Star Alliance, 2000

Brandeis University 246 - 001 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS SCHOOL Rev. 23/2/04 Star Alliance, 2000 Bringing together airline organizations that span the globe is very complex but we are ready to accelerate the process. We are clearly ahead of the competition, and we intend to maintain that lead. -- Friedel Roedig, Chairman of Star Alliance During the 1990s, the global airline industry was being transformed by new regulatory policies and new company strategies. The United States deregulated the industry in 1978 and the European Union followed in 1997. While regulatory hurdles still prevented cross-border mergers in many countries, airlines were driven to pursue different strategies, from privatization to the formation of global alliances.1 Star Alliance was created in May 1997 by Lufthansa, United Airlines, Air Canada, Thai Airways, and Scandinavian Airways System (SAS); Varig, Air New Zealand, Ansett, and All Nippon Airways (ANA) joined in 1998. The founding members sought to expand their global network of service and attain many of the synergies of a merger, but while maintaining their independent identities. Despite great strides that Star was able to make over a short interval, several critical issues remained in 2000 and were likely to increase in importance. Success of the alliance was likely to depend on its organization and management, but few companies had experience with the type of structure that Star was building. Would it work? Would the airlines continue to operate as independent companies or function as almost-merged entities? If they remained independent, how would power and benefits be divided among them? With rival alliances growing in strength, how would Star compete? Would it continue to expand its network of allies, or would its growth reach a point of diminishing effectiveness? Research Assistant Sarah Marchand (MA ’99) prepared this case under the supervision of Associate Professor Benjamin Gomes-Casseres as the basis for class discussion, rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The case draws on research done by Exchange Students Guillaume Hery, Igor Pruniaux, and Thomas Ostergaard, and is based solely on library sources. Copyright © 2000 Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass. For permission to copy, call (781) 736-2264. 1 The airline industry continued to be affected in one way or another by highly complex foreign ownership regulations. These regulations effectively prevent full mergers between airlines domiciled in different countries. For example, non-Canadian investors could not own more than 31% of a Canadian airline’s voting stock. 1 246-100 Star Alliance, 2000 The Rise of Airline Constellations Star was a new form of organization in the industry in that it was a “constellation” of multiple partners. Historically, airline alliances had been bilateral, that is, between two companies. For example, Air France had twenty-four bilateral alliances in 1998, with different airlines across the globe, but it had not linked these separate alliances into one global alliance. That is what Star did – it was a multi-partner alliance formed to exploit synergies and reduce costs among multiple partners at once. Even so, Star relied foremost on its two biggest member companies, United Airlines and Lufthansa, which together serviced 578 destinations in 106 countries. By the end of 1999, Star was composed of twelve members with 800 destinations in 130 countries, with still other companies planning to join in the near future (see Exhibit 1). Star tried to strengthen its position in South America, Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It was also developing new methods to improve the service of its members, such as through a new E-Ticket Service, by adding technologically advanced Boeing 777s, installing Airport Gate Readers, and so on. Star was not alone in forming a multi-partner alliance. While Delta Airlines, Singapore Airlines, and Swissair had formed a three-way alliance in 1989, rivalry among large constellations did not take off until American Airlines and British Airways launched their Oneworld alliance in February 1999. Among the founding members of this rival constellation were also Canadian Airlines, Cathay Pacific and Qantas. In September 1999, Finnair and Iberia joined, resulting in 650 number of destinations served. A comparison of key performance statistics of the main airline constellations active in 1999 is shown in Exhibit 2. Regulated Competition in the Global Airline Industry Air travel was a huge industry operating on a global scale. In 1999, the 269 member airlines in the International Air Transport Association (IATA), together transported over 868 million passengers (of which 27% were flown internationally) and had operating revenues of $150 billion, growing at 5% per year.2 Company performance in the airline industry was cyclical, a product of changing consumer demand and the price of inputs (particularly fuel). Performance of selected airlines is shown in Exhibit 3. The profitability of an airline depended on three primary variables: costs, pricing and occupancy rates, or load factor.3 The typical cost structure within airline companies was such that ticketing and promotion represented the largest share of costs, with fuel expenses following close behind. Major airlines were dedicated to reducing marketing costs in part by cutting commissions, introducing on-line booking, and establishing their own online reservation systems. Star Alliance opened two such agencies that were operated by the constellation of members. With the spread of the Internet, airlines were devoting larger amounts to advertising on-line in an attempt to increase their load factor. Because a vacant seat cost the airline virtually as much as an occupied seat, profitability depended highly on the load factor. Soaring fuel prices during the Gulf War in 2 www.iata.org 3 Load factor is a measure of capacity utilization, equal to total revenue per mile (RPM) divided by total available seat miles (ASM). 2 Star Alliance, 2000 246-100 the early 1990s led many companies to suffer considerable losses; the overall industry lost $16 billion from 1990 to 1993. In turn, the low fuel prices that followed, along with the buoyant global economy, raised profits to $18 billion from 1994 to 1998.4 Glenn Engel of the Transport Group at Goldman, Sachs & Co. reported: In terms of profitability, the years from 1991 to 1993 were, historically, the industry’s worst ever. But the next five years were its best ever, especially 1998, when earnings peaked. In 1999, earnings came down a bit -- probably 20% from 1998, but they were still strong. So I guess you could say the 1990s were the best of times and the worst of times! Regulation and De-regulation Traditionally, the industry had been regulated by national governments in a multitude of ways. For the most part, routes had to be approved and licensed by government agencies; prices were set by negotiation between governments and by national authorities; foreign ownership was restricted in national airlines; and airlines were restricted to flying only to and from their home countries. International rules of “cabotage” restricted airlines from operating domestic flights in countries other than their home bases. In other words, a German airliner was allowed to fly from Germany to the United States and back, but not between two cities in the United States. The birth of airline alliances came as a result of deregulation. Starting in the U.S. in 1978 and spreading to the European Union (EU) in 1993, a wave deregulation loosened restrictions on pricing and on routes. Europe-Union airlines were also permitted the right to fly to and from all international destinations within the EU area. In April 1997, law makers in EU cou tries gave the right to carriers from one country to travel domestically within other EU countries, modifying the long-standing rules of cabotage. However, travel to and from non- EU countries was still subject to bilateral negotiations and the traditional cabotage rules. Beginning in 1992, the governments of the U.S. and the Netherlands signed a new Open Skies bilateral air treaty that allowed U.S. airlines to fly without restrictions to Dutch cities, and the reverse. The treaty also granted KLM and Northwest full antitrust immunity to pursue an alliance, though they were not allowed to merge ownership. After that, the U.S. made similar agreements with 36 other countries. These policies successfully eliminated restrictive bilateral alliances and liberalized air routes across the globe. Among the benefits that countries received in signing an agreement with the U.S. was permission for U.S. national airlines to cooperate with the foreign airline in designing, pricing, and selling their product.5 Despite their aggressive approach, the U.S. carriers were not free from international regulations. An Open Skies agreement still does not grant the U.S. the right to cabotage in the foreign country’s domestic market. But by joining in an alliance, a U.S. carrier could connect more effectively to the domestic route structure operated by the foreign airline. Anti-trust Issues The traditional form of alliance in the industry had been one of loose ties between two partners, with no equity cross-participation; there were a few exceptions, such as British Airways, which was likely to take an equity interest in its partners. One of the features of these alliances is that they enabled the partners to overcome some of the restrictions imposed by national regulations. 4 www.iata.org 5 Global Airline Alliances, Candace Browning & Michael Linenberg. Merrill Lynch, 1999. 3 246-100 Star Alliance, 2000 Though many industries had seen the decline or elimination of “national champions” in the 1980s and 1990s, this did not happen to the same extent in airlines. In a lot of countries, national airline companies were either state-owned or protected by the government. In Europe, even after the creation of the single European market in 1992, the rule was generally that no foreign investor was allowed to own more than 49.9% of the capital of a national airline.

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