Wlnter 1993 JOURNAL • Space Power Survivability • The Art of Intelligence Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila E. Widnall Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Henry Viccellio, |r. Commander, Air University Lt G e n J a y VV. K e l l e y Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Paul R. Dordal Editor Lt Col Ri chard B. Clark Associate Editor Maj Gwendolvn D. Favne Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor M a r v i n VV. B a s s e t t . Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Director ofA rt and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Hovvell, Prepress Production Manager The Airpower Journal. published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova- tive thinking on militarv doctrine, strategy, tac- tics, force structure, readiness, and other mat- ters of national defense. The views and opin- ions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con- strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force. Air Edu- cation and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US gov- ernment. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If thev are reproduced, the A irpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Winter 1993, Vol. VII, No. 4 AFRP 10-1 Editorial 2 Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present Maj Jason B. Barlow, USAF 4 The Art of Intelligence, by the General Edited by Col Gary D. Payton, USAF 16 Space Power Survivability Dr Colin S. Gray 27 Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job? Maj J. C. Cantrell III, USAF Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr., USAF 43 Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Debate Col Richard Szafranski, USAF 55 The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping Dr Steven Metz 6 8 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 8 4 Index 87 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL________________ Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty Give unto me, made lowly wise, The spirit o f self-sacrifice. —Wordsworth, “Ode to Duty” ** I IFE’S A b______ , a n d t h e n you d i e . ” recipient of that oh-so-wondrous pearl L VVell, that just about sums it up, isn’t the same creature that had to suffer doesn’t it? It’s not easy being in the Air with the irritant for who knows how long! Force these days. It’s not just the fact that I don’t believe Fve ever heard a comment we have fevver people and not as many on what the oyster gets out of the pearl- dollars to work vvith. W e’ve faced that making bargain. issue before. No, the difficulty is that Think about it. If the sand is an irritant, everything's changing, and everything’s isn’t the pearl simply a bigger annoyance? just so . indefinite. Perhaps the AFSC After all, the oyster keeps secreting the you’ve devoted your whole career to went mother-of-pearl, and the pearl just gets away. Or your wing was deactivated, and bigger and bigger. Admittedly, the oys- you volunteered (and were turned down) ter’s central nervous system isn’t particu- for X number of jobs on the bulletin board. larly sophisticated, but it would seem we Or worse, the uncertainty of your future in could associate some pain with wrenching the Air Force due to the threat of an the oyster apart to extract the pearl. And impending_______ (RIF, passover, SERB— what happens to the oyster after the pearl you fill in the blank) makes you wonder is harvested? Well, I'm not a marine biol- about the efficacy of gambling away ogist, a philosopher, or someone who another year with the Air Force . or a makes a living off oysters, so I don’t have s e p a r a t i o n b o n u s . o r a n o t h e r as s i g n - those answers (nor do I want them). But I m e n t . ad i n f i n i t u m . I f yo u h a p p e n to do know that the oyster doesn’t have a complain too much, some optimist quotes choice about whether to make a pearl. you a sugarv platitude like, “If life hands Fate gives it an irritant, it makes a pearl, you lemons. make lemonade”—as if you and we humans reap the benefits— liter- didn’t have a right to be angry and resent- ally. ful. As with the oyster, irritants force them- VVell, perhaps you do have reasons for selves into our professional and personal being angry and resentful. But you also lives every day. Some of these intrusions have a choice— although it’s not necessar- aren’t merely irritants but full-scale catastro- ily an easy one to make. Fve often heard phes which, through no fault of our own, motivational speakers use the pearl-mak- cause us and others great personal suffering. ing capabilitv of the oyster as an example Unlike the oyster, WE have a choice. We to inspire higher performance. An oyster don’t have to accept the pearl-making responds to a grain of sand intruding into process. We can refuse or resist or com- its closed ecosystem by secreting a solu- plain it away. Or we can give in and make tion called mother-of-pearl, which covers a pearl, even if we aren’t the ones who’ll the irritant and eventually makes a pearl. reap the value. The metaphorical pearl- It’s nice to think that what was once an making process is long and uncomfortable. irritant can become a thing of beauty and Often the pearls (those things of great lasting value. The trouble is that the value to our organizations, families. or 2 society as a whole) will be harvested at Not many of us. But perhaps we should great personal cost and sacrifice. How take that risk. Eventuallv, the oyster will many of us are vvilling to produce pearls die anyway. The pearl and its value will under those conditions? How many of us remain for years. are willing to risk personal pain and loss I think l’d rather leave even one pearl for a better way and a better Air Force? behind. lt’s better than an emptv shell. GDF Letters to the editor are encouraged. AU corre- airlift missions. These units control current spondence should be addressed to the Editor, operations and process requests for unplanned Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, sorties. Preplanned sorties, including interdic- Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. ITe reserve the tion and strategic strike missions. are scheduled right to edit the material for overall length. and coordinated directly bv the air operations center (AOC). Thats where the problem is. Air- craft on ground alert for air defense or close air COMMA.VD AND CONTROL CONCERNS support can be scrambled in minutes. Interdic- tion sorties have to be spelled out detail for 1 agree that Air Force command and control (C-) detail in the air tasking order (ATO), more than a could be speeded up and made more flexible and dav in advance. It's not the C2 system that slows survivable. but 1 think that lst Lt Gary A. Vin- down responsiveness—it 's the lack of one. Flex- cent's article on “A New Approach to Command ible, responsive interdiction/strike missions and Control: The Cybernetic Design" (Summer could be planned and executed by a composite 1993) takes changes too far. He wants to combine wing tailored for them. Another approach implicit C* with improved Computer technologv would be to create the ground attack control cen- to completely overhaul C2 as we know it. Implicit ter. which up till novv has been a footnote hid- C2—embodied in mission orders. a shared under- den in Tactical Air Command and Air Combat standing of the commander’s intent. and trust for Command regulations. Any system that speeds subordinate commanders—is a great idea. It up the planning cycle would make offensive air could be called “total qualitv warfare.” Improved operations much more flexible. computers and Communications are also an excel- In many system training exercises at a CRC, lent idea that would let the theater air control Sys- one thing that slowed air defense execution tem (TACS) achieve its full potential. The prob- time in TACS vvas waiting for permission from lem occurs when Lieutenant Vincent suggests the tactical air control center (TACC, novv removing all layers of authority from TACS and AOC) 1o scramble, conunit, and shoot. As with the US Army except for theater headquarters and any other mission. having AOC trv to do every- flights or companies. which he considers “basic thing just slows the whole system down. action units" (BAU). The resulting svstem would Lieutenant Vincenfs desire to implement be slower and less able to execute implicit C2. implicit C2. including mission-type orders. Currently. TACS consists of basically inde- conflicts with his desire to take layers of com- pendent svstems for air superioritv (control and mand out of the loop. The trouble is. if one reporting center |CRC], forward air control post gives mission orders to a company or flight.