream of recurring 50 to first principleso" In his view, the United States has not made a "single contribution to political science". Those ideas which are embodied in "American Political Theory” are, according to Brownson, largely imports from Europe. The point of view expressed in these reflections on American political science as it was presented in those days has been buttressed by a number of observations by American

50. "Origin and Ground of Government," Works, XV, p. 2960 political scientists of a later era* Professor Charles Merriam, in his book American Political Ideas; 1865-1917 (first published in 1929) has- generally affirmed Brownson's earlier misgivings concerning the development of a- theo­ retical, science of politics in the United States„ Merriam argues strongly that Americans have made only minor advances in the development of a more systematic, theoretical pre­ sentation of political ideas. "But on the whole, there was little energy expended in the study of politics, in compar­ ison with contemporary English and continental developments in social science, economics and politics, where the rise' of a science of society under the inspiration of Auguste Compte, and of Utopian and proletarian socialism, avowed 51 general interest in social problems." What was the cause of this phenomenon? Brownsqn did not view the failure to develop a more highly theoreti­ cal study of politics as an accident or a result of American intellectual indolence; rather, he saw this negligence springing from the levelling spirit in America, a perverse notion of equality often mentioned or suggested by other observers of American society, notably Alexis De Toqueville. In this regard, he wrote, "Instead of feeling it our imper­ ious duty to instruct and elevate the mass, the tendency

51° Merriam, ojd. cit., p. 2. 30 among us is to take our law from the mass, and to bring thought down to a level with the narrow views, crude notions, 52 and blind instincts of the multitude," Brownson saw this underdevelopment of a theoretical politics as a result of this social levelling, asserting that this general tendency would result in a decadence in American intellectual life. What Brownson found truly abhorrent in this tendency was the fact that such a general decline in intellectual standards was often sanctioned by the argument of "democracy". 53 He vigorously denied this application of the word "democracy", arguing that this disastrous levelling process, especially as it may affect intellectual life,was in itself anti­ democratic. It bespoke a conviction that the people in gen­ eral, or what is often termed the "mass", would never have the capacity to enjoy the higher things in life, that is, to appreciate the realm of ideas.^ In this vein he wrote, They feel they want intelligence, want light, and they look eagerly around for it; but between them and light stand ever this immense body of shallow- pat ed politicians, who dread nothing so much as popular intelligence, and whose sole chance of . success is in shutting out the light, and making the people believe that they, the people, are already masters of political science. 55

52. "Origin and Ground of Government," 0£. cit., p. 299. 53. Idem. , - 54. Idem. 55. Ibid., p. 300. ■ 31 Writing in-this vein, Breamson proposed to speak for what he called ’’outraged democracy”, a ’’democracy” with an abiding faith in the people, a faith in their progress. As a democrat of this conviction, he argued that the intel­ lectual leadership of American society, as well as the polit­ ical leaders, must cease this ’’servility to the mass”. Those endowed with fine intellects must, in a spirit of humility, make themselves servants- of the people and ’’dare 56 labor for the elevation of the people”. This will streng­ then the fabric of society. This will bring about a true democracy. Democracy, in Browns on ’ s-- sense, was thus bound up with the notion of general progress brought about by the enlightenment of the people. He argued strenuously against the misuse of the word ’’democracy” by politicians little concerned with a true elevation of the people; only concerned with pandering to their passions, they are most often raised to their positions of power by.the•"energy with which they scream democracy". Brownson saw such callous, activity as a betrayal of the trust that men in political office hold by virtue of popular election. A cynical attitude towards pub­ lic life, as' expressed by the raucus demagoguery of far too

56. Idem. 32 many political figures, only served to undermine the Repub- ' lie. 57 ■ True democracy, as expressed in his terms, could be established if enough men were to take the pains to inject some true scholarship into questions of politics, approach­ ing the questions of the public order with a greater degree of theoretical sophistication. American political life could.be revitalized. The decay, brought about by demagogu- ery, might be checked. Having a faith in the progress of the people, if only they had the opportunity for enlightenment, Brownson well Realized that there are some subjects which require a great deal of intellectual energy. Moreover, the apprehen­ sion of truths in these disciplines most often depended on . certain natural mental talents unequally distributed among the population. Even the most educated men had difficulty in clear apprehension of certain truths. In this case, of course, it would be ideal to have an elevated, well disci- plined, class of scholars. A democrat, Brownson, like Jefferson, saw the need and the truth of a '"natural aristoc­ racy". However, the essence of his thinking on this matter, especially as,, it applies to the development of a study of

57. Ibid., p. 301. . 58. Idem.

/ 33 politics and American intellectual life in general, is found in his. distaste for those ”insane efforts'* at levelling which would eventually deprive American life of real intellectual vitality,a mediocrity brought about through an "adulation of the mass", 59 : ■ ■ (’ The failure to develop a serious, independent, and sophisticated theoretical politics was also the result, he thought, of an age which had succumbed to "theoretical and practical anarchy"e Men in his times, he contended, were swept up in an age of chaos and confusion. There was no firm foundation upon which men could set forth correct theory. In the study of politics, he found the prevailing notions of government in his own times devoid of a satisfactory explana­ tion of the origins of the right of government to govern, or authority. How, he thought, was it proper to talk of government and argue its necessity without adequately consid­ ering the ethical question: the right of government to govern? The "theoretical, and practical anarchy" so rife in his own times had bred only confusion and doubt. Men did not know where to turn for the truth;.and political theorists were of little help in providing them with means to arrive properly at truth. In his Brownson*s Quarterly Review of October, 1848, in an essay entitled "Legitimacy and

59°. Idem. 34 Revolutionism1** "he wrote; ”» <,«ideas and movements are marked by impatience- of restraint, denial of law, and con- 60 tempt of authority.** Certainly, the'intellectual life of the nineteenth century was in a state of agitation and ferment. ■ Change was becoming more and more rapid. Technology had become more and more refined. New ideas were ushered in with these other developments; older notions were often summarily dis­ missed as useless in the New Age& The ideological and phil­ osophical conflicts, which often manifest, themselves in bitter political controversies in the era in which Brownson lived, proved unsettling to men seeking a stability in gov­ ernment and an authority in the realm of thought. The flux was fast. Charles Merriam once remarked: The Nineteenth Century was full of new political forces and forms. The individualism of the Eigh­ teenth Century type deepened into the Nineteenth Century laissez-faire, and still further developed into the unanticipated doctrines of philosophical anarchism. Democracy, the revolutionary ferment of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, took the new form of Liberalism, in its varying shades, and at times passed over into the garb of collec­ tivism and of socialism.. 6l The world which Orestes Brownson closely observed, and of.which he was very much an active part, was steeped in

60. Op. cit., -p. 6b. 61. Merriam, op. cit., p. 2. 35 controversies = ’’Liberty” had become the rallying cry of various political and social movementsy many of them contra­ dictory to one another in their goals, in both Europe, and America, In these movements Brownson detected all too often a ”contempt for authority” and. an ”impatience at restraint", bringing about the instability he saw as deleterious to the march of true progress, In times such as these, Brownson was convinced that it was a duty to remind men of their moral obligations, These obligations were owed to legiti- - mate government. They were not to be compromised. In effect, he saw it his duty to protest against the pervading spirit of his age, "This," he wrote, "is our offense", 62 One who spoke of such obligations, reminded men of the necessity of prudence in their political actions, was not to be counted among the more, popular figures of this day. In cognisance of this' difficulty,, he wrote? We have done it, because liberty is impossible without order, order is impossible without govern­ ment , and government,in any worthy sense of the term is impossible without a settled conviction on the part of the people of its legitimacy, and of their obligation in conscience, to obey it, 63 As the age was in the throes of change, as Professor Charles Merriam has described it, or marked by "impatience of restraint", "denial of truth", or "contempt of authority", as .Orestes Brownson, a man of these times, was to describe

62, "Legitimacy and Revolutionism," op. cit., p. 60. 6 3 , Idem. it, a study of politics was necessary which would liberate men from their incertitude, at least on a theoretical or - philosophical level, eventually reducing the level of ten­ sion in society in general. Brownson insisted that this study of politics should focus oh the ethical question of authority, tracing government to its source, to the "foun­ dation of its authority"« In this, one finds the necessity of a theoretical, more sophisticated study of politics„ After the completion of such a task, it would be necessary and proper for those entrusted with superior intelligence, minds fitted for such undertakings, to trans­ mit their knowledge to the people in general. Again, Brown— son stresses the duty of the intellectuals to enlighten the people= In this instance, it has a practical and beneficial consequenceo If government is going to command the respect of its - citizens, if it is to be so constituted as to incur a moral responsibility in these subjects to obey, then the sources of its right to govern, or•authority, must be correctly underbtood* What has to be comprehended in govern­ ment is its moral element« Brownson saw a utilitarian approach most inadequate for such a task. Obedience, he thought, could not rest upon what is merely useful or con­ venient , but rather on what,is right, just, and proper. In effect, it must be grounded in moral duty. To define rights . 37 to coramand and moral obligations to obey, was the task Brownson outlined for himself« Here was the role of poli­ tical science in Brownsonian terms. Throughout Brownson's earlier career, his thinking on social and political issues had been strongly influenced by religion. Political and social questions were most often moral questions, and the answers to these issues were most often cast in a religious frame of reference, This insis­ tence on the relevance of religion held true after Orestes Brownson had become a member of the Roman Catholic Church in 1&44° In the introduction to his most famous volume, American Republic, one finds, ”1 am a Catholic by God's grace ahd goodness", and must write as" I am, Upon becoming a Roman Catholic in 1844, Brownson had felt the sting of anti-Catholic prejudice, especially ■ as it had become pronounced in the "Know-Nothing” movement of that decade. By the close of the great Civil War in l86'5, he expressed the opinion that anti-Catholic prejudices in ■ America had abated considerably. Certainly, he thought, the valorous conduct of Roman Catholic elements of the popula­ tion in support of the Union cause had effected a change in attitudes in the United States to a more than tolerable degree. In this connection, he wrote in the American Repub- lic: •

6 4 o Orestes Brownson, American Republic [New York; P. O'Shea Company, 186$], p. xiii. JS At any rate, it can no longer be denied that Cath­ olics are an integral, living, and growing element • in the American population, quite too numerous, too wealthy, and too influential to be ignored. They have played too conspicuous a part in the late troubles of the country, and passed out too freely and too much of their richest and noblest blood in defense of thp unity of the nation and the integ­ rity of its domain for that, 65 For their part in the development of intellectual life in the United States, Brownson foresaw members of the Roman Catholic faith, free at last, from prejudices, making valuable contributions. Their views on politics, he thought, would win as much respect in the United States as anywhere else, "Catholics, henceforth, must be treated as standing, in all respects, on a footing of equality with any other class of American citizens, and their views on political science, as of any other science, be counted of equal importance, and listened to' with equal attention,"66 Optimistically, Brownson. expressed the opinion that he had no longer any fears that the publication of his definitive work on political theory, American.Republic, would suffer neglect because its author professed the Roman Catholic 67 faith. And it was in the Catholic frame of reference, with allusions to elements of Roman Catholic theology, that he set forth his presentations on political theory.

6 5 . Ibid., p. xiv. 66. Idem.

67 Ibid., p. XV. 39 . . ' The American Republic deals in large part with the origins and foundations of government generally, the source of authority, and the consequences.of this development of government for the United States within the confines of his general theory. The problem to be examined in this gen­ eral study, of course, is his treatment of political auth­ ority. Brownson published two major works defining his doctrines concerning the origins and functions of political authority. "The Origins and Grounds of Government", first published in 1$43 in a series of three articles for Boston’s Democratic Review, and also, as noted above, in his definitive work on political theory, American Republic, first published in 1865. Brownson makes numerous refer­ ences to the problem of authority, expounding his central ideas concerning it.s nature, source, and its functions in several other rather fascinating essays on political affairs, philosophy and theology, social controversy, and practical questions of the day. - Within the framework of political science,auth­ ority, for Brownson, was to be analyzed in relation to the origins of government. Thus, he wrote in his first major essay on the subject, "The origin of government consid­ ered in itself, as an isolated question, is of no great practical importance; it becomes practically.important only when we make use of theories we adopt concerning the 40 bases of our doctrines on the ground and.legitimacy of the authority of government« n Brownson’s doctrine of authority was heavily influ­ enced by his religious perspectives. This peculiar twist . of his general line of thought certainly did not endear him to a great number of critics, especially Protestants, 69 In his essay, "Legitimacy and Revolutionism" he suggests that his fundamental notions of political authority, quite hostile to secular interpretations of political development, would not be. the most popular, "That it is hostile to VO political atheism, now so rife, we concede," In the same vein he wrote, "Our doctrine, just at this moment, may be unpopular, and we know it will put no money in our pockets,

■ 68. "Origin and Ground of Government," Works, XV, p. 310. 69° In particular, Protestant critics objected to Brownson’s continual habit of stringently framing questions of political legitimacy, moral rights and duties, in a Roman Catholic framework. He would never concede the irrelevance of religion to political theory. "In politics, the same tendency to eliminate God from society and the state is un­ mistakable. The statesman and political philosophers who base their politics on principles derived from theology are exceptions to the rule, and are. regarded as ’behind the age’. Political atheism, or the assumption that the secular order is independent of the spiritual, and can and should exist and act without regard to it, is the popular doctrine throughout Europe and America, alike with monarchists and republicans, and is at the bottom of all the revolutionary movements of the last century and the present," "Essays in Refutation of Atheism," Works, II, p. 2. 70. "Legitimacy and Revolutionism," op. cit., p. . 41 and bring us no applause; but this is not our fault, nor a reason why we should withhold it." 71 For Brownson, his political science led him into views on authority and liberty quite unlike those generally held by his countrymen. Some observers have remarked that such notions were nothing 72 less than a return to the Middle Ages.

All of his life, he had been in search of truth. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has argued that it was the con­ suming passion- of his life. In politics, therefore, it was not unusual that the fundamental issue for him was the truth of the grounds of legitimate government, the source of the right to govern, and the moral obligations of men to one another, in political relationships. Only through an under­ standing of the nature of political authority, he contended, could one conceive of the nature of true liberty.. Liberty was, in this sense, a secondary problem for him, Brownson’s general political philosophy is rather complicated. His first essays on political theory appearing in J. L . Sullivan’s Democratic Review were often perplexing to his readers. Says Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "It is no won­ der that these essays completed the bewilderment of the

71. Ibid., p. SO. 72. Brownson saw reality as encompassing all of that which is "natural" and all of that which is "super­ natural" . Science was the means by which man could appre­ hend reality. Political.science, for him, would entail a knowledge of both realms. "Science is what we can know of the two parts' of this one whole by reason or our natural faculties". "Religion and Science," Works, III, p. 530. 42 readers of the Review® They were long, tedious, misty, shot through with Platonism, and several times going up in the smoke of metaphysics®"^^ BrownsonTs attempt to elevate the "Masses", as a spokesman for "outraged democracy", with the apparently growing influence of Roman Catholic theology on his thought, met with increasing hostility. Critically, writes Schlesinger, "The words were so remote from: things , it would have been useless to ponder their truth; and the only consideration was whether they were glorifying, Brown- son's political theory had now advanced so far that only a Catholic could have been much gratified. Certainly, the VZl readers were not; they were infuriated," Nevertheless, as Francis G, Wilson has noted, he developed some innovative ideas on the Constitution, the constitution of government generally, the nature of federal­ ism, and the political and religious tendencies of .the Amer­ ican Republic, Of course, the fundamental concern of Brownson was the ethical concern, the problem of political authority. Political science, as he understood, it, was an • instrument by which one could arrive at the truth of the rightfulness of government. In an age of "theoretical and

73 o Schlesinger, ojd. cit», p. 159, .74,' Idem,' 43 -practical anarchy”, besieged by the debilitating effect's of "democratic” levelling, Brownson as a political scientist set out to examine, in a systematic fashion, with the, power of his logic at his disposal, the basis of political auth­ ority. It is to this problem, and his special treatment of it, as presented in his various essays and his American Republic that we now turn. CHAPTER 3

A CRITIQUE OF SEVEN THEORIES . .

Brovmson initiates his discussion of political, author­ ity in the first chapter of his American Republic by describ­ ing the civil power as both a "fact" and a "right".. In the framework of his general political theory, this distinction is vital. "Its origins as a fact is simply a question of history; its origins as a right, or authority to govern, is 7 5 a question of ethics." Both elements and both questions are involved in the term "government". It must be a combi— nation- of force and right. ' Both 'qualities' are inseparable. As a force, government is "that which governs" or that which "restrains, guides, and directs". 76 Such a force must be rightful. It must have "authority" in order to be properly designated as government. Accordingly, Brovmson writes, "Government is not only that which governs, but that which has the right to govern."77

75° Brovmson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 26. 76. "Origin and Ground of Government," op. cit., p. 307. 77- Idem.

44 45 How is one to come to a knowledge of what is ethical or rightful in government? For Brownson, there are two ways;, philosophy and the teachings of the Scriptures« The failure to distinguish between, government as a fact andthe ethical question as to whether government has the right to exercise power has resulted in a number of falla— cious theories of political authority over the several cen­ turies of human existence. In his categorization of fallacious notions concern­ ing the origins of government and political authority, Brownson lists seven major ideas which have gained prominence; lo Government originates in the right of the father to govern:his children. 2V Government originates in convention; it is founded on a social compact. 3®- It originates in the people collectively; taken collectively, the people are sovereign. 4® Government springs from the spontaneous develop­ ment of nature.

5. The right and fact of government, are derived from the immediate, and-express appointment of God; God is the source of political authority.- 6. The right to govern comes from God, and is to be exercized by the Pope, the visible head of the spiritual order. 7o Political authority comes from God through the people. In his consideration of these notions, it becomes clear, as Professors Cook and.Leavelle .confirm, that Brownson’s focus of concern is the ethical issue of governmental authority rather than with the origins of government as a fact. For Brovmson, these are two essentially different questions.. In this regard, Orestes Brownson breaks with several other theorists who considered the origins of authority in the same category as the factual origins of government, itself. This is most notable to one who should examine liberal rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. According to Thomas Ira Cook and Arnaud Leavelle"Certainly, in the Seven-. teenth and Eighteenth centuries that discussion pretending to be concerned with beginnings, was actually a justification of authority and its limits by positing fictional origins, or by using suppossed, but erroneous, actual origins to defend particular theories of the rightful power, scope and 7$ limits of government at the time." Brownson then, clari­ fies the ethical question of authority by declaring that the issue of the right to govern is to be distinguished from the historical origins of the civil power.

The Patriarchal Theory • According to Brownson,.the "Patriarchal Theory" of the origins of government and political authority is only partially correct. It has validity if one confines the theory to a consideration of government as a fact. In his

7 8 . Thomas Ira Cook and Arnaud Leavelle, "Orestes Brownson*s ’American Republic *," Review of Politics, IV [January 1942], p.. 8 3 . consideration of this theory, Brownson argues that there has always existed government, in the family. In.fact, gov­ ernment in the family, embodied in the rule of the father,. is the "earliest known form of government". 79 It is the human source of government, a source which is modified over time through a variety of historical circumstances. Rule of the tribe and eventually the nation is derived from the patriarchal origins. This "transition from family to tribe $ is natural and easy, as also from the tribe to the nation." Brownson observes that in some parts of the world this pro­ gress is slow given the tribal rule of some territories, notably in Africa and in Asia. He posits, however, that the tribe has been a natural form of human association, and is apparently common to Western man as well. In this con­ nection, he takes nptice of Scottish Clans and Irish Septs. Thus Brownson argues that the right of the father to govern his children and servants, as a fact, is the first step in the development of civil government in history, from the family to the tribe, from the tribal organization to the modern nation. Society in some form, .he declares, has always existed. The basic unit of society, the family, has always existed. In Brownson's view, this is a cardinal tenet. Society and government are inseparable. Since there has

79o Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 27. SO. Roemer, _0£. cit., p. 49. 48 never been a society devoid of government, that is, a super­ vising order, it is apparent to him that "government begins 8l with the family". He asserts that it was the first family of Adam and Eve, after their banishment from bountiful Paradise by the Lord, for their Original Sin, that was to be governed by the male in line with the Divine command. In substance then, "The basic origin of the state in time", for Brownson, "is patriarchal". In his thought is discerned a progression, in a historical sense, from the fundamental unit of society and government, the family, onwards to the tribe, and eventually, to the nation. The influence of the political theory of Aristotle on Brownson’s explanation of the development of the social order, as Cook 0? and Leavelle remind us, is quite pronounced. ~ However, it appears that Brownson sets forth a'more elaborate presen­ tation.of the ethical question of authority in the process of this development. While society.has always existed with man, at least in terms of the family unit - with a political rule of some sort providing a necessary order for the continuity of prog­ ress and undergoing change throughout history — the legiti­ macy of the exercise of social or political power must be clarified. In his deliberations on the "Patriarchal Theory",

01. Idem. 02. Cook and Leavelle, ojd. cit., p. 03. 49 Brownson endeavors to realize that clarification. Turning from the issue of fact, he addresses the problem.of right. Does the father have a "right” to govern his family? Brownson answers affirmatively, arguing that the right of the father to govern his family is a "natural right” as he is the natural head of the family. The doctrine that men =' have a superiority over women in this sense is repeated con­ sistently in many of Brownsonfs essays concerning social issues 0 In one essay entitled "Socialism and the Church", written for the January number of his Brownson's Quarterly

Review of 1£>49j he asserts; . Some things may be assumed to be settled; if not, the'human race can settle ..nothing, and it is idle to examine: the claims of a new theory.. If any­ thing can be settled, it is that the man is the head of the woman, and she is for him, not he for her; and that religion, government, family, pro­ perty, are essential elements of all civilization. S3 Can patriarchal authority be the source of authority in the civil order? No.. For Brownson, the rights of the father over his wife, his children, and his servants, are not the source of his authority over the rest of society. It is not clear, says Brownson, how proponents of a patri- • )■ archal theory justify the right of a father to exercise his authority over the children, wives, and servants, of other men. Conceding that a father has the right to govern

#3 . Kirk," bp... cit., p. 73. . . 50 within the confines of his own family, Brownson denies this patriarchal authority■over and above the immediate family unit» Therefore, "political authority (the right to govern society generally) cannot be deduced or evolved from parental authority, The personal natural right of the father to govern his family, when carried over to the state at large, is., for Orestes Brownson, an essential injustice. The exercise of political authority as a personal right, in a practical sense, leaves the exercise of the civil power quite arbitrary. In the moral sense, such a government could never rule with "legitimate authority", no matter how that "authority" were exercised. Substantially, the very existence of patriarchal rule in civil society is wrong whether or not the ruler's government "be tempered with affection," 85 In other words, the positive manner in which that personal patriarchal authority would be exercised.would, not alter the fact that it is essentially illegitimate and-"barbaric," Roemer states that, "Brownson's argument is based upon the fact that auth­ ority is exercised in the same way that it exists. To the extent that authority exists as the right of an individual, he may use his authority according to his own pleasure-. This is despotism," 86 As he relates in his American Republic,

6 4 , Roemer, ojd. cit., p, $1, 8 5 , Idem, 86, Idem, . . 51 despotism is "barbaric" = . Browns on .stresses the point that, "The essence of barbarism consists in the fact that authority $r7 is privately ownede" In this way, Brownson denies the "right" of the ruler to exercise his power arbitrarily, as his personal right, in civil society. In this general context, we are entitled to inquire as to what are the limitations of the exercise.of parental authority within the proper family.unit itself. Though the authority of the rather is a natural right, inherent in his person, does that constitute absolutism? According to Orestes Brownson: But though the patriarchal system is the earliest form- of governmentand all governments have been . developed or modified from it, the right of govern­ ment to govern cannot be deduced from the right of the father to govern his children, for the paren­ tal right is not absolute or complete. 88 As will be seen later on, no human authority is absolute or complete. Furthermore "those governments which claim to derive their.authority from patriarchal origins, and assume the absolute power to govern without restraints, are barbaric or despotic, and therefore without any legiti­ mate authority.", Brownson asserts that, "The right to govern rests on ownership and dominion. Where there is no pro­ prietorship, there is no dominion, and where there is no dominion, there is no right to govern." 89 In the first

8?. Ibid., p. 52o' 88. Brownson, American' Republic, op. cit., p. 39. 89. Ibid., p. 40. 52 chapter of the American Republic. Brownson sets forth the foundation of his doctrine of political authority. Here? he repeats, "Property, ownership, dominion, rest on creation. The maker has the right to the thing made. .He, so far as he is sole, creator, is sole proprietor... is QQ Sovereign Lord and proprietor of the universe."' God’s dominion is absolute and unlimited. What is indeed com- \ forting about this Divine Rule is that God can be no despot. That is to say, he cannot usurp any authority which is not his own by right, the right of creation. More­ over, his infinite goodness serves as a.guarantee that the exercise of Almighty Power will be legitimate, always right­ ful. .Says BrownsOn, "The despot is the man. attempting.to be God on earth, and to exercise a usurped power."91 • For Brownson then the despotism in a political order is most often "based on the parental right, and the parental 92 right is assumed to be absolute." However, the despot who would justify his rule on the patriarchal argument is relying on a false premise.- It is in this connection that Brownson outlines his arguments on the limitations of the patriarchal authority within the confines of the family itself. He asserts that the right of the father to govern

90. Idem. 91. Idem. - 92. Idem. his family is an "imperfect right” in the sense, that the " head of the family is only a "generator” and not a "creator" of the life of his children. Of course, only God can "create". The father only cooperates in the Divine Plan. In this sense, the father is a "second", as opposed to a "first cause". Brownson notes in this context that the early Roman law of "Pater Families” was founded on the essential confusion between "creation" and "generation", giving rise to the notion that the head of the household, the patriarch, was given "absolute authority" over his children, including the right of life and death. 93 With the coming of Christianity, these barbaric "rights" were abrogated. Thus, "The authority of the father, like all power, was then a trustIn rejecting the absolute authority of the father over bis children, Brownson argued that the dominion of the father over his children was limited by nature, to a secondary dominion, brought about by. the "secondary cause." of "generation" in contrast to a "first cause" of creation.

. ' ^ This distinction between first and second causes is of prime importance throughout his general theory. In his rejection of the "Patriarchal Theory", Brownson denied that there ever existed a connection of logical necessity between the right of one to govern his own children and one's right to govern the children of others,

93* Ibid., p. 41.

94= Ibid., p. 42. .54 or society in general« Any attempt to exercise such rule constituted, for Brownson, a usurpation, a depot ism,. "How, from my right bo govern my child, conclude the right of society to found the state, institute government, and exer- cise political authority over its members*?" 95 Denying the notion, that political authority in society can be properly derived from a personal, patriarchal source, Brownson then develops the importance of another ingredient in political theory, an ingredient which sireng-. \ - thens his own idea of political authority, A theory of authority which would apply to civil society in general must be free of "barbaric" trappings. In this context,.it is relevant to observe how Brownson employs the term "barbarism," In his discussion of the merits of various theoretical notions, Brownson employs the term "barbarism" in an ancient Greek political sense, "to designate a social order in which the state was not developed, and in which the nation was personal, not territorial, and authority was held as a private right rather than a public trust,Thus, in a normative sense "barbarism" refers to an "underdevel­ oped or primitive" social order. The opposite of "bar­ barism" is civilization," When government is transformed, from the arbitrary rule of a tribal chief or patriarch into a

95® Idem, 96, Ibid,, p, 32, 55 polls, a city government, or a "state," then "we have. civilization." 97 In the "civilized" order "The city or state takes the place of the private proprietor, and terri- torial rights .take the place of purely personal -rights." A political order arrives at this state of civilization through a process of development from the family to the tribe to the nation. This progressive transformation, in time, if allowed to develop without "barbaric" interven­ tions, will result in a civilized social order. The in­ gredient in this general transformation, which affects a . change in thenature of authority itself, is common land. It is this ingredient which, according to Brownson, strengthens his own theory of authority. In his discussion on the matter, he notes the importance of land as a polit­ ical factor by referring to an ancient Roman customs When land was transferred to a new tenant, the practice in early times was to bury him in it in order to indicate that it took possession of him, received, accepted, or adopted him, and it. was only such persons as were taken possession of, adopted or accepted by,the sacred territory or domain, that, though denizens of Rome, were citi­ zens with full political rights. 99 The idea that Brownson wishes to impress upon his readers through this reference is that the state, in the civilized order, is not simply personal, but territorial.

97e Ibid., p. .29. 98. Idem. 99. Ibid., p. 30. dominated by a public authority, exercising the■right to rule over that defined territory. ' As to when this trans­ formation from a barbaric to a civilized or developed political order, with a public, in contrast to a private or personal authority occurs,.. Brownson confesses ignorance For each people, with different historical developments, the transformation apparently takes place at different times„ However, Brownson does argue that the- earliest evi­ dence available of such a transformation of political authority from a personal or barbaric rule to a public or civilized rule, in the sense in which he speaks, indicates ancient Grecian and Italian origins. The civilized order, or a developed political order, is called a “republic” in Orestes Brownson*s terms. In thisconnection he writes, “Republic, res publics, by the very force of the term, means the public wealth, or in good English, the commonwealth..." 101 Brownson sees "civilized” government as grounded- "not on personal or private wealth, but on the public wealth, public territory, or domain, or a government that vests authority in the nation, and attaches, the nation to a certain definite 1 OP territory. Only in a "republic” can one have a "civi­ lized" political authority, a proper right to govern the

100. Idem. 101. Ibid., p. 32. 102. Idem. 57 entire community. In this vein he continues, "The distinc­ tive mark of republicanism is the substitution of the state (the civil power of the territorial.people) for the personal chief, and public authority for personal or 103 private right." At this point it is well to reconsider the in­ adequacy of the people, collectively taken, alone as those who render authority a public trust rather than a private right. This inadequacy stems from the equality of man in nature as a created being. "The only sense.in which • men are equal is in that they were equally created, and are all equally human beings, members, though unequal members, of one and the same family, and alike morally 10/ accountable to the one and the same divine Master." As members of this family of humanity, men are afforded by .their Creator certain rights as men. "By the law of nature all men have equal rights, are equals, and equals have no authority over one another." 105 Therefore, authority can­ not spring from individuals, as one individual has no in­ herent right to govern any other individual. Moreover, the greatness of numbers makes no essential, qualitative differenceo Says Brownson, "Private authority cannot be

103. Ibid., p. 33o 104® "Origins and Ground.of Government," Works, op., cit., p. 330. 105» Brownson, American Republic, op. cit.,, p. 57. ) 58 converted into a public trust merely be referring it to a whole population .as persons or private individuals./.for what is privatej particular in its nature, is not and cannot be general.""^0 If there is nothing common, if there, is nothing public, then there is, and can be, only that which is personal or private. It follows then that the political order based on private proprietorship must be governed by a personal or private authority. Here, without "res publica", without commonwealth, there can only be an arbitrary, "uncivilized1* or "barbaric" rule =107 To recapitulate, authority is not made civilized, or public (as only authority held as a public trust can be civilized) through the. participation of large numbers of people in government, all having equal rights. One man, by virtue of his equality with every other in nature, can have no right to rule another inherent in himself. The element which makes authority truly public is terri­ tory. . Authority is exercised in a .commonwealth, a "repub­ lic Proper political authority, then, is exercised over a territory which is bound up with a "nation", "a family or tribe called by the name of its ancestor, founder, or chief." 10$ In Brownson, we see that political authority

106. Roemer, op. cit., p. 53. 107. Ibid., p. 54. 108. 'Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. '34» 59 or the right to govern, held as a public trust in a civi­ lized community, rests on two mutually dependent elements: the nation, or the collective people, and the territory that is common to the nation. The common land held by the nation, or the. whole, people, is the area in which the political authority is exercised. That authority exists for the protection of that common territory and the whole people within it. Thus, it is exercised for the benefit of not one tribe or family, or over personal or patriarchal territory, but for the benefit of the whole people, the public, and over the territory which belongs to them as a whole people. The necessary.ingredient of territory in Brownson*s theory of political authority serves to define the area in which the public authority is to be exercised. . This element of common land aids,in defining authority as a public thing, to be exercised as a trust over matters of public concern. In Brownson, we see that real political authority can only exist in a "republic", a commonwealth, a developed or "civilized" order. Political authority, that authority which by right is to be exercised over the whole people, in Brownson*s terms, cannot be derived from < personal right as exercised over those inhabiting a per­ sonal estate. The right to rule in a "civilized" order cannot be founded on the "patriarchal" rights of the father over his children and his wife. Indeed, authority founded . . 60 on such a notion is “barbaric". While government as. a fact, in history, may have its origins in the patriarchal rulej government as a right in a highly developed civil order, as a matter of ethics, does not. In connection with the "Patriarchal Theory", Brownson takes note of a notion of authority as a personal right among "radical democratic theorists". In prin­ ciple, he observes, they are asserting "barbarism". According to Brownson: The characteristic principle of barbarism is that power is a private and personal right and when democrats assert that the elective franchise is a natural right of man, or that it is held by virtue of the fact that the. elector is a man, they assert the fundamental principle of bar­ barism and despotism. 109 Brownson does not, it should be made clear, argue against universal manhood suffrage in this connection. He was a democrat and was strongly opposed to any political privileges. His criticism, rather, centers on an improper metaphysical conception of natural law which has some damaging, far-reaching consequences, as he views it, for the "civilized" or republic order. Thus, he continues, "The barbarism, the despotism, is not in universal suffrage, but in defending the elective franchise as a private or personal.right. It is not a.private, but a political right, and, like all political rights, a public trust." 110 Brownson,

109. Ibid., p. 37. 110. Idem. 6 i here, is simply warning democratic theorists that they should be wary of adopting the same foundations of auth­ ority which characterize, for example, Oriental Despo-

The Contract Theory After discussing some of the major inadequacies of the "Patriarchal Theory" as an explanation for the origins of civil authority, Brownson then turns his analysis to­ wards the "Contract" or "Compact" theory of government and authority= This general- theory, the most, popular in liberal thou-gh-t a-t the -time% wa-s- best- expressed in a systematic fashion in the seventeenth century. Brownson believed that the general theory of "Social Contract" was of spe­ cial importance to students of American politics inasmuch as it had become so pervasive in the United States. Many

111. In attempting to draw the distinction between authority in the political order as a public trust rather than a private right, and exercised over the entire commu­ nity within a clearly defined territory, Brownson was to strike a blow, so to speak, for the value of liberty as against despotism. At first glance, it does seem strange ■that he was at odds with his democratic comrades. While a paradox, the logic of his position is clear. . "Some men", he wrote, are often under the impression that they are at the "head of civilization" in promoting the notion that the masses have an inherent, personal right to elect their rulers. Yet they should be much surprised to learn that, in essence, they are asserting another "barbaric principle", a principle which rules "nations on whom the light of civi­ lization has never yet dawned." Ibid. , p. 38.. . 62 American arguments were framed in “Contract Theory” lan- . guage. : Indeed, the intellectual and political aristocracy of the United States at the time in which Brownson lived had come to accept the contractarian approach to the questions of theorigins and authority of government,, "at least insofar as they ever trouble their heads with the question.at all, which it must be confessed, is not far." 112 Apparently, for Brownson, the most pervasive expression of contractarian theory in America was that of John Locke, an idea reinforced by Professor Louis Hartz many years later. While recognizing the differences among the various contractarians, men such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, Brownson notes the common belief amoiig all of them that there existed prior to civil society a "state of nature", a human existence without any "government, laws, or manners." As Brownson recounts,men in such a state found their situation either intolerable"or inconvenient, a condition which stirred them to leave their primitive existence and, through a voluntary contract, submit them­ selves to a rule of civil law as interpreted or. promul­ gated by a king, a parliament, or a "General Will". Generally speaking, the "compact" is the origin of polit­ ical authority within the terms of the "Contract; Theory,"

112. Ibid., p. 43° Brownson, it should be noted, oversimplifies the contractarian approach to. the point of error. Greater . differences exist between Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau than he casually suggests. In Rousseau, for example, there is only one contract, that contract which forms political society. The sovereignty of the people, which consists in the General Will, is the active authority in the state continuously. For Locke-, on the other hand, as Professor Alfred Cobban observes, there are actually two contracts: the contract which forms civil society, and the contract between the members of society and the government itself. Sovereignty is not found in the government for Locke. It rests with the people and comes actively into play only in the event that the government should fail to preserve the terms of the contract. 113 As Brownson relates, the most widely accepted in­ terpretation of the "Social Contract" in America stems not from Thomas Hobbes or Jean Jacques-Rousseau, but from John Locke. In his monumental Two Treatises of Civil Government is set forth the inalienable "natural rights of man", the doctrine that property is the end of civil government, and the notion of majority rule as the arbiter of the practical questions of government. In a sense, government is "created" out of a "state of nature" through

113. Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Modern State [London: Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1964j, pi 7"2. the "Social Contract", through the "consent of the governed." Orestes Brownson notes that: This theory as so set forth, or modified, by assert­ ing that the individual delegates., instead of surrendering his rights to civil society, was generally adopted by the American people in the last century, and is still the more prevalent theory with those among them who happen to have any theory or opinion on the subject. 114 The notion that individuals may create government and, at the same time, dispense with it as they deem it .necessary was well ingrained in the nineteenth century American political mind, In fact, wrote Brownson, "It is

. pi.c the political tradition of the country." y However, the regrettable, experiences of the terrible Civil War brought the problem of authority into focus. In effect, it has placed, the questions of authority and liberty in proper perspectiveIt was certainly a costly education. 116 Concerning this theory of government as it applies to the question of fact, Orestes Brownson sets forth a number of striking objections. First, he asserts, there is

114o Brownson, American Republic, op. eft., p. 47° • 115o ■ Idem. . 116. "Prior to the Southern Rebellion, nearly every American asserted with Lafayette, ’the sacred right of in­ surrection or revolution, and sympathized with insurrec­ tionists , rebels, and revolutionists, wherever they made, their appearance." Ibid., p. 4&» 65 no reason to believe, as there is no evidence to support such a belief, that a pre-political "state of nature", as envisioned b y .any of the major contractarians ever existed. Apparently Brownson does not consider the "state.of nature" concept as a logical postulate, an abstraction employed to explain the necessity of civilized political community.. In this view, as Professors Cook and Leavelle confirm, Brownson’s argument rests .with the convictions of modern anthropologists. 117 Yet, Brownson in his objection is quick to note that his denial of a pre- political "state of nature" does not entail a denial of Natural Law. It is, he writes, "the reason and conscience of civil society, and every state acknowledges its auth- 1 1 d ority." Along with Locke, Brownson asserts that civil law must conform to Natural Law where.it finds its "ground 119 ■ and reason." The second argument Brownson makes against the contractarian position is fundamentally this: If man did exist in this so-called "state of nature", how would it ever be possible for him to get out of it? "If his prim­ itive state was his natural state, and if the political

117» 0]D. cit. 118. American Republic, op. cit., p. 4 8 . 119° Idem.' 66 state is supernaturalj subnatural, or.preter-naturalf how passed he alone, by his own unaided powers from the former to the later?” 120 Such phenomenal progress, according to Brownson, is not adequately explained in any of the major contractarian thinkers to his satisfaction. As noted earlier, the only truly progressive nations, for Brownson, are those which are.civilized and republican. Progress is made possible through the transmission of knowledge. Just as savages cannot rise above their poor condition without the external help of the knowledge provided by missionaries or settlers from the colonial powers, he asserts, neither would it be possible for primitive men, of whatever variety, to come into a political society from a "natural society", an order of being without government. Furthermore, Brownson argues, the men described by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, are far below even the most primitive.savages known. These savages, at least, have some organized social life with notions of authority and obli­ gation, no matter how primitive their conceptions might be. However, the men described by the contractarians in their "natural state" would not even be able "to conceive of 1 22 civilization, much less realize it."- Brownson, of course, is a proponent of the idea that man is a social animal, al- ways having some government to insure order, in turn,

120. Ibid., p. 49. 121. Ibid., p. 51o ■ 67 insuring the- progress of human existence. This, indeed, is what is "natural" to him. "Man is in his nature, and is in- separable from it." 122 Thus it follows, "Man cannot divest themselves of themselves, and whatever their efforts to do it, they think, reason, and act as they are."123 The logical imperatives following an assumption of a "state of nature" are astonishing. If men did truly live in such a state, without any knowledge of science, art, or notions of authority and obligation within a civilized order, they were indeed extraordinary creatures. Living such a simple existence they were able to conceive and yet realize a civilized order later highly complex. Consider­ ing their original circumstances, the construction of such ,a civil order would suggest their tremendous superiority to any of those men who came after them, living in a civi- 12Zl lized, yet terribly imperfect society. Dismissing the "Contract Theory" as an explanation cf the fact of government, Brownson further contests the ■ ethical argument that government as a right, that is, the authority of government, rests on contract. The American philosopher first undertook an examination of this ques­ tion in a three part essay, his more famous "Origin and Ground of Government," originally published in the Boston

122. Ibid., p. 52. 123o Ibid., p. 49° 124o Such Imagination! "Was Rousseau right in asserting civilization as a fall, as a deterioration of the race?" Ibid., p. 56. 63 Democratic Review in 13435 twenty-two years before his more elaborate and definitive treatment in the American Republic. The problem of authority in the "Contract Theory”, as Brownson viewed the matter, resulted from a central confusion as to the origins of government as a fact and the origins of government as a right» Furthermorehe saw a persistent confusion among adherents to contractarian theory as to the proper relationship between the individual-

■ ( - and the political authority. In this connection, he .writes: Now sovereignty must be alienable or inalienable. If it is inalienable, as I contend, as does Mr. Jefferson, in the preamble to the ’Declaration of Independence’, then the individual retains all the freedom in civil society that he has out of it. 125 This right to liberty is a right held by all men according to the law of nature. In this there is an equal­ ity of men. It thus follows, according to Brownson, that no single man or any group of men have an inherent right to rule any other man or group of men. The power to rule,, according to the contractarians, as it has a source in "natural society", may be delegated to those to whom natural man has granted the "right to rule". However, that right to rule is still vested in the recipient, having its source in the individual; and this power or right to rule may be revoked when the. individual deems such a revocation

125. "Origin and Ground of Government", Works, op. cit., p. 3 1 5 . 69 necessary. By the force of logic Brownson finds in such a principle a source of anarchy. "If we assume that sover­ eignty is inalienable, that is, that a man cannot alienate: his natural freedom, we are Obliged to come to the conclu­ sion, here stated, obviously incompatible with all govern- raent." 126 .The outstanding problem here, of course, is the . problem of sovereignty. Brownson. defines "sovereignty" as the "ultimate power", that which is "absolute". In this "absolute" sense then the only true sovereign, he argues, 127 is God. The sovereignty of God, of course, is inalien­ able from his nature. . . . Brownson interprets some contractarians, such as Rousseau as asserting that sovereignty originally rests in "natural man". They argue that such a sovereigntyis "ali­ enable" (in order to escape the anarchic consequences) in contrast to the doctrine of "inalienable" sovereignty as held by such theorists as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson. In taking cognizance of difficulties encountered with this position he writes: But we are told that man is bound to keep his engagement, and when he has once given his assent to civil society, he is bound to abide by.its decision, and it has the right to enforce his obedience. That is, sovereignty is alienable, and a man on coming into civil society surrenders up his natural freedom, his natural rights, to

126o Idem. 127. "Democracy," Works, op. cit., p. 17. 70 the whole, and consents to receive in turn only such rights as the whole- or a major part shall con­ cede him, 12.8 BrownsOn identifies this central line of thought with Jean Jacques Rousseau, noting that such a scheme would submerge the individual in the mass, robbing him of true individual liberty, leaving him prostrate before the state power. Such an authority would, in his view, be illegiti­ mate 0 Strictly speaking, Orestes Brownson’s interpreta­ tions of Jean Jacques Rousseau are erroneous. Entrance into civil society does not result in an alienation of the individual from sovereignty. For Rousseau, sovereignty is not embodied in the government, nor even in a majority of the citizens, rather it consists of the General Will of the 129 people, a Will of which all men partake. It is that Will directed towards the common interest of the community. Theoretically, the General Will is inalienable.. It resides within us, even though we may be blinded by ignorance or passion from realizing it, pursuing our own selfish inter­ ests at the expense of the common interest of the community. Reflecting upon, this difficulty encountered by con- tractarians on the question of sovereignty, Brownson comes to understand their dilemma in this'manner; . If one asserts

128. "Origin and Ground of Government," op., cit., p. 315. 129. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 1 New York: Washington Square Press, 19571, p. 99. 71 that the individual retains within himself inalienable sovereignty, an inalienable natural freedom and power, to be delegated and revoked as he should deem it necessary or even convenient, then one is assenting to the theoretical underpinnings of anarchy. On the contrary, if one argues that an individual's sovereignty is ’’alienable,” to be surrendered to civil society after convention, then one is confronted with the unhappy loss of liberty, legitimate redress with foundations in right. The idea of ’’alienable sovereignty” is often bound up with the idea that the people, taken collectively, are sovereign. They, and they alone, are the last resort. Brownson’s discussion of the ethical problems encountered in "Contract Theory” are cause for a considera­ tion of a number of the more outstanding ideas contained in his own general theory of authority. Such notions will be developed in due course later on in this general analysis. To recapitulate here, the contractarian position, as analyzed by Orestes Brownson, declares that the rights of the society are derived from the rights of those who deem it necessary or convenient to enter into a "social compact", establishing government. The problem here, as Brownson sees it, is that no individual can give what he does not already possess; and he denies that authoritative civil government could logically arise by this manner of "agreement” inasmuch 72 as no particular 'individual, in himself> has any inherent right govern another. 130 "By the law of nature all men have equal rights, are equals, and equals have no authority one over another." 131 While asserting this equality, Brownson further argues against stark individualism as rep­ resented by the.notion that individual men have a sovereignty unto themselves which is, itself,. inalienable. "Nor has an individual the sovereign right even to himself, or the 132 right to dispose of himself as he pleases." In fairness, it should be noted that even the indi­ vidualistic Locke did not promote the position that Brownson attacks.' Again, it is not the individual who is sovereign for Locke, but civil society. Popular sovereignty, not anarchy, is the liberal contractarian position. His per­ spectives here may have'been distorted by the prevalent individualism in the United States, so highly developed that he saw threatening social order. Men are, in Brownson's view, limited, imperfect, and dependent creatures. This dependence is directed not only . towards the supernatural order, the uncreated order of God (as the Creator of men), but also toward the natural order, the created order', itself. Man, he observes, "is dependent,

130. Brownson, American Republicop. cit., p. 57. 111. Idem. 132. Idem. and dependent not only on his Maker, but on his fellow man, on society, and even on nature, or the material world. **133 The principle that he wishes to affirm here is that those beings upon which men depend for their existence, by virtue of that dependence, owe obligations. That upon which men depend has a "right" to them, and this right to each and 131 every social man "limits his own right over himself". Therefore, it is clearly demonstrable that men owe an obe­ dience to God, as their Creator, the source of their lives and goods.' Moreover, men are dependent upon one another in society. Society itself provides a communication and an ■ organization which is necessary for true progress both in an intellectual and in a material sense. It is relevant, at this point, to observe the dis­ tinctions that Brownson makes in reference to the rights and duties of the state in contrast to the rights and duties of individuals within the state. As will be seen, the Brownsonian analysis differs markedly from the contractarian approach. A proper understanding these distinctions is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of his gen­ eral theory of authority. "Society" he defines as "the communication of Man with his Maker through his. kind." 135 In contrast to some

133• Idem. 134- Idem. 135- Ibid., p. 16. 74 extreme, anarchic individualism,- Brownson stresses the role of society in human-, development. The role of society, espe­ cially with his imposing theological implications, cannot be underestimated. However, "Man does not depend exclu­ sively on society, for it is not his.only medium of commu­ nication with God, and therefore its right to him is neither absolute nor unlimited; but he still depends on it, lives on it, and cannot live without it." 136 . This dependence, then, is the source of certain societal rights over the individuals And these rights are not derivative from him, "These rights of society overide his rights to himself, and he' can neither surrender them, nor delegate them." 137 What Brownson is actually saying, especially in his reference to the differences between the rights of society and the rights of the individual, is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It is a rejection o f . the empirical view of society as an aggregation of indivi­ duals. Society, for him, is not simply a "mere aggregation" of individuals, as liberal-rationalist contractarians have so often presumed, but rather, "It is an organism, and indi- viduals live in its life as well as it in theirs."..13$ In his own time this organic conception of social reality, as

136. Ibid., p. 57. 137° Ibid., p. 5&. - 133. Ibid., p. 6 5 o 75 set forth by Orestes Brownson, was certainly a peculiar notion for an American theorist. What is it that renders a collective people a liv­ ing unit? For Brownson, the answer is to be found in an essential human solidarity. ’’There is a real, living soli­ darity which makes individuals members of the social body, and members one of another.’’139 The metaphysical foundations of Brownson’s organic theory of society is elaborated in great, detail in his ear­ lier essay on the issue of political authority, ’’The Origin and Ground of Government”, first published in 1843• Unfor­ tunately, an.equally penetrating discussion does not appear in the first part of the. American. Republic, a book which is more concerned with a critical analysis of various theories- of the origins of government and political authority. This metaphysical discussion is certainly indispen­ sable to a deeper understanding of Brownson, especially in reference to his rejection of the contractarian notions of political authority. Consider, ”My politics are, to no inconsiderable extent, founded on the Platonic doctrine of ideas..o”"^^ Such a statement suggests the deeper elements of Brownson's political theory. Unquestionably, as an American theorist, he goes much deeper than most into the

139. Idem. 140. Brownson, "Origin and Ground of Government," op. cit., p. 3 6 4 . ' 76 intricacies of metaphysics» It is no wonder that, as Schlesinger has recorded, his discussion of the nature of political reality only served to madden his contemporaries. However, those deeper elements also served to strengthen Brownson’s critique of much theory different from his own. They were a point of reference, an alternative, most orig­ inal in American theory, from which he launched his criti­ cisms of different notions of the ethical questions of politics. Borrowing from Platon, Orestes Brownson posits that there exists an Ideal order, an order from which ideas are to be drawn in order to be actualized in the Real order. He recognizes, however, that there is an imperfection in the Real order which prohibits the perfection of that actu­ alization. In discussing the problems of politics, the most important element of the Ideal order is the Idea of Man. Thus he writes, "Man is an idea; his destiny is to actualize himself in individuals; the conditions of this actualization are expressed in one word communion - communion with his kind, with nature, and with God; and the conditions of this communion are expressed also in one word, Freedom."111 According to the Brownsonian analysis, Society with Freedom, the free communion of men with their fellows within a

141 • Ibid., p. 36,3. 77 "solidarity” of natural humanity, makes organized human exis­ tence , qualitatively, more than a group of single indivi­ duals. The important principle to remember here is that the essence of this social solidarity is Humanity. Man, or Humanity, to repeat, is that Ideal existence in which all 1/^2 men as men. share. Essentially, it is an Idea of God. This fundamental view of the vital force which unites men in society is thus counter-posed to the "Social Contract" notion, which for Orestes Brownson, attempts to replace this "real living solidarity" with an "artificial solidarity", a fictitious unity for a real unity, a cork- leg for that ! 2 o which nature herself gives." Brownson sees that civil society, brought about by a social agreement through the "consent of the governed", not only fails to explain the true nature of the social union, but also fails to justify the authority which main­ tains that union. "It has only an artificial unity based '• on diversity; its authority is only personal, individual, and in no sense a public authority, representing a public will, a public right, or a public interest.In effect, then, the authority born of such an arrangement can only be,

142. Ibid., p. 372. 143• Brownson, American Republic, op. cut., p. 66. 1 4 4 • Idem. in essence, "barbaric", an authority founded on-personal right* This, he consistently argues, is not a proper author­ ity for political society» True political authority,, it will be recalled, can only rest on a commonwealth. Here is the right to govern in a "civilized" state. It must have a public and territorial' basis. To repeat, the "civilized" state is founded upon a union of the "nation" and the "territory". In this "republic", political authority is held as a "public trust" rather than a "private right", and is exercised only over public matters, those pertaining to the commonwealth within a defined territory. Private right, inherent in the governor, is anathema to Brownson. Fundamental to a complete political theory is a con­ ception of the state. Again, as an American theorist, Brownson departs from the Lockean tradition in developing an organic theory of political reality, a notion, which, as Francis Graham Wilson observed, was to capture the imagina­ tions of numerous writers on American politics after the Civil War. For Brownson, the "civilized" state is a mystical reality, a reality of spirit and experience. Thus he writes: It is not a voluntary association, a collec­ tion, or an aggregation of individuals with no existence, no life, no activity, except what it derives from them. It is a real existence, not a mere abstraction;, an organism, not a mere organi­ zation. It has its own unity, its own central life, of which individuals participate *.. and which enables, them to live -a-national as well as an 79 individual life...This mystery of the state is, in some sense, the mystery of the race itself, distinguishable, never separable from the indi­ vidual, any more than the individual is.separable from the race, or man from men. 145 As a real.existence, an existence fortified by this inner spiritual unity, the developed or ’’civilized" state, founded upon the union of nation and territory, has certain fundamental rights and obligations. It has, for example, the right and duty to protect its territorial boundaries, the ■ right of "eminent domain", the protection of coasts and nav­ igable waterways. These are special rights which are not, according to Brownson, derivative solely from individuals • out of any "state of natureThe state defends its territory, its domain, as well as the rights and properties of its inhabitants within the defined territory. This, for Brownson, is the exercise^ of its "territorial rights". 1Zl7 The authority to carry out these rightful functions, in his view, has not come from men in any "state of nature". It is on this question of authority, the right of the state to care for its territorial boundaries, that Brownson develops his points In the state of nature, the territorial rights of individuals, if any they have, are restricted to the portion of land they occupy with their rude culture, and with their flocks and herds, and in

145* "The Federal Constitution," Works, XVII, p. 501. 146. American Republic, op. cit., p. 68. 147. Ibid., p. 69. 80 civilized nations, to, what they hold from the state, and therefore, the. right as held and defended by all nations, and without which* the nation has no status, no fixed dwelling, and it can be no state, could never have been derived from .individuals e 148 The authority of the state, in his view - an actual authority existing in everyday reality protecting the boun­ daries and the rights and properties of the citizens within those boundaries - is not derived from the individual, but from God. The "Social Contract" idea, in this,instance, cannot account for the state's authority to exercise terri­ torial rights in the republic. This is a public authority, an authority exercised over the commonwealth belonging to the nation or the whole - people.

Contract and Consent f For Brownson, the problem of reconciling the "con­ sent of the governed" with a viable political, authority is another outstanding facet of his general difficulties with contractarian theory. First of all, as it has been gener­ ally understood in the United States, the contract itself could legitimately bind only those who voluntarily entered 119 into it. The logic of the argument would certainly

148. Ibid., p. 70. 149». Brownson stresses this point, noting the fact that the Congress o f .1776,,and such luminaries of American independence as Thomas Jefferson, asserted that proper government derives its "just powers from the consent of the governed". recommend the seriousness of the deliberate act of making such an agreement« Should not such an agreement, be made personally, in full freedom, by each individual, "and not one for the other without his express authority"? Brownson suggests that, in such a framework, there would be a con­ tinual instability. Indeed, it would be an instability spanning generations. He calls attention to the fact that .it has been objected that residence in a nation, or even silence, is a form of consent, "tacit consent" => In turn, he rejects this line of reasoning by arguing that (a) silence says simply nothing; one may keep silence out of "fear" or a sense of "futility", or may simply have no ideas on the problem of government whatever; and (b) one’s residence in a political community may be a matter of necessity rather than political conviction.But this is not all. If one should diligently follow the logic of the contractarians, that is, the liberal contractarians, there would appear an injustice. He argues that, in the event of a disagreement with the reigning political order, "the individual may be unable to emigrate, if he would; and by what right can indi­ viduals form an agreement to which I must consent or migrate to some strange land?"151 In a practical sense, viewing the matter from the ■ perspective of an American citizen of the nineteenth century,

150. American Republic, op. ext., p. 59« 151• Idem. 82 Brownson perceives a great many difficulties with the con­ sent doctrinee In America, a great number of persons would be excluded from the contract, including women, children (unable by virtue of their age to understand the significance ' of such an agreement), and the mentally infirm (who would be so intellectually weakened that they would be unable to com­ prehend the terms of such an immensely important agreement). To these, what would be the value? Not fit to enter such important negotiations, "These several classes cannot be less than three-fourths of the population of any country." 152 Government, obviously, cannot be legitimately extended to them. They have not, and in some cases cannot, give a full, freei voluntary consent. Thus, there can be no true author- - ity over them in the terms of a liberal contractarian approach based stringently on the doctrine of \the direct consent of . the governed. In closing his assault on the foundations of politi­ cal authority in contractarian political theory, Brownson levels another lance against the practice of majority rule, as first outlined by John Locke, insolving the practical questions of politics. He observes that the "Contract Theory" in general, as it is taken in the United States, denies that civil society has any more rights than those which are

'152. Ibid., p. 60.

\ 83 derived from the individuals who comprise it. Of course, all men, by nature and nature's law, have equal rights. Civil society is a composition of free, independent, and equal men, who are, according to liberal contractarianis, sovereign unto themselves in natural society. The impor­ tant factor here, is the element of equality. Men do not lose that natural equality upon entering into the contract, living in civil society. Still, then, theoretically, it is not possible for one man, naturally equal with every other, to have an intrinsic right to govern any other man. Nor, in accordance with the Lockean dictum, can anyone be sub­ mitted to any political authority without his voluntary consent. If one man can have no authority over his equal, it follows that no group of men can have any such authority. Indeed, by the force of logic, the rule of the majority is "manifestly improper, illegitimate, and invalid, unless adopted by unanimous consent". 153 This is a utopian hope, of course, as all men are unlikely-to agree on anything. The rule of some men over others, all of whom are naturally .. equal, could only be justified by assigning some mystical virtue to a majority. Otherwise, one would have to assert the natural inequality of men, • developing a theory Of author­ ity from that standpoint. The "Contract Theory", as generally understood in America, according to Brownson, stressed the notion that

153o Ibid., p. 62. ' ■ 34 government was to be the agent of the individual, an agent to whom the individual has delegated, not surrendered, his "rights and powers".Thus, "He is free at any time he pleases to recall the powers he-has. delegated, to give hew instructions, to dismiss him (the ruler).In this lies the crisis of political authority in "Contract Theory". Sovereignty resides within the individual; theoretically, he should be free to withdraw his consent whenever he judges it convenient or necessary to do so. If a man is free to

' - 156 give his consent, then he should be free to withdraw it. The state, according to the contractarian approach, is a voluntary association. It differs radically from a "politi­ cal corporation which survives in all its rights and powers, 157 though the individuals die". If one follows the doctrine of the "consent of the governed" with a stringent logical consistency, it is obvious that only that generation which

154* Ibid., p. 63 o 155. Ibid., p. 65. 156. This notion expanded to the States of the - Union provided a justification for the Southern Rebellion. "Secession is perfectly legitimate if government is a con­ tract between equals. The disaffected the criminal, the thief, the government, would send to prison, or the murderer it would hang, would very likely revoke his consent, and recede from the state." Ibid., p. 6 3 . 157. ■ Ibid.,. p. 65* 85 had, made the contract would be the only generation properly 156v bound to it. - In this consideration of the "Contract Theory'' then, ■ Brownson does not uncover an ethical justification for the right to govern. Authority in the civilized state, in Brownson*s terms, must be held as a public trust. It is not, and cannot, be held as a private right. In essence, he asserts that the general contractarian approach, as he dis­ cusses it in his American Republic, is simply a return to the "barbaric" principle. Like the "Patriarchal Theory", this theory lays the foundation of political authority on arbitrary, personal right. It is on this ground that Brown­ son rejects it. The government, under this theory, is, fundamentally, the creation of the.individual. The right to govern, or the political authority, is manufactured, so to speak. As Lawrence Roemer has explained the logical difficulty in "Contract Theory": "Having been created by individuals, it cannot exercise authority over them, for the creature, has no

158. "The doctrine that one generation has no power to bind its successor is not only a logical conclusion from the.theory.that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, since a generation cannot give its consent before it is born, but is very convenient for the nation that has contracted a large debt; yet, perhaps, not so convenient to the public creditor, since the new gen­ eration may take into its head not to assume or discharge the obligations of its predecessor, but to repudiate them." Ibid., p. 6 4 . 86 authority over its creator." 159 The creator cannot be, in essence, truly subject to that which he creates. Authority in the contractarian framework is subject to abolition, in a strictly logical sense, (taking the doctrine of the "con­ sent of the governed.seriously) - whenever the individual feels that its abolition is advisable. In this Brownson finds a simple, and. unacceptable, basis for anarchy. The­ oretically, then, the question of government, and its authority,is not adequately answered by the "Contract Theory" approach.

The Democratic Theory Turning from the contractartans, Orestes Brownson then confronts what he calls, the "Democratic Theory", the theory of "social sovereignty". The; central core of this theory is found in this doctrine of sovereignty; "Sover­ eignty, it is now maintained, is inherent in the people; not individually indeed, but collectively, as the people, as society. In one sense, the American philosopher sees this emphasis on society in contrast to the. individual (as given its most severe expression in liberal "consent" doc­ trine) , as a theoretical improvement over the contractarian

159° Roemer, op. cit., p. 5 6 . 160. Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 71° 8? approach, "a return to.sounder principles of'antiquity" He is in fundamental agreement with the idea that in society, where people live and work and are in communication with one another, there is something greater than the number of indi­ viduals composing it, having rights and duties paramount, . and underived from them. ' In this line of thought, there is emphasized a dependence of the individual on his fellows, on society. According to Brownson, this dependence is the foundation of social authority. "Individuals, to a certain extent, derive their life from God through society, and so far as they depend on her, they are hers; she owns them, and has the right to do as she will with them." This "owner­ ship"', as our philosopher observes, is quite restricted. The point that he wishes to stress in his discussion of social authority is that man alone is not as developed, intellec­ tually or materially, nor can be, as is man in communication . with his fellows. While society does not exist without indi­ viduals, it{is primary to the individual. It is in society that the individual man, through communication and mutual development, progresses, moving closer to the perfect Idea of Man, the Divine concept. In this vein he writes, "Society stands nearer to God, and participates more immediately of the divine essence, and the state is a more lively image of

l6l. Ibid., p. 73o 88 God than the individual« It was man, the generic and repro­ ductive man, not the isolated individual, that, was created

162 " in the image and likeness of his Maker," The emphasis on society over and above the indivi­ dual, in Brownson*s view, has a greater element of truth than is found in an individualistic contractarian definition of society. Yet, an outgrowth of this general stream of . thought, the outgrowth which he labels the "Democratic Theory", is marked by a number of perversions. "Not a few of the European democrats recognize in the earth, in heaven, or in hell, no power superior to the people, and say not only people-king, but people-God." 163 Such assumptions are idol­ atrous o For Brownson, the substitution of the people for : God is nothing less than a vile usurpation. Equally repre­ hensible, is the notion "vox populi, vox Dei", the idea that the people are, collectively, the spokesmen for the Divin­ ity. Dangerously, the tendency has grown to identify the will of the masses as the supreme law, the court of last . ', resort, not only in politics, but also in "religion, philos- ophy, morals, and the arts". This general tendency, he feared, would stifle the earnest pursuit of truth and pro­ hibit true human progress. Like a number of other writers

162. Idem. 163. Idem. •

1 6 4 o Ibid., p. 74* who came after him, most notably perhaps, Ortega y Gasset, Brownson was disturbed by the levelling influence of mass culture, the debilitating effects of■"democratization" of all spheres of human life* Excellence, he thought, should ' be the talented man’s goal in whatever field or vocation he sought to pursue. Making reference to a statement by the Italian liberal, Mazzini, who declared religion as simply a matter of popular preference, Brownson fearfully reflected that this "theory is the dominant theory of the age, and is. in all civilized nations advancing with apparently irresis­ tible force" In. his declarations on the "Democratic Theory", Brownson sets forth two major objections, the elaborates ■ some major ideas of his.own in consideration of the consti­ tution - ofgovernment and the basis of authority. According to the theory, as set forth by him, the people, taken collectively,are sovereign. Thus, he asks, "Who are the People?" He notes, "The word 'people’ is vague, and in itself determines nothing.There are, Brownson observes, all kinds of "people" in various walks of life, in various positions of authority and subservience, masters and slaves, the educated and the ignorant, the captains of industry and the common proletariat. All species of men,

. 165. Idem. 166. Idem. 90 he argues, come under the genus "The. People"• If one is attempting to establish a legitimate political authority on a democratic principle, then it is incumbent upon the for- mulator to clearly and carefully define exactly what is meant by the "sovereign people"e In his examination of this question of sovereignty, and how that sovereignty is attached to the people collec­ tively, Orestes Brownson sets forth some of the basic "demo­ cratic" elements of" his own thought. Moreover, he presents his notions of government, as a fact, within a "democratic" . framework. As noted earlier, the unification of the "nation" and the "territory" establishes, for Brownson, a state in which, hopefully, the political authority is held as a public trust, and is exercised over matters of public concern within a defined land area, Dutifully, the government is supposed to protect the national territory; but it is the nation, the people collectively, who constitute government, Government over the nation is constituted only after the 167 . . - nation has settled the territory,■ This element of terri­ tory then is central to his general discussion; its implica­ tions for his theory of authority are substantial,

1 67, Ibid., p. 7 6 . 91 The importance of the territory consists in the fact that, until it is settled, or defined, one is not able to identify the nation, or the ’’sovereign, people”. Without a defined territory, one is not able to establish what people are, and what people.are not, united by law under a consti­ tuted government. "Laws have no extra-territorial force, and the officer who should attempt to enforce the national laws beyond the national territory would be a trespasser. Thus, we have here defined the "sovereign people" as the people collectively, of a "nation", who define a territory and constitute government within that territory. The second major question'that BrownsOn undertakes to examine is the nature of that sovereignty which is vested in the people collectively. He calls attention to the fact that the proponents of the "Democratic- Theory" often proffer false principles, ultimately, in his view, dangerous to individual liberties. In this vein, he writes, "The theory assumes that the people collectively, ’in their own might and right’ are sovereign. According to it, the people are

168. Idem. 169. As abstruse as this theoretical question might . seem, the very essence of the debate had a terrible practi­ cal significance in his own time. The Civil War, he thought, was a product of sharp disagreement on the nature and extent of the national sovereignty. "All on both sides agreed that the nation.is sovereign; the dispute was on the existence of thenation itself, and the extent of its jurisdiction." Ibid., p. 77. : 92 ultimate, and free to do whatever they please.” 170 Such a view, indeed, negates individual liberty. It asserts a "social despotism", an "absolutism of the state". 171 Social authority is to be absolute. If the people are the ulti­ mate court, there can be no real restraints on their power. If the individual should transgress against the popular will or the will of the majority, as one variation of the "Theory" would have it, he has no legitimate recourse to anything higher. The people are the sovereign. The individual is submerged. He is prostrate before the Mass. In reference to this improper expansion of state - power, Brownson takes cognizance of the fact that even the \ "relatively civilized" Grecian and Roman politics were stig­ matized by perverse notions of absolutism. "Society", he writes, "recognized no limit to her authority, and the state claimed over individuals all the authority of the patriarch over his household, the chief over his tribe, or the absolute monarch over his subjects". 172 This state of . affairs, especially within the later Roman Empire, according to Brownson’s historical analysis, was not to be ameliorated until the coming of Christianity. Absolutism, he thought, .

170. Ibid., p. 78. 171. Idem. 1 7 2 . Ibid., p. 79. 93 declined with the impression of the civilizing influences of the Christian religion. Liberty, according to his phil­ osophical observations, was grounded with deeper roots with Christian teachings. 173 ■ How is one to discover the limitations that are to be properly placed upon the people, taken collectively, the society, or the democratic state? The answer, comments Orestes Brownson, is to be found in a higher order of exis—.. tence, an order of truth which exists independently of our minds, or the wishes of the people generally.Brownson held strongly that the doctrine that society, in and of itself, is absolute or- sovereign, or that the majority has a right to tyrannize over the individual inasmuch as it is supposedly sovereign, was a departure from that truth. Quantity was not to be the foundation of quality. Moral authority was not to be founded on numerical majorities. Instead, the identification of the,proper spheres of public action, the political rights and obligations of both the state.and the individual, begin with, an examination of man’s relationship to God, to nature, and to his fellow man. Society, as described by Orestes Brownson, is a means of

173. On this point, Brownson is adament: ’’The doc­ trine of individual freedom before the state is due to the Christian religion, which asserts the dignity and worth of every human soul, the accountability to God of each man for - himself, and lays it down as law for everyone that God is to be obeyed rather than men.” Ibid., p. SO. 174. Ibid., p. Si. 94 communication which facilitates the mutual, progress of men. It has a certain number of rights. These rights of society find their source in the dependence of the individual.on his fellows'. But society is more than simply a medium of communication between one man and many others; it is also a means of communication with God. The development of reason and understanding enables men to come closer to God, the source of allbeing 1 Society, as a medium of communication with Divinity, could not, properly, abuse its power. According to Brownson, man, being ultimately .depen­ dent upon God, could arrive at communion with him in three distinct ways; (a) through immediate Divine approach, an approach manifest both in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, for example; (b.) through his fellows, "his kind"; and (c) through "nature". 175 Brownsori held that this "three-fold communion" was the source of three major corresponding insti­ tutions in human history: "religion, or the Church, society . or the state, and property". 176 In this scheme, our phi­ losopher calls attention to the fact that religion, a rela­ tionship with God founded upon "Creation", and further stim­ ulated by the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, is not derived through society. Religion is established through direct

175. Ibid,, p. 8 2 . 176. Orestes Brownson, "The Papal Power," Works, XII, p. 361. . ' “ ; 95 communion with Divinity. The individual, participating in religion, has a right to this relationship with his Creator, and society, or the political authority, may not bar him from it. Since the individual is not dependent upon society in the realm of religion it does not have any right to interfere with its practice. Likewise, property is also held independently of society. It is derived from nature. Thus, the right of property is also held indepen­ dently of society. In his discussion of the property right, Orestest Brownson comes very close to a Lockean in his expression; But the state does not create the right of pror- perty, and its chief right or chief duty in regard td it, is to protect the proprietor in the' free and full employment of his property. The right to hold property is prior to civil society, and is one of those rights called the natural rights of man, which civil society is instituted to protect. 177 Religion and property are not derived from society. The rights to these are held independently of society, Or the people collectively. Thus, the collective people can­ not take them away. They are natural and inviolable. One can see them, from this discussion, that dependence estab­ lishes both the rights, and the obligations of man in Brownson’s general political philosophy. ■ While we may have clarified somewhat Brownson*s notions of individual rights, the rights of men apart from

177. Idem. 96 society, it is still necessary to establish the nature of the "social sovereignty", the sovereignty of the people in Brownsonian thought. In examining the nature of the "sovereign people", Orestes Brovmson begs us to deny, at the outset, that they have the powers of the Almighty. They-are creatures, he stresses, not creators. They are not. "independent", or "self-existent". All men, socially organized, or not, are dependent. "Society, derives her own life from God,.and exists and acts only as dependent on him." 17$ Men are not the first causes of anything inasmuch as they are created, beings.. They are only second causes. ■ This, principle holds true with re'fe'fence' to political sovereignty. Men are hot the sofurce of their political sovereignty. "They can then even in the limited sphere of their sovereignty, be sov­ ereign only in a secondary sense, never absolute sovereign 1 7Q in their own independent right." It is important to recall, at this point, that the "sovereign people", in Brownson's terms, is the "nation"

\ - or the collective people who define a territory and con­ stitute government over public matters within that terri­ tory. All of this is secondary causality.' Why? Because at the root of all things is Divine intervention or

1 7 8 . . Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 8 3 . - 179. Idem. 97 causality. This supernatural intervention of the Creator is often termed "Providence11. "Providence", according to Brownson scholar Robert Caponigri is defined empirically "as the order or ration of this special intervention, and as such it constitutes the supernatural order whose actuality in hist ory is empirical fact... it is nothing more or less than the divine creative force itself, immediately active at a point in time and history. Certainly, in Brownson’s view,, the impact of his­ torical experiences on the development of the "nation" are immense. Still, even these many experiences are influenced ultimately by the hand of God. Through a variety of historical experiences, be they wars, famines, floods, epidemics, or migrations, the "nation" itself is given a special character. In the constitution of civilized government, in time, one must Understand that ultimately it is the Hand of God "weaving" among men "psychic bonds which are stabilized within a defined territory." iBl In the formation of the civilized state, a state with a public authority, this is how the people, taken collectively, in a "nation" are dependent upon God. The political develop­ ment, in history, from the family to the tribe, and even­ tually, to the civilized nation-state is not to be divorced

ISO. Robert Caponigri,'VBrownson and Emerson; Nature and History", New England Quarterly, XVIII [September, 1945], p. 3 88. ‘ * .

l8l. Parry, op., ext., p. 197« . 98 from the influences of Providence« However? any further elaboration of Brownson's theory of the "constitution of government" is well beyond the immediate scope of this, essay. At this point it is well to remember that society, or the people taken collectively, for Brownson is limited.

It is limited and dependent. "Then she is sovereign over

individuals only as dependent on God. Her. dominion then is 182 not original and absolute, but secondary and derivative." Theoretically, the potential strength of any political authority is limited by Brownson's ontological assumptions. While attacking the notion that the people collec­ tively, or society, is absolute, Brownson does not deny some of the truths embodied in what he terms the "Democratic Theory". Specifically, he finds the idea that society is more than a "mere aggregation" of individuals an improvement. over the radical atomistic view often found in literal con­ tractarian theories. Furthermore, the idea that the people are 'Sovereign" is in accord with his own view. The error in the "Democratic Theory", as he defines it, is found in the notion that the people, taken collectively, are sovereign in and of themselves. Brownson, to the contrary, holds to the notion that sovereignty is vested in the people by God. What is sovereign, for Brownson, is what is ultimate. God, of course, is the only ultimate and, therefore, in an

. 182. Brownson, American Republic, op. eft., p. 8 3 . absolute sense, the only sovereign. "The theory that the people in their own independent right and might, as some zealous democrats explain it, are sovereign, asserts the fundamental principle of despotism, and all. despotism is false for it identifies- the creature with the creator.’1■ 1$3 According to Brownson, the sovereign, and only the sovereign, is the source of political authority. Being ultimate, of course, the sovereign is absolute. Only God, in this scheme, is absolute. The notion that the people themselves are the source of authority, the creators of it, and responsible to no order higher than their own, estab-. lishes, theoretically, an absolute and arbitrary human authority, in Browhsdn’s view, this is the essence of what he terms the "Democratic Theory". As such, it is "barbaric and unacceptable as an ethical theory for a civilized state It is a right to rule, founded in the people; it is not a trust o

The Naturalist Theory Rejecting the "Democratic Theory" as a principle of authority, Brownson undertakes an analysis of yet another view, a "Naturalist Theory" of government and authority. "Satisfied that it has never been instituted by a voluntary and deliberate act of the people, and confounding govern­ ment as a fact with government as authority, (some theo- rdste ) maintain that government is a spontaneous development

' 183. Ibid., p. £4 . 100 of natureo” Nature, according to this view, working by- energies of her own, that is, by "her own laws, develops society, and by the laws of nature, society develops govern- T ment, just as (analogously) liver secretes bile". Brownson objects to this notion on the grounds that it is unclear as to how, exactly, these laws of nature are actualized. "That is all the secret.According to this idea, the origin and ground of government is found.in"• nature itself. It is simply there. There is no order of reality, no transcendent order, outside of space and time. Epistemology, for the political "naturalist", is quite sim­ plified. The natural order can be known by empirical science, the function of which is to define, discover, and explain this natural process = Reality is that which can ' be sensibly verified, nothing else. In objecting to this position, Orestes Brownson attacks the roots of epistemological empiricism itself. "Principles", he writes, "are as really objects of science as facts, and it is. only in the light of principles that facts themselves are intelligible". Philosophy is the science which deals with the principles of reality. It is an indispensable discipline. Philosophy, according to Brownson, should not be rejected in the study of politics,

' 1 8 4 . Ibid., p. 8 5 . 1 8 5 « Idem. • 101 as it should not be rejected in other disciplines. ■ Empiri­ cal science, or the study of external sensible reality, ■ itself, should not be divorced, from the philosophic disci­ pline. "If the human mind had no science of reality that transcends the sensible order, or the positive order, it could have no. science at all." ° . Here, the American phi­ losopher sets forth a doctrine of essentialism; "As. things exist only in their principles or causes, so they can be known only in their principles and. causes; for things can be known only as they are, or as they really exist." H e .. concedes, in reference to this general discussion, that the positivists are quite correct in their assertions that one cannot derive principles from singular facts. However, he argues further, .this does not mean that such principles of reality, the principles of the facts themselves, do not exist. Narrow positivism, in his view, fails in recognizing what is truly essential, not only in the study of politics, but in the scientific disciplines generally. Referring to the "Naturalist Theory" of "natural development" of social and political phenomena, Brownson calls attention to the major flaw that there is presented no cause or principle for the "development"; .he questions the "secret". Do such social and political phenomena sim­ ply explain themselves? "Something that transcends the

186. Ibid., p. 8 6 . 18?. Idem. sensible order there must be, or there could be.no develop­ ment; and if we had no science of it, we could never assert that development is development, or scientifically explain the laws and conditions of development." Furthermore, "Development is not creation, and cannot supply its own germ. That, at least, must be given by the Creator, for from nothing nothing can be developed. If Authority has not its germ in nature, it cannot be developed from nature ' igQ spontaneously or otherwise." In Brownson’s view, there . is indeed a development in nature. And it is the duty of science to explain this development. However, he stresses, this development must have a source. As is evident from earlier discussions on the sub- . ject, authority comes from the sovereign. The sovereign is, to repeat, the ultimate or highest power. In absolute terms, the sovereign is independent. In his discussion of the "Naturalist Theory", Brownson observes that nature, her­ self, is not independent; and thus,, cannot be the sovereign. Nature is created, and is dependent. As it is not sovereign it is not the source of the ethical right to govern, polit­ ical authority. Nature, a.s it pertains to -irrational creation, is governed by physical, nor moral, laws. These

1-88. Ibid., p. 8?. - .189. Idem. 103 are not to be confused. Morality, and thus the ethical question of government, is to be examined in terms of rational creatures, moral beings. In making, this distinc­ tion, Brownson does not deny that there is a moral law which;governs in the "natural order” (in contrast to the "supernatural order"). The law of the created, that is, "natural” order, is the Natural Law.■ 190 He emphasizes, at this point, that the Natural Law is not a "creation" of the "natural order". That is impossible, as only God can create. To the contrary, it is imposed on the "natural order", and those rational, moral beings within that order, by God. In essence, this distinction between,the "natural" and’ the "supernatural", between that which is independent and sovereign and that which is dependent and subject, between creator and creature, constitutes Brownson’s denial of the notion that moral authority can have its source in the created "natural order". In combatting the assumption of the "positivists" and the proponents of the "Naturalist Theory", Brownson is not denying the importance of.natural development. He is simply contradicting their interpretations of it, and the

190. "It is called natural because it is promul­ gated by the supreme lawgiver through natural reason,.instead of supernatural revelation, and is, at least in a measure, known to all men; for all men have reason, and a natural sense of right and wrong, and therefore, a conscience." "Nature and Grace," Works, III, p. 353° implications of these interpretations for a doctrine of political authority® In his objections, it can be clearly seen that he is promoting the idea of "First Cause", a fun­ damental assumption apparently borrowed directly from St. Thomas Aquinas. Again, one can detect the strength of Catholic thought in his overall plan of attack; there is nothing in the natural order which explains itself, or is, . in and of itself, the cause of itself. Germination starts, ultimately, with Divine Creation. Any scholar undertaking a serious examination of Brownson’s general political philosophy will note the strength of the Roman Catholic theological assumptions, which play a central role in his thought. He is convinced that there is an order and a unity to the universe. There is not only a solidarity of the race, but in some sense, of all races, or species; all created things are bound to their creator, and to one another. One and the same law or principle of life pervades all creation, binding the universe together in a unity that copies or imitates the unity of the Creator. 191 - Moreover, not only is all being dependent on the Creator,, but He is at work directly, intervening in the "natural order". A concrete reference to this intervention or Providence, is to be found in Brownson's essays on the "constitution of government", the development of the nation state.

191. Brownson, American Republic, op. eft., p. 91. 105 In sum., Brownson objects to the "Naturalist Theory": of government on both questions; the question of govern­ ment as a fact, and the question of government as a right, as political authority.. Concerning the issue of the fac­ tual origins, he asserts, "Nature of herself can no more develop government than it can language. There can be no. " language without society,. and .no society without language. There can be no government without society, and no society 192 without government of some sort." Again, he declares, . there is a coexistence of society and government. They are never separated from each other in time; but they are logi­ cally distinct. Furthermore, with regard to the central issue which concerns us here, the issue of political authority, there is no real foundation for a right to govern in nature itself. Even ifthis spontaneous development of nature were granted, argues Brownson, it would not thereby follow that such "natural" social institutions would possess the moral author­ ity necessary. to true- government. Nature is not to be dei­ fied. She is not sovereign. She is not, therefore, the source of moral authority. Men "do. not belong to her" ° Nature} according to Brownson*s theological interpretation, does not even "belong to herself" Thus, with these

192. Ibid., p. 94• 193o Idem. 106 considerations, Broxmson states that the issue of political .authority is left unresolved by the "Naturalist Theory"„

Divine Right of Kings Theory . The idea of the "Divine Right of Kings",. as our philosopher reminds us, had reached a degree of popularity in the seventeenth century. As a theory of authority, it differed radically, of course, from those notions holding authority in the state as an outgrowth of individual men coming together .in contract, men in a collective, or nature. The men of letters and philosophers who developed this notion have argued, in essence, that authority in the poli­ tical order is a "right" bestowed by the "direct and express appointment of God himself".In effect, these theorists of "Divine Right" argued a dependence position. Political rulers were not directly accountable to the nation, or the people collectively, as they did not, in fact, derive their rightful power from the nation. As the King is answerable only to the Lord, and his Divine, commission to rule is the central reality, the major obligation of the subject is, in-. effect, a passive obedience to the ruler.

r . T, ■,, , , m . n . t " 194- Ibid., p. 98- 195- Brownson notes, in this connection, that the : idea of authority being exercised as a "Divine Right" was not a principle of Roman Catholic social doctrine, even though some Catholic monarehs may have asserted it. It is also well to note that the doctrine was denounced by the Spanish Inquisition under the reign of Phillip II. Ibid., p. 99. ■ 107 . Brownson*s general treatment of the "Divine Right Theory" is carried forth in theological terms, as it is, essentially, a theological issue« Again, there is a tremen­ dous influence of. Roman Catholic thought manifest in his considerations« The principle, "Non est potestas nisi a Deo" (There is ho power but from God) is central to this American theorist; and in this he is in accord with the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and Christianity gen­ erally. However, he reminds us, the Catholic Church, in her social doctrine, has always taught that the exercise of civil power cannot be, morally, an arbitrary, independent rightIt is, to the contrary, viewed as a trust. As a trust, it is to be held with honor. Violations of such a trust could result,justifiably in a forfeiture of the ruler’s proper authority.In line, with Catholic thought, as expressed by such distinguished Doctors of the Church as Augustine and Aquinas, Brownson observes that civil laws contravening justice are to be considered "violences". 197 Now God, being the only true sovereign in an abso­ lute sense, the ultimate power of the universe, the final cause of all that which exists, is truly the source of all powers in the universe physical and spiritual.. In Brown­ son’ s terms. He is independent; He has obligations to no

196. Ibid., p.. 100. 197. Idem. 108 other being. Moreover, His rule, because of His essential goodness, cannot, by that fact of His Divine' Nature, be anything else but perfectly just. He is the source of all goodness and justice, to which all earthly goodness and positive justice, as explicated in human-law, must conform. While the "First Cause" of all being, there are in His created universe "second causes". These, of course, operate by virtue of God’s creation. In one sense, they are supposed to fulfill the purposes of Divine Creation. Secon­ dary causation, in contrast to primary causation, is dis­ tinctly ofthe "natural order". "What He does through them or through their agency is done by Him, not immediately, but mediately, and is said to be done naturally, as what He does immediately is said to be done supernaturally. Again, the distinction between what is "natural" and what is "supernatural" is fundamental to an understand­ ing of Orestes Brownson’s general political thought. It is this distinction which provides the basis for his appeals to a higher authority in matters of political morality. "Natural", he writes, "is what God does through second causes, which He creates; supernatural is that which He does by himself alone, without their intervention or agency." 199 The Ten Commandments, for example, are granted '

198. Ibid., p. 1 0 2 . 199<> Idem. . . ■ /

109 to us supernaturally, directly from God* In politics, Israel had the benefit of a supernatural appointment of her 9Q0 Kings'in"David and Saul,~ In observing phenomena, Brown- son urges, one should immediately presume that occurrences in the natural order do indeed come about naturally, that is, through the operation of secondary causes. The super­ natural is not common in human history. Thus, the cogency of an argument - which attaches the intervention of the "First Cause" to a phenomenon certainly must rest, Brpwnson declares, on "conclusive" evidence. Aside from the Israeli experience, and the Divine commission of the Roman Catholic Church, he contends, there is no such conclusive evidence to substantiate the notion that "any particular government has existed by express or direct action" of God, 201 Govern­ ment is a natural, not a supernatural, institution. It Is not clear where there has been any particular family or class, by heredity or election, who have been given direct, supernaturally ordained, authority to rule over their fellow men. In his contentions on the "Divine. Right Theory", it is apparent that Brownson has attacked the most extreme variation of that thought, the notion that a ruler is granted direct authority to rule by God, This limitation, perhaps, points up a weakness in his method of analysis,

200, Ibid,, p, 103, 201, Ibid., p, 104, 110 Concluding his discussions on the "Divine Right Theory", Orestes Brownson affirms that there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that rulers receive the right to govern directly from God. Secondly, the doctrine of "Divine Right", with its corollary of "passive obedience", is hos­ tile to basic liberty. Men have, and can have, no rights "in the face of civil society", a civil society supernaturally ordained. The idea that the King is a direct representative of God, and the political order is a'direct manifestation . of Divine ordination, is in direct contradiction with the historical experience of the political order, as ruled by an absolute monarch, as a repressive institution contrary to natural justice. This "theory," says Brownson, "conse­ crates tyranny, and makes God the accomplice of the tyrant, if we suppose all governments have actually existed by his express appointment". 202 Furthermore, considering Brownson’s earlier distinc­ tions between what makes a civilized political order in contrast to a barbaric order, one is reminded, again, of the nature of proper political authority. Within the con­ text of Brownson*s normative assumptions, the assertion that the political authority, or the right to govern, is a per­ sonal right, even though granted directly by God, rather than a public trust, is incongruent with his pronouncements

202. Ibid., p. 105. on republicanism and civilization. Here distinctions are necessary. Even if such a "right” were Divinely granted, it would not be a personal right. Rather, it would be a trust in which the dependent ruler would be accountable to God's laws. His right to rule would not be arbitrary in this specific sense. He could not, because he is not, be the absolute sovereign. At this juncture,, we. should call attention to the fact that there is more than one specimen of "Divine Right", doctrine. As with his treatment of contractarian theory, Brownson's generalizing considerations of "Divine Right" theory blur vital distinctions. While his theoretical pre­ sentations are certainly lucid, this failure to call atten­ tion to other species of this idea is a central flaw in his method of analysis.

The Papal Theory One valuable element in the "Divine Right Theory" consists in the fact that God is recognized as the source of political authorityFor Drownson, this is an improve­ ment, certainly, over the secular explanations. However, .some thinkers have presented a different variation of "Divine Right", arguing that while political authority is not : directly vested in the civil ruler, say a King, it is vested in the spiritual ruler. Or, in another -variation, the spir­ itual and political leadership is an ancient idea. Perhaps 112 it is most sharply expressed, in the West, as Brovmson reminds us, in the practice of Imperial Rome where the supreme ruler served in the spiritual capacity as "Pontifex Maximus” as well as "Imperator”» The underlying principle guiding the "Papal Theory”, the idea that the Roman Pontiff, as Vicar of Christ on earth, has authority not only in spiritual affairs, but in temporal political affairs, is that the priestly office is above the secular political office„ There is a hier­ archy of value which must be respected. Rule comes from • God in a descending order.® The Pope is the link between . God and Man as visible, head of Christ1s Church, By virtue of his higher office, the Pope should rule over the natural order. In explaining the general Roman Catholic inter­ pretation of this doctrine, Brownson writes: Like Him whose priests they, are, Christian priests ' are priests after the order of Melchisidech-wh.o was without priestly descent, without father of mother of the priestly line, But in being priests after the order of Melchisidech, they are both priests and kings, as Melchisidech was, and as was , Our Lord himself, to whom was given by his father all power in heaven and in earth. The Pope, or Supreme Pontiff, is the vicar of Our Lord on earth-his representative - the represen­ tative, not only of him who is our invisible High . Priest, but of Him who is King of Kings, and Lord of lords, therefore, of both the priestly and the kingly power. Consequently, no one can have any mission to govern in the state any more than in the Church, unless derived from God directly or in­ directly through the Pope or Supreme Pontiff,^04

203« Ibid,, p.. 106, 204» Ibid, p, 10$. This idea, as strange or hostile as it might appear to modern man, actually had a number of serious and strong 205 proponents„ y Of course, along with his general view of the nature of things, colored by a strong Roman Catholic theological influence, Brownson held firmly to the principle that the spiritual order, by its very nature, is superior to the temporal order, and that political rulers must obey the laws of that higher order of spiritual existence» How­ ever, this is not to say that ecclesiastical authority does, in right, have the power to rule, by virtue Of their spir­ itual office, over the political.order. Brownson, in his major work American Republic, hastens to remind us that while- the "Papal Theory" (as ' here designated) had some serious support among Roman Cath­ olic theologians and students of Ecclesiastical Law, it has 2< never attained the respectability of a dogma of the Church» The political relations that the Popes had in the Middle Ages and in the later Renaissance, Brownson adds, were un­ connected, essentially, with the Roman. Pontiff’s spiritual 205o As Brownson himself notes, the theory had acquired the support of such Popes as Gregory III (the . spiritual lord who humbled Emperor Henry IV at Canossa), Innocent III, Gregory IX^ Innocent IV, and Boniface VIII„ In practice, it might be noted that Charlemagne received the crown from the Pope, The psychological effects of Papal authority, as they bore upon the political order in Europe, have been tremendous« _ Witness the fact that Napoleon called upon the Pope to administer his coronation as the First Emperor of France = 206o Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 109. 114 office. Apparently, he wishes to emphasize a distinction between the spiritual'and:the temporal order, a distinction maintained in the Churchfs teachings. In this general analysishe calls attention to the fact that the rights and duties of the Pope and the rights and duties- of the civil rulers rest in these two distinct orders. "Hence the canonists have maintained that the subjects of other states may even engage in war with the Pope or prince, without breach of their fidelity to him as Pontiff or supreme visible head of the Church. 207 In addition, our philosopher takes note of the fact that the Church condones the legitimacy of a government which may even be constituted by "heretics" or "infidels", and' is respectful towards the authority of that government, as long as its decrees are in accord with the laws of God. Having clarified the position of the Roman Catholic Church, in accordance with her doctrine of the distinctions between the spiritual and temporal orders, Brownson re­ jects the assumptions of the "Papal Theory". The Papal authority, he declares, in line with-his adherence to the Catholic faith, is derived from God directly. It is a supernatural authority. The authority of the political order, as will be clarified later on, is derived mediately from God through nature. It is thus, in a proximate sense, a product of the "natural order". What then,.can'be.said of

20?. Ibid., p. 111. - 1-15 the relationship between the "natural order" and the"super- - natural order"? - Brownson summarizes thusl'y: ■ No. doubt, as the authority of the: Church is derived . immediately from God in a supernatural, manner, . and as she holds that the state derives its auth­ ority only mediately from him, in a natural mode, she asserts the superiority of her authority-,, and that in case of a conflict -between the two powers, the civil must yield. But this is only saying that supernatural is above natural. 20$ Ideally, any conflict between the Church and the poli­ tical authorities would be confined to certain spheres of contention, that is, questions of moral import. Inline, with Her own teaching, the Church has not the right to "abrogate" the', "natural", or "supersede" the political auth- ority in those matters< which are its province. 209 Papal invasion of the "natural order" is, essentially, tyrannical, . a usurpation. It is not justified by any teaching of the Church. It is not sanctioned by God. Thus, the "Papal Theory" is to be rejected.

The People as Sovereign "St. Augustine, St. Gregory Magnus, St. Thomas, Bellarmine, Suarez, and the theologians generally" writes Orestes Brownson, "hold that princes derive their power from God through the people, or that the people, though not the source, are the medium of all political authority, and therefore, rulehs are accountable for the use they make of.

20$. Ibid., p. 112. 209. Ibid., p. 113. . . 116 21 0 their power to.both God and the people." This distinc­ tion between the source of political authority and the medium by which political authority is derived, is central to Brownson’s theory of authority. It is this element of his thought which clarifies political relationships in an ethical sense, setting forth the nature of civil liberties and obligations, and the role of authority in a political order. In his excursions into the deeper elements, of this Catholic doctrine, Brownson takes cognizance at what, might be termed the "democratic element" of this idea. That is, the investiture of sovereignty in the people taken collective in contrast to the "sovereignty" claimed for a certain class of men, a nobility, or a king« It differs much from the "Democratic. Theory" inasmuch as it denies the source of authority in the "sovereign people". The people, he declares, are only "sovereign" in a secondary sense, or in an analogous sense, as they derive that, "sovereignty" in the natural order from God. Additionally, the theory is congruent with Brownson's concept of an organic people, the people collectively as a living organ­ ism, above and- beyond that "mere aggregation of individuals" so often designated as "society". The theory would also • concur with his idea that the organic people who settle a territory and form a nation-state, as sovereign in a • secondary sense, may eventually develop a civilized political

210.. Idem. order in which authority is held as a public trust. Thus, the idea of a sovereign people in this Catholic sense would , accord with his notion of the "people in the republican sense of the word nation, not in the barbaric or despotic Oil sense„" For our immediate purposes of analysis, and in order to better clarify the problem, it is well for us to con­ sider. here, in some detail, exactly what Brownson means when he uses the term "sovereign". Interrogatively, it might be objected: How can one be, and not be, sovereign at one and the same time? How can one be sovereign in a secondary sense? Given the widespread use of the word in his political writings the mattor warrants scrupulous examination. Brownson admits the apparent difficulty, but he . arguesanyhow, 'that the term "sovereignty" can be util­ ized in both an "absolute" or "relative" sense. As early as IG3 8 , in his essay "Democracy", an essay he had written for the Boston Quarterly Review, Brownson stated that when taken "absolutely", as it ought to be taken in general discourse, the term "sovereignty" refers to the "highest", "That which is ultimate", that"which has the right to

• 212 command what it will, and which to resist is a crime." But, he continues, "When taken relatively, as it usually is

211. Idem. 212. Orestes Brownson, "Democracy", Works, XV, . p. 10. " 118 by writers on government, it means the state, or the high- est civil or political power of the state." 213 In referring to the "sovereign people" then, Brownson is using the term : in a relative or an analogous sense in order to explain the obligations one.has toward the political authority. Furthermore, in denying the. "absolute" denotation of the . word "sovereignty" in the natural order he demonstrates the moral limitations on political power. Brownson is very much in agreement with the notion of the "sovereign people" as. defended by the.Catholic phi­ losophers and theologians mentioned above. He finds the differentiation between the source of political authority, and where that political.authority is invested, a vital con­ tribution. In this way, these Catholic thinkers have served the double purpose of (a) demonstrating the divine origins of authority and (b) in a "democratic" sense, holding the rulers responsible to the people. In essence, Brownson accepts the doctrine as outlined by the Catholic theologians he mentions, the doctrine recognizing authority in God and mutual obligations between the rulers and: the ruled, as a proper step in the direction of truth. It is, in his view, of all the other theories considered, the most appealing to him. However, the major difficulty with the theory of these Catholic scholars, (the majority at least) consists in the

213 - Idem. - 1 1 9 fact that it does not explain precisely how God.invests political sovereignty and authority in the people collec­ tively » Is this natural? Are the people operating here, in his terms, as a secondary cause? Is this investiture supernatural? With this difficulty as his point of. depar­ ture, Orestes Brownson sets forth his Own interpretations of the nature and function of political authority. It is to those interpretations, and an analysis of their import, that we now turn. 1 CHAPTER 4

BROWNSON’S CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY

The central importance of the Brownsonian critique of the aforementioned seven theories of government consists in:. (a) his explicit rejection of the notion that true political authority can have its source in humanity or in the natural order; and (b) his appeal, in accordance with his ontological assumptions, to a higher source of right, a source ultimately grounded in the supernatural order. It is. clear - as is established by his premises and the logic he employs in the development of his critique - that the political problem is to be resolved in' theology. For him, God, in an absolute sense, is the only true Sovereign. As Sovereign, He is the source of all right, and thus all poli­ tical authority. The derivation of this right as discerned, in the ’’Divine Right Theory”, the "Papal Theory", or the Catholic notion that the people are sovereign in a secondary sense - despite the fallacies and/or omissions embodied within each - is a. derivation of redeeming value, a deriva­ tion with that saving element which looks towards Heaven. ' To recapitulate, it is apparent that the idea, developed by a number of notable Roman Catholic literateurs and theologians, that the people are sovereign in a secondary

120 121 sense, is the most appealing, to Orestes Brownson, of.all the theories considered. While a highly developed notion, its major inadequacy consists in the fact that there is no explicit explanation as to how, in fact, the.morality of rule is transmitted from God to the people Collectively. In essence, this is the problem that Brownson must resolve if he is to fortify the general theory of a "sovereign people" as set forth by noted scholastics and luminaries of Roman. Catholic theology. - The first principle set forth by Orestes Brownson, in the critical formulation of his own theory of authority, is this: the moral right to govern men cannot be deduced from humanity. Commenting in'his American Republic, he. notes, "But as under the law of nature, all men are equal, or have equal rights as men, one man has and can have no right to govern another; and as man is never absolutely his own, but always and everywhere belongs to his Creator, it is clear that no' government originating in humanity can be legi­ timate government. In effect, no government "originat­ ing" in imperfection can be rightful. Within his ontological framework, however, all being ultimately has its final cause in Perfection. Yet, in his general discussions, it is clear that Brownson is deferent to the realities of imper­ fection, the natural order, and the moral law which is

214. American Republic, op. cab., p. 114° ■ _ ‘ " 122 imposed by God on men living in that order. One element of that. Natural Law, long heralded by democratic theorists, is the law of natural equality. Man as man is equal to all men. All men, that is., participate in this Idea of God in an essential sense« The equality of men thus consists in the fact that they were all equally created, of intellect 215 and will, sharing in the Divine Idea of Humanity. . Fur­ thermore, all men are equal in the possession of their natural rights. "We believe that all men are born with equal natural rights, and that all should be equal before- the law, however various and unequal may be their acquired or adventitious rights; but that is all the equality we on r believe in." This doctrine of natural equality was established in one of Brownson’s first essays on political theory, "Democracy", as far back as I83S in the radical pe­ riod of his life.- The doctrine was never to be deleted from . his general philosophy of man. Our rights and duties belong to us as men, as human beings. Then all who are men, human.beings, have the same rights and duties; - in. a matter of right and duty all men are equal. Hence,.the grand, the thrilling, the tyrant-killing doctrine of Equality, the Doctrine That Man Measures Man The World Over. -' In Brownson*s writings, one may discover a number of these natural rights, including the right to live in

215. "Origin and Ground of Government," op. cit.,'

Po 330. ““ 216. Orestes Brownson, "Hereditary Genius," Works, IX, p. 4 1 2 . 217. "Democracy," op. cit., p. 28.■ 123 accordance with the laws of God, the right to exercise proper, liberty, the right to property and, of. course, the right to religion. Thus, in considering the issue of author­ ity in the state, he sets down the fundamental principle, of great import to the logic of his position, that all men are essentially equal as men. It can be discerned that this doctrine of equality, while, setting forth an obligation of every man to respect. the rights of every other man as a human being and a creature of God, also gives no man the inherent right to govern another. In this sense, in accordance with a natural law argument, Brownson denies the human origin of political _ - 21G authority. Not found in the natural order or in humanity, one must find the source of authority in God, What is, in the absolute sense, "ultimate" or "sovereign" is unquestionably Sovereign. True sovereignty is the source of true authority. Anthropocentric political theory, that theory which would substitute the power and the authority of man for the power

21S. Brownson's emphasis on equality is tempered by his faith in the efficacy of an aristocracy. Like Burke and Jefferson, he stresses the benefits of an aristocracy of talents and virtue. "No greater evil could befall any country than to have no distinguished families rising, gen­ eration after generation, above the common level; no born leaders of the people, who stand head and shoulders above the rest; and the great objection to democracy is, that it tends to bring all down to a general average, and to.place administration of public interests in the hands of a low mediocrity, as our American experience proves, in some measure. "Hereditary Genius," ojd. cit., p. 413. • 124 and authority of God, is,, in Brovmson’s view, little more than a justification for despotism. It is born of.pride and lust for power or error. "It is the fundamental sophism 219 which underlies1 every error and every sin." As Lawrence Roemer has noted, "Having demonstrated the impossibility of legitimizing government on a purely human basis, Brownson maintains that it is necessary to reject, plainly and unequiv- o ca lly, the authority of civil government,.or else admit its authority is derived from God." 220 . In Brownson’-s mind, starting from this rather uncompromising assumption, it becomes apparent that "anyone conceding the existence of and the legitimacy of civil government can deny the existence of God only at the expense of logical consistency."221 Now Brownson*s early discussion of,the "Patriarchal Theory" concludes with the assertion that political authority, in his ideal sense, is to.be found in a republic or common­ wealth, and is to be exercised as a public trust. In line with the thought of some notable Catholic theorists, he admits also that authority or the right to rule is vested in the people, taken collectively, who are "sovereign" in a

219. . Brownson^ American Republic, op. cit., p. 144" 220. Roemer, op. pit., p. 56. 221. Idem. 125 secondary sense = He calls attention to the fact that the ancient Greek and Roman writers were at a loss to explain how political authority could have a Divine source and yet 2? 2 not be supernatural, as opposed to natural. ~ They failed, . he suggests, to understand the real difference between that which is spiritual and that which is temporal. This, they were unable to comprehend the different channels by which true authority is derived from God. At this point, it becomes necessary to explain the role of secondary causation and the relevance of Providence ' in our clarification of the Brownsonian interpretation. Moreover, it is necessary to outline the distinguishing char­ acteristics of the natural order in contrast to the super­ natural order. Brownson’s point of departure is theological - Divine . Creation. "Nothing in man, in nature, in the universe, is explicable without the creative Act of God, for nothing exists without that Act. God as the "actor" and "crea-1 . tion" as the "act" is all that exists-;, "for in him we move, and have our being". 2 2 Z l Through the act of creation, God is "imminent"; He is First Cause of all being. As God, he insures the continued existence of all being. At times, this insurance is manifest directly through His Divine inter­ vention in the natural order. This insistence on the reality

222. Brownson, American Republic, op. eft., p. 116..' 223. Ibid., p. 124. 224. Idem. • 126 of Divine Providence, for Brovmson, as for Edmund Burke, ■has a number of strong implications for.his general polit­ ical theory, "Government cannot exist without the effica- . cious presence of God any more than man himself, and men might as well attempt to build up a world, as to attempt to found a state without God, All being, rational and irrational, is joined to God through the Act of Creation, Government,, then, con­ sisting of the force and right, also participates in the Divine essence, God is the First Cause of government inas^ much as he is the First Cause of all men. And men, of course, are created as social animals; it is their nature. There is no society without government, a force of order. Government, to be sure, is coexistent with humanity, or coextensive with.Man in time. Now inasmuch as God is the First Cause of all government, and true authority which is inherent in government, it is true that, government, as a force ordering human existence, is in a sense a "sacred" institution. It allows for the greater progress of men. Positively, it is a force for good. (Of course, there are a number of important qualifications to be made in con­ nection with this idea of civil power.) While the origin of this institution is supernatural, the people, who con­ stitute it in the natural order are the secondary cause of its existence. As they constitute government in the natural

225o Ibid., p. 126. 127 order, they are invested by God mth a relative "sover­ eignty", the source of a relative authority, and hold this "sovereignty", not as a right but as a trust, In this way they are accountable to God. In a word, they are depen­ dent . "If it were their own, they might do with it as they pleased and no one would have any right to call them to an account, but holding it as a trust from God, they are under .. his law, and bound to exercise it as that law prescribes„"226 Is this investiture of a "secondary" or "relative". political "sovereignty" an act of Providence? A super­ natural event? For Brownson such is not the case„ Men, to be sure, are secondary causes of government„ And as men, they are bound to abide by the law which governs their nature, the..Law of God imposed on the natural order, the Natural Law. This notion of Natural Law, for Orestes . Brownson, is similar in several major respects to that out­ lined by St. Thomas Aquinas, the Catholic philosopher who apparently had such a profound influence on the development of his thought. The Thomistic interpretation of Natural Law, as George Sabine has recounted: o.omay perhaps be described as a reflection of divine reason in created things. It is manifest • . in the inclination which nature implants in all. beings to seek good and avoid evil, to preserve themselves, and to live as perfectly as possible the kind of life suitable to their natural endow­ ment. In the case of mankind this means, as Aristotle had taught, the desire for a life in which the rational nature may be realized. 1

226. Idem,. • Thomas mentioned as examples of this the inherent inclination.in men to live in society, to preserve their lives, to beget and educate children, to seek the truth and develop intelligence. Natural law enjoins all that is implied to give these human inclinations their widest scope. .. Humanity, as actualized in the people individually and collectively, in constituting government over time,, from the family to the nation, does so according to the Natural Law, the law which governs.men, ordering men to realize the ' proper end of their rational and social nature. In this sense, the people, taken collectively, as a secondary cause of legitimate civilized government, cooperate in the Divine Plan. This human causality, though secondary, is necessary. It. must be recalled here that government is a combination of force and right. In Brownson’s terms, even as this com­ bination suggests an extreme normative bias, these two fac­ tors are inseparable. Thus, in constituting government, the human element is also responsible for the constitution of the right to govern, or the authority inherent in government For Brownson, it will be recalled, true political authority inheres in a republic. It is a civilized author­ ity which is held as. a public trust rather than a private , right = Government is constituted in varying degrees of development over time. The people collectively, the nation,

227. George Sabine, A History of Political Theory [New York: Henry Holt Company, 1954J? P° 253. is the instrument by which true political authority in a civilized order is realized. Over time, as men constitute government in the natural order, as secondary causes, in accordance with the Law which governs their nature, civi­ lized government, and.the political authority inherent ' within it, is realized naturally. It differs from any imagined supernatural constitution; the action of an imme-. diate First Cause is minimal, if present at all. The • estab­ lishment' of government takes place through secondary causation. (However, from time to time, God in his love for Man, may intervene in rare .circumstances, or "weave” the "psychic bonds" among men within a defined national territory.) Sov­ ereignty, and the relative authority which is derived from ■it, is invested by God through the Natural Law as the people of a nation define a territory- and establish a polit­ ical authority, a public authority, within that defined territory. It is apparent that Brownson assigns the historical process of political development, from family to national republic, the status of Natural Law. This development, it appears,is in line with the inclinations of men for their proper social and spiritual needs. In substance, then, civilized government, republican government, and the polit­ ical authority inherent within it, is a natural institution 130 inasmuch as human causality is the proximate cause of its existence under that Law which governs human nature. The inspiring element of all of this consists in the fact that the rulers holding the political authority have serious obligations to the people. As noted by Cook and Leavellei ' The rights of government to govern come only in­ directly from God through society. The source of political authority (in the natural order) is the people collectively. And this people has the right to decide on the use made of the power that comes from it in terms, of its interests. 229 Through their definition of territory and the estab­ lishment of civilized government within that territory, the collective people acquire a sovereignty through, the Natural Law. In this way, God invests them with authority. Brown- son suggests that this view is an improvement over the others inasmuch as he demonstrates how, in effect, polit­ ical authority may be derived from God and yet remain "natural" in contrast to "supernatural"= He also sees this explanation as an improvement over the■view of the "sover­ eign people" as held by the Scholastics and Doctors of the Church insofar as it states explicitly how political auth­ ority, inherent in true government, is derived from God through the people. The Catholic theologicans and philos­ ophers, upon whom Brownson relies in many instances, failed to provide explicit clarifications of this derivation. The implications of this view of delegated popular sovereignty, the medium for the transmission of authority, become clears

229. Cook and Leavelle, op. cit., p. G9. 131 The political sovereignty, under the law of nature, attaches to the people, not individuall, but collectively, as civil or political society. It is vested in the political community, or nation, not in an individual, or family, or class, because, under the natural law,, all men are equal, as they are under Christian law, and one man has, in his own right, no authority over another, 230 Again, there appears the democratic element of Brownson’s thought, that notion of natural human equality, a notion antagonistic to all political privilege. It. is important, at this.juncture, to clarify a number of the major ideas Brownson has concerning the Natural Law, What, is immediately important in this regard is that the Natural Law, in the Brownsonian perspective, is not legislated- by Nature itself, but is imposed on Nature by God, the source of all laws in the universe, both physical and moral. In making such an assertion, Brownson - is actually, attacking those he terms "rationalists" who desire to "lose God" by arguing that Nature herself is the originator of the laws that govern her, 231 ' Human nature, to be governed by the Natural Law of God, then, is ultimately governed by God himself. He summarizes his conception of this Divine ordering in one highly significant passage in his American Republic; . The law of nature is not the order or rule of the Divine action in nature which is rightfully called providence, but is, as has been said, law in the.

230, Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p, 135, 231, Orestes Brownson, "Lecky on Morals," Works, XIV, p-, 392, 132 primary or proper sense, ordained by the author of nature, as its sovereign and supreme lawgiver, and binds all his creatures who are endowed with reason and free-will, and is called natural, be- caus^promulgated through the reason common.to

How is one to come to a knowledge of this Natural Law? To many perhaps, the Browhsonian response does not adequately resolve the epistemological problem. Perhaps, however, this is so (and Brownson would venture to say that it is) because the epistemological obstacle cannot. adequately be overcome. However, he sets forth a two-fold response to the question: The. knowledge of the natural law has been trans­ mitted from Adam to us through two channels: reason., ' which is i n .every man, and in immediate relation ' with the Creator, and the tradition of the primi­ tive instruction embodied in language, and what ■ . the Romans call jus gentium, or law common to all civilized' nations.. Under this law,'whose pre­ scriptions are promulgated through reason and embodied in universal jurisprudence, nations are providentially constituted, and invested with political sovereignty; and as they are constituted under this law, and hold from God through it, it defines their respective rights and powers, their limitation and their extent.

232. Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 134° It is worth mentioning in this context that Brownson wishes to make the fine distinction between the "natural order" and the "supernatural order" on the basis of creation. The natural order is the created order; the supernatural order is the order of God. For a further development of this general, distinction, one should consult Brownson*s numerous essays on theology. A firmer grasp of the subject can only be gotten - through an investigation of his apologetics and moral theol­ ogy. 233 ° Idem. 133 Reason and tradition, then, are the cornerstones of human knowledge of that "structure of reality", that Law which governs our natural existence. Capsulizing our analysis of Brown son’s concept of political authority, we would designate his perspective as theocentric and providential. God, in the absolute sense, is sovereign inasmuch as He is the ultimate or highest power in the universe, the Creator, the First Cause of all that which exists, dependent on no other being. His domi- . nation is total; and by virtue of His absolute goodness, it is just. In line with the dictum that ownership is the basis of the right to govern (as was noted in our earlier discussion of Patriarchal authority),. it is clear that the ownership of the universe, by yirsue of creation, can rest with God alone. Authority, then, begins with God; all polit­ ical authority on earth must, if it is to be authority at all, respect this fact. What might be termed the "democratic element" of the Brownsonian theory rests with the proposition that "sovereignty", in a relative sense, is derived from God and is invested in the people collectively. In this vein, "sovereignty", as is "authority", is transformed. The "high­ est power" in the universe becomes the "highest power" on earth. Thus, the rulers are restricted in the kinds of commands they can issue to the ruled. In turn, the people are restricted, in a moral sense, from .exercising a "social 134 despotism11 o Authority, as a right to govern, inherent in the absolute justice of the Lord, is transformed into a trust to be held as delegated by the people collectively« Arguing that men, in abiding by the dictates of that Law which governs their nature, cooperate with Divin­ ity, Brownson denies that the political order should be theocratic. In fact, the theory is rescued from theocratic implications by the very fact that the political authority is not derived supernaturally, In effect then, the collec­ tive people do not derive their authority, the.authority - that is invested in them as a "sovereign people", immedi­ ately , through a supernatural intervention; they derive it mediately, through their constitution of civilized govern­ ment, natural and necessary to them as men, over time. They accomplish their political task in accordance with the Natural, not the 'Supernatural, Law, To recapitulate Brownson's theory of political authority in his own words: "The right of government to govern, or political authority, is derived by the collective people or society, from God through the law of nature, This distinction between what is natural, or medi­ ate or created, and what is supernatural, or immediately connected with God, is the basis for the division of author­ ity between the Church and the State in the Brownsonian anal­ ysis,

234, Ibid,, p. 133I 135 Ecclesiastical and Political Authority It is to this distinction that we' now turn in order to examine and clarify the proper relationship between polit­ ical and religious authorities„ As has been demonstrated, the government holds its authority mediately, through the collective people, the sovereign, who has settled and defined a territory. This, to repeat, is done in accordance with nature. The politi­ cal development which ultimately gives rise to a civilized political authority is in accordance with the Natural Law. Natural Law, in a sense is the ”channel” of authority from God to Man. What is accomplished is accomplished within the natural, or created order. In contradistinction to the natural order is the supernatural order. - This order, says Orestes Brownson, is "an infinite order above the highest specific or created nature, that is to say, an infinite super-natural order, of which the highest'conceivable created nature knows and conceives nothing by virtue of its natural powers."235 This supernatural order, moreover, is "eminently real, not imaginary, not fictitious, not an abstraction, not a clari­ fication or generalization of particulars, not something 236 that depends for its reality oh human belief or disbelief."

235• "Transcendentalism," Works', VI, p. lOS. 2 3 6 . Orestes Brownson, "Independence of the Church," Works, XIII, p. 90. 136 As a means of explanation, this vital distinction between natural and supernatural establishes a framework of analysis which facilitates Browns'on's explanation of the role and the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and the channel by which that authority is derived. If one accepts Roman Catholicism, he argues, then one, in accor­ dance with the doctrine of the Church, also accepts the Divine origin of the Church as an institution directly com­ missioned by Christ to teach the truth of Christianity, or the Word of God, to all mankind. . Because of this direct commission, "The Catholic Church is divine; it is a super­ natural institution, and supernaturally sustained and pro­ tected. It teaches all truths, that is, all truths pertaining to religion and morals. It decides positively 237 on no other subject." Not exercising its authority by right of Natural Law, or by virtue of humanity, the channel of its authority to rule in matters of faith and morals is derived directly. .In Brownson's view, the Church, as teacher, is a witness to the truth: That the Church is a competent and credible witness in the case, or an adequate authority for believing that God has revealed what she believes and teaches as his word, can be as conclusively proved as the competency and credibility of a wit­ ness in any court whatever. She was an eye-ear witness of the life, death, and resurrection of our Lord, who is at once perfect God and perfect Man;, she received the divine 'word directly from him, and is the contemporary and living witness ,

237« Orestes Brownson, "Literary Policy of the Church of Rome," Works, VI, p. 506. 137 of what he taught and commanded. The Church has never, for a moment, ceased to exist, but has continued from Christ to us as one identical liv­ ing body that suffers no decay and knows no succession of years; with her nothing has been forgotten, for nothing has fallen into ,the past. the whole revelation of God is continually present to her mind and heart. She is then, a competent witness; for she knows .all the facts to which she is required to testify. She is a credible witness; for God himself has appointed, commissioned, authorized her to bear witness for him: to all nations, and ages, even unto the con­ summation of the world, and has promised to be with her, and to send to her assistance the Para­ clete, the Spirit of Truth, who should recall to her mind whatsoever he had taught her, and lead her into all truth. . The divine commission or authorization to teach carries with it the pledge of infallibility in teaching; for GOd cannot be the accomplice of a false teacher, or one who is even liable to err. What surrender is there of one's reason, judgment, free-will or manhood, in believing the testimony of a Competent' and cred­ ible witness? 238 The authority of Roman Catholicism, in matters of faith and morals, results from that union between the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of Truth, and the Church itself. For Brownson, as a professor of the Roman Catholic faith, this was a real and vital union. The infallibility of the Pope, for example, speaking ex-cathedra, does not rest with him simply by virtue of his office. In an explanation of the deeper elements of this moral and religious infallibility, Brownson writes, "No pope or council in itself is impeccable or infallible. It is only with the protection and assistance

2 3 8 . Orestes Brownson, "An. Imaginary Contradic­ tion," Works, III, p. 394- 138 of the Holy Ghost (supernaturally assisting the Pope).„. preserving, permanently, or for the time being, his judgment • 239 from error0.0." Why should a consideration of the authority of the Roman Catholic Church have any importance in this discussion on the Brovmsonian. conception of political authority? The. reason for this diversion rests with the importance of reli­ gion in Brownson’s general perspective on political ques­ tions. This is most especially true in reference to the . issue of political, authority. In this instance, we have an ethical question. . The right to rule is, fundamentally, a moral issue. Now. ultimately, the government holds its authority as a trust from God,. Civilized government is dependent on two elements for its constitution; (a) God, the creator of .all that which is; and (b) the collective people, the people of the republic, as "sovereign", who. define'" the territory of the nation, and constitute government in cooperation with the Divine plan with the aid of Providence. Dependence, in principle, just as it gives organic society rights over the individual incurring.obligations on the part of the individual therein, also incurs obligations on the part of the government. Government holds its authority as a trust from God indirectly; but it holds authority as a trust from

239. Orestes Brownson, "The Convert," Works, V, Po 180. 139 the people directly. It is for this reason, to reiterate Brownson* s maxim,.that the government is obligated to both God and his people. It is to be held responsible for the protection of the natural rights and liberties of the .people; and in so doing, government is in obedience, so to speak, to the laws of God. While, the Brownsonian framework may manifest a theoretical neatness, it becomes evident that there are, indeed, a number of practical difficulties in common polite ical affairs in which the political authorities of the commonwealth, or the republic, are in apparent conflict with the rights and liberties of the citizens. Again, there are ethical questions. How is such a c.onflict, potential in any system, to be.resolved? This- issue which arises here is, ultimately, a ques­ tion of epistemology. . How is political man to arrive at truth? Intersubjective disagreement between the rulers and the ruled as to the propriety of the measures legislated within the republic on questions of moral import.is often quite damaging to the stability of the political order. If the rulers are unable to command the obedience of the citi­ zens on moral grounds, they will most likely rely upon raw power or coercion to accomplish their ends. Who,or what ■ segment of the population, or what institution, is to. 140 ... decide the moral rightness of rule in the event.of a prac­ tical collision between the civil power and the individual? Brownson recognizes that the constitution of govern­ ment under the Natural Law, a moral prescription, is ulti­ mately a result of God’s creationThe moral appeal of the contestants on any political question must be an appeal to God’s law. However, in such a conflict it is well to ask: Who is to interpret the laws of God? Is there a violation of Natural Law? • Who, if not the individual him- • self, is to interpret the Natural Law? Such a position is to be rejected, in Brownson-s terms, primarily because the individual would then be.in a, position to violate the rules of civil society, arguing that his personal interpretation of God’s law is the foundation of his sincere convictions. In this way, he might conceivably justify any form of his p i O disobedience to the civil law. Is the ruler to interpret the law of God? Brownson rejects this alternative on the ground that it would leave, in effect, the state free to justify any act of repression, . no matter how tyrannical, based on its interpretations of God’s law. 2Zl1 Majoritarian democracy is of little assis­ tance in resolving the moral issue inasmuch as it simply renders truth a convention, something numerically determined.

240. Roemer, op. cit., p. 59. 241. Idem. 141 Rejecting these interpretations of the laws of God, Brownson asserts that there is, indeed, an institution estab­ lished by God for the purpose of resolving questions in matters of faith or morals. At the same time, Brownson’s consideration of this issue raises a number of striking issues in political theory. His: assertions- aside for the , moment, it is.helpful to examine the epistemological issue enjoined by this general discussion. As Father Stanley Parry has noted, "The question Brownson really poses is: When two subjective judgments are at variance is there any - way to resolve the conflict short of suppressing one of 242 them?" Within the imperfect circumstances of the natural order, or within the realm of "purely political theory", the response for Brownson is "no". 2Zl3 In all frustration at the imperfections of the world, he finds no means of escape from this dilemma, except, as Parry explains, through the counsels of the Church: That is, in the natural order the problem is insoluble.. For in the answer he does give, his appeal to the infallible authority of the Church, he abandons the entire context of his. basic rational metaphysic and political theory. And he seeks a solution, not in the oridnary providential order.of history, not in the appeal of a pure natural knowledge of God’s, intention gained through abstract consideration, but rather, he seeks a solution in a new and supernatural movement of the Divine into the order of history - in Christ, that is to say, projected through history in His Mysti­ cal Body, the Church. 244

- 242. Parry, cit., p. 209. 243 - Idem. 244= Idem. 142 Substantially, Orestes Brownson relies upon the Roman Catholic Church as the "court of last resort" on 1 . ' . - questions of ethical import, especially in regard to the issue of political authority, rights and obligations, and rule in Civil society aS Sub ject to., the laws of God. His view of the Roman - Catholic Church as a court adjudicating the moral issues of civil government was.not developed later in his life; it was developed relatively early in his public life o \ •• One outstanding manifestation of this early convic­ tion is found in a stimulating essay, first published in his own Browns on1 s Quarterly Review. in October, I.B4B entitled "Legitimacy and Revolutionism". Unquestionably, those movements and personalities bent on revolution in. Europe are of primary importance in attempting to explain the extremity of the Brownson position. They maddened him. Add to this, however the "democratic spirit" in America, that strain of levelling equality well detected by Brownson famous French contemporary, and one is even appreciative of the sentiments underlying his appeals to a religious authoritarianism. Consider the following exerpts. from "Leg timacy and Revolutionism"; But who is to decide whether the actual govern­ ment has transcended its powers, and whether, the . case occurred when we are permitted or bound to resist it? This is a grave question, because, if 143 the fact of legitimacy be not established by some competent authority, they who resist run the risk of resisting legitimate authority, and of ruining both their own souls and their country. Evi­ dently, again, not the people, for w e .must take the people as a state, or as outside of the state. Outside of the state they are simply individuals,. and, as we have seen, have not, and cannot have, the right to decido. As the state, they have no faculties and no organs but the government which is to be judged, and therefore can neither form nor express a judgment. Who then? Evidently the power whose .function it is to declare the. law of God.©. But what shall be done in case there be no. such court of competent jurisdiction? We reject the supposition. Almighty God could never give .. a law without: instituting a court, to declare it, and to judge of its infractions. We, as Catholics, know what and where that court is, and therefore cannot be embarrassed by the question. If there are nations who have no such court, or refuse to recognize the one Almighty God has established, ... that is their affair, not ours, and they, not we, are responsible to the embarrassments to which . .they are subjected. They, undoubtedly, are obliged either to assert passive obedience and non-resistanceor to deny the legitimacy of gov- . ernment by ...asserting the right of revolution; that is, they have no alternative but anarchy or des­ potism, as their history proves. But this is not our fault.We are not aware that we are obliged to exclude God and his Church from our politics in order to accomodate ourselves to those who blaspheme the one and revile the other. We are not aware that we are obliged to renounce our reason, and reject the lessons of experience, becanse, if we admit them, they proee that Almighty God has made his Church essential to the maintenance of civil liberty on the one hand, and of civil authority on the other, because they prove that the. state can succeed not better than the individual, without religion. We have never supposed that a man could be a Christian and exclude God from the state, and we have no disposition to concede, or to undertake to prove, that he can be. If the Church is necessary as a teacher of piety.and morals, she must be necessary to decide the moral questions which arise between prince and prince, and between prince and subject, and to maintain the contrary is only to contradict one’s self.' Politics are nothing but a branch of general ethics, and ethics are simply practical theology. 245 . Brownson’s final appeal.to the ecclesiastical author­ ity ...for the solution of moral issues in politics, such as the legitimacy of the rule of the civil powers in concrete circumstances, stems from his insistence on the inseparabil­ ity cf the natural and the supernatural orders<, For Orestes Brownson, these two orders constitute the whole of reality. The natural order is a creation of God; and man, who resides in the natural order, was created for a supernatural des­ tiny. While these two orders are inseparable, in this sense, they are quite distinct from one another. ; ’’The highest natural virtue is imperfect, and no sin is simply a sin against the natural law. The natural.is not the supernatural, /pi/’ but was never intended to subsist without it.” At times, in accordance with his Divine Love, God condescends to aid man within the natural order. Providence is another manifestation of the union between the two orders, however rare such Divine intervention might be. The distinctiveness, yet inseparability, of the natural from the supernatural defines, in essence, the role of the Roman Catholic Church as the court of last resort in

245« Brownson, "Legitimacy and Revolutionism,” op. cito',, pp. 69-70. 246 . Brownson, "An Imaginary Contradiction," op. cit., p. 399. 145 temporal affairs. While the state derives its authority naturally, through the "sovereign people", the Church derives her authority supernaturally, directly from Jesus Christ, in a real living union with the Holy Ghost. Both Church and state are under God's law, manifest supernatu- - rally and naturally respectively, and it is the role of the Church, according to Brownson, to interpret that law. The jurisdiction of the Church in the natural order is most clearly defined (in relation to the authority of the state) in an essay entitled "Authority and. Liberty" first published in Brownson's Quarterly Review for April, 1849- ■ ,■ The Church and state, as administrations, are distinct bodiesbut they are not, as some modern politicians would persuade us, two coordinate and mutually independent authorities. The state holds under the law of nature, and has authority only within the limits of that law. As long as it confines itself within that law, and executes, faithfully, its provisions, it acts freely with­ out ecclesiastical restraint or interference. But the church holds, from God under the super­ natural or revealed, law, which.includes, as inte­ gral in itself the law of nature, and is therefore the teacher and guardian of the natural as well as the revealed law. She is,, under God, the supreme judge of both laws, which for her are. but one law; and hence she takes cognizance.,, in her tribunals, of the breaches of. the natural law as well as of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance of its breaches by nations as well as of its breaches' by individuals, by the prince as well as the subject, for it is the supreme law fop both. The state is therefore, only an infe­ rior court, bound to receive the law from the supreme court, and liable to have its decisions reversed on appeal. 247

247® Orestes Brownson, "Authority and Liberty," Works, X, p. 129. ' 146 This intrusion of the ecclesiastical authority in political. Ilf e,. as hoped for by Orestes Brownson, cannot be underestimated in consideration of his general theory of political authority„ The indispensability of religion to social and political life is a cardinal axiom in his thought, and can be detected as far back as his first preachings as a Protestant minister to the working class of Boston in the 1830’se While the resolution of the epis- ' temological question of moral truth is left to the juris­ diction of the Roman Catholic Church, Brownson acknowledges that religion, in general, serves as a mainstay, a moral underpinning, of legitimate political authorityc Its whole­ some effect is to train the citizenry, "to habits of obedi- ence".2^ It might be objected that this reliance upon the Church as the final adjudicator of moral issues in politics is an expression of "authoritarianism"»- Would such a charge be valid in a political sense? One Brownsonian scholar, Father Parry, in response to this,objection, observes that Brownson could be labeled a "political authoritarian" only "if one crudely thrusts upon him a premise he never accepted: that the authority of the Church is a purely

p I Q human authority"» As a proponent of the freedom of con- ... science (that freedom which brought him to the Church in the first place), Brownson would stress that there is no

. 2 4 8. Brownson, American Republic, op:, cit,, p, 127., 249o Parry, op, citc, p. 210, 147 rightful physical force by which the Church can coerce those not of her flock to abide by the rules„ Furthermore, the existence of the Church as the Church of Christ does not necessarily mean that her authority is extant over all 250 men. He seems to .argue that men must have the faith before it can bind them. As a Catholic, Brownson looks hopefully toward the future when all men might come to the truth of the Catholic faith. In his political delibera­ tions, as Parry recounts, he understands the necessity of a general agreement on fundamental principles in order to insure the proper exercise of liberty and authority in the political ordero Christian principles, as taught by the Roman Catholic Church, would be ideal for the stable poli­ tical order. In this ideal sense, in hopes of reconciling liberty and authority in justice, Brownson prays that all men may come to embrace' the Roman Catholic Church<>251 Nevertheless, he does issue a word of advice to those not of the Roman Catholic faith concerning her moral; authorityo In those questions decided by the Church as Mater et Magister, "they would be required to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence of her divine institution and commission to teach and govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to the Kingdom of God on Farth",^^^

250. Ibid., p. 209. - 251. Ibid., p. 210. 252. Orestes Brownson, "Authority in Matters of Faith," Works, VIII, p. 579. 148 Protestants, infidels, agnostics, atheists, all of those not within the flock, of the Roman Catholic Choreh, are thus confronted with an intellectual problem, the problem of recognizing the veracity of the Church’s origins in Christ, the Son of God, Brownson asks that those not of her con­ gregation, with an open mind, should freely resolve it.

The Reconciliation of Authority and Liberty In his first major exposition of his political theory, ’’Origin and Ground of Government”, Brownson .defined freedom, 253 in a positive sense, as the ’’power to do”. However, this notion of liberty or freedom as the ability or power to act, in Brownson’s thought, is to be.distinguished in a qualitative sense from ’’license” in that it has a proper moral end. What is that end? For Orestes Brownson, liberty consists in acting in accordance with what is right, acting in accordance with God’s law as revealed directly or indirectly through nature. God governs man qua man, that is to say, God governs Humanity in its nature. ’’When we say he governs humanity, we necessarily assume that humanity remains, as the subject governed. But humanity is all and entire in its nature, in those attitudes which we call,

■ ( - ‘ whether properly or not, its constitution.” Liberty, or the right to act, is natural to man; it . is an element of the natural law, the law governing his

253« "Origin and Ground of Government," op. cit., P- 359. ' 149 nature0 Writes Brovmson, "So long and so far as I exist at all, so long and so far I am free..., God governs humanity, but governs in accordance with its freedom, and must if he governs at all. In subjecting man to the absolute sover­ eignty of God, we then provide for the highest possible free— or; dom.” In accordance with the dictum that all true authority is. from God, and that He is, by virtue of his Creative Act, the sole sovereign in the universe, and the source of all that is right and good, men have a sacred duty to obey all legitimate political authorities who possess, in trust, the right to govern. Through a process of histor­ ical development, they have acquired this right to rule through the Natural Law from the "sovereign people" in the republic« Those rulers' who abuse their trust, who usurp / ' ■ powers that do not, by right, belong to them, are despotic and wanting of Divine sanction. In essence, they are in violation of the Lord’s law. And without the.Divine sanc­ tion, the state can only have a human basis for its "author­ ity", a basis with no source in sovereignty in the primary sense, having.in itself, no right, to.govern. In effect, this is tyranny. In such an instance, the citizens are not. morally bound to civil obedience. There is only power, bind­ ing the rulers and the ruled. Moreover, observes Brownson, it is viciously tyrannical to coerce men to obey despots

254* Ibid., p. 359. 150 Who have no right to commande 255 This is the quintessence of abusive, tyrannical power= What assurance does the citizen have that the govern^ ment is indeed holding the political authority as a trust with Divine sanction? For Brownson,. one may discern a legitimate ruler as he who submits to a moral authority. He is not a tyrant, strictly speaking, if he is exercising the political'authority in behalf of the good of his people and in accordance with the. laws of God* Ideally, the proper moral authority would be the Roman Catholic Church, Brown- x • son finds it thrilling, that, upon reflection, the state power was limited by the authority of the Church. The scourging of Henry II at the tomb of Thomas a Becket, and the Humbing of Henry TV at Cannossa by Gregory VII, are prime examples of the moral power of the Church. At times when "brutal tyrants", titled as kings, emperors, or barons, ran "roughshod" over the rest of humanity, it was the moral authority of the Church which humiliated and restrained them, preventing excesses, and putting the fear of the Lord into their hearts. In what are called, pejoratively, the "Dark Ages", Brownson discovers certain redeeming features in contrast to the modern industrial era: It is a reproach to a man in these times and in this country to. name it without execrating it.

255<> Brownson, "Authority and Liberty, " op>. cit., p. 128. 151 The. age which covered Europe over with its Gothic churches,.and with foundations and hos­ pitals for the poor, produced St. Anselm, Abe­ lard, St. Bernard, and Dante, Chaucer Old John of Gaunt, and Magna Carta, De Montfort, William Longbeard, Phillip van Arteveld, Roger Bacon, Albert us Magnus, John of Fidanza,- Dus Scot us, and St. Thomas Aquinas, is a blank in human "history! Thank God we have outgrown it, got rid of it. We are no longer superstitious; we have made away with the old monks whose maxim was "work is worship", we have struck down the last of the old baron; we are free; we have the. gospel of the cotton mill, laissez-faire, save who can, and the devil take the hindmost, and we can do what we please with our own^ 25o Seeing the Church as the proper moral authority in the civil order, Brownson readily agrees that her scope is limited. She may not transgress, rightfully, upon the tem­ poral authority of the civil magistrates to administer the civil law. The Church may offer them guidance. In accor­ dance with her .authority to teach in matters of moral con­ cern, she may explicate or give direction in the application of the moral law; but that is all. Only in this sense, in the natural order, is the Church "above" the civil ruler. Brownson, apparently, is ever mindful, of his conception of politics as a.branch of ethics, a matter of "practical theology"; it is in this way, he admonishes the citizen to examine the Divine sanction of the civil power. In his assertion of the moral authority over the civil authority, he is uncompromising;

256. Russell Kirk [ed.], "The Present State of Society," Orestes Brownson: Selected Essays [Chicago: Gate­ way Editions, 1955J, pp. 41-42. 152 In the temporal order, again, the authority claimed by the Church is nothing but the asser­ tion over the state of the Divine sovereignty, which she represents, or the subjection of the prince to the law of God, in his character of prince as well as his character of man. That, the prince or civil power is subject to the law of God, no man who admits Christianity at all does question; and if.the Church be divinely com­ missioned teacher and guardian of that law, as she certainly is, the same subjection to her must be considered. 257 - In essence then it is stressed here that all true liberty, as does all true authority, has its source in God. God created man in his nature with liberty or the "power to do". The legitimacy of both liberty and authority, to a great extent, is determined by the manner in which they are actualized. Their very existence, indeed, depends upon this actualization. Legitimate "civilized" authority, to repeat, is . properly held as a trust from God, and no one, either ruler or subject, may justly contravene that legitimate trusti Man is free to realize his power to act in the civil order in any way which does not contradict the exercise of legiti mate authority. There is, in other words, no right of revo lution against legitimate political authority. This much is all.very clear within the confines of Brownson’s general theory. Liberty, in a civil and a moral sense, is thus clearly distinguishable, at.least in a theoretical sense,

257° Brownson, "Authority and Liberty," op. cit., p. 126. ■ 153 from "license". Also, in this theoretical framework,'jus- . tice is achieved through the exercise of both proper authority and true liberty. Working in harmony, order and justice in civil society are established« Theoretically, then, Orestes Brownson reconciles liberty and authority; and in his application of his general principles, he settles one ofthe most difficult problems in political theory. The source of both liberty and authority, it must be recalled, is God himself. Submission to Him through obedience to His laws in the natural order (through the Natural Law) or as it is supernaturally revealed through His instrument for bringing men to salvation, the Roman Catholic Church, is the means of effecting this reconcilia­ tion. His definitive exposition of this theoretical recon­ ciliation is presented most ably in an essay dealing specifically with the subject of reconciliation, "Authority and Liberty," first published in the Brownson's Quarterly Review of April, l$49s . . Absolute subjection to him (God) is absolute subjection to eternal, immutable, and absolute jus­ tice. Hence, subjection to him alone is, on the one hand, subjection to absolute justice, and on the other, freedom to be and to do, all that abso­ lute justice permits. Here is just authority as great as can be conceived, and true liberty as large as is possible this side of license; and between the two there is, and can be, in the nature of things, no clashing, no conflict, no antagonism. How mean .and shallow is infidel phi­ losophy! 258 ' . ■

258. Ibid., p. 126. 154 Drawing upon his theological assumptions, Brownson thus resolves the-classic issue, an issue of much bitter contention, of liberty and authority. Conformity of the public authority to the law, of God is a law establishing conformity by the citizen to the public authority. To a skeptic, as to some of Brownson’s critics, no doubt, this manner of theoretical resolution is little more than the employment of theology as an escape mechanism. However, his resolution suggests the necessity of the faith in order to arrive at truth. That is how, I.think, he would answer his critics. CHAPTER 5

THE. BROWNSONIAN THEORY IN PERSPECTIVE

What can be said' of the Browns.onian contribution to political theory in the United States? Certainly, it would, not be incautious to argue that Browns.on* s political . . ideas are rather unusual in the history of American polit­ ical thought o Drawing upon Greek classical writers, the. Catholic Scholastics, and elements central to modern demo- ... cratic theory, he weaves these various strains of thought into a novel, synthesis* Like his friend and associate, the man for whom he expended much energy in lS44> John C. Calhoun, Brownson largely broke from the liberal tradition in America. That . break, however, was not total; certain outstanding elements of liberal thought he found most attractive, especially the concept of natural human equality. Like Calhoun, he envi­ sions society, the race, over the above the individual, An organicist, he asserts, in contradiction to the liberal contractarians, that society is natural to man. And govern­ ment, surely, is natural and coexistent with society. This, he insists, has been the human experience. 156 Again, in contrast to the prevalent liberal thought of his times, Brcwnson stressed the positive role of gov­ ernment ■ and political authority. He disdained the negative attitude toward government as simply a restraining force on the baser, passions of men. Political authority, held as a trust, can be instrumental in bringing men to greater perfection, providing the order in which liberty and pro­ gress may flourish. Certainly, it has the task of restrain­ ing passion, vice, and the license contrary to the security of liberty. But the political authority is"more than this. The political authority helps to solidify the nation within its common territory; it strengthens the people as a people, as an organic whole, unifying them..; It serves to secure, in many respects,.the progress of society as society "and while it provides for the common good of all, to each, the lowest and the. meanest, with the whole force and majesty of society". 259 This positive role of politi­ cal authority in the modern civilized order cannot be under­ estimated. Government, for Orestes BrownsOn, has a role in fostering the development of the arts and science, .advancing civilization generally,;and establishing condi­ tions through which the power of religion can be exercised,

^ 259. Brownson, The American Republic, op. cit., 157 insuring the moral health and welfare of the nation, bring­ ing men ever closer to God. While Brownson may have drifted far from the current of liberalism, or what might be termed the "liberal tradi­ tion" in the United States, he has not dispensed with some of the major hopes and even fears of a liberal, society. He was an obstinate opponent of state absolutism, whether such a perverse rule be manifest through a tyranny of the one, the few, or the many. . He set limits on the extent of state intervention, especially in matters of property, con­ science, or religion.' The individual, by virtue of his - natural independence from society in.these matters, should be free, Brownson thought, from the strictures of state con­ trol. It is apparent, then, that Orestes Brownson, in terms of the "liberal tradition" is not a total heretic. For, as Cook and Leavelle note, "...if liberalism be defined as the attempt to find the laws and relationships by which the individual is associated with the whole, then Brownson was a liberal".260 Is he, at last, to be classified among the conser­ vatives? Here, again, caution is necessary. Brownson, in several respects, breaks too with what is all too often identified with conservative inclinations. As Cook and Leavelle relate, he is adamantly opposed to any privileged

260. Cook and Leavelle, 0£. eft., p. 191° 158 class ruling by virtue of heredity or wealth. He never defended "the prerogatives of property". Moreover, as Cook and Leavelle remind us, his defense of American insti­ tutions, as exemplified by his attitudes toward the Supreme ' Court in heated controversy, was wanting-for a •man of strong conservative Convictions. Perhaps the radicalism of his earlier life, so well recorded by Arthur M, Schles- inger, Jr., left upon his psyche the indelible marks, of a social rebel. All of this simply suggests that one must . tread with caution towards any capsulization Of Brownson’s social and political thought. Yet, upon reflection, the . case for his conservatism appears the stronger. "It is true," write Cook and Leavelle, "that, while he advocated few of the political principles ordinarily associated with the conservative tradition in America, his assumptions and , thought processes followed the conservative pattern." 26l Furthermore: There is more than a suggestion, in his theory. .that political authority and stability are ends in themselves, that the continuity of moral values is the real link between technological change or. material.advance and human progress, that what exists is rational if properly under- stood, and that the role of the individual and . the possibility of basic change in the social pattern is slight. 262

261. Ibid., p. 190. 262. Idem. ■ ■ ' 159 Father Stanley Parry, in his own consideration of Brownsonian theory, has argued that there are striking sim­ ilarities between Orestes Brown son and Edmund Burke*- An . examination of the Burkean view of authority in the social order seems to confirm this view; certain elements of ... their general thought patterns coincide, appearing, at points, almost.identical.. Both Burke and Brownson saw government as both human and Divine. Political authority, for each, has its origins in God, nurtured, refined, and developed by rational, social man. Again, both men saw ' / government as having a positive role in the development of civilization, nurturing the transmission of the arts and sciences, bringing, humanity, to greater perfection. The reliance upon Natural Law as a legitimizing element of civil authority is quite pronounced in each. As Parry observes, the "organismic character" of the Burkean theory is con­ gruent with Brownson's own organicist notions concerning the nature of society. Their opposition to contractarian theory is grounded in their shared conviction that govern­ ment has its origins and authority "apart from human causal— 263 ity and volition". Moreover,, for each .philosopher, the state has a Divine sanction (Brownson’s major criterion for legitimate: government), and Providence is a reality, oper­ ative in human affairs. The history of the state, for Edmund

263. Parry, ££. cit., p. 198. 160 Burke, as for Orestes Brownson to a considerable extent, "is a history of God's providential intentions". 26/l The greatest difference between Brownson and Burke, apparently,.consists in their divergent approaches to the problem of,metaphysical speculation in politics, Edmund Burke was reluctant to rely upon the full power of reason, and the use of a priori assumptions, in his approach to political questions, A rebel against the spirit of the Enlightenment, he was highly suspicious of the metaphysics used to justify radical attacks on the political order. This suspicion, and his general reluctance to employ meta?- physical justifications of.his- own, is especially pronounced, one may discover, in his deliberations on the problems of realizing "natural rights" in a gradually maturing, tradi— 265 tional,.political order. Legitimategovernment, and the authority inherent within it, for Edmund Burke, does not rest simply on reason, the consent of the individual, or even

264 o Idem, 265 o The problem for Edmund Burke was not the real­ ity of such metaphysical notions, but their actualization in political society. Thus, he wrote: "The science of con­ structing a commonwealth,, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science; because the effects of moral causes are not always immediate; but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in the remoter operations; and its excellence may arise even from, the ill-effects it produces in the beginning, Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France [Chicago: Gateway ■ Editions, 1962J, p, 9T, ' " 161 the consent of an entire generation. Rather, this legiti­ macy rests upon the traditional.acceptance of an entire species, many generations of men who have accepted the civil arrangements, of society as they have unfolded through many years of experience, through a variety of numerous circum­ stances, along with the peculiarities, prejudices, temper, habits, and general disposition of the people. As much as Burke was reluctant to employ "metaphysi­ cal abstractions" to the questions of politics, Orestes Brownson was eager, Thus, in almost all of his essays deal­ ing with political and social questions, one may discern . the application of uncompromising premises and rigid logic. The power of reason is what brought him to his own theory of authority, and even, to a great extent, his Roman Catholic religion.' (A penetrating account of the theological and phi­ losophical propositions with which Brownson wrestled can be found in his intellectual autobiography, The Convert.) Brownson, it must be stressed, adopted his theory of author­ ity before he read the Catholic writers. Says Lawrence Roemer: "...Brownson defended, prior to his conversion and without a knowledge of the writings of Catholic philosophers and theologians, the view that government cannot be sus­ tained without infallible authority"Never compromising,

266, Roemer, on. cit., p. 11. the metaphysics of his position certainly did not endear him to Protestant critics in the United States» There is some cogent scholarship suggesting simi­ larities between Edmund Burke and the great German meta­ physician, George Hegel» Briefly, Hegel1s .Weltanschauung embodies a progressive flux; " „ othe history of civiliza­ tion is the unfolding of the progressive realization of the World Spirit in time"„ Burke’s.idea of the continuity of civilization toward progress, in accordance with a Divine Plan, is certainly suggestive of the Hegelian idea-,^^ Orestes Brownson, as Father Parry has observed, is not so easily linked with Hegelianism. Unlike H eg e1, Brown son’s Idea is not immanent in nature, actualizing itself in ■ different forms through a historical process. Rather, as Parry notes, it is imposed on nature, or the natural order, by God through Providence» God’s Idea of the state, or of the nation, is supernatural, originating from outside the : natural order. For Brownson, it is not inherent- within it. What are the consequences of the Brownsonian theory of authority? What, if any, benefits to civil society would be derived from such a theory?

267o Sabine, op. cit„, p. 639- 26S. Says Sabines "In this feeling for divine immanence in the social order and its historical develop­ ment Burke was strikingly like Hegel." Ibid., p. 617. It is interesting to note that in all twenty volumes of Brown­ son’ s Works Burke is hardly ever mentioned. A direct Burkean influence on his thought is not apparent. ' ' 163 On a theoretical level, the Brownsonian.approach serves to (a) reconcile "stability” .and "movement”, and (b) to reconcile liberty and authority in civil society. He argues that there are two elements necessary for true human progress; stability and movement«, He sees the -func­ tion of authority, as granting men true liberty, allowing them to actualize themselves to the widest possible extent within-the confines of justice. Liberty serves to ensure progress. Men employing their talents., developing their intellectual, spiritual, and material resources, will ele­ vate the human condition. Political authority, in a prac­ tical sense, will protect liberty insofar as it will restrain license, that which inevitably interferes with the freedom of virtuous men. Movement, for Brownson, is found in men. "The human, element is the element of move­ ment, for in it are possibilities that can only be succes­ sively actualized. But the element of stability can be found in the Divine, in God, in whom there is no unactualized possibility, who, therefore, is immutable, immovable, and. eternal.Here is thus established a relationship between "stability" and "movement”, between authority and liberty, between God.and Man in the civil order. Movement is realized through freedom. Stability is grounded in authority. The authority, ideally, should be grounded in

269. Brown son, American Republic, op. cit., p. 123. , 164 the laws of God. ’’The doctrine that derives authority from God, through the people, recognizes in the state both of these elementsand provides .alike 'for stability and pro- gress o”,,270 . ■ In this theory of authority, we have a true recon­ ciliation of liberty and authority. The justice of God, as revealed through natural and revealed law, is the ground of both. In this submission to justice on the part of the rulers and the ruled, this reconciliation is realized. Truly, on a theoretical level, Brownson resolves one of the most pressing issues in political theory. Perhaps one. major objection to Brownson’s thought stems from his theological intrusions into his general political theory. As a means of explanation or clarifica­ tion, the reliance upon theological assumptions is certainly not novel. One may discover such assumptions in ancient, . medieval, and modern political writers = Augustine, Aquinas, Locke,and Burke are prime examples. Indeed, the concept that the state has its origins in God, that it is the earthly handmaiden of the Lord in this world, bringing men to greater perfection is a recurrent theme in political theory. However, the most provocative aspect of this theme in Brownson is in his unabashed appeals to the truth of God in a visible, historical institution, the Roman Catholic

270. Idem. Churche It is certainly understandable, at least in his­ torical retrospect-, why so many. Americans would have been hostile to Brownson's interpretation of political reality. His 'declarations that-; there exists no real separation between.the natural. and;,the - supernatural, and that the state must look to the Roman Catholic Church for moral guidance, were hard, and to many, unpalatable assertions. Such appeals, unquestionably, militate against the tradi­ tional American principle of separation between Church and State, a principle well established and so religiously guarded by our judicial institutions. Moreover, such a stringent appeal to the moral authority of any. religious institution would be of dubious value in an age in which secular trends have been advancing steadily, - It is also well to consider that America was, and still is, to a great extent, a pluralistic society with a historyof ethnic, sectional, racial, and to a lesser degre religious hostilities. It is very easy to apprehend the extent to which the Brownsonian theory, in itself, is divorced from contemporary social reality. "In the medie­ val world," comments Cook and Leavelle, "a common heritage a common morality, plus the existence of both temporal and spiritual powers, which.on the one hand supported and on the other checked each other, allowed the scheme to work "• 166 > ■ effectively,, Yet today, as to a lesser extent in Browns on * s' 271 time, there is.no such balancing of factors,Yet, Brownson had not lost hope. He looked forward to the day •when the American people, as a nation, would embrace the .Roman .Catholic faith. In so doing, a sense of real brother­ hood in Christ would be realized, "the development of a 272 sense of community above both government and the individual" Community, cemented by a shared and authoritative religion, was possible, indeed necessary, for the realiza­ tion of a theory of authority which would bring stability to the nation and insure true progress. The idea of America Brownson thought, was liberty with order„ To establish this union in its highest possible, form he saw as the mission of/ the United States of America, "In other words," he writes, "its mission is to bring out in its life this dialectic

union of authority and liberty, of the n a t u r a l rights of 273 man and those of society," In accomplishing this dialec­ tical union, the United,States of America would have sur­ passed, practically, the political and philosophical great­ ness of the Greeks and Romans, The United States would

271, Cook and Leavelle, op. cit., p. 90. . 272, Thomas Ira Cook and Arnaud Leavelle, "Orestes Brownson’s 'American Republic’," (Part I), Review of Politics, V [April 1942], p. 1 9 2 . : 273 ° Brownson, American Republic, op. c it., p. 5«. . 167 truly be the shining light to the rest of the world, as God, in his providential love, has intended. In the turbulent era in which Orestes Brownson lived and wrote, the two major evils he perceived.(espe­ cially in reference to the theoretical underpinnings of modern governments) were despotism and anarchy. His attempt to formulate a theory of authority was an endeavor to stave off both of these dangers. Humanity, he thought, is. vola­ tile. Investing any class or. group of men with political authority is not going to resolve either of these difficul­ ties. A group of men, as men, can easily fall into des­ potic practices. What about the sovereign people? The investiture of sovereignty in the people.by God is certainly an improvement, he thought, over previous ideas. However, in practice, there still exists.the danger of social des­ potism. In effect, then, what kind of a guarantee does the citizen have against the abuse of state power in the Brown- sonian theory? The individual has, indeed, only moral guaran­ tees against the abuses of power by the sovereign people, which may no doubt sometimes prove insuffi­ cient . But moral guarantees are always better than none, and there are none when the people are held to be sovereign in their own native right and might, organized or unorganized, inside or outside of the Constitution, as most.modern democratic theorists maintain; since, if so, the will of the people, however expressed, is the criterion of right and wrong, just and unjust, true and false, is infallible and impeccable, and no moral right 168 can ever be pleaded against it; they are account­ able to. nobody and, let them do what they please, they can do no wrong„ 274 In effect, the Brownson proposal theoretically frees the individual from any obligation to tyrannical rulei It asserts the truth of liberty in the face of autocratic, class, or social despotism,. It denies the pretensions to legitimacy on the part of any individual, class, or even the sovereign people themselves, if the civil power exceeds its proper boundaries» The rights of the ruler and the obliga­ tions of the ruled must be kept in proper balance, in a balance of justice. Thus, summarizing the Brownson approach, Book and Leaveile writes This whole theory then, is a theory of balance„ It is a denial of. human omniscience and of abso­ lute human power,o It is an attempt to get justice by arguing for the moral responsibilities in terms of conscience, both of rulers and.ruled, while enforcing duties where not voluntarily performed by giving rights, and the right to maintain rights, to each party respectively; and by making- those 275 rights correlative to the duty of the other party. All Of his life, from the earliest days of his pub­ lic career as a radical reformer, an author of vigorous and highly controversial tracts against industrial capitalism, Orestes Brownson opposed special privilege. He was con­ vinced that neither wealth nor indigence.qualified any man for special political advantages. Men, for him, were equal

274o Ibid., p. 1.28. 275o Cook and Leavelle, op. cit., p. 89. 169 by nature = They possessed equal rights as men, granted by their common Creator. In this natural human equality there is no right, clearly discernible, of any one man over another. The state, to be sure, is natural; but its author­ ity originates in the supernatural. . \ - An argument he found especially repellent was the idea that special political advantages should be extended to those who had acquired property. The argument., in his own day, had special significance in reference to the fran­ chise. In line with his general theory, Brownson put for— : 276 ward his own reasons for the extension of the vote. Unlike the Southern conservatives, he did not have an abiding faith in any propertied aristocracy. It was not necessarily the fountain of virtue and wisdom. Members of such a class, having numerous advantages and greater lei­ sure, were not liberated from the temptations of despotism. "Property," he wrote, "like all natural rights, is entitled by the natural law to protection, but not to govern." More­ over, "The rich have in their riches, advantages enough over the poor, without receiving from the state any addi- 277 . tional advantages."

2 7 6 = Ibid., p. 6$. According to these commenta­ tors, "The suffrage..ois not a private right belonging to man because of his own nature. Rather, it is a public trust, and Brownson justifies universal suffrage on the very ground that members of the nation state, persons in the territory who share citizenship rights, ought to partici­ pate in control." 277« Brownson, American Republic, op. cit., p. 137« Brownson was at the height of his popularity when he embraced the Roman Catholic faith in 1S44- The ideas he skillfully wove into, the synthesis that is his political theory were developed, to repeat, prior to his. conversion, ..They .were not a consequence of it . As Lawrence Roerner has noted, while Brownson adopted a Catholic framework after his acceptance of that faith, there was no discernible "radical break in his thought subsequent to his conversion", Catholicism, especially in his later life, was to play a central role in his writings on political and social questions, All of his life, tormented by doubts, he grasped for an infallible authority which would grant him truth in moral questions, especially as they pertain to society and politics, It was only in the arms of the Roman Catholic Church where he achieved that final satisfaction for which his intellect - and his soul - sorely ached.

278. Roerner, op. cit., p. 13. LIST OF REFERENCES

Books Anderson, Thornton. Jacobson's Development of American Politica 1 Thongiit. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Incorporated, I960. Brownson, Henry F. [ed.]. Brownson * s Works, Volumes 1-20« New York: AMS Press, 1966. ~ " ' Brownson, Orestes. American Republic. New York: P. O ’Shea Company, 1865. Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Chicago:' Gateway Editions, 1962. ! ” - Cobban, Alfred. Rousseau and the Modern State. . London: . Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964. Dolbeare, Kenneth. Directions in American Political Thought. . New Yorks John Wiley and Son's-, 1969. Friedrich, Carl. Constitutional Government and Democracy. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1946. ^ . Gettell, Raymond. . History of American Political Thought. New York: The Century Company, 1928. Kirk, Russell fed.] Orestes Brownson: Selected Essays. Chicago: Gateway Editions, 1955* - Kirk, Russelld The Conservative Mind. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953= Lapati, Americo. Orestes Brownson. New York: Twayne Pub­ lishers , 1965 . Lewis, Edward R. History of American Political Thought: From the Civil War to World War. I." New York: MacMillan Company, 1937. Mason, Alpheus T. and Richard Leach. In Quest of Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, l9'60. \ — — ■

171 172 Maynard, Theodore„ Orestes Brownson: Yankee, Radical, • Catholic. . New York; MacMillan Company, 1943° Merriam, Charles. American Political Ideas; ■1865-1917. New York; MacMillan Company, 1929. Minar, David. Ideas and Politics; The American Experience. Homewood, Illinois; The Dorsey Press, 19o4. Roomer, Lawrence. Brownson on Democracy, and the Trend Toward Socialism.' New. York; Philosophical Library, 1953 e Rousseau, Jean Jacques. The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. New York; Washington ■ Square Press, 1967. Ryan, Alvin fed.]. The•Brownson Reader. New York; P. J . Kennedy & Sons, 1955«• Ryan, Thomas. The Sailor's Snug Harbor; Studies in Brownson’s Thought. Westminster; Newman Book Shop, 1952. , Sabine, George. A History of Political Theory. New. York; ' • . ■ • Henry Holt Company, 1954. Schiesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Orestes A. Brownson: A Pil- grim's Progress. New York; Little Brown Company, 1939. ... Orestes Brownson; A Pilgrim's Progress. New York; Octagon Books, 1963. ' ” Scott, Andrew. Political Thought in America. New York; . . Rinehart Company, 1959. ' ' Wilson, Francis G. The American Political Mind; A Text­ book in Political Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949. Wright, Benjamin F. American Interpretations of Natural ' . ; Law: A Study in the History of Political Thought. New York: Russell & Russell Incorporated, 1962. 173 Articles Caponigri, A . Robert "Brownson and Emerson: Nature and History," New England Quarterly, Vol» XVIII, [September, 1945 J. ' Cook, Thomas Ira and Arnaud Leavelle. "Orestes Brownsonfs 'American Republic’," (Fbrt I), Review of Politics, Vol. IV [January, 1942]. ______• "Orestes Brownson’s ’American Republic’M (Part II), Review of Politics, Vol. V, [April, 1942]. Fitzsimmons, M. A. "Brownson’s Search for the Kingdom of God: The Social Thought of an American Radical," Review of Politics, Vol. XVI, [January 1954]• Parry, Stanley. "The Premises of Brownson’s Political Theory," Review of Politics, Vol. XVI, [April, 1954]. Soleta, Chester A. "The Literary Criticism of Orestes A. Brownson, ’’ Review of Politics, Vol. XVI, [July, 1954]. • u