Airpower Journal: Winter 1993, Volume VII, No. 4

Wlnter 1993 JOURNAL • Space Power Survivability • The Art of Intelligence Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila E. Widnall

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak

Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Henry Viccellio, |r.

Commander, Air University Lt G e n J a y VV. K e l l e y

Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Paul R. Dordal

Editor Lt Col Ri chard B. Clark

Associate Editor Maj Gwendolvn D. Favne

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor M a r v i n VV. B a s s e t t . Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst. Director ofA rt and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Thomas L. Hovvell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal. published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on militarv doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con- strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force. Air Edu- cation and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If thev are reproduced, the A irpower Journal requests a courtesy line.

JOURNAL Winter 1993, Vol. VII, No. 4 AFRP 10-1

Editorial 2

Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present Maj Jason B. Barlow, USAF 4 The Art of Intelligence, by the General Edited by Col Gary D. Payton, USAF 16

Space Power Survivability Dr Colin S. Gray 27

Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job? Maj J. C. Cantrell III, USAF Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr., USAF 43

Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Debate Col Richard Szafranski, USAF 55

The Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping Dr Steven Metz 6 8

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 8 4 Index 87 Contributors 9 5 EDITORIAL______Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty Give unto me, made lowly wise, The spirit o f self-sacrifice. —Wordsworth, “Ode to Duty”

** I IFE’S A b______, a n d t h e n you d i e . ” recipient of that oh-so-wondrous pearl L VVell, that just about sums it up, isn’t the same creature that had to suffer doesn’t it? It’s not easy being in the Air with the irritant for who knows how long! Force these days. It’s not just the fact that I don’t believe Fve ever heard a comment we have fevver people and not as many on what the oyster gets out of the pearl- dollars to work vvith. W e’ve faced that making bargain. issue before. No, the difficulty is that Think about it. If the sand is an irritant, everything's changing, and everything’s isn’t the pearl simply a bigger annoyance? just so . . . indefinite. Perhaps the AFSC After all, the oyster keeps secreting the you’ve devoted your whole career to went mother-of-pearl, and the pearl just gets away. Or your wing was deactivated, and bigger and bigger. Admittedly, the oys- you volunteered (and were turned down) ter’s central nervous system isn’t particu- for X number of jobs on the bulletin board. larly sophisticated, but it would seem we Or worse, the uncertainty of your future in could associate some pain with wrenching the Air Force due to the threat of an the oyster apart to extract the pearl. And impending______(RIF, passover, SERB— what happens to the oyster after the pearl you fill in the blank) makes you wonder is harvested? Well, I'm not a marine biol- about the efficacy of gambling away ogist, a philosopher, or someone who another year with the Air Force . . . or a makes a living off oysters, so I don’t have s e p a r a t i o n b o n u s . . . o r a n o t h e r as s i g n - those answers (nor do I want them). But I m e n t . . . ad i n f i n i t u m . I f yo u h a p p e n to do know that the oyster doesn’t have a complain too much, some optimist quotes choice about whether to make a pearl. you a sugarv platitude like, “If life hands Fate gives it an irritant, it makes a pearl, you lemons. make lemonade”—as if you and we humans reap the benefits— liter- didn’t have a right to be angry and resent- ally. ful. As with the oyster, irritants force them- VVell, perhaps you do have reasons for selves into our professional and personal being angry and resentful. But you also lives every day. Some of these intrusions have a choice— although it’s not necessar- aren’t merely irritants but full-scale catastro- ily an easy one to make. Fve often heard phes which, through no fault of our own, motivational speakers use the pearl-mak- cause us and others great personal suffering. ing capabilitv of the oyster as an example Unlike the oyster, WE have a choice. We to inspire higher performance. An oyster don’t have to accept the pearl-making responds to a grain of sand intruding into process. We can refuse or resist or com- its closed ecosystem by secreting a solu- plain it away. Or we can give in and make tion called mother-of-pearl, which covers a pearl, even if we aren’t the ones who’ll the irritant and eventually makes a pearl. reap the value. The metaphorical pearl- It’s nice to think that what was once an making process is long and uncomfortable. irritant can become a thing of beauty and Often the pearls (those things of great lasting value. The trouble is that the value to our organizations, families. or

2 society as a whole) will be harvested at Not many of us. But perhaps we should great personal cost and sacrifice. How take that risk. Eventuallv, the oyster will many of us are vvilling to produce pearls die anyway. The pearl and its value will under those conditions? How many of us remain for years. are willing to risk personal pain and loss I think l’d rather leave even one pearl for a better way and a better Air Force? behind. lt’s better than an emptv shell. GDF

Letters to the editor are encouraged. AU corre- airlift missions. These units control current spondence should be addressed to the Editor, operations and process requests for unplanned Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, sorties. Preplanned sorties, including interdic- Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. ITe reserve the tion and strategic strike missions. are scheduled right to edit the material for overall length. and coordinated directly bv the air operations center (AOC). Thats where the problem is. Air- craft on ground alert for air defense or close air COMMA.VD AND CONTROL CONCERNS support can be scrambled in minutes. Interdic- tion sorties have to be spelled out detail for 1 agree that Air Force command and control (C-) detail in the air tasking order (ATO), more than a could be speeded up and made more flexible and dav in advance. It's not the C2 system that slows survivable. but 1 think that lst Lt Gary A. Vin- down responsiveness—it 's the lack of one. Flex- cent's article on “A New Approach to Command ible, responsive interdiction/strike missions and Control: The Cybernetic Design" (Summer could be planned and executed by a composite 1993) takes changes too far. He wants to combine wing tailored for them. Another approach implicit C* with improved Computer technologv would be to create the ground attack control cen- to completely overhaul C2 as we know it. Implicit ter. which up till novv has been a footnote hid- C2—embodied in mission orders. a shared under- den in Tactical Air Command and Air Combat standing of the commander’s intent. and trust for Command regulations. Any system that speeds subordinate commanders—is a great idea. It up the planning cycle would make offensive air could be called “total qualitv warfare.” Improved operations much more flexible. computers and Communications are also an excel- In many system training exercises at a CRC, lent idea that would let the theater air control Sys- one thing that slowed air defense execution tem (TACS) achieve its full potential. The prob- time in TACS vvas waiting for permission from lem occurs when Lieutenant Vincent suggests the tactical air control center (TACC, novv removing all layers of authority from TACS and AOC) 1o scramble, conunit, and shoot. As with the US Army except for theater headquarters and any other mission. having AOC trv to do every- flights or companies. which he considers “basic thing just slows the whole system down. action units" (BAU). The resulting svstem would Lieutenant Vincenfs desire to implement be slower and less able to execute implicit C2. implicit C2. including mission-type orders. Currently. TACS consists of basically inde- conflicts with his desire to take layers of com- pendent svstems for air superioritv (control and mand out of the loop. The trouble is. if one reporting center |CRC], forward air control post gives mission orders to a company or flight. the (FACPI, airborne warning and control system mission has Io he company- or ilight-sized. If lAWACSJ) and close air support (air support the theater commander has a larger problem. he operations center (ASOC). tactical air control or she has to break it down into smaller prob- party (TACP|, airborne battlefield command and lems. and then down into BAU-sized missions control center [ABCCCI). A separate system (air- suitable for relatively junior commanders. For lift control center [ALCC|. airlift control element |ALCE|. combat control team |CCT|) supports continued on page 81

3 STRATEGIC PARALYSIS A N AIR POWER STRATEGY FOR THE PRESENT

M a | Jaso n B. Bar l ow , USAF

The most complete and happy victory is this: HE MILITARY has long sought a to compel one's enemy to give up his purpose, quick and economical decision in while suffering no harm oneself. battle. Leaders of armed forces the —Count Belisarius world over continue to search for Tthe perfect maneuver, the right terrain, or the ideal weapon that promises victory at To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the lowest possible cost in terms of blood the least exposure to ourselves, is a military and treasure. Is modern air power what axiom lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of victory. they are looking for? Precise aerial warfare—although not suited for every con- —Dennis Hart Mahan flict—does offer certain distinct advantages over the more traditional forms of // a battle can be won without suffering loss, surely this is the most economical, if not the most traditional, way of gaining the strategical object. —John Frederick Charles Fuller STRATEGIC PARALYSIS 5 war. This article suggests an independent ing such change and the role of air power strategv for the application of air power— in this process. Because strategic paraly- strategic paralysis—and discusses the con- sis calls for attacking or threatening ditions necessary for its success.1 national-level targets that most directly Some readers will dismiss this article as support the enemy's war-making efforts just another parochial piece on air power. and will to continue the conflict, this Be that as it may, the military can no strategy holds promise for changing the longer afford to divide everv budget and enemy’s behavior at a relatively low cost every conflict equallv. True joint warfare to both sides. Air power is the primary demands recognition of the most appropri- weapon of this strategy because only it can ate and capable force for each situation provide the access, mass, persistence, and and requires us to look hard at our future simultaneity of attack needed to induce requirements and employment strategies. paralysis. The Gulf War of 1991—notable for technological achievements and the willingness to use them correctly—marked air power’s coming of age. Failure to recognize air power’s maturity or decisiveness in this war— or to downplay its potential in the next— is as mvopic as suggesting that air power can totally replace land or sea forces. Most military theorists agree that the objective of any military conflict is to change the enemy governmenfs behavior. What is not so clear is the means of effect- 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Strategies Two fundamental strategies of warfare are attrition and annihilation (fig. I ).2 On the one hand, attrition warfare seeks victorv by exhausting the enemy in time, space, energy, and supplies. Because attrition warfare rarely leads to a quick. decisive victory, it is an unappealing choice for a war strategy. On the other hand, annihilation is the strategy of choice because it implies superiority over an adversary. One side seeks (or is capable of) the complete destruction of the other. But this form of wrar is often lengthy, Figure 1. Traditional Strategies of War costly, indiscriminate, and hard to control. Both strategies are linked by some increase in military force or war-fighting hilation. Unlike these strategies, strategic paralysis calls for precise aerial attacks capability vis-à-vis an opponent; this against an enemy’s most vital targets to increase serves to elevate attrition to anni- paralvze his ability to continue the conflict and perhaps even break his will to do so. The idea of paralyzing the enemy has many historical antecedents.3 In the 1950s, for example, Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart saw paralyzing an enemy by air as a way to win wars at the lowest possible cost: “It is thus more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting. . . . A strategist should think in terms of paralysis, not killing.” Liddell Hart argued that the resulting “psychological pressure on the government of a countrv may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command—so that the sword drops from a paralyzed hand.” His analysis of war showed “that while the nominal strength of a country is represented by its numbers and resources. this muscular development is dependent on the State of its internai organs and nerve-svstem— upon its stabilitv of control, morale, and supply.”4 Liddell Hart’s ideas are signifi-

During World War II, the skies over Germany witnessed a deadly battle of attrition; however, when Germany lost the air war, it lost the war. Here. a B 24 flies over its smoking target—an oil refinery at Dlechhammer, Germany. STRATEGIC PARALYSIS 7

^^^erdictionj^ C^Strategic Attack^ ([Close Air Support}

(^ANNIHILATION Air superiority Counterforce and countervalue .Mi! , 11. ^ Strategy of overwhelming force

AEROSPACE ÍCONTROL Counterair QATTRITION Counterspace Figure 2. Air Power Framework for the Traditiona! Strategies of War cant in their recognition of increasingly side fought for control. Thus, the intro- important leveis within any government. duction of modern bombers in World War Because strikes at the higher leveis have II simply moved the bloody trenches of the most impact, one can induce national World War I to 25,000 feet. When the Ger- or strategic paralvsis by selecting targets mans lost the battle for the air, they lost carefully. the war. Strategic paralysis, then, constitutes a Neither solely annihilative nor solely significant departure from the more tradi- attritive, strategic paralysis is distin- tional views of war. As we shall see, the guished by a qualitative—not quantita- success of this strategy depends upon four tive—change in force or capability. That key elements that determine its relative is, because one attacks the enemy any- strength or weakness: (1) aerospace con- where, anytime, with a simultaneity and trol, (2) technology, (3) vulnerable infra- guaranteed precision that ensures few structure. and (4) vital targets. casualties,6 the strategy holds the promise—thanks to technology—of resolving conflict at a levei of destruction far Aerospace Control short of complete annihilation. Control of the air5 is fundamental to any successful militarv—let alone air—operation (fíg. 2). Although air power thinkers Technology recognized the importance of air superiority early on. warriors often found it hard High technology makes possible an alter- to achieve. The advent of large aerial native to the strategy of annihilation (fig. forces in World War II did little to change 3).7 Such innovations as precision guided this reality. Despite the high praise munitions, cruise missiles, global posi- accorded aircraft, they did not ensure vic- tioning systems, and stealthy airplanes tory. Before airplanes could drop their now give air power the penetrative capa- bombs, they had to be able to reach their bility, persistence, and specialized targets; consequently, one of the largest weaponry necessary to directly attack an aerial attrition campaigns ever waged took enemy’s strategic centers with devastating place in the skies over Germany. as each accuracy. 8 AIR POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Aim is to paralyze enemy STRATEGIC and force an early solution PARALYSIS^ TECHNOLOGY Targets key national elements of value Is of shortest dura- ( ^ A NNIHILATION tion and is least bloody

AEROSPACE í CONTROL ATTRITION

Figure 3. Air Power Framework for War Strategies

The Gulf War was not the first conflict calibre rifle bullets indiscriminately into in which the US sought to employ a strat- an elephant all day, and he will still be egy similar to strategic paralysis. For on his feet at night. One aimed shot, example, the US began World War II with however, will knock him to his a doctrine that advocated the daylight pre- knees.”11 Technology now allows us to cision bombing of Germany’s industrial- take that aimed shot. ized centers as a way to force Germany into ending the war. But the available airplanes, bombs, and navigational instru- Vulnerable Infrastructure ments (i.e., the technology) did not mea- If strategic paralysis is to attain quick vic- sure up.8 Indeed. because accuracy and tory by applying technologically superior ordnance were so poor, targets had to be air power, planners must identify impor- attacked heavilv and often. For example, tant, vulnerable targets.12 Such targets are 108 B-17s were required to achieve a 96 readily found in a modem, industrialized percent probability of kill on a power- society that relies on a fixed and vulnera- station switching yard measuring 400' x ble infrastructure. For example, because 500 V It comes as no snrprise, then, tbat Iraq’s bridges, communication centers, Air War Plans Division— Plan 1 (AYVPD-1) power production stations, and water called for 6,860 bombers to destroy only plants were strategically important and 154 targets. The situation was no better extremely vulnerable to air attack, thev for B-29s in the Pacific, where “only were nearly ideal targets for a strategic 50% of [thej total aircraft dispatched paralysis campaign. In fact, the air cam- would successfully attack a given target paign in Operation Desert Storin carne as a n d . . . o n l y 2 5 % o f th e b o m b s d r o p p e d close to fulfilling this strategy as any cam- (or 12% of the total bombs dispatched) paign ever conducted, a fact acknowl- would fali within a 1000 foot radius of edged by Secretary of the Air Force Don- the aim ing p oin t.”10 As one writer ald B. Rice, who noted the Air Force's observed about war, “You can fire small- “abilitv to paralyze our adversaries’ war- S TH A TEGIC PA HA L YSIS 9

fighting ability as air power did in Opera- national elements of value (NEV)15 can tion Desert Storm.”13 paralyze the enemy government, one should concentrate one’s air power resources exclusively on those targets. Vital Targets Given their importance, NEVs deserve Target selection lies at the heart of mili- closer examination. tary doctrine and theorv. lf aiming your effort—as Carl von CÍausewitz would sav— is important for the ground com- National Elements mander, it is much more so for the air of Value commander because air power is expensive and precious.14 Air power can put an Ideally, one should direct air attacks enormous amount of fire on an enemy against a vulnerable, vital element of the position. but it is costly and difficult to enemy’s national structure, and this ele- sustain. Hitting an insignificant target ment should consist of only a few targets. with a bomb that has been flown 3,000 Understanding and identifying these tar- nautical miles is wasteful. Strategic paralysis sensibly assumes that every country Technology allows us to move from a strategy of has some targets that are more important annihilation to one of strategic paralysis. Precision guided munitions and stealthy aircraft now give air than others in terms of sustaining the power penetrative capability, delivery accuracy, enemv’s capability or will to wage war. persistence. and specialized weaponry to attack an Because the destruction of these targets or enemy s strategic centers. 10 AIR POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993 gets is as much an art as it is a Science. If zations as the Air Corps Tactical School a country is to be considered a sovereign and the German Luftwaffe (in World War power, it must enjoy at least four instru- II). Seven NEVs in particular are notewor- ments of national power or influence: thy: (1) leadership, (2) industry, (3) armed political. economic, military, and informa- forces, (4) population, (5) transportation, tional.16 Since some aspects of these four (6) Communications, and (7) alliances. instruments are also sources of strength in These seven are important because they war, they should be targeted. delineate a country’s sources of strength These types of targets have already been and identify the target sets necessary for identified by such people as Clausewitz, the country’s defeat. In theory, one can Henri de Jomini, Giulio Douhet, Gen induce paralysis on a strategic scale by VVilliam (“Billy”) Mitchell, Liddell Hart, neutralizing the right combination of these and Col John YVarden, and by such organi- elements. It is important to understand that NEVs are interdependent and can compensate National elements of value are important because they for each other.17 One problem with the identify a countrys sources of strength as potential historical view of air power targeting the- targets. One of our NEVs—our leadership—is represented here by President Clinton and top military and ory is the notion that the destruction of a civilian officials. single target or target set can bring down STfíATEGIC PARALYSIS 11 entire countries (e.g., the bombing of the bali bearing industrv in Germany in World 1. Leadership War II). This premise generallv has no 2. Industry basis in fact. A more realistic approach is 3. Armed Forces to assume some sort of dvnamic interac- 4. Population tion among NEVs (fig. 4). Although a sin- 5. Transportation gle NEV might be more important than others at a given moment. it is still 6. Communications affected bv the others. The elimination of 7. Alliances anv NEV will destabilize the others. individuais important enough to be NEVs (e.g.. modern-dav dictators) are rare these days.18 The destruction of one target (or target set) could be enough to collapse an enemy government, depending on the importance of the NEV and the speed and thoroughness of its destruction. as well as Figure 4. Model of Dynamic National Elements of the dependence. resiliency, and speed of compensation of the other NEVs in rela- Value tion to it. This notion of replenishment and sub- war, then so can its most important tar- stitution (i.e., the ability of an NEV to gets. At best, depicting something as an increase in importance/size, to reposition NEV is accurate only at the time of the itself, etc.) is especially important.19 For “snapshot." Therefore, what might have example, if a countrv’s industrv were crip- been a criticai target at the beginning of pled bv enemy attacks, a suitably moti- the war might not be later on. Because vated and effective leader could rallv his some elements can increase in importance population to work harder and thereby (e.g., bv compensating for the weaknesses compensate for the loss. If the leader were of others), one must continually reevaluate killed, however, the svstem would have to them during the conflict. The same is true compensate. Clearly, democratic govern- of alliances, whose security guarantees, ments with established rules of succession Communications links, shared religious are more likely to survive this type of and cultural beliefs, and economic ties are assault. But work-arounds and efforts at also likely to change during a conflict. substitution can go only so far, especially One need only look at the complex coali- when attacks occur across a wide spec- tion in Operation Desert Storm (and Sad- trum of NEVs. The strategic trauma asso- dam’s strategy to defeat it) to appreciate ciated with such strikes cannot easily be the importance of understanding the value compensated for. regardless of one’s and vulnerabilities inherent in any preparation. Some people have compared alliance. such wide-ranging attacks to a type of Although every country has the same nationwide torture (i.e.. "death bv a thou- NEVs, their relative importance changes— sand cuts”).20 depending on the circumstances. Such Thinking in terms of NEVs instead of was the view of Maj Muir S. Fairchild, an centers of gravitv offers several benefits. instructor at the Air Corps Tactical For instance, while everv country pos- School, who wrote in April 1938 that sesses all seven NEVs, no two countries each nation differs from all other nations, not will have the same strategic target sets. If only in its degree of vulnerability to air a country's NEVs can wax and wane in attack, but also in the kind of vulnerability; 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

that is to say in the elements of its national rational decisions. One cannot expect to structure that are most vulnerable to this sort exert much influence on an enemy who of an attack. One nation is weak and vulner- places no value on the targets attacked. able in one respect and strong in another— Thus, in order to avoid wasted effort, the while the exact opposite may be true of its attacker must understand how the enemy neighbor [emphasis in original].21 values his assets. Air Comdr Jasjit Singh NEVs mirror each country’s interna- contends that “the aim of strategic air tional status in industrial, social, cultural, power is Ithe] destruction, disruption and and political development because they dislocation of the enemy war-waging comprise the very elements which convey machine in its totality so as to . . . increase such status. NEVs may also reside outside the costs of waging war to an unacceptable the geographical boundaries of the country levei.” In other words, the enemy must in question. During Desert Storm, for value his costs and unacceptable leveis in example, Saddam saw IsraeFs relationship a way that is predictable or understand- with the US and other members of the able.23 A rational enemy will give up only coalition as a vulnerability and tried to when the costs of continuing the conflict exploit the situation by directing the outweigh any potential benefits. Air majority of his Scud missile attacks not at power’s toughest challenge (as Douhet the coalition but at Israel. Fortunately (for found out) may be in educating future a number of reasons), he was unsuccessful adversaries in the fact that loss of the air in fragmenting the coalition, but the strate- means loss of the conflict. gic outcome probably would have been Last, first-class intelligence is vital to different, had he succeeded. the selection of NEVs, for air power is tar- NEVs are also more vulnerable when geting and targeting is intelligence.24 It is they are highly developed. Thus, the especially important to a strategy of strate- higher a country’s position on the indus- gic paralysis because precision weapons trial ladder, the more likely its NEVs will require precise intelligence. It would be be vulnerable to air power attack. Over 50 foolish to load an airplane with laser years ago, Maj Alexander P. de Seversky guided bombs and send it off against a city observed that “total war from the air without any specific targets in mind. against an undeveloped country or region Without good intelligence, one will waste is well-nigh futile; it is one of the curious effort, extend conflict, and increase costs. features of the most modern weapon that As Charles de Gaulle observed, “A general it is especially effective against the most with an excellent army most carefully modern types of civilization.”22 deployed for battle will yet be defeated if The characteristics of a country’s infra- he is insufficiently informed about the structure are the key to its vulnerability. enemy.”25 For example, transportation is essential to any country’s ability to sustain itself in combat. However, using aircraft to attack Limitations of Strategic men and materiais that are moving along Paralysis jungle trails is considerably more difficult than attacking more modern rail, road, and Despite the appeal of a strategy of strate- air transportation systems. The same gic paralysis, one must be aware that a holds true for Communications. Runners diminishment of any of the four elements carrying messages are far less susceptible criticai to its success—especially technol- to systematic air attack than are telephone ogy and aerospace control—could have an lines or microwave towers. adverse effect on the strategy (fig. 5). A Another consideration that has a bearing “loss” of technology, for example. could on NEVs is the enemy’s proclivity to make lead to a less discriminating war of annihi- STRA TEGIC PAR AL YS1S 13

lation.26 In this instance, one doesn’t lose cause, loss of aerospace control eliminates aerospace control—only the abilitv to any hope of strategically paralyzing the attack precisely. This situation could enemy. occur if an enemy becomes able to employ an effective countermeasure for a wide range of our precision guided munitions Conclusion or cruise missiles. (In the future, this might entail nothing more than interfering Would any country other than the with our global positioning system, on United States be interested in pursuing a which our weapons and airplanes are strategy of strategic paralysis? First, the likely to become more dependent.) strategy should appeal to any country More serious is a loss of aerospace con- seeking a quicker victory at a relatively trol, which could lead to a war of attrition. lower cost. However, the requisite ele- This situation could occur if an enemy ments of high technology and aerospace becomes able to detect and destroy our control likely put the strategy beyond the stealthv aircraft, a situation that would means of all but the most technologically force us to regain the skies (i.e., work advanced and wealthy countries. Second, through the attrition stage) before we the strategy should appeal to any country could continue with either annihilation or seeking to minimize civilian and military strategic paralysis. casualties and to preserve human rights. Aerospace control might also be lost by However, such considerations are usually nontechnical means, including the failure irrelevant to aggressor nations, who would to logistically maintain the precision likely perceive strategic paralysis as a weapons or airframes required for air strategy of weakness. superiority. or the imposition of politi- Further, strategic paralysis is not suited cally motivated restrictions that limit the for every situation. A rogue country that exploitation of our strengths or the is aggressively pursuing territory is not enemv's weaknesses. Regardless of the likely to benefit from this strategy because 14 A1RPOWEB JOURNAL WINTER 1993 the territory it desires would have to be never known such a small rate of loss in comparison to the popuiation of the nation, taking into consideration the mag- occupied. Clearly, the need for aerospace nitude of these great bombing battles and the effect they are control makes strategic paralysis an offen- having in shortening the war." Air Marshal Sir Hugh M. sive strategy. One cannot imagine an Trenchard. "The Effect of the Rise of Air Power on War,” in Air Power. Three Papers (London: Air Ministry, Directorate attacker (certainly not after the Gulf War) of Staff Duties, 1946), 10, 12. allowing his opponent to gain and main- 7. 1 am indebted to Maj Nick Clemens and Col Phil Meilinger of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, tain aerospace control (or attacking at all Maxwell AFB, Ala., for helping distill and nurture this con- with inferior air power assets). cept. But strategic paralysis is suited for the 8. Although lhe US Strategic Bombing Survev and many air power advocates argue that we were in fact successful in US military, which prefers to fight wars as our bombing strategy of strategic paralysis against the Ger- quickly, inexpensively, and bloodlessly mans, our victory required the occupation of Germany and (on both sides) as possible. High-tech air the nearlv complete annihilation of the German armed forces and economy. Certainly. this was no sirnple paralysis. power makes this strategy feasible. Attri- 9. Briefing. Headquarters USAF. subject: The Air Cam- tion and annihilation are no longer the paign from Close to the Mirror. 9 February 1992. 10. Lt Col Thomas A. Fabyanic, Strategic Air Attack in the only strategies available to the military United States Air Force: A Case Study. Professional Study commander. Strategic paralysis has come no. 5899 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1976). of age. 64. 84. 104-6; Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, Air Bom- bardment: The Story of Its Development (New York: Harper Brothers, 1961), 21-26; and Robert F. Futrell, The United Notes States Air Force in Korea. 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: 1. Only 16 years after the VVright brothers' first flight, Col Government Printing Office, 1983), 130. John Frederick Charles Fuller discussed "Strategic Paralysis 11. William Bradford Huie, The Fight for Air Power (New as the Object of the Decisive Attack," in On Future Warfare York: American Book-Stratford Press, Inc.. 1942), 261-62. (London: Sifton Praed and Co., Ltd., 1928). 83. 2. See Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Anni- hilation (London: Greenwood Press, 1986). 177. Wallach credits German historian Hans Delbruck with introducing the term attrition strategy and describes attrition as the opposite of annihilation. See also Hans Delbruck. "On the Con- trast between the Strategies of Attrition and Annihilation,” in History of the Art of War. vol. 4. The Dawn o f Modern Warfare. trans. VV. I. Renfroe, )r. (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 439-44. 108-9: and Carl von Clausewitz, On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton. N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 384. 3. Brig Gen William ("Billy") Mitchell. Giulio Douhet, and Gen Sir Edward Bruce Hamely, as well as the Air Corps Tac- tical School and the German Luftwaffe (along with many others). refer to air power's ability to paralyze an enemv. 4. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954; reprint, New York: Penguin Books. 1991). 212. 5. Control of the air is usually thought of as air superiority or air supremacy and is attained bv sheer firepower or overwhelming force, or is inherent in the weapon system used. For example. a s'tealth aircraft brings its own tvpe of air superiority to the Fight and does not engage in the traditional Fight for access that is normally associated with gaining and maintaining air superiority. 6. In theorv. wars conducted according to strategic paralysis can end relatively early because of low costs on both sides. If losses are already high in annihilative or attritive wars. ít may be much harder for the enemy to stop the conflict and save face than it would be if civilian casualties and damage were relatively light. As Sir Hugh M. Trenchard observed, "Air can carry much more destruction to the enemy per man with a minimum loss of life than any other form of warfare. . . . Though the cost of life and limb of the bomber crews may on occasion be heavy, the world has STRA TEGIC PAR AL YSIS 15

12. This is not to say that air power has no role in low- 16. Some wrilers describe the informalional instrument of intensity conflict with countries that have no vulnerable power as either social or psychological. See Joint Pub 3-07. infrastructures. On the contrary. air power offers Solutions Doctrine for )oint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (test along the full spectrum of conflict. A more legitimate ques- pub), October 1990,1-7. tion would concem the role of air power in a large-scale con- 17. NEVs are not centers of gravity. Clausewitz defined ventional conflict against a third world nation with a mini- cenler of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on mal infrastructure, such as Vietnam. which everything depends. That is the point against which 13. Julie Bird. "Rice: New Capabilities Are Needed," Air all our energies should be direcled.” Clausewitz. 596. He Force Times. 11 November 1991. 6. rocognized that more than one cenler could exist and that 14. Clausewitz. 486. When air power resources are plenti- nonphysical entities such as public opinion and altiances ful. target selection is easy. "However wheri the power could be centers of gravity. However, Clausewitz does not resources are scarce, criticai target selection is more difficult. address the concept of interaction between them. Not only must the comparative worth of lhe targets be mea- 18. "Non-democratic regimes usually have unreliable sured. but the available strike resources must be measured arrangements for the legitimate transfer of power. and doubts and allocated against them." Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 200- about how it can be accotnplished smoothly tnay increase 17. An Introduction to Air Force Targeting. 11 October 1978, the longer a single leader lasts in office. There is a wide- 9-2. Modern aerospace resources are very expensive, hard to spread presumption that countries ruled for extended peri- replace. and subject to a multitude of abuses bv people who ods by authoritarian leaders degenerate inlo chãos when don't understand them. Thev must be conserved by caring those rulers die and their special personal status no longer and competent airmen. See the note on "Economy of Force” holds the lid on their countries' tensions. II is. however, also in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of possible to assume the contrary.” Richard K. Betts and the United States Air Force. vol. 1. March 1992,16. Samuel P. Huntington. "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: 15. NEVs were called “vital centers" by Ciulio Douhet. Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political “vital targets" by Gen Curtis LeMay, "decisive strategic Instability?" International Security, Winter 1985-1986, 112. poínts" by Henri de Jomini. “panacea targets" by Air Chief This article does not address the overthrow or death of the Marshal Sir Arthur (“Bomber") Harris, "Achilles' heels” bv leader in a coup d'état. which is one of the possible out- Liddell Hart, "nerve centers" by Billy Mitchell, and "centers comes of the strategy of strategic paralysis. of gravitv" by Clausewitz. Thev were all referring to the 19. See Mancur Olson. )r.. The Economics of Wartime same thing. Shortage (1963; reprint, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1991), 17. 20. Col John A. YVarden 111, “What Aerospace Lessons Should We Carrv into lhe Future from the Gulf War?" presentation to conference on Aerospace Power's Role in Ameri- can National Security, Crvstal City. Va., 16 March 1993. 21. Maj Muir S. Fairchild, "The New York Industrial Area," lecture no. AF-llC, Air Corps Tactical School, 6 April 1938, 1, document no. 248.2019A-12, USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala. See also idem, "Pri- mary Strategic Objectives of Air Forces," lecture no. AF-14C, Air Corps Tactical School. 11 April 1938. 6, document no. 248.2019A-14. USAF Historical Research Agencv, Maxwell AFB. Ala. 22. Maj Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1942). 101-2. 23. Air Comdr Jasjit Singh, Air Power in Modern Warfare (New Delhi: Lancer International. 1985), xxxi. 24. See also AFP 200-22, Targeting: Profession and Process, 12 May 1989. 25. Charles de Gaulle, The Edge o f the Sword. trans. Ger- ard Hopkins (New' York: Criterion Books. 1960), 80. 26. Theoretically. one could still paralyze an enemy with nonprecise (annihilative) weapons, but such attacks would be costlier and bloodier than those with precision weapons.

A continuous flow of intelligence is necessary for successful strategic air warfare. Here, Intelsat VI is about to be captured by the crew of the space shuttle Endeavour Crew members added a new motor, giving the satellite more boost and maneuverability. HIS ESSAY IS the “final product” THE ART OF of a future deputy chief of staff for intelligence, United States Air INTELL1GENCE, Force. The author, an unnamed Tgeneral, enjoyed an almost 30-year career as an intelligence officer spanning 1987 to by the GENERAL the spring of 2017. Faced with the impact of the information explosion on the quan- Edited by Col Gar y D. Pavt o n, USAF tity of “raw data” available to intelligence professionals, he undertook a project to distill intelligence to its very essence. The principies and tenets described here form the fundamental truths of the art. Now the reason the enllghtened prince and the Styled in the manner of Sun Tzu’s clas- wlse general conquer the enemy whenever they sic The Art of War, as translated by move and thelr achlevements surpass those of Samuel B. Griffith, and using the same ordinary men Is foreknowledge. technique of assertion and expert com- —Sun Tzu mentary, this essay describes the princi- ARTOFINTELLIGENCE 17

pies and tenets of intelligence that are uni- gic Command, the general watched and versal across time and stand the test of learned how intelligence supported—or changing technology. failed to support—military commanders. His experience with the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing in Saudi Arabia during BIOGRAPHY OF THE Operation Desert Storm anchored his GENERAL entire career. As a junior officer, he devoted months at Royal Air Force (RAF) The ultimate objective o f intelligence is to Lakenheath in England to gaining the enable action to be optimized. confidence of the pilots and weapons Sys- —Dr R. V. Jones tems officers who flew the venerable Chief. British Scientific Aardvark.2 During the prewar buildup, he Intelligence, World War II and his enlisted intelligence specialists The general died Monday while TDY to honed their skills in building target fold- San Antonio. His last day in the Pentagon ers, briefing and debriefing crews, and was like hundreds of others—quick providing the wing commander with com- reviews of intelligence background papers prehensive intelligence reports on Saddam for the chief, planning for the upcoming Hussein’s forces. But when the air war Sênior Intelligence Officers’ Conference, began, nothing he could do at the unit and telephone calls regarding the place- levei could get poststrike satellite imagery ment of colonels in key positions around of the military targets into their hands fast the Air Force. Late Friday, after he stuffed enough. Their appetite for imagery was the last few folders in his briefcase and insatiable and could not be met.3 Despite turned to leave the office. he flipped the the many successes of intelligence in keys of his locked desk to his executive Desert Storm, a generation of future Air officer. “Just in case!” the general called. Force leaders convinced themselves that “Just in case,” replied the exec as he intelligence failed because they as pilots caught the keys and dropped them into his were unable to get timely pictures of their desk. It was a departure ritual they had strike missions. carried out countless times. This time was In the 1970s and 1980s, when an intelli- the last time. gence officer was characterized by the He had been the best of a new breed of nature of his or her technical training (e.g., intelligence officers—a “generalist” skilled being viewed as a SIGINTer, a photo inter- in intelligence operations and intelligence preter, or a HUMINTer), the opportunity application. Unlike the many deputy and to lead large numbers of Air Force people assistant chiefs of staff for intelligence was not equally available to junior intelli- before him, he had not progressed in a gence officers. When career emphasis and “stovepiped” discipline of signals intelli- training shifted to a “generalist” mode, gence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence, or officers like him began to receive assign- human resources intelligence (HUMINT). ments to key positions across a wide range Rather, the career path he followed had of major commands based on their leader- been envisioned by sênior intelligence ship skills and managerial ability, not just officers in the 1980s and codified by major on their past affiliation with a technical changes to Air Force specialty codes in the specialty. The generaTs future was early 1990S.1 shaped by the breaking down of these his- Across a series of assignments that torie barriers. included wartime duty with an F -lll As a captain, he had served as a flight fighter wing. leadership at a major signals commander at one of the Air Intelligence intelligence collection site, and joint duty Agency’s (AIA) most important overseas on the unified command staff at US Strate- field sites, the 6903d Electronic Security 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Group at Osan Air Base, Korea. He had His daily activities ranged from team been thrust into the role of leading over 40 building and goal setting to working the specialists in their around-the-clock task dozens of personal problems (caused by a of providing vital intelligence support to year’s separation from family in the States) the commander, Seventh Air Force, and to his subordinates brought to him. And, the US and South Korean chain of com- most important, along the way he mand. absorbed the myriad of details associated “Up close and personal" had character- with high-tech intelligence collection. He ized the generaFs leadership opportunity learned the strengths and the weaknesses, in Korea. He had led his flight by per- and he began to ponder the enduring prin- sonal example. He motivated. He dele- cipies and tenets of intelligence in support gated. He empowered. He disciplined. of military operations. Years later, as the US Strategic Com- mand’s director of intelligence, or J-2. the general served in Omaha as a principal advisor to his four-star commander in

In 1982 Israeli Air Force F-16s (left) were part of a successful threat against 17 Syrian missile sites that used SA-6 missiles similar to these (below). Accurate intelligence served as a powerful force enhancer. ART OF 1NTELLIC.ENCE 19

chief on such criticai issues as the Strate- enemy’s secrets while protecting one’s gic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty own.4 III and global weapons of mass destruc- It wasn’t until Thursday, after the major- tion. He recognized clearly the political ity of the details for the Arlington Ceme- impact of his counsel when his military tery funeral were ironed out, that the gen- views on treaty compliance clashed with eral’s executive officer opened the locked those of the Department of State or the desk. Patiently, the exec separated per- Central Intelligence Agency. He saw first- sonal items from official documents and hand how timely and accurate intelligence classified messages. In the bottom drawer shaped policy on issues vital to the secu- in a hanging folder marked “Art’’ that was ritv of the United States. bulging with dozens of yellow highlighted For nearly three decades, the general and annotated articles and clippings, he served as an intelligence officer. From the found the draft manuscript and the illus- aircraft shelters of Saudi Arabia to the trative comments the general had asked halls of the Pentagon, he helped shape his closest confidants to prepare on each intelligence products delivered to com- major subject. manders. From “bombs on target" to The following excerpts of this final national security decision making. he product of the general, The Art o f Intelli- understood the value of piercing the gence, were first published four months after his death.

The Art of Intelligence PRINCIPLES and the economy of combat forces to achieve their objective. Intelligence is an instrument o f conflict. It consists o f words, numbers, images, sugges- The historian: Accurate intelligence serves as a tions, appraisals, incitements. It consists powerful force enhancer. In the largest single also of truths that enlighten or mislead, or of air battle of the second half of the twentieth outright falsehoods. Because it is immaterial, centurv, the Israeli Air Force (1AF) devastated intelligence cannot wound. But its use has the Syrian Air Force on 9 june 1982. To sup- led to the killing or saving o f millions. port “Operation Peace for Galilee,” the IAF's mission was to neutralize Syrian SA-6 sites and —Ângelo Codevilla destroy reacting enemy fighters. At every junc- ture, planning and execution were enhanced by Accuracy accurate intelligence. In the one-year period following the April 1981 introduction of SA-6 The general said: missiles into the Bekaa Valley, Israeli military 1. Accuracy is the prime principie of military intelligence had focused on the new surface-to- intelligence. With accurate intelligence. all air threat. Their successes allowed aircrews to aspects of strategic, operational. and tactical rehearse the strike missions in the Negev planning and execution proceed on the basis of Desert against highly accurate replicas of the fact. Without accurate intelligence on the missile sites. On the day of the attack, superb enemy’s location. capability. and intent. plan- tactical intelligence contributed to success. ning is an unfocused and wasteful exercise, Syrian airspace was scanned by E-2C surveil- and execution may result in defeat. lance aircraft flying off the Lebanese coast. A 2. Accurate intelligence is a necessary condi- Boeing 707 signals intelligence platform moni- tion for victory. It is not. however, a sufficient tored Syrian Communications and radar activ- condition to gain the victory. Intelligence does ity. With F-15 and F-16 pilots flying combat not pilot air and space vehicles, or field armies, air patrols, IAF F-4s armed with Shrike, stan- or sail ships at sea. Instead, intelligence sup- dard antiradiation, and Maverick missiles, and ports the maneuver, the surprise, the security. F-16s loaded with standoff weapons and con- 20 AIRPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1993 ventional munitions attacked 19 SA-6 sites and century. When we solved the data compaction several SA-2 and SA-3 sites. problem of the multispectral imaging satellites, In a superb example of real-time intelligence we could at last take full advantage of virtual application, the IAF strike commander moni- reality (VR).a It had all come together before tored the ongoing operation from video pro- the Iranian military launched the Second Gulf vided by forward orbiting Scout and Mastiff War in 2010.9 Timely intelligence produced a remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). On the first dramatic impact on operational planning and day of the air campaign, 17 SA-6 sites were tactical execution. In the battle cab at the Air destroyed along with several SA-2 and SA-3 Operations Center in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, installations. On 9 June, the Israelis downed the joint force air component commander 23 Syrian MiG-21s and MiG-23s. On 10 }une, (JFACC) swiveled into a VR depiction of his they shot down 15 more MiGs. By the end of next day’s air tasking order. The image genera- September, Israeli pilots had destroyed 29 sur- tors driven by a direct digitized satellite feed face-to-air-missile (SAM) sites in seven raids, produced a detailed, three-diinensional image 85 Syrian MiGs, and had lost only two IAF air- of the air campaign. By selecting the appropri- craft to enemy ground fire.5 Accurate intelli- ate icons, the commander viewed Iranian air gence contributed mightily to this successful defenses, advancing divisions, and ballistic air campaign. missile trajectories. He then overlaid the friendly air attacks accelerated in time. Timeliness In addition to allowing the commander to see his own air forces move across the border to The general said: attack Iranian targets, virtual reality enabled 3. Victory in battle is gained by the side that him to move in space and to have a “God’s operates at the faster tempo or rhythm. The eye” view of how his incoming air and missile timeliness of intelligence contributes directly attack looked from the Iranian commander’s to the commander’s ability to observe, orient, perspective.10 Not only did timely intelligence decide, and act. With timely intelligence, the aid his observation and orientation by creating commander is able to act at a faster tempo, gen- a telepresence of our attack from the Iranian erate confusion and disorder in the adversary, viewpoint, the JFACC could "get inside the and achieve victory. Without timely intelli- mind” of his opposing commander.11 gence, the commander’s observation and orien- Results at the squadron levei were equally tation are delayed. His decisions and actions, impressive. The virtual reality advanced plan- therefore, are slower, and initiative and lever- ning system was based on near-real-time threat age are lost to the enemy.6 data. The imagery intelligence and signals intelligence feeds were linked with weather The engineer: The delivery of evermore timely information and inerged with the mapping data intelligence was a central focus of the intelli- base. In short, aircrews could plan and gence-engineering community in the two rehearse the mission and select weapons decades following the 1991 Persian Gulf War. employment alternatives based on intelligence Our initial combat successes following Desert data collected just minutes prior to takeoff.12 Storm were based on collocating the intelli- Timely intelligence successfully contributed to gence collection and Communications assets of an even faster decision-making tempo. Sus- the Air Intelligence Agency with the air opera- tained across the first weeks of the campaign, tions center of the Air Combat Command the tempo forced the Iranian offensive to col- forces.7 When the 366th Wing at Mountain lapse into itself.13 The remaining leaders in Home AFB, Idaho, deployed to Tunisia in 1995 Tehran complied with all coalition demands in response to the Libyan incursion, AIA’s spe- for conflict termination. cialists worked side by side with the wing’s own intelligence and planning staff. With an organic collection capability and on-line access Usability to national intelligence networks, timely intel- The general said: ligence kept the commander’s decisions and actions inside Libya’s own decision cycle. Our 4. Intelligence must be usable to have value. greatest successes, however, flowed from the If it is not tailored to meet the needs of the engineering breakthroughs at the turn of the commander, intelligence has no usability and AfíT OF1NTELLIGENCE 21

makes no contribution to military planning and that's what his intelligence analysts and mid- execution. dle managers first thought. In fact, his harsh 5. Intelligence is a product. Users of intelli- editorial comments were consistently aimed at gence are customers. If the product delivered making the array of intelligence products more to the customer is unusable, then the cus- usable to the customer. He developed this sim- tomer's intelligence needs go unsatisfied, and ple “Usability Checklist": the production costs of creating the product are 1. Does this intelligence product meet the wasted. customer’s needs? How do you know? How 6. Making intelligence usable is a part of do you know you know? effective marketing. First, determine what the 2. Does it answer the question asked? customer wants and needs. Wants and needs 3. Is the main point “up front”? are not often identical. Second. tailor the intel- 4. Is it as concise as you can get it? ligence-production process to create the agreed-upon product. Third. deliver an accu- Across the spectrum of intelligence products, rate and timely product in a usable format. the general sought to make them usable to the Fourth, ask the customer for feedback on the customer. Does the draft of the National Intel- product’s usability. Fifth, absorb the feedback ligence Estimate provide a focused analysis of and begin again. the issue so the National Security Council can develop a new policy option? Does the esti- The executive officer: I first worked for the mate of an enemy weapon have sufficient general in Omaha. He was a brutal editor, or detail to enable the USAF research and devel-

The use of virtual reality (VR) in the Second Gulf War of 2010 is a prime example of successful intelligence. The JFACC was able to use images generated by direct digitized satellrte feed (left) to produce a detailed three-dimensional image of the results of the next day s air campaign (above). 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993 opment community to plan the Air Force’s The historian: On 1 January 1945, the Luft- next-generation system? Does the current intel- waffe conducted a highly successful attack ligence briefing provide unique insights or (Operation Goldregen) against Allied aircraft information to aid the commander in deciding located on liberated Belgian airfields. In a on a course of action? Is the myriad of elec- postattack assessment, the intelligence staff of tronic order-of-battle information delivered in a the 12th Army Group Headquarters realized usable format to the mission planner, the elec- they had received adequate SIGINT and tronic warfare officer, or the pilot? Is the threat HUMINT reporting to have provided tactical data streaming into the cockpit of the orbiting warning to the commander. The reports, how- F-22 usable in aiding the pilot to conduct his or ever, were not fused. Highly compartmented her defensive counterair mission? Ultra intercepts received before the German A trivial example illustrates the principie of attack indicated Operation Goldregen was usability. The general shocked his Pentagon being launched. The SIGINT specialist had no intelligence staff the day he directed that all knowledge from his source of an Operation written replies to the chiefs questions would Goldregen. Filed elsewhere in the headquar- be limited to two data screens or one printed ters, a prisoner of war interrogation report (an page. He hammered the point. The customer aspect of HUMINT) of a former Luftwaffe needed concise, to-the-point replies directly clerk in Berlin described aspects of Operation answering the question—no room to showcase Goldregen—a plan to employ low-flying air- personal knowledge of air and space power in craft in large numbers. No fusion. Extensive the twenty-first century, and no room to pro- compartmentalization. Single-source intelli- vide flowing prose amplifications of supporting gence information held within “stovepiped” data. Understand the need. Answer directly. structures. Airmen died. Aircraft were Get the main point “up front.” Be concise and destroyed.14 be done. Relevancy The general said: Fusion 10. Intelligence has relevancy if it contributes to the commander’s ability to execute his mis- The general said: sion at his levei of military operation. No mat- 7. Fused intelligence is a finished intelli- ter how accurate, timely, or fused the intelligence product produced from more than one gence is, if it is not germane to the comman- source of intelligence information. Fusion der's needs, it could detract from overall mis- draws upon the complementary strengths of sion accomplishment. signals intelligence (what they said or what 11. What is highly relevant intelligence at their radars emanated), imagery intelligence one levei of military activity may be of limited (what it looks like), human intelligence (infor- relevance at another levei. Intelligence produc- mation derived from a human source revealed tion, therefore, must be geared to meet the dis- through overt or covert collection). tinctive needs of commanders across the full 8. Fused intelligence creates the most accu- spectrum of military operations. rate and complete picture of what is known The wing commander: As the wartime com- about an activity. In the absence of fused intel- mander of an F-125 fighter-bomber wing, I ligence, products are one-dimensional. While faced similar challenges in the Second Gulf the levei of detail in single-source reports may War that my predecessors faced in 1991. Intel- be sufficient to meet narrowly defined cus- ligence must be relevant to the mission it sup- tomer needs, fused reports are essential to gain ports. If the intelligence lacks relevancy, it an in-depth understanding. extracts a price in time required to read it, 9. Because the enemy will try to deceive you, watch it, or be briefed on it. Twenty years ago, guard against placing unquestioned trust in a field commanders criticized much of the Desert single-source intelligence report. What you Storm intelligence as being designed for high- hear, what you see, or what you are told may level policymakers. It was too general, too be a lie or a fabrication. It is far more difficult broad-gauged. Much of what they got at the to be deceived when yòu rely on fused intelli- wing, division, and brigade levei wasn t rele- gence. vant to mission planning and execution.15 ARTOFINTELLIGENCE 23

At my levei, I wanted to know about Iranian supported by facts. The same moral courage targets. When your mission is to kill road- and intellectual honesty must extend to report- mobile Khomeini intermediate-range ballistic ing even what you do not know, no matter how missiles at night, you need intelligence on cam- unpleasant that may be in the short term. ouflage and concealment techniques, dummy 14. Intellectual honesty must drive the intel- launchers, reload and refire capability, and ligence professional to distinguish for the cora- relocation schemes. Therefore. incoming mander those conclusions that are solidly reports on intemational political developments grounded in fact and those that are extrapola- and domestic reactions in foreign capitais are tions or extensions of the fact. The commander not my ideal of relevant intelligence. Don’t get cannot be left with uncertainty in his mind me wTong, I understand the value of such intel- regarding what is fact, what is an estimate, and ligence at other leveis. But when you’re in the what is opinion. thick of it, if intelligence isn’t contributing to putting ordnance on target, then I don’t want to The mentor: My colleagues at the agency hear it! always knew I was an Air Force intelligence Consider what my wing’s intelligence needs analyst in the Pentagon of the 1970s. Occa- were when the sênior Iranian military leader- sionally, one of them who had studied the ship relocated to the Shiite religious center of record would ask, “Was the Air Force estimate Qom. Nondestructive or "disabling" munitions that the Soviet Backfire bomber had interconti- were the only option to drive them out.16 High nental capability intellectually honest?” I have explosives, even from our best precision concluded over the years that the answer to the guided munitions, were absolutely out of the question must be no. Let me explain. question. The task, then, was to shut down the When the new supersonic bomber appeared entire electrical grid in the city. You’ve heard at the Kazan aircraft plant in 1969, it validated the old adage “Precision weapons need preci- the long-held Air Force prediction of a new sion intelligence.”17 We needed it. We got it. Soviet bomber. In 1971, the aircraft, now des- And it was relevant: precise coordinates for ignated the Backfire, was noted in aerial refuel- every power station and substation serving the ing from a tanker near the test center of Ramen- city, detailed engineering reports from the skoye, just east of Moscow. The mission of the Japanese contractors who built the transform- bomber, peripheral attack or intercontinental ers, and satellite imagery that drove the image attack, now became one of the most fiercely generator in our virtual reality advanced plan- contested intelligence debates of the cold war. ning system. We got it all. Then we planned The predominant view of the Washington intel- the mission, rehearsed it in VR, and executed. ligence community was that the Backfire was a We completely “put their lights out!" With rel- peripheral attack weapon and would not play a evant and precise intelligence contributing to significant role in a strategic air attack on the mission success, the Iranian generais were dri- United States. Supporting this position was ven out of the sanctuary of Qom and back to the Backfire’s limited payload, modest self- Tehran. defense capabilities, and anticipated difficulty in staging the aircraft from far northern Siberian bases.18 The Air Force strongly dissented and Intellectual Honesty consistently argued the Backfire could be used for intercontinental attack—even if the aircraft The general said: flew one-way missions.19 The key variable was 12. Intellectual honesty must be a cardinal the estimate of the range of the aircraft. A element in intelligence reporting. Accuracy series of competitive analyses to determine the and honesty are not the same. Accuracy is the range produced dissimilar results and failed to absence of factual mistakes or errors. Honesty, conclusively end the debate.20 however. is the adherence to facts and truthful- In short. though we lacked hard evidence ness with which those facts are interpreted and that the Soviet Long Range Aviation Backfires presented. ever rehearsed intercontinental strikes, the Air 13. Moral courage is required to remain intel- Force estimate of range and intent drove our lectually honest and to resist the pressure to institutional position that it could and would reach intelligence “conclusions" that are not be used in an attack on the United States.21 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

The most troublesome aspect about the sona. Some are scholars. Some are showmen. “intellectal honesty” of our intelligence esti- Some take on the outward appearances of the mate was the connection between the threat commander they serve. The particular persona estimate and Air Force hardware procurement. that develops is irrelevant. What is important At the time, the Air Force was fighting for the is that the style they adopt helps them commu- B-l as a replacement for the aging B-52. F-15 nicate the intelligence. fighter production was expanding to produce When they engage the mind of the one they large numbers of highly capable air-to-air fight- serve, they can successfully influence the for- ers. mulation of a policy or plan or the execution of There is an ethical difference between a dangerous mission. They can be an aid to “worst-case analysis” of the threat and the pru- victory and a contributor to saving lives. If dent planning and procurement that flow from they fail to communicate the intelligence well, the analysis and the deliberate overstatement of the commander will continue toward the objec- the threat to drive budget increases for tive but without the full power of foreknowl- expanded weapon buys. In the first case, intel- edge. ligence serves to warn the nation’s leaders in sufficient time to respond deliberately. In the AFTERWARD second case, intelligence is prostituted to the goal of “buying more metal.” While the end What is called “foreknowledge" cannot be result may be the same, one end is derived at elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by honestly and the other dishonestly. analogy with past events, nor from calcula- tions. It must be obtained from men who Communication know the enemy situation. The general said: —Sun Tzu 15. The power of intelligence to aid the commander in planning and executing military The general said: missions is nothing if the intelligence is not Intelligence is an art and not a Science communicated. Knowledge of the enemy’s because it is a creation of people, not nature. intent, capabilities, and location has no worth People collect intelligence. People analyze until the commander receives, understands, intelligence. People make human judgments as and acts upon the intelligence. an intelligence product is created. And, ulti- 16. It is the responsibility of the intelligence mately, a person communicates the intelligence professional to choose the most effective way to the commander. to inform the commander. Choosing the spo- Thus far, I have described the principies of ken word, the written word, the picture, or the intelligence as the fundamental truths of the map is a criticai decision. Only by knowing art. Accuracy, timeliness, usability, fusion, rel- well the commander whom he or she serves evancy, intellectual honesty, and the require- can the intelligence officer choose wisely. ment to be communicated are all principies The teacher: If my students fail to communi- inherent in intelligence and are not bounded cate, they fail to serve. Behind the delivery of by time or changing technology. While these an accurate and timely intelligence product is a principies form the basics of the art, they are vast, multibillion-dollar structure designed to complemented by the supporting tenets of poli- manage, collect, process, and analyze informa- tics, timing, and the multilevel nature of mili- tion. Yet, decades of technological and human tary operations. These tenets further character- investment are wasted if the intelligence officer ize intelligence as art. cannot communicate. Intelligence is a political process. It In the schoolhouse, I teach my students to involves the judicious relay of intelligence think critically. I teach them to write with pre- from a person to a commander who is empow- cision. I teach them to brief with clarity and ered to act upon the intelligence. It involves conciseness. When the teaching stops, it is interaction between groups of people who rep- their responsibility to learn and to do. To do resent powerful institutions. Typically, these well is to communicate. interactions are between intelligence profes- The intelligence officers who most effec- sionals and operations professionals. And, tively serve their commanders develop a per- ultimately, the success of the intelligence ART OFINTELL1GENCE 25

process may rest on the personal relationship dramatic, can be offset with other local victo- developed over time between the intelligence ries. At the operational or theater levei, intelli- officer and the commander whom he or she gence has a lengthier period of usability. With serves. To work best. this relationship must an emphasis on enemy force disposition and involve trust, mutual respect, and a shared capability, the gravity of operational intelli- dedication to the mission. gence greatly exceeds that of the tactical levei. To have the greatest impact on the com- Should major intelligence errors occur, the mander. the timing of the delivery of the intel- impact on the theater campaign may be disas- ligence is crucial. The principie of timeliness trous and not recoverable. At the strategic and the tenet of timing are not the same. Tim- levei, intelligence supporting national security ing involves the calculation of when to present decision making has a much longer usability. the intelligence to the commander. If the tim- Likewise, it must reflect the political, eco- ing is wrong and the commander is unable to nomic, as well as the military characteristics of focus on the intelligence, the impact of the the adversary nation. At this highest levei, the information delivered may be diminished. It is consequences of misestimation are nationally the responsibility of the intelligence officer to profound. pick the best timing for the delivery of the most Intelligence, then, is art created by people. important intelligence. And, the impact of that art on the decisions of Finally, intelligence has a multilevel charac- the commander is greater than that of any other ter as it supports missions at the tactical, opera- input he receives. Indeed, the “words, num- tional, or strategic leveis of warfare.22 When bers, images, suggestions, appraisals, (and) supporting tactical operations, intelligence is incitements” describe the enemy and help the highly perishable. The usability of the infor- commander “optimize” his action to accom- mation may be measured in hours, minutes, plish the mission. And, in the victory that fol- and increasingly in seconds. Should intelli- io ws, the commander can claim he was served gence fail, the impact, while deadly and locally well by the art of intelligence. Washington, D.C. 19 April 2017

Notes 1. Joe West, "Specialty Codes to be Renumbered Novem- 11. William Safire, "Virtual Reality," New York Times ber 1." Air Force Times 53 (29 March 1993): 3. Magazine. 13 September 1992, 20. 2. Susan B. Cibson. chief of intelligence. 48th Tactical 12. Louisa Griffin, “U.S. Mission Planning Systems Strive Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, U. K., interview with author, for Portability," Defense Electronics 24. no. 2 (February 4 April 1993. 1992) : 38—41. 3. Department of Defense. Conduct of lhe Persian Gulf 13. Boyd seminar. Conflict: An ínterim Report Io Congress (Washington, D.C.: 14. “Notes on Strategic Air Intelligence in World War II Government Printing Office. 1991), 338. (ETO),'' Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.. October 4. Paul Seabury and Ângelo Codevilla. War: Ends and 1949, 32. cited in Charles N. Culbertson, "Air Intelligence MeanslNew York: Basic Books. Inc., 1989), 185. and the Search for the Center of Gravity." Research Report 5. Benjamin S. Lambeth. "Moscow's Lessons from the (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1988). 24. 1982 Lebanon Air War," in War in the Third Dimension: 15. Conduct o f the Persian Gulf Conflict, 340—42. Essays in Contemporary Air Power. ed. R. A. Mason (Lon- 16. Alan W. Debban, "Disabling Systems: War-Fighting don: Brassey s Defence Publishers. 1986), 127—48. Option for the Future," Airpower Journal 7, no. 1 (Spring 6. John R. Boyd. “A Discourse on Winning and Losing," 1993) : 45. Air War College seminar. Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 -8 April 17. Campen. 53. 1993. 18. John Prados. The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence 7. Julie Bird, "Battle Planned without Middleman," Air Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton. N.J.: Prince- Force Times 53 (29 March 1993): 16. ton University Press, 1986), 257-68. 8. Jenish D'Arcy, "Fantastic Voyages," Maclean's 105 (14 19. William E. Colby and Peter Forbath. Honorable Men: My December 1992): 43—46. Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 424. 9. Charles J. Duniap. Jr., “The Origins of the American 20. Bonner Day, “Soviet Bombers: A Growing Threat,” Air Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 2. no. 4 (W inter Force Magazine 61 (November 1978): 85-86. 1992-1993): 11. 21. "Cassandra and the Cold War." Newsweek 89 (10 Janu- 10. Alan D. Campen. "Communications Support to Intelli- ary 1977): 24. gence. in The First Information War: The Story o f Commu- 22. Michael I. Handel. "Intelligence and Military Opera- nications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Per- tions," in Intelligence and Military Operations. ed. Michael I. sian Gulf War. ed. Alan D. Campen (Fairfax. Va.: AFCEA Handel (London: Frank Cass and Company, Ltd.. 1990), 27. International Press. 1992), 58. Fali 1993 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Maj Thomas R. McCabe, USAFR

for his article The Limits of Deep Attack

Congratulations to Maj Thomas R. McCabe on If you would like to compete for the Ira C. his selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner Eaker Award, submit an article of feature for the best eligible article from the Fali 1993 length to the Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault issue of the Airpower Journal. Major McCabe Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. The receives a $500 cash award for his contribu- award is for the best eligible article in each tion to the Air Force’s professional dialogue. issue and is open to all US military personnel The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is below the rank of colonel or equivalent and all made possible through the support of the US government civilian employees below GS- Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of Winches- 15 or equivalent. ter, Massachusetts. SPACE POWER SURVIVABILITY

Dr Colin S. Gray

EN COLIN POWELL, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the United States learned from Operation Desert Storm that it had “to achieve total control of space if [it is| to succeed on the modern hattlefield."1 This statement may sound immoderate, but it actually ranks on the modest side of the stream of relevant

Vw Vv 28 AlfíPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993

prophecy. US policy in the 1990s is to maintain clear maritime and aerospace superiority, not mere advantage.2 The intriguing question urgently in need of exploration is just what benefit “total control” of space yields to its possessor. The theory and practice of US military behavior in World War II matched a less extravagant version of General PowelTs claim, with air substituted for space and with the term total deleted. From Guadal- canal to Okinawa, the US theory of victory in the war with Japan was based upon the value of superior air power. The carrier- poor United States of 1942 sought compensation via air bases on land (e.g., Hen- From Guadalcanal to Okinawa, the US theory of victory derson Field on Guadalcanal in the in the war with Japan was based on the value of Solomons),3 while the carrier-rich United superior air power. The carrier-poor US of 1942 States of 1944-45 sought island bases from compensated by building air bases such as Henderson which the strategic air bombardment of Field on Guadalcanal (above). In the future, we may build our bases in space. An artist s conception (below) Japan could be conducted or escorted (e.g., shows a space shuttle approaching space station Saipan, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima).4 Freedom. Prophets often have insight, but—almost SPACE POWER SURVIVABIUTY 29

as often—zeal for anvthing new threatens That other superpower no longer exists, to unbalance judgment. The past few and 10 years or more may pass before it is vears have seen no lack of prophecy on functionally replaced by a superpower- behalf of the military significance of space quality foe to US geopolitical interests in prowess. Four examples serve well Europe and Asia. Nonetheless, Admirai enough as markers for a bold claim for the Trost’s argument. or assertion, is inher- importance of space. First, writing in ently intriguing. Just what he meant, or 1988—the penultimate year of the cold could mean, by his claim concerning the war—Simon P. Worden and Bruce P. Jack- “use [of] the surviving sp ace system s to son noted that “the Soviets seem to recog- decide the contests on land and sea" is nize that the primary measure of national less than crystal clear. After all, even a power in the decades ahead will be the mature air power has never had that abilitv to place large vehicles up and out degree of strategic effectiveness, though of the Earth’s gravity well."5 This com- the Gulf War of 1991 might have had that ment is tvpical of the excessive claims for character. What can be the basis for new. allegedlv dominant, weapons. Simi- believing that space systems themselves lar claims have been advanced in the past could be wielded literally to decisive for gunpowder for field artillerv, for naval effect?8 battle fleets, for bomber fleets, and for Fourth. an Air Force Blue Ribbon Panei mechanized land power. concluded in 1988 that space power will Second, also in 1988, Gen John L. be as decisive in future conflict as air Piotrowski—then the commander in chief power is today.9 The panei is probably of US Space Command—advised that “the correct in its argument that the loss of side that loses the space battle will very space cover, or of space assistance in all likely be unable to meet its objectives on respects, in the future would be as debili- land. at sea, or in the atmosphere.”6 This tating for ground, sea. and air forces as observation is plausible. Indeed, follow- loss of air cover today would be for the ing the experience of Desert Storm in prospect of success in terrestrial opera- 1991. it assumes even a commonplace tions. Again, the analogy of air power to quality. As the US armed forces place space power is persuasive and warrants ever heavier reliance upon space systems imaginative, yet disciplined, application. for communication, navigation, early One must recognize, however. that liken- warning, over-the-horizon intelligence ing air power to space power carries no gathering, and meteorology, Piotrowski's detailed implications for the utility of claim acquires the status of a self-fulfilling space systems. Most emphatically, this prophecy. article does not suggest that satellites can Third, though talking still very much in substitute for aircraft in all, or even most, a cold war context in 1987, Adm Carlisle respects. A. H. Trost— then the chief of naval operations—made an argument of enduring interest: Operational Thinking Today vve know that in wartime, even in a for a Space Campaign conventional war of limited duration, the tvvo superpowers would fight a battle of Bulletproof soldiers, aircraft proof attrition in space until one side or other against surface-to-air missiles, and tanks had wrested control. And the winner immune to antitank weapons have yet to would then use the surviving space Sys- be invented. Although soldiers, aircraft, tems to decide the contests on land and and tanks are vulnerable, they remain use- sea (emphasis added].7 ful in war. The operational context is 30 A1RPOWEH IOURNAL WINTEfí 1993

always criticai for evaluation of the utility many complementary dimensions—com- of people-machine combinations in war- peting theorists write as though the sur- fare. vivability of space platforms will be the Survivability and effectiveness in forces key to peace and war, victory and defeat, are qualities with strong policy, strategic, national extinction and survival. Fortu- and tactical referents—in addition to the nately, the operational realities of arms physical properties from which tactical races, crises, and wars are far more com- and even strategic judgments have a way plex. Survivability is always to be of flowing. The debate over space-system weighed on a range of criteria with refer- survivability has been conducted by some ence to the functions of the systems in of the same people, of determinedly question, and in the context of the total astrategic inclination, who argued vocifer- war-fighting posture of the State. Other- ouslv about the modernization of intercon- wise, one is reduced to debating whether a tinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). From bullet can kill a soldier or whether two the ICBM debate of the early and mid- SS-18 warheads can knock out an ICBM 1980s, one might have inferred that a that a US president chose to leave in its nominally vulnerable silo, or ICBM silo. In decades past, generally intelligent launcher, was tactically the equivalent of a people solemnly debated the “issue” of vulnerable ICBM and that an enemv might whether or not aircraft could sink large, believe he could wage war against the heavily armored ships (to which, histori- ICBM force alone.10 cal experience in 1942-45 answered, “Yes, In order to avoid nonoperational think- but . . . . ”) . 12 ing, one must remember the following Also, operational or campaign sense about an enemv: he cannot assume that often has been absent from discussion of he will fire the first volley in a war in antisatellite (ASAT)/defense of satellite space; he cannot expect—e.ven if he shoots (DSAT) issues. Questions of ASAT and first—that the US defensive architecture space-system survivability have meaning will be susceptible to instant catastrophic only in the context of the pace of military elimination (or fatal damage); he must and political events on earth, which is not anticipate that behind the shield—even to denv that a space campaign could influ- the damaged shield—of our active ence those events. As an operating defenses lurks a large and capable strate- médium necessarily adjunct to the land, gic nuclear offensive capability; and he is space cannot sensibly be analyzed in iso- probablv a careful student of Carl von lation from the strategic context that gives Clausewitz and knows all about the com- it meaning. A maritime analogy is helpful posite notion of “friction" (or Murphy’s here. Superiority at sea frequently has Law) in war.11 Commentators often are so functioned strategically as an overall war- concerned • about being responsibly winning asset. But if an enemy can win defense-conservative that they forget about the war on land in a matter of davs, the an offense-conservative enemy. Fatal slow pace of pressure from the sea is “what-ifs” for robust systems need to be reduced to an irrelevancy. For example, balanced by consideration of enemy-ori- consider the monumental inutility of ented what-ifs. Although one must French naval superiority in the Franco- assume that the technical characteristics Prussian War of 1870-7Í. This is not to of rival space systems are important, war sav that one must analvze everything in is not, in the final analysis. a technical order to analvze anything, for that woidd enterprise. constitute a case of the holistic fallacy. The military space debate has seen a But it is to claim that. as one proceeds rel- crude analytic reductionism whereby— ativelv narrowly, one must acknowledge neglecting the operational context in its the broader contours of statecraft and war. SPACE POWER SUR VIVAD1LITY 31

The space policy of the US military mind that a space campaign is not of inter- requires that space control be asserted and est except with regard to war as a whole, exploited. Often, space control is dis- the key question has to be what degree of cussed as if the concept had some self-evi- control is judged essential—as contrasted dent and usefully precise meaning. In fact with merely desirable. The United States it does not. What is more, using air or sea requires reliable access to orbit for mis- control as an analogy is not necessarily sions that cannot be performed well enlightening. What if sea control is exer- enough in other ways (e.g., by high-flying cised on and over—but not beneath—the aircraft or by radar picket ships). Simi- surface? If enemy submarines can harass larly, the United States should be able to and threaten to close sea lines of Commu- deny mission survivability to enemy space nications (as did Germany’s U-boats in systems. The sky would not need to be 1917 and 1941-43), what integrity remains swept clear of all enemy space platforms, to claims for control—let alone for com - but— for the purpose of prewar deter- mand—of the sea? Space control is rence— the enemy should be led to expect defined here as a condition wherein the reasonably prompt demise of his plat- friendly space forces enjoy reliable access forms in orbit and the prompt interception to orbit and are able—again reliablv—to of replacement (reconstitution) plat- fulfill their missions there, while the forms.16 enemy is denied those benefits. Space In the context of war—particularly war control does not imply the ability to oper- of a protracted character—space control is ate in space without harassment. and nei- likely to be permanently in dispute, with ther does it imply the ability totally to both sides able to make some use of space exclude the enemy’s vehicles from orbit. systems. Many assets criticai for space By wav of analogy, consider these words surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill of Alfred Thayer Mahan: assessment (SATKA) will be damaged and destroyed in war—especiallv those in The control of the sea, however real, does not known terrestrial locations—though some imply that an enemy’s single ships or small mobile surveillance platforms (particu- squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, larly those based in very high orbit) cer- make harassing descents upon unprotected tainly would survive. Given the variety of points of a long coastline, enter blockaded SATKA capabilities, at least for low earth harbors.13 orbit, space denial would be a more usual condition than one of space control or of In practice, control usually is to some disputed command and shared—but reli- degree disputed. though it is rarely in gen- able— use. The military space community uine dispute by rival battle fleets. Mar- strongly suspects that space denial, at itime control or command may be thought least for low orbits. would be a great deal of as moving zones, not as permanently easier to achieve than would a quality of occupied and defended regions.14 The space control that permits positive military geography of space implies that exploitation of the space ways. People of access to—and relativelv secure and long- goodwill and equal knowledge disagree on enduring use of—low earth orbit would be this subject, for which there is no direct improbable in time of vvar between major historical evidence. powers. But that same geography suggests As space systems assume greater signifi- that space denial would be much more cance for terrestrial combat, the stakes in a difficult to achieve for semisynchronous, space campaign must rise. By analogy, in geosynchronous. and high earth orbits.15 1918 air superiority was useful but not Modesty is a sensible approach to the strictly essential.17 By 1939-45, however, question of space control. Bearing in winning a campaign on the ground or at 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

sea in the absence of such superiority had upon space systems and their systems’ become all but impossible. Disputed com- vulnerability to damage. mand was not good enough. Opinions vary widely as to when a If a space campaign includes a shoot-out space campaign would be conducted. At between the orbital elements of missile least three clear alternatives present them- defense architectures, then that cam- selves: (1) as a precursor to war, (2) as the paign— in and of itself—might be able to first campaign in war, and (3) as contribu- dictate the course and outcome of a war tor to a long struggle conducted in all (i.e., if defenses in an ASAT mode could environments. One can hypothesize that destroy or fatally degrade an enemy’s bal- in time of crisis a precursor ASAT cam- listic missile defenses [BMD] and retain paign could so damage a country’s ability sufficient potency to eliminate the long- to fight efficiently that that country or range missile threat). In this case, the coalition would be intimidated into sur- space campaign would wield a decisive render. On balance, this possibility is influence over the course and outcome of improbable, if only because of the strategic a war. Nonetheless, space control is not warning it would provide. The damage the key to victory or defeat in war. What- wreaked by a war-precursor space cam- ever the nominal utility of the working paign would be too modest to satisfy the control of space, questions remain. What operational taste of some strategic cultures do we plan to do with such control? Can (certainly the Soviet-that-was and proba- our terrestrial forces be assisted usefully bly the Russian-that-will-be). A more from space? credible argument is that a space cam- The purposes of a space campaign paign would be waged promptly on the would be both positive and negative. outbreak of general hostilities, as forces On the positive side, one might attempt are deploying to their war stations and to change the balance of relative advan- maneuvering for the first round. If a great tage in space so that the enemy would war were protracted in time and global in face the prospect of fighting under per- scope, one should think of space systems manently hostile skies. The measure of and of space campaigning as permanent— intimidation achieved by early success or perhaps recurring—elements influenc- against space systems must depend ing the course and outcome of events. upon the enemy’s weighting of the significance of net prowess from orbit. However, one should not allow oneself to be captured too easily by 1960s-era strategic concepts. The overriding purpose served by securing an early military advantage in space would be war Threats to Space fighting— not deterrent— in nature. Systems On the negative side, one could attempt to launch a space campaign against assets Although space-system survivability— believed criticai for the orderly and coher- hence availability— is a fundamental ent conduct of terrestrial enterprises. As issue, the rather abrupt demise of the cold an “operational disintegrator,” a space war in 1989 has lowered the position of campaign would contribute vitally to the this issue on the priority list of official disruption of enemy Communications and concerns. Nevertheless, how should one the destruction of key platforms for sur- characterize questions of space-system veillance, reconnaissance, and targeting. survivability over the long term? (For Needless to say, adversaries will vary today’s US defense planner, the long term widely in the measure of their dependence begins arbitrarily—as well as symboli- Order Processing Code *5151 JOURNAL

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cally—in the year 2000.) Such questions The US military's space policy requires that space be include survivability to do what, for how controlled and exploited, even though that concept long. and with what benefits-to-costs. does not have a self-evident and precise meaning. But satellite Communications—both military and civilian— Notwithstanding the strategicallv permis- are certainly part of space control. Here. the Syncom sive context of the 1990s, what do we IV-5 Communications satellite orbits over West Afnca. believe we understand about the terms and conditions of actual combat in and matter for the course of war elsewhere? from the space wavs? What is encom- Could two sides’ space systems suffer passed by ASAT and DSAT capabilities? some attrition yet coexist in an important How do the two relate to each other? sense? After a 11, rival navies and air Bluntly posed, what would war in and for forces, albeit often in clear relations of space be like, and how much would it superiority-inferiority, frequentlv have 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

coexisted. Or, because of the very nature portionate expenditure of scarce assets to of the space environment, must one party unrewarding assault, and generally unbal- be able to succeed in sweeping the space ance him for the defender’s riposte. ways? Does the inherently global and fea- The worth of space-based military assets tureless character of space yield all-or- must always be a value relative to assets nothing stakes to space warfare? Perhaps otherwise deployed. The less the unique one should pay particular attention to the value of space-based or space-dependent likely terms of coexistence for superior- systems, the less the potential value in inferior space forces. assaulting them. Space systems for BMD For active missile defenses, a strategic functions, for example, would be pro- issue of concern is not whether space plat- tected if—in enem y cam paign form A or B— or even whether space-plat- prediction—friendly forces are postured form constellation A or B—could survive competently. Enemy war planners would in some absolute sense. Rather, the ques- have to calculate how an ASAT/DSAT tion is whether the space-based and space- duel likely would proceed, how the out- dependent elements of a multilayered come of that possibly protracted duel (possibly ground-, sea-, air-, and space- would influence the result of an based. or rapidly space-deployable) archi- “exchange” between offensive forces, tecture of strategic defense could survive and—to make policy sense of the entire in their essentials long enough to perform enterprise— how the combat in and for the deterrence— or war fighting for deter- space and the strategic exchange would rence and denial—missions for which translate for war termination into a tolera- they were designed. What is the context ble political outcome. for space combat? Is it precrisis maneu- Plainly, this article does not speak to the vering, harassment, and raiding? Crisis- new world regional disorder of the 1990s, time attrition of geographically isolated, but it does address what can be termed key important military assets? Regional or structural aspects of war in and from space global nonnuclear or nuclear war (far dis- in the future. Threats and issues of space- tant though some of these dreadful possi- system mission survivability have a whole- bilities are from the political conditions of war context, regardless of specific historical the early 1990s)? Is the launching of an circumstances. Missile defenses erected to ASAT campaign a coordinated step in the anticipate regional problems in the 1990s immediate execution of a plan for general (for protection against limited strikes)19 can- war? What are the stakes in space—stale- not fail to have investment value for the mate or victory? In the latter case, does an return of major balance-of-power struggles in ASAT assault have as its immediate goal the twenty-first century. the rough equalization of the strategic bal- Both small- and large-scale errors in ance for reciprocai counterdeterrence (in a defense plans, posture, and military doc- hypothetical context of superior US BMD trine are inevitable. It is not useful, how- capabilities) or the achievement of a major ever, to postulate worst-case threats military advantage? involving an improbably supercompetent Impregnable defenses have never been foe and extraordinarily foolish Americans. constructed. The function of defenses— Most things are possible, but history tells whatever the geographical environment us that military success attends the side and whatever the historical period, levei that can best recover its balance from past of technology, and polities in hostile con- errors, since both sides will err. Some tention—is to complement the offense for overexcited rhetoric in the Strategic positive goals in war.18 Defenses may Defense Initiative (SDI) debate of the work well enough if they delay an 1980s produced truly superhypothetical attacker, compel him to devote a dispro- threats in the face of which no US space- SPACE POWER SURV1VABIL1TY 35 based BMD architecture possibly could salvo battle rather than a campaign, one survive. For example. how can one con- should allow that such warfare—and asso- sider space-based boost or early mid- ciated measures—would be a two-way course BMD if the enemy is permitted a Street. Space-based BMD capability, for skv-sweeping first ASAT volley by some example, would be designed to function mix of space mines on active trailing sta- synergistically with ground-, air-, and sea- tion and directed-energv weapons? This based system elements, as well as with the is the never-never land of what-if. In a actions of offensive forces (of many differ- similar vein, alarmists postulated the ent kinds). An enemy’s attack planners blitzkrieg assault that unraveled (beyond have to consider such questions as, What recovery) NATO’s central front in a week; might or would the other side do? Even if the “first salvo” at sea that reduced the we do well, how well do we do? How US Navy to a Coastal defense force; and badly might events proceed? What might the strike that paralyzed command, con- be the consequences? Unless a super- trol, Communications, and intelligence power has been extravagantly unwise in (C3I). thereby precluding the national making defense preparations, it is not command authorities from issuing emer- going to be functionally disarmed by gencv action messages.20 adverse ASAT action (unless one adheres The United States endeavors to design to a simpleminded “King of the [Gravityl svstems— not individual platforms—to Mountain" or “Lord of the Gravity Well” survive, and to survive in a functional theory of victory). sense, which is the onlv sense that really Questions of space-system survivability matters. System effectiveness will all too often attract dramatic judgments of degrade over time, as ammunition or the worst reductionist kind. The mindless power supply is depleted in some cases assertion that there are no places to hide and as enemy action takes its toll. Prece- in space jostles with claims to immortality dents have been set vvith the planning of for platforms in distant orbits. In the the defense satellite Communications Sys- absence of any historical experience of tem (DSCS) III, navigation satellite timing space campaigning and in the face of so and ranging (NAVSTAR), and military much technical, tactical, and strategic strategic and tactical relay (MILSTAR) complexity, the debate on space-system satellite constellations (involving such survivability is not easy to subject to ana- survival technologies as proliferation of lytical discipline. Indefinite survivability platforms for redundancy, substantial of every unit in every space system impor- autonomy of operation, choice of orbits tant in wartime is neither possible nor distant from threats, variety of orbital necessary. Policymakers have to consider planes, hardening, ASAT attack-warning how much survivability they need, for sensors, and irregular phasing in orbit). how long, and with what confidence. Further, the US defense community has With few exceptions, the debate over onlv begun to plan for space deployments space-system survivability has been con- on the assumption of a hostile environ- ducted via the method of contrasting “Chi- ment (an assumption difficult to sustain nese menus.” now that the Soviet Union has collapsed). The problems are threefold, at least. It is. therefore, premature to assert axioms First, in the wise—if unhelpful—words of concerning what can and cannot be done a 1985 report by Congress’s Office of Tech- to ensure the tolerably graceful degrada- nology Assessment, tion in effectiveness of critically important space-system architectures. Whether the means of protecting satellites Unless there are excellent grounds for will be adequate to ensure the survivability arguing that space warfare would be a one- of particular space-based BMD systems will 36 A1RPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1993

depend in part on the kind of systems easily explained) were in the process of deployed and in part on future Soviet anti- prepositioning themselves for a compre- satellite capabilities. Insufficient Informa- hensive assault on key elements among tion is now available to resolve the surviv- those platforms. ability question [emphasis added].21 At the barest minimum, five leveis of If the evidential base was insufficient in challenges and responses affect the surviv- 1985 in the context of a known adversary, ability of space systems: (1) technology, how much less satisfactory must it be in (2) tactics, (3) operational art, (4) strategy, the 1990s, when the adversary is and (5) policy. Public debate, analysis, unknown? planning, and material preparation can Second, there will be a never-ending acquire an unhealthy and unnecessary fix- technoiogical, tactical, and strategic ation upon one or two of these leveis at dialectic between ASAT and DSAT mea- the expense of the others, with the result sures. For every menu offering in the that valuable synergies and alternatives threat column, innovative and imaginative are neglected. Space-system design and engineers and military operations plan- operation, as well as campaign plans or ners can devise or invent a counter. arms control policy, for example, inadver- Third—remote though this point may tently can be required to exceed reason- seem from the imaginative technical able expectations of performance if the debate on ASAT/DSAT—the subject is true structure of the subject—hence, the war writ large, not only war in and from scope for assistance— is not well appreci- space. At the levei strictly of technical ated. and tactical possibilities, there can be no Help for space-system survivability—let absolute showstoppers for the wartime alone assured help of the required quality utility of space platforms, provided no and quantity—cannot be secured reliably true technical shortfalls appear. In prin- at each of the five leveis alone. Indeed, cipie, at least, bv far the most formidable recognition of the theoretical availability ASAT weapons would be space-based par- of all five leveis may be important pre- ticle-beam battle stations or space mines. cisely because technology or perhaps pol- But even these all-function debate stop- icy cannot accomplish much towards alle- pers over ASAT and boost and early mid- viation of a particular problem. As the course BMD possibilities have their vul- focus shifts from technology—through tac- nerabilities. A direct-energy ASAT tics, operations, and strategy—to policy, weapon would require command and the context assumes ever greater impor- information from the ground, as well as tance. For example, one would look for externai SATKA assistance. Interference different kinds of answers if the problem with the C31 net for space-based weapons at hand were the survivability of a tank: an should render them harmless and vulnera- armored brigade or division; tanks as part ble to assault. of a combined-arms team on campaign The humble space mine (whether missions: or the feasibility of achieving designed to destroy by conventional deterrent or war-fighting goals via a mili- explosion, kinetic impact, or nuclear deto- tary instrument with a significant tank nation) would need to be active— indeed, component. very noticeably active— in quite large Technology can provide phvsical hard- numbers. It is difficult to believe that a ening, stealthy design. and the means for country willing to assign criticai wartime some agility in tactical functioning (table missions to space platforms would acqui- 1). Strictly speaking, technology drives esce passively in the face of unmistakable tactics, but tactical imagination also can notice that enemy space mines (or uniden- direct technology. Making decisions on tified maneuvering objects in orbits not how. when, and where an individual space SPACE POWER SURV1VAB1UTY 37

Table 1 Technical-Tactical Options

Ground Elements C3 Links Space Platforms

Diminished reliance, Electronic Electromagnetic pulse satellite autonomy, countermeasures shielding and intemetting Proliferation for Frequency agility Nêutron hardening redundancy Mobility Extremely high Attack warning sensors frequency and and prompt shutdown superhigh frequency Security precautions Redundancy of relay In-orbit spares nodes Hardening Message authentication Ground-based spares for and encryption reconstitution Launch flexibility Satellite autonomy and Autonomy and intemetting intemetting Payload integration Platform proliferation for (with launch vehicle redundancy and ground facilities) Stealth characteristics Reflective coating/shielding Armor hardening Maneuver Active defense Fiares Distance/remote orbits Decoys

platform or space system would be used is icai for tactical feasibility. Similarly, the the realm of tactics. Prospective technical-tactical mission for which a ASAT/DSAT combat of all kinds, embrac- space system has been designed must ing all three segments of space systems impose more or less severe restrictions (i.e., ground uplink, ground downlink, and upon the range of practicable technological orbital) is the immediate subject for tacti- and tactical choices (table 1). cal choices. The technological decisions Many of these survival aids and tech- incorporated in system design must be crit- niques would be militarily infeasible or 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

prohibitively costly for particular space cal decisions will be made in the clear systems. Design for the survival and effec- light of operational-level understanding of tiveness of space assets must deny an the missions to be accomplished from enemy prompt, cheap shots that would space. Indeed, according to the classical have a major unfavorable impact on the formula, tactical matters will have mean- balance of military power. Enough of the ing only in relation to the total operational military space assets must be sufficiently performance of the space architecture. effective to perform their missions for the Operational success can be built only on time span of relevance for those missions. the basis of tactical success, but some per- Beyond passive protection (deception, centage of tactical failures in military hardening, maneuver, proliferation, recon- engagement—as always happens, in all stitution, autonomy, and the like), space- environments—is inevitable and prewar planners must consider more active dictable. At the operational levei, deci- measures and the space campaign as a sions will be made on such subjects as whole in conjunction with the war in whether and when to take active measures other environments that the space cam- of different kinds against different ele- paign is intended to influence. In the best ments of enemy space systems. Consider- tradition of systems analysis, one should ations of space control will loom large, but seek to avoid becoming locked into a prob- strategic demand from terrestrial theater lem/solution fit that is focused upon how commanders for space denial will help space systems might achieve mission sur- shape the conduct of space operations in vivability in the face of an imaginative, real time. skillful, and well-funded enemy. In addi- The importance of, and scale of chal- tion, one should be open to the possibility lenges to, space-system survivability must that the answer—or a part of the answer— be influenced massively by strategy writ may be in the joint realm rather than with large and by policy. Policy choices—what truly super space systems. we seek to achieve—substantially deter- The term operations refers to the theater mine the ends in the means-ends nexus levei, insofar as land power and “tactical” that is strategy. The character of those air power are concerned.22 Because the ends (deter an attack on Saudi Arabia, near-earth space environment is by defini- defeat and punish Iraqi military power, tion a global envelope, the ideas of opera- defend Israel, and so forth) specifies what tions and operational art can be applied is required of military space systems, as only with great care. In practice, the well as how much and for how long. The whole of near-earth space is the space the- probability of combat to. in, for—and one ater of operations, even though military day even from—space is a variable largely space systems would have their effect determined by the total context for a con- upon particular terrestrial theaters. There flict provided by policy and strategy. is nothing noVel about that point. After Mission survivability overrides system a 11, both air power and sea power have survivability. Consequently. wherever it their effect upon the course and outcome can usefully do so at reasonable cost, the of war via their effect upon land opera- United States duplicates in terrestrial sys- tions in distinctive theaters. But the cam- tems some of the functions performed by paigns for control of the air and the sea space systems. Redundancy in the ability take place according to a rhythm unique to to accomplish the mission acts as a surviv- the air and sea environments. So must it ability measure. Clearly, all systems and be for the space environment also. all missions are not equally important. With operational-levei choices, a state The more important the mission and the will select the complete architecture of its more important the system to the accom- military space assets. Technological-tacti- plishment of the mission (in theory at SPACE POWER SURVIVABILITY 39

least). the greater the attention paid to Sys- Arms Control: tem survivability. Since all Systems are Problem, Solution, or not equally important, it follows that all do not require equal attention to surviv- Just Irrelevance? ability. As a consequence. many programs do not include specific survivability mea- The arms control community has sures. US space policy explicitly recog- pressed for a variety of ill-considered nizes this logic. For example, a 1988 ASAT control measures. As a general White House statement mandated that rule, these measures have failed every test that a prudent US national security policy the DoD must provide for the survivability of has posed. The arms controllers have had selected. criticai, national security space an open agenda item of seeking to protect assets (including associated terrestrial com- benign space platforms (i.e., those per- ponents) to a degree commensurate with the forming surveillance, early warning, and value and utilitv of the support they provide communication functions) and a barely to national levei decision functions, and mil- concealed agenda item of complicating life itary operational forces across the spectrum for strategic defense by denying space bas- of conflict.23 ing to some BMD platforms. Critics of ASAT arms control have stressed the sub- Survivability measures apply to those stantial overlap of ASAT and BMD capa- parts of the system that are earth-based— bility, which is to say that if a State has the uplinks and downlinks between the even a modest exoatmospheric BMD capa- ground and satellites and between satel- bility, it should have—as a bonus—an lites—as well as to the satellites them- excellent low-earth-orbit ASAT. The selves. The most effective approach is to interface between ASAT and BMD capa- apply redundant survivability techniques bilities is subject to constant movement as to each part of the entire system so that technologies evolve. systems cannot be defeated by a single The United States needs to protect countermeasure and so that if they ASAT deployment options for the should fail. they will fail gracefully—not prospective value of those options as catastrophically. In this way, it is possi- active DSAT—possibly, though improbable that mission accomplishment can be bly, to deter attack on US spacecraft but ensured, even with degraded systems. more likely to help deny an enemy reli- Broadly speaking, threats to the mission able access to criticai orbits. For the long survivability of space systems can be cat- term, regardless of whether or not the egorized as physical or electronic in United States proceeds to deploy some kind. and—with particular regard to the space-based elements of a BMD architec- orbital segment—these threats invite dif- ture, it will be vitally important that any ferent responses at semisvnchronous or enemy be denied working control of geosvnchronous (as contrasted with low) space. Ground-, sea-, and air-based ASAT altitudes. Above all else, perhaps— weapons would not likely be a fair match though far from exclusively—space-sys- for the active and passive self-defense tem survivability reduces to a set of prob- capabilities of a space-based BMD system. lems in the conduct of defensive elec- Moreover, if any enemy could bid seri- tronic warfare. Efforts to achieve the ously to be “King of the Mountain” with actual physical destruction or disable- space-based weapon deployments, he ment of criticai elements of space sys- should stand a better-than-even chance of tems—while always possible—have some being able to deny the United States the distinctive disadvantages, most notice- reliable ability to enter orbit (any orbit, ably that of lead time. that is). Analysts have speculated on the 40 AIR POWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

possibility of devising an ASAT arms con- at present but recognizes a prospectively trol regime that would prohibit weapon permanent need for military superiority. deployments potentially threatening to satellites in high earth (including geosynchronous) orbit. Specific suggestions Facing the Future include prohibition of the deployment of directed-energy weapon platforms at an The argument that space power will be as orbital altitude in excess of 1,000 kilome- important as sea power or air power is likely ters; defined “keep-out” zones around to be true one day. As with all such asser- space platforms (vis-à-vis possible space tions, however, it has to refer to specific situ- mines); and a variety of “rules of the road" ations between specific enemies in a specific for space operations to avoid or minimize period. The US armed forces could acceler- perceptions of threats (and their conse- ate the trend to dependence upon space Sys- quences).24 tems, but if they do that, they need to be On balance, the prospects for ASAT well satisfied with their space control. By arms control are distinctly dim, even in analogy, dependence upon seaborne supply these post-cold-war years. Great powers is ill advised without sea control. Also, one do not bar themselves from being able to should not forget that air power’s visibility do something that could be very important and audibility have an effect on enemy militarily. Space is a geographically dis- morale that space power cannot duplicate. tinctive environment but is dominated The absence of reliable air cover would be militarily bv the same policy impulses particularly devastating to a US Army that— that produce conflict on earth. The incen- except briefly in the Solomon Islands and in tive to cheat on agreements would likely North África and Sicily in 1942-43—has be matched bv the ease with which cheat- never known that condition and whose tacti- ing could be effected. The more criticai cal style is airland in character. For space space becomes as a field of competitive power to begin to approximate air power in militarv endeavor, the greater the incen- strategic effectiveness, space systems for tives to avoid legal constraints on (peace- force application would need to be added to time) behavior. The massive overlap the familiar space-based force enhancement between civilian and military space tech- assets. Quite aside from military. technolog- nologies (e.g., common transportation Sys- ical, and economic arguments, the political tems) and space activities would compli- dimension of long-range (nonnuclear) force cate any endeavor to write arms control application from orbit is unlikely to be triv- treaties. Also, opinions vary as to the ial. quality of space surveillance that will be Eventually, space will witness a fui 1 available at different times in the future. transition from being a convenient place Suffice it to .sav that there would be a to perform useful force-enhancement tasks problem in verifying space activitv/capa- to being key to mission accomplishment. bility exceeded in severity only by the tra- As with the maritime environment in the ditional difficulty of a democracy in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and designing and executing a sanctions pol- with air in this century, the space environ- icy for noncompliance with treaties. ment will not be reliablv usable in future Notwithstanding the politically permis- major conflict unless it is first secured for sive international climate of the 1990s, the passage of friendlv vehicles. The end- space arms control is unlikely to succeed ing of the cold war has slowed the pace of for many of the same reasons that fore- the military exploitation of space, but it doom naval arms control. In the geo- cannot redirect the historical course of graphical realms of both sea and space, the technological change in its relation to United States is not seriously threatened physical geography. SPACE POWER SUR VIVABILITY 41

Overall, planning for space-system than the right to use the sea and the right effectiveness and survivability to date has to fly. However, the US defense commu- focused heavily not upon providing an nity is not used to thinking of space as a architecture of space assets and forces theater for combat, just as it is not used to organized and commanded for a combat overlaying space campaigns upon terres- environment but upon individual space trial campaigns for a coherent view of war. systems (for example, NAVSTAR global A great deal can be learned from the positioning system [GPS]). The arrival of military history of war on earth (on land, political peace among the superpowers, at sea, and in the air), but some of what is followed by the new status of the United on offer could mislead. The theorist and States in the 1990s as the solitary super- military planner for space power need to power. threatens to slow prudent adapta- know how space resembles, and how it tion to the space age. The purse strings in differs from, the other environments. The democracies are held by people who tend era of great, simple assertions remains to be moved only by the arrival of a danger alive and well with respect to the surviv- that is both clear and present. Although ability of space platforms and the mission the Gulf War of 1991 showed skeptics the survivability of space systems. (Only to value of space systems in war,25 it did lit- those people who are truly reductionist in tle to encourage realistic thinking or plan- their approach is space-system survivabil- ning for a strategic context wherein both ity a simple set of issues.) sides would enjoy access to orbit. The defense enjoys a major advantage The space environment is different from over the offense at very high altitudes. the other environments, and that differ- The great distance that the offense has to ence matters for technology, tactics, and cover, not to mention the multidimen- operations. But space power, no matter sional costs of climbing out of earth’s grav- how different, is of interest only because it ity well, yields criticai initiative for defen- can contribute strategic effectiveness to sive technology and tactical choices. the deterrence or conduct of war as a However, the claim that the defense is the whole. More and more defense profes- stronger form of war in geosynchronous sionals and commentators are coming to orbit may well be only a relatively brief, appreciate that the right to use space will technology-driven operational judgment need to be fought for, no more and no less and not a lasting truth. □

Notes 1. House. Prepared Statement by Gen Colin L. Powell, Review 37, no. 6 (September-October 1986): 91-93; and Lt Chairman of lhe Joint Chiefs o f Staff. before the Commillee Col Frank W. Jennings. "Doctrinal Conflict over the Word on the Budget. 102d Cong.. 2d sess.. 5 February 1992, 23. Aerospace," Airpower Journal 4, no. 3 (Fali 1990): 46—58. 2. “Achieving and maintaining preeminence in the air, in 3. See Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive space. and at sea is key to our continued success as a global Account o f the Landmark Battle (New York: Penguin, 1992), leader. In peace. maritime and aerospace superiority 16, 499, 606. enhance our deterrence capabilities. In war, they are criticai 4. A reliable recent treatment of the war in the Pacific is to the conduct and successful termination of conflict.” Colin Dan van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign: World War II. the L. Powell. National Military Strategy o f the United States, U.S.-Japanese Naval War, 1941-1945 (New York: Simon and fanuary 1992 (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Schuster, 1991). Office. 1992). 9. The concept. or shotgun marriage, of air and 5. Simon P. Worden and Bruce P. (ackson. "Space, Power, space that is rendered as aerospace remains controversial. and Strategy." The National Interest, no. 13 (Fali 1988): 50. Geographically speaking. the composite superenvironment of 6. Gen John L. Piotrowski, “Space Warfare Principies" aerospace certainly lacks integrity. See Maj Grover E. Myers. (Unpublished paper. 1988), 39. At the time. General "Aerospace Doctrine: WeTe Not There Yet." Air University Piotrowski was commander in chief of US Space Command. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

7. Adm Carlisle A. H. Trosl. “Antisubmarine Warfare: The graph Series 82-4 (Washington. D.C.: National Defense Uni- Challenge in Space," Vital Speeches of the Day 53, no. 18 (1 versity Press. 1982). Julv 1987): 552. 16. See Capt Lawrence A. Cooper. "Assured Access to 8. For Ihis claim for the potential decisive effect of space Space: The Dilemma of Reconstitution and Launch-on- power to begin to be plausible, lhat power would have to be Demand," Airpower Journal 6, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 47-56. of the "full-service" vuriety. Specifically, it would have to 17. The author of an excellent recent history of the air- include some capabilities for force application from space, plane in World War l concludes that its "role was not a which is to sav terrestrial bombardment. Needless to add. major one." Lee Kennett, The First Air War, 1914-1918 perhaps. terrestrial bombardment from orbit long has been (New York: Free Press, 1991), 220. an exlraordinarily politically sensitive topic. In the mid- 18. This argument is explored in detail in Colin S. Gray, 1980s, Soviet spokesmen routinely claimed that the United Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military States was seeking to acquire "space-strike weapons" via its Technology (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, Strategic Defense Initiative. 1993). 9. This verbal formula has been blessed bv repetition over 19. See Keith B. Payne, Missile Defense in the 21st Cen- the vears. For example. see House, Prepared Statement by turv: Protection against Limited Threats, Including Lessons Iames F McGovem. Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and from the Gulf War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). Gen Larry D. Welch. Air Force C hief of Staff. before the 20. For a classic example of how a good idea (ensure Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Defense, secure command and control) can become a much less good 10'lst Cong.. lst sess., February 1989, 15. idea (worry about fine-tuned, supercompetent threats), see 10. For details of this issue, see Colin S. Grav, “[CBMs and Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining Deterrence: The Controversy over Prompt Launch," The the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. lotirnal of Strategic Studies 10, no. 3 (September 1987): 285- 1985). 309. 21. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Ballis- 11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War. ed. and trans. Michael tic Missile Defense Technologies. OTA-ISC-254 (Washington. Howard and Peter Paret (Princ.eton. N.).: Princeton Univer- D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1985), 26. sitv Press. 1976), 119-21. 22. See Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War 12. VVhen the tactical issue was as stark as that posed by and Peace (Cambridge. Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard British surface vessels against German aircraft in the University Press. 1987). for a generally compelling concep- Mediterranean. or Japanese aircraft off Malaya. there could tual treatment of the different leveis of conflict (all, accord- be no doubt that ships were vulnerabie. But when surface ing to Luttwak, United by the distinctively paradoxical vessels multiplied their antiaircraft artillery, were protected hehavior that uniquelv characterizes "strategic” effort). It is by friendly fighter forces, and were available in large num- agreeable to note that the US Air Force in the 1990s has hers. the “issue" began to acquire its due complexity. In the- abandoned its near-half-century-long organization by pur- ory. any individual ship might be vulnerabie, but the power- portedly "tactical" or "strategic” duties. projection capability of a whole fleet or navy need not be. 23. "Presidential Directive on National Space Policy" 13. Capt A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Press Secretarv, the White Historv. 1660-1783 (Boston: Little. Brown, and Co.. 1890), House, 11 February' 1988), 8. 14. 24. For a sampling of the literature on space arms control, 14 "The aim of maritime strategy is therefore not so much see Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The to establish complete control of all sea Communications, Limits of the Possible," International Securitv 10, no. 4 which would be an ideal hardly attainable until final victorv (Spring 1986): 46-98; H. Guyford Stever and Heinz R. was almost vvon. as Io develop the ability to establish zones Pageis, eds., The High Technologies and Reducing the Risk of maritime control wherever and whenever thev may be of War (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1986). necessarv. . . . And a zone of maritime control means no pt. 1; and Paul B. Stares. Space and National Securitv more than an ability to pass ships safelv across an area of (Washington. D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1987), especially water which may be quite small in extent or may cover many chap. 6. thousands of square miles of ocean.” Capt S. W. Roskill, The 25. See Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, "The First HVj / o t Sea. 1939-1945. vol. 1. The Defensive (London: Her Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War," Majestv's Slationery OfFice. 1954), 3. RUSI JRoyal United Sendces Institute for Defence Studies] 15. On the question of space-svstem survivability, see Col Journal 136, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 45-53: and Vice Adm Robert B. Giffen, US Space System Survivability: Strategic William A. Dougherty. "Storm from Space," US Naval Insti- Alternatives for the 1990s, National Securitv Affairs Mono- tute Proceedings 118. no. 8 (August 1992): 48-52. WHERE DOES the AIR FORCE NEED OFFICERS, or W HY SEND an OFFICER to D O an N C O S JOB?

M aj J. C. Cantrell III, USAF M a | H en r y L. A ndrews, ] r ., USAF

To command. make war-fighting policy, and be accountable for accomplishing the A ir Force mission. —ACSC Officer Requirements Study

ISTORICALLY, military force damentally sound nurturing for them to reductions have ravaged the com- fulfill the defense needs of our country. bat capability of the armed Ser- Ill-advised execution of manpower cut- vices (recall the “hollow force” of backs will profoundly retard our ability to Hthe post-Vietnam era). These reductions succeed on the battlefield. The objective affect the basic building blocks of combat Air Force, the ‘‘one-base, one-wing, one- capability: weapon systems, technology, boss” concept, and composite wings are logistics, and, most importantly, people. Air Force efforts to manage the end People, as the most perishable component strength drawdown through organizational of our war-fighting capability, require fun- restructuring. Meanwhile, the “base 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993

force” has fallen victim to fiscal restric- lem Air Force sênior leaders address every tions, and budget reductions are pushing day. Air Force end strength to drastically lower leveis. This turmoil directly affects our war-fighting capability. Thesis As a result, in October 1992, Gen Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, asked If we accept the requirements inherent Maj Gen Glenn A. Profitt, then the Air in the above mission statement for the Air Force director of manpower and organiza- Force officer corps, we logically conclude tion, to examine some basic officership that onlv officers should fill billets that issues, key among them being what does satisfy the mission statement. But, the the Air Force realíy need its officers to do. question remains, Who will accomplish This article describes the results of an Air the many essential tasks not encompassed Command and Staff College (ACSC) study in the mission statement but currently (see sidebar on page 45) that took a "clean- done by officers? The possible responses sheet" approach with no preconceived are noncommissioned officers (NCO), product and focused on the things that reservists, civil servants, and contractors. must be done by officers and developed a Recasting the NCO’s role is essential. method for placing officers where they can There is a need to assign more responsibil- do them. ities to those in the grades of E-5 through From the study carne a mission state- E-7 and to provide the opportunity for ment for the Air Force officer corps: “To sênior and chief master sergeants to do command. make war-fighting policy, and more middle management tasks. Today, be accountable for accomplishing the Air many of our company grade officer billets Force mission.”1 The study also devel- are filled by "process experts.” During the oped a model that turns the three discrete continuing drawdown in force structure, criteria of the mission statement into a these billets will transition to other man- method the Air force can use to distin- power categories (in most cases, enlisted guish officer billets.2 members). The NCO corps is ready, will- This study was not merely a paperwork ing, and able to tackle these duties.3 Yet, exercise. It answered an Air Staff tasking there may be criticai training questions to generated by the political realities of answer down the road as we incur a today’s budget-cutting environment. Con- responsibility to better prepare these gress is concerned about the Air Force NCOs for the staff duties that were once costing more than other Services in terms the specific domain of the company grade of personnel expenses {e.g.. Sen John H. officer. Glenn. Jr. [D-Ohio), often says the Air Enlisted members daily shoulder an Force’s officer-enlisted ratio is far too high increasingly higher share of the respon- when compáred to the other Services, sibility for mission success. In the early especially the Marine Corps). Some 1970s, the Air Force required an officer believe that the Air Force, when compáred to recode the targets in a Minuteman II with the other Services, is underutilizing missile; NCOs now do it. Today's its officers in supervisory roles. Even if enlisted members come in the Service this belief is unfounded, we must move better educated than ever before. We the system to respond in dramatic, proac- take these bright enlistees and train tive ways or have the “answers” dictated them to a very high standard. Over to us by legislation. The academic free- time, incrementai changes in who we dom of ACSC provided a unique environ- are as a service and what we ask our ment in which to design an unbiased, people to do have blurred some of the pragmatic solution to a real-world prob- traditional distinctions between many WHERE DOES THE AIR FORCE NEED OFFICERS? 45

Team Composition and Methodology CSC FORMED the study group in December for those who would use the products of the A1992 with LtCol Frederick B. ("Rik") Gervais, project. The first assumption was that this effort ACSC director of plans and programs, serving should complement similar work already done as facilitator.* The group consisted of 79 mem- by the Air Force. For example, the team closely bers of ACSC. The accompanying figure scrutinized recent studies that resulted in the Air depicts the distribution of study team members Force decisions to put general officers back in by career functional area. Additionally, a semi- the field as wing commanders and the “colonel nar of the Air Force Sênior Noncommissioned requirements study." Officer Academy (AFSNCOA) researched the While the group recognized that some regula- same issue. provided inputs, and reviewed the tions would probably need to be changed to work of the ACSC team. affect full implementation of the study results, The large group was divided into five- to most of the necessary policies for personnel seven-person cells. occasionally assembling in management and compensation are already in one large forum to share ideas and insights. In place (although some might need to be appíied late January 1993, two dozen members formed in Creative ways to meet new requirements). an “executive committee" to move from thematic The group targeted no specific AFSC, but work done in the small cells to a method by which focused on the entire officer corps. This non- programmatic decisions could be made by the parochial approach was maintained so the Air Force. Sênior field grade officers of the Air results would be applicable to all officers. War College and the Ira C. Eaker College for Although over the long term money will cer- Professional Development reviewed the brief- tainly be saved by having a higher percentage ings, as did manpower experts at Headquarters of the force populated by enlisted members, the Air University. In April 1993, the team briefed study team was not tasked to save money. The General McPeak, who approved the products of final assumption was that even 79 members of the study and urged the Air Staff to “press hard" ACSC wouldn't have all the answers and that toward full implementation. waivers for appropriate situations would be The study group had to make certain as- necessary when changes generated by this sumptions in order to provide a reference point study were implemented.

*Now a fu i colonel and commandef of the 45th Logistics Group, Patrick AFB, Florida.

JAG SPS Engineer/ Scientist OTHER Chaplam Admin Support Logistics BSC Other Education /Training Maintenance Intel Personnel / Manpower Pol-Mil Affairs GS-7 (retired E-8) Acquistion Comm / Computers Operators

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Number of Functional Area Representatives 46 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL W1NTER 1993

officer billets and enlisted billets. This retain people of a particular skill (e.g., blurring does not imply there is no dif- engineering) has been to pay a competitive ference between an E-8 and an 0-3, but salary. Despite the availability of various it is a fairly safe assertion that there may types of financial incentives, the way we not always be dramatic differences frequently attract needed skills is to offer between many of their duties and commissions. responsibilities. The final traditional driver is risk/accountability. “Risk,” in this sense, is not only laying one’s life on the line— Traditional Drivers after all, enlisted pararescue specialists and many others take such risks every Although there are many qualities we day. As warriors, all military members desire in all our personnel, there appears readilv accept this type of risk. Quintes- to be four dominating traditional factors sentially, however, "risk” represents entre- that drive officer requirements. First and preneurial risk, taking the chances that go foremost is the need to provide officers along with making the tough decisions who command units and exercise Uniform that allow any portion of the Air Force to Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority operate effectively. The “accountability” over their subordinates. Putting just any- side of this driver, on the other hand, indi- bodv in a command billet doesn't satisfy cates the officer’s ultimate culpability for this requirement. People must be pre- all activities going on under his or her pared for command responsibilities. purview, whether or not he or she was Every experience and opportunity the Air personally aware of the specific issue in Force gives to an officer on the way to question. For instance, regardless of being a commander shapes the officer’s which aircraft maintenance production abilitv to do the job well. Beyond the superintendent was on duty and signed off issue of whether combat leaders are made an airplane later involved in a mishap, the or born, the essential point is that our squadron maintenance officer will also be future leaders’ abilitv to lead is shaped by held accountable for any mistakes. The the experiences we provide them. Thus, bottom line here is that if it goes wrong, the Air Force must ensure that every billet the officer responsible will be called to an officer is assigned to on the way to task for the results. command will properly prepare the officer to be a war-winning leader. Protocol is another driver. One of the best examples of the protocol requirement Defining the is in the joint and international arenas Air Force Officer when our sister Services or other countries’ military Services supply an officer of A s e c o n d q u e s t i o n m u st a lso be a particular grade and we feel obligated to addressed: What do we want officers to be do the same. We do this to ensure our Ser- doing in the Air Force today? The vice interests are clearly heard in these response requires a philosophical con- important forums. If we don’t meet such struct upon which to base programmatic protocol requirements, portions of our decisions. A central concept is the notion war-fighting capability could be inadvis- that we are not operators, maintainers, or ably sacrificed at some headquarters con- medies. Rather, we are officers in Service ference table. to our nation. We must consider the duty The third driver, compensation, is engendered by our oath and commission important because, in the broadest sense, before we consider our allegiance to a spe- sometimes the easiest way to attract and cific Air Force career field. WHERE DOES THE AIR FORCE NEED OFFICERS? 47

The mission statement “To command, make war-fighting policy, and be accountable for accomplishing the Air Force mission” represents the challenges posed to and accepted by Air Force officers upon commissioning. The statement includes the three things that, in their ultimate definitions. can be done onlv by Air Force officers. If these duties are not properly discharged. we can no longer guarantee to the American public war-fighting successes like Operation Desert Storm. Rather, it’s not unlikelv we could repeat the postwar drawdown fiascoes with results similar to those we experienced during the summer of 1950 in South Korea.4

A Logic Tree

From the mission statement, we can develop a way to categorize Air Force officer billets. ín an ideally structured Air Force, officer slots should fali into one of three categories: commanders, war-fighting policymakers, and the remainder of the accountable decision makers. Commander billets are reserved for the commanders who exercise UCMJ authority and have an “A” prefix on their Air Force specialty code.* This construct excludes many positions we now call “commanders,” like aircraft commanders or flight commanders within a flying squadron. War- fighting policymakers include those bil- Several factors drive officer requirements. One is the lets filled by noncommander, executive- protocol requirement in the joint or International arena level leaders who are making war-fighting where we feel obligated to match officers assigned by policy at their levei of the Air Force sister Services or foreign militaries (top) with an Air where the function must be exclusively Force officer of equivalent grade. Another factor is compensation, such as offering commissions to the province of the military professional. doctors, which makes it possible for the Air Force to In this construct. we look to the differ- attract and retain sufficient numbers of people in criticai ences between the Air Staff and the Air skills (below) Force secretariat. In the secretariai, we have placed a sênior officer “blue suit” presence in major functions. but those functions are actually run bv civilian appointees. However, when it comes to war-fighting areas like the plans and oper- 'Thu wa» «theduled lo be changed to a ”C” prefix nn 1 October ations community, tliere are no civilian 1993 u a rasult of AFSC reatrur.turmg counterparts, thus revealing the distinc- 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

tion between a policymaker and a “war- Those slots meeting none of these tests are fighting policymaker.” Finally, we must candidates for deletion or conversion to clearly define the accountable decision- another manpower category. Alternative maker billets. Officers in these slots exer- manpower categories include enlisted, cise essential military leadership, over- reservist, civil servant, or contractor. This sight, decision making, and accountability very simple logic tree represents an in their daily duties, all factors whose con- endgame for officer authorizations; how- sequences increase the higher a billet is ever, it is not sufficiently developed to placed in the organization. Further, these account for the complexities of progress- billets prepare officers for more responsi- ing to that endgame. We need a more bility and authority. These slots sustain sophisticated vehicle for AFSC functional the “pipeline” that ensures the Air Force managers to use in reaching that vision. has an adequate supply of officers who will eventually fill positions in the commander and war-fighting policymaker cat- Implementation Model egories. Figure 1 depicts a logic tree for ensuring We can incorporate the logic tree as the that officer authorizations are of the type three entering questions of the implemen- we ultimately want to retain in a smaller tation model in figure 2. The intent is for Air Force. As shown in the diagram, any an AFSC functional manager to use the officer authorization fitting one of these implementation model and the 38-series three definitions (e.g., commander, war- Air Force directives governing organiza- fighting policymaker, or a remaining tional structure to assess the need to retain accountable decision maker) is retained. the officer billets they control. As in our earlier discussion of the logic tree, many billets will fali into the three entering cate- Command Retain Officer gories (commander, war-fighting policy- “A” Prefix Billet maker, or remaining accountable decision maker) already discussed. On the other hand, other billets will immediately become candidates for conversion or deletion. War-Fighting Retain Officer Tagging billets as commanders, war- Policymaker Billet fighting policymakers, or remaining accountable decision makers is only the initial step of the review represented by the implementation model. When this first step is complete, AFSC functional Remaining Retain Officer managers must then use the model to gen- Accountable Billet erate more information by which the Air Decision Makers Force can make further judgments about the billets that remain in a smaller officer corps. While the initial categorization of Convert officer slots as commander, war-fighting policymaker, or remaining accountable (Enl., Res., Civ., Contr.) decision maker will cause many autho- or Delete rizations to be deleted or converted to another manpower category, further Figure 1. Logic Tree for Ensuring Officer scrutiny holds the possibility of finding Authorization even greater economies. These economies WHERE DOES THE AM FORCE NEED OFFICERS? 49

are located in billets that today pass the lets which today have an "A” prefix and model’s tests, but do so only on the niar- could otherwise pass the logic tree’s siin- gin. In the course of this examination, we plified test)? By tasking functional man- will not quarrel with the need to do a agers to validate their command require- function, but we must ask who should be ments, we gather data that helps make this doing a particular task. We do this in a determination. Logically, most “A” prefix series of questions that first review the billets will validate during this test; those propriety of command billets. Then we that don’t are subject to further review. identify slots that are assistants to other For the noncornmander billets ("War- officers and exercise meaningful oversight Fighting Policymaker" and “Remaining of subordinates. Finally, we determine if Accountable Decision Makers” blocks another manpower category (enlisted, [fig. 2]), we gather additional data on the reservist, civil servant, or contractor) authorizations in these categories. The could do the same job. These questions first question (“Assistant?” block) deter- are then summed up in an overall valida- mines whether the authorization under tion process for each officer authorization. review is an “assistant” billet. An For instance, when looking at the “Com- “assistant” is one officer serving under mand ‘A’ Prefix” block in figure 2 and another officer at the same levei of the considering command billets in a down- organization and overseeing the same sizing environment, can we afford to have portions of the organization. Group officer squadron section commanders (bil- deputy commander authorizations, for

Validated Retain YES Remaining Command Officer Billet “A” Prefix Accountable Decision Makers Not Validated NO J War-Fighting YES Assistant? Policymaker NO }\ YES^ Remaining Accountable Convert Billet? (Enl., Res., Civ., Contr.) Decision Makers NO t Convert Not Validated Validated (Enl., Res., Civ., Contr.) Validate Officer Retain or Delete Requirement Officer Billet

Figure 2. Implementation Model 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993 instance, are one example of officer slots a functional manager addresses this subject, smaller Air Force may elect to forgo.5 thereby gathering data about an officer slot A further test (“Subordinates?” block) of that may never before have been captured. the officer requirement for a particular bil- After the “Convert Billet?” block in fig- let is whether the position has any mean- ure 2 generates the fourth and final data ingful subordinates. Referring back to the point asked for in the portion of the model definition of an accountable decision that addresses those officer slots presently maker, officers exercise “essential military on the margin, all this information is then leadership, oversight. decisionmaking, considered by the functional manager in and accountabilitv” (e.g., having no subor- making the retention decision. The “Vali- dinates or supervising only the squadron date Officer Requirement” block in figure information management specialist may 2 brings the invalid command slots, assis- not qualifv). Note, however, that the route tant, subordinates, and billet conversion out of the “Subordinates?" block in figure data together into one final discussion on 2 is the same, regardless of the answer to the wisdom of retaining any particular this question. Asking the question not officer slot. Included in these functional onlv ensures the gathering of the data on manager deliberations must be an over- this characteristic of the officer billets arching priority to retain enough officer under revievv but also allows the func- authorizations to ensure the sustainment tional manager to recognize that officer of the pipeline as discussed earlier. Out positions without meaningful subordi- of this process will come a final recom- nates are sometimes necessary, even mendation to retain, convert, or delete the though billets not satisfying this test may officer billets. be impractical in the even leaner times To ensure consistent treatment of every ahead. AFSC. sênior Air Force leaders must pro- To this point. the functional manager for vide a clear charter for the AFSC func- a given AFSC has generated data in three tional managers to follow. It must include areas: finding “A” prefix officer slots specific AFSCs to focus on or to avoid as vvhere the command requirement is not well as to give guidance on how vigor- valid, determining if the officer slot is an ously to applv the model. The following "assistant," and reviewing the quality and factors helped define the bounds of the quantitv of oversight of subordinates overall review. attributed to the officer billet. In figure 2, In discussing the need for an officer to the information gleaned from each of these do a particular job. proponents of the pro- three reviews is brought together for the officer side of the question frequently lean functional manager to answer the fourth on tradition or the oft-quoted “You have to and most basic question (the “Convert Bil- have an officer to do that job” when let?” block): - “Can another manpower cat- defending certain billets. In a drastically egory perform this function?” In other downsizing Air Force, the obvious ques- words, can the Air Force convert this bil- tion is why. Therefore, we must identifv let to an enlisted person, reservist, civil vvhere personnel and compensation policv servant, or contractor? One basis for are inadequate to support institutionaliz- answering this question comes from exam- ing the changes which could come from ining whether more than one category of using the implementation model. In addi- manpower does the same job today, as can tion, we must find those public laws that be found in some disciplines. As with the restrict Air Force options in making the “Subordinates?” block in figure 2, the choices necessary to use the implementa- route out of the “Convert Billet?" block is tion model effectively. The bottom line the same, regardless of the answer to the here is to not let present policies or laws question. This ensures that the AFSC interfere with making the correct recom- WUERE DOES THE AIR FORCE NEED OFFICERS? 51 mendation on the retention, conversion, or Because no review of Air Force person- deletion of an officer slot. 11 regulations or nel of this magnitude happens in a vac- laws need to be changed, the Air Force uum, today's sênior leaders must provide can tackle that later bv using the informa- guidance to the AFSC functional man- tion gained in implementing tbis system. agers. Specifically, it would be useful to It is clear that as the Air Force deletes identify the "low-hanging fruit" in the officer authorizations or converts them to officer trees where such measures as an enlisted billets, sênior and mid-level inflated officer-enlisted ratio or unusually NCOs vvill be assigned broader duties. We narrow spans of control are clues to possi- have discussed how officers and NCOs bly dvsfunctional officer billets. Addi- alike feel today’s NCOs are ready to tionally, we should not ignore opportuni- assume this new mantle of responsibility. ties in the Department of Defense (DOD) To ensure a smooth transition to this new agencies and joint arenas. In these organi- division of labor, we must determine what zations, not only does the Air Force pro- additional training opportunities are vide an inordinately high percentage of needed to allow NCOs to effectively step the officers assigned (when compared to into traditionallv officer-held authoriza- the other Services), but the definitions of tions. officers providing essential military lead- When it comes to defining “Remaining ership. oversight, decision making, and Accountable Decision Makers,” there could be differences in this category between each officer career fiel d. As the experts, AFSC functional managers will play a criticai role in assessing the characteristics of essential military leadership, oversight, decision making, and accountabilitv in their career fields. They must also meet the need to sustain the pipeline to the “Command” and “VVar-Fighting Pol- icymaker" billets in their specialty. Fur- ther. they must determine how these traits fit into their specific AFSCs duties and responsibilities. During the last three years, the Air Force has witnessed a dramatic restructuring under the objective Air Force ban- ner. The implementation model described here applies directlv to today’s objective Air Force. However, AFSC functional managers must recognize that other organizational changes are possible outgrowths of using this model. Func- tional managers must identify where these changes are needed in the organization. This is especially so if further con- solidations of AFSCs become necessary to “keep the doors open” as an individual Using the logic tree, the Air Force can reserve commander billets for the commanders who exercise AFSC when wide-scale slot conversions UCMJ authorrty and have an “A " prefix (now “C”) on or deletions leave too few authorizations their AFSCs. These billets must always be the in an AFSC. exclusive province of the military professional.

51 52 A IRPO WER fOURNA L WINTER 1993

responsibility clearly are being over- ian or enlisted positions. The primary looked. problem on the civilian side of that equa- Again relying on AFSC functional man- tion is the internally imposed cap in civil- ager expertise, the Air Force must define ian end strength (which the Air Force how it can restructure some offices into a already exceeds bv about 7,000 people); team concept. The "team” approach can converting officer billets in these areas be visualized when you examine a would make that situation worse. On the notional Air Staff office with a dozen lieu- other hand, while conversions to enlisted tenant colonels, majors, and captains in slots would not exacerbate the civilian it—all, or most, in “one-deep” jobs. When end strength issue, the Air Force would these billets are run through the model find itself wondering whether a sufficient one at a time, it is conceivable that all number of retainable or recruitable could fail the tests of being an assistant. enlisted personnel have the education and having no meaningful subordinates, or training to perform some of the highly having a job that another manpower cate- technical tasks associated with these gory could do. However, if we restructure AFSCs. Therefore, we must determine if this notional office into a three-team orga- the internally imposed civilian end nization. each team with an officer leader strength cap will soon be overcome by and the enlisted or civilian process events (e.g.. civilianization of the acquisi- experts necessary for that particular function corps). allowing us to be more flexible tion, three officer billets would pass the in using the civilian manpower categorv model tests because they now exercise than we presently anticipate. “essential military leadership” and possess the other characteristics of accountable decision makers.6 AFSC functional managers must craft a basic (or minimum) “team” composition below which we should not go because the officers leading the team would not meet the characteristics inherent in the “Remaining Account- able Decision Maker” definition. Conver- sions of this magnitude may require other changes. For instance, although the objective wing structure may have removed some excess officer billets from the traditional wing/base structure. more can be done at this levei. (An example will be The Air Force could restructure some offices into a discussed later.) However. as this model team concept, each team with an officer-leader winnows down the “process expert” offi- overseeing the enlisted or civilian process experts cers who have traditionallv moved to necessary for that particular function. headquarters staffs as midgrade or sênior captains, the candidates for headquarters jobs will be the E-6 to E-9 NCO process Special duty assignment (SDA) officer experts. We must prepare to incorporate requirements should also be addressed. this new NCO expertise into the various You may ask how the levy of SDAs affects staffs. The “team” concept described the various AFSCs. The issue here is one above is one way to approach this issue. of who lias the stick. It is safe to say that a A big question concerns whether officer given AFSC functional manager knows slots in the scientific/engineering/acquisi- exactlv what is being done by an officer tion AFSCs should be converted to civil- working within his or her primary AFSC IVHEfíE DOES THE Alli FORCE NEED OFF1CERS? 53

(PAFSC). Unfortunately, it may be ditfi- occupied a succession of billets specifi- cult for the AFSC functional manager to cally designed to prepare them for that accurately ascertain how an officer from crucial point in their military lives—com- any AFSC is being utilized when, for bat. example, lie or she is filling an assignment in a recruiting squadron. an Air Force Reserve Offícer Training Corps (AFROTC) detachment. or a teaching position at Air Model Application University. This means that experts from the special dutv assignment areas must The application of these concepts may also be charged with using this model to have already affected your AFSC. For determine if the officer authorizations in example, during one of the “tests” on an their particular areas meet the tests in the AFSC with a particularly heavy officer implementation model. The Air Force presence, six units were evaluated. All must identifv methods bv which SDA units considered had varying missions managers. who presently levy require- throughout the spectrum of possible ments on AFSC functional managers, are duties in this career field.7 Of nearly 90 told to address implementation of the officer authorizations represented in the model and officer utilization vvithin their test, 20 slots were retained as officer bil- specific areas. If reductions in some SDAs lets, 18 slots were converted to enlisted are made, there is the possibilitv of com- billets, and the remaining 46 or so posi- plementary reductions in primary functions were converted to civil Service.8 tional areas, since fewer officers will be This “test” proved an interesting exer- vvorking outside of their PAFSC in SDAs. cise, but reality was even more startling. Finally, no matter how you slice it, mis- Recently, an Air Force major command sion essentiality is a criticai concern. scrubbed its own billets in the same Using the expertise of each AFSC func- AFSC. This command examined 54 offi- tional manager, the Air Force must decide cer authorizations in this AFSC using a what the vvar-fighting measures of merit practical application of the criteria should be in each specific career field. In defined in the implementation model. other words, what must the war-fighting The results: the command determined commander bring to the fight from each that 27 of these billets required officers, 26 officer specialty to get the job done both others were recommended for conversion effectively and efficiently? This acid test to a different manpower category (as yet of the officer slots retained after the imple- undetermined), and one was deleted. mentation model is used will help deter- In this actual application, squadron mine if the modePs results meet the test of commander billets were retained as officer mission essentiality. War-winning authorizations. although squadron section remains the ultimate objective. The most commander slots are being reviewed for important measure of merit is whether, conversion. Among other billets retained when the work is done. the war-fighting as officer authorizations were “deploy- commander has the necessarv expertise in able” officer slots used in wartime duties sufficient numbers to meet essential mis- and various flight commander billets. sion requirements. There should be no Tbese accountable decision-maker posi- detriment to getting the wartime mission tions sustain the pipeline to the “A” prefix done due to fewer officers in the force commander authorizations and war-fight- structure. In fact. the results should actu- ing policymaker billets. Among those jobs allv be better because the officers we chosen for conversion were authorizations throw into the fray would be better pre- vacant for at least six months, “peacetime pared to execute their duties. They’ll have only” slots, slots in this AFSC which in 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

realitv function as executive officers, and officer component with higher effectiveness some detachment-level billets. and efficiency. Officers in the future will have more expertise functioning at the “system levei” rather than being “process In Pursuit of the experts”—a role more clearly compatible with the oversight and leadership aspects of “Endgame” their mission. As we continue to downsize As AFSC functional managers on the Air and restructure, we must make every effort Staff strive to implement these tools, it’s to ensure that our officer authorizations are important to look ahead to what the Air carefully placed throughout our organization Force officer corps can become under this to remain the most effective combat force the system. We see a stronger. more focused world has ever known.9

Notes 1. Air Command and Staff College Officer Requirements 7. During the coordination phase of the study, Lt Gen Billy Study, staff studv, Air Command and Staff College. Air Uni- |. Boles. Air Force deputy chief of staff for personnel, asked versity. 10 May 1993. 7. the team to provide examples to demonstrate how the model 2. Ibid., 9. might be applied. Each Air Force member of the study group 3. Both the ACSC study team and SNCOA seminar group tested the model against the unit or staff organization to independently reached this conclusion. which he or she was assigned before coming to ACSC. To 4. Clav Blair, in his book The Forgotten IVar: America in date. the official "reception" of this study’s products has Korea. 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987). says that been overwhelmingly positive. the post-World War II condition of the American Army 8. Ibid. made it unprepared for the Nortb Korean invasion of South 9. This study has the potentiai to improve the war-fighting Korea in June 1950. He States that "for various reasons. it capability of everv Air Force officer on active duty todav and [the United States Army] was not prepared mentallv. physi- for the foreseeable future. The study results would not have callv. or othervvise for war. On the whole. its leadership at been possible without the substantial contributions of 79 Air the army. corps. division. regiment, and battalion leveis was Command and Staff College students of the Class of 1993, overaged. inexperienced, often incompetent. and not physi- faculty, and staff members. Moreover. all who participated callv capable of coping with lhe rigorous clirnate of Korea" are grateful for lhe thoughtful assistance and valuable (page xi). insights provided bv the Sênior NCO Academy. Air War Col- 5. Of note was the study team's conclusion that the Air lege. Ira C. Eaker College for Professional Development. and Force has a cultural tendencv to rely on "assistants" more the Air Staffs manpower, personnel, and programming com- than our sister Services. munities. In the end. though. evervone who plaved a part in 6. One caveat in "team” formation is that all ofFice teams this projecl owes a great debt of gratitude to our facilitator, Lt must be able to properlv discharge their "protocol” duties as Col "Rik” Gervais. who epitomizes "essential military leader- defined in this study. ship." weapons for combat. Even so, hoth types ANNULLING of marriages have some similarities. The observer can see the similarities by viewing human marriage from afar—objectively MARRIAGES and in the abstract. Viewing it from within, the observer interacts with the REFRAMING THE thing observed to the degree that perceptions are often inaccurate.1 ROLES, MISSIONS, AND In the abstract, the function of secular human marriage is to promote social order FUNCTIONS DEBATE by facilitating the orderly transfer of property, and it has nothing to do with love, Col Ric h a r d Szafr anski, USAF passion, or procreation—all of which are not essential to marriage because all can exist without marriage. We do not, how- HIS ARTICLE is about annulling ever, experience marriage in the abstract. marriages, but not the marriages On a more personal and less abstract that bind people to people. Rather, plane, marriages function to formally and it focuses on the “marriages” that legally bind human beings in relationships Tbind the military departments, the Ser- with other human beings. At a very per- vices, to their declared need for specific sonal and concrete levei, marriage recog- 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL W1NTER 1993

nizes, seals, and sanctions the intimacy allow “Creative induction.”3 By mentally that, for example, “Pat” shares with dismantling the relationships and struc- “Chris.”2 Pat and Chris may not recognize tures that exist today, we can be led to dis- that their intimate bond fulfills the social cover the new relationships that a changed need for the more orderly conveyance of environment demands. With this aim in property. They may not realize this unless mind, this article proposes ways to their circumstances change, forcing them reframe the roles, missions, and functions to contemplate the dissolution of their debate that can guide us toward making personal marriage. Only then may they positive changes. It argues that we now see and admit that abstract marriage is and need to annul some old “marriages” to was about the ownership and conveyance form new and better relationships between of concrete property. the Services and their instruments for Like human beings in relationships with future warfare. These new relationships one another, the Services enter into rela- affect each of the Services as the opera- tionships—“marriages”—with the instru- tional media of air and space become more ments of warfare. At the higher leveis of important to present and future war fight- abstraction, these instruments exist to pro- ing. A commitment to answer the still- vide the capability to fulfill specific func- unanswered question What is best for our tions. There is. for example, a perceived country? underpins these arguments.4 need for the capability to strike an enemy from long range with a large number of weapons arriving at one time. This requirement for warfare is detached in the Changes and Continuity abstract from any service. Yet, sometimes through good sense, romance, tradition, For over four decades, our country and habit, or negotiation, the Services person- most of us accepted the fact that we were alize their relationships with both require- engaged in a cold war with the Soviet ments and capabilities. VVhen they do, the Union. Adopting George Kennan’s pro- requirement or capability takes a very spe- posed strategy of containment, we con- cific and intimate form. The requirement tained the Soviet Union and it collapsed.5 for a long-range, high-volume weapon Yet, our victory surprised us, as many of delivery svstem transforms itself into the our victories do. We apparently did not intimate relationship between the Air presume we would succeed in this “war.” Force and the B-2. between the Navy and As a consequence, the heralded “new the carrier battle group, or between the world order” is, as Secretary of Defense Armv and the attack helicopter. Unless Les Aspin observed, more new than it is the environment changes or their circum- orderly.6 The changes unleashed by the stances change, the Services can remain disintegration of the Soviet Union will happilv wed to their personal. intimate. reverberate for decades. If we lacked a and concrete forms for satisfying abstract Vision or a plan to capitalize on our vic- needs. tory in 1990, we should not wait until Things have changed. The environment 1995 or 1996 to acquire or to craft one. If has changed. The changes continue. This we wait much longer, we are more likely article argues that dramatic changes to be victims of chaotic change than agents demand equally and appropriately dra- controlling, moderating, and reordering its matic responses. To respond to the effects. changes in ways that preserve our capacity When dramatic changes occur in the to serve our country, we must go through a environment, the organic Systems within mental process, using John Boyd’s words, it—human beings, armed forces, nations— of “destructive deduction” in order to must adjust. According to Ilya Prigogine’s ANNULLINC, M AfífílAGES 57

theories regarding order and chãos, living and streamlining—resonate (if not in har- systems can respond to major changes in mony, at least in chorus) with the man- the environment in one of two ways: they date. The edict to reorganize and reform can escape to a “higher order” by reorga- the armed forces promises continuai and nizing or transforming themselves, or they cascading changes for the Services. How can collapse.7 Some kind of order have our military leaders responded? emerges from chãos, but absent our initia- The Air Force proclaimed its post-cold- tive, it may not be the kind or order we war role first and commenced reorganiza- expect or want. tion well ahead of the other Services. Each When the United States emerged as the of the other Services then answered the sole victor of the cold war, it became the call to reform by producing its own new planefs only superpower. We are now in and revised statement of purpose. Each “first place” with the next closest competi- service’s statement asserts the unique and tor many places behind. Our cold war vic- continuing contributions that only that tory led to a strategic pause, an interval Service, preserved in its present form, can during which our country has no clear and make to our nation’s security.10 All of present military threats to its vital inter- these documents also assert the ascen- ests.8 Like any war, the cold war fatigued dancy of and the criticai need for specific the nation. Our citizens crave rest, domes- technological Solutions—programs, hard- tic improvements, and changes in their ware, and organizational forms—required economic condition. These popular goals to meet the expected demands that future do not translate into increasing military enemies are likely to place on what today appropriations. Yet, the uniformed lead- are our Army, our Navy, and our Air ers of our armed forces are only slowly Force. Viewed from afar—objectively and and painfully realizing the unwillingness in the abstract—each of these documents or inability of our citizens to sustain large contains more advocacy than analysis, forces, or the wrong forces, just because more declaration than proof. Shortly we have them, plan to build them, or have thereafter and in compliance with the law, begun to build them. To most of our citi- the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff zens, “right sizing” clearly means “down- submitted the required biennial review of sizing.” We will have fewer and smaller the roles, missions, and functions of the forces. How can we fulfill the obligations armed forces. It proposed some changes of a democratic superpower with smaller but stimulated the secretary of defense to forces? order a more thorough review.11 In the We can fulfill our obligations with tumult of changes in the environment, the smaller forces if form follows function and Services at least provided one element of reason and logic dominate the process of continuity—the apparent unwillingness to reordering and reconstituting our armed make major changes. forces. Toward that end, our civilian leaders have issued a mandate to our nation’s military leadership: define and evaluate the fundamental functions the armed forces must fulfill in the future and organize and arm these forces in the ways that best and most thoughtfully and economi- Roadblocks and Challenges cally fulfill those functions.9 Explicit in this mandate is the call to eliminate costly We will change if only because we can- duplication and unnecessary redundancy. not avoid changing. Change is difficult Management reforms—including such but not impossible. There are only two things as centralization, regionalization, impediments to change within the armed 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

As an abstraction. secular marriage has nothing to do with love. passion. or procreation. Though husband and wife may not believe their intimate bond (above) fulfills the social need for the orderly conveyance of properiy, the fulfillment of that need is symbolized by the nngs they wear (right).

forces: romance and tradition. A third profession. in immersing ourselves in our impediment exists outside of the armed personal responses to the call to arms, we forces: selfishness. That roadhlock, may have lost sight of the objective char- erected bv those who control and profit acteristics of armed force. In the abstract, from controlling the means of weapon pro- our profession requires organized and duction. is not present if they are sworn to more-or-less controlled killing and alvvays put the countrv first. Each of these destruction to serve political objectives. three impediments can be overcome if we Akin to hunting, it formerly required the are willing to understand them in the physical strength and stamina necessary abstract and to grapple with them in the for stalking and killing.12 Technology concrete. Logic and the commitment to do now allows much killing and destruction what is best for our country provide coun- for a very small investment of strength. In termeasures to romance and tradition. some force elements, killing and destruc- Even so, romance and tradition are power- tion also require very little stamina. Air ful. We need to understand the influen.ce forces provide an example. The limits of that romance and tradition exert. technologv originally demanded the Romance sparked the marriages that exist human sensory abilities, muscle. computa- between the Services and their instru- tional capabilitv. and the stamina to drive ments of warfare today. Should logic and operate aircraft effectively. Romantic threaten romance, tradition may intervene notions of warfare originally stipulated to sustain these marriages. that males must do this work. That has To begin with, we have romanticized changed. Romance and tradition now the profession of arms. By ‘‘romanti- argue that humans should do it. That can cized.'' I mean that in living the military change. Air forces today may suffer from ANNULLING MARR1AGES 59

the same mvopia that afflicted their cav- process wherein each service could count alrv forebears: technologv altering warfare on its fair share of the defense appropria- more quickly than warriors can see the tion and was relatively free to spend it to need to outgrow romance. pursue its own force structure, readiness, The Services have also romanticized and modernization programs. Analysis of their roles, enshrining them in tradition. needs at the Service levei often took the In the past. distinctive operational envi- form of advocacy. The quest for “joint- ronments imposed different demands on ness," for the more thoughtful integration the armed forces, and differentiation of capabilities. had to be resisted, and was, occurred. Armies. navies. marine forces, because it imperiled the autonomy of the and air forces are one wav of organizing Services. The pace of the resource alloca- forces. Over time. effectiveness demanded tion cycle, the existence of analytical- and technologv allovved commonalities in advocacy agencies within each service and capabilities among the differentiated force among its hired consultants, and—until elements. Onlv romance and tradition recently—the stimulus provided by the argue that we preserve the differentiation Soviet Ünion all worked together to keep among our forces in those areas where service budgets large and relatively con- technologv has illuminated the fact that stant. On occasion, some people may we are preserving distinctions without a even have employed foot-dragging, slow- difference. Again, air forces provide an rolling, and staff guerrilla warfare. example. Each force element found its This process also enshrined numbers: effectiveness enhanced by control and the 600-ship Navy, 15 carrier battle exploitation of the air or space. Hence, groups, 100 B-lB aircraft. and the long-lost each force element created its own air 70-bomb-wing Air Force. These numbers force, then its own space force. Each Ser- could be compared to the numbers vice realizes that the air and the space required or consumed in World War II to media are to present and future war fight- demonstrate that World War II could not ing what the carbon molecule is to life be refought in the same way without the itself. Armies cannot operate effectivelv same numbers. During the heyday of the without freedom from observation and cold war, planners could arrav Soviet, attacks bv air. Naval forces cannot operate Chinese, North Korean, and Warsaw without freedom from observation and Treaty Organization numbers and, where attacks bv air. Someone, something, some ours were fewer. could argue the need for capability. or set of capabilities must exist “more” for our side. That the numbers to control the air and the space media so were somewhat meaningless benchmarks as to see. hear, target, and touch the was lost on all but a few. Even today, enemv. Tradition would seem to require force structure numbers are the basis of that Air Force pilots, flying aircraft. do arguments that dominate service polemics. most of this work. Logic suggests that this Although numbers are not a reliable indi- is but one alternative. Even so. the tradi- cator of capability, they pervade the some- tions of our separate armed forces, the times tautological arguments involved in decades and decades that thev operated assessing capability and may be little more autonomously even while building Sys- compelling than such things as the num- tems and acquiring capabilities that mim- ber of oceans, the miles of coastline, or the icked one another. are now a powerful numbers we had three years ago. What roadblock to change. does an esoteric “fighter wing equivalent,” The shackles of tradition will be diffi- for example, communicate about sorties- cult to break. especia llv where the per-day, targets-per-sortie, functional resource allocation process has institu- effectiveness, or systemic capability? Per- tionalized tradition. Tradition begot a haps it was for these and other reasons 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993

On a fundamental levei, the military requires organized and controlled killing and destruction to serve political objectives. Services have a tendency to overly romanticize certain functions such as special forces (left), which, like hunting and most military functions of the past, require the physical strength and stamina necessary for stalking and killing. Technology inherent in the F-22 (below) and other modem weapon Systems, however, altere warfare quicker than warriors can outgrow their romantic notions about their profession. ANNULLINC, MA RIU AGES 61

that even the celebrated “base force" has use “deductive destruction” to ask, Why been relegated to the dustbin.13 carriers? and. Why not unmanned or Romance and tradition are powerful remotely piloted vehicles? The funetions motivators to those of us fighting from the demanded must determine the form, not trenches. They help ordinarv people the familiar numbers advocated or the tra- accomplish extraordinarv feats. Even so. ditional inodernization expected. Do we vve must see romance and tradition as a really need aircraft for the “defensive form of bias. They should have little counterair” or the “offensive counterair” influence in the force-structuring and funetions? Can we protect ground forces resource-allocation process. In these are- with better and more economically nas. vve must give logic and reason the organic and ground-based area and point dominant place. We must also respect- defense technologies? Do Solutions to the fullv distance ourselves from any inclina- defensive problems posed by battlefield tion to put a Service or a system ahead of ballistic missiles pave the way for defense our country’s best interests. And vve against intercontinental land- or sea- should not feel guilty or behave as if we launched ballistic missiles? Are we advo- vvere guilty because vve reached this point cating Solutions even before we define or in historv and are struggling to cope with understand the problem? the changes we helped unleash. We also Continuing in this vein, must "fire-and- would do well to keep in mind that forget” antiaircraft missiles be fired by an romance and tradition afflict political par- aircraft? Why must the aircraft that fire ties and the critics of the military as much them have a human being on board? For as they afflict the military. The debates example, what essential future funetions over upgrading the B-lB provide one will the F-22 or the later series of B-2 air- example. There is, for example, neither craft fulfill that absolutely require human guilt nor blame accruing to those who beings on their flight decks? Which of the advocated the B-lB bomber and brought it technological Solutions to the problems into the operational inventory. We built it posed by space operations have utility for exclusively to penetrate the multiple rings solving the problems posed by atmos- of defenses that protected the "evil pheric or terrestrial warfare? Might we empire" and to strike it with devastating alreadv have enough platforms for nuclear force. The B-lB can be adapted at “things” even though we lack smarter and some cost to fulfill other funetions, of better weapons for the platforms to carry? course. Yet. objectivitv demands that it One of the areas overripe for review is compete as one technological solution to “dose" air support. The function of close the problems posed bv the target sets of air support can and will continue to be the future. It should not be discarded as fulfilled by forces formed within and the “Republican bomber" or the “Reagan organic to the force elements that employ bomber." nor should it even be modern- them. The battlefield must be viewed ized if 30 or 50 more B-2 aircraft or some through a panoramic macroscope—not as other capability provides a better and we are used to looking at it. through the more economical form of technological lenses of separate Service microscopes. solution. What are the logical and essential differ- The same is true for new carrier-based ences between an A-10 and a Blackhawk? and land-based strike aircraft. We have Propulsion? Ownership? The bonds of not avoided the influence of romance and matrimony? A series of integral bottom- tradition nor reached the appropriate levei to-top reviews likely will illuminate other of abstraction or analysis if we only ask, traditional air and aerospace funetions How many? or. What characteristics do that may, over time, have become or been these aircraft require? Rather. we must misplaced or malassigned. One can thus 62 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993 expect the heretical questions posed about plex, sophisticated, and costly. And, of to be asked and answered in the continu- course, we undoubtedly will preserve the ous processes of review and rationaliza- essentially brute-force forces necessary to tion. One can also expect the Services, take and hold the land. A costly tail of even though affected by romance and tra- beans, bullets, bandages, and bottled water dition, to answer the questions posed hon- inevitablv follows these forces. estly. Can one also expect the weapons- As romance, tradition, and selfishness producing industries to do the same? are set aside, tremendous opportunities W orld W ar II w as good for bu s in e s s . emerge for our country and for our friends The vveapon producers garnered large and allies. It would be unwise to make profits during the Vietnam era. The whole changes for the sake of change, to elimi- cold war was profitable for them.14 Can nate or add functions without compelling they now participate as unselfish partners reasons, or to craft architectures or forms in a series of functional reviews and stud- that only result in providing aid or com- ies conducted every summer? Can they fort to future enemies. Nonetheless, if the help with analysis that is divorced from best organizational forms require radical advocacy? As long as there is a military- alteration of existing, traditional forms, so industrial marriage to the old notion of be it. It is clear that our armed forces must “surge" and “the prolonged war," we will and will change. This is a consequence of be inadequate unless we have continu- a new paradigm. That these changes be ously operating militarv shipyards and air- made intelligently and sensitively is the craft production lines, a surplus of depots, challenge before us. We are required to and huge inventories of the Stores neces- meet the challenge. sarv to refight and rewin World War II. The notion of the “defense-industrial base” goes hand in glove with extant but An Agenda for Reframing antiquated notions of brute force warfare.15 The future demands more attention One agenda we may wish to consider to the “defense technology base.” Can has five steps: (1) deduce the essential industrialists annul their marriage to the functions and capabilities required by advocacy for brute force warfare? Can armed forces. (2) generate candidate tech- they divorce themselves from the support nological Solutions that fulfill those func- of unchanging or unchanged Services and tions, (3) jointlv select the best Solutions. the arcane tools of a bvgone era? Yes, they (4) commit the resources necessary or can, and for three reasons. available to field the best Solutions, and First, they are patriots too. Second, (5) embrace the organizational forms that functional reviews focusing on the genera- use the best technological Solutions to best tion of the best technology to solve the fulfill the functions. problem sets of the future ultimately will An analysis of our national security require them to build this technology. needs defines the functions of armed There is money to be made there. Third, force. The functions determine the best these Solutions can spawn ever-increasing form/forms that our forces should take. It technological sophistication, better com- will be difficidt for us to define the objec- mercial competitiveness, and even more tive functions of force in the abstract. It production. In the “high-low” mixes that will be even more difficult for us to make are likely to emerge as the candidate force the courageous decisions necessary to structures of the future, the “low” is prof- select the right forms. itable because it will be procured and pro- We must rely on our civilian leadership, duced in mass. The “high” is profitable the Joint Chiefs of Staff (keeping in mind because it is usually wonderfully com- that each chief is also the head of a sepa- ANNULLINCi MAfífílAGES 63

However we organize, we must prepare for threats some point, someone or something will from enemy systems An understanding of these compel us to stop insisting that we can Systems illuminates essential functions of forces and capabilities required. For example. mere numéricaI put the same familiar square pegs into strength is not an authentic measure of merit. A mis- new round holes. match in operational capabilities might give one F-15 Analvsis of the campaign plans of the the advantage over three or more enemy aircraft. CINCs provides the kev to meeting the agenda. The campaign plans describe the operational geography of each area of rate and sometimes parochial military responsibility in rich detail, stipulate the department). the Joint Staff. and the com- capabilities of potential enemies and manders in chief (CINC) of the unified enemy coalitions within the region, and commands to be our honest brokers as we describe what is required to incapacitate redefine essential functions and appropri- adversary systems—and. most importantly, ate forms. Since we can expect that hon- the adversary as an organic system— est brokerage will occur. the agenda pro- within the area of responsibility.16 Cam- posed will satisfy the call to reform and paign planning capitalizes on the “total re-form our armed forces. If it cannot or quality" revolution by allowing us to see does not occur. change will continue, but the generation of offensive or defensive it will be full of unnecessary surprises. At force as the “process” of a “system.” As 64 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL WINTER 1993 we come to better understand total quality if we learn that there is a significant mis- and better describe and improve our own match in operational capabilities because processes, we learn much about adversary of logistics factors (mean time between processes and vulnerability. Key nodes— maintenance, sortie-generation rate, time essential interdependencies between “cus- to rearm and relaunch, dependence on tomers” and “suppliers” and the vulnera- avionics systems with high failure rates, bility created by transportation, informa- and so on) or because of operations factors tion acquisition and distribution, capacity, (vulnerability of Communications systems, inventory, and throughput—all reveal shortage of trained pilots, insufficient themselves. This process-oriented training experience in night flying, lack of approach can allow us to improve our own current intelligence, limitations in air- national combat capability—our own cam- borne warning or control capabilities, and paign plans—if we can see that capability so on), the m ism atch in numerical as the holistic product of more effectively strengths can be to our advantage with integrated, organized, and networked only 100 F-14 aircraft or perhaps even 25 activities. Analyses of the enemy and F-15 aircraft. That we made much of the enemy processes can also allow us to dis- fact that Iraq, for example, had the world’s cern the functions of force within a geo- fourth largest land army and sixth largest graphical area of responsibility. air force may say less about comparative Yet, we should anticipate problems if capabilities than it does about our fond- we discover that our organizational struc- ness for numbers and our unwillingness to ture for commands is flawed. The land is discover or appreciate authentic measures the seat of purpose, so most commands are of merit.18 organized for operations within a geo- Moreover, in the rigorous analysis of graphic area. Analysis of needs may sug- enemy capability and the authentic search gest that future commands be organized to for the functions we must execute to operate in time. not in geographic space. defeat it, we will learn that there are other In this review process, we will also have possible technological Solutions that to confront the problem posed by extrater- defeat the utility or function of enemy restrial space. If “space” is not a mission capability than merely opposing symmet- but is instead a place, then it too will be rical capabilities.19 In the case of the MiG- an area of responsibility, a strategic zone, 29 above, perhaps F-15 or F-14 aircraft are or part of a very large extraterrestrial area not the best solution. Perhaps long-range, contiguous to the areas of responsibility precision guided ground- or sea- or space- assigned to the CINCs. As air power and launched runway-cratering munitions in space power shrink the globe, geographic sufficient numbers to destroy all the areas of responsibility logically will enemy’s runways simultaneously might be become larger in size and fewer in num- a better solution. Another solution might ber.17 However we organize, we must be be an aerial umbrella created by ground- prepared for threats and dangers from launched antiaircraft missiles. There are, enemy systems. in short, more alternatives to defeating the Understanding enemies as organisms or effectiveness of 400 aircraft than merely systems illuminates the essential func- opposing them with 400 of our own. Yet, tions of force and the capabilities required if the ownership or operation of F-15 or by force elements. It also helps us better F-14 aircraft is seen by the aviators in the understand our own force-production and separate Services as more valuable than force-employment schemes. For example, alternative ground-based systems that if an enemy possesses an air arm with 400 have the same or greater effectiveness MiG-29 aircraft, we might believe we need against a specific threat, we will continue 400 F-15 or F-14 aircraft to defeat it. Yet, to generate “air” Solutions to what we will ANNULLING MAHfílAGES 65 continue to insist are—by tradition, doc- force are the central issues in the present trine, and budget—Air Force problems. debate. Technology provides an ever- As the combined CINCs analyze their growing range of candidate Solutions to campaign plans and “black world” capa- the problems posed by enemy capabilities. bilities are shared, we will learn that num- Any service can press the buttons of the bers count less than the nearly perfect weapons of the future. Who ought to pos- employment of the right technological sess these weapons and press these but- solution to the systemic challenges posed tons is the question that must be by an enemy. Moreover, some break- answered. The Air Force asserts that it through and breakaway technologies—the ought to have that role. Others assert that best solution to some problems— may pro- “air” and “space” are “places” in which vide the foundation, the important first all force elements need to operate. There step, in solving other— more complex— is no “aerospace,” they argue, no com- problems. The nonnuclear cruise missile pelling reason that the Air Force should be was one of these breakaway technologies. given the lead and the resources to domi- There are others. If, for example, we nate it. The truth is that the Air Force has develop the capability to solve the defen- organized, trained, and equipped itself to sive counterair problem in a relatively be the leading force in both air and space. small area of responsibility without The truth is that the Air Force intends that manned airborne systems, will we not be leadership to continue. What is best for better prepared to solve the analogous our country? problem when the area to be protected is We must reframe the debate in terms of our larger homeland? In so doing, would what is best for our country with an we not have or preserve authentic techno- authentic willingness to annul the mar- logical “super" power? riages that are no longer appropriate. It is Technological Solutions that pivot on good that we continue to engage in the our aerospace superiority and its preserva- process of review, that we strive to under- tion ensure that we will retain super stand the capabilities of potential future power. Aviation, air power, and aero- enemies. It is good that we generate possi- space operations are at the heart of the ble Solutions to the problems posed by present roles, missions, and functions enemy capabilities. It is wise to recall that debate. Aerospace operations are the in the heyday of their respective technolo- nexus of war fighting today and will be in gies—their Solutions—the horse-mounted the future. Command of the electromag- fighter, the gunsm ith-artillerist, the netic spectrum, knowledge of the enemy, entrenchment-wise engineer, and the global synchronization in time and space, human pilot first dominated, then became the coup d’oeil, and effective decision just another contributor to the Science and making are not possible without the con- art of warfare.20 trol and exploitation of air and space. As technologies became assimilated into Even so, one must be suspicious of air- warfare, warfare became less linear, asvm- alone Solutions to the problems posed by metrical. and a multimedia activity. Com- enemy forces. The land is and will con- bined arms logically evolved into joint tinue to be the seat of purpose. “No-fly” arms. Joint arms evolve into integrated zones can sweep the skies. but control of arms. Integrated arms can beget unified the skies is merely a prerequisite to a solu- arms. Today we “unify” arms, or think we tion and should not be viewed as the mili- unify them, within an area of responsibil- tary solution for most problems. ity or around a function assigned to a Whose responsibility it ought to be to CINC. Keep in mind that, although this is control the aerospace and who is to pos- one way and our traditional way to unify sess and operate aerospace instruments of arms, it may not be the best way. A differ- 66 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993 ent way may be to have an air force and a Among the first to be smashed might be surface force providing forces to the CINCs those insistent upon enslaving atomic of a rapid response force and a sustain- energy for warfare and those given to dis- ment force. Different, however, is not nec- ruptive opportunism and adventurism essarily better. It may be that a kind of beyond their borders. natural selection governs the process of Many of these nations have immature evolutionary changes in organizational military architectures even though they forms. If the environment is changing and possess modem weapons. Their capabili- our armed forces are adapting inade- ties are “lopsided,” and we have the quately, they will pass from history along wherewithal to unbalance them and defeat vvith the Red Army that long defined their centers of gravity. Their armed them. It may be that the failure to envi- forces are well behind ours in the evolu- sion and imagine is the most serious threat tion from combined arms to joint arms and we face.21 There are other threats or “dan- on toward unified arms. We should nei- gers,” of course. Super power can keep ther regress in our own evolution—in our these irritants inanageable. progress to better integrate the capability The post-cold-war world is an unstable of our own ground, air, and maritime world. It is a world of sovereign nations forces— nor surrender the capability to competing for scarce resources. Strangely, achieve military objectives by failing to in the world that is emerging, one nation’s use any of the war-fighting media effec- enemy will inevitably be another nation’s tively. valued customer, supplier, or market. Even so, it is also possible that a review Treaties, agreements, and an awareness of will determine that the future requires interdependency may provide increasing more of one kind of force than another constraints on the use of force for conflict kind. In their days, Rome, Carthage, and resolution. Even so. renegades may France were land powers, and Portugal emerge in the lesser-developed nations. and England were naval powers, as befit- On balance, however, the armed forces of ted their national objectives.22 Oceans the lesser-developed nations lack the mili- and coastlines neither make a nation a tary capabilities that the great powers and “maritime power” nor require that a the recently great powers possess. They nation fancy itself one. On the other also lack the intellectual and doctrinal hand. cannot one argue that anv nation architecture necessary to employ these that regards itself as an authentic air and capabilities to greatest effectiveness. As space power is autom atically a maritime organisms, their nations and their armed power? Air and space enshroud the forces, lethal and technologically sophisti- planet. The oceans only surround the cated though these forces may be, are continents. The question of "power” must primitive and simple when compared to focus on the kind of power and the func- ours. Exploritable vulnerabilities exist in tions of the force required to meet the their warfare-supporting transportation nation’s objectives. The characteristics of infrastructures. production. Communica- opposing power are no less important. tions, logistics movement and resupply Consider the potential national security systems. training. and sustainability. Even consequences if some nation organized as though their numbers may be large and a Corporation developed an affordable pol- their hostile will powerful. many lack the lution-free vehicle and the means to pro- total capability required to pose a real duce it in large num bers. W ould we threat where coalitions oppose them. threaten this nation/corporation with our Diplomacy can effectively hold many of F-22s and B-2s to prevent the collapse of these potentially renegade nations in our own automobile manufacturers? By check, but others may have to be smashed. reframing the debate as a broad search to AN NU LU NG MAHfUAGES b7 define the functions that shoulcl determine annul some marriages, and the time is run- our forms, we mav come to agreement on ning out. This strategic pause wili not last vvhat is best for our country. forever. These are, in the worse and likely None of this is possibíe if we remain case, merely the new interwar years. We wed to the past. None of this is possibíe if can prolong them by reforming our armed we continue to be married to the forces. We have everything it takes to processes, structures, and forms of a emerge victorious from whatever future bygone era. Our country and our coun- fights our capability cannot deter. The trv’s leadership call us to change, to essential first step is the willingness to undertake the process of re-forming and annul the marriages of the past. reforming our armed forces. It is time to

Notes 1. Gary Zukav. The Dancing IVu Li Masters: An OverView the suggeslion that our country has more than one air force o f the New Phvsics (New York: Bantam Books. 1980), "makes a wonderful sound bite but distorts the facts." See 111-14, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, "Chairman's Report: A First 2. These androgynous nicknames vvere chosen to suggest Step." Defense 93, issue 2 (July 1993), 24-25. The Defense the complexity of relationships in the last decade of the 93 article was derived in pari from a letter Secretary Aspin twentieth century. If relationships characterized by affection sent to lhe chairs of the Senate and House Armed Services are complicated. imagine the complexities in relations Committee on 29 March 1993. See also “Navy Wins Out in affected by competition. Bottom-Up Review." Navy News & Undersea Technology, 6 3. John R. Bovd. "Destruction and Creation." August 1976. September 1993, 1. 4. Sen Sam Nunn. “The Defense Department Must Thor- 14. William W. Kaufmann and Lawrence J. Korb. The 1990 oughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions," Vital Defense Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu- Speeches 20 (1 August 1992): 717-24 This speech was tion. 1989). 9-13. Although difficult Io calculate with preci- given in the US Senate on 2 JuJy 1992. See also Barton Gell- sion, over $8 trillion (in 1989 defense dollars) were spent man, “Senator Nunn Questions Militarv Duplication," Wash- between 1951 and 1991. ington Post. 3 July 1993. 15. John Ellis. Brute Force: A llied Strategy and Tactics in 5. “X” (George Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," the Second World War (New York: Viking Penguin. 1990). Foreign Affaics 4 (July 1947): 575-81. Ellis suggests that the Allies, led by the production giants of 6. Secretarv of Defense Les Aspin. "Four Challenges to the the US and the USSR. inelegantly bludgeoned the enemy to New World Órder." Defense Issues 8 (1 February 1993): 2. defeat. Brute force warfare requires a commitment to pro- 7. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of longed wars and a defense industrial base to support lhem. Chãos: \ían's New Dialogue with Nature (Boulder. Colo.: It is arguable that the Congress or the people wili support a New Science Librarv. 1984). 171-76, 297-313. large, prolonged war or even a "major regional contingency." 8. Les Aspin. The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New See also John D. Morrocco and David A. Fulghum. "Saving Era (Washington. D.C.: Department of Defense. 1 September Industrial Base Key in Bottom-Up Review." Aviation Week 8- 1993). "Threats" to national security have been replaced by Space Technology. 6 September 1993, 24 “dangers." 16. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for 9. Nunn. 623. Combat (Washington. D.C.: National Defense University 10. Respectivelv. these are Land Warfare in the 21 st Cen- Press, 1988). tura' for the Army. From the Sen for the Navy, and Global 17. Ronald J. Wright. Kevin D. Stubbs, and Joseph J. Reac.h—Global Power for the Air Force. See Tom Donnelly. Muniz. "The Soviet Concept of a Theater of Mililary Opera- “Services Outline Their Futures in High-Stakes Era," Army tions: Implications for Outer Space." in )acob W. Kipp et al.. Times. 26 April 1993. 25. Soviet Views on Militarv Operations in Space (College Sta- 11. Barton Gellman. "Aspin Gently Criticizes Powell tion, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology. 1986), 221—43. Report." Washington Post, 30 March 1993. 6. 18. Department ol the Air Force, "Reaching Globally. 12. Rick Fields. The Code o f the Warrior: In History. Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Myth, and Everyday Life (New York: HarperCoIlins Publish- GulfWar," a report (Septeml)er 1991), 3-5. ers. 1991). 5-17. See also Robert L. 0'Connell, Of Arms and 19. 0 ’Connell. 296, 301-7. Men: A Historyr of War. Weapons, and Aggression (New 20. Ibid. York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 20-29. 21. Gen Merrill A. McPeak, "Flexibility and Airpower." an 13. A comparison of the forces emerging from the "Bot- address presented al the Air Mobilitv Command dining in. tom-Up Review" and those fortnerly judged to be the "base 12 June 1993, in Department of the Air Force. "Air Force case” show that we now have a new floor or base. The 1999 Update," June 1993. 4. "Bottom-Up" force structure. cited above. establishes the 22. Paul Kennedy, The fíise and Fali of the Great Powers: requirement for 11 active Navy carriers and 13 active Air Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 Force Fighter wings. Unlike Air Force wings, everv carrier (New York: Random House. 1987). Col John Warden, the wing is a small “composite" wing. The numher of fixed- and commandant of the Air Command and Staff College, suggests rotary-wing aircraft in lhe armed forces probably led to the that air and space forces wili occupy an increasingly impor- assertions by Senator Nunn and others that our country has tant role in the conilicts of the future. several "air forces." Secretary of Defense Aspin asserts that THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

D r Steven M et z

T IS EASY to assume that the end of nificance. Common wisdom held that the cold war changed only the key neutrality was a prerequisite for peace- actors in global politics but left funda- keeping. Since the US was seldom neu- mental concepts and relationships tral, other nations were better suited to I provide peacekeeping forces. intact. Such an assumption would mean that American national security profes- Furthermore, most of the recent interna- sionals need only find ways to adapt old tional peacekeeping operations were techniques to new circumstances—not an under the control of the United Nations especiallv taxing procedure. But the truth (UN), an organization that was decidedly is that the essence of military power is hostile to the US by the 1970s.* Indeed. also changing, a fact that presents new intellectual challenges of dramatic propor- tions for security professionals and that demands creativitv on a wide range of top- ics. None of these challenges is more complex than discovering an effective role for United States military power in multinational peacekeeping operations. Although the US historically supported international peacekeeping and often paid a substantial portion of the costs, it accorded this task minimal strategic sig- Now the impasse is broken, and peacekeeping is—according to Laurence Mar- tin—a “growth industry."5 In fact, the UN dispatched more forces since 1988 than it did in the previous 40 years combined.6 Blue-helmeted troops are on the ground in a dozen operations from El Salvador to Western Sahara to Cambodia. This frenzy of activity. which is a direct result of the end of the cold war, has strained the UN's capabilities. After their externai support was cut off, many third world conflicts were resolved diplomatically with some form of UN involvement. The ability of the UN to the UN General Assembly and the US had monitor and implement diplomatic Solu- such starklv divergent views of global tions. however, lagged far behind its skill security that there was little ground for at negotiating them .7 consensus. From the American perspec- At the same time that UN peacekeeping tive. the UN jettisoned anv veneer of neu- underwent a renaissance, hostility toward trality through actions such as the General US involvement in third world conflicts Assembly resolution of 10 November lessened. This phenomenon is due in part 1975. which claimed that Zionism is a to a new American attitude. Specifically, form of racism and racial discrimination. after the demise of the Soviet Union, we By the 1980s, many Americans ques- no longer viewed regional conflict through tioned the continued participation of the the narrow, often paralyzing confines of United States in the UN.2 Charles the cold war. Today, many belligerents Krauthammer probably captured wide- recognize that the US has no imperial spread feelings when he wrote. “On war ambitions and that no peacekeeping oper- and peace. vvhether in Afghanistan, ation can succeed without American back- Nicaragua or the Persian Gulf, the United ing (if not direct participation). Thus, Nations is irrelevant. . . . Dominated bv its they now welcome our involvement automatic Soviet bloc-Third World major- instead of shunning it. ity, the United Nations is one of the most This confluence of trends provides important instruments of anti-Western strategic opportunities. According to diplomacy.”3 Richard Connaughton, “The time for a As a result of this impasse. US success new military strategy of peace for the in peacekeeping carne outside the UN. world based on the UN in general and the most notably vvith the Multinational Force Security Council in particular has never and Observers in the Sinai.4 In general, been more propitious.”8 UN Secretary- though. fiascoes such as the bombing of General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has the US Marine barracks in Lebanon—com- attempted to take advantage of this oppor- bined vvith ideological bias and incompe- tunity by constructing a framework for the tence in the UN—led us to conclude that resuscitation of the UN. In his widely peacekeeping operations brought risks and praised report of June 1992 entitled An costs out of proportion to the political Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, payoffs. As a result, our national security Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, he wrote strategv and militarv doctrine talked of that “an opportunity has been regained to peacekeeping. but we did not take it seri- achieve the great objectives of the Char- ouslv. ter.’’9 In the secretary-generaFs vision, the

69 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTEfí 1993 cold war was only an interregnum in the ing operations is understanding the nature movement towarcl a system of global secu- and associated problems of these opera- rity that transcends the persistent violence tions. Although the type of peacekeeping of the traditional one. However, this described here is a recent phenomenon, movement requires not just an increase in the notion of inserting an outside, neutral the extent of traditional peacekeeping but force into a conflict to allow a cooling- totallv new forms of UN activity. down period. to facilitate negotiations, Unfortunately, the US military is not and to help assure adherence to a diplo- fully prepared to play an active role in matic settlement has been present the evolution of peacekeeping. Our post- throughout history. What is unique, how- cold-vvar national security and military ever, is the ongoing institutionalization of strategies have not fully accommodated the process under the aegis of the UN, as basic changes in the form and utility of well as regional international organiza- military force, particularly in such tions such as the Organization of African rapidly changing areas as peacekeeping. Unity and Organization of American Landmark documents such as the States. N ational Military Strategv o f the United Collective security and the peaceful set- States of January 1992 and the Chairman tlement of disputes were two of the pri- o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Report on the mary functions of the UN from its incep- Roles. Missions, and Functions of the tion. But the UN charter assumed that Anned Forces of the United States of Feb- threats to security after World War II ruary 1993 barelv mention such would take the traditional form of inter- changes.10 Although joint doctrine, pol- state aggression. The framers of the char- icv, and procedures are being developed, ter did not foresee that ideological struggle without a solid foundation in the wider and the often-violent process of decolo- framework of military strategy, they will nization would dominate the postwar have onlv a minimal effect on training global security system. Thus, the charter and planning. This situation would leave did not mention peacekeeping as it later us poorly prepared to face new security developed but assumed that a permanent challenges. Put bluntly. there is a great military force created and manned by the need for serious study, intense debate, great powers would keep the peace.11 and sustained analvsis on the role that The charter notion of international the US can play in constructing a post- security quickly proved unrealistic, leav- cold-war global security system in which ing the UN to seek innovative ways to per- multinational peacekeeping is an effec- form its mandate. Peacekeeping was one tive element of conflict resolution. This of these innovations, and troops were first fact is especially true for the US Air Force dispatched under the authority of the since, bv bringing unique capabilities to Security Council to the Middle East in multinational operations, it can be a 1948. Under the energetic and Creative vital— perhaps essential—component of leadership of Dag Hammarskjõld, UN sec- future success at peacekeeping. retary-general from 1953 to 1961, and others, such as Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and longtime UN official Brian Urquhart, peacekeeping developed Peacekeeping, Old into a useful (if limited) element of con- and New flict resolution.12 In essence. traditional peacekeeping was a form of military The first step in crafting effective proce- activity “organized by the U.N. on an ad dures, plans, and doctrine for the use of hoc basis to act as an interposition force American aerospace power in peacekeep- following a cease-fire, but prior to any THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PEA CEKEEPING 71

agreement resolving major issues in a dis- reinforced infantry company from the pute.”13 Berlin Brigade was part of a preemptive UN peacekeeping operations followed a deployment to Macedonia.1H Other common pattern.14 The Security Council actions have been considered, including or the General Assembly created and UN monitoring of the border crossings established guidelines for a specific opera- between Serbia and Bosnia to prevent the tion but exercised little actual direction military resupply of Bosnian Serb over the operation. The secretary-general militias.19 The US has also encouraged named the force commander, recruited the the UN to send a multinational police force from member nations, and wrote force to Haiti to reestablish order and ease rules of engagement and procedures that the transition to democracy. This UN were subject to approval by the Security peacekeeping force would be the first one Council or General Assembly. The com- inserted into a situation not involving mander then took command of a multina- civil or international war.20 tional force that almost always excluded Beyond these reactive steps, Secretary- American or Soviet troops and usually General Boutros-Ghali has actively those from NATO or the Warsaw Pact.15 attempted to craft a conceptual and strate- The peacekeepers operated with the con- gic foundation for post-cold-war peace- sent of the parties to the conflict, keeping. To expand the UN’s capabilities attempted to remain rigidly neutral. and— beyond the traditional model, he called for since they were to act as observers, stabi- a new category of UN forces to be called lizers, confidence builders, and buffers “peace-enforcement units.”21 These rather than as enforcers— carried only trained volunteer troops would be more light arms. The force did not require or heavily armed than traditional peacekeep- even seek military effectiveness.16 ers and would be made available to the Clearly, the conditions under which tradi- Security Council on a permanent basis by tional peacekeeping could succeed were member States. Peace-enforcement units limited. could intervene without the consent of the The end of the cold war, however, pro- local parties when the Security Council vided the opportunity to expand the util- approved and, by implication, could aban- ity of multinational peacekeeping. The don neutrality when one party clearly question is, How? Initially, it might seem posed the major threat to peace.22 In other logical to pass the peacekeeping mandate words, these second-generation peace- to some international organization or orga- keepers could be more intrusive and nizations other than the UN, but short- aggressive than traditional ones. comings of regional organizations are even To augment the flexibility and speed of greater than those of the UN.17 Similarly, peacekeeping operations, the secretary- the most militarily efficient solution— hav- general asked for improved training for ing the US act unilaterally as the agent of UN police contingents and for preposi- the UN— is politically infeasible. The tioned military supplies.23 Recognizing answer, then, is strengthening the UN, but that all peacekeeping is grounded in at present there is no clear consensus on diplomacy, Boutros-Ghali also empha- the extent or nature of this process. sized peacemaking (bringing hostile par- Some adaptations of the traditional ties to agreement through peaceful means) model are being made “on the fly” as the and p ea ce building (identifying and UN responds to crises with intrusive, non- strengthening support structures solidify- traditional activities, many of which ing peace).24 In Boutros-Ghali’s vision, involve US forces. For example, US Air the UN would transcend the limitations of Force F-15s and F-16s participated in traditional peacekeeping and develop the enforcing the Bosnian “no-fly zone,” and a capability to play an effective role in a 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993 range of conflicts from relatively simple keeping and humanitarian operations. observer missions through the protection • Ensuring adequate and equitable fund- of safe havens to full-scale enforcement ing for UN and associated peacekeeping activities such as Operation Desert operations.29 Storm.25 Most importantly, these actions Clearly, the UN’s role in peacekeeping is could take place without the consent of changing in a way congruent with US the antagonists in a conflict. In this way, national interests. This trend has serious the vision of the charter would be realized implications for the US military and par- half a century after its signing. ticularly for the Air Force. Other analysts have proposed even more radical expansions of peacekeeping. James Meachem, for example, supports creation of a brigade-size standing Air Force Missions UN force to serve as a rapid-reaction ele- In order to succeed at the type of intru- ment for crises that cannot wait for the sive activities proposed by Boutros-Ghali, building of a traditional peacekeeping the UN must be able to perform, organize, force or to serve as the first echelon of a or coordinate a range of military missions. larger UN contingent.26 In an even more According to a study by a group of US mil- innovative vein, J. S. Bremner and J. M. itary officers, these missions range from Snell envisage a role for UN forces in simple assessments to joint and combined new types of security threats, including campaigns in major regional conflicts environmental peacekeeping and inter- (table 1). These missions, in turn, require a range of military capabilities: national anticrime operations.27 This proposal is well in accord with Boutros- A. Intelligence Ghali’s holistic view of economic, social, 1. Indications and Warnings and environmental problems as security 2. Strategic Assessment threats coequal with military conflict.28 3. Tactical Intelligence B. Integrated Military Command, Control, Given this trend, the UN may eventually and Communications (C3) consider other functions, such as the 1. Planning intrusive enforcement of a nuclear, bio- 2. Operations logical, or Chemical nonproliferation 3. Training and Simulation regime or the restoration of democratic 4. In-Place Regional Command governments. Structure Although official American policy has 5. Area Specialization not been nearly this forward thinking, 6. Global Communications President George Bush did embrace 7. Precision Locating Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace. In a C. Aerospace Power 1. Aerospace Control speech to the UN, Bush called for multina- 2. Precision Munitions Delivery tional efforts in five key areas: 3. Survivable Deep Attack • Developing and training national mili- 4. Theater Missile Defense tary units for peacekeeping operations and D. Maritime Power/Sea Control humanitarian relief. 1. Countermine 2. Countersmuogling •Developing multinational planning, 3. Protection or Escorts/Sea Lines of training, and field exercises. Communications • Providing adequate logistical support 4. Refugee Control for peacekeeping and humanitarian opera- E. Forcible Entry tions. F. Strategic Mobility •Developing planning, crisis manage- 1. Airlift ment, and intelligence capability for peace- 2. Sea Lift THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPING 73 Table 1 Possible UN Military Missions

PEACEMAKING PEACE BUILDING PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT

Assessments Assessments Assessments Assessments

Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring Show of force

Counterterrorism Counterterrorism Counterterrorism

Observers Observers Free passage

Law and order Law and order Blockade

Humanitarian Humanitarian Air/naval campaign assistance assistance

Disarming/ Hostage rescue Limited major regional demobilizing conflict

Organizing/training Protection of enemy Major regional conflict prisoners of war

Protecting elections Noncombatant evacuation

Reconstruction Preventive peacekeeping

Environmental protection

Source: Martha Bilis et al., Options for U.S. Military Support to the United Nations (Washington. D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1992), 5.

G. Global Loeistics Support Because many of these functions are far H. Land Comoat Power beyond the UN’s current capabilities, the 1. Light Infantry Force US—in view of its extra-UN global mili- 2. Armored Force tary commitments—should focus on those 3. Heliborne Force functions that other member States cannot I. Unconventional Warfare J. Nation Building provide. Specifically, aerospace power is 1. Engineering just the sort of task that the US can pro- 2. Civil Affairs vide quicker, more effectively, or more 3. Psychological Operations30 efficiently than other nations. 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

The central role of air power in preserv- • Provision of joint planners to the Joint ing a UN-engineered peace is not new. As Staff and the staffs of the unified and spec- Eric Grove points out, “The Charter is ified commands; these planners under- explicit in considering air forces the most stand the special requirements of peace- appropriate weapons of first resort against keeping operations. potential aggressors.”31 Today the speed, • Provision of planners to multinational power, and flexibilitv of aerospace power planning staffs involved in UN operations. can be decisive, both as a deterrent and an •Training of multinational planning actual counter to aggression. The UN des- staffs. peratelv needs aerospace power but has • Provision of strategic, operational, and none. tactical mobility and resupply for The US Air Force can support UN oper- deployed UN peacekeeping forces. ations in a number of areas: • Provision of command, control, Com- munications, and computers (C4), especially air traffic control. Sincp the cold war ended, the UN has engaged in a frenzy of peacekeeping operations. UN leaders see • Provision of basing and repair facili- their goal as maintaining intemational peace and ties for use by peacekeeping forces. secunty. as well as secunng justice and human rights. • Training of non-US air components of

UN PHOTO 110649 THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PEA CEKEEPINC, 75

UN forces, especially intelligence and sup- in the traditional sense. The military Ser- port elements. vices must give peacekeeping its fair share • Refueling of UN aircraft and those of of resources in terms of intellectual other members of peacekeeping forces. energy, talent, and training time—some- • S e a r c h a n d r e s c u e . thing that can happen only when the atti- • M e d i c a i e v a c u a t i o n . tudes of sênior leaders change. • Intelligence, reconnaissance. and sur- Such a change in attitude does not veillance support for UN peacekeeping imply abandoning the war-fighter ethos forces and crisis management teams, espe- that the American military worked so hard ciallv support derived frorn space plat- to create and sustain. But the fact remains forms. including both data and interpreta- that peacekeeping and war fighting have tion. fundamental differences, including diver- • Provision of weather information. gent objectives. Further, peacekeeping • Provision of certain tvpes of special occurs in the fuzzy area between war and operations support. peace, where military force is directly sub- • Suppression of air activity or estab- ordinate to diplomatic efforts. The tradi- lishment of air exclusion zones in areas of tional American approach to conflict, peacekeeping or enforcement operations. however. draws a rigid distinction • Traditional air povver applications and between peace and war and can be dys- air campaigns in support of multinational functional in the area of low-intensity con- enforcement actions. flict or—to use the more current phrase— military operations short of war (including peacekeeping). Approaching all conflict Implications as war can be dangerously counterproduc- tive. We must, therefore, recognize the What would it take for the US military, limitations on the appropriateness of the especially the Air Force, to provide more war-fighter ethos lest we find ourselves in effective support for UN military actions? a sikuation in which our own attitudes It would not require anv radical force erode opportunities to forestall war. structure changes above those alreadv Peacekeeping requires a unique form of planned because the crisis-response and leadership, especially by junior and non- contingencv forces called for in the new commissioned officers.33 They must national military strategv—in conjunction understand that there is a time and a place with the planning and intelligence for war fighting— and a point at which a resources of the unified commands— war fighter’s attitude must dominate, even would suffice.32 Although the inherent in peacekeeping. Service cultures and flexibility of composite wings would make systems for the cultivation of leaders must them especially useful. the unique nature find a way to make leaders understand of the new UN operations should persuade this fragile and rapidly changing relation- sênior leaders to consider the formation of ship. a dedicated unit in the US military for this type of activity. In addition, the Àir Force should advocate and pursue change in Training and Education three kev areas. Because attitudes and Service cultures ger- minate in the Service educational systems, Altitudes all leveis of professional military educa- Above all else, the Air Force must take tion (PME) should include the fundamen- peacekeeping seriously by valuing the tais of peacekeeping. including the dis- preservation of peace as much as victory tinction between peacekeeping and war 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

fighting.34 Further, PME should look for notes that "the single most important instructors from nations with extensive requirement of a peacekeeping operation involvement in peacekeeping operations. is consent to the operation by all the par- Canadians, for example, have wide experi- ties in the dispute,” a sentiment echoed in ence in traditional ÜN peacekeeping, and Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aero- the broad similarities in the Canadian and space Doctrine o f the United States Air US militaries would make for a logical Force.™ Obviously, US doctrine has not relationship between the two, once Ameri- captured the sense of radical c.hange in cans accept the notion that they are the the notion of peacekeeping and needs students and not the teachers. refinement in order to retain relevance in Peacekeeping operations require that the world of more aggressive and intrusive planners and field commanders acquire IJN actions. This observation is particu- extensive cultural and political sensitiv- larly true for the portions of the doctrine ity— traits that must be acquired far in that deal with the air component. advance of deployment. A combination of The US should assist in the develop- civilian and military educational institu- ment of UN doctrine, staff, and planning tions must provide courses in these areas. procedures for multinational peacekeep- For example, basic and intermediate PME ing operations. Currently, no such doc- (e.g., Squadron Officer School and Air trine exists; instead, the UN has a combi- Command and Staff College, respectively) nation of case-by-case rules of engagement can provide a basic foundation that must and a “protodoctrine” compiled by a pri- be augmented by more detailed regional vate organization that supports UN activ- studies at civilian universities or the Air ity.37 Likewise, the UN’s ability to plan War College. These institutions should and direct a military operation is limited. offer courses in ethnicity, history, and cul- Although articles 46 and 47 of the charter tural factors, which must in turn be aug- established a Military Staff Committee mented by staff and unit exercises involv- composed of the military chiefs of staff of ing joint, interagency, and combined oper- the permanent members of the Security ations in support of the UN. The Air Council acting through day-to-day repre- Force should also consider establishment sentatives,38 the cold war stalemate of a formal peacekeeping institute such as destroyed the effectiveness of this con- the one at the US Army War College. struct, so most planning was ad hoc (and inefficient). Today, manv experts argue (without Doctríne and Planning Procedures reaching a consensus) that the UN needs We have joint doctrine for US military doctrine, rational planning procedures. involvement in peacekeeping operations, and a trained staff to provide clear. strate- but it focuses on traditional, first-genera- gic guidance that the peacekeeping force tion activity. 'Joint Pub 3-07.3, “Joint Tac- comniander and his staff can translate into tics, Techniques, and Procedures for mission statements.39 Marrack I. Gould- Peacekeeping Operations” (revised final ing, former UN under secretary-general in draft), for example, defines peacekeeping charge of peacekeeping. feels that the cre- as “operations, conducted with the con- ation of a “war room" for operational plan- sent of the belligerent parties, designed to ning would distract from the essentiallv maintain a negotiated truce and help pro- diplomatic nature of UN missions.40 As a mote conditions that support the diplo- compromise, the US, Great Britain, matic efforts to establish a long-term peace France, Canada, and the Scandinavian in areas of conflict.”35 countries added military advisers to their Similarly, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine UN missions to aid in planning—a for Military O perations Other than War, halfway step at best. A more svstematic THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PEA CEKEEPINC 77 plan calls for (1) a US-sponsored multinational UN military school to train planners. (2) the formation of a strategic plans and policv cell at UN headquarters led bv a flag officer. and (3) establishinent of a high-tech UN Communications unit by the US.41 In addition. the US should refine its ovvn methods for planning peacekeeping operations. As John Mackinlay and jarat Chopra point out. a model exists in our planning procedures for counterinsur- g e n c y , 42 a form o f co n f l i c t — l i k e p e a c e - keeping—characterized by political and psvchological factors and by severe liinits on the use of military force. Hence. Amer- ican doctrine and planning procedures for counterinsurgency could be adapted to peacekeeping.43 The US must refine several other ele- UN PHOTO 62334 ments of planning if it is to provide more Undet Dag Hammarskjõld—UN secretary general from effective support to UN peacekeeping. For 1953-61—and other leaders, UN forces would enter example. we need better methods for an area following a cease-fire and keep the peace until wamng countries settled their dispute. establishing air exclusion zones or air quarantines. Key issues would include nondestructive methods for suppressing necessarv for the Air Force to assume a hostile air movement. appropriate steps more active and effective role in support for suppression of air defenses. and tech- of UN peacekeeping. Shortcomings in niques for Identification friend or foe (IFF) doctrine. training, and—most impor- and the identification of military and non- tantly—attitude can be transcended, but militarv air traffic in the peacekeeping only if the national command authorities environment. US planners must also con- unambiguously commit the nation to sider the impact of peacekeeping opera- greater effectiveness in peacekeeping. tions on the budget and on personnel rota- Currently, it is impossible to tell how seri- tion and assignment during the ongoing ous we are about peacekeeping. On the force dravvdown. Peacekeeping operations one hand, Bush's speech to the UN—cited vvill usually not require large numbers of earlier—and numerous other policy state- US forces but may require a protracted US ments linked peacekeeping with the US presence. Finallv, US intelligence capa- national interest.44 The former presidenfs bilities can be of great utility to UN peace- valedictory national security strategy keeping. but our Services and intelligence cal led for renewed American efforts to agencies must develop guidelines for improve the effectiveness of the UN in intelligence sanitation and procedures for conflict prevention. peacekeeping, and dissemination prior to an operation. peacemaking.45 Similarly, the Clinton administration expressed support for a strengthened UN along the lines suggested Obstacles to Success by Boutros-Ghali. During Senate confir- mation hearings, ClintoiTs UN representa- VVithout a doubt. the US has both the tive, Madeleine K. Albright, said. “Presi- human and material resources that are dent Clinton has spoken about the impor- 78 AIRPOWER fOURNAL WINTER 1993

Although UN troops are still involved in traditional peacekeeping, providing relief to starving populations (above and below) is now one of their major functions.

tance of creating a [UN] rapid deployment force, or a force that vvould be available to deal vvith problems.”46 In line vvith its general strategy of moving from the unilateral to the multilateral application of force, the Clinton administration in June 1993 made public a plan that vvould dramatically enlarge the role of US military personnel in UN peacekeeping.47 A draft policy review document known as PRD-13 advocated US involvement in planning and implementing peacekeeping operations whenever US interests justified such involvement rather THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PE A CEKEEPING 79

than whenever the US could make a the unease of many people on the political unique contribution. This policy would Right: constitute an endorsement of many of the ideas espoused by Boutros-Ghali in his As more usual than not in political matters, the purposes are admirable, even compelling. report on An Agenda for PeaceA8 There are, however, increasing grounds for On the other hand, actual policy indi- concern about the practicality, prudence, and cates that obstacles mav still outweigh even morality of the means which some imperatives. For good reasons. the US enthusiasts want to adopt. Cautionary notes remains deeply suspicious of the UN's need to be sounded, not least because abilitv to control and direct military activ- bureaucratic euphoria, coupled with empire ity, just as many other nations complain building, increasingly tempts the UN estab- of amateurism in UN peacekeeping opera- lishment.54 tions.49 But American resistance is more serious than that of other nations, given Because of these mixed signals, efforts our power to augment the UN's effective- on the part of the Department of Defense ness. This fact is reflected in the debate and the military Services to refine strategy, between opponents and proponents of doctrine, training, education, or force strengthening the UN. During discussions structure have been slow in coming. of an expanded peacekeeping presence in Sênior leaders, faced with the crushing Bosnia, for example, the Clinton adminis- complexitv of retaining military prowess tration insisted on NATO control.50 during dramatic downsizing of the Ameri- When he was unable to engineer a consen- can military, have been extremely cau- sus among our European allies, the presi- tious in assuming new tasks that would dent turned toward old-fashioned unilat- entail additional demands for personnel, eralism.51 Similarly, the UN’s assumption money, and time. As a result, our mistrust of command of Operation Restore Hope in of the UN's capability is self-fulfilling: Somalia caused congressional and public because we mistrust it, we do not take it unease, as was the case with the deploy- seriously; and because we do not take it ment to Macedonia, despite the fact that seriously, it stands little chance of both commanders vvere from NATO improvement. nations (Turkey and Denmark. respec- If this confusion ends and if our tively).52 Only after extensive debate dur- national security leaders do decide that ing the Clinton administration's revievv of more effective US support for UN peace- the US role in UN peacekeeping did keeping is a worthv element of our strat- American military leaders drop their tradi- egy, then aerospace power will be a vital tional insistence that US forces ahvays be çomponent of our contribution. No other kept under US command.53 nation can match the speed and efficiency In general, enthusiasm for expanded UN of aerospace power that the US could con- peacekeeping follows the traditional lib- tribute to UN efforts. Thus, the Air Force eral/conservative split in American poli - should at least begin preparing for the tics. with liberais far more supportive of changes in attitude, doctrine, organization, the process than are conservatives. Lau- and training that such a contribution rence Martin, writing in the influential would require once our strategy becomes journal The National Interest, expresses clear.

Notes 1. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A Dangerous Place on Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise (Boston: Little. Brown, 1975), especiaUy 95-255; and |eane ). Institute, 1983). 79-108. Kirkpatrick. The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speechex 2. The Herilage Foundation provided lhe most sophisti- 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993 cated and persistent critique of lhe UN. See. for example, Force of 500 for Haiti," New York Times. 10 May 1993, A3. Burton Yale Pines, ed., A World without a U.N. (Washington, In late May, the Haitian military government rejected the D.C.: Heritage Foundation. 1984). plan. Idem, “Leaders in Haiti Spum Police Plan." Neiv York 3. Charles Krauthammer, "The U.N. Corrupt Impostor," Times, 25 May 1993, A4. Washington Post, 27 September 1985. A25. 21. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "The 38th Floor: An Agenda 4. See Mala Tabory, The M ultinational Force and for Peace," UN Chronicle, September 1992, 2-3. Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure. and Func- 22. Boutros-Ghali did not discuss this form of enforcement tion (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). in An Agenda for Peace. He did mention it in the article 5. Laurence Martin, “Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry,” "The 38th Floor." Detailed analysis is found in United The National Interest 32 (Summer 1993): 3-11. Nations Association of the United States, Partners for Peace: 6. Paul Lewis, “U.N.'s Top Troop Official Sees No Need Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century (New for War Room," New York Times. 27 December 1992, 12. York: United Nations Association of the United States, 7. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second General 1992). Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly 15, no. 3 23. The secretary-general was not specific on the nature of (Summer 1992): 116. these stocks or the military advantages of prepositioning for 8. Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the the UN. 1990s: A New Logic o f War (London: Routledge, 1992), 72. 24. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 11. 9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 25. Mackinlay and Chopra, 117. Diplomacy. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the 26. (ames Meachem, “From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the United Nations Faces a Changing Role," International Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 Defense Review, March 1992, 218. (New York: United Nations, 1992). 27. J. S. Bremner and ). M. Snell, “The Changing Face of 10. For example, Chairman of the foint Chiefs of Staff Peacekeeping," Canadian Defense Quarterly 22. no. 1 (1992): Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions o f the Armed 6- 11. Forces of the United States recommends that responsibility 28. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Setting a New Agenda for the for support to UN peacekeeping be given to a to-be-created United Nations," /ournal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 expanded Atlantic Command (page 111-5), and the National (Winter 1993): 290-91. Military Strategy of the United States mentions in passing 29. George Bush, “The United Nations: Forging a Genuine that the National Security Strategy of the United States lists Global Community," L/S Department of State Dispatch. 28 strengthening international institutions like the UN as a September 1992, 721-24. national objective. The section on collective security focuses 30. Martha Bilis et al., Options for U.S. Military Support to solely on Desert Storm-style coalitions operating under the the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic auspices of the UN but led by the US (pages 8-9). Colin L. and International Studies. December 1992), 13. Powell, Chairman o f the foint Chiefs o f Staff Report on the 31. Eric Grove, “UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Roles, Missions. and Functions o f the Armed Forces o f the Committee," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): United States (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 173. For a detailed plan for the use of aerial surveillance in February 1993); idem, National Military Strategy of the support of UN operations. see Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P. United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Tracey, "Open Skies and UN Peace-Keeping,” Survival 32, Office, January 1992); and George Bush, National Security no. 3 (May/June 1990): 251-63. Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White 32. Powell, N ational Military Strategy o f the United House, January 1993). States, 21-23. 11. Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, 33. For an excellent explanation of the attitudes UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference, Headline required for peacekeeping, see International Peace Acad- Series no. 292 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, emy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon, 1990), 9. Germane elements of the charter are chapter 6. 1984), 373ff. which deals with the peaceful resolution of conflicts. and 34. This process is under way. The National War College. chapter 7, which deals with collective security. for example. offers an optional advanced study course on 12. Lewis. 12; and A. Leroy Bennett, International Organi- peacekeeping, and individual lessons have been devoted to zations: Principies and Issues, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, it at schools such as the US Army Command and General N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 140. Staff College and the Air War College. 13. Paul F. Diehl. “Institutional Alternative to Traditional 35. Joint Pub 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques. and Pro- U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multi- cedures for Peacekeeping Operations," revised final draft, 10 national Options,"'Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 2 (Win- August 1992. ter 1993): 209. 36. Joint Pub 3-07. foint Doctrine for Military Operations 14. Patrick ). Garrity, "The U.N. and Peacekeeping," in Other than War, November 1992, IV-I; and AFM 1-1. Basic Pines. 139—40. Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. vol. 2, 15. Canada and Poland were exceptions. March 1992. 59. 16. Mackinlay and Chopra, 113. 37. See International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's 17. Diehl, 209-10. Handbook. 18. John Pomfret, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Balkans." 38. Grove. 175. Washington Post. 6 July 1993. Al. A ll. 39. Bilis et al., 21; Mackinlay and Chopra, 121-24; and 19. Paul Lewis. “U.N. Near Accord on Plan to Watch Norton and Weiss, 29. Serbian Frontier,” New York Times. 13 May 1993, Al, A6. 40. Lewis, “U.N.'s Top Troop Official." 12. The current Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic later reneged on under secretary-general for peacekeeping is Kofi Annan. his promise to allow international border observers. Craig 41. Bilis et al., 22-23. R. Whitney, "Belgrade Reneges on Verification of Ban on 42. Mackinlay and Chopra, 119. Arming Bosnian Serbs," New York Times. 26 May 1993, 43. For example, candidates for adaptation include Joint Al. A6. Pub 3.07 and Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5/Air Force Pam- 20. Howard W. French, “U.S. to Push for a U.N. Police phlet (AFP) 3-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Con- THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN UN PEACEKEEPINC 81 flict. 1 December 1990. See also Steven Metz. "Counterin- 49. Ríchard Bernstein, "Sniping Is Growing al U,N.'s surgent Campaign Planning.” Parameters 19, no. 3 (Septem- Weakness as a Peacekeeper." New York Times, 21 June 1993, ber 1989): 60-68. Al. For a detailed analysis o(' lhe UN’s problems, see Adam 44. See also )ohn R. Bolton, "UN Peace-Keeping Efforts Io Roberts, “The United Nations and International Security," Promote Security and Stability," U.S. Department o f State Survival 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 3-30. Dispatch. 30 March 1992, 245. 50. Michael R. Gordon, "20,000 U.S. Troops May Go to 45. Bush. National Security Strateg)' o f lhe United States. Bosnia, NATO Admirai Says," New York Times, 4 May 1993, 7. 19. Al, A6. 46. Quoted in Paul Lewis. "Peacekeeper to Peacemaker: 51. Steven A. Holines. "U.S. May Attack Serbs Even with- U.N. Confronling New Roles." Aleiv York Times. 25 January out NATO." New York Times. 2 August 1993, A3. 1993. A10. 52. "A Big Second Step in Somalia" (editorial), New York 47. R. leffrey Smith and (ulia Preslon. “U.S. Plans Wider Times, 4 May 1993. A14. Role in U.N. Peace Keeping," Washington Post. 18 |une 53. Smith and Preston, Al. 1993. Al. 54. Martin, 3. 48. Ibid.

Ricochets continued from page 3 example, a land commander might want to pre- capabilities and desires with the Air Force’s vent an enemy regiment from entering a battle. A needs. In reality, 1 don’t think it would be single company can’t do it, but a battalion (three either that simple or that effective for several to four BAUs) could. and a brigade (nine to 12 reasons. First, airplanes sitting on the ground BAUs) could push the enemy regiment back. If wouldn't be in the link. If flight commanders we take those experienced brigade and battalion get all their information from the data link, commanders out of the operational C2 loop, then then they don’t have any reason to take off the theater or division commander has to be the until after they take off. For planning pur- on-scene commander over every group of compa- poses, every squadron would need its own nies, in addition to all his or her other duties. ground-based Joint Tactical Information Distri- Each levei of command in the Army looks at bution System (JTIDS) terminal. The air com- a different amount of land, a different duration ponent commander would need to task of time, and a different mix of weapons. Each squadrons—not BAUs. Second, pilots can’t also coordinates operations with logistics and just take off with whatever their ground crew intelligence. That’s a lot of work for the next hung on the wings and go after the first avail- higher or lower levei to take over. able target. Before they step out to their air- The US Army has already experimented planes, aircrews spend a significant amount of with removing layers of command and increas- time planning. They take into account mission ing commanders' span of control. The lOlst requirements, threats, tactics, weather, arma- Airborne Division was converted to pentomic ment carried, and so forth. Aircrews, ground configuration in the 1950s. The reorganization crews, and intelligence personnel all need at cut one layer of command and gave each com- least a basic idea of where the planes are going. mander five identical subordinate units. It was Lieutenant Vincent deserves credit for identify- fax less extreme than what Lieutenant Vincent ing problems in C2 and for prescribing a look at envisions, but the Army abandoned it. If a the overall system. However, I must disagree division commander can’t control five “battle with his specific Solutions. Rather than discard- groups" (which replaced battalion and brigade ing interim headquarters and C2 nodes. I would leveis), then he or she can't control about 40 prefer to use them properly. Give everyone rifle and tank companies plus supporting units. access to modern Communications and comput- When I read Vincenfs article, I envision ers; push responsibility down to lower leveis; and pilots taking off with a load of iron. joining use mission orders, commander’s intent, and swarms of other flights (BAUs), and then good doctrine. Let the AOC stop trying to do selecting interesting missions from a data-link everything itself. It should concentrate on over- smorgasbord of enemy targets. In theory, it seeing what everyone else does. would be similar to the current officer assign- Lt Ken Pascoe, USAF ment system, in which individuais try to match Wríght-Patterson AFB, Ohio 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

My hat is off to lst Lt Gary Vincent for his arti- amount of data generated during modern war. cle on command and control (C2) in the Sum- The massively parallel design increases, rather mer 1993 issue. I'm not saying this because I than decreases, the amount of data in the hands agree with all of his points (actually, I agree of BAU commanders. This situation is analo- with very few) but because he succeeded in gous to the one involving the air tasking order getting me to think about our Air Force’s C2 (ATO) in Operation Desert Storm, as described processes as I never have before. in the October 1992 issue of Military Review: My biggest concern with the article is that Lieu- tenant Vincent confuses the verb form of C2 with Although the use of the Computer allowed for the generation of the ATO and permitted central man- the noun form—as in C~ n e t w o r k . For example, he agement of coalition air forces, the product was says “the point of C2 is to get information as immense, consisting of a thousand pages of text. rapidly as possible from the providers to the The limited time available to read it and plan air users." Actually. this is the point of C2 networks. operations forced the air wings to concentrate only The point of C2 is to direct aerospace operations on the data that specifically applied to them. The towards the national command authorities’ objec- air operations planning staffs often were unaware tives. Similarly. he discusses the “two major chal- of other missions in the same area that might have lenges confronting C2—survivability and speed.” affected their plans even though that information was buried in the ATO. (Page 38) While these are valid challenges for C2 networks, it’s important to realize that the fastest. most sur- Closely related to the “information overload” vivable network in the world is useless unless it challenge is the question, Is every BAU com- combats the challenges confronting C2 itself. mander reallv prepared to handle the entire Unfortunatelv, the massively parallel design does battlefield model? I don’t think so. The rea- not sufficiently combat these challenges. sons have little to do with motivation and The first C2 challenge 1 will address is resource training, but with a lack of time to examine the allocation. For example. much of the C2 in Air entire model and—often—with no real need to Mobilitv Command is concerned with getting the know every battlefield detail. right airlifter or refueler connected with the right Finally, I question the practicality of the mas- cargo or aircraft at the right time. In Air Combat sively parallel design. First, network connectiv- Command. C2 is concerned with getting the right itv would be dependent on radio because land- aircraft to the right target with the right weapon at lines aren’t mobile enough for modern war. and the right time. And Air Force Space Command Fm not sure enough bandwidth is available in C2 is concerned with getting the right launch manv high-threat areas (particularly Europe and vehicle with the right payload or reentrv vehicle the Korean peninsula). Second. I question the to the right place at the right time. survivability of the system because of the sheer In Lieutenant Vincenfs massively parallel number of users. If at all possible. users will design. “basic action units” (BAU) act indepen- phvsically locate themselves close to one another dentlv and can access the entire battlefield model to access logistical support and Communications and pull out the information they need to accom- infrastructure. This efficient peacetime place- plish their objectives. This works fine for ants, ment could easily prove disastrous in war. which work independently but towards common So what is the answer? Regrettably. I don’t have objectives (e.g.. gathering food). However, the a complete solution either. Clearlv, our current C2 resource allocation problem is relatively small for structure is not ideal for manv tasks (e.g.. hunting ants. It’s no big deal to an ant if another ant picks Scuds, putting target imagery into cockpits, and up the piece of food it was planning to get; it just flying close air support). Improving C2 and the walks to the next piece. On the other hand. it’s associated C2 networks for these tasks is an imper- rlefinitely a big deal to a pilot if another pilot ative. But massive parallelism is not the answer attacks his or her target, especially after sneaking because it would cause a glut of information all or fighting through air defenses! Resource alloca- over the battlefield instead of just at the top. I tion becomes even more of a problem when one think the answer lies in improving the C2 capabili- tries to exercise C2 over very scarce resources, ties of intermediate control units. I see two impor- such as those needed for search and rescue. elec- tant C2 roles for them: (1) perform resource alloca- tronic combat. surveillance and reconnaissance, tion functions for the BAUs under them and (2) and so forth. make sure the BAU commander is getting the part Another C2 challenge is the difficulty of try- of the battlefield model he or she needs. Only ing to absorb and act on the overwhelming with a focused effort on the second role will inter- fílCOCHETS 83

mediate units be more than a "pipeline to funnel Each progressive levei of command has some information up and orders down." Service, equipment, or personnel that are not Finally, regarding the editorial in the Sum- found at the lower leveis. These leveis Service mer 1993 issue, if APJ keeps printing articles more than one combat unit, but they cannot Ser- like Lieutenant Vincenfs, I don’t think you'll vice all their assigned combat units at one time. have to worry about complaints that the Jour- Where and when these people go is determined nal is “just another vehicle for communicating by the commander’s intent. The lower the levei, ‘the Air Force party line’!” the more combat power is available and the more support is needed for beans, bullets, bombs, and Capt Clavton B. Perce, USAF Malmstrom AFB. Montana fuel. Combat power is found at the upper leveis, but its primary mission is direct and indirect support of the lower-level combat forces. For exam- Command and control (C2) in any Service branch ple, Patriot missiles are controlled by the corps (if is an issue of survivability and mission attain- one is in-theater) and not by the combat brigade ment. The lavers of command that lst Lt Garv or battalion UTCs. Vincent highlights in his article on C2 in the Sum- Lieutenant Vincent has not given the Air mer 1993 issue are a verv real hindrance to effec- Force credit for its planning and execution tive execution of the overall battle plan. These process. He States that leveis are not incompetent, but thev use precious time during their decision cycles. Anvthing that the command unit [i.e., tactical air control center (TACC)] issues only the letter of its orders and not can decrease the decision/command cycle would the spirit of its intent. . . . In this System |i.e.. mas- benefit the engaged forces. sively parallel design], the command unit does not Lieutenant Vincent introduces the term basic issue explicit orders but instead identifies mission action unit (BAU). If he vvants a baseline for indi- objectives and a focus of [thel main effort. vidual combat or combat support units, he could have used the term unit tasking code (UTC). The The key word here is intent. Any Air Force deployment of manv units that participated in the commander, from theater levei to the four-ship, Persian Gulf War was based on their UTCs. The flight-lead levei, is able to express—in terms of UTC—a basic unit of contingency planning—can explicit and implied tasks—his or her assigned be a person. an entire ship. or a fighter vving. mission. The commander’s intent is the common The author is not up to speed on modern Army model that Lieutenant Vincent describes, and it is battlefield control measures. He believes that his the guiding focus that supports the overall battle "massivelv parallel design" would eliminate unit plan during joint operations. When the plan boundaries and phase lines since they “are better execution doesn’t occur as planned, the com- suited to a static battlefield.’’ These control mea- mander's intent (the known explicit and sures are intended for coordination between all implied tasks), tempered with judgment and the parts that make up an army in the field during experience, will keep the combat forces any type of battle (ofíensive and defensive). focused on the mission objectives. This will be These control measures not only depend on who accomplished without command-unit (depicted is where but—more importantlv—who is respon- as TACC-level) involvement since it is most sible for where. The massivelv parallel design probably inside the decision cycle of the com- will not answer the question of who is responsible mand unit (i.e., it's a done deal before the com- for where. mand unit can complete its decision cycle). The intermediate leveis of C2 process support Vincent says his System is not centralized equipment and personnel that are not found at control/decentrulized execution, which is the the direct combat levei. For example, an armored backbone of Air Force employment doctrine. divisional brigade has heavy equipment trans- He prefers centralized command/decentralized porters (HET) but not enough to move an entire control and execution, a concept which has brigade over a long distance. However, the divi- merit but is really no different. Coordination— sion levei has additional HETs that can be shifted whether one calls it control or command—is around to the battlefield to support the combat one characteristic that the author does not brigade’s short-term needs. This allows the mention in his article. but it is the keystone of brigade to move all its combat equipment in one Service and joint operations. Coordination—a seamless move. The brigade performs a similar form of control—makes or breaks an operation, Service for the battalions. and it is a characteristic that must be consid- 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

ered during tactical operations. Coordination information into usable intelligence form creates is a function that C2 staffs are really good at. a real-time bottleneck that can hurt an operation The C2 massively parallel design could be bet- at the tactical levei. This is one area in which ter used as an information net to support combat Lieutenant Vincenfs design could produce great units. Flow of information is a problem. Getting results but not in the C2 function. Maj T. Darrel Westbrook, USAF North Symcuse, New York

N E T ■ A S M E N T

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY fields. This, coupled with an unwillingness of the American people to have such nuclear Sys- tems deployed near their homes, led the US to The Origins of SDI. 1944-1983 by Donald R. plan for a limited BMD system to protect our Baucom. University Press of Kansas, 2501 W. ICBMs, enhancing their survivability. The idea 15th St., Lawrence, Kansas 66049, 1992, 256 was to preserve US security using deterrence pages, $29.95. through offensive weapons. Such decisions led Donald Baucom was the official historian for the way to the arms control decade of the the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Office 1970s. starting in 1987, and his access to both the pro- Part 2 of The Origins o f SDI deals with the grama records as well as the players involved 1970s: the “age of SALT (Strategic Arms Limi- is apparent in this history of ballistic missile tation Talks).” During this time, the US defense in the United States. Meticulously attempted to tie negotiations for offensive and footnoted, this account of the politics, technol- defensive strategic weapons together in order ogv, and strategic situations that led to Presi- to reduce both. Instead, the Soviets succeeded dent Ronald Reagan's historie decision on in separating negotiations for these two types strategic defense gives a firm foundation for of weapons, limiting BMD while maintaining understanding why and how our leadership their abilitv to modernize their strategic offen- carne to embrace this concept. The Origins o f sive forces. The end result. Baucom shows, SDI chronicles the history of ballistic missile was the “institutionalizing" of the concept of defense (BMD) from initial plans to counter the mutual assured destruetion (MAD) and severe German V-2 rocket in World War II with anti- restrictions on BMD. aircraft artillerv to the high-technology These restrictions changed the course of defenses that made President Reagan's 1983 American BMD. The onlv US operational BMD speech embracing BMD possible. site was closed (as it was no longer effective as The history begins with the dawn of the mis- a bargaining chip to reduce offensive systems), sile age—German V-2 attacks on England in and BMD programs were reoriented toward 1944—and how BMD was originally just research and development. Although progress another defense against a new weapon. First was made in new technologies (including attempts in BMD were as a selective defense directed-energy [laser] weapons), this was the against the Soviet intercontinental ballistic time that the strategic balance (in Baucom’s missile (ICBM) threat, with capabilities against opinion) shifted to the Soviet Union. This new "Nth-country” threats such as the People's offensive threat would set the stage for the Republic of China. Programs were developed rebirth of strategic defense. in the 1950s and early 1960s, but technology The Origins o f SDI then goes on to describe proved to be inadequate to provide more than a this “crisis” and how the proponents of strate- “thin shield" defense of several cities or ICBM gic defense redeveloped the concept of BMD to NET ASSESSMENT 85

ensure US security. Factors in the resurgence expecting that one of you will smile or nod of BMD were our inability to agree on a surviv- approvingly.” able basing mode for the MX missile, the efforts Rowny took this tale to heart, spending of the "High Frontier” organization to publicize "al most twenty years . . . trying to resist the the capabilities of potential BMD systems. and temptation to smile or nod at my Soviet ‘danc- the rise to power of Ronald Reagan. whose staff ing partners”’ (page ix). Sometimes said to be had strong ties to several BMD proponents. "to the right of Attila the Hun" (page 136), Baucom details these influences and shows Rowny represented Department of Defense how these factors combined to allow the cre- interests in the highest councils of our strategic ation of the Strategic Defense Initiative. nuclear arms talks under five presidents, from This revievv gives just a glimpse of this Nixon to Bush. This book presents the mem- extremely detailed insider's view of the history oirs of a tough-minded cold warrior who pulls of SDI. Baucom uses statistics, anecdotes, and few punches when dealing not only with presi- a wealth of background material (including dents, but also with diplomats like Henry over 51 pages of notes on 16 interviews and Kissinger and Cyrus Vance. innumerable reports, official histories, books, Central to lt Takes One to Tango are 10 nego- and personal memoirs) to bring life to this tiating guidelines—as well as prescriptions for topic. The only flaw in his presentation is an future negotiations—that Rowny developed overemphasis on the case for SDI. The reader while he studied at Yale in the late 1940s. The can tell that Baucom is an SDI advocate. Even book’s title emphasizes one of the most impor- so. this book is a good look at the conditions, tant of these points—that one must always personalities, and technologies that led up to "take into account the cultural sensitivities of 1983, and accomplishes Baucom’s goal of pro- those on the other side of the table” (page 256). viding a “reasonably complete account of Presi- But surely this volume will best be remem- dent Reagan s decision.” bered for its criticai analysis of presidents and Maj YVilliam P. Doyle, Ir., USAF their advisors. Of the chief executives, Gerald Peterson AFB. Colorado Ford receives the highest accolades—Jimmy Carter and George Bush the lowest. In fact, his critique of Bush could have been effectively utilized by the Democrats in the last presiden- AUTOBIOGRAPHY, BIOGRAPHY, tial campaign. AND MEMOIRS In addition to anecdotes, Rowny also provides numerous insights into the personalities and policy-making worlds of Geneva and It Takes One to Tango bv Edward L. Rowny. Washington: Brassev’s. Inc., 100 Front Street, Box 500, Riverside, New Jersey 08075, 1992, 273 • “Many of our most difficult negotiations took pages. S23.00. place not with the Soviets but among the mem- When Lt Gen Edward Rowny told a famous bers of our own team” (page 49). American aphorism to Col Gen Ivan Beletsky, • When Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson "realized his Soviet counterpart in the SALT II negotia- after the first several sessions that the Soviets tions, Beletsky told him it was not true, insist- could hold their liquor and their tongues better than we could. he decided not to serve alcohol" ing that "it only takes one to tango.” Explain- at the informal sessions (page 51). ing himself. Beletsky noted that, as in the West, • “Over the years the United States and Soviet young Soviet women and men tend to segregate Union had developed an entire lexicon of terms themselves bv gender at school dances. Rather to obfuscate the true character of ongoing negoti- than ask a girl to dance, the future Soviet gen- ations" (page 232). eral would tango with a chair to see whether he could secure an approving nod or smile before For anyone about to enter the higher leveis of requesting the young lady’s favor. "It is the command and staff service, this volume could same in our dealings with you,” he continued. be an eye-opener on the realities of life among “We simply keep repeating our positions, the high, the mighty, and the devious. David Curtis Skaggs Bowling Green, Ohio Basis of Issue

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86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL Volume VII

AUTHOR INDEX

Andrews, Maj Henry L., Jr.. and Maj J. C. Cantrell III. London, Lt Col John R., III. "The Ultimate Standoff "Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why Weapon." no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. Send an Officer to Do an NCO's Job?" no. 4 (Winter McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep 1993): 43-54. Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Anonvmous. “A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” McClain, Maj George T., and Maj P. Mason Carpen- no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. ter. "Air Command and Staff College Air Cam- Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. "The Leadership Imperative paign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School in a Transforming Air Force,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. 35-50. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. “Air Campaign Planning," Barlow, Maj Jason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Power Strategy for the Present,” no. 4 (Winter Mann, Col Edward. “Military Support for ‘Peace 1993): 4-15. Efforts’." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Mann. Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1993): 62-71. 35—43. Cantrell, Maj J. C., III, and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower “Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job?” no. 4 (Winter Has Finally Gone?" no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. 1993): 43-52. Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United Carpenter, Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. Nations Peacekeeping,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. McClain. “Air Comraand and Staff College Air ______. “The Operational Levei of Nuclear War Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?" no. 1 (Spring Reborn?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. 1993): 13-20. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “It’s Time to Put Up or Shut Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control, and Up” (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2. Air Superiority," no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. _____ . "Mental Preparation for War” (editorial), no. Payton, Col Gary D. "The Art of Inteíligence, by the 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Debban, Lt Col Alan W. “Disabling Systems: War- Shaud, Gen John A. “The ‘Staff Experience’ and Fighting Option for the Future," no. 1 (Spring Leadership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 1993): 44-50. 4-11. Fayne, Maj Gwendolyn D. “Growing Controversy” Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1993): 2. Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- ______. "Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty” gram?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1993): 2-3. Szafranski, Col Richard. "Annulling Marriages: Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. "Impact of Precision Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. mer 1993): 4-10. Vincent, lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design," no. 2 (Winter 1993): 27-42. (Summer 1993): 24-38. Huggins. Maj William S. “Deterrence after the Cold War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of War,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57.

TITLE INDEX “Air Campaign Planning," Lt Col Maris McCrabb. no. sions, and Functions Debate," Col Richard Szafran- 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. ski. no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. "Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign "Art of Inteíligence, by the General. The,” Col Gary Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Reborn?” D. Payton. no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Maj P. Mason Carpenter and Maj George T. "Deterrence after the Cold War: Conventional Arms McClain, no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. and the Prevention of War." Maj William S. Hug- “Air Force Role in United Nations Peacekeeping, gins, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. The," Dr Steven Metz, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 72-86. "Disabling Systems: War-Fighting Option for the Future," "Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles, Mis- Lt Col Alan W. Debban, no, 1 (Spring 1993): 44-50.

87 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

“Douhet Society, The: A Recipe for Your Profes- Dead?" Lt Col Edward Mann, no. 1 (Spring 1993): sional Development Program?” Lt Col Kimble D. 35—43. Stohry. no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. “Operational Levei of Nuclear War Fighting, The: "Growing Controversy” (editorial), Maj Gwendolyn Missing or Unnecessary?” Dr Steven Metz, no. 1 D. Fayne, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 2. (Spring 1993): 13-20. "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Opera- “Space Power Survivability," Dr Colin S. Gray, no. 4 tions,” Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, no. 2 (Summer (Winter 1993): 27-42. 1993): 4-10. “'Staff Experience' and Leadership Development. "It’s Time to Put Up or Shut Up” (editorial), Lt Col The,” Gen John A. Shaud, no. 1 (Spring 1993): Richard B. Clark, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2. 4-11. “Leadership Imperative in a Transforming Air Force, "Stealth, Sea Control, and Air Superiority," Capt The,” Lt Col R. Joe Baldwin, no. 3 (Fali 1993): James H. Patton, Jr.. no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. 35-50. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the "Limits of Deep Attack, The,” Maj Thomas R. Present,” Maj Jason B. Barlow, no. 4 (Winter 1993): McCabe, no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. 4-15. "Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty” (editorial), “Towards a New Airpower Lexicon—or—Interdic- Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne, no. 4 (Winter 1993): tion: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" Col 2-3. Phillip S. Meilinger, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. "Mental Preparation for War” (editorial), Lt Col “Ultimate Standoff Weapon, The,” Lt Col John R. Richard B. Clark, no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. London III, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. “Military Support for ‘Peace Efforts',” Col Edward “United States Needs to Exploit Its Air Power Advan- Mann, no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. tage, The,” Lt Col Price T. Bingham, no. 3 (Fali "New Approach to Command and Control, A: The 1993): 62-71. Cybernetic Design.” lst Lt Gary A. Vincent, no. 2 “Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why (Summer 1993): 24-38. Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job?” Maj J. C. "New Defense Industrial Strategy, A,” Anonymous, Cantrell III and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr., no. 4 no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. (Winter 1993): 43-54. “One Target, One Bomb: Is the Principie of Mass

SUBJECT INDEX

Aircraft Air Power Anonymous. “A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage,” no. 3 (Fali McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep 1993): 62-71. Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Carpenter, Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. Szafranski, Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Debate,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Air Defense Debban, Lt Col Alan W. "Disabling Systems: War- Fighting Option for the Future," no. 1 (Spring Gray, Dr Colin S. "Space Power Survivability," no. 4 1993): 44-50. (Winter 1993): 27-42. Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Air Force Organization Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Cantrell, Maj J. C., III, and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. mer 1993): 4-10. "Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why McCabe. Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job?” no. 4 (Winter Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. 1993): 43-54. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. “Air Campaign Planning," Szafranski, Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Mann, Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): Airlift 35-43. Meilinger. Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower Mann, Col Edward. "Military Support for ‘Peace Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Efforts’.” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Has Finally Gone?" no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Metz, Dr Steven. "The Air Force Role in United Patton, Capt James H.. Jr. "Stealth. Sea Control. and Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Air Superiority,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. INDEX 89

Air Power History Ballistic Missile Defense McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Air Campaign Planning.” Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability." no. 4 no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. (Winter 1993): 27-42. Mann. Lt Col Edward. "One Target. One Bomb: ls London, Lt Col John R., III. "The Ultiinate Standoff the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Weapon,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. 35-43. Budget Planning Process Meilinger. Col Phillip S. "Towards a New Airpower Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Anonvmous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Has Finallv Gone?” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Clausewitz Air Superiority Huggins. Maj William S. "Deterrence after the Cold Barlow, Maj Jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter War," no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. 1993): 4-15. Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A Bingham, Lt Col Price T. "The United States Needs Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali gram?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. 1993): 62-71. Carpenter. Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. Cold War McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Huggins, Maj William S. "Deterrence after the Cold Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of Rebom?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. War,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49—57. Glosson. Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Mann, Col Edward. “Military Support for ‘Peace VVeapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Efforts',” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. mer 1993): 4-10. Metz. Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): (Winter 1993): 27-42. 68-81. McCabe. Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Attack,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Command and Control Patton. Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth. Sea Control. and Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 Air Superiority," no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. (Winter 1993): 27-42. Payton. Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the Arms Control General,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Mann. Col Edward. “Military Support for 'Peace Vincent. lst Lt Gary A. "A New Approach to Com- Efforts’." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 5Í—61. mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design,” no. 2 Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United (Summer 1993): 24-38. Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. ______. “The Operational Levei of Nuclear War Computer Technology Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?” no. 1 (Spring (See also Aviation Technology, Military Technology, 1993): 13-20. Space Technology, Technology) Aviation Technology Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs (See also Computer Technology, Military Technol- to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali ogy, Technology) 1993): 62-71. Debban. Lt Col Alan W. “Disabling Systems: War- Anonymous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy.” Fighting Option for the Future,” no. 1 (Spring no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. 1993): 44-50. Bingham. Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Gray, Dr Colin S. "Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali (Winter 1993): 27-42 . 1993): 62-71. Payton. Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the Glosson. Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- mer 1993): 4-10. Counterair Operations McCabe, Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep Vincent, lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design," no. 2 Mann. Lt Col Edward. "One Target, One Bomb: Is (Summer 1993): 24-38. the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-43. Defense Reform Patton. Capt James H., Jr. "Stealth. Sea Control, and Anonymous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy.” Air Superiority." no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Szafranski, Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: Szafranski, Col Richard. "Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles. Missions, and Functions Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Deterrence Fayne, Maj Gwendolyn D. “Growing Controversy,” Huggins, Maj VVilliam S. "Deterrence after the Cold no. 2 (Summer 1993): 2. War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of _____ . "Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty," no. War," no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. 4 (Winter 1993): 2-3. Dissent Electronic Warfare Metz, Dr Steven. "The Operational Levei of Nuclear Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?” no. 1 (Winter 1993): 27-42. (Spring 1993): 13-20. Fighter Operations Doctrine Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Barlow. Maj )ason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage,” no. 3 (Fali Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 62-71. 1993): 4-15. Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Bingham. Lt Col Price T. "The United States Needs Weapons on Air Combat Operations," no. 2 (Sum- to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage.” no. 3 (Fali mer 1993): 4-10. 1993): 62-71. McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Carpenter. Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. McClain. "Air Command and Staff College Air Foreign Military Forces Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Mann, Col Edward. “Military Support for 'Peace Reborn?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Efforts’," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Mental Preparation for Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United War” (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Debban, Lt Col Alan W. "Disabling Systems: War- Shaud. Gen John A. "The ‘Staff Experience’ and Lead- Fighting Option for the Future,” no. 1 (Spring ership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 4-11. 1993): 44-50. Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Intelligence Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Glosson. Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision mer 1993): 4-10. Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Gray. Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability," no. 4 mer 1993): 4-10. (Winter 1993): 16-25. Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability," no. 4 McCabe. Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep (Winter 1993): 27-42. Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Payton, Col Gary D. "The Art of Intelligence, by the McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. “Air Campaign Planning.” General,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Vincent. lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- Mann. Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is the mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design," no. 2 Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 35-43. (Summer 1993): 24-38. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower Interdiction Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower Metz, Dr Steven. "The Operational Levei of Nuclear Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?” no. 1 Has Finally Gone?” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. (Spring 1993): 13-20. International Relations Payton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Szafranski, Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: Mann, Col Edward. “Military Support for ‘Peace Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Efforts’," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Debate.” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Interservice Conflict Douhet Anonymous. “A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Mann. Lt Col Edward. “One Target. One Bomb: Is no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): Szafranski, Col Richard. "Annulling Marriages: 35-43, Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A Debate,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55—67. Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- Joint Operations gram?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. Barlow. Maj Jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Editorial Power Strategy for the Present,” no. 4 (Winter Clark. Lt Col Richard B. “It's Time to Put Up or Shut 1993): 4-15. Up." no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs ______. “Mental Preparation for War,” no. 3 (Fali to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. 1993): 62-71. INDEX 91

Carpenter, Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. Vincent, lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- McClain. "Air Command and Staff College Air mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design," no. 2 Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School (Summer 1993): 24-38. Reborn?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72—83. McCabe. Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Management/Organization Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Cantrell, Maj J. C., III, and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Air Campaign Planning." “Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Send an Officer to Do an NCO‘s Job?" no. 4 (Winter Meilinger. Col Phillip S. "Towards a New Airpower 1993): 43-54. Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Middle East Afiai rs Metz, Dr Steven. "The Air Force Role in United Huggins, Maj William S. "Deterrence after the Cold Nations Peacekeeping,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of _____ .“The Operational Levei of Nuclear War Fight- War," no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. ing: Missing or Unnecessary?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United 13-20. Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control, and Payton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the Air Superiority.” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. General,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Szafranski. Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: Reframing the Roles. Missions, and Functions Military Education Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Vincent, lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. “The Leadership Imperative mand and Control: The Cybernetic Design,” no. 2 in a Transforming Air Force,” no. 3 (Falí 1993): (Summer 1993): 24-38. 35-50. Carpenter. Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. Leadership/Management McClain. "Air Command and Staff College Air Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. “The Leadership Imperative Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School in a Transforming Air Force.” no. 3 (Fali 1993): Reborn?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. 35-50. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “Mental Preparation for Cantrell. Maj J. C., UI. and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. War" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. “Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A Send an Officer to Do an NCO’s Job?” no. 4 (Winter Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- 1993): 43-54. gram?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “Mental Preparation for Military Technology War" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. Payton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the (S’ee also Aviation Technology, Computer Technol- General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. ogy, Space Technology, Technology) Shaud, Gen John A. “The ‘Staff Experience' and Barlow, Maj Jason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air Leadership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Power Strategy for the Present,” no. 4 (Winter 4-11. 1993): 4-15. Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage,” no. 3 (Fali gram?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. 1993): 62-71. Debban, Lt Col Alan W. "Disabling Systems: War- Legal Issues Fighting Option for the Future," no. 1 (Spring Metz. Dr Steven. “The Operational Levei of Nuclear 1993): 44-50. War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessarv?” no. 1 Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 (Spring 1993): 13-20. (Winter 1993): 27-42. McCabe, Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep Logistics Attack,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Anonymous. “A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Mann, Lt Col Edward. "One Target, One Bomb: Is no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): Mann, Col Edward. "Military Support for Peace 35-43. EffortsV no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control, and Metz. Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United Air Superiority," no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. Nations Peacekeeping.” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Payton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Low-lntensity Conflict Szafranski, Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: Debban. Lt Col Alan W. “Disabling Systems: War- Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Fighting Option for the Future," no. 1 (Spring Debate." no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. 1993): 44-50. 92 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Miiitary Thought Shaud, Gen John A. “The ‘Staff Experience’ and Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. "The Leadership Imperative Leadership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): in a Transforming Air Force," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-11. 35-50. National Security Policy Barlow, Maj Jason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. “The Leadership Imperative Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter in a Transforming Air Force,” no. 3 (Falí 1993): 1993): 4-15. 35-50. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Barlow, Maj Jason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage," no. 3 (Fali Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 62-71. 1993): 4-15. Cantrell, Maj J. C., III, and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. Carpenter, Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. “Where Does the Air Force Need Officers, or Why McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Send an Officer to Do an NCO's Job?” no. 4 (Winter Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School 1993): 43-54. Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Carpenter, Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability," no. 4 McClain. "Air Command and Staff College Air (Winter 1993): 27-42. Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Mann, Col Edward. “Miiitary Support for 'Peace Rebom?" no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Efforts'," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. “It’s Time to Put Up or Shut Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United Up” (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2. Nations Peacekeeping,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. _____ . “Mental Preparation for War" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. National Strategy Fayne, Maj Gwendolyn D. “Growing Controversy” Barlow, Maj Jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1993): 2. Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter ______. "Making Pearls: A Perspective on Duty” 1993): 4-15. (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1993): 2-3. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. "The United States Needs London. Lt Col John R., III. “The Ultimate Standoff to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage.” no. 3 (Fali Weapon,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. 1993): 62-71. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower Carpenter, Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Has Finally Gone?” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Payton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. General.” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. NATO Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. “The Douhet Society: A Mann, Col Edward. “Miiitary Support for ‘Peace Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- Efforts’," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. gram?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. Metz, Dr Steven. “The Air Force Role in United Szafranski, Col Richard. "Annulling Marriages: Nations Peacekeeping,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Reframing the Roles. Missions, and Functions Shaud, Gen John A. “The ‘Staff Experience' and Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Leadership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Miiitary Training 4-11. Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. “The Leadership Imperative Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. "The Douhet Society: A in a Transforming Air Force.” no. 3 (Fali 1993): Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- 35-50. gram?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. Naval Operations Missile Operations McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Attack,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control. and mer 1993): 4-10. Air Superiority,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 (Winter 1993): 27-42. Nuclear Strategy London. Lt Col John R., III. "The Ultimate Standoff Metz, Dr Steven. “The Operational Levei of Nuclear Weapon,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?" no. 1 McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep (Spring 1993): 13-20. Attack,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Nuclear War Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control, and Huggins, Maj William S. “Deterrence after the Cold Air Superiority,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of Morale War," no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. Fayne. Maj Gwendolyn D. “Making Pearls: A Per- Metz, Dr Steven. “The Operational Levei of Nuclear spective on Duty” (editorial), no. 4 (Winter War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?" no. 1 1993): 2-3. (Spring 1993): 13-20. INDEX 93

Peacekeeping/Humanitarian Efforts Political-Military Relations Huggins. Maj William S. "Deterrence after the Cold Mann, Col Edward. "Military Support for ‘Peace War: Conventional Arms and the Prevention of Efforts'.” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. War.” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 49-57. Metz. Dr Steven. "The Air Force Role in United Mann. Col Edward. “Military Support for Peace Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. Efforts',” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 51-61. Preparedness Metz. Dr Steven. "The Air Force Role in United Anonymous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy.” Nations Peacekeeping," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 68-81. no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Persian Gulf War Carpenter. Maj P. Mason, and Maj George T. Barlow. Maj Jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Power Strategy for the Present,” no. 4 (Winter Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School 1993): 4-15. Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Bingham. Lt Col Price T. “The United States Needs Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Mental Preparation for to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage,” no. 3 (Fali War" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. 1993): 62-71. McCabe, Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep Carpenter, Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. McClain. “Air Command and Staff College Air Pavton, Col Gary D. “The Art of Intelligence, by the Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School General," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Szafranski. Col Richard. “Annulling Marriages: Glosson. Lt Gen Buster C. "lmpact of Precision Reframing the Roles, Missions, and Functions Weapons on Air Combat Operations." no. 2 (Sum- Debate," no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. mer 1993): 4-10. Principies of War McCabe. Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep Barlow. Maj jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Power Strategy for the Present." no. 4 (Winter McCrabb. Lt Col Maris. "Air Campaign Planning." no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. 1993): 4-15. Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. "lmpact of Precision Mann. Lt Col Edward. “One Target. One Bomb: Is Weapons on Air Combat Operations," no. 2 (Sum- the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): mer 1993): 4-10. 35-43. Mann, Lt Col Edward. "One Target, One Bomb: Is Meilinger. Col Phillip S. “Towards a New Airpower the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Gone?" no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. 35-43. Pavton. Col Garv D. “The Art of Intelligence. bv the Pavton, Col Gary D. "The Art of Intelligence, by the General." no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. General." no. 4 (Winter 1993): 16-25. Vincent. lst Lt Gary A. “A New Approach to Com- Procurement mand and Control: The Cvbemetic Design,” no. 2 Anonvmous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy." (Summer 1993): 24-38. no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Personnel Issues London. Lt Col John R., III. "The Ultimate Standoff Baldwin. Lt Col R. )oe. “The Leadership Imperative Weapon,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. in a Transforming Air Force," no. 3 (Fali 1993): Professionalism 35-50. Baldwin, Lt Col R. )oe. "The Leadership Imperative Cantrell. Maj J. C.. III, and Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. in a Transforming Air Force,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): "Where Does the Air Force Need Officers. or Whv 35-50. Send an Officer to Do an NCO's Job?" no. 4 (Winter Fayne. Maj Gvvendolvn D. "Making Pearls: A Per- 1993): 43-54. spective on Duty” (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1993): Fayne, Maj Gwendolyn D. “Making Pearls: A Perspec- 2-3. tive on Duty” (editorial), no. 4 (Winter 1993): 2-3. Shaud, Gen John A. "The ‘Staff Experience' and Planning Leadership Development,” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 4-11. Anonvmous. “A New Defense Industrial Strategv,” Stohry, Lt Col Kimble D. "The Douhet Society: A no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- Carpenter. Maj P. Mason. and Maj George T. gram?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. McClain. "Air Command and Staff College Air Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Professional Readings Reborn?” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Mental Preparation for McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Air Campaign Planning." War” (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 1993): 2-3. no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Meilinger, Col Phillip S. "Towards a New Airpower Szafranski, Col Richard. "Annulling Marriages: Lexicon—or—Interdiction: An Idea Whose Time Reframing the Roles. Missions, and Functions Has Finally Gone?" no. 2 (Summer 1993): 39—47. Debate." no. 4 (Winter 1993): 55-67. Stohry. Lt Col Kimble D. "The Douhet Society: A 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1993

Recipe for Your Professional Development Pro- Technology grara?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): 21-33. (See also Aviation Technology, Computer Technol- Research and Development ogy. Military Technology, Space Technology) Anonymous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Anonymous. "A New Defense Industrial Strategy,” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. no. 3 (Fali 1993): 16-33. Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability," no. 4 Barlow, Maj Jason B. "Strategic Paralysis: An Air (Winter 1993): 27-42. Power Strategy for the Present,” no. 4 (Winter London. Lt Col John R., III. ‘‘The Ultimate Standoff 1993): 4-15. VVeapon,” no. 2 (Summer 1993): 58-68. Bingham, Lt Col Price T. "The United States Needs to Exploit Its Air Power Advantage,” no. 3 (Fali Space Operations 1993): 62-71. Gray. Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability," no. 4 Debban, Lt Col Alan W. "Disabling Systems: War- (Winter 1993): 27-^12. Fighting Option for the Future,” no. 1 (Spring McCabe, Maj Thomas R. "The Limits of Deep 1993): 44-50. Attack," no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Gray, Dr Colin S. “Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 Space Technology (Winter 1993): 27-42. (See also Aviation Technology. Computer Technol- McCabe, Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep ogy, Military Technology, Technology) Attack.” no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Mann, Lt Col Edward. "One Target, One Bomb: Is Gray, Dr Colin S. "Space Power Survivability," no. 4 the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): (Winter 1993): 27-42. 35-43. McCabe. Maj Thomas R. “The Limits of Deep Attack." no. 3 (Fali 1993): 4-14. Vietnam War Mann, Lt Col Edward. "One Target, One Bomb: Is Strategic Bombing the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. "Impact of Precision 35—43. Weapons on Air Combat Operations,” no. 2 (Sum- mer 1993): 4-10. Women in the Military Baldwin, Lt Col R. Joe. “The Leadership Imperative Strategic Defense Initiative in a Transforming Air Force,” no. 3 (Falí 1993): Gray, Dr Colin S. "Space Power Survivability,” no. 4 35-50. (Winter 1993): 27-42. World War I Strategy Mann, Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is Barlow, Maj Jason B. “Strategic Paralysis: An Air the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): Power Strategy for the Present," no. 4 (Winter 35—43. 1993): 4-15. Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision World War II Weapons on Air Combat Operations," no. 2 (Sum- Mann, Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is mer 1993): 4-10. the Principie of Mass Dead?” no. 1 (Spring 1993): McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. “Air Campaign Planning," 35-43. no. 2 (Summer 1993): 11-22. Patton, Capt James H., Jr. “Stealth, Sea Control, and Mann, Lt Col Edward. “One Target, One Bomb: Is Air Superiority," no. 1 (Spring 1993): 52-62. the Principie of Mass Dead?" no. 1 (Spring 1993): Writing for Publication 35-43. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "It’s Time to Put Up or Shut Metz. Dr Steven. "The Operational Levei of Nuclear Up" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1993): 2. War Fighting: Missing or Unnecessary?" no. 1 Fayne, Maj Gwendolyn D. “Growing Controversy" (Spring 1993): 1-3-20. (editorial), no. 2 (Summer 1993): 2. Tactical Air Power Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. "Impact of Precision Weapons on Air Combat Operations.” no. 2 (Sum- mer 1993): 4-10. C □ N T T □ R S

Maj lason B. Barlow [BS. Universitv of Hawaii; MPA. Golden Gate Uni- Colin S. Cray (BA, Manchester Uni- versity) is an action officer with the Col Gary D. Payton (BS, USAFA; versitv; DPhil. Oxford Universitv) is Operational lssues Group. Deputv MAS. Johns Hopkins Universitv: European director of the National Chief of Staff. Plans and Operations, MA. Georgetown Universitv) is com- Institute for Public Policy. Fairfax. Headquarters USAF. He has ser\’ed mander. 17th Technical Training Virgínia, and professor o( interna- as a U-2/TR-1 training flight com- Group. Goodfellow AFB. Texas. A tiona! politics at the Universitv of mander. instructor. and evaluator career intelligence officer. his assign- Hull (England). He served for five pilo», and as a T-38 instructor, evalu- ments have included conimander. years on lhe Presidenfs General ator pilot. and academic instructor. 6988th Electronic Securitv Squadron. Advisory Conimittee on Arms Con- .Major Barlow is a graduate of Roval Air Force Mildenhall. United trol and Disarmament and served as Squadron Officer School. Air Com- kingdom. during operations Desert president of the National Institute mand and Staff College. Marine Storxn and Provide Comfort: and he for Public Policy. Dr Cray is the Corps Comtnand and Staff College. has had staff duties at Randolph author of 12 books, most recently and the inaugural class of the School AFB, Texas; Camp H. M. Smith. Weapons Don'1 Make IVar (1993) of Advanced Airpower Studies Hawaii: Ramstein AB. Germanv; and and House of Cards: Whv Arms (SAASI, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Control Musl Fail (1992). This year. Colonel Payton is a graduate of he coinpleted a major study on the Squadron Officer School. Air Com- future of aerospace power for Head- mand and Staff College. and Air VVar quarters USAF. Directorate of Plans. College.

95 assignments as aircraft maintenance officer at Osan AB. Republic of Korea; aide-de-camp to the Eighth Air Force commander at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana: protocol support officer at Offutt AFB, Nebraska: and executive officer and missile combat crew member and instructor at McConnell AFB. Kansas. Major Andrews is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Steven Metz (BA and MA. Univer- sity of South Carolina; PhD. Johns Hopkins University) is an associate Maj C. Cantrell III (BS. MS. Vir- research professor of national secu- gínia Polytechnic Institute) is chief. rity affairs at the Strategic Studies Contingency Plans Branch, Allied Institute. US Army War College, Forces Northern Europe, Kolsas. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Norway. A sênior pilot with more Immediatelv preceding this assign- than 3.000 flying hours, he has ment, Dr Metz was an associate professor in the Department of Regional also served as an associate profes- and Warfare Studies. Air War Col- sor. Department of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, United lege. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. He States Military Academy. Other has also served on the faculty at Vir- gínia Polytechnic Institute and State assignments include C-141B pilot, aircraft commander, and instructor University and at the US Army Com- mand and General Staff College. His pilot and F -lllF vveapons systems articles on international politics, officer. Major Cantrell is a graduate Col Richard Szafranski (BA. Florida military strategv. and national secu- of Squadron Officer School and Air State University; MA, Central Michi- rity affairs have appeared in several Command and Staff College. gan University) is a professor of journals. including Airpower lour- national security studies at Air War nal. Dr Metz is the author of Eisen- College. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. as hower as Strategist: The Coherent well as research director for SPACE- Use o f M ilita ry Power in IVar and CAST 2020. a study of future mili- Peoce (1993). tary space requirements. He previ- ously commanded the 71h Bomb Wing. Carswell AFB. Fort YVorth, Texas. A command pilot and distinguished graduate of Squadron Offi- cer School and graduate of Air Com- mand and Staff College and Air War College. Colonel Szafranski has also been published in Strategic Review, A ir University Review, Combat Crew, and Parameters.

Maj Henry L. Andrews, Jr. (BS. Syracuse University; MBA. Louisiana Tech University) is a national defense fellow at the Ridg- Please Recycle way Center for International Secu- rity Studies. University of Pitts- burgh. Pennsylvania. He has had

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