The Struggle for the

An analysis of changing socio-technical imaginaries on during the late 20th century in the

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Final research master thesis Author: Siebren Teule Supervisor: dr. Liesbeth van de Grift

Research-master History Utrecht University

Word-count: 36749, excluding footnotes and bibliography)

Date: July 17th, 2020

Front-page images: Figure above: The monument on the Enclosure , commemorating the construction process. It depicts the labourers who worked on the Dam, and a now-famous phrase: A living people build their own future (‘Een volk dat leeft bouwt aan zijn toekomst’).1

Figure below: While airplanes fly across carrying banners with slogans against the reclamation, the last gap in the between and is closed in the presence of minister Westerterp (TWM) on September 4th, 1975.2

1 Unknown author, Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afsluitdijk_monument.jpg. 2 Photo: Dick Coersen (ANP), Nationaal Archief/Collectie Spaarnestad.

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Acknowledgements This thesis is the final product of six months of research, and two years of exploring my own interests as part of Utrecht University’s research-master History. During the past months, I have found the particular niches of historical research that really suit my research interests. This thesis is neatly located in one of these niches. The courses, and particularly my internship at Rijkswaterstaat in the second half of 2019, aided me greatly in this process of academic self-exploration, and made this thesis possible. There are many people who aided me in this process, either by supervising me or through discussions. I want to thank my thesis-lab-group and its host for the useful discussions. I am indebted most of all to my supervisor Liesbeth van de Grift, for her critical feedback on this thesis and in particular for helping me write to the point and downsize my text. Inevitably, this thesis is also a product of the covid-19 pandemic that struck in the process of writing. Although I am lucky to count myself among those who were not personally afflicted by this disease, my research process was strongly affected through the closure of archives, unavailability of sources, and other side-effects of this crises. I wish to in particular thank Catja for pulling me through – without her, I undoubtedly would not have been able to finish this project.

Siebren Teule, July 2020

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Abstract One of the most impressive feats of Dutch hydro-engineering is the Zuiderzee reclamation project, a series of land reclamations during which four were created. The Netherlands turned its inland sea into a freshwater lake. However, one of the planned land reclamation projects, the Markerwaard , has never been realized. In its place today lies the Marker lake, a large freshwater body surrounded by an awkward silhouette of dikes and . Whereas the other Zuiderzee polders were reclaimed in the years between 1930 and 1970 without much controversy, the reclamation of the Markerwaard met powerful societal resistance. The future of the Markerwaard became a national debate until the reclamation was finally called off in 1990. In between 1970 and 1990, ideas on land reclamation changed drastically. In order to fully understand this change, in this thesis I argue that it is necessary to understand how ideas on environmentalism, spatial problems, and protest culture intertwined and echoed within broader Dutch society. To analyse this change, the concept of socio-technical imaginaries is particularly well- suited. In this thesis, I operationalize this concept into a framework for historical research. Using this framework, I subsequently demonstrate how the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation projects was challenged in the early 1970s. This fuelled a major, society-wide debate on the future of the Markerwaard in the early 1980s, and a resistant imaginary rose. Elements of this resistant imaginary were incorporated in the hegemonic imaginary, which changed ideas on land reclamation. This ultimately resulted in the downfall of the Markerwaard polder.

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ...... 7

CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORIAN AND THE FUTURE ...... 16

CHAPTER 2: RECLAIMING A SEA ...... 27

CHAPTER 3: DAVID AND GOLIATH ...... 41

CHAPTER 4: A CONFUSION OF TONGUES ...... 67

CHAPTER 5: THE DOWNFALL OF THE MARKERWAARD ...... 94

CONCLUSION ...... 106

EPILOGUE: FROM MARKERWAARD TO MARKER WADDEN ...... 112

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 114

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List of abbreviations

Abbreviation Full meaning (Optional) Dutch

APIJL Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer

DHR Documents of the House of Representatives

IJDA IJsselmeerpolders Development Authority Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders

MHR Minutes of the House of Representatives Rijkswaterstaat (Directorate-General for Public RWS Works and Water Management)

SCD Spatial Core Decision Planologische Kernbeslissing

SPC Spatial Planning Council Raad van Advies voor Ruimtelijke Ordening

STI Socio-technical imaginary

STS Science and Technology Studies

TWM Ministry of Transport and Water Management Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat

WMC Water Management Council Raad voor de Waterstaat

ZPD Zuiderzee Project Department Dienst Zuiderzeewerken

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Introduction In the spring of 2019, tourists were allowed to visit the Marker Wadden nature reserve for the first time (see Figure 1).3 This man-made archipelago, located in the Marker lake, is the newest piece of land acquired by the Netherlands. The reclaimed islands can be considered as the epitome of artificially constructed nature in the country. Curiously, however, the islands should not have existed in the first place. The Marker lake was supposed to have been reclaimed as a polder called the Markerwaard over five decades ago. The Markerwaard polder was an element of the Zuiderzee reclamation project that lasted from 1918 to 1975, during which four major polders were reclaimed in the former inland Zuiderzee sea. However, when in the early 1970s the Markerwaard was about to be reclaimed, the project became contested. The Dutch government ultimately decided to discontinue the reclamation project in the wake of a societal debate that had lasted twenty years. Considering this lengthy and tense debate, it is quite remarkable that the Dutch government accepted the plans for the reclamation of the Marker Wadden archipelago at all.

Figure 1: Tourists on the Marker Wadden

The Markerwaard is illustrative of a larger transition that took place in the Netherlands during the last decades of the 20th century. In this transition, the Dutch perception regarding the creation and management of the environment seemingly changed, particularly as regards the question to what extent such an environment is and should be engineerable through artificial means. In this thesis I will contribute to a better understanding of this puzzling transition by historicising it. The thesis will focus on the practice of land reclamation, which until the 1970s was relatively uncontested, but became fiercely debated from that period onwards. Technologies such as land

3 Figure 1: ChristiaanPR, Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marker_Wadden_2018_05_12.jpg.

7 reclamation, I argue, are connected to a shared social and moral order on desired societies. Therefore, to fully understand the changes in the Dutch societal perception of land reclamation, discourses on desirable and undesirable futures need to be considered. In this thesis, I will do so by perform an analysis of the socio-technical imaginaries related to land reclamation. I focus on the case study of the Markerwaard, limiting myself to the societal debate in between 1970 and 1990, during which ultimately the Markerwaard reclamation project was discontinued.

Historiography Several historians and other scholars have analysed to what extent the Dutch people historically considered their wet environment to be artificially engineerable. For this purpose, the relation between Dutch culture and water can be considered. This approach is often taken by anthropologists and philosophers. They frequently argue that there is something uniquely Dutch about land reclamation. Vice versa, they state, the Dutch culture has been strongly influenced through its riverine landscape and position next to the . The Dutch philosopher Lotte Jensen, for instance, has recently argued that the ‘battle against the water’ is constitutive of Dutch identity. This identity, according to Jensen, is partially made up of standard image repertoires of flooding, and a national culture of remembering disasters. Thus, this battle against the water has become a cultural construction.4 Artificially reclaiming land from the sea, therefore, can be considered as a victory in this everlasting contest. Anthropologist Peter Stephenson considers land reclamation project in a similar fashion. He argues that land reclamation projects also disconnect the past from the present. Creating a new polder provides a clean slate for a society, but simultaneously allows for the modernisation of more traditional areas of the Netherlands, such as fishermen villages.5 Reclamation projects are thus intimately linked to Dutch culture and self-perception. Environmental historians tackle the question of understanding changes in the engineerability of the environment differently. Generally speaking, when discussing case studies that took place more recently, these historians point to the influence of environmental awareness. This line of reasoning hinges on the idea that from the 1960s onward two simultaneous processes occurred in Western societies: the rise of successful protest movements, and an increase in environmental awareness. According to these historians, an environmental turn took place in this period, which saw the establishment of green political parties, the increase of environmental political protest, and the creation of green institutions.6 During the 1970s, a large part of Dutch society grew more concerned with environmental degradation, overpopulation, and overconsumption in particular.7 This argument is frequently used by Dutch historians of technology and society, to explain why during the 1970s many infrastructural projects were postponed or cancelled. Historians A. Bosch and Willem van der Ham demonstrate that the decade between 1970 and 1980 saw an increase in the number of demonstrations against large infrastructure projects. In their extensive history of RWS, these historians show that those demonstrations were often successful. They refer, for example, to the demonstrations against a highway expansion near the Amelisweerd forest close to Utrecht, and the debate on the dam built in the Oosterschelde river in the Rhine- delta.8 Van

4 See Radboud Universiteit, ‘Hoe de strijd tegen het water onze identiteit heeft gevormd’, Historiek.net (2019). 5 See Peter. H. Stephenson, ‘Does New Land Mean New Lives ?’, De Etnofoor 3 (1990) 17–31, at 19, 27. 6 See J.R. McNeill, Something New under the Sun (1st ed; WW Norton Company 2001) 325–355; J.R. McNeill, ‘The Environment, Environmentalism, and International Society in the Long 1970s’, in: Niall Ferguson ed., The Shock of the Global (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2010) 263–278. 7 See Hans Righart, ‘Milieu in Beweging’, Socialisme en Democratie 49 (1992) 418–423, at 419. 8 See A. Bosch and W. Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat (2nd ed; Asten 2015) 172–173, 261–268.

8 der Ham argues that this success was largely the result of well-executed lobbying attempts, in which environmental protest movements were able to put pressure on the Dutch government.9 In order to fully understand the broad transition regarding the creation and management of the environment discussed above, however, the connection between these two elements (the relation between Dutch culture and water, and the environmental turn that affected a broad group in Dutch society) must be made. To fill this gap, instead of focussing on the Dutch government or protest movements, as other historians have done, it is necessary to consider the Dutch general population. Specifically, this implies researching how changing ideas on artificial changes to the environment interacted with ideas on water and land reclamation among Dutch society. The relatively new concept of sociotechnical imaginaries is well-suited to study this interaction. It emphasises analysing discourses on desired futures that can be attained through technologies, such as land reclamation. The concept will be discussed below in more detail. The question why in particular the Markerwaard reclamation was discontinued has also been discussed by historians. The Markerwaard has been approached by historians in roughly two different ways. One way is to approach the reclamation project as the final element of the Zuiderzee reclamation project. In two separate works, historians Gerard van de Ven and Anita van Dissel discuss the Markerwaard from this perspective. They both argue that policymakers ultimately realised that an open lake had at least as much quality as a reclaimed polder. These qualities, such as recreation and the ecological value of the lake, were only taken seriously after 1980. As such, although the polder had been planned for nearly a century, it ultimately was discontinued.10 In a similar vein, reporter and author Emiel Hakkenes discusses how the Markerwaard polder was the first of the Zuiderzee polders to be challenged by experts from outside the governmental agencies responsible for reclamation. This challenge did not directly affect the Markerwaard, but inspired environmental movements to oppose the reclamation project, which ultimately led to the downfall of the polder.11 Alternatively, the Markerwaard has been approached by perceiving it as one of many infrastructural projects that became the topic of societal debate during the 1970s and 1980s. The Markerwaard is frequently listed together with the Amelisweerd and Oosterschelde debates discussed above.12 This approach allows for comparing the Markerwaard debate with these other debates. What becomes clear from this comparison is that the Dutch government was internally divided on how to proceed with these infrastructural projects. Historian Andre Geurts argued that internal government strife, especially between different ministries, resulted in the Markerwaard question remaining unresolved for a long period of time. No administration dared to make a final decision on the subject, yet this indecision served as a cause for frustration.13 Van de Ven, who also discussed the Markerwaard from this approach, adds that the burden of proof on projects such as the Markerwaard slowly shifted as a consequence of this indecision. At first, it was up to opponents of the Markerwaard to prove that the reclamation project would cause harm. Within two decades, however, it was up to those in favour of reclamation to demonstrate the benefits of reclamation, in order to bring about the realisation of the Markerwaard.14

9 See Willem Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken ( 2007) 368–370. 10 See G.P. Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands (Utrecht 2004) 13; Anita Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in , en : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989 (Zutphen 1991) 261–262. 11 See Emiel Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween (Amsterdam 2017) 354–362. 12 See Bosch and Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 265–268; For an extensive case study on the effects of the Oosterschelde debate on Dutch water management, see Cornelis Disco, ‘De natuur herboren - De ecologische wending in het Nederlandse waterbeheer’, Tijdschrift voor waterstaatsgeschiedenis 9 (2000) 1–18. 13 See an interview with Geurts in: Maaike Bezemer, ‘150 jaar toekomst’, Trouw (zp 18 October 2006). 14 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 393.

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Political scientist Henri Goverde has written the single most extensive analysis of the Markerwaard debate from this perspective. He perceives the infrastructure debates that took place during the 1970s and 1980s as, at their core, spatial problems.15 Goverde uses an advocacy-coalition- based theory to analyse the Markerwaard debate.16 Goverde argues that, in particular, the environmental organisations that protested the Markerwaard were successful because they were able to influence those actors who Goverde calls power-brokers. Power-brokers are not necessarily the formal decision-makers (i.e. the ministers of the Dutch government) but rather dealmakers and intermediaries who connect stakeholders, solve conflicts, and realise compromises while simultaneously striving for the realisation of their own goals.17 According to Goverde, in contrast to the successful environmental movements, governmental organisations responsible for the Markerwaard-reclamation followed the wrong strategies in appealing to these power-brokers.18 Even though these contributions are very valuable, what remains unclear is the complex process in which suddenly the Zuiderzee project became a national issue accompanied by a major societal debate. Clearly, the way in which Dutch society perceived the Markerwaard as a desirable contribution for the Netherlands changed over the 1970-1990 period, as did the perception on managing the environment. However, so far, the effect of the rise of environmentalism on the discourse on land reclamation has not been discussed. This thesis will fill in that lacuna. It will demonstrate that central to these transitions was a shift in thinking about the desired future of the Netherlands.

Research questions This thesis contributes to explaining the transition in Dutch society regarding the perception of creating and managing the environment. As mentioned, I will apply the concept of socio-technical imaginaries for that analysis. Specifically, therefore, I aim to explain how and why the socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation changed, using the Markerwaard reclamation project as a case study. As such, the main question I will answer in this thesis is, in what ways did the Dutch socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation change between 1970 and 1990? In order to answer this research question, I first will discuss the socio-technical imaginary approach in more detail. As will be discussed below, this approach lacks a distinct methodology for applying it for historical research. Thus, I will answer the question, how can the socio-technical imaginary approach be operationalised for historical research? This question will be answered in chapter 1. In this chapter, I argue that socio-technical imaginaries are never static. Rather, in a given community, at any time various contesting imaginaries are at play. One of them is hegemonic while the others are resistant. Therefore, in chapters 2, 3 and 4, I answer the following two questions: how did the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation develop during this period? And how did the alternative, resistant socio-technical imaginaries on land reclamation develop during this period? Last, in chapter 5, I answer the question, to what extent did the resistant socio-technical imaginaries on land reclamation affect the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary?

15 See H.J.M. Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, Nederlandse Geografische Studies (Nijmegen 1987). 16 Theoretically, his argument is close to Sabatier’s advocacy-coalition framework, although at the time of his writing that approach was not well-known yet. See Paul A Sabatier, ‘An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein’ 168 (1988) 129–168. 17 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 15–17, chapter 2 and 3. 18 Historian Anita Van Dissel, who studied this debate from the perspective of such a governmental organisation, disagrees, arguing that these organisations were limited in their options and had to follow government policies. See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 265.

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Answering these questions provides a better understanding of the transition regarding the Dutch perception of creation and management of the environment. Various contemporary Dutch debates hinge on this broad transition. One example of such a debate concerns the , a nature reserve located quite close to the Marker Wadden in the province of Flevoland. The nature reserve came into existence by accident, when a large, recently reclaimed area was left unattended for a decade. Once it was discovered that a unique nature reserve had come into existence, the area was left to develop with little human interference.19 Today, however, the Oostvaardersplassen is controversial precisely because of this non-interference principle. Thousands of grazing animals die on a yearly basis due to starvation. Another example is the recently finished Dutch project Ruimte voor de Rivier, in which rivers are reverse-engineered to gain a more ‘natural’ trajectory. This project signifies a new approach of the Dutch riverscape and environment, with more respect for the original course of rivers. Paradoxically, this more natural state is attained by artificial alterations.20 Historicising this broader transition regarding the perception of creating and managing the environment, provides additional arguments and insights in how to manage and balance human activities and the natural environment in a relatively small country.

Approach and sources To analyse the Dutch societal perception of desirable and planned futures through land reclamation, I will be considering the Markerwaard debate as an expression of several competing sociotechnical imaginaries (STIs). Sociotechnical imaginaries, as introduced by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, are ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’.21 Such collective visions on the future are both normative constructions as well as contested and politicized configurations. At any time, multiple contending imaginaries can be at play in a given community. Similar to discourse, some imaginaries will therefore be hegemonic and have the ability to strongly influence policy and behaviour in this community. Others, however, resist the hegemonic imaginary. Over time, they can become more influential. Although the socio-technical imaginary concept has become popular since its inception, it lacks a well-developed methodology for operationalizing it in research. Jasanoff and Kim propose a rough sociological approach, but this needs finetuning, especially for historical research. I will propose such a methodology in the first chapter of this thesis, when I discuss the socio-technical imaginary concept in more detail. I selected the Markerwaard as a case study because it is embedded in the history of the Zuiderzee polder reclamation.22 The Markerwaard was not the only land reclamation project that became subject of societal debate. For instance, the Dutch government seriously considered plans to reclaim an in the North Sea since 1971, but similarly discontinued this plan during

19 See Frans Vera, De Oostvaardersplassen : van spontane natuuruitbarsting tot gerichte natuurontwikkeling. (zp 1988). 20 See Alex van Heezik, Strijd om de rivieren; 200 jaar rivierenbeleid in Nederland of de opkomst en ondergang van het streven naar de normale rivier [proefschrift] (zp 2007). 21 See Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 1–33, at 4–5. 22 In this thesis, I use the concept Markerwaard to refer to both the polder as well as the geographical location where the polder is to be, unless I directly want to reference the Marker lake. I do thus not use the concept Marker lake frequently, and I avoid the alternative concept Marker space entirely (Markerruimte). I do so because I perceive the debate I am analysing as primarily a struggle for, or against, the Markerwaard. I am aware that this concept is of course biased on favour of the reclamation. However, the Marker Space concept is even more biased, as that briefly became a part of the imaginary in 1982. I discuss that particular episode in chapter 5. As a result, I stay away from the Marker Space concept, even though Henri Goverde choose to use this concept throughout his analysis of the same debate. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 6–7.

11 the 1990s. Other land reclamation projects, such as the expansion of the Rotterdam harbour, were in fact realised after much societal debate, so the practice was not cancelled altogether.23 What makes the Markerwaard unique is its embedding in the Zuiderzee reclamation project. The reclamation of this series of polders continued virtually unchallenged for decades, only to stop short of reclaiming the last planned polder. As such, analysing the Markerwaard provides an opportunity to scrutinize the connection between this long history and the desired future of the Netherlands expressed in the imaginaries on land reclamation. Additionally, the Markerwaard has become topical again because of the reclamation of the Marker Wadden. Explaining why past reclamation projects were continued or discontinued will inform the currently ongoing debate on the future of this artificial archipelago. In this thesis, I focus in particular on the 1970-1990 period. I chose 1970 as a starting point since the Markerwaard reclamation project was not contested before that year. During the subsequent two decades, however, the Markerwaard became a permanent discussion among Dutch society and politics. I analyse two particular episodes of this debate. The first occurred between roughly 1970 and 1976. In this period, for the first time Dutch citizens were given the opportunity to formulate an opinion on the Markerwaard. Although only a minor fraction participated, the reclamation project was unexpectedly challenged and a societal debate kickstarted. The second occurred in between 1980 and 1982. In this period, a major society-wide public participation period took place. In this process, similar to a referendum, the question whether to reclaim the Markerwaard was at stake. Although the public participation process ended in 1982, it took the government nearly another decade to make a final decision regarding the Markerwaard. In 1990, the contemporary administration ultimately decided to discontinue the Markerwaard reclamation. Hence, I chose 1990 as the final year for this analysis. In addition to analysing the 1970-1990 debate, I briefly highlight some important historical elements of the Zuiderzee reclamation project at the beginning of my analysis. Similarly, I briefly discuss at the end how more recently the Marker Wadden came into existence. Generally speaking, to identify socio-technical imaginaries this thesis is limited to analysing primary sources that were available to the general Dutch public during the Markerwaard debate. First of all, there are four primary documents I focus on in this thesis. These became vital points of contention during the Markerwaard debate, and they were important during the two key episodes of debate discussed above. The first of these is Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard. It was published in 1972 by the Zuiderzee Project Department, the governmental organisation responsible for the reclamation of the Markerwaard.24 It was the first plan on the Markerwaard that was put up for public consultation, and as such stimulated societal debate on the project. The second document, Plan Waterlely, was published as a response to Reconsiderations in 1974.25 It was written by the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake, one of the most vocal groups protesting the reclamation project. The third document is called Development of the Markerwaard area. The policy proposed in this document – to reclaim the Markerwaard - was at stake in the 1980-1982 public participation procedure.26 Development was published by the Ministry of Transport and Water Management in 1980. The fourth and last is a set of documents written by the Spatial Planning

23 For the North Sea Island case, see Siebren Teule, ‘Nederlandse Noordzee-aangelegenheden. 50 jaar beheer en beleid op het Nederlands deel van de Noordzee, 1971-2020’ (Utrecht 2020), Utrecht. 24 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1 25 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 26 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980.

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Council in 1981 and 1982.27 In this set, the 1980-1982 participation period is summarized and reflected upon. All of these four documents are indicative of the contesting imaginaries on land reclamation. Therefore, in this thesis I will analyse each of these using the STI-framework I develop. Apart from these four key documents, the empirical basis of this study primarily consists of Dutch newspaper articles, on the basis of which the Markerwaard debate can be reconstructed. Opinion- forming information is crucial. For this purpose, I employ the online database Delpher to access a large variety of newspaper articles on the Markerwaard debate.28 Delpher has a lot of available material, so I have limited myself to a number of national and regional newspapers that reported on the Markerwaard during the 1970s and 1980s. Based on how these newspapers framed issues, and by considering what they did and did not report on, I analyse to what extent these articles express socio-technical imaginaries. Each of these newspapers is aligned in a broader political and religious spectrum.29 If these political or religious affiliation are relevant during the discussion of the presented imaginaries, I will mention these in my analysis. In this thesis, I also used two other sets of important primary sources. These are available on the databank of the ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, as well as the online databank of the Dutch parliament. The former contains a large amount of formal reports and plans that were written by various departments of the ministry and its predecessors, including nearly 300 reports on the Markerwaard.30 Some of these reports were made available to the public and influenced the Markerwaard debate. The latter is a databank that houses minutes of parliamentary meetings, as well as documents intended to inform members of parliament.31 Although these documents have always been publicly available, they were not read as often as newspapers were. Still, these parliamentary documents provide insights in how members of parliament and the Dutch government acted during the Markerwaard debate. To enrich these insights, I also analysed the positions of various political parties on the Markerwaard, as expressed in their election programmes for the elections between 1971 and 1998.32 To construct a narrative of events, I rely largely on secondary sources, including the authors I have mentioned in the historiography. Henri Goverde’s social-political analysis in particular provides an extensive narrative of the events surrounding the Markerwaard debate. However, I want to point out that I treat Henri Goverde’s analysis as a rich primary source instead of a secondary source. Goverde himself was actively involved in the Markerwaard debate as president of one of the most important anti-reclamation lobby groups.33 Although I commend his ability to separate his scholarly analysis from his political activism, his frame of reference for analysing the decision-making process is unavoidably influenced by his own participation in that very same process. Additionally, his analysis

27 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982; DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982. 28 See https://www.delpher.nl/. Delpher is particularly useful due to its powerful search engine and ability to separate results on newspaper, time-period, type of message and distribution area. However, its text-download function is not optimal and as such it is difficult to perform bulk text analysis. 29 The national newspapers I use are: the non-aligned Algemeen Dagblad and De Telegraaf, the right-centrist NRC Handelsblad and the left-centrist De Volkskrant, the communist De Waarheid, the social-democrat Het Vrije Volk, the Christian reformed Nederlands Dagblad, the catholic Trouw and De Tijd newspapers, and the Amsterdam-based Het Parool. I also use the newspapers Leeuwarder courant and the Nieuwsblad van het Noorden to gain a regional perspective. 30 See http://publicaties.minienm.nl/. 31 See https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch. 32 I used the Dutch Political Parties database of Groningen University (Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen), available at https://dnpp.nl/verkiezingen/tk/prog. 33 Goverde was president of the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel lake (Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer) between 1975-1980. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 477 (curriculum vitae).

13 stops rather abruptly in 1985, while the actual Markerwaard debate continued for another five years. His analysis is written without the benefit of hindsight – the benefit a historian might bring to the table. To corroborate the narrative of events he presents, I use secondary sources as well as newspaper articles. Last, I should note that I wrote this thesis during the early months of the 2020 covid-19 pandemic. The lack of access to archives has largely influenced my choice of topic as well as of primary and secondary sources, although it did not directly influence my access to publicly available sources in the databanks mentioned above. As such, my analysis of public discourse is not directly affected by the negative effects of this crisis. Still, my access to physical sources, such as internal documents of protest movements and governmental organisations, has been very limited.

Chapter overview In the first chapter of this thesis, I will develop an operationalization of the socio-technical imaginaries (STI) concept for historical analysis. I demonstrate that there are some important similarities between this approach and the better-known method of discourse analysis, even though they are distinct. Based on this, I develop a framework for STI analysis. This STI-framework provides a way to identify six key elements of any (historical) socio-technical imaginary. The framework builds on discourse analysis but is distinct in its focus on desirable and undesirable futures and temporality. The framework is subsequently used in the remaining chapters of this thesis. In chapter 2, I briefly discuss the pre-1970 history of the plans to reclaim the Zuiderzee. First, I provide an overview of the polders that were reclaimed and the reasons why the Markerwaard polder was continuously postponed. Then, I use the STI-framework presented in chapter 1 to highlight a number of elements of the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation, present throughout this period. In particular, I discuss changes to the perceived desirable future for the new polders. Additionally, I point to the role of nationalism in the justification of the Zuiderzee reclamation project. The elements I discuss were also influential after 1970. In Chapter 3, I focus on the first of the two key public debates on the Markerwaard that I have identified. I start by discussing the publication of Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard, the document published by the Zuiderzee Project Department in 1972. The publication led to a societal debate on the Markerwaard. During this debate, the alternative Plan Waterlely was published by the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake in 1974. In the chapter, I juxtapose both documents and use the STI-framework to compare the imaginaries that are expressed in either. Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard expressed a hegemonic imaginary, and Plan Waterlely expressed a resistant imaginary. Still, both shared a notion about an undesirable future they wanted to keep at bay, rampant suburbanisation of the western Netherlands. Yet, whereas Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard sought solutions for this problem in land reclamation, Plan Waterlely found them in an alternative spatial plan for the entire country. In Chapter 4, I focus on the second of the two key public debates I identified. This was the public participation procedure on the Markerwaard that took place between 1980 and 1982. Nearly 20.000 people participated in this procedure, which was more than in similar procedures. These people responded to the policy proposal published by the Dutch government in 1980 called Development of the Markerwaard area. In this chapter, I first use the STI-framework to analyse the hegemonic imaginary that was expressed in this document. Subsequently I consider the responses to the participation procedure. The imaginary expressed in Development of the Markerwaard area saw strong continuity with the hegemonic imaginary expressed in the 1972 Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard document. In contrast, those who responded in the participation procedure expressed a wide variety of resistant imaginaries on land reclamation. Last, in this chapter I discuss the final

14 recommendation by the Spatial Planning Council on the issue. Contrary to expectations, this recommendation did not lead to a compromise on the issue. Rather, it reflected the stalemate in the societal debate, and as such, the hegemonic and resistant imaginaries that led to this stalemate. In Chapter 5, finally, I briefly discuss this stalemate and why it lasted until 1990. Importantly, during this period a new criterium on land reclamation was adopted by the Dutch government. This criterium expressed a change in the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation: elements of the resistant imaginary were adopted. These elements had already been expressed in the 1974 Plan Waterlely and subsequently also during the 1980 participation procedure. Ultimately, the new criterium led to the downfall of the Markerwaard. It was very restrictive and led to the rejection of various reclamation plans. As a result, the government decided in 1990 to discontinue the entire Markerwaard reclamation project. I end this chapter by briefly discussing the events of the following two decades, in which ultimately plans were made for a new type of land reclamation: the Marker Wadden archipelago.

15

Chapter 1: The historian and the future

Imagining the future is political […] but political action is also profoundly imaginative. 34

34 See Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 321–342, at 338.

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In this chapter I operationalise the socio-technical imaginary concept for historical analysis. The chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I discuss what socio-technical imaginaries are, how they have become a subject of analysis within the field of Science and Technology Studies, and why they are relevant for my analysis. In the next section, I demonstrate that socio-technical imaginaries can be understood as a sub-type of discourse, a shared way of understanding the world. As such, the instruments used in analysing discourses are available for analysing socio-technical imaginaries, once they are altered slightly. In the third and last section of this chapter, I discuss how to operationalize the socio-technical imaginary concept. I point to six components that make up socio-technical imaginaries: (un)desirable futures, target communities, story-lines, closure, temporality and signifiers. Related to the case study for this thesis, I argue that the transition of ideas on land reclamation that took place during the Markerwaard debate can only be understood when tracing the historical development of the related socio-technical imaginary. Tracing this historical development is the subject for the remaining chapters of this thesis.

1.1: Socio-technical imaginaries There are various ways to study the Markerwaard-debate, yet so far little attention has been dealt to the complex relation between the technology of land reclamation and political power. One could study the changing societal status of land reclamation by considering political ideology related to water infrastructure, or perhaps Dutch master narratives on land reclamation. The long-term consequences of such ideologies and master narratives have indeed been the subject of historical research, specifically related to Dutch water management.35 Other historians have emphasised more short-term policy agendas, and the coalitions formed by political actors, to realise these agendas.36 These studies tend to present land reclamation projects as the application of the best available technologies to drain bodies of water. In this thesis, this understanding is expanded. Land consideration is considered as a technology that specifically offers a solution for societal problems, while simultaneously it provides opportunities for engineers to plan new societies. As such, this technology produces normative suggestions on what constitutes the public good, while simultaneously reinforcing ideas on what the Netherlands is and should be. How to study such a technology, and particularly why it was unexpectedly questioned during the Markerwaard debate? The recently introduced concept of sociotechnical imaginaries provides an adequate approach. Research in the broad field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has until recently not dedicated a lot of attention to the complex relationship between science and technology, society, and political power.37 STS-scholars Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim identified this lacuna in 2009 while comparing 20th century U.S. and South Korean regulation of nuclear science and technology.38 Jasanoff and Kim argue that scientific and technological projects play a major role in encoding and reinforcing society, precisely because they often deal with societal issues. To study the relation between technologies and important societal questions, Jasanoff and Kim propose to consider the collective imagination of a community on specific ideas for desirable – and undesirable – future developments. This idea builds on the general STS notion that life is structured by materials and

35 See for example Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands; Lotte Jensen, Wij tegen het water. Een eeuwenoude strijd (Nijmegen 2018); Petra Van Dam, ‘An Amphibious Culture. Coping with in the Netherlands’, in: P. Coates, D. Moon and P. Warde eds., Local Places, Global Processes. Histories of Enviromental Change in Britian and Beyond (Oxford 2017) 78–93. 36 See for example Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte. 37 Scholars in the interdisciplinary field of STS want to explain how scientific research and technological innovation is affected by politics, culture and society, and vice versa. 38 See Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, ‘Containing the atom: Sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear power in the United States and South Korea’, Minerva 47 (2009) 119–146.

17 immaterial technologies.39 Therefore, studying changing perceptions on the Markerwaard cannot be done without incorporating collective imaginaries on land reclamation. To study the collective imagination on future technologies, Jasanoff and Kim introduce the analytical concept of socio-technical imaginaries (STIs). STIs are ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’.40 Let me unpack this definition. STIs are essentially visions of desirable futures. Crucially, these visions are not individual, but held by communities – either particular groups such as scientists or specific social movements, national communities, or even the global community. To maintain such a vision in a group of diverse individuals, the visions are institutionally stabilized and publicly performed; meaning they are continuously both constitutive of, and constituted by, the institutions of those communities. It is relevant that Jasanoff and Kim focus specifically on how, through these visions of desirable futures, political and technoscientific order are co-produced. Additionally, the desired futures reflect on forms of social life and social order while it simultaneously is advances in science and technology that make these desirable futures attainable. It is important to note here that STIs are not static. They develop as time passes, becoming either more influential and encapsulating an entire community, or fading away. Often, they originate from individual or organisational future visions that subsequently spread. They become shared conceptions, in the process turning a single vision to a shared imaginary.41 The STI approach builds on social-constructivist theory. A key constitutive element of the approach is the notion that imagination is not just individual thinking, but rather an important cultural community resource. Scholars who developed this notion during the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated that the imagination does several things: it produces systems of meaning that enable collective interpretations of social reality in a community; it constructs a gaze to perceive the ‘other’ outside of that community; and it provides ways for governing bodies to guide standardization of humans in this community, so they can be governed more effectively.42 Other social theorists have shown how collective imagination can be studied. Benedict Anderson’s work emphasises how nation- wide practices such as the print press can stimulate the shared sense of belonging that is constitutive of nationalism, while Arjan Appadurai’s disjuncture-theory builds on the understanding that shared imagination is central to forms of agency.43 Both emphasise that collective imagination should be considered as an organized field of social practices. Charles Taylor subsequently used this notion to study the history of Western modernity, introducing the concept of ‘imaginary’ to analyse this field

39 See Tom Moylan, ‘‘Make me happy and I shall again be virtuous’: science fiction and the utopian surplus of science’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 186–200; Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’. 40 Although the concept was originally introduced in 2009, Jasanoff refined the definition of socio-technical imaginaries in a subsequent publication. See Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’, 4. 41 Ibid., 24–27; also see Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, 321–337. 42 On collective interpretations of social reality, see Cornelius Castoriadis, The imaginary institution of society (Cambridge, Mass 1998); on the gaze to perceive the ‘other’, see Edward Said, Orientalism (London 1978). On how the imagination provides ways for governments to guide standardization of human objects for effective government, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The birth of the prison [original title: Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison (1975)] (London 1977); James C. Scott, Seeing like a state. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT 1998); Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting things out. Classification and its consequences (Cambridge, MS 1999); Jasanoff and Kim, ‘Containing the atom: Sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear power in the United States and South Korea’; Kaat Louckx, ‘Parameters of nation-ness and citizenship in Belgium (1846-1947)’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 169–185, at 169–185. 43 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London 1983); Arjun Appadurai, ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy’, Theory, Culture and Society 7 (1990) 295– 310.

18 of social practices.44 Up to the introduction of the STI-concept by Jasanoff and Kim, however, imaginaries did not play a role for STS scholars studying the relation between technology and society.45 It is, therefore, these community-wide STIs that are of interest to this analysis of the Markerwaard debate.

1.2: Comparing discourses with socio-technical imaginaries Applying an STI approach to the Markerwaard case is clearly valuable, but the question how to conduct such an analysis has not been answered in a uniform manner. Despite its recent conception and the competition with other theories that explain socio-technical change, the STI approach has gained positive reputation and many scholars have deployed the concept during the last few years.46 Even so, Jasanoff and Kim have not provided a methodological basis for studying socio-technical imaginaries. As such, a large variation in the operationalization of the STI concept can be found in the literature.47 In this section and the next, I will therefore develop a more detailed operationalization of the STI concept. First, I will point to some similarities in approaches. There is general agreement that comparison is a good starting point for STI-research. Comparison can be done either across groups, or across time. Comparing across groups allows scholars to identify different STIs in the communities that are at stake. Additionally, it allows scholars to explain why some communities respond differently to a particular new technology than others, or why particular technologies develop differently across communities. For instance, in their original article on the imaginaries on nuclear regulation Jasanoff and Kim compare between different nation states (the United States and South-Korea) and show how there are striking differences in imaginaries between those countries.48 Other scholars show how it is possible to discern STIs for other types of communities as well, such as social movement groups, or scientific organisations. Performing a comparative analysis between STIs of different communities generally results in an ideal-type overview of STIs. These ideal-types relate to cultural perceptions, experiences, and identities of individuals in the different communities.49 Comparing across time allows scholars to carve out the historical development of a particular STI, showing how it became more powerful or diminished at key moments in history. This approach reveals how at any time there are multiple contending imaginaries at play. Socio-technical imaginaries are not static belief systems. Neither is there a single imaginary in each community. Still, some STIs tend to be more durable and influential than others, and over time this balance changes.

44 See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC 2003). 45 The only exception is the anthropologist George Marcus, who explored how imaginaries are embedded in scientific organizations and practices how they subsequently shape research and innovation. Yet, his approach is limited to the individual imagination of scientists and does not understand imaginaries as shared fields of social practices. See George E. Marcus, Technoscientific Imaginaries: conversations, profiles, and memoirs (Chicago, IL 1995). 46 Benjamin Sovacool and David Hess interviewed key STS scholars in order to explore the wide diversity of theories that explain socio-technical change. They show that the STI-concept is mentioned by at least 25% of their interviewees. The most influential theory, sociotechnical transitions theory, is mentioned by 43% of their interviewees. See Benjamin K. Sovacool and David J. Hess, ‘Ordering theories: Typologies and conceptual frameworks for sociotechnical change’, Social Studies of Science 47 (2017) 703–750. 47 My overview of the various types of operationalization I discuss beyond this point builds on various approaches that other scholars have used when studying STIs. I particularly build on two key collections of articles on STI-research. See Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, Technology and Culture (Chicago and London 2015); Gert Verschraegen et al., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society, Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (New York 2017). 48 See Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’, 24–25; Jasanoff and Kim, ‘Containing the atom: Sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear power in the United States and South Korea’, 139–143. 49 See Regula Valerie Burri, ‘Imaginaries of Science and Society: Framing Nanotechnology Governance in Germany and the United States’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 233–253.

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Generally speaking, there are several phases in the temporal development of an STI: how it originated, how it embedded itself in a community, what resistance it encountered, and how it extended.50 This four-stage-model will be discussed in more detail below. This approach allows one to discern competing STIs at moments in history in a particular community, and to demonstrate how and why particular STIs gained in influence while others lost favour. It is therefore most fit for the analysis of the Markerwaard debate. In order to operationalize the STI concept for historical research, I propose to understand socio-technical imaginaries as a type of discourse. They are a sub-type of discourse in the sense that in such a discourse, a specific perception of the future is emphasised. Jasanoff has argued that discourse analysis is different from analysing STIs, because discourse analysis emphasises language and semantics, whereas STIs are more associated with active performances of state power, including prioritisation, investment, and acceptance or suppression of dissent.51 I disagree with her argument, since discourses also need to be continuously reperformed, as will be discussed below. Additionally, various scholars who analyse STIs employ ‘discursive reading’ as a method of analysis. They focus on how issues are framed, and political agendas are set, as well as how symbolic and cultural resources are used.52 As such, I argue that the tools of discourse analysis can also be applied for analysing imaginaries. In the next section I will discuss how this can be done. First, however, I will elaborate on what discourses are, and how they can be analysed. A discourse is a shared way of understanding the world. Political scientist John Dryzek argues that the way how an individual views the world is not always easily comprehended by an individual who subscribes to a different discourse.53 In his synthesising work on environmental discourses, Dryzek promotes political scientists Maarten Hajer and Charlotte Epstein as theoretical pioneers of this field.54 Epstein defines discourses as ‘a cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations about a specific object that frame that object in a certain way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it’.55 A discourse, understood in this sense, is a broad but powerful web of connected interpretations. Discourses are powerful because through them, objects and actors are understood to have power. When one of such interpretations in a discourse is expressed, actors either recognize the discourse as either their own and endorse the discourse, or they do not and dismiss it. Epstein has called this the ‘twin process of articulation and interpellation’. Articulation refers to the way in which a statement from an actor implicitly and immediately triggers a set of pre-existing associations at an audience. When one of the interpretations in a discourse is articulated, the others resonate. Interpellation refers to the way how discourses ‘hail’ actors. When a statement is presented, both the actor who articulates it, as well as those who listen or read it, respond to it. They either endorse

50 See Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, 324–337. 51 See Jasanoff and Kim, ‘Containing the atom: Sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear power in the United States and South Korea’, 123; Jasanoff, ‘Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity’, 20. 52 See, for instance, Ulrike Felt, ‘Keeping Technologies Out: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Formation of Austria’s Technopolitical Identity’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 103–125; Joshua Barker, ‘Guerilla Engineers: The Internet and the Politics of Freedom in Indonesia’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 199–218. 53 See John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (3rd ed; Oxford 2013) 9–10. 54 See Maarten Hajer, ‘The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process’, in: The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process (London 1997); Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, The Power of Words in International Relations (Cambridge and London 2008); Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses. 55 See Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 1–3.

20 or dismiss it. The actor who expresses the statement actively recognizes him- or herself as a subject in the discourse and behaves accordingly. 56 Therefore, discourses exert power as they render meaning and constrain and enable actors and behaviour. Discourses render meaning to real things in particular ways. Epstein, in analysing the anti-whaling discourse, shows how the word ‘whale’ means something completely different to those who subscribe to the anti-whaling discourse, than to those who subscribe to different discourses. Still, this rendered meaning does not affect the whales in question directly: they are still the large mammals swimming around the ocean. That is, until the discourses affect whaling policies. Additionally, discourses both enable and constrain actors. A discourse allows actors to act in the social world, but only if the actor speaks and behaves according to the shared interpretations of that discourse. Consequently, discourses also enable and constrain behaviour. Discourses become normative benchmarks of good and bad behaviour. The discourse that is most powerful at any moment in time often encodes what is ‘normal’ behaviour, and judges that which is considered deviant behaviour.57 Through enabling and constraining actors and behaviour, discourse coalitions are created. These coalitions are not just composed of the actors who subscribe to that discourse, but also the story-lines and the practices that are generated by such a discourse.58 The latter will be discussed in the next section. Discourse coalitions should not be confused with advocacy coalitions. As discussed in the introduction, in his analysis of the Markerwaard debate Henri Goverde applies a framework that resembles Paul Sabatier’s notion of advocacy coalitions.59 There are important differences between the two types of analyses. In the advocacy coalition framework, language is seen as a means for individuals to express beliefs and norms. Beliefs and norms are static, attributed values. The discourse approach, in contrast, holds that language and context constitute beliefs and norms. Following discourse analysis, actors hold unstable positions that may be influenced by new narratives.60 This brief discussion of discourse analysis allows for a synthesis of the presented ideas on socio-technical imaginaries and discourses. At first glance, the concepts are very similar. Both focus on collectively held ideas, concepts, and categorizations, and have language as a constitutive element. Both provide ways in which the (un)desirable can be framed, in which certain courses of actions are foregrounded while other courses of action are excluded entirely. Through this process, specific actors and types of behaviour are enabled or constrained. As such, STIs as well as discourses allow for the process of articulation and interpellation to take place: there is a shared understanding of ideas on social life and social order that resonates when particular statements are expressed. However, there also are key differences. STIs are limited to collectively held visions of (un)desirable futures. Although discourses tell us something about the desirable, it is not necessarily connected to the faraway or nearby future. Additionally, STIs reflect on the expected development/status quo of science and technology which subsequently enables society to attain or avoid that future. Discourses do not necessarily focus on technology or science, even though STS scholars frequently argue that our society is conditioned and perceived through technology. Discourses can focus purely on non-technological relations, such as social or political. With respect to these differences and similarities, I argue that STIs can be understood as a sub-type of discourse.

56 Ibid., 93–95. 57 Ibid., 4–6, 13–16, 111–112. 58 See Hajer, ‘The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process’, 58–68; Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 95, 109–111. 59See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte; Sabatier, ‘An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein’. 60See Hajer, ‘The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process’, 68–72.

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Therefore, tools meant for analysing discourses can be useful for analysing STIs as well. I will move to this step in the next section.

1.3: A framework for analysing socio-technical imaginaries In this section, I will discuss six components that make up socio-technical imaginaries: (un)desirable futures, target communities, story-line, closure, temporality and signifiers. Together, these concepts form a methodological framework that I will use for analysing the imaginaries on land reclamation during the Markerwaard debate. They are based on instruments for discourse analysis. The framework is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: A framework for the analysis of socio-technical imaginaries Component Important questions to ask Desirable and undesirable future What desirable futures are invoked? What monsters need to be kept at bay? How does the imaginary reflect (expected) gains, risks, and profits related attaining or avoiding this (un)desirable future? Target community How does the imaginary reflect a national/local image? What is the role the community, or parts of it, are supposed to play in attaining or avoiding (un)desirable futures? How is said community involved in debating or discussing these futures? Story-line What narratives are presented on attaining or avoiding (un)desirable futures? How do these narratives frame problems and solutions? What roles are given to actors in these narratives? How do these narratives draw on wider symbolic references? Closure What avenues and means of closure are presented? How are governance and policy presented, what is their purpose? Temporality What is the relationship between past and future? How is the past remembered and invoked? How does this memory change? What “myths” are used to explain present and future? Important signifiers and their signified What signifiers and their signified play important roles?

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Desirable and undesirable futures. A key aspect in identifying a socio-technical imaginary is teasing out the desirable future that it invokes. It is important to not only consider what this future is and how it is different from the present, but also why it is claimed to be desirable in the first place. A desirable future does not have to be a utopia but can be based on real-life examples.61 Importantly, STIs do not necessarily need to invoke a desirable future that needs to be attained, as they can also invoke undesirable futures that need to be avoided. These are the ‘monsters’ that are kept at bay, and the consequences of such a monster for maintaining contemporary social and political order can be influential.62 Monsters present challenges and threats that need to be defeated, or obstacles that need to be overcome. Examples of such monsters are dystopian views of society, enemies of the state, but also historical controversies.63 Hegemonic imaginaries often stress that the contemporary political or social order is the most important, or even the only factor keeping these monsters at bay.64 For the Markerwaard case, the fear of overpopulation and suburbanisation of the western Netherlands was a powerful monster to argue in favour of reclamation, as will be shown in chapters 3 and 4.

Target community. STIs are invoked in relation to a specific community, but often emphasise particular sub-groups that are more strongly affected by the desired or undesired future, as well as groups that have a responsibility in bringing about this desired future or keeping at bay the monsters. As such, it is important to consider to what extent the community is involved. 65 Most STI research has focussed on nation-wide imaginaries. Some researchers, however, have considered imaginaries that interact within communities at for instance a regional/local or even a global level. 66 Others have pointed out that civil society and social movements often formulate their own imaginaries, that are in direct competition with state-driven STIs. 67 In this thesis, a similar conflict can be found between

61 In analysing the imaginary of a ‘modern’ Rwanda, Warigia Bowman shows how the idea of an ‘African Singapore’ is constructed as a desirable future – thoroughly modern, wealthy, and powered by ICT. See Warigia Bowman, ‘Imagining a Modern Rwanda: Sociotechnical Imaginaries, Information Technology, and the Postgenocide State’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 79–102. 62 Michael Dennis has coined this term of ‘monster’ in his analysis of U.S. science and government during the Cold War. See Michael Aaron Dennis, ‘Our Monsters, Ourselves: Reimagining the Problem of Knowledge in Cold War America’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 56–78, at 56–57. 63 See Andreas Mitzschke, ‘Competing, conflicting and contested futures: temporal imaginaries in the GM crops controversy’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 91–113; Andrew Lakoff, ‘Global Health Security and the Pathogenic Imaginary’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang- Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 300–320. 64 Monsters are powerful instruments, as Sang-Hyun Kim analyses. By repeatedly invoking them, a hegemonic socio- technical imaginary leaves little room for alternative and competing visions of an ideal society. See Sang-Hyun Kim, ‘Social Movements and Contested Sociotechnical Imaginaries in South Korea’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 152–173. 65 For instance, often scientists play a particularly important role in bringing about a solution that provides for the desirable future. See Thomas Völker, ‘Preserving landscapes and reordering science-society relations: imagining the future in transdisciplinary sustainability research’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 114–136. 66 Clark Miller and Andrew Lakoff show how the international health community also forms a level at which STIs operate. See Clark A. Miller, ‘Globalizing Security: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Political Imagination’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 277–299; Lakoff, ‘Global Health Security and the Pathogenic Imaginary’. 67 Suzanne Moon and Joshua Barker make a case for paying more attention to imaginaries of civil society and social movements specifically. See Suzanne Moon, ‘Building from the Outside In: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Civil Society in New Order Indonesia’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 174–198; Barker, ‘Guerilla Engineers: The Internet and the Politics of Freedom in Indonesia’.

23 a state-driven STI on land reclamation and an alternative fostered by various social movements. Both interact with the Dutch population in a different way.

Storyline. The concept of story-lines is coined by Hajer, who defined them as ‘narratives on social reality […] that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding’.68 Story-lines frame problematic situations in such a way that the problem, the solution, and the actor who must bring the solution about are accounted for, in a strongly simplified fashion. Their simplicity allows for easy repeatability, which makes them a powerful element of a discourse. 69 Additionally, story-lines can also be images that represent a narrative. An example of a visual story-line are the various maps of the Zuiderzee project in which all future polders have been drawn, that have been made since Lely formulated his plans. These maps made the reclamation process itself look like an accomplished fact, as will be discussed in chapter 2. This practice was continued even during the Markerwaard debate.

Closure. The concept of closure is intimately linked to that of the story-line. Closure is the process in which complexity is reduced to a single, clear-cut explanation, for instance in the shape of a course of action, or a catchy one-liner. It is thus the process in which story-lines are formed. Closure imposes a non-complex line-of-facts between problem and solution while simultaneously framing out other ways of understanding the problems and, consequently, other solutions.70 As will be discussed in chapter 3, the Markerwaard was presented to provide a direct solution to various, if not all, spatial problems that the Netherlands suffered from in the late 1960s.

Temporality. Not just imagined futures, but also imagined pasts are important when studying STIs. Other STI researchers have pointed to a relation between the past, the memory of the past, performances of this memory, and visions of the future.71 Often, events that are remembered as important in the formation of a particular country of technology have a near-mythical status. The difference between these myths and reality often shows how memories provide new interpretations of events, which support newer imaginaries for the future.72 A historical sense of justification of the

68 See Hajer, ‘The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process’, 62. 69 Jens Beckert proposes the idea of a future-line, or a promissory story. These are story-lines that is are specifically relevant for attaining or avoiding a particular (un)desired future. However, the existing story-line concept also services this purpose, which is why I will not use Beckert’s new concept. See Jens Beckert, Imagined futures:fictional expectations and capitalist dynamics (Cambridge, Mass 2016). 70 See Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 95–98. 71 For example, Alexander Wentland’s account of historical ideas on the ideal German car society shows that attachments to historical memory and performing such memories result in complex perceptions of the ideal future. See Mitzschke, ‘Competing, conflicting and contested futures: temporal imaginaries in the GM crops controversy’; Alexander Wentland, ‘An automobile nation at the crossroads: reimagining Germany’s car society through the electrification of transportation’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 137– 166. 72 Ari Schick and Elta Smith perform similar analyses on events that are frequently remembered as important, yet these memories shows important deviations from the historical reality. However, these deviations feed the STIs on the regulation of bioethics and the corporate social responsibility, respectively. See Ari Schik, ‘Bioethics and the legitimation/regulation of the imagined future’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 15–44; Elta Smith, ‘Corporate Imaginaries of Biotechnology and Global Governance: Syngenta, Golden Rice, and Corporate Social Responsibility’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 253– 276; See also J. Benjamin Hurlbut, ‘Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of Asilomar’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 126–151.

24 reclamation of the Zuiderzee is an important part of the hegemonic STI on land reclamation during most of the 20th century.

Important signifiers and their signified. When analysing a discourse, it is important to distinguish between real objects (the signified) and the words that refer to them (the signifier). The meaning and interpretation of words is not inherent to these words, but contingent and dependent on discourses. Importantly, what fills a signifier, a word, with meaning, is its relation to a signified, the real object. This relation is constituted within the discourse, in relation with other signifiers.73 Epstein explains this concept by pointing out that a whale is a majestic animal in one discourse, and a source of energy and food in the other. Similarly, a polder is a large swath of arable land in one discourse, and an environmental disaster in another.

As discussed previously, I will analyse the public STIs on land reclamation by comparing them across different settings in time, in order to trace their historical development. I focus on those imaginaries that were widespread. At any given point in time, a variety of visions for (un)desirable futures are likely to be present in a community. It is very difficult to determine at that stage which of those visions will develop to become a collectively shared imaginary, and which will dwindle and disappear altogether. Therefore, it is easier to focus on the collectively shared visions that are present in full force as imaginaries. In order to explain how I trace the historical development of these STIs in the subsequent chapters, I will briefly elaborate on the four stages of historical development of an imaginary identified by Jasanoff: origins, embedding, hegemony/resistance and extensions.74 I simultaneously explain how this four-stage-model is reflected in the chapters of this thesis. The first stage is the origin of the imaginary. Imaginaries start somewhere. Often, their origins can be traced back to specific individual or organisational visions that embody loosely connected aspirations or ideas. One can therefore perform a biographical or organisational history approach, in order to find out how a particular imaginary became influential on the level of an entire community.75 However, the most interesting moment for analysing an STI is not when it originates or runs smoothly, but rather when things begin to break down.76 Therefore, in this thesis I will start by analysing the imaginaries on land reclamation that were already widespread at the brink of the 1970s, instead of tracing them back to their origins. One of these STIs has historical roots that go back nearly a century, which I why I discuss these roots in chapter 2 when simultaneously narrating the history of the Zuiderzee reclamation project. The second stage of the development of an STI is embedding. Jasanoff describes this phase as the moment when ideas on (un)desirable futures latch onto expressions, commodities, legal

73 Epstein uses using De Saussure’s concept of signification when she coined this concept in relation to discourse analysis. See Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 6–7. 74 See Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, 324–337. 75 For example, William Storey has shown how Cecile Rhodes was able to transfer his personal vision for the future of South-African society to many national institutions, through slowly accumulating an influential personal network. In a similar fashion, Joshua Barker traces the role of Onno Purbo, an Indonesian internet activist, in Indonesian civil society imaginaries. Kim Hendrickx and Jan Baedke show how particular think-tanks can be very influential in determining the perception of new technologies. See William Kelleher Storey, ‘Cecil Rhodes and the Making of a Sociotechnical Imaginary for South Africa’, in: Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim eds., Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago and London 2015) 34–55; Barker, ‘Guerilla Engineers: The Internet and the Politics of Freedom in Indonesia’; Kim Hendrickx, ‘Working imagination along the food-drug divide’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 65–88; Jan Baedke, ‘The new ideology of the social: shaping human’s future, science, and public health’, in: Gert Verschraegen et al. eds., Imagined Futures in Science, Technology and Society (London and New York 2017) 45–64. 76 See Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 13.

25 instruments, cultural expectations, or other artifacts.77 Rehearsals and reperformances are key elements of this process. To explain how this works, I want to briefly discuss two examples. Ulrike Felt shows how the memorable sentence ‘Austria is free’ has become the core element of a socio- technical imaginary in which Austria is kept free from any foreign technology. The sentence was originally uttered by the Austrian ruler directly after World War II – if it was expressed at all. At a certain point, it does not matter anymore whether the original statement was actually uttered, as a myth begins to stabilize.78 Similarly, Benjamin Hurlbut engages with the mythic status of a 1975 scientific conference on the regulation of biotechnology at Asilomar, California. The conference is remembered as a key turning point for the imaginary of a self-governing scientific community in the United States – even though, as Hurlbut shows, the conference itself was hardly as memorable as the myth has it.79 Subsequently, some STIs become hegemonic while others are resistant. This is the third stage. Imaginaries become hegemonic when, as a result of a struggle, one discourse is translated into institutional arrangements while others are not.80 At that point, most actors who are involved with the issue have an interest in maintaining these specific institutions, since those define their interests and identities. As a result, hegemonic discourses often stay dominant.81 Simultaneously, various alternative imaginaries can spring up in communities that resist those hegemonic ones. These can become mobilizing tools which translate dissatisfaction with the present situation into possibilities for the future.82 Resistance does not always lead to a new imaginary becoming dominant. Hegemonic imaginaries can be a formidable obstacle to the spread of new ideas. In this thesis, the process of embedding as well as hegemony and resistance is discussed throughout the remaining chapters. In chapter 2 I will analyse the background of state-driven STI on land reclamation that was hegemonic during most of the 20th century. Subsequently, analyses in chapters 3 and 4 will show how this STI was continuously reperformed in policy whitepapers and expressions by leading civil servants during the 1970s and 1980s. In contrast, an alternative, resistant STI was developed only during the 1970s, which I will discuss in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I analyse how this resistant STI grew more popular among the Dutch population. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I will first analyse the narrative of events that surround this struggle between imaginaries, before analysing the imaginaries themselves. In the latter parts of these chapters I analyse the specific elements of the imaginaries as presented in Table 1. Last is the process of extension, in which an imaginary can be moved from one particular setting to another. Jasanoff describes this as a situated re-embedding, in which actors who are responsible for the hegemonic STI – often governmental institutions – incorporate elements from other, either hegemonic or resistant, imaginaries.83 In chapter 5 of this thesis, I will discuss a similar process when a number of decisions made by administrations in the 1980s ensured that elements of the resistant anti-reclamation imaginary were incorporated in the pro-reclamation imaginary. This would ultimately spell the downfall of the Markerwaard reclamation project.

77 See Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, 326–329. 78 See Felt, ‘Keeping Technologies Out: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Formation of Austria’s Technopolitical Identity’, 117–119. 79 See Hurlbut, ‘Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of Asilomar’, 146–148. 80 See Hajer, ‘The politics of environmental discourse: Ecological modernization and the policy process’, 61. 81 See Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations, 68–70. 82 See, for instance, Kim, ‘Social Movements and Contested Sociotechnical Imaginaries in South Korea’; Storey, ‘Cecil Rhodes and the Making of a Sociotechnical Imaginary for South Africa’; Moon, ‘Building from the Outside In: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Civil Society in New Order Indonesia’; Smith, ‘Corporate Imaginaries of Biotechnology and Global Governance: Syngenta, Golden Rice, and Corporate Social Responsibility’. 83 See Jasanoff, ‘Imagined and Invented Worlds’, 332–337.

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Chapter 2: reclaiming a sea

Within a few months the first Zuiderzee polder will be reclaimed, and an expanse of 50.000 acres will become available for colonisation. This is a good occasion to discuss societal questions on exploiting and colonising that area […] Since it is desirable for the state to intervene in societal life in order to stimulate it in the right direction, the state should be given responsibility for the social task of colonisation.84

84 This is my translation from the original Dutch citation ‘… binnen enkele maanden zal de eerste Zuiderzeepolder droog vallen en zal, spoediger dan velen verwacht hadden, een uitgestrektheid van meer dan 20.000 H.A. kostelijke grond ter beschikking komen van den Nederlandschen landbouw, zal een kolonisatiegebied gewonnen zijn, grooter dan de […] Er is dus alle aanleiding, zich voor het droogkomen van den eersten Zuiderzeepolder te verdiepen in de vraagstukken van maatschappelijken aard, die samenhangen met het in kultuur brengen en de kolonisatie van dat gebied. […] Naarmate de overtuiging veld wint, dat het wenschelijk en mogelijk is, in te grijpen in den loop van het maatschappelijk leven, teneinde de ontwikkeling daarvan te stuwen in een vooraf aangegeven richting, wordt aan den Staat, als het daarvoor geschikte machts- orgaan der volksgemeenschap, een groot deel van die sociale taak toegedacht.’ See Henri Nicolaas ter Veen, ‘Op nieuw land een nieuwe maatschappij: het Zuiderzeeprobleem’, Mensch en Maatschappij 6 (1930) 313–329.

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Most popular historical accounts of land reclamation and polder creation in the Netherlands argue that reclamation projects are a second nature to Dutch society.85 Often, these are stories of unabated progress, engineering masterpieces, of an everlasting battle against the sea slowly, but surely, being won by the Dutch.86 It is precisely the point of this thesis to argue that such histories of land reclamation have a major effect on contemporary land reclamation projects, as well as future ones, through the socio-technical imaginaries they create. However, in order to understand the events that led to the eventual downfall of the Markerwaard plan, the history of the Zuiderzee project must be narrated as well. Therefore, in this chapter I will discuss why the Zuiderzee was reclaimed and how this process proceeded until the 1970s. Subsequently, I will discuss the socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation throughout this reclamation process.

2.1 Reclaiming an inland sea The Zuiderzee was a large inland sea in the heart of the Netherlands, that formed a single estuary together with the . It has been in existence since roughly the 13th century, when over several centuries subsequent floods expanded an inland lake called until it was permanently connected to the North Sea. The area had unique flora and fauna due to its brackish water and strong tidal variation. It was a shallow and muddy sea. Strong winds could flood coastline areas, or lay bare land that was inundated just moments before. 87 Life along the coastline was difficult, yet also worthwhile for those fishermen who knew the secrets of this sea. Painters and travellers were struck by the diverse social encounters they had along the edges of this sea in the late 19th century: rich cities and beautiful manors were alternated by deathly towns struck by poverty. 88 Technological developments during the 19th century made reclaiming the Zuiderzee a possibility, yet none of the plans that were proposed became a reality. Land reclamation had been practiced in the Netherlands since the Medieval period. With it, the Dutch were able to create polders (tracts of land enclosed by dikes, often below the original sea level), often for arable purposes. Aided by the introduction of the windmill in the 13th century and steam engine in the 19th century, circa 230 square kilometres of lakes were reclaimed for this purpose. 89 With the introduction of the steam engine, the eyes of Dutch engineers turned to that massive inland sea, and plans for reclamation were made.90 Some of these plans focused on reclaiming specific areas of land

85 RWS has published various of such histories, either for their own historical records or in a popularised format for a wider audience. See, for instance, the works published by sub-directorates or their engineers: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, De Zuiderzeewerken. Het werk van een halve eeuw in een notedop (The Hague, 1967). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/de-zuiderzeewerken-het- werk-van-een-halve-eeuw-verteld-in-een-no; J. Th. Thijsse, Een halve eeuw Zuiderzeewerken, 1920-1970 (Groningen, 1972). Available online at: https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid%3A88a5bf77-ede5-4781-bf12- 30dc9548109b; Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Zestig jaar Zuiderzeewerken (Lelystad, 1979). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/zestig-jaar- zuiderzeewerken. 86 See, for instance, Stephenson, ‘Does New Land Mean New Lives ?’; Jensen, Wij tegen het water. Een eeuwenoude strijd. 87 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 370. 88 Particular difficulties were experienced by the inhabitants of the island . Their island frequently disappeared beneath the waves during bad storms. Yet they rebuilt their homes almost every time, until the Dutch government decided to evacuate the island in the late 19th century. See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 212–217. 89 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 12–13; C. Van der Wal, In praise of common sense. Planning the ordinary. A physical planning history of the new towns in the Usselmeerpolders (zp 1997) 23–27. 90 In the mid-17th century ideas were already put to paper to build dikes between the Wadden Islands in order to turn the entire inland sea into a massive polder. However, at the time this was just a fantasy. Only the access to steam engine technology allowed engineers to consider this utopia as a possible future. See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en

28 alongside the old coastline or the entire southern basin of the Zuiderzee, while others aimed to reclaim virtually all the Zuiderzee along with the Wadden Sea. Several of these plans were discussed in parliament. However, there was no effective way to compare these plans in terms of costs and benefits. As such, a deadlock was reached in the political debate on reclamation of the Zuiderzee.91 The plan that changed the game came from the hand of , a young engineer in service of the new Zuiderzee association. This association, established in 1886, was made up of prominent, often liberal Dutch citizens who together invested their personal money and political power to overcome the deadlock. 92 Within five years, Lely devised a plan for the reclamation based on sound hydrological research and the latest engineering knowledge, and also convincingly argued why his plan was superior to the plans preceding his. 93 Lely envisioned a 30-km-long dike to close the entire inland sea off from the North Sea (which later became known as the or Enclosure Dam). This would result in a large freshwater basin. Lely planned four polders on the edges of this basin, reclaiming in total more than 2200 km2 of land, likely very suitable for agricultural purposes. His plan reduced the coastline of the Netherlands dramatically by nearly 300 kilometres, which would greatly improve the flood security of the country.94 Although no other serious alternative plans were published to challenge Lely’s conception, it took nearly thirty years before these plans became a reality. Successive administrations either favoured or opposed the reclamation, and as such continuously submitted Lely’s plans for new Acts or retracted them. Even though Lely himself became minister of Water Management, Trade and Industry three times in between 1891-1918, he had difficulties passing his plans through parliament. Even though sympathy for Lely’s plans grew during this period, there was plenty of cause for political debate.95 The project would only be feasible if it was executed and financed by the Dutch state, yet that required huge investment over a long-term period. Additionally, many Zuiderzee fishermen would lose their jobs.96 There was also a lack of urgency. Farmers used improved fertiliser to increase production and severe floods had not occurred in the area since 1825. Two events during Lely’s third term as a minister (1913-1918) changed this perception. The ministry of Agriculture predicted in 1913 that the Netherlands would have insufficient available agricultural acreage in the coming decades, even with the use of fertiliser. Second, in 1916, a violent storm surge occurred, which led to at least 19 deaths when dikes burst in dozens of places surrounding the Zuiderzee. In the immediate aftermath, an Act was introduced to finally reclaim the Zuiderzee along the lines of Lely’s plans. This Act passed Parliament in 1918 with little resistance. 97

2.2 The reclamation process up until 1970 To organise the entire Zuiderzee construction effort, three exceptionally influential new governmental organisations were established in the early years of the project. First, the Zuiderzee de Zuiderzeewerken, 220–221; G.L. Cleintuar, Wisselend Getij: Geschiedenis van de Zuiderzeevereniging 1886-1949 (Zutphen 1982) 25–28. 91 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 221–228, 267–274; Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 370–371. 92 See Cleintuar, Wisselend Getij: Geschiedenis van de Zuiderzeevereniging 1886-1949, 42. 93 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 371– 374; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 232–245. 94 The plan was published between 1886 and 1891 in 8 separate technical memoranda. See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 371–374; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 232–245. 95 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 245–248, 252–260. 96 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 30; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 250–252. 97 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 267–274; Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 375–376.

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Council (Dutch: Zuiderzeeraad) was established as an independent advisory council with members that were appointed for their expertise on relevant matters. The council was in existence until 1969, when it became a sub-committee for the more encompassing Water Management Council or WMC (Dutch: Raad van de Waterstaat). Second, the Zuiderzee Project Department or ZPD (Dutch: Dienst Zuiderzeewerken) was the organisation responsible for the actual land reclamation. This organisation was also established as an independent organisation in 1919 and came under the supervision of RWS in 1935. Third, the IJsselmeerpolders Development Authority or IJDA (Dutch: Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders) was established in 1930 as the executive organisation responsible for the planning, development and management of the newly reclaimed land.98 As the progressed, the responsibilities of this last organisation expanded. The IJDA functioned as a temporary municipality, province, and water board altogether and was responsible for exploiting, planning, and building on the new land, as well as organising education and healthcare and providing public services.99 In 1918, it was generally expected that the Zuiderzee Works would be finished by 1950, but due to frequent alterations to the plans the actual construction process took until 1975, disregarding the Markerwaard debate (See Figure 2 for a map of the completed reclamation projects).100 The Zuiderzee Act envisioned a counter-clockwise order for the reclamation projects. Once the Wieringermeer polder was finished, the south-western polder (the Markerwaard) would be reclaimed, after which the southern, eastern, and north-eastern polders would follow. As time passed, however, this process was essentially reversed (see Table 2).101 Most of the alterations were made for economic reasons. Already during the construction of the Enclosure Dam, the project was postponed because of economic crises.102 Ironically, an excess of government funds, a result of to the Marshall Aid programme, allowed for the Dutch government to continue the project. In the 1950s, the available funds allowed the administration to prioritise the larger southern and eastern polders over the Markerwaard. When the Markerwaard was supposed to be continued in the 1960s, a lack of funds once again resulted in postponement. By 1975, apart from the Markerwaard the plan was largely complete, and the new province of Flevoland was established in 1986.103 It was a remarkable feat of Dutch hydro-engineering, even though many Dutch people have grown used to this artificial province and tend to downplay its importance in comparison to for instance the .104 The reclaimed polders would play host to a new type of society, planned by experts and researchers. These experts agreed that intensive research would be constitutive of this blueprint,

98 The English terms ‘Zuiderzee Project Department’ and ‘IJsselmeerpolders Development Authority’, as translations of the Dutch names, were coined by Van der Wal. See Van der Wal, In praise of common sense. Planning the ordinary. A physical planning history of the new towns in the Usselmeerpolders, 13. 99 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 376– 377, 390–392; Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 266–267; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 274–277. 100 Figure 2: Adapted from: Io Herodotus (Wikipedia handle), Wikimedia commons. Available online at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31335976. 101 The information presented in Table 2 is based on the following sources: Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 311–313; Bosch and Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 172–173; Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 377–378. 102 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 278. 103 Although it is beyond the scope of my thesis, focussing on the remarkability of the non-recreation of the Markerwaard may be the wrong way of seeing things: perhaps it is remarkable that all the other polders were in fact reclaimed, and that the entire Zuiderzee reclamation project continued virtually uninterrupted for over 8 decades in spite of crises and war. See, for instance, Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 393; Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 177–179. 104 See Stephenson, ‘Does New Land Mean New Lives ?’, 23.

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Table 2: an overview of the Zuiderzee reclamation project

Project Construction period Size/length Purpose/Spatial Composition as of 2020 Enclosure Dam 1919-1924; 32 km Purpose: To separate the Zuiderzee from the Wadden Sea and North Sea

(Amsteldiepdijk) 1927-1932 Amsteldiepdijk: 2.5 km and create a freshwater basin (the IJssel lake). Proefpolder Andijk 1926-1927 0.4 km2 Agricultural; meant to research most efficient ways for agricultural production Wieringermeer 1927-1930 200 km2 Agrarian-only focus.

No major cities. Large villages: & Middenmeer.

Inhabitants (2011): 12.570 (63 per km2) Noordoostpolder 1936-1942 480 km2 Agrarian focus, but more attention to urban planning.

Major city: , located at the core of a ring of smaller villages.

Inhabitants (2011): 46.253 (96 per km2) Eastern Flevoland 1950-1957 540 km2 Largely agrarian, partially urban area. Also space for recreation along the edge lakes.

Major city: Lelystad (planned on central spot between northern, eastern, southern and south-western reclamation)

Inhabitants (2007): 110.270 (204 per km2) Southern Flevoland 1959-1967 430 km2 50% agrarian. Space for recreation along edge lakes and in the south-east. Major nature reserve (Oostvaardersplassen).

Major city: Almere.

Inhabitants (2007): 200.808 (467 per km2) Houtribdijk 1959-1975 27 km Purpose: At first, was meant to become the northern edge of the Markerwaard polder. Later separated the Marker lake from the IJssel lake. and that scientific innovation and knowledge would be incorporated to the utmost extent in the new society. In this spirit, a ‘pilot polder’ was reclaimed near the town of Andijk to research efficient agrarian production. New knowledge was subsequently incorporated in the plans for the Wieringermeerpolder, which was an experimental space for the next polder, and so on.105 As time passed, this process became more complex as an increasing number of experts became involved: hydraulic engineers, city planners, architects, ecologists, social scientists, and environmental scientists.106 They all aimed to create a new society on this new land, but had strongly differing views on what this should look like.107 The reclamation effort saw a rise and then a fall of government influence on the project. Although many lake reclamations in the 19th century had been private efforts, due to its size and risk the Zuiderzee project was only deemed possible if it were government-led and funded. As such, the ZPD and IJDA enjoyed unparalleled power and influence in this experimental space, especially during the pre-war reclamation efforts.108 After the war, this changed. New insights on national spatial planning for the Netherlands affected the polders, making them no longer a goal in themselves, but

105 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 304–305, 329–330. 106 See Van der Wal, In praise of common sense. Planning the ordinary. A physical planning history of the new towns in the Usselmeerpolders, 35–37, 63–66. 107 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 305–306. 108 See Liesbeth Van De Grift, ‘On new land a new society: Internal colonisation in the Netherlands, 1918-1940’, Contemporary European History 22 (2013) 609–626.

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an instrument in the larger spatial planning design of the Netherlands.109 Simultaneously, various actors in society became involved in the process, presenting alternative desirable futures for the polders. This drove a wedge between the IJDA, which adhered to a traditional, agriculturally focussed plan for the polders, and the ZPD, which favoured a more integral approach.110 These changes will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Wadden Sea Reclaimed land Old land

Enclosure Dam Fresh water (1932) Sea water

Wieringermeer (1930) IJssel lake

Pilot polder Andijk (1927) Noordoostpolder (1942)

Houtribdijk (1975)

Marker lake

Eastern Flevoland (1957)

Southern Flevoland (1967)

Figure 2: a map of the Zuiderzee reclamation works. The Markerwaard was supposed to be constructed in what today is the Marker Lake.

109 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 227, 260. 110 Ibid., 141, 175; Bosch and Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 198–199.

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2.3 The imaginary on land reclamation In this final section, I will apply the framework presented in the previous chapter to analyse the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation. It is important to note from the outset that there was no static imaginary on the reclamation process during this period, as it continuously evolved. In this section, I will highlight some important elements and changes of the imaginary that not only were important during the pre-1970 period, but also affected the post-1970s imaginaries.

Desirable future The desirability of the Zuiderzee reclamation always had two sides. First, there was a terrifying monster to be kept at bay: the sea, or rather, the damage that floods could cause. All 19th century reclamation plans, including Lely’s, focused on keeping the country habitable by not just increasing the amount of arable land, but fighting the sea. 111 The Dutch had given this seaborn enemy the zoomorphic nickname ‘waterwolf’, perceiving this threat as a dangerous natural predator.112 Lely’s plan reduced the Dutch coastline by nearly 300 km, which would greatly improve the flood security of the country. Additionally, the new IJssel lake freshwater basin would help to combat salinization of in the surrounding areas, which in turn would be a boon for agricultural production.113 Second, the new polders provided a chance to build a new ideal society. In contrast to earlier reclamation projects, such as the Anna Palownapolder and Haarlemmermeerpolder which became socially and economically impoverished, the Dutch government was to be actively involved in populating the new polders.114 In 1936, social scientist Henri ter Veen proposed to actively plan the new society in the Wieringermeerpolder. The approach had a social-darwinistic tendency. Farmers would be selected based on characteristics such as inventiveness, farming expertise and abilities as an agrarian manager, but also their industrious and diligent character.115 Their wives were trained to be good housewives. Even churches set up their own settlement bureaus. While these provided advice to members from their community who wanted to move to the new polder, it allowed churches to vet people so only the role-model Christians would move.116 However, it became clear that given the rapid speed of economic changes, even the most up-to-date scientific methods had difficulties in properly predicting human behaviour in these ideal societies. For instance, the new settlers used a car far more frequently than expected. This affected their mobility, which in turn overthrew all spatial planning models: the farmers were willing to drive larger distances to go shopping, which had consequences for nearby towns. Similarly, increased mechanisation decreased the need for labourers on farms, which in turn affected the amount of families that could work on a farm. It turned out that the future was more difficult to predict and society was less engineerable than expected.117

111 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 8–13, 369. 112 See Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Beschouwingen omtrent de functies en de begrenzing van de Markerwaard (studie-nota, december 1971) (Lelystad, 1971), 1. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-omtrent-de-functies-en-de-begrenzing- van-de-marker. 113 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 371– 374; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 232–245. 114 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 305–306. 115 Ibid., 330–338; Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 103–104; Van De Grift, ‘On new land a new society: Internal colonisation in the Netherlands, 1918-1940’, 617–618. 116 See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 132–133. 117 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 313–329, 340–345.

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The spatial composition of a desirable new land A parameter that constantly changed throughout the reclamation process was the spatial composition, the preferred division of the available space, of the new polders (see the last column of Table 2).118 This composition roughly reflects what an ideal society would and should look like. For the purposes of analysis, the spatial functions can be roughly divided in three categories: agriculture, urban areas, and recreation areas.

Agriculture. From the outset, it was expected that the reclaimed land would become fully agrarian. This served two purposes: to produce agricultural goods as efficiently as possible, and to allow for the resettlement of farmers from other locations in the Netherlands if they had to move because of urbanisation. Importantly, there was an inherent tension in these plans. To attain the goal of efficient farming, farms needed modern machinery that could process large plots of land. To attain the goal of resettlement, however, the new land would need to be divided in smaller plots, so many families could be given a new home. This required a fine balance, pivoting around the size of a farm plot, which therefore changed for each subsequent polder.119 Regardless, an agrarian society similar to existing rural areas in Utrecht, Groningen and was envisioned. To realise this, efficient arable plots and high-quality water management were important, which required straight canals and roads and thus determined the shape and layout of the polder. Each farm would host a family and required services such as schools, shops, churches, and postal offices. As such, it was projected that the new polders would have 200.000 inhabitants, divided amongst 40 villages.120 This agrarian emphasis, however, was strongly affected by changing priorities in the Netherlands during the 20th century, particularly the importance of urban development and space for nature and recreation.

Urban development. Unexpected mobility changes and nation-wide population growth influenced the planners of the IJDA to reconsider the city planning of new polders. The planners were at first strongly influenced by the German geographer Christaller’s new central-place theory, in which the largest cities (cores) with most services would be centrally located, while the smaller village-cores with less services would be located in a ring around this central core. The distance between the cores was based on labour relations and mobility possibilities. 121 This theoretically perfect spatial order was less well received than expected. To some, it became a calculated and perhaps even cold, over- structured society – a dystopian society (interacts with aesthetics, but also with ideal society).122 After 1950, the spatial composition in the polders was more strongly affected by nation-wide worries about population growth and regionally unbalanced economic development. Especially the west of the Netherlands, the Randstad region, expanded swiftly and it was feared this area would become one massive suburban sprawl.123 To combat this, a government committee recommended to keep a large area at the heart the Randstad free from urbanisation (the Green Heart). Specific other areas,

118 ‘Spatial composition’ refers to the Dutch concepts ruimtelijke bestemming or ruimtelijke inrichting. These words are hard to translate directly to English, since they originate in the Dutch scientific profession of planologie. 119 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 389– 390. 120 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 305–306. 121 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 390– 392; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 338–340. 122 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 141. 123 The Randstad is the megalopolis in the central-western Netherlands. Instead of being one large urban sprawl, it is a ring of cities, including the four largest Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). This ring surrounds an agricultural area that has been called the Green Heart of the Netherlands.

34 including the southern Zuiderzee polders, would be designated as overflow areas. This notion became a cornerstone of national spatial planning. To prevent small cities popping up everywhere, a new strategy of ‘bundled deconcentration’ was introduced in 1966. Population efforts were focused on a few medium-sized cities, including Lelystad and Almere in the Zuiderzee polders.124 Even though the IJDA and ZPD were still in charge of the reclamation process, it became clear during that the creation of the polders was no longer a goal in itself, but an instrument in the larger spatial planning design of the Netherlands.

Nature & Recreation. Nature conservationists worried about the effects of the new polders and were unexpectedly joined by city planners who lobbied for more recreation areas. Nature conservationists were involved from the outset. In several columns in De Amsterdammer in 1914 and 1915, well- known nature conservationist Jac P. Thijsse worried about the straight and tangential design of the new polders, so boring in his opinion. Even though they were impressive, real natural beauty was scarce to be found.125 Independently, the Dutch nature conservation organisation Natuurmonumenten actively lobbied to conserve particularly special areas on the old coastline of the Zuiderzee (IJdoorn and the Oudemirdumer Klif).126 At first, however, these efforts only led to minor aesthetic changes in the built infrastructure.127 However, in 1942 Natuurmonumenten joined hands with the Royal Dutch Touring Club to publish an alternative plan for the south-western polder, which at the time was to be reclaimed next. Since that polder was to be located to close to Amsterdam, the organisations argued that this polder should not become an agrarian-only area, but rather answer to the desperate needs of the city: recreational space and perhaps expanded room for urbanisation.128 Their lobby was particularly effective. Polders reclaimed since saw much more nature areas on their territories. Additionally, they were created with so-called edge lakes on the inland side. Although this primarily had a geohydrological purpose, it boosted water-recreation as well.129

Target community The Dutch elite perceived the reclamation of the Zuiderzee as a nationalistic prestige project, but the broader Dutch population at first did not share that sentiment. The Dutch elite felt the need to prove their country on the international stage. Since they did not participate in the First World War and could not prove their merits through warfare, they had to create their own opportunities. Additionally, the construction project would modernise an important part of the Netherlands. The 1918 parliamentary debates on the Zuiderzee Reclamation Act were therefore remarkably consensus-focused probably due to this sentiment. Politically attacking the Zuiderzee project was

124 See Eric Koomen and Frank Bruinsma, Ruimtelijke ordening in Nederland (Amsterdam 2018), Amsterdam; Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 177–179; Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 390–392; Van der Wal, In praise of common sense. Planning the ordinary. A physical planning history of the new towns in the Usselmeerpolders, 43–45. 125 For the first column, see Jac. P. Thijsse, ‘De droogmaking van de Zuiderzee’, De Amsterdammer, February 14st 1915. Available online at http://historisch.groene.nl/nummer/1915-02-14; for the second column, see Jac P. Thijsse, ‘De Drooglegging van de Zuiderzee II’, February 21st 1915. Available online at http://historisch.groene.nl/nummer/1915-02- 21. 126 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 362; Van der Wal, In praise of common sense. Planning the ordinary. A physical planning history of the new towns in the Usselmeerpolders, 41. 127 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 305–309. 128 See Bosch and Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 198–199; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 351–354. 129 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 390– 392; Bosch and Van der Ham, Twee Eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat, 172–173.

35 perceived as similar to attacking the nation itself.130Among the broader Dutch population, however, the reclamation project at first did not inspire many. Almost nobody in the Netherlands responded to an appeal wave the Dutch flag to celebrate the passing of the Reclamation Act.131 The Zuiderzeevereniging missed various opportunities to publish propaganda and awaken a sense of nationalism among the Dutch population. At times, it seemed as if foreigners were more up-to-date and enthusiastic about the new Dutch piece of water engineering, than the average Dutch person.132 The ZPD and IJDA successfully challenged this lack of nationalism during the first decades of the reclamation process. Both organisations published quarterly newsletters for the entirety of the project, which were often used by the national press to write reports.133 Once good progress was made on the Enclosure Dam, luxurious brochures were published with various aerial pictures and clear maps, as well as picture albums and even stamps, to show off the project.134 The Dutch press took many pictures to display progress. This fit in a broader strand of scientific nationalism, in which the modern, technological achievements were used to appeal to a nationalist sentiment.135 The pictures conveyed a message of modernism: a step was made into the future, and with it, a chapter of the past, of traditional life, was closed.136 Most successful, however, were probably the various movies that were made on the Zuiderzee projects. The first were commissioned by the ZPD and IJDA, but others were made independently. This resulted in a true Zuiderzee-cinema in the Netherlands.137 Finished projects, such as the completion of dikes, were celebrated as small victories (see Figure 3).138

130 See Marnix Beyen, ‘Een gezond oorlogskind. Parlementaire discussies over de afsluiting en de drooglegging van de Zuiderzee, 1918’, in: Getemd maar Rusteloos. De Zuiderzee verbeeld - een multidisciplinair onderzoek (zp 2008) 73–90, at 73–75, 77–80, 86–88. 131 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 267–274. 132 See Van de Ven, Man-made Lowlands: History of Water Management and Land Reclamation in the Netherlands, 369; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 217. 133 The ZPD published a technical quarterly update on the construction progress. The IJDA later published a newsletter called Flevoberichten. See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 287–291. 134 See, for the Dutch version, Hendrik Wortman, De afsluiting en gedeeltelijke droogmaking van der Zuiderzee (Amsterdam, 1929). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/de-afsluiting-en-gedeeltelijke-droogmaking-van-de-zuiderzee-i 135 See Remco Ensel, ‘De Afsluiting in de fotografie. Techniek in de beeldcultuur van het interbellum’, in: Getemd maar Rusteloos. De Zuiderzee verbeeld - een multidisciplinair onderzoek (zp 2008) 25–50, at 28–31. 136 The closure of the Enclosure Dam symbolised unrelenting progress: once the dike was complete, there was no way back. Photography and cultural analysis in the early 1930s tended to combine a focus on modernity and progress with a focus on tradition and the life bygone, life as it once was in villages adjacent to the Zuiderzee. See Barbara Henkes, ‘‘Een volk dat leeft, bouwt aan zijn toekomst’. Teloorgang en versterking van een Nederlandse volkscultuur rond de Zuiderzee’, in: Getemd maar Rusteloos. De Zuiderzee verbeeld - een multidisciplinair onderzoek (zp 2008) 91–114, at 106–108; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 298–300; Beyen, ‘Een gezond oorlogskind. Parlementaire discussies over de afsluiting en de drooglegging van de Zuiderzee, 1918’, 84–85. 137 The first of these movies were made by famous cineaste Willy Mullens, commissioned by the ZPD, and used by RWS to portray progress abroad. Then, in his Zuiderzeefilm (1928) folklorist Jan van der Ven tried to capture the old, authentic Netherlands in fishing villages on the coastline of the Zuiderzee. Joris Ivens’ Wij Bouwen (1930) and Nieuwe Gronden (1933) portrayed the perspective of the labourers who worked on the Enclosure Dam. In feature films such as Terra Nova (1932) and Dood Water (1934) the reclamation process itself was not central but provided the setting for the plot. Opponents of the Zuiderzee reclamation, in particular Eibert den Herder, also made films to argue their case. Den Herder’s Nieuwe Zuiderzee-film (1930), a direct response to Van der Ven’s 1928 film, was meant to halt the progress of the Enclosure Dam before it was finished. By no means did this film-making tradition stop after the 1930s. Bert Haanstra made En de zee was niet meer (1956), documenting the quick changes in traditional culture of people who lived around the now partially reclaimed inland sea. Additionally, films were used by both opponents and proponents of the Markerwaard to argue their case during the 1970s and 1980s. See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 320–341; Henkes, ‘‘Een volk dat leeft, bouwt aan zijn toekomst’. Teloorgang en versterking van een Nederlandse volkscultuur rond de Zuiderzee’, 106–108. 138 Whenever a Zuiderzee dike or dam was finished, it would be celebrated as a national achievement. This was the case for the Enclosure Dam, but also for, as the picture shows, the closure of the dam near in 1957. This was

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Figure 3: The completion of the Markerwaard dike, 1957. While a large crowd watches, the majors of Marken and the adjacent municipality of Broek in place the Dutch flag in the last patch of clay of the new dike. Story-lines The Zuiderzee reclamation was often understood as a war-like situation. This idea was fostered during the Dutch neutrality in the First World War, when as discussed above the project was presented as a peaceful way to annex land, in contrast to the bloodshed that raged through Europe. The sea was recast as a fiend in this story-line, and the Dutch set out to defeat this enemy once and for all.139 The story-line was not new, however: various plans in the late 19th century also portrayed the reclamation as an effort that would bring the Dutch to the same admirable level as the Prussian, French and Greek annexations. 140 As such, it was not just a prestige project, but also a way for the Netherlands to be a model country, showing how land reclamation was to be preferred above warfare. A 1918 cartoon in the newspaper De Amsterdammer illustrates this beautifully (see Figure 4).141 The reclamation-warfare story-line lasted for a long time, and was for instance still perceivable in 1950s tourist advertisements (see Figure 5).142

supposedly the first element of the Markerwaard reclamation. Figure 3: Harry Pot, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/a96c7f44-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. 139 See Beyen, ‘Een gezond oorlogskind. Parlementaire discussies over de afsluiting en de drooglegging van de Zuiderzee, 1918’, 80–84; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 267–274; Tom Sintobin, ed., Getemd maar Rusteloos. De Zuiderzee verbeeld - een multidisciplinair onderzoek (zp 2008) 14–16. 140 This was Beijerinck’s 1886 plan. See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 223–227. 141 Figure 4: See the cartoon by Johan Braakensiek, ‘Nederlands Annexionisme “Verover mij dat land!”’, De Amsterdammer, February 16th 1918. Available online at http://historisch.groene.nl/nummer/1918-02-16. 142 Figure 5: This advertisement was placed by the Verenigde Toeristenbedrijven . Ironically, this is the company originally founded by anti-reclamation activist Eibert den Herder. The advertisement was placed in the

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Figure 4: The reclamation of the Zuiderzee, Dutch annexionism. Cartoon published in De Amsterdammer, February 16th 1918.

Closure The reclamation of the Zuiderzee polders were, as time passed, more strongly presented as inevitable. The reclamation process was normalized, not just because of the powerful governmental institutions that were involved, but also because the plans were presented as an accomplished fact.143 The polders were closure to a variety of societal problems, more so as the project progressed. Various maps of the Netherlands presented the reclamation process – including Markerwaard – as a done deal, which were visual representations of this closure.144

Temporality A key element of the imaginary on reclamation was the historical perception of righteousness. It was considered to be historically right to reclaim the Zuiderzee, because the entire area used to be land many centuries ago. As such, the reclamation was an effort to correct this historical mistake. This idea was already present in one of the first 19th-century plans for reclaiming the Markerwaard.145 It

Arnhemsche Courant, Trouw, De Telegraaf and Het Parool in the summer months of 1957, 1958 and 1959. For the photo, see Verenigde Toeristenbedrijven Harderwijk, ‘Een heerlijke vacantiedag in LELYSTAD en HARDERWIJK!’, Arnhemse Courant, 12 juli 1957. 143 See Stephenson, ‘Does New Land Mean New Lives ?’, 25. 144 See Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Inpolderingsplannen Zuiderzee en varianten Markerwaard: van 1667 tot heden (Lelystad, 1972). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/inpolderingsplannen-zuiderzee-en-varianten-markerwaard-van-1667. 145 The Dutch engineer Van Diggelen, for instance, argued in his 1849 reclamation plan that the Zuiderzee had been taken violently from the Dutch by the sea, and had to be taken back again. See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 221–222.

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was used in formal policy documents and in popularised brochures and resulted into a powerful appeal to the inevitability of reclamation.146

Figure 5: A late 1950s advertisement for a boat-trip on the IJssel lake, inviting tourists to come see the ‘battle for the Markerwaard’

146 See, for instance, J. Th. Thijsse, Een halve eeuw Zuiderzeewerken, 1920-1970 (Groningen, 1972), 5-7. Available online at: https://repository.tudelft.nl/islandora/object/uuid%3A88a5bf77-ede5-4781-bf12-30dc9548109b; or Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Zestig jaar Zuiderzeewerken (Lelystad, 1979), 12-15. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/zestig-jaar-zuiderzeewerken.

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Signifiers and their signified A powerful signifier of the reclamation imaginary was the Old land/New land dialectic. The land that would be reclaimed was quickly signified as “new” land and contrasted to the older, existing land. This did not just refer to the younger age of the reclaimed area, but also echoed the desire to create an ideal society on this new land, modern instead of traditional – things that were more difficult on the old land. Most clearly, the signifier was expressed by the previously discussed sociologist Henry ter Veen, who discussed the reclamation plans in an article titled ‘On new land, a new society’.147 The new land/new society was intimately linked with the ideal of an engineerable society throughout the early 20th century.148

Hegemony and resistance Generally speaking, this imaginary was hegemonic, and led to remarkably little resistance. In fact, during the pre-1970 period, there was only one vocal opponent of the Zuiderzee reclamation: Eibert den Herder, a fishing industrialist from Harderwijk.149 Den Herder saw himself as a spokesmen for the plight of the Zuiderzee fishing-industry. However, he was also worried about the potentially disastrous consequences of the reclamation project. In various brochures and a movie, Den Herder argued that the project was a financial disaster for the fisherman and death for the herring in the Zuiderzee and North Sea. Moreover, he argued the reclamation would leave a puddle of polluted water in the middle of the country, the dikes of which were prone to burst during any major storm.150 In the 1930s Den Herder found a national ally in the catholic newspaper De Tijd, which dedicated several full-page articles to his concerns.151 The Zuiderzeevereniging launched a counter-propaganda campaign, which led to a brief moment of national fame for Den Herder. He tried to use the momentum to become involved in national politics with an anti-reclamation party but failed. Later in life, Den Herder was compared by critics to the Greek mythological figure of Cassandra, who predicted the fall of Troy, but was ignored by everyone.152

147 See Henri Nicolaas ter Veen, ‘Op nieuw land een nieuwe maatschappij: het Zuiderzeeprobleem’, Mensch en Maatschappij 6 (1930) 313–329. 148 See, for instance, H. Pruntel / Nieuw Land, ‘Maakbare Samenleving’, Canon van Flevoland (2009). Available online at: https://www.canonvannederland.nl/nl/flevoland/flevoland/maakbare-samenleving. 149 Arguably, Jef Last’s Zuiderzee novel (1932) can also be mentioned here, but in contrast to Last, Den Herder’s anti- reclamation campaign continued for a long period of time. See Sintobin, Getemd maar Rusteloos. De Zuiderzee verbeeld - een multidisciplinair onderzoek, 16–21. 150 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 291–298. 151 See Fred Thomas, ‘Waar de golfslag klinkt als een verwijt. Het droogleggingsdrama der Zuiderzee’, De Tijd, January 12th 1930. Also see Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 146–147. 152 See Ibid., 370–373, 393–393.

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Chapter 3: David and Goliath

‘Now that we have been able to tear the Markerwaard decision away from the Rijkswaterstaat-only territory, our first battle as David versus that powerful Goliath has been won!’153

153 Marten Bierman, president of the APIJL. Citation translated from an interview in Trouw, see Haro Hielkema, ‘Inpoldering Markeraard is nu zaak van planologie’, Trouw, October 1st 1974.

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This chapter will focus on the first stages of the nation-wide Markerwaard debate in 1973-1974. I will discuss two documents that were expressed competing socio-technical imaginaries during this period. In the first section, after briefly recapping why the Markerwaard was not reclaimed before 1970 and what infrastructural works on the polder-to-be had been performed in the meanwhile, I will show how the late 1960s societal debate on the future of Schiphol Airport kickstarted the Markerwaard debate. Quickly, however, the Markerwaard debate moved beyond the airport realm. It turned out that, surprisingly, the Dutch government was divided on the Markerwaard: some municipalities, provinces, and ministries opposed the Markerwaard, while other ministries and organisations such as the IJDA and ZPD were in favour. In the meanwhile, a powerful protest group was established that opposed the Markerwaard: the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake or APIJL (in Dutch: Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer). I end the first section by discussing how the Dutch administration decided to postpone the Markerwaard decision through considering it as a Spatial Core Decision. This implied a major public participation procedure had to be organised. This procedure, which took place in 1980-1982, is the subject of the next chapter. In the second and third sections of this chapter, I discuss two alternatives plans for the Markerwaard that were produced by the ZPD (1972) and the APIJL (1974). These were exemplary for two different socio-technical imaginaries. The ZPD plan, Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard, naturalized the Zuiderzee reclamation history, making it a matter when to reclaim the Markerwaard and not whether to do so at all. Rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad was presented as a monster to be kept at bay, and the reclamation was the only solution. Importantly, in the document the ZPD presented itself as the only viable expert on the reclamation process, not taking societal input seriously. In contrast, I consider the alternative Plan Waterlely published by the APIJL in 1974. This plan was unexpectedly well received by the Dutch press in general. One of the few similarities with Reconsiderations was its perception of the rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad as a major societal problem. However, Plan Waterlely diverged by presenting an alternative desirable future which involved major spatial planning changes for the entire Netherlands. The plan was not just an alternative to reclaiming the Markerwaard, but it presented a different understanding the spatial problems of the country.

3.1: Narrative of events (1970-1976) The Markerwaard in 1975 – a polder-silhouette Of all the Zuiderzee polders, the Markerwaard has been postponed most frequently. Lely’s original plans featured an anti-clockwise sequence of reclamations. Once the Enclosure Dam and the Wieringermeerpolder would have been realised, the south-western polder (the Markerwaard) was to be reclaimed next. It was the smallest planned polder and therefore deemed most easy to reclaim. However, three moments in history can be distinguished when priority was given to a different Zuiderzee polder, and as a result the Markerwaard was to be reclaimed last. First, once the Wieringermeerpolder was finished in the 1930s, the Dutch government decided to prioritise the Noordoostpolder, since it had the largest area of potential arable land which would aid in ensuring the food supply. While the end of the Second World War resulted in a brief pause in the general reclamation process, the construction efforts continued in the 1950s partially due to the post-war Marshall Aid. These improved financial means allowed the contemporary administration to prioritise the largest and more expensive polder, eastern Flevoland, instead of the Markerwaard. The third postponement occurred as a long-term consequence of the 1953 flood disaster. To prevent such as disaster from occurring again, the Dutch government initiated a second major infrastructural project that would dwarf the Zuiderzeewerken: the Delta Works, to protect the Rhine-Meuse delta near Zeeland. Expertise, focus, and funding were partially diverted from the Zuiderzee project. As a result,

42 the original simultaneous construction of the remaining polders was discontinued, and the south- eastern polder was prioritised.154 Consequently, in the early 1970s, half of the dikes and dams that were necessary for the reclamation of the Markerwaard were already put in place.155 The construction efforts in the early 1940s resulted in a 13-km-long dike and adjacent canal on the eastern side of the Markerwaard. This Oostvaardersdijk originally was planned as become the external dike of the Markerwaard, but was flipped during the late 1950s and re-used as the external dike of the western side of Flevoland. In 1958, a dike was finished connecting the island of Marken and the mainland of Noord-, which was supposed to be the first segment of the south-western dike of the Markerwaard. Incidentally, the completion of this dike resulted in the south-western polder becoming known as the Markerwaard. Last, in 1959 the process of building sluices at Enkhuizen and Lelystad and a 26 km long dike to connect them was initiated. This Houtribdijk would become the northern-most boundary of the Markerwaard. It took a considerably long time to finish this project: the dike and road were only opened in 1976, twenty years after construction had started (see Figure 6).156 Given this construction progress on the Markerwaard over nearly four decades, it is perhaps not strange at all that in 1972 nearly 25% of the Dutch population assumed the Markerwaard had already been reclaimed.157 The Markerwaard did not have a unilateral planned spatial function. Instead, its spatial composition was to be diverse and serve a variety of needs of the Netherlands. This contrasts the strictly agrarian purpose of the earlier Wieringermeerpolder and Noordoostpolder, but it is in line with the continuously changing ideas on the composition of the Zuiderzee polders, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the subsequent decades, the goal of the reclamation of the Markerwaard changed. No longer would it have to increase the availability of arable land. Instead, the growing population of the Netherlands was expected to require more land in general for a variety of purposes, which could be created with the reclamation of the Markerwaard. The change can clearly be seen in official plans for the polder, such as a 1961 memorandum published by the ZPD. In it, it is argued that reclaiming the Markerwaard also results in the availability of more urban and recreational space as well as improved infrastructure for the growing population in the northern provinces. Most importantly, the memorandum states that the Markerwaard contributes to the ‘harmonic’ (spatial) development of the entire country. 158 As such, the needs of the Netherlands strongly influenced the STI that was dominant in relevant organisations, such as the ZPD and the IJDA. I will turn to this imaginary in the next section of this chapter.

154 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 105, 177, 266–267; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 363– 364. 155 See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 351–354. 156 Figure 6: Dick Coersen (ANP), Nationaal Archief / Collectie Spaarnestad 157 This was surveyed by TNS NIPO research and discussed in several newspapers. See, for instance, Haro Hielkema, ‘Beheersplan voor IJsselmeer nodig’, Trouw, June 20th 1980. 158 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Een structuurplan voor de Zuidelijke IJsselmeerpolders (1961), 7. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/een-structuurplan-voor-de-zuidelijke-ijsselmeerpolders-1.

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Figure 6: While airplanes fly across carrying banners with slogans against the reclamation, the last hole in the Enkhuizen-Lelystad dam is closed in the presence of minister Westerterp (V&W) (September 4, 1975)

Kickstarting the Markerwaard debate The catalyst for the societal debate on the Markerwaard can be found among the growing concern on the noise pollution of Schiphol Airport in the late 1960s. In the late 1960s, projections were made which indicated that the Dutch national airport Schiphol would reach full capacity in 1980-1985, and that a second airport was necessary soon thereafter to accommodate the increasing number of passengers. An alternative solution was to build a fifth airstrip at Schiphol. This latter plan worried people living close to Schiphol, who suffered from the noise pollution of the airport. Several action groups were formed in 1969 and 1970, which organised a variety of demonstrations and published their own reports on the issue. A formal government committee was assigned to investigate. Its report concluded that a second national airport would be the best solution, and the Markerwaard was labelled as the best location for this airport.159 Subsequently, protest groups spawned opposed the second national airport in the Markerwaard. In a similar manner, they organised demonstrations and published counter-reports.160 The floodgates for the societal Markerwaard debate were opened when during the same period a group of spatial planners from Utrecht University published an alternative plan for the

159 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 170–172. 160 Most protest groups used nonviolent tactics, yet others claimed they were not afraid to use violence – drawing comparisons to the similar situation in Japan where protesters had violently demonstrated against the Sanrizuka airport a few years before. Even so, members of parliament realised that building a new airport would only transfer the problem to other villages. See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Kamerleden tegen groter Schiphol. Nieuw vliegveld afwachten, De Volkskrant, March 11th 1972; Unknown author, ‘Geluidsoverlast voor bewoners van Waterland na aanleg vliegveld’, Het Parool, March 11th 1972; Unknown author, ‘“Markerwaard van de kaart” ontsteld over druk op Tweede Kamer’, De Tijd, March 14th 1972.

44 spatial composition of the Markerwaard polder. This challenged the authority of the ZPD and the IJDA as the only experts involved in planning for the Markerwaard. The plan was published in the journal of the Dutch Association for Wasteland Redevelopment in February 1971.161 National newspapers a few articles on this alternative for the Markerwaard. The ZPD felt sufficiently challenged by this plan so as to deal with it in detail in its 1972 report Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard, which will be discussed in more detail below. Regardless, this alternative to the Markerwaard spatial composition and the protest groups opposing the airport opened the floodgates for the Markerwaard debate. During the parliamentary budget debates for 1972, several political parties in parliament argued that the best location for the second airport needed to be reconsidered. Additionally, some discussed the justification of the Markerwaard reclamation altogether.162 Different local governments had taken an interest in the Markerwaard, and they frequently opposed each other. As early as March 1971, councils from small municipalities adjacent to the potential polder discussed the Markerwaard. Landscape Quality Committees from these municipalities were likely inspired by the plans presented in the Heidemaatschappij journal. Municipal councils and majors decided to openly question the wisdom of reclaiming the Markerwaard. 163 The council of even send a formal message to the minister, asking him to cancel the reclamation project altogether.164 However, the province of Noord-Holland itself was very much in favour of the reclamation project. The province was home to both the city of Amsterdam as well as Schiphol airport, and saw opportunities for urban expansion and a new airport in the Markerwaard.165 The national government was also divided on the issue. On the one hand, the ZPD and the IJDA – powerful actors within the Ministry of TWM – were still very much in favour of reclaiming the Markerwaard, as can be expected from organisations strongly involved with the Zuiderzee project. The ZPD in particular felt it risked losing its reason for existence if the Markerwaard was not reclaimed. The IJDA also feared for its existence under the same circumstances. Sooner or later, this organisation would run out of tasks, especially once administrative functions were transitioned to newly established municipalities. Budget cuts that hit both the ZPD and the IJDA due to the 1974- 1975 and 1980-1982 crises only increased these tensions and therefore the perseverance of these organisations in reclaiming the Markerwaard.166 On the other hand, from 1971 onward various incumbent administrations openly doubted the merits of continuing the Markerwaard project. This confirmed the concerns and wariness of the ZPD and the IJDA. The Markerwaard issue was first mentioned in the 1971 election campaign of D’66, the earliest political party to oppose the reclamation project.167 After the elections, a new Dutch

161 See Borgstein, B., T. Miltenburg, and W. Van der Sluis. ‘Perspectief op de Markerwaard’, Tijdschrift der Koninklijke Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij, 2 (1971), 51-54. Can be found online at https://www.erfgoed-knhm- arcadis.nl/documentatie+nieuw/online/default.aspx 162 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 173–174. 163 See Jan van Hoof, ‘IJsselmeerkust vreest aanleg Markerwaard’, De Tijd, March 6th 1971. 164 See Jaap Van der Zwaag, Nederland is bijna klaar. Een kritische beschouwing over de Zuiderzeewerken (Edam, 1977). 165 See Unknown author, ‘GS willen snel beslissing over tweede luchthaven. Vijfde baan Schiphol ontlast Zwanenburg. Unieke mogelijkheden in Markerwaard’, De Tijd, March 13th 1971. 166 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 266–271. 167 D’66 was the only party to mention the Markerwaard in its election programme; none of the other parties considered it to be an issue. See D’66, Beleidsplan D’66. Regeringsbeleid voor de jaren 1971-1975 (Busseum, 1971), 57. Available online: http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/203/7/D66%20Beleidsplan%201971-1975.pdf. Then, in the 1972 elections, the Markerwaard was again opposed by D’66, but this time cooperatively together with the PvdA and PPR. Both parties have since opposed the reclamation effort. No other parties discussed the Markerwaard in their 1972 election programmes.

45 administration was formed lead by prime minister Barend Biesheuvel. This Biesheuvel administration was the first to actively engage with environmental problems. Willem Drees Jr., minister of TWM, quickly became famous for breaking conventions and generally disregarding previous governmental styles in his ministry.168 His style – which earned his ministry the dubious nickname of a one-man- department – had consequences for the Markerwaard. Drees openly questioned the economic justification of the Markerwaard reclamation. During the subsequent decades, his successors continued to express doubts about the project, none of the committing to the Markerwaard as their pre-1970 predecessors had committed to the Zuiderzee project in general. As a consequence of these divisions, as well as the protests surrounding the second national airport, minister Drees issued a formal call for advice on the Markerwaard in late 1971. By that time, the administration had already stated that ‘various’ solutions were possible the Markerwaard. Even so, the Markerwaard project was not abandoned altogether: the administration still increased the 200-million-guilder budget targeted to improve the connections and mobility between the Randstad and southern Flevoland, used to complete the Houtribdijk.169 Drees called upon the Water Management Council (WMC), the highest advisory council on water management affairs, to provide a formal advice on the Markerwaard project. In order to prepare this advice, both the ZPD and the IJDA were tasked with writing reports in which they discussed several variants for the Markerwaard. The ZPD presented its report, Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard (Beschouwingen van de Markerwaard) in October 1972. The IJDA published Explorations of the Markerwaard (Verkenningen van de Markerwaard) in 1975.

Opposition, indecision, and delay The most influential early protest group that opposed the Markerwaard was the Markerwaard off the Map Association (Dutch: Stichting Markerwaard van de Kaart). This association was founded in March 1971. Although it was inspired by the movement protesting the establishment of a second national airport in the Markerwaard, it went a step beyond and argued to stop the reclamation of the Markerwaard completely. To promote its point of view, the association collected signatures and distributed posters for publicity (see Figure 7).170 It also organised activities such as sailing rallies and public hearings which drew national politicians and large crowds.171 By the summer of 1971, the association had found a large audience willing to listen to its demands.

See PvdA, D’66, PPR, Keerpunt 1972, Regeerakkoord van de progressieve drie (1972). Available online: http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/518/25/PvdA%20D66%20PPR%20-%20Keerpunt%201972.pdf. 168 Drees’ unconventional approach got him the infamous title ‘The Hague Tornado’ (Dutch: ‘Haagse Tornado’). See Unknown author, ‘Drees jr is duidelijk present. Na negentien jaar in de wachtkamer’, De Volkskrant, September 4th 1971; Bernard van Bossum, ‘Minister Drees (Verkeer-Waterstaat) als bezuiniger in tweede kamer’, De Tijd, November 1st 1971. 169 See DHR 11/500 1, Minister van Financien, ‘Rijksbegroting voor het Dienstjaar 1972. Nota over de toestand van ’s rijks financiën’, 1971-1972, September 21st 1971; also see Unknown author, ‘Zuiderzeewerken vergen miljoenen meer’, Tubantia, September 24th 1971; Unknown author, ‘Druk van Drees’, Leeuwarder Courant, September 28th 1971. 170 Figure 7: Stichting Markerwaard van de Kaart (Edam), poster, Archief Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. Available online: https://hdl.handle.net/10622/97D17FEA-DEB1-4697-A6AF-A8E865D07E5C. The Vrije Volk newspaper wrote in August 1971 that the poster had become incredibly popular in the region surrounding Edam and Alkmaar. ‘Inmiddels gonst heel Waterland van de acties van deze stichting, die de laatste weken nogal wat publiciteit heeft gekregen […] Wat Amsterdam tot aan Enkhuizen ziet men de blauwe affiches, waarop het woord Markerwaard is doorgekrast, achter de ramen hangen’. See Unknown author, ‘Kleine 20.000 ondertekenaars menen: Markerwaard structurele verarming van het milieu’, Het Vrije Volk, August 21st 1971. 171 Even so, reporters expected that the Markerwaard decision would not be made anytime soon: ‘Men gelooft overigens niet dat het met de vooruitgang van de aanleg van de Markerwaard zo’n vaart zal lopen, nu Drees jr. op verkeer en waterstaat zit, zodat er nog tijd genoeg is om akties voort te zetten’. See Unknown author, ‘Deskundigen niet op hoorzitting’, De Tijd, July 24th 1971; Anonymous author, ‘VVD-Kamerlid Koning op hearing: twijfels over nut Markerwaard’, De Volkskrant, July 24th 1971.

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Figure 7: Markerwaard van de Kaart window poster

Those who protested the second national airport started to redirect their attention and protest the reclamation altogether. In 1972, the Markerwaard off the Map Association merged with various like-minded groups. A new organisation was established: the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake or APIJL (in Dutch: Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer).172 The president of the organisation, engineer Marten Bierman, had already established a reputation as an activist on spatial planning issues. He had been involved in the successful fight against French chemical giant Progil, which planned to open a plant in Amsterdam.173 Bierman was also known for opposing a new metro-connection in Amsterdam.174 One of the first major feats of this new organisation was the publication of Plan Waterlely in early 1974, a report that presented an alternative vision for the Markerwaard. Plan Waterlely officially was a response to the Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard report, that had been published by the ZPD just over a year before. By that time, the APIJL already counted 2800 members.175 Unwilling to anticipate the formal WMC advice, the government administration decided in 1973 that the Markerwaard was to be put up for public consultation through the so-called SCD-

172 See Jaap van der Zwaag, Nederland is bijna klaar. Een kritische beschouwing over de Zuiderzeewerken (Edam, 1977), 56-61. 173 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 167–168. 174 See Ibid., 168. 175 See Unknown author, ‘“Plan Water-Lely” wil IJsselmeer en Waddenzee redden. Treinverbinding ook over Afsluitdijk’, Trouw, February 2nd 1974.

47 procedure. This Spatial Core Decision-procedure (in Dutch: Planologische Kernbeslissing) was a new instrument for spatial planning. It had been introduced in 1969, when members of parliament realised they had no way to interfere with the in their eyes potentially harmful plans for a major chemical plant and industrial harbour near the small town of Moerdijk. Parliament decided it had insufficient tools to check local spatial planning decisions that had national consequences. The SCD- procedure was introduced, which allowed the government to organise a non-binding referendum on particular local spatial issue that had national consequences. At first the ministry of TWM did not consider the Markerwaard as an appropriate case for this procedure.176 In 1973, however, the minister relented to pressure from parliament. His decision was confirmed in July 1974, when the Markerwaard as well as the second national airport were put on a list of 23 spatial planning issues that would be put up for consultation through this new procedure.177 The consultation procedure itself would not take place before the early 1980s, and will be the subject of next chapter. In 1976, the WMC recommended to indeed reclaim the Markerwaard. However, the contemporary administration decided that the spatial composition of the polder had to be determined before reclamation. The recommendation by the WMC was controversial. Its Zuiderzee subcommittee was very divided on the Markerwaard issue, but the council itself overruled this in a unanimous recommendation in favour of reclamation. The council argued that, combined with the additional extra value created for recreation, not to mention the additional new land which could solve many spatial issues, it would be a mistake not to reclaim the polder.178 The council proposed a general plan for the size and shape of the polder, and recommended a decision on reclamation be made quickly.179 However, the council was too divided to recommend a particular spatial composition for the new polder.180 Consequently, minister Westerterp – a successor of Drees – decided to postpone the reclamation until the designated composition of the area had been decided on.181 This decision marked a major change in policy regarding the Markerwaard, and the Zuiderzee Works in general: instead of reclaiming a polder first and subsequently deciding what specific purpose and designation the area would have, now the purpose of the polder had to be decided before reclamation began. As such, the Markerwaard debate was not resolved during the 1970s, and the country became more divided on the issue. While during the early part of this decade the issue was suddenly being propelled to the main stage of public debate, the discussion abated, and the issue was simmering. Successive ministers of TWM postponed the issue, arguing that they did not want to make a decision before the SCD-procedure was finished. Meanwhile, the Dutch population had become more and more aware of the Markerwaard debate and had started to formulate their own opinions on the issue. A poll in 1978 found that just over a third of the Dutch population opposed reclaiming the Markerwaard, another third did not have a strong opinion either way, and the

176 The ministry argued that the decision to reclaim the Markerwaard was based on the 1918 Zuiderzee Reclamation Act, and thus had already been made. Hence, there was no legal necessity to go through the participation procedure. As such, Minister Tuinman (TWM) at first did not agree with a proposal by parliament to include the Markerwaard decision in the first round of SCD-procedures. See MHR 1973-1974, Tweede Kamer OCV / UCV, M1-M26, February 4th 1974, 16-17. 177 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 212–213. 178 The Markerwaardrapport of the WMC was sent to parliament in October 1976. See DHR 14.164 1, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Het al of niet inpolderen van de Markerwaard’, 1976-1977, October 13th 1976. 179 Interestingly, the size and shape of the Markerwaard that were recommended by the WMC was different from the scenarios presented in the Reconsiderations report. The WMC had decided to follow the plans proposed by the IJDA in its 1975 Explorations report. 180 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 262–263; Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 217. 181 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 261–262.

48 remaining third was in favour of reclaiming.182 As the moment SCD-procedure drew closer, the country became divided on the issue. Overall, in this debate during the early 1970s, two documents expressed two strongly differing socio-technical imaginaries on land reclamation. One of these is the hegemonic STI, expressed by the ZPD in its report Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard. It is worthy to mention that the report IJDA report, Explorations on the Markerwaard, also expresses this same STI.183 Yet because the Reconsiderations report was put up for consultation in early 1973, and the IJDA report was not, the Reconsiderations report has received more response by society. It is therefore more valuable to analyse the Reconsiderations report and the response it provoked. This will be discussed in the next section. The other imaginary was expressed by the Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer in its 1974 Plan Waterlely. It resisted the hegemonic imaginary. This plan presented a future vision that was different from the hegemonic STI expressed by ZPD, not just in terms of the alternative developed for the Markerwaard, but also as an alternative for the spatial planning of the entire Netherlands. This STI will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

3.2 STI-analysis of Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard In this section, the Reconsiderations report as published by the ZPD in 1972 will be discussed as an expression of a hegemonic socio-technical imaginary. First, the report and its origins will be briefly described. Subsequently, I will use the model provided in chapter 2 to analyse the STI that is present in the report. This analysis is based both on the report itself, as well as on the subsequent debate in Dutch media.

The Reconsidations report Minister Drees’ call to reconsider the Markerwaard marked the first time the reclamation project was considered by the wider Dutch public. As a result of the call, the ZPD helped prepare the recommendation by the WMC. In November 1972 it published Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard (in Dutch: Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard).184 This document was put up for consultation at all municipalities and provinces adjacent to the Markerwaard, as well as within the Dutch Parliament, between February and March 1973.185 An announcement of the consultation period was published in nearly 40 national and local newspapers, and over 80 organisations were officially contacted to provide their point of view on the report (See Figure 8).186 The ZPD also organised seven public sessions to discuss the plans in Lelystad, Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam. This was intended to improve societal participation in this debate: individuals and interested organisations could read

182 See Haro Hielkema, ‘Beheersplan voor IJsselmeer nodig’, Trouw, June 20th 1980. 183 The Explorations on the Markerwaard report (IJDA, 1975) develops four different scenarios for the designated composition of the Markerwaard. The report therefore presumes that the Markerwaard will be reclaimed, in its largest size. The first scenario (Garden of Europe) emphasised nature, the second (Netherlands-North Sea Beach) recreation, the third (Amsterdam-Central) urbanisation/housing and the fourth (Link with Northern-Netherlands) agriculture. Van Dissel (262-263) argues that the IJDA positioned itself as the leader of the proponents of the Markerwaard with this report, taking over this role from the ZPD from 1975 onwards. See Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolder, Verkenningen Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1975). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/verkenningen-markerwaard. 184 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1. 185 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 181. 186 The advertisement was placed in Nieuwsblad van het Noorden (31-01-1973), NRC (01-02-1973); De Volkskrant (01-02- 1973), Het Vrije Volk (01-02-1973), Leeuwarder Courant (01-02-1973), Telegraaf (01-02-1973), Trouw (01-02-1973), and Het Parool (01-02-1973). For Figure 8, see Raad van de Waterstaat, ‘De Raad van de Waterstaat maakt bekend’, NRC Handelsblad, February 1st 1973.

49 the report and send in their response and feedback. This was particularly useful for municipalities, provinces, and related governmental organisations who could provide feedback on the plans in this way. The consequence of the consultation procedure for the general Dutch public should not be underestimated. These public participation procedures were a relatively new phenomenon. Since the 1960s, various changed had been made to grant citizens more access to the political decision- making process. As such, this was one of the first times Dutch citizens were invited to formulate their opinion on infrastructural plans.187 It was certainly the first time they were invited to form an opinion on the Markerwaard. In total, the report received 101 formal responses. The APIJL commented on Reconsiderations with a letter of protest signed by more than 5000 people. The most divergent response to the report was the alternative plan launched by APIJL a year later, Plan Waterlely, which will be discussed in the next section. In the Reconsiderations report, the ZPD concluded that the Markerwaard should indeed be reclaimed and presented six scenarios for this process, proposing to follow the fifth scenario that entailed the most expansive reclamation. The report argued that, from a spatial planning perspective, there was a necessity on a national scale to reclaim the Markerwaard. The report then proceeded to discuss several scenarios for this reclamation project (see Figure 9).188 The first of these scenarios was a variant without actual reclamation but planned to build major hydrological engineering infrastructure that was necessary to ensure safety and high-quality water management. The second, third and fourth scenarios represented the ZPD’s analysis and response to the 1971 proposals by the Spatial Planning Group of the Utrecht University. Whereas the Spatial Planning Group devised a single plan with two separate reclamation projects, the ZPD discussed each of these individually (scenario’s two and three) and then proposed their own alternative (scenario four) which represented a reclamation of only a part of the Markerwaard. The fifth and sixth scenarios envisioned the reclamation of the entire Markerwaard, the major difference between them being the size of the edge lakes around the polder. The ZPD formally did not make a choice between the scenarios in the Reconsiderations report. However, through these six scenarios, the ZPD hoped to redirect the nature of the debate toward a comparison between these scenarios, instead of debating the necessity and purpose of the reclamation project itself. In the interaction surrounding the report, the ZPD made it clear they favoured the fifth scenario, which entailed the largest sizable reclamation.

187 See Pepijn Van Houwelingen, Anita Boele and Paul Dekker, ‘Burgermacht op eigen kracht? Een brede verkenning van ontwikkelingen in burgerparticipatie’ (The Hague 2014), The Hague. 188 Figure 9: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 24. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1

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Figure 8: Advertisement-campaign from the Water Management Council, declaring that the Reconsiderations document was now put up for public consultation

Figure 9: Variants for the Markerwaard in the 1973 Reconsiderations report.

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An important part of the societal response to Reconsiderations was a conference organised on February 16th, 1973, in Utrecht, and the subsequent press response to this conference. It was organised by several expert organisations, including the Royal Dutch Institute of Engineers.189 Esteemed speakers were invited to respond to particular elements of Reconsiderations.190 Most of them found some faults in Reconsiderations, but in particular Gerrit-Jan van den Berg, professor in spatial planning of Groningen University, extensively criticised the plan. Van den Berg argued that nation-wide trend of increasing urbanisation should be put to a halt, stating that cities such as Amsterdam should focus on improving inner-quality of life city instead of continuously expanding. In his view, the hydro-engineering, technical-executive RWS was not fit to deal with complex spatial issues that had a national impact.191 The Dutch press, attending the conference in large numbers, delighted in the debate. The following day, a variety of newspapers discussed the experts that criticised RWS, and to a large extent agreed with the negative remarks.192 The symposium was influential because the criticism presented here was used frequently by opponents of the Markerwaard in subsequent debates during the 1970s and 1980s.193 The ZPD responded to this criticism but to a large extent tried to ignore it. They considered that their duty was to only inform the Dutch public of the plans, yet the plans were still drawn up by the experts from the ZPD, and not uninformed outsiders.194

The socio-technical imaginary expressed in the Reconsiderations report Desirable and undesirable future Instead of arguing for a desirable future, the STI expressed through Reconsiderations is driven by a monster that needs to be kept at bay: the rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad. This monster results in many problems. The first of these are a set of spatial issues that result from the increasing urban growth of the northern Randstad, the area surrounding Amsterdam. The Reconsideration report refers to overpopulation, lack of space for services such as the airport, and lack of good quality housing in inner cities. The second of these problems is the threat of suburbanisation of the Green Heart, the largely agricultural area located in the middle of the urban Randstad (roughly within a ring

189 See NIROV, ‘Symposium Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard’, Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting, 54 (1973) 4, 130-164; also see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 199–207. 190 The APIJL was not invited. Instead, the association wrote an extensive article for the professional engineering journal De Ingenieur. In the article they argued arguing that the Markerwaard polder would become a financial disaster. However, at the last minute they were also barred from publishing this article in De Ingenieur. Furious, the association used its excellent connection to the national newspaper NRC Handelsblad (one of APIJL’s founding members, Wouter van Dieren, was a reporter for NRC Handelsblad) and published the article there. In hindsight, this provided the association with a wider audience than an original publication in De Ingenieur had done. See Wouter van Dieren, ‘Nieuwe Kostenberekening Actiegroep: Markerwaard gaat twee miljard kosten’, NRC Handelsblad, February 10th 1973. 191 See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 354–359. 192 Newspaper De Tijd devoted a full page to the criticism of prof. Van den Berg. See Unknown author, ‘Geleerde kritiek op plan inpoldering Markerwaard’, De Tijd, February 17th 1973. De Volkskrant argued that the reclamation plans were short-sighted. See Unknown author, ‘Verwijt van hoogleraren. Studie Markerwaard nog beneden pijl’, De Volkskrant, February 17th 1973. The newspaper Trouw was less critical but still emphasised the negative remarks by Van den Berg. See Unknown author, ‘Planoloog heeft veel kritiek op nota over “Markerwaard”. Stuk mist een deugdelijke grondslag’, Trouw, February 17th 1973. Last, the Leeuwarder Courant interpreted Van den Berg’s the criticism as evidence that the province of would suffer from the reclamation project. See Unknown author, ‘Planoloog op symposium in Utrecht: Friesland de dupe bij inpoldering van Markerwaard’, Leeuwarder Courant, February 17th 1973. 193 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 206. 194 The director of the ZPD, Marten Klasema, was quoted in an interview stating ‘t Is de tijd. Voor enige jaren merkten we er met zoveel van. Iedereen vond het wel mooi. Maar nu maak je dingen mee, waar het hele land mee te maken krijgt. Opeens komt de Markerwaard m de belangstelling. Het is logisch dat men erover ingelicht wil worden’. Note how he emphasises that the Dutch population wants to be informed, as opposed to being involved in the decision making process. See Ibid., 177.

52 of cities including Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Utrecht). Uncontrolled suburbanisation would result in this area slowly disappearing to ever-increasing cities on its edge. Reconsiderations builds on new Dutch spatial planning policies. As discussed in the previous chapter, a key concept of this policy was to designate several areas, including the southern Zuiderzee polders, as locations to absorb the urban expansion of the Randstad, so as to prevent the Randstad itself from becoming a massive metropolis. The means of this policy was a bundled deconcentration approach, in which several new or existing cities were assigned as expansion points to absorb urbanisation. Up until 1980, the existing assigned locations – cities in the province of North-Holland, as well as Lelystad and Almere – would suffice to house the overflow population and services of the northern Randstad. After that period, however, the space the Markerwaard could provide was necessary continue this absorption function. As such, the increase in available space of the Markerwaard would prevent the Green Heart from disappearing.195 The ZPD is therefore adamant in Reconsiderations that the reclamation of the Markerwaard benefits the entire country. The report extensively discusses the role of the Markerwaard polder in relieving the spatial problems of the Randstad, particularly its northern wing. Before even discussing the agricultural, recreational, or natural value the Markerwaard could have, the report already concludes that the reclamation of the Markerwaard is desirable.196 Although it still argues in favour of land reclamation, Reconsiderations presents a discontinuity in the land reclamation STI discussed in the previous chapter because land reclamation is no longer presented as a necessity to provide safety from flooding. It is particularly revealing that the Reconsiderations report features a first scenario without any reclamation which, according to the report, still sufficiently addresses potential future water management issues including flood protection. As discussed in the previous chapter, previous discourse on the Zuiderzee Works is built on the idea that reclamation has two main purposes: increase of the amount of arable land, and flood protection of the country. This discontinuity shows how the ZPD now argues for the necessity of the Markerwaard from a perspective that primarily considers national spatial issues, instead of national safety or national sustenance.

Target community Through the Reconsiderations report and particularly the societal debate surrounding it, the ZPD presented itself as the only viable expert on the Markerwaard while simultaneously discouraging the role of society at large in the debate. Prior to the publication of the report, it became clear that the ZPD’s main goal was to inform the Dutch people of the reasons why the Markerwaard had to be reclaimed and give some details on scenarios for the manner how, and not invite them to join the debate. The head of the ZPD, Marten Klasema, argued in several public interviews that it was logical to inform the Dutch society on the details of the Markerwaard plans, since large infrastructure projects received more public attention. The report itself contains no specific questions or sections where societal input is considered useful. Even though it was put up for public consultation in February 1973, this must be understood primarily as a way for local governments to access the

195 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 5-16. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1. 196 ‘Gezien de omvangrijke overloop waarmee in de IJsselmeerpolders aantoonbaar rekening moet worden gehouden en het planologisch belang om zowel temporeel als ruimtelijk een marge te houden bij de stedelijke ontwikkeling van Flevoland, kan worden gesteld dat de ruimtelijke inrichting van ons land gediend zal zijn met de inpoldering van de Markerwaard [my emphasis].’ See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 16. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1.

53 debate. As a result, it is not remarkable that one third of the organisations that responded to this open consultation were (semi-)governmental organisations.197 As an unintended consequence of this position, Dutch newspapers produced a frame in which the SPD opposed the general Dutch population. This was partially a result of the ZPD’s own expressed distrust against the activist groups who engaged with the Markerwaard. Klasema accused the Markerwaard off the Map Association in 1971 of a lack of trust in the Dutch government and its policies. Klasema argued that the government, and by extension the ZPD, obviously has expertise, works for the benefit of general society, and knows what it is doing.198 However, Dutch newspapers juxtaposed the ZPD in direct contrast with the associations that opposed the Markerwaard, giving both ample of opportunity to argue their cases, and positioning both sides as experts on the issue. A great example of this framing can be found in an article ran by Het Parool during the debate. A picture of Klasema was placed directly beneath a map of the Markerwaard as proposed by the ZPD, and a label stating ‘…voor…’ (in favour of). The other side of the page featured a picture of miss D. Luger- Van der Steen, who was a board member of the Markerwaard van de Kaart association, beneath the plan as proposed by the Utrecht University Spatial Planning Group, and a label stating ‘….tegen…’ (opposing). Klasema, the stern-looking, older man, seemed to portray a harsh and unalterable position in the debate, opposed by the wide-eyed young woman who represented those in society who opposed the reclamation.199

Story-line The Reconsiderations report frames the Markerwaard as a necessity. The experts from the ZPD presented various arguments as to why this was the case. Perhaps most important is the social and economic development of the Netherlands since the Second World War. Reconsiderations argues these developments have had far-reaching spatial consequences, and as a result, the Netherlands simply needs more space. The Markerwaard is then called upon as the most obvious solution.200 An additional argument, presented by ZPD officials in various lectures and interviews where the Reconsiderations report was discussed, is more in line with new ideas on the environment. According to this line of reasoning, the Markerwaard was necessary to prevent environmental disasters from occurring. Without the Markerwaard, quantitative and qualitative water management issues would more frequently occur and would increase the amount of pollution in the IJssel lake.201 Consequently, throughout the Reconsiderations report a story-line is presented which connects these problems with the Markerwaard as a necessary solution. The necessity of the reclamation project is taken for granted, which is reflected in its language. Phrases that echo this idea of necessity are abundant, while phrases that reflection possibility or potentiality are hardly used.202

197 See Ibid., 207–210. 198 See Unknown author, ‘Kleine 20.000 ondertekenaars menen: Markerwaard structurele verarming van het milieu’, Het Vrije Volk, August 21st 1971. 199 See Piet Mulder, ‘Markerwaard óp of ván de kaart?’, Het Parool, August 21st 1971. 200 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 1. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1 201 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Milieuramp dreigt als besluit over Markerwaard te lang uit blijft. Verdere inpoldering IJsselmeer snel nodig’, De Tijd, March 31st 1973. 202 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 1-3. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1.

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Closure The ZPD refrained from making a choice between the scenarios in Reconsiderations, but made it very clear in the subsequent debate that they favoured scenario five. Although the report contains six scenarios, these boil down to three basic choices. Either no reclamation would take place but the necessary hydrological infrastructure for water management would still be constructed; or partial reclamation would take place; or a full reclamation would take place. Note that the report does not consider completely halting all infrastructure works and leaving the lake as it was in 1972. The ZPD aims to at the very least complete the infrastructure it considers necessary for good water management. Still, the organisation seems to disapprove of this scenario, as it lacks the required space for spatial planning solutions and results in a less attractive lake, both from a recreational as well as from a quality-of-landscape perspective.203 In the report, the ZPD set for itself two sets of goals, on water management and on spatial planning. Whereas the water management goals are met in all scenarios, the goals related to spatial planning are only met in scenarios five and six. As such, the ZPD implicitly argued in favour of these latter scenarios.204 Additionally, the way how Reconsiderations portrays the reclamation budget and in particular the expenses of all scenarios shows an implicit preference for scenario five. Graphs at the end of the report show how the hydrological works necessary for water management in the area seem to inexplicably become cheaper in the variants in which more land is reclaimed.205 There is a sound, if biased, rationale: if the ZPD would reclaim the entire lake, constructing this hydrological infrastructure would be less expensive relative to the total costs. As such, some of the costs for this infrastructure are labelled as additional in the full-reclamation scenarios, while they are labelled as necessary in the partial and no reclamation scenarios. In this way, the costs of the infrastructure that is necessary anyway is higher in scenarios without reclamation.206 An early version of the report reveals that the ZPD never originally intended to include six scenarios at all. This early concept shows only one plan for the Markerwaard which is most similar to the later variant five (see Figure 10).207 Interestingly, this concept dates to January 1971, so it was written before Minister Drees called for reconsidering the project. 208 The document was originally written for a rather different purpose: to discuss the order in which hydrological works for the Markerwaard, such as dikes and sluices, would need to be built. Reclamation itself, or the size and shape, were not contested by the ZPD. The only points of discussion in this concept version were of

203 The report explicitly mentioned that even though scenario 1 would not result in negative environmental or ecological changes per se, the quaint little fishing-island of Marken would have to be surrounded by a rather high ring-dike (their emphasis), which would spoil the quality of landscape immensely. See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 26-29. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1. 204 See NIROV, ‘Symposium Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard’, Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting, 54 (1973) 4, 130-164, 132. 205 Two tables, which compared the total costs of all variants, show that the hydrological works are rather expensive in scenario 1 (450 million guilders), while comparatively cheap in scenarios 4, 5 and 6 (between 55-85 million guilders each). See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 37 (attachment 7). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1. 206 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 35. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1. 207 Figure 10: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard [concept] (The Hague, 1971), attachment 3. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1 208 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard [concept] (The Hague, 1971). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1

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a technical nature: the shape and size of the dikes and dams surrounding Marken. 209 Importantly, however, the size and shape of the polder presented in this concept, as well as the rationale for reclaiming the Markerwaard, were almost literally copied to the fifth scenario of the final Reconsiderations report.

Figure 10: Desired shape of the Markerwaard by ZPD as of 1971

Temporality The reclamation of the Markerwaard is portrayed in the Reconsiderations report and surrounding debate as inevitable, even though the ZPD was explicitly asked to discuss alternatives to the Markerwaard. The inevitability of the reclamation follows from the argumentation that the spatial planning problems of the northern Randstad need to be solved, and that the Markerwaard is the only possible solution. This idea is strengthened by expressions of ZPD employees in the Dutch media. They for instance frequently stated there was ‘no way back’ for the reclamation project, and

209 See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard [concept] (The Hague, 1971), 37-42. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1.

56 that it was impossible to cancel or postpone.210 Interestingly enough, to make this case, the ZPD builds on existing policies and insights of other governmental organisations. Upon closer scrutiny, this presents a circular reasoning. The reports the ZPD uses to argue that the Markerwaard is a necessity, themselves also presume that the Markerwaard will be reclaimed, and use that notion as a guiding principle in laying out policy.211 Consequently, this presumption of the Markerwaard is transferred to the Reconsiderations report as well.212 This is quite remarkable, as minister Drees asked the ZPD to discuss alternatives to the Markerwaard in the first place. Importantly, the Reconsiderations report does not refer to the historical inevitability argument used in earlier iterations of the hegemonic imaginary, as discussed in the previous chapter. The authors of Reconsiderations argue that the origin of the Markerwaard project can be found in the 1918 law, and the report briefly refers to Lely’s work and older reclamation plans. Even so, the report explicitly states that in light of more recent spatial developments, the justification and argumentation for the Markerwaard reclamation needs updating.213 This is a discontinuity of temporality in the imaginary.

Important signifiers and their signified The Reconsiderations report lacks powerful signifiers to express the imaginary that fuels it. The report is of a rather technical nature. In contrast to the Plan Waterlely, which will be discussed in the next section, the language in Reconsiderations is very technical, frequently only expressing the argumentation and pros and cons of particular variants, without referring to metaphors or figures of speech to make a case or illustrate something. For a technical report, there are surprisingly little tables and charts used by the ZPD to argue their point, apart from the already mentioned budget tables and maps of the different scenarios (see Figure 9). Perhaps as a consequence, it was possible for some of the Dutch press to reframe the Markerwaard as a solution that would benefit only Amsterdam, instead of benefitting the entire country. The final debate of the February 1973 symposium resulted in a particularly hard clash between Van der Berg, who as previously discussed criticised the spatial planning rationale of Reconsiderations, and Han Lammers, alderman of the city of Amsterdam, Lammers, in charge of urban development, accused Van der Berg of misunderstanding the issues that Amsterdam was facing.214 In the following months, correspondents from several newspapers kept reporting on the debate between Van der Berg and Lammers. In their articles, as a result of following this debate, the Markerwaard is presented as mainly a solution for Amsterdam’s problems.215 This did not benefit the

210 The Director of the ZPD, Marten Klasema, was quoted in NRC Handelsblad stating that they were ‘unable’ to stop. This made it both seem inevitable, but also as if the organisation was out of control. See Hans Smits, ‘Markerwaard, strijd om land of water (2)’, NRC Handelsblad, July 24th 1971. Similarly, in Het Parool he stated that there was no way back. See Piet Mulder, ‘Markerwaard óp of ván de kaart?’, Het Parool, August 21st 1971. 211 These are, for instance, the first Water Management whitepaper (1968) and the second Spatial Planning whitepaper (1966). 212 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 189–190. 213 ‘Hetgeen tot dusverre is geschied is tot stand gebracht als onderdeel van een meer omvattende globale conceptie. Thans moet definitief de richting worden bepaald die zal worden ingeslagen voor de voltooiing van de Zuiderzeewerken in het licht van de waterhuishoudkundige en ruimtelijke doelstellingen voor de vóór ons liggende decennia.’ See Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 1. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de- markerwaard-1. 214 See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 359–362. 215 Over the following weeks, Het Parool and De Tijd, two Amsterdam-based newspapers, cast the Markerwaard debate as a struggle for solutions to Amsterdam’s spatial planning issues. See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Lammers nodigt prof. uit voor een rondleiding’, Het Parool, February 19th 1973; Han Lammers, ‘Bedenkelijke kritiek op Markerwaard’, De Tijd, February 20th 1973.

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ZPD’s case, as it was framed as a governmental organisation that did not serve the interests of the entire country.

Sub-conclusion The Reconsiderations report highlights elements of a hegemonic socio-technical imaginary that was prevalent among the ZPD and the IJDA. It shows to what extent the land reclamation imaginary that has been discussed in the previous chapter was embedded in the institutional arrangements of these organisations. Still, the ZPD was able to divert from the pre-existing imaginary slightly, for instance in the new focus on national spatial issues instead of flood safety. One of its key elements is the inevitability of the Markerwaard reclamation, as a consequence of a historical and nearly natural process of reclamation. Rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad was presented as a monster to be kept at bay, and the reclamation was the only solution. As such, the question is not whether to reclaim, but rather how to reclaim. Importantly, in the document the ZPD presented itself as the only viable expert on the reclamation process, not taking societal input seriously. This imaginary is summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: Socio-technical Imaginary present in Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard Component Expressed socio-technical imaginary Desirable and undesirable future Instead of arguing for a desirable future, the STI expressed through Reconsiderations is driven by a monster that needs to be kept at bay: the rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad, and its most damaging consequences (overpopulation in the northern Randstad and suburbanisation of the Green Heart). Target community The ZPD presented itself as the only viable expert on the case while simultaneously discouraging the role of society at large in the debate. As an unintended consequence, the ZPD was framed by Dutch media to oppose the general Dutch population. Story-line In this imaginary, recent economic and societal developments are presented to have had major consequences for the spatial planning of the Netherlands. As a result, the Markerwaard is simply necessary. Closure The ZPD presented a fully reclaimed Markerwaard as the solution for both contemporary spatial problems as well as future water management issues. This was expressed in a particular scenario, the fifth of the report. The ZPD disapproved of the scenario in which the Markerwaard was not reclaimed at all. Temporality The reclamation of the Markerwaard is portrayed in the Reconsiderations report and surrounding debate as inevitable. Important signifiers and their The Reconsiderations report lacks powerful signifiers to express the signified imaginary that fuels it. Therefore, some Dutch media were able to reframe the Markerwaard as a solution that would benefit only Amsterdam, instead of benefitting the entire country.

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3.3 STI-analysis of Plan Waterlely In this section, the APIJL’s alternative Plan Waterlely is discussed as an expression of a resistant socio- technical imaginary. First, the plan and its origins will be briefly described. Subsequently, similarly to the analysis of the Reconsiderations report, I will use the model provided in chapter 1 to analyse the STI that is present in Plan Waterlely. This analysis is based both on the report itself, as well as on the subsequent debate in Dutch media. Since Plan Waterlely was a response to the Reconsiderations report, in this analysis I will also point to differences and similarities between the two imaginaries.

Plan Waterlely The most impactful alternative to the Reconsiderations report was Plan Waterlely, published by the APIJL in 1974. By publishing this plan, the association intended to contribute to the societal Markerwaard debate. The association had drawn its conclusions from the February 1973 symposium and publicly argued that a decision on the Markerwaard could not yet be made, and thus requested the minister to pause the ongoing construction of the Houtribdijk and take into consideration alternative plans, which would include their own Plan Waterlely. The plan was launched with considerable fanfare in the Dutch press, available to the general public in book-format. 216 At its core, the plan was not just an alternative for the Markerwaard, but presented a new spatial development vision for the larger IJsselmeer area and the northern Netherlands. Primarily, the APIJL feared that irreplaceable natural values would be lost with the reclamation Markerwaard.217 Still, like the ZPD, the association saw the threat of suburbanisation of the Randstad. It therefore proposed to ‘emancipate’ the cities that circled the IJsselmeer (so a ring from Alkmaar, north to the Enclosure Dam, east across the Dam to and Groningen, and south-west again Utrecht and Arnhem). Emancipation would solve the spatial planning issues of the Randstad. It included the construction of a railway-connection that would connect all these cities, of which an important segment – the connection between Alkmaar and Harlingen across the Enclosure Dam – still had to be built.218 Through these better infrastructure connections, people would be able to travel to a from these cities and the Randstad quicker, enabling them to commute and travel between the cities more often and decreasing the need for more housing in the Randstad. As a result, the Markerwaard was unnecessary and the lake would not have to be reclaimed. The plan presented a seemingly very simple solution for a very complex issue.219 Even though it might be considered too simplistic and was not realised, Plan Waterlely sparked the imagination and charged the debate surrounding the Markerwaard. Plan Waterlely was received very well by the Dutch press. Various newspapers wrote positive reviews of the plan after the initial launch. 220 They expressed amazement at idea of a railway connection across the Enclosure dam. It was a bit of an oddity that an association that concerned itself with the deteriorating environment would in fact propose to build new infrastructure. wide variety of Dutch newspapers, from different political or religious affiliations, wrote positively about the plan and seemed to agree with APIJL that the Markerwaard was perhaps a solution for problems

216 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘“Plan Water-Lely” wil IJsselmeer en Waddenzee redden. Treinverbinding ook over Afsluitdijk’, Trouw, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘“Nog geen beslissing over Markerwaard”’, Trouw, February 24th, 1973; Unknown author, ‘Vereniging pleit voor Water-Lely’, Nederlands Dagblad, February 26th 1973. 217 See Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 354–359. 218 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 219 See Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 369. 220 See Ibid.

59 of the previous century, but that contemporary problems needed different solutions. The proposed emancipation of northern Dutch cities could indeed help improve the quality of the Randstad.221 Various actors within the Dutch government were less enthusiastic about the plan. As can be expected, the ZPD, IJDA, and the Zuiderzee committee of the WMC were not amused at this rival plan for the Markerwaard and took time to rebut it in different interviews. The Zuiderzee Committee dismissed Plan Waterlely in its entirety, unable to agree with the APIJL’s new take on national spatial development. 222 Additionally, the province of Noord-Holland positioned itself as a vehement opposer of Plan Waterlely. The province saw the Markerwaard as the urgently necessary solution for solving many spatial issues in the province and felt threatened by Plan Waterlely. Especially the King’s Commissioner of the Province dismissed Plan Waterlely, dismissing it as a document which included the wildest spatial and hydrological ideas.223 Expecting this, the APIJL had hoped for a response from the Dutch parliament or political parties. This failed, as will be discussed next.

The socio-technical imaginary expressed in Plan Waterlely Desirable and undesirable future Similar to the Reconsiderations report, the authors of Plan Waterlely took rampant urbanisation of the Randstad very seriously. In contrast, however, they argued that the urbanisation itself was the problem and should therefore be halted. The monster expressed in Plan Waterlely was not necessarily the reclamation of the Markerwaard. Rather, the association feared a never-ending process of reclamations, the Wadden sea following the Markerwaard, that would be the result of the continuously growing spatial demands of the Netherlands. Creating new land would only postpone true solutions to these issues, instead of solving them. As such, the only solution would be a changing approach: less focus on growth, or a stop on growth altogether.224 This argument was akin to the ideas presented in the famous Limits of Growth report, written by the international Club of Rome only two years earlier. This report had received a lot of attention in the Netherlands.225 Plan Waterlely thus epitomized on ongoing Dutch debates on the issue of infinite growth on finite space.

221 Generally, the plan was received well. See Unknown author, ‘“IJsselmeerders” zien niet veel heil in Markerwaard- polder’, Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, February 1st 1974; Unknown author, ‘Milieuvereniging wil spoorbaan over Afsluitdijk’, Leeuwarder Courant, February 1st 1974; Unknown author, ‘“Plan Water-Lely” wil IJsselmeer en Waddenzee redden. Treinverbinding ook over Afsluitdijk’, Trouw, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘Milieuvereniging wil spoorbaan over Afsluitdijk’, De Telegraaf, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘Pleidooi voor spoorlijn over Afsluitdijk’, Algemeen Dagblad, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘Spoorbaan over Afsluitdijk bepleit’, NRC Handelsblad, February 4th 1974; Unknown author, ‘Milieuvereniging wil spoorbaan over Afsluitdijk’, De Tijd, February 5th 1974.Some newspapers focussed on particular aspects of the problems and solutions it presented. De Volkskrant¸ for instance, engaged with the spatial planning issues of the largest cities and in particular Plan Waterlely’s consequences for the poorer population of those cities, and thus was enthusiastic about the city-ring plan. See Unknown author, ‘Stedenband rond IJsselmeer. Alternatief ontworpen voor Markerwaard. Aanleg spoorlijn over Afsluitdijk noodzakelijk’, De Volkskrant , February 2nd 1974. The Amsterdam-based newspaper Het Parool perceived the Markerwaard conflict as a solution for Amsterdam’s problems in particular and was therefore curious to what extent Plan Waterlely would solve the issues with Schiphol Airport. See Unknown author, ‘Alternatief van IJsselmeervereniging. Geen Markerwaard na aanleg spoorlijn’, Het Parool, February 2nd 1974. 222 This is remarkable, as Goverde points out, because the APIJL’s ideas actually aligned quite well with contemporary spatial policy documents such as the Third Spatial Planning whitepaper that was published in 1974 as well. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 244–249. 223 See Henk Huurdeman, ‘Kranenburg/Kranenburg II’, De Volkskrant, February 21st 1974; Hans Kops, ‘Klein IJsselmeer ook in nadeel watersporter’, De Volkskrant, March 1st 1974. 224 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 225 In Limits to Growth, the Club of Rome proposed to limit infinite economic growth, as it would result in pollution and irresponsible use of space. The APIJL echoed this argument, worrying about the irresponsible use of space in particular, but also about the damage reclamation would to the natural values of the Marker lake (organisms, fish, bird, etc). See Righart, ‘Milieu in Beweging’, 419; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 368.

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Simultaneously, Plan Waterlely presented an alternative spatial planning for the entire Netherlands as a desirable future. Cities in the northern parts of the Netherlands should provide a realistic alternative to the Randstad, in terms of both services as well as for housing, and should therefore be ‘emancipated’. Everything the Randstad had to offer, ought to be shared with these cities. To ensure that this could happen, the infrastructure connections between these cities should be improved, creating a belt-city or bandstad in the process. Public transportation in general should be more leading in spatial planning, the association argued, and therefore improved public transportation along this belt-city was presented as a key instrument in emancipating the cities. This is why the plan proposed to construct a new railway connection across the Enclosure Dam.226

Target community With Plan Waterlely, APIJL hoped to stimulate debate in the Dutch parliament in particular, but engaging with the general Dutch population was a secondary benefit. Such a debate, the association hoped, could result in parliament taking charge in the issue and consequently deposing the ZPD and the IJDA as the most influential actors on the Markerwaard issue. Additionally, the APIJL hoped to influence the debate on the upcoming third Spatial Planning whitepaper. 227 The association tried to also stimulate this debate through other means. For instance, the president, Marten Bierman, called for the representative of the D’66 political party (of which Bierman was a member) to trigger a debate on the future of the Markerwaard.228 In contrast to this effort, the Dutch general public was not directly addressed by the APIJL, beyond inviting them to formulate an opinion on the issue. 229 Dutch parliament, however, kept eerily quiet on the issue. Plan Waterlely’s alternative vision was only mentioned a few times in parliament, each time by Leo Jansen, member of the radical left PPR party.230 As such, a debate on the plan itself did not take place. Together with the another protest association that fought for the conservation of the Wadden Sea, the APIJL put an advertisement in national newspapers in November 1974 to reach out to parliamentary members personally (see Figure 11).231 Their goal was to convince the politicians of the folly of the Markerwaard, and to stop the construction of the Houtribdijk between Enkhuizen and Lelystad which in the meanwhile was nearly finished. Unfortunately, the APIJL had to conclude that not a single member of parliament responded to their advertisement.

226 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 227 See Haro Hielkema, ‘Inpoldering Markeraard is nu zaak van planologie’, Trouw, October 1st 1974. 228 See Unknown author, ‘Amsterdam sterft volgens Martini. “Veel geld nodig voor redding”’, Het Parool, March 23rd 1974. 229 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 230 See MHR 1973-1974, Tweede Kamer OCV / UCV, M1-M26, February 4th 1974, M16-M17; MHR 1973-1974, 2303 (February 6th 1974); MHR 1973-1974, 4466 (May 15th 1975); MHR 1974-1975, 5708 (August 28th 1975). 231 The advertisement was published on November 23rd 1974 in Het Parool, De Volkskrant, De Telegraaf and Trouw. Figure 11: Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer & Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee, ‘Laat Den Haag zich aan de dijk zetten?’, Het Parool, November 23rd 1974.

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Figure 11: Laat Den Haag zich aan de dijk zetten? Political advertisement by the APIJL, November 1974

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Story-line Plan Waterlely contained a powerful story-line that influenced the Markerwaard debate during the subsequent decades: stopping the old land-new land problem deflection. One of the core elements of Plan Waterlely was its rejection of the logic of ‘deflecting’ spatial problems to the New Land. The story-line builds the Old land/New land signifiers that were part of the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation. However, instead of proposing that New land should contain a new society, the APIJL argued that spatial problems that originated on the Old land should be solved there, instead of transferring –in words of the APIJL, deflecting – them to the New Land.232 The second national airport was just one of these problems, just like the rampant urbanisation of the Randstad. New land should not be burdened by the problems of the Old Land, especially if there were alternatives available. This logic is constitutive to the monster that made up this imaginary: solving the existing problems in Randstad cities, and improving urban development there, should be prioritised above reclaiming new land. 233

Closure Plan Waterlely was filled to the brim with powerful statements of closure, which simplified any complex solution to the problem of Randstad suburbanisation to the construction of a railway. The desirable future expressed in Plan Waterlely entails the emancipation of the cities adjacent to the IJssel lake. Presumably, this is a complex, long-term process, but according to the APIJL the first and perhaps most important step in this process is the construction of 65 km railway between the cities of Alkmaar and Leeuwarden. For the association, this was a very simple and yet incredibly powerful infrastructural change that would bring about this switch to a more desirable future for the country.234 As such, similar to Reconsiderations and the pre-existing hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation, Plan Waterlely strongly relied on the idea that the Netherlands was engineerable through spatial planning. According to the APIJL, creating such a railway would result in less car-use, better quality-of-life changes in inner cities of the Randstad, and less of a disconnect between the Randstad and the rest of the country. In this respect the plan was not so different from the imaginary in Reconsiderations or even the historical discourse surrounding reclamations: all imaginaries incorporate the idea that a society is able to stimulate positive and negate behaviour through infrastructure change. Plan Waterlely, however, broke convention by favouring improved public transport above land reclamation, arguing that qualitative changes were more important than quantitative.

Temporality Plan Waterlely presents a strong discontinuity from the past as it challenges the historical Dutch ‘habit’ of land reclamation. The plan – in line with Reconsiderations – argues that reclamation is no longer necessary for flood prevention. However, the APIJL subsequently concludes that the Markerwaard simply is not necessary anymore. With this approach, the APIJL challenged the convention of land reclamation and the process by which most Dutch people took dikes creation and

232 The APIJL called this process of transfer ‘afwenteling’ in Dutch. 233 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974). 234 This included statements such as: ‘Met de aanleg van circa 65 km rails over de Afsluitdijk zijn we al ongeveer waar we wezen moeten’ (building 65 km of railway across the Enclosure Dam should get us where we need to be), see Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974),3; ‘“Ruimtelijke ordening per spoorboekje” biedt een heilzaam perspectief’ (spatial planning via railway offers a wholesome solution), see Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974), 5.

63 polder reclamation for granted. Newspaper correspondents keenly commented on this very clear- cut changing perception, most of them – regardless of political allegiance – welcoming the new critical perspective. 235 Some even used the opportunity to once again explore the downsides of land reclamation, and nostalgically discussed the small Noord-Holland towns that were to lose their ‘paradisal’ and picturesque character if the polder would be reclaimed. This echoed the duality of modernity and traditions that had historically accompanied the imaginary on land reclamation.236 Both imaginaries expressed in Reconsiderations and Plan Waterlely revere the legacy of Cornelis Lely, but used the legacy to advance their own ideal futures. Whereas the imaginary expressed in Reconsiderations considers the Markerwaard to be an inevitable result of a continuous process leading back to Lely’s plans, Plan Waterlely argues that Lely would never have reclaimed the Markerwaard had he been alive in the 1970s. The APIJL presented their plan as a ‘contemporary variant of the original plans by Lely’. According to the association, Lely created his Zuiderzee plans based on what society needed at that time. Since the needs of society had changed during the past decades, the Zuiderzee plans would need updating as well. The APIJL even argued that, would he still be alive, Lely would fully agree with Plan Waterlely.237 The title of the plan itself, Waterlely, is a play on words on this temporality. Waterlely references Cornelis Lely as well as the Dutch word for waterlily (waterlelie). By directly referencing Lely, the APIJL not only honours him but also suggest that the plan is part of Lely’s legacy, or perhaps that Lely’s thinking is responsible for the plan.

Important signifiers and their signified Plan Waterlely included several important signifiers that would play an important role in the Markerwaard debate in the decades to come. Two of them are discussed below.

Wet Heart: The idea of a Wet Hart (Natte Hart) in the centre of the Netherlands was a powerful spatial metaphor introduced in Plan Waterlely.238 At face value, the Wet Heart was an simple reference to the IJssel lake and Marker lake. By invoking the heart-metaphor, it was clear that these lakes were central to the Netherlands, not just in location but also in importance. However, the Wet Heart idea also drew upon the pre-existing idea of a Green Heart in the centre of the Randstad. Arguing that the IJssel lake was a Wet Heart invoked a similar sentiment to the Green Heart: the Wet Heart region should be kept intact and should be saved from urbanisation, and therefore, reclamation. This neatly fit the play on words in the title of the plan, Waterlely, which references a waterlily. The heart of the lily was the IJssel lake, the Wet Heart, and on its edge - the rim of the lily

235 Many examples abound. Het Vrije Volk wrote ‘Het ziet er naar uit dat het eeuwenlang ongerepte beleid – met ir. Lely als triomferend hoogtepunt – van de Nederlander als stoere dijkenbouwer en verbeten drooglegger wat begint te wankelen’. See Unknown author, ‘Kleine 20.000 ondertekenaars menen: Markerwaard structurele verarming van het milieu’, Het Vrije Volk, August 21st 1971. Trouw wrote ‘het vlijtig baggerende en polderende volkje begint langzamerhand een beetje van gedachten te veranderen’. See Haro Hielkema, ‘Inpoldering Markeraard is nu zaak van planologie’, Trouw, October 1st 1974. 236 For example, Het Parool portrays Broek, a village in Waterland, as a paradise not yet lost, a town not yet touched by relentless progress. It will be lost, however, if Markerwaard was to be reclaimed – due to the effects of the airport and increased traffic, as well as the loss of landscape quality. The article used photos, presenting Broek as a simple village with a church, a small lake near the village green, inhabited by mainly farmers and those who sought to relieve themselves of the busy city life of Amsterdam. See Wil van der Smagt, ‘Broek – ’n nog niet verloren paradijs. Rustig dorp in Waterland vreest de komst van de Markerwaard’, Het Parool, September 15th 1971. 237 This view was expressed by APIJL president Marten Bierman in several interviews and public lectures. See, for example, Vic Langenhoff, ‘“Markerwaard louter verspilling”’, De Tijd, April 19th 1974; Unknown author, ‘IJsselmeerproblematiek in Broodje Cultuur’, Tubantia, November 1st 1974. 238 See Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Plan Waterlely (Edam, 1974), 8. The phrase was further popularised in several books that were published by the APIJL. For instance, see Jaap van der Zwaag, Nederland is Bijna Klaar. Een kritische beschouwing over de Zuiderzeewerken (Edam, 1977).

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– the desired city-ring was located. This implied that the solution provided by the APIJL was in line with nature. Dutch newspapers immediately caught on and widely used the metaphor.239 This was a powerful metaphor, that is still in existence over forty years later.240

The association’s name and framing as underdog: A series of powerful signifiers expanded from the name of the association. The Dutch name for the APIJL, Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, is strongly reminiscent of another Dutch environmental organisation: the Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee.241 Only a decade earlier, this newly established organisation had successfully campaigned against the partial reclamation of the Wadden Sea.242 Like that organisation, the APIJL was frequently framed as an underdog by the Dutch press in their fight against the ‘mighty and powerful’ RWS. Various newspapers even described this conflict using a battle-rhetoric, which strongly resembled the framing of conflict that has been part of the Dutch water reclamation imaginary, as discussed in the previous chapter. 243 The new battle-rhetoric, however, was altered: RWS was still fighting, but no longer fighting the sea. Instead, it was fighting society. The APIJL tried to use this frame to their advantage, suggesting that their fight was similar to that of the Christian David battling Goliath. Newspapers, especially the ones that leaned to a Christian affiliation, loved the figure of speech and continued to portray the APIJL in this manner.244

239 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘“IJsselmeerders” zien niet veel heil in Markerwaard-polder’, Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, February 1st 1974; Unknown author, ‘Stedenband rond IJsselmeer. Alternatief ontworpen voor Markerwaard. Aanleg spoorlijn over Afsluitdijk noodzakelijk’, De Volkskrant, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘“Plan Water-Lely” wil IJsselmeer en Waddenzee redden. Treinverbinding ook over Afsluitdijk’, Trouw, February 2nd 1974; Unknown author, ‘Alternatief van IJsselmeervereniging. Geen Markerwaard na aanleg spoorlijn’, Het Parool, February 2nd 1974. 240 The Wet Heart phrase itself is no longer in existence, but it has been replaced by the concept Blue Heart (Blauwe Hart) which largely functions the same. It still refers to the larger IJssel lake area. Arguably, it functions as a more effective metaphor, because it directly contrasts with the Green Heart area. Nowadays, the Blue Heart Association is a general umbrella organization for all types of associations who work in the larger IJssel lake area, including the successor of the APIJL. 241 The APIJL had nearly had a different name. During the merge-meeting in which the APIJL was founded, on March 25th 1973, the new board proposed to call the organisation Vereniging tot Beheer van het IJsselmeer. According to them, this name signified that the new association would focus on the larger IJssel lake area and aim to have it well-managed. Note the difference between beheer (management) and behoud (conservation) in the final name. The board argued that their case was not just about conserving the lake in its current state, but actually managing it to create a healthier lake, ecologically speaking. In hindsight, it might indeed have been a more appropriate name. However, the members of the association chose otherwise. The originally proposed name can be found in the announcements of the merge-meeting. See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Vereniging op bres voor IJsselmeer’, NRC Handelsblad, March 21st 1972. 242 There was strong cooperation between the APIJL and Vereniging Behoud Waddenzee. The latter feared that reclaiming the Markerwaard would ultimately lead to more pollution entering the Wadden Sea, and – in line with the arguments from APIJL – that reclamations would not stop at the Markerwaard, and ultimately the entire Wadden Sea would be reclaimed. Also see Anna-katharina Wöbse, ‘The “ Ecological Discovery ” of the Global Wadden Sea’, in: Raf de Bont and Jens Lachmund eds., Spatializing the History of Ecology (zp 2014) 204–222. 243 Examples abound. NRC Handelsblad regarded the Markerwaard debate as a ‘battle on land or water’. See Hans Smits, ‘Markerwaard, strijd om land of water’, NRC Handelsblad, July 3rd 1971. De Volkskrant wrote about the protestors preparing its cannons to fight the cannons of Rijkswaterstaat. See Unknown author, ‘Luchthavenplannen maken tegenstanders actief’, De Volkskrant, April 17th 1971. The battle rhetoric was also present in articles surrounding the early 1972 debate on potential oil and gas claims in the IJsselmeer. The protest movements cooperated with fishermen from Marken, who acted as “spies” for the movements since they knew the area and were able to quickly identify the vessels used by oil companies for their seismic explorations. See Martin Ruyter, ‘Als t IJsselmeer maar behouden blijft. Olieboorders moeten uit het meer blijven’, De Volkskrant, April 8th 1972. 244 Trouw presented the APIJL as David, and the Rijkswaterstaat as Goliath. In the narrative in the article, David had just beaten Goliath because Minister Tuynman (TWM) had recently determined that the Markerwaard decision would be put through the SCD-procedure. See Haro Hielkema, ‘Inpoldering Markeraard is nu zaak van planologie’, Trouw, October 1st 1974.

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Sub-conclusion Plan Waterlely expressed an imaginary that resisted the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation and was expressed in documents such as the Reconsideration report. As such, Plan Waterlely was dismissed by governmental bodies as well as ignored by the Dutch parliament, but unexpectedly well received by the Dutch press and presumably the Dutch population. There were some similarities between the hegemonic and resistant imaginary, in particular the identification of the growing suburbanisation of the Randstad as a monster to be kept at bay. In contrast to Reconsiderations, in Plan Waterlely a future vision rather than a feasible plan was presented. However, this proved to be a key element: the plan was not just an alternative to reclaiming the Markerwaard, but presented a different understanding of spatial planning problems and solutions in the Netherlands. It echoed the dire warning of overpopulation and over-planning that had recently become a very relevant issue in the Netherlands. The resistant imaginary it expressed is summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Summary of the socio-technical imaginary present in Plan Waterlely Component Expressed socio-technical imaginary Desirable and undesirable future Plan Waterlely presents both a monster and a desirable future. The monster is rampant urbanisation and its related spatial demands, which results in a never-ending reclamation process. The desirable future is an alternative spatial planning for the entire Netherlands, in particular for emancipating cities in the northern Netherlands and improving their relation to the Randstad. Target community VBIJ hoped to stimulate debate in the Dutch parliament to reconsider the future for the Markerwaard. Story-line Stop the Old land/New land problem transfer. Closure Building a railway across the Enclosure Dam was the first important step in the emancipation of cities in the northern Netherlands. Through this and other infrastructural changes, the Netherlands is engineerable through spatial planning. Temporality Plan Waterlely challenges the historical Dutch ‘habit’ of reclaiming land. It utilizes the legacy of Cornelis Lely, arguing that if he had been alive, he would not have wanted to reclaim the Markerwaard. Important signifiers and their The influential Wet Heart metaphor positioned the IJssel lake as the new signified Green Hart area, a region to be protected from rampant urbanisation.

The association’s name was chosen carefully, and aided the process in which the APIJL was framed as the underdog in a fight against Rijkswaterstaat.

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Chapter 4: A confusion of tongues

‘Governmental wisdom will assure that the best choice will ultimately be made. That is, unless it turns to governmental fiasco, and the Netherlands will be left with a half-finished Zuiderzee-project: a 20th-century Tower of Babel’ 245

245 Roel van Duin, director of the IJDA, cited in Trouw. See Hans Schmidt, ‘toren van babel’, Trouw, April 8th 1981.

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This chapter is focused on the Markerwaard Spatial Core Decision (SCD) procedure that took place between 1980 and 1982. The SCD-procedure was a large public participation procedure and became the main stage for the Markerwaard debate. In this chapter I argue that the procedure had two important consequences: first, the resistant socio-technical imaginary in which reclamation was opposed became more influential, and second, this led to a stalemate between the pro-reclamation and anti-reclamation camps that lasted from 1982 until 1990. The next, final chapter of this thesis will elaborate on the stalemate and other relevant events after 1982, discussing why the Markerwaard reclamation was discontinued in 1990, and how ultimately the Marker Wadden came to be. In the first section of this chapter, I will narrate the events that occurred between roughly 1976 and 1982, narrating how the societal debate developed in the run-up and during the SCD- procedure. This narrative ends with the 1982 recommendation by the Dutch Spatial Planning Council. Subsequently, I discuss the 1980 policy proposal to reclaim the Markerwaard, written by the Dutch government, in more detail. This document was the initial starting point of the SCD-procedure and was another expression of the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation, similar to the 1972 Reconsiderations report. In the third section of this chapter, I discuss the various reactions to this policy proposal expressed as part of the SCD-procedure. These reactions indicated many alternative desirable futures for the Markerwaard. I discuss to what extent there was a single most influential resistant imaginary present in these reactions. The final section of this chapter is focussed on the utterly divided Spatial Planning Council recommendation of 1982. The council was unable to compromise, and therefore recommended two diametrically opposed plans for the Marker lake. Both expressed completely different imaginaries, broader than simply favouring or opposing reclamation.

4.1 Narrative of events (1976-1982) The run-up to the SCD-procedure In 1974, minister Westerterp (TWM) determined that the future of the Markerwaard would be decided through the so-called Spatial Core Decision-procedure or SCD (in Dutch: Planologische Kernbeslissing ). Over twenty similar regional spatial issues were put through this procedure in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The procedure consisted of four steps. First, the government would form a policy proposal in which it would outline the intended and favoured policy. Subsequently, a major participation process was organised by the Spatial Planning Council (SPC) (in Dutch: Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening). In this process, governmental institutions, non-governmental organisations and citizens could respond to the policy proposal. This was followed by a formal recommendation on the issue by the SPC. Ultimately, a final decision on the issue by the government would follow.246 It took subsequent administrations six years to formulate a policy proposal on the Markerwaard, which was largely due to the entanglement of the issue with the Second National Airport debate. Even though minister Westerterp had already determined that both issues would be subject to separate SCD-procedures, they were intricately connected because the Markerwaard was considered a top location for the airport. Between 1974 and 1979, reports and research on the airport took in consideration the Markerwaard option.247 The sting was only taken out of the debate

246 The procedure was outlined by the 1976 recommendation of the WMC. See DHR 14/164 1, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Het al of niet inpolderen van de Markerwaard’, 1976-1977, October 13th 1976, 3-5. 247 See, for instance, Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Variatiemogelijkheden tweede nationale luchthaven Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1978). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/variatiemogelijkheden-tweede-nationale-luchthaven-markerwaard; also see

68 in November 1979, when Westerterp’s successor minister Tuynman (TWM) proposed to expand the existing airport of Schiphol and various small local airports. The Markerwaard airport was off the table.248 Without the burden of the airport, the Van Agt-I administration was finally able to publish a policy proposal in the summer of 1980. The administration intended to reclaim the Markerwaard. In the proposal, called Development of the Markerwaard area, a polder of 400 km2 was proposed, roughly structured as proposed by the IJDA in 1975.249 Notably, the proposal did not include a spatial composition plan for the new polder. It only spoke of a rough division: 50% of the newly reclaimed land would have an agricultural purpose, and the other 50% was to become either urban, forest, or recreational area. Additionally, space could still be reserved for special functions such as a military terrain, a power station, and even – still – an airport. During this preparation period, the Association for the Preservation of the IJssel Lake entrenched itself as the best-known, most-vocal anti-reclamation organisation. The APIJL published three books in this period: Het Groot IJsselmeerboek, which celebrated the history of the IJsselmeer region; Nederland is Bijna Klaar, which argued that the plans for reclamation were outdated; and Markerwaard/, which argued that a plan should be developed for the water management of the Marker lake.250 The organisation also made an anti-reclamation movie, which was broadcast on Dutch television in November 1977 and well received by the Dutch press.251 Most important, in cooperation with the IJsselmeer fishermen the APIJL hosted two mass sailing manifestations during the summers of 1977 and 1979.252 The protests (see Figure 12-Figure 16) were held in Volendam, adjacent to the Marker lake, and drew large crowds.253 The inhabitants of Volendam wore traditional clothing, presumably to appeal to the historical values that would be as

Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Enige sociaal-economische beschouwingen over de inrichting van de Markerwaard, in het bijzonder betreffende de gevolgen van een luchthavenvestiging (Lelystad, 1980). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/enige-sociaal- economische-beschouwingen-over-de-inrichting-van-d. 248 The administration was deeply divided on the issue during the last months of 1979. Ministers Tuijnman (TWM) and Van der Stee (Agriculture) wanted to reclaim the Markerwaard regardless of the airport debate, because of the potential benefits for agriculture and the expansion of available urban space. Ministers Ginjaar (Public Health & Environment), Wallis de Vries (Culture, Recreation and Social Work) and Andriessen (Finance) wanted to postpone the reclamation unless the polder was necessary for a new airport. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 217–221; Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930- 1989, 263. 249 For the policy proposal, see DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘ Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979- 1980, September 5th 1980. For comparison with the IJDA report from 1975, see Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolder, Verkenningen Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1975). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/verkenningen-markerwaard. 250 See Jaap Kramer and Theo Kampa, Groot IJsselmeerboek (Amsterdam, 1974); Jaap van der Zwaag, Nederland is bijna klaar (Edam, 1977); Jaap van der Zwaag, Markerwaard/Markermeer. Witboek IJsselmeer (Utrecht, 1980). 251 See Water Weg, film, director unknown, Edam, 1977: Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer. For the review articles, see Unknown author, ‘VBIJ met film in de strijd tegen verdere inpolderingsplannen’, Leeuwarder Courant, October 28th 1977; Peter d’Hamecourt, ‘Film vecht voor behoud IJsselmeer’, Algemeen Dagblad, October 28th 1977; Unknown author, ‘Film over toekomst Markerwaard. “Water weg” meer dan voorlichting’, Trouw, November 1st 1977. 252 Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 368–369. 253 Figure 12: Bert Verhoeff, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/aca1091e-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 13: Bert Verhoeff, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/aca109fa-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 14: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07dfc-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 15: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07b54-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 16: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07cf8-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

69 a result of the reclamation. As a result of this continuous stream of activities, the APIJL was popular among the Dutch press. Reporters even frequently visited the APIJL annual meetings.254 The activities of the APIJL are starkly contrasted with the lack of pro-reclamation manifestations in 1976-1980 period. Presumably, most Dutch citizens and organised groups in favour of the Markerwaard assumed that the polder would be reclaimed anyway, which might explain this lack. One of the few pro-reclamation manifestations that did occur was the rather blunt attempt by Han Lammers, head of the IJsselmeerpolders Public Body (the organisation that aided in the organisation and transfer of power to new municipalities and provinces in the reclaimed polders). Lammers, the former alderman of Amsterdam, wanted to rename the Houtribdijk to Markerwaarddijk – a pretext to the polder it would contain. His promotion stunt failed, as only the minister of TWM had the jurisdiction to give the dike a name.255 As the end of the decade drew closer, and no policy proposal on the Markerwaard was published yet, its absence became a political issue as well as a source of frustration. In the 1977 election more political parties made a statement of opposing or favouring the reclamation. The lack of progress and need for a quick decision was even mentioned in the queen’s speech of 1979.256 In general, the Dutch press seemed to agree that any alacrity regarding the Markerwaard was gone by the end of the decade, and that postponing the decision had become the norm. Those involved in the Markerwaard struggle realised they were in it for the long haul. There was a general acceptance that the SCD-procedure was now the stage where this battle was to be fought. 257 As a result, there was hardly any development of the imaginary in this stage. It is noteworthy that only during the very late stages of this period, the anti-reclamation organisations united in the IJsselmeer Discussion Group (Dutch: Overleggroep IJsselmeer) and tried to convince the minister of TWM that a non- reclamation Markerwaard should be taken seriously.258 However, as has been discussed above, the final policy proposal did not include a non-reclamation option.

254 The annual meeting of November 1979 was best reported. During the meeting, members of parliament from the CDA and D’66 political parties expressed their opinions on the Markerwaard. See Unknown author, ‘Drooglegging Markerwaard “kernvergissing”’, De Volkskrant, November 12th 1979; Unknown author, ‘“Tegen slok-op valt niet meer in te polderen”’, NRC Handelsblad, November 12th 1979; Unknown author, ‘CDA: regering moet noodzaak aantonen. “Markerwaard is er nog niet”’, Trouw, November 12th 1979. Even the IJDA was present during these meetings to take notes. See Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Enkele opmerkingen bij de jaarrede van de voorzitter van de vereniging tot behoud van het IJsselmeer d.d. 10 november 1979 (Lelystad, 1980). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/enkele-opmerkingen-bij-de-jaarrede- van-de-voorzitter-van-de-vere. 255 The Volkskrant reconstructed Lammer’s attempt to rename the dike. See Lambiek Berends, ‘Dijk’, De Volkskrant, December 3rd 1977. Even though the dam still bears name Houtribdijk today, the small segment within Lelystad’s municipal borders was in fact renamed Markerwaarddijk. 256 See Parlement.com, Troonrede 1979. Available online: https://www.parlement.com/id/vjw0igtgd4ur/troonrede_1979_volledige_tekst. 257 Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 161–162. 258 The IJsselmeer Discussion Group consisted of, among other organisations, the APIJL, the Royal Dutch Water Recreation organisation, the Dutch Bird Conservation Society, fishermen unions, and various other organisations related to the IJssel lake.

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The 1977 demonstration

Figure 12: Mass public gathering in Volendam to protest the Markerwaard reclamation

Figure 13: Secretary of State Van Hulten accepts an eel, as part of the 1977 demonstration

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The 1979 demonstration

Figure 14: the 1979 manifestation as seen from the Volendam harbour.

Figure 16: Various slogans used during the 1979 Figure 15: Various slogans used during the 1979 manifestation, including 'Markerwaard Misdaad’ and ‘Doek manifestation, including ‘we laten er geen gras over ons ruime sop niet op’ groeien!’

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The Spatial Core Decision-procedure Once the policy proposal was published, the second phase of the SCD-procedure was initiated. This public participation phase was launched with a major communication campaign to inform the Dutch public and stimulate them to participate and share their opinion. The policy proposal document was put up for consultation in October 1980 at over 2000 locations. For a period of eight months, anyone interested could send in a response to the proposal.259 To make the public aware, a large advertisement campaign was organised in national and regional newspapers (see Figure 21), window posters and a free information brochure were distributed, and information meetings in various cities were organised. When all input was collected, the SPC organised hearings in order to become even further informed on the debate. Respondents could either be invited by the SPC to participate in these hearings or invite themselves. In this manner, the council heard 60 respondents.260 Once finished, the SPC summarized the participation response and subsequently wrote their own formal recommendation based on the input. During the procedure, many societal organisations declared to either be in favour or opposition of the policy proposal. Among the groups opposing reclamation were, for instance, the APIJL, the Royal Dutch Touring Club, the Royal Dutch Water Recreation Society, the Dutch Bird Protection Association and the Dutch Angler Association.261 Unsurprisingly, the APIJL was the most vocal opponent. In the eight-month participation period, the group organised several demonstrations. The largest anti-Markerwaard demonstration of the entire 1970-1990 period took place on June 6th, 1981 and was co-organised by the APIJL and the Royal Dutch Water Recreation Society. On that day, 2000 ships sailed on the Marker lake and circled the small fort-island of Pampus (See Figure 17-Figure 19).262 No less important were the declarations by the municipality of Amsterdam and the province of Noord-Holland. Both had been proponents of the reclamation project during the 1970s. Now, however, they switched sides and proclaimed they opposed the reclamation effort. Reclamation, according to their new position, was no longer necessary since Amsterdam could solve its housing problems within existing city bounds and Schiphol would likewise be able to expand on location.263 Given how many organisations declared to oppose reclamation, it is striking that virtually no pro-reclamation manifestations occurred. Apart from the signatures gathered by the aforementioned Belangengroep Inpoldering Markerwaard, there were hardly any

259 Originally, the public participation procedure was planned for a period of six months, in between October 1980 and April 1981. This turned out to be too limited, as the public information meetings only started in January 1981. As such, the period was extended to June. See DHR 16/320 3, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1980-1981, October 17th 1980; DHR 16/320 4, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1980-1981, April 13th 1981. 260 The Spatial Planning Council found no new points of view or alternate perspectives in the process. The hearings mainly served to confirm previously existing assumptions. The SPC found this lack of refreshing ideas very disappointing. The Council even changed the rules for hearings in subsequent SCD-procedures, so that they would be more useful to the process. See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 7. 261 For the declaration of the Royal Dutch Touring Club, see Unknown author, ‘Visie van ANWB op inrichting IJsselmeer’, Leeuwarder Courant, March 7th 1981. For the declaration of the Royal Dutch Water Recreation Society, see Unknown author, ‘Watersport tegen inpolderen Markerwaard’, Algemeen Dagblad, June 9th 1981. For the declaration of the Dutch Bird Protection Association, see Unknown author, ‘“NEE” tegen Markerwaard’, Algemeen Dagblad, June 19th 1981. 262 Figure 17: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7ba4-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 18: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7cc6-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 19: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7d98-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. 263 For the municipality of Amsterdam, see for instance Unknown author, ‘B. en W. Amsterdam tegen inpoldering Markerwaard’, De Waarheid, March 14th 1981. For the province of Noord-Holland, see Unknown author, ‘Noord-Holland beslist nog niet over inpolderen’, Trouw, October 13th 1981.

73 organisations that publicly agreed with the policy proposal. The organisers of the annual Dutch water recreation exhibition were one of the few, but claimed to only support only a small variant of the reclamation, which would leave more water open for recreational purposes.264 The most striking result of the participation procedure was the sheer amount of people who shared their opinion. Both in absolute terms, as well as relative to other SCD-procedures, the participation process was very successful.265 664 organisations and individuals had sent in a formal response to the policy proposal. Of those responses, nearly 200 were from formal institutions, both governmental (ca. 50) as well as NGOs (ca. 150). Over 400 responses were sent in by citizens who cared enough about the issue to read the policy proposal and share their thoughts.266 Additionally, guided discussion meetings and secondary school debates also resulted in a number of responses. The SPC estimated that these 664 responses represented at least 20.000 people. A lot of the formal responses were the result of a demonstration, manifestation or signature action, and as such represented a larger group of people – sometimes a few thousand.267 This total number of involved individuals was very high relative to other SCD-procedures that were held during the same period.268 A majority of the responses opposed the reclamation effort. Of the formal responses, 335 in total were in opposition, whereas 220 were in favour, and the remaining group was undecided. However, this balance changes when one includes the individual signatures. When considering the positions of the ca. 20.000 people represented by these responses, it becomes clear that a large majority opposed reclamation. In total, only 2700 signatures were collected in favour of reclamation, most of them (2496) by a single group called Belangengroep Inpoldering Markerwaard. In contrast, a staggering 15.500 signatures were collected opposing reclamation. Of these, 11.250 and 1130 signatures were collected during two separate demonstrations organised by APIJL.269 As perhaps can be expected, the respondents were not evenly distributed across the country. Goverde calculates that 78% of responses in favour of reclamation originated in the IJsselmeerpolders, while 58% the responses against reclamation hail from Noord-Holland.270 Many respondents also criticised the formalities of the policy proposal document and the procedure. There were two key points of criticism. First, respondents argued that the policy proposal lacked crucial information. In general, vague phrasing and the lack of data-based argumentation were denounced. The lack of a detailed plan for the spatial composition of the Markerwaard was especially glaring. Neither did the policy proposal contain detailed information on, for instance, the geohydrological consequences of reclamation, which was a major issue for inhabitants of cities adjacent to the Markerwaard. A lot of relevant information was published only during or even after

264 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Hiswa: kleinere Markerwaard met ‘ongedeeld’ water, NRC Handelsblad, February 19th 1981. 265 Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 263. 266 The full list of respondents can be seen in the overview by the Spatial Planning Council. See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 34-43 (attachment 2). 267 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 8. 268 The SPC compared the response to the Markerwaard-SCD to other SCD-procedures in the same period (1980-1982). Twelve were organised in those years, and only one saw a higher number of responses (the Nota Landelijke Gebieden with795 responses). This is quite understandable since that was a nation-wide policy proposal. A more comparable SCD on a regional, such as the Waddenzee-SCD, only had 398 formal reactions. More noteworthy perhaps, the Markerwaard- SCD saw 421 responses by individuals, which was nearly double the amount of people who responded to the Waddenzee- SCD. See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 33. 269 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 8, 34-43. 270 Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 267–268.

74 the SCD-procedure. The Dutch environmental organisation Natuur en Milieu even went to court when the Dutch press rumoured in January 1981 that a particularly important document that did have information on the spatial composition of the Markerwaard was kept confidential.271 Second, various organisations complained that the policy proposal did not discuss alternatives to the Markerwaard. Two alternatives in particular were missed, the first of which was the Marker lake option. As mentioned above, the IJsselmeer Discussion Group had lobbied for such an alternative in the summer of 1980, but to no avail. This group therefore tried to produce this alternative by itself, in collaboration with several university researchers. Their report was published in the middle of the participation period in February 1981.272 Their appeal likely influenced responses to the ongoing participation procedure, and more importantly, influenced the 1981 election, which will be discussed below. The other alternative was Plan Lievense, a plan to build an energy reservoir in the Marker lake. The Dutch engineer Luc Lievense made this plan as a response to the general ongoing energy debate in the wake of the oil crisis and safety concerns on nuclear power plants. Lievense’s plan combined a wind farm with a heightened water reservoir in which superfluous wind energy could be stored. Several Dutch newspapers caught wind of his plan in the early months of 1980, right before the SCD-procedure was initiated.273 Even though the Markerwaard was deemed as an inappropriate location for this water reservoir by the IJDA in 1983, many respondents to the SCD-procedure criticised the government for not considering this option in the policy proposal.274 As a result of the parallel participation procedure and the 1981 elections, the Markerwaard debate became politicised. During the previous election of 1977 and 1972, of the major parties only the progressive D’66 and social-democrat PvdA declared to oppose reclamation, while most other parties did not consider the issue to be relevant. By contrast, in 1981 more than half of the political parties mentioned the Markerwaard in their election programmes. Only one political party, the reformed protestant RPF, was unequivocally in favour of reclaiming the Markerwaard, while many others decided to oppose reclamation. This included the PvdA and progressive D’66, two major opposition parties to the incumbent Van Agt-I administration. 275 Importantly, the liberal VVD and the Christian Democrat CDA parties – who together formed the Van Agt-I administration – both took no definitive stance to the reclamation project, wanting to await the results of the SCD-procedure.

271 The document in question was the so-called 3DG-nota, and it indeed contained information on the spatial composition of the polder. However, it was not published until after the participation procedure. Without such spatial composition plans, it was downright impossible to determine which potential functions of the Markerwaard could ultimately be realised. Especially since the combined area of all proposed potential functions was much larger than the total area that was to be reclaimed. For the military practice terrain, see for instance Unknown author, ‘Defensie wil andere oefenterreinen’, De Volkskrant, March 18th 1981. For the discussion, see DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 9-10, 23. 272 Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 293–294. 273 Lievense’s plan sparked less enthusiasm among the Dutch press than, for instance, Plan Waterlely had done a decade earlier. Still, it was expected that Plan Lievense would become yet another reason to delay the decision-making process on the Markerwaard. See Theo Klein, ‘Een stuwmeer, een lange dijk en windmolens’, De Volkskrant, February 9th 1980; Haro Hielkema, ‘Leeghwater, Lely, Lievense. Windmolens langs Markermeer als energie-leveranciers’, Trouw, March 14th 1980. For a general analysis of the history of Plan Lievense, see Unknown Author, ‘Lievense, de man van het opslagbekken’, De Ingenieur (2015) Available online: https://www.deingenieur.nl/artikel/lievense-de-man-van-het- opslagbekken. . 274 See Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, De Markerwaard en het plan Lievense (Lelystad, 1983), 20. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/de-markerwaard-en-het-plan-lievense. Also see DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 23-26. 275 See Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma's: Bijeengebracht en van een register voorzien door prof. dr. I. Lipschits (The Hague, 1977); Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma’s 1981: bijeengebracht en van een register voorzien door prof. Dr. I. Lipschits (The Hague, 1981).

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The 1981 Pentecost demonstration

Figure 18: Various slogans used during the 1981 manifestation, including Figure 17: Various slogans used during the 1981 manifestation, including 'We laten er geen gras over groeien' 'Wie gooit er nou geld in 't water?!'

Figure 19: A young family participates in the 1981 manifestation. In the background, a large ship flies a banner ‘Markermeer met water veel meer waard voor later’.

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As a consequence of the politicisation, the Markerwaard became a key subject during the subsequent government formation procedure. The CDA, D’66 and PvdA formed the new Van Agt-II administration. Whereas the CDA did not want to influence the ongoing SCD-procedure, the other two parties wanted to change the governmental position on the Markerwaard.276 As a result, the new administration took a new position regarding the Markerwaard. It declared that the Dutch government was not convinced of the desirability of the Markerwaard, yet the ongoing SCD- procedure would be respected before the government would make a final decision on the case.277 The new governmental position affected the final SPC recommendation. The SPC was supposed to summarize the participation procedure results and subsequently provide a recommendation on the Markerwaard reclamation. The council usually sought to compromise and favoured unanimous or large majority recommendations. However, now it was forced to incorporate this new government position. The council had therefore decided to discuss not one, but two scenarios for the Markerwaard: the reclamation-scenario of the policy proposal as well as a completely new, non-reclamation scenario. The SPC published the recommendation report in March 1982. The council determined to cast a vote between either reclaiming now, reclaiming later, not reclaiming at all, or postponing the decision. None of the options reached a majority, particularly because nearly half of the 43 councillors did not cast a vote at all. The largest minority of 13 members voted in favour of reclaiming right now, whereas two opposed reclamation, and the rest voted for postponing the decision or reclaiming later.278 The Van Agt-II administration, tasked to make a final decision on the Markerwaard, now had to deal with this strongly divided recommendation. That process, as might be expected, took nearly another decade, and will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.

Sub-conclusion Due to the entanglement of the Markerwaard debate with the Second National Airport debate, it took the Dutch government until 1980 to develop its policy proposal to reclaim the Markerwaard. This was a particularly powerful expression of a socio-technical imaginary on reclamation. In the meanwhile, the opponents of the reclamation effort were able to sharpen their arguments and gain favour among the Dutch public for their cause. The Dutch press criticised the slow decision-making procedure. During the actual SCD-procedure of 1981-1982, a remarkably high number of people participated, and largely opposed the reclamation effort. It is striking that during both the build-up to the SCD-procedure as well as during the procedure, there were hardly any pro-reclamation manifestations. Many criticised the seemingly biased policy proposal. The various responses to the policy proposal are illustrative of the various imaginaries on land reclamation and spatial planning present in Dutch society, as will be discussed in the next sections of this chapter. Importantly, during this same period general elections were held. Not only did the Markerwaard become a topic of debate in the election campaign, the new administration reversed their predecessor’s position and now openly doubted the desirability of the Markerwaard. As a consequence, the final recommendation by the SPC was strongly divided. This was a tell-tale sign of the stalemate to come.

276 Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 369. 277 See DHR 17/000 2, R.F.M. Lubbers, J. de Koning & F. van Thijn, ‘Brief van de informateurs’, 1981, August 3rd 1981, 25. 278 Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 263.

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4.2 STI-analysis of the policy proposal In this section, I will subject the policy proposal on the Markerwaard to the socio-technical imaginary analysis framework.

Development of the Markerwaard area The proposal, Development of the Markerwaard area, was sent to the Dutch parliament in September 1980.279 Since this document was at stake in the public participation procedure, it can be considered as an expression of the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation, and the starting point for the various alternate imaginaries that rose up against it during the participation procedure. Development of the Markerwaard area was widely available: everyone in the Netherlands could either consult this document in most governmental buildings in the country, or request this document be send to them. An alternative to this policy proposal was an information brochure, basically a popularised version of the policy proposal, that would be send if one responded to the national advertisement campaign of October 1980. During the procedure, 9785 copies of the policy proposal were distributed, as well as over 20.000 brochures.280 This analysis will be based on the document itself; the debate surrounding it will be analysed in the next section. In Development of the Markerwaard area, the choice to reclaim the Markerwaard was divided in four important decisions. First, the document proposed that the Markerwaard area would be partially reclaimed, not fully. The new polder would have an area of 410 km2, roughly in a square shape with corners near Enkhuizen, Lelystad, Almere, and Edam, but smaller than the 500 km2 reclamation proposed by the ZPD in 1972. The polder would be surrounded by edge lakes, which cover ca. 200 km2 (a third of the size of the Marker lake). Second, the reclamation project would start in the near future, although no starting date was determined. The speed of the project depended on the economical and budgetary development of the country. Third, no spatial composition of the polder was provided, only general indications. Half of the reclaimed land would have an arable purpose. The other half would consist of recreational areas (including forests), urban areas, and nature. Last, once the decision to reclaim had been made, a regional plan would be developed to determine the final spatial composition of the polder. This plan would be subject to criticism by the usual advisory councils.281

The socio-technical imaginary expressed in the Development of the Markerwaard area Desirable and undesirable future Development of the Markerwaard area argued that the polder was a widely desired future, just within reach. Unlike the 1973 Reconsiderations document, this document did not necessarily emphasise the spatial problems of the Randstad and the Netherlands in general. Instead, it focused on the nearly limitless possibilities this new land would have to offer. Agriculture was proposed as a ‘minimum’ variant for the spatial composition of the new land - minimum in an economic sense, in the respect that other functions would result in higher return rates – and at least 50% of the polder would become arable land. The remaining area could become urban, forest, nature, or recreation

279 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980. 280 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 5. 281 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 41-42.

78 space. It could provide a potential location for an airport, a military practice terrain, or even a powerplant. And the reclamation effort would boost archaeology and technical innovation.282 It was deemed unnecessary to discuss any alternatives to the reclamation, and only the polder-option was developed and discussed. Potential disadvantages of the reclamation were acknowledged, but ‘decreased to a minimally acceptable level’, and therefore not compared to alternatives.283 The choice to leave roughly 1/3rd of the Marker lake as edge lakes would allow for water recreation and fishing to continue. From a financial perspective, it was acknowledged that reclaiming a polder was expensive. Yet, the proposal calculated that even if the entire polder would become arable space, the return from selling the land to farmers would be equal to the investment of creating the polder. Any other spatial destination was considered to be potentially more profitable, and as such the polder could be expected to be financially sound, even if the exact spatial composition was not yet clear. In fact, the policy proposal literally argued it was important to move away from the disadvantages of reclamation and focus instead on the many advantages.284

Target community Even though the policy proposal kicked off a public participation campaign, Development of the Markerwaard area has little interaction with the Dutch public. It is written mostly from the perspective of the government itself, as expressed in its choice of language when discussing the economic consequences of the reclamation. For instance, it only considered the national budget and national employability rates, instead of discussing the consequences for a particular employment sector such as fishermen.285 Importantly, the policy proposal did not seem keen to engage in a debate about the reclamation itself: the Dutch public was invited to participate and give their opinion on the spatial composition of the new area, instead of the desirability of reclamation itself.286 Especially the information brochure was harshly criticised by respondents for its propagandic nature. 20.000 brochures were distributed among the Dutch population. The respondents, especially those who opposed the reclamation effort, argued the brochure was less of an objective and informational summary of the policy proposal, and more of a propagandistic attempt to deceive the Dutch public that the Markerwaard reclamation was a benefit to the entire country.287

Story-line The imaginary that is expressed in Development of the Markerwaard area provides a very simple yet powerful storyline why reclamation is necessary. Roughly summarized, it argues that the Netherlands is densely populated and strongly urbanized. Population and spatial demands from all types of activities will continue to grow and increase in the coming decades. Additional land,

282 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 16-25. 283 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 33. 284 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 25-27, 30. 285 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 5 286 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 37. 287 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 9.

79 therefore, is always useful and welcome.288 This seems to echo the storylines expressed in the Reconsiderations document, and starkly contrasts the imaginary of Plan Waterlely. Although all agree that there are spatial problems in the Netherlands that need to be solved, Plan Waterlely argues that they should be solved on the existing land, without resorting to reclamation efforts. The storyline indeed excludes other types of solutions for problems related to economic growth, and as such make growth seems as an autonomous process, beyond the influence of policies. Another important storyline is the use of data and maps in the document, or rather, the lack of it. Graphs, data tables and maps can be powerful storylines, for they summarize a lot of information in a single visualisation. For a document that formulates policies on a hotly debated issue, there is an astounding lack of data used to support the presented arguments. The long, dense document features only one table which shows the financial justification for the reclamation effort, and a single map of the polder-to-be (see Figure 20).289 The map presents the Markerwaard as white, empty space, in contrast with the surrounding land. This perhaps represented the potential of the polder, but it also represented the lack of spatial composition, and could be interpreted as indecisiveness.

Figure 20: The planned Markerwaard polder according to the 1980 policy proposal Development of the Markerwaard area.

288 Expressed in various statements across the document. See, for instance, DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 5, 13, 17, 18. 289 Figure 20: Ministry of Transport and Water Management. The figure originates from the 1980 policy proposal. See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 9.

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Closure One of the key elements of the imaginary that was expressed in Development of the Markerwaard area was its supposed urgency. Beyond arguing that the reclamation was historically inevitable, as was done in Reconsiderations, the document expressed that the decision whether to reclaim the Markerwaard had to be made right now. Already in 1976, the Water Management Council had recommended to swiftly proceed with the decision. The policy proposal argued that since 1976, much research has been done to solve some unanswered questions, yet the nature of the debate was unchanged and thus the urgency only increased. As such, postponing the decision would only result in repeating the same debate some moment in the future. It would be better to reclaim now, rather than delaying the inevitable.290 In the SCD-procedure advertisement campaign, this element of closure was expressed through a powerful metaphor: the Markerwaard was the last piece of the puzzle. A visual graphic in the advertisement (see Figure 21) portrayed the Netherlands as a large jigsaw puzzle, with an open gap at the location of the Marker lake.291 A hand brought in the last piece of the puzzle, about to put it into place. This was a powerful reminder that the decision was about to be made, and the future – a reclaimed Markerwaard – was close at hand. Additionally, this illustration downplayed the possibility that not reclaiming the Markerwaard was an option, as that would leave the puzzle unfinished.

Temporality Development of the Markerwaard area largely draws upon the history of the Markerwaard plans to present the Markerwaard polder as the logical next step in history. The document has a historical chapter that explains the backstory of the Zuiderzee Works, including the 19th century plans, the 1918 law, and subsequently the various changes to the planning that occurred throughout the 20th century.292 Importantly, the reasons for those earlier reclamations are not discussed, simply that there was and still is a historical tendency to expand the area of the Netherlands. As such, the Markerwaard is presented as a logical next step in this history. The proposal also frames the Markerwaard as unfinished: it has a silhouette of dikes and dams, but work needs to be done to complete it.293 Regarding the future, the policy proposal compares the current values of the Marker lake area to the future potential of the Markerwaard polder. This line of reasoning excludes alternate futures, such as the scenario presented in the Plan Waterlely or the much-desired lake variants that respondents complained about. The policy proposal essentially juxtaposes two alternatives for the area: their own reclamation plan, versus a bare and open lake without any future value.294 The plan also stating that, once a decision to reclaim had been made, reversing this decision by inundating a

290 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 11, 29. 291 Figure 21: This ad was placed in all national newspapers on October 14th, 1980. See, for instance, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat & Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘Inspraak Markerwaard’, NRC Handelsblad, October 14th 1980. 292 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 6-11. 293 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 7. 294 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 18. Also see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 266.

81 reclaimed polder was ‘unimaginable’, so it was important to make the right decision. It was acknowledged that new ideas on society and ecology could develop, which included notion to keep the lake as it was. However, the authors dismissed those options as ‘risks’ inherent to the nature of any spatial decision, and as such a risk the government was willing to bear. 295

Figure 21: the SCD-procedure advertisement, as published in newspapers in October 1981

295 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 30.

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Important signifiers and their signified The policy proposal uses the concept Markerwaardgebied – also in the title – to refer to the area at stake, yet this word is prejudiced in favour of reclamation. Alternative concepts, such as Markermeer and Markerwaard, are also used in the document, but not as the primary designator for the area at stake. Formally, the policy proposal presented the concept Markerwaardgebied as a simple geographic indicator.296 However, the concept signifies the area as a polder-to-be, instead of the lake it was in 1980 or perhaps could be in the future. Moreover, whereas the concept markerwaardgebied often has positive associations, the concept Markermeer (Marker lake) is frequently negatively associated in the document. ‘Open’ land areas are valuable for urbanisation but an open Marker lake is of no use, and the Marker lake cannot contribute to solving future spatial problems, nor can it support urbanisation policies. 297

Sub-conclusion Development of the Markerwaard area was at stake in the public participation procedure and can therefore be considered as the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation, as well as the starting point for various resistant imaginaries. The imaginary present in this policy proposal was largely based on the one expressed in the 1973 Reconsiderations document, but for an important exception: instead of keeping a monster at bay, the Markerwaard polder itself became the most desirable future. The Markerwaard polder was presented as not just inevitable, but just around the corner, and a sense of urgency in choosing in favour of reclamation was conveyed. No alternative scenarios were considered. Still, no plans for the spatial composition of the polder were conceived either. The imaginary that was expressed in the policy proposal seemed to disregard any resistance to it. The imaginary is summarized in Table 5.

296 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 43. 297 See DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 17, 18, 20. Also see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 265–266.

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Table 5: Socio-technical Imaginary present in the policy proposal Development of the Markerwaard area Component Expressed socio-technical imaginary Desirable and undesirable future The policy proposal argued that the polder was a widely desired future, just within reach. It was deemed unnecessary to develop any alternatives to reclamation, and only that option was discussed in great detail. Target community Even though the policy proposal kicked of a public participation campaign, the document has little interaction with the Dutch public. Importantly, the document did not seem enthusiastic to engage in a debate about the reclamation itself, asking the Dutch public only to respond with ideas on the spatial composition of the new polder. Story-line The Netherlands is densely populated and strongly urbanized. Population and spatial demands from all types of activities will continue to grow and increase in the coming decades. Additional land, therefore, is always useful. Closure One of the key elements of the policy proposal was its sense of urgency. This element of closure was expressed through a powerful metaphor: the Markerwaard was the last piece of the puzzle to finish the Netherlands. Temporality The policy proposal largely draws upon the history of the Markerwaard plans to present the Markerwaard polder as inevitable. By only comparing the future potential of the Markerwaard polder with the current values of the Marker lake, alternative futures are excluded from the debate. Important signifiers and their signified The policy proposal uses the concept Markerwaardgebied, also in its title, to refer to the area at stake, yet this word is prejudiced in favour of reclamation.

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4.3 A diversification of opinions on the Markerwaard In this section, I discuss the direct response to Development of the Markerwaard area, and as such, the response to the socio-technical imaginary expressed in this policy proposal. The SCD-procedure forced many people to formulate an opinion on the Markerwaard issue for the first time. Of these new opinions, a larger number opposed the reclamation rather than favoured it. Although at first glance it seems as if the Dutch society was polarised over the Markerwaard debate, the actual responses in the participation procedure show that opinions very much diversified. I will first discuss in what ways the SCD-procedure forced the Dutch society to formulate an opinion regarding the Markerwaard. Then, I will discuss the various opinions that were recorded as responses to the SCD- procedure. In contrast to previous sections, I do not analyse the imaginary expressed in a single source. The goal of this section is to determine whether a variety of imaginaries can be found among the responses, or perhaps only a small number that were thus relatively more influential. The SCD-procedure forced a part of Dutch society to formulate an opinion on the Markerwaard, and most of these new opinions opposed reclamation. The amount of people engaged with the Markerwaard debate by 1980 was high relative in comparison to the early 1970s, yet in absolute terms, it was still not much. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, at various moments in time, the attitude of Dutch society regarding the Markerwaard has been surveyed, by agencies such as TNS-NIPO. When analysing the long-term changes in these opinion polls results, two trends attract attention. While during the late 1970s roughly a third of the population opposed reclamation, this group grew to over half during the SCD-procedure. The group that was in favour of reclamation also grew, but only slightly. The group which did not have a strong opinion on the subject – roughly a third during the late 1970s – shrunk remarkably during the same period. A poll held in 1985 even found that only 3% of their respondents did not have an opinion on the matter.298 As such, it seems that from 1976 to 1982 and beyond, many people had given the Markerwaard question some thoughts and either were in favour or opposed reclamation. These numbers must be put in context, however. Surveyors found in 1984 that ca. 20% of the Dutch population was engaged with issues such as the installation of nuclear warheads of the construction of nuclear powerplants, while only 3% showed the same level of engagement to the Markerwaard.299 Relative to other debates, people were less engaged or worried about the future of the Markerwaard. Apart from various organisations declaring their opposition to the reclamation, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, the role of the Dutch press should be scrutinized. Even though they abstained from publicly choosing a side, many media seemed to favour the anti-reclamation camp by framing the issue in particular ways and allowing anti-reclamation organisations to express themselves in the news. During the run-up to the SCD procedure, several newspapers openly criticised the slow decision-making process. Although the publication of the policy proposal in September 1980 was initially received favourably, this quickly reverted back to criticism once reporters realised that this policy proposal was only the start of a procedure that could easily take another few years.300 Throughout the SCD-procedure, some major newspapers – especially NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant – explicitly provided the opponents of reclamation, such as the APIJL,

298 Even though this remarkably low number was probably due to the methods of the surveyors, it is very likely that the group that did not have an opinion on the Markerwaard had shrunk to less than 10% of the population after the SCD- procedure. See Ibid., 278–281. 299 See Unknown author, ‘Kleine meerderheid Nederlanders tegen polder Markerwaard’, Algemeen Dagblad, February 15th 1985. 300 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘“Polder Markerwaard biedt veel voordelen”’, NRC Handelsblad, June 21st 1980; Unknown author, ‘Kabinet-Van Agt wil Markerwaard gaan inpolderen. Definitief besluit na inspraak-ronde’, Het Parool, June 21st 1980; Unknown author, ‘Markerwaard wordt polder. Kabinet onduidelijk over bestemming’, Trouw, June 21st 1980; Unknown author, ‘Principebesluit kabinet: toch inpoldering van Markerwaard’, De Volkskrant, June 21st 1980.

85 with a platform to formulate their opinion.301 Still, it is noteworthy that only two newspapers formally took a stance the Markerwaard debate: the left-wing Volkskrant and the protestant reformed Nederlands Dagblad as well.302 Another important news medium was the Dutch broadcasting formation NOS, which produced a documentary on the Markerwaard debate and broadcast it in the middle of the SCD-procedure.303 Rather than being unbiased, the documentary clearly opposed the Markerwaard reclamation, by focussing on what was lost with the reclamation effort.

Socio-technical imaginaries expressed in the responses to the SCD-procedure It is worthwhile to consider to what extent the responses to the SCD-procedure were compatible with the hegemonic STI on land reclamation. And, if they were not, whether a single resistant STI, or a variety of different imaginaries, were expressed in these responses. When taking a closer look at the responses to the SCD-procedure, it becomes clear that there was much more diversity in the opinion on the Markerwaard than simply favouring or opposing it. The scope of this thesis does not allow me to analyse the imaginaries that were expressed in each of these 664 responses individually. Therefore, I will focus on the categories of responses that the Spatial Planning Council had identified. The SPC grouped the responses in fourteen categories, based on their approach to the Markerwaard (arguing from a general vision on society, or arguing from a specific interest); the thoroughness of a response (whether it discussed the entire policy proposal or just some aspects of it); and the opinion on the Markerwaard reclamation (proponent, opponent, neutral).304 To limit the extent of this analysis, some of these categories can be collapsed into others, which allows me to end up with five broad categories of responses (see Table 6).305 For four of these five response-categories, I will discuss to what extent it fits the imaginary expressed in the policy proposal.306 There was no single most influential counter-imaginary prevalent among the responses. Some of them evolved from Plan Waterlely, but others evolved from completely different ideas on the best future for the Netherlands. Respondents who proposed a full polder reclamation largely agreed with the desirable future expressed in the policy proposal’s imaginary. It is important to note that only a handful of these responses, such as the one by Genootschap Flevo, seemed to uphold a very similar imaginary for the future of the Netherlands. Most of the respondents mainly agreed with the closure expressed in this imaginary – reclaim the Markerwaard – but wanted to see as much of their own interests realized as a desirable future. For example, forestry organizations were in favour of reclaiming the Markerwaard, but only if the final spatial composition of the polder would include as much forests as possible. Similarly, some municipalities adjacent to the Markerwaard were in favour of reclaiming if the final spatial composition would be in their benefit, for instance by stimulating commercial

301 See H.J. Goverde, ‘IJsselmeer onvervangbaar als Nederlands Natuurgebied’, NRC Handelsblad, June 27th 1980; Unknown author, ‘“Ambtenaren beslissen over Markerwaard”’, De Volkskrant, May 9th 1981. 302 See Unknown author, ‘Ten Geleide: Markerwaard’, De Volkskrant, June 23rd 1980; Unknown author, ‘Markerwaard heeft nog kans. Besluit van kabinet allerminst definitief’, De Volkskrant, July 19th 1980; GJV, ‘“Markerwaard/Markermeer” is een interessant boek’, Nederlands Dagblad, July 31st, 1980. 303 The documentary was broadcast on April 1st 1981. See Markerwaard, winst of verlies?, director: Piet Windmeijer, Hilversum, 1981: Nationale Omroepstichting. It has been suggested that the contemporary head editor of the NOS was an avid water sportsman and a strong opponent of the reclamation, which might explain the prejudiced approach of this documentary. See Kasper Jansen, ‘NOS-Journaal: uitleg of lekkere plaatjes?’, NRC Handelsblad, April 18th 1981. 304 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 23-26. 305 The amount of responses recorded in this table approximates the actual responses in each category. The SPC unfortunately did not provide an accurate count of all responses in the categories they distinguished, instead they approximated. However, when computing the separate approximations, the total is not equal to the total of responses recorded in the process. As such, I decided to approximate as well. See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 34-43 (attachment 2). 306 The fifth category ‘others’ is simply too diverse to discuss here.

86 activities in their municipality. As such, although these respondents all favoured reclamation, they imagined very different desirable futures that would result from reclamation.307

Table 6: overview of SCD-procedure responses, collapsed into five categories Response category by SCP # responses New category for STI-discussion (rounded up) Proponents of reclamation, arguing from a Ca. 5 general societal vision Proponents of reclamation, arguing from a Ca. 100 specific interest Proponents of reclamation, discussing only Ca. 90 Proponents of full reclamation (ca. 225, 34%) part of the policy proposal Proponents of reclamation, discussing all Ca. 10 aspects of the policy proposal Proponents of reclamation, discussing only Ca. 20 size/shape of the polder-to-be

Proponents of reclamation + Plan Lievense Ca. 10 Proponents of partial reclamation Ca. 10 Proponents of partial reclamation (ca. 40, 6%) Opponents of reclamation, propose Plan Ca. 20 Lievense instead

Postponers Ca. 20 Postponers (ca. 20, 3%)

Others (critical of policy proposal, but no Ca. 20 Others (ca. 20, 3%) specific opinion/too divided)

Opponents of reclamation, discussing all Ca. 70 aspects of the policy proposal Opponents of reclamation, discussing only part Ca. 170 of the policy proposal Opponents of reclamation (ca. 330, 54%) Opponents of reclamation, arguing from a Ca. 70 specific interest Opponents of reclamation, arguing from a Ca. 20 general societal vision Total: 664

Respondents who proposed a partial polder reclamation agreed with the policy proposal’s storyline that reclamation would solve societal issues. However, they disagreed on the monster to be kept at bay, arguing that in fact other societal issues could be solved through reclamation or alteration of the Marker lake. A striking number of respondents promoted the idea of Plan Lievense, to build a major wind farm and water reservoir in the lake which would help solve the Dutch energy crisis. For some respondents, this implied that reclamation of the Markerwaard could partially occur alongside Plan Lievense while others figured this made reclamation impossible. These respondents defied the policy proposal’s desirable future as well as the proposed closure but saw potential in the space of the Marker lake to solve societal issues. They considered that that altering the Marker lake in the future was inevitable. Additionally, this group includes some respondents who favoured a smaller polder to increase the water recreation potential of the remaining edge lakes.308

307 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 24-25. 308 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 24-25.

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Respondents who wanted to postpone the reclamation mainly challenged the temporal dimensions of the policy proposal. Regardless whether the Markerwaard itself was a desirable future, or whether Dutch spatial problems needed to be solved by reclaiming land, these respondents argued that right now was not the time to decide on reclamation. They denounced the urgency of the policy proposal. Some of the respondents, such as several municipalities and the labour union FNV, saw the potential of reclamation but wanted to wait for an economically more opportune moment. Others simply argued that, without a fully developed alternative lake-scenario, it was impossible to judge whether the reclamation was a good idea.309 Respondents who opposed the reclamation altogether disagreed with every single aspect of the imaginary expressed in the policy proposal. Some opponents argued from a specific interest, such as water recreation, and found the open Marker lake to be a more desirable future than a reclaimed polder, regardless of the merits such a polder could have. Most of the respondents in this group argued that reclaiming the Markerwaard would not be a solution to any existing spatial problem at all. In contrast to the policy proposal, these groups argued that increasing urbanisation was still an undesirable future that needed to be kept at bay. The Markerwaard, however, was not a solution. Echoing the sentiment from Plan Waterlely, these respondents argued that such problems needed to be fixed by permanently changing the spatial quality of the Netherlands. Simply adding on to the total area of the Netherlands would not solve anything. These respondents were the only ones that tried to appeal to the larger Dutch public through protests and manifestations. As such, they were in a position to launch alternative signifiers during the SCD-procedure, such as labelling the entire procedure as a planologische kernvergissing (‘spatial core mistake’, phonetically close to planologische kernbeslissing, the Dutch name for the SCD-procedure).310 Additionally, these respondents expressed a different idea on temporality. They echoed the ideas that were expressed more than half a century earlier by Harderwijk fishing industrialist Eibert den Herder: the IJsselmeer region was valuable, ecologicaly, culturally and historically, and reclamation would destroy that. To prevent this from occurring, these respondents argued, starting today the Marker lake should be managed as a lake, not as a polder-to-be.311

Sub-conclusion The policy proposal was an expression of a hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation. Through the SCD-procedure, the general Dutch awareness of the Markerwaard issue was increased and quite a lot of people were forced to formulate an opinion on the Markerwaard. This process was fuelled because of the many organisations that publicly declared to oppose reclamation, and also because of the slightly biased anti-reclamation framing of events by the Dutch press. As such, many alternatives to the Markerwaard were explored, which can be seen in the wide variety of responses to the SCD-procedure. Importantly, there was no single most influential counter-imaginary prevalent among those who opposed the pro-reclamation policy proposal. Some organisations opposed reclamation based on their interests, while others argued from a wider vision of an ideal societal future. All insights strongly influenced the final SPC- recommendation, which was the first step to toppling the hegemonic STI. This will be discussed in the next segment.

309 See DHR 16/320 5-6, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel b, Hoofdlijnen uit de Inspraak’, 1981-1982, March 29th 1982, 25. 310 See Jaap van der Zwaag, Markerwaard/Markermeer. Witboek IJsselmeer (Utrecht, 1980). Also see Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Enkele opmerkingen bij de jaarrede van de voorzitter van de vereniging tot behoud van het IJsselmeer d.d. 10 november 1979 (Lelystad, 1980). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/enkele-opmerkingen-bij-de-jaarrede-van-de-voorzitter-van-de- vere. 311 This concept was already coined in 1974 by members of the APIJL. See Jaap Kramer & Theo Kampa, Groot IJsselmeerboek (Amsterdam, 1974).

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4.4 STI-analysis of the Spatial Planning Council recommendation In this segment, I will discuss how the Spatial Planning Council reflected on the participation procedure in order to develop its own recommendation on the Markerwaard case, which was published in April 1982. Even though the council’s decision did not strongly influence the public debate, it did affect subsequent decision-making on the Markerwaard. After discussing the council’s recommendations in general, I turn to the 1982 recommendation itself. Contrary to how the council usually operates, on the Markerwaard it was unusually divided. In contrast to the policy proposal, in which only the option to reclaim the Markerwaard was discussed, the Spatial Planning Council decided to elaborate on both a reclamation and a non-reclamation scenario. In its final recommendation the council turned out to be strongly divided, with neither option reaching a majority vote. As such, I argue that the Spatial Planning Council’s response was a reflection of the societal debate, rather than an attempt to compromise and move forward. The SPC was one of the most influential governmental bodies working with spatial planning issues. In contrast to other advisory bodies, the members of the SPC were experts who were not civil servants.312 This included representatives from provinces and water boards, but also private organisations, labour unions, environmental organisations, and professors on spatial planning. The council had an influential position. For large and complex spatial planning issues, ministers usually asked for the council’s recommendation, since it would reflect the opinion of a diverse array of societal actors. By involving these organisations early in the decision-making process, it was hoped that these actors would not publicly denounce decisions made in a later stage. Consequently, the members of the SPC were inclined to compromise on issues. A unanimous recommendation by the council was very difficult to ignore for a minister, while a small majority decision – or worse, a complete disarray of opinions in the council – could easily lead to the responsible minister deciding his or her own fancy, or postponing the decision.313 It is therefore peculiar that the Spatial Planning Council was unable to reach a majority decision in its recommendation on the Markerwaard case.314 As has been discussed above, the elections of 1981 – held during the SCD-procedure – resulted in the new Van Agt-II administration. This administration changed positions on the reclamation in late 1981, and proclaimed it was not convinced of the desirability of the Markerwaard. The SPC prepared its recommendation between June 1981 and April 1982 and as such was confronted with this new political reality mid-way through its working process. Several members of the council felt the new stance justified looking at alternatives to the policy proposal, but not all agreed. It was difficult to find a consensus for any alternative.315 Therefore, the council took a unique approach. It would develop two scenarios for the Markerwaard, a reclamation and a non-reclamation scenario. Importantly, the scenarios were not endorsed by all members of the council. Rather, they were a result of the ‘mental universe’ of its proponents, that is to say, the Markerwaard scenario was a depiction based on the ideas of councilmembers in favour of reclamation, while the Marker lake scenario was a depiction based on

312 There were two other important governmental bodies that worked on spatial planning: the Rijksplanologische Dienst, in which civil servants prepared national spatial planning, and the Rijksplanologische Commissie, in which civil servants from various ministries advised the minister of Spatial Planning on all types of spatial planning issues. 313 Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 282–283. 314 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 5-11. 315 ‘Bovendien werd al in een vroeg stadium duidelijk dat de gebruikelijke wijze van adviseren door de raad, waarbij een advies wordt gepresenteerd dat berust op een hoge mate van consensus, met in enkele gevallen een minderheidsstandpunt op onderdelen, niet mogelijk zou zijn. […] De raad heeft, gezien de situatie, gemeend het advies een innoverende, wat minder traditionele opzet te geven.’ See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 10.

89 the ideas of those councilmembers who opposed reclamation. 316 As a result, this was anything but a compromise: personal and institutional preferences were abundant in both scenarios. The scenarios therefore displayed the debate within the council, and the debate within broader society, very thoroughly, instead of providing a compromise.

The socio-technical imaginaries expressed in the SPC recommendation The pro-reclamation scenario was perhaps the most explicit expression of the hegemonic imaginary already presented in the Reconsiderations report and the Development of the Markerwaard area policy proposal. The same monster was to be kept at bay: the spatial consequences from overpopulation in the Randstad and the old land in general. Disastrous consequences would await the Green Heart and other nature areas (new to this rendition of the imaginary). The authors did not question the ability of current spatial policies to solve this problem, but they argued that there was still a lack of space to expand in the future, and to solve spatial bottlenecks on the old land. Reclaiming the Markerwaard was the perfect closure, as the spatial value of the Markerwaard would be larger than the sum of any conceivable spatial solutions that could be located there.317 A letter, attached to the recommendation and signed by some council-members that favoured this scenario, reveals a particularly powerful iteration of this land reclamation imaginary.318 The scenario also reveals other ideas of the authors on Dutch society. For instance, agriculture was considered to be the cornerstone of the Dutch economy, and with the Netherlands being the second largest food exporter worldwide, the Markerwaard could additionally be an important contribution to solve the world food crisis. The Netherlands also had an international reputation to maintain concerning land reclamation.319 Although the alternative non-reclamation scenario displayed some ideas about the Marker lake as a lake, it revealed a future imaginary in which spatial and societal issues in the Netherlands would be solved. The only thing both scenarios agreed on was the monster to be kept at bay, the overuse of space in the Netherlands, and that a solution was necessary. 320 The proponents of this vision had a simple story-line, in line with the imaginary expressed in Plan Waterlely, arguing that such problems had to be solved on the old land. Current policies were only continuing the issues instead of solving them. The scenario proposed changes to policies on housing and land consolidation, and to society in general: the Netherlands should need less space and consume less

316 ‘Opgemerkt wordt dat de beschrijving van de scenario's niet steeds door alle raadsleden wordt onderschreven. Er is in elke beschrijving nl. steeds uitgegaan van de ideeënwereld van de «voorstanders» van ieder scenario. We kunnen echter constateren dat (persoonlijke) meningen en prioriteitstellingen in vele gevallen dwars door de verschillende scenario's heenlopen. Op deze wijze heeft de raad de verschillende in de discussie naar voren gebrachte argumenten (in hun onderlinge samenhang) zo zuiver mogelijk trachten weer te geven.’ See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 13. 317 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 29-35. 318 The letter is fascinating, especially the rhetoric used to express the imaginary. ‘Ons overvolle land heeft grote behoefte aan nieuwe gebieden, waar op langere termijn ontwikkelingen tot stand kunnen worden gebracht, die de te verwachten druk op de bestaande ruimte kunnen verlichten’; ‘De Markerruimte biedt de zeer zeldzaam in de wereld voorkomende mogelijkheid, om in een reeds dicht bevolkt land, juist in de nabijheid van het dichtst bevolkte deel, een combinatie van land en beschermde binnenmeren te scheppen tegen redelijke kosten’; ‘Iedereen weet dat onze land- en tuinbouw een hoeksteen is van onze economie en onmisbaar is voor het handhaven van onze positie in de internationale handel’. See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 62-64. 319 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 32-35. 320 This was expressed, for instance, in the following citation: ‘De processen die aan dit overvloedig ruimtegebruik ten grondslag liggen zullen - indien niet ingegrepen wordt - vastlopen op de eindigheid van ons grondgebied.’ See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 36-40.

90 products. This scenario focused on international cooperation instead of competition, an on an issue such as the world food crisis this scenario portrayed the Dutch focus on export rather negatively and argued that the Netherlands should be exporting knowledge instead of products. Not reclaiming the Markerwaard was so oblivious to the authors of this scenario, that it only appeared as an afterthought in their proposal.321 To justify the combination of these scenarios in one report, the members of the council agreed to replace the biased signifier Markerwaardgebied with a more neutral concept (See Figure 22).322 The phrase Marker space was introduced, which was a complex new signifier. The concept avoids a bias either in favour of the lake scenario or the reclamation scenario. It can therefore be seen as an expression of the stalemate between the two diametrically opposing scenarios. However, the concept made it clear that the future of this area was still very much at stake – a complete reversal of the situation during the summer of 1980, when the policy proposal had made it seem the reclamation was about to begin. The Marker space concept did not in particular catch on beyond the Spatial Planning Council, but it was used extensively by Henry Goverde in his analysis of the debate (aptly titled Control over the Marker Space).323 The introduction of both scenarios led to the uncharacteristically divided vote in the council. At first, the council was unable to even decide what to vote on and had to delay the recommendation. 324 When the final vote was cast, nearly half of the 43 members of the council were not even present. As such, only 24 voted on the case.325 The largest group of these, thirteen members, voted to reclaim the Markerwaard. Of these, ten had signed the previously discussed additional letter, in which the necessity for reclamation was repeated once again in a powerful rhetoric. Five members voted to postpone the decision, and strongly criticised the lack of information. These members specifically requested new information from the government, including a well-developed Marker lake scenario, a spatial vision on the larger Marker space, and a plan for the spatial composition of the reclaimed polder, before they could prepare a proper recommendation. Four members opposed reclamation as of right now, arguing that they preferred to vote in favour of an option that left the most opportunities for future generations. In their eyes, both scenarios would constrict possibilities in the future. Last, two members of the council voted to oppose reclamation altogether, calling for the government to work toward a permanent, well-managed Marker lake.326

321 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 38-40. 322 Figure 22 was taken directly from the SPC recommendation. See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 12. 323 The Dutch name for this concept was Markerruimte. See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 10-12. Goverde was an advisory member to the SCP during this particular debate, which is the reason why he used the concept in his dissertation. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 1. 324 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘Raad verdeeld over toekomst Markerwaard. Uitstel advies’, De Volkskrant, March 25th 1982. 325 Goverde, who was present during most of the SPC meetings, argues it is likely that many council members who had a neutral view on the Markerwaard did not vote in the final decisions. Still, it is hard to guess how the vote would have turned out if every council member had turned up to vote. See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 289. 326 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 48-51, 62-64.

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Figure 22: the Markerruimte concept as introduced by the Spatial Planning Council in 1982.

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Dutch newspapers were aware of the complex decision-making process. When the recommendation was finally published, it was framed in the newspapers as a stalemate in the Markerwaard debate. This was not too far-fetched: the opening statements of the SPC recommendation had a very apologetic tone, as if the council was ashamed of its own unorthodox method and unconventionally split vote.327 Most Dutch newspapers portrayed the recommendation as a victory for the pro-reclamation camp, since the largest minority had voted in their favour.328 Still, the recommendation could be interpreted in many ways. Many organisations tried to spin the final recommendation in their favour. Even those who opposed reclamation saw this as a victory, arguing that most council members had abstained from voting or had opposed reclamation right now.329 Either way, the Dutch press was keen to highlight the internal division in the SPC. According to several reports, the divided recommendation represented an ever-growing division within the Dutch government on the future of the Markerwaard. Since this recommendation would not inevitably result in reclamation, the remaining procedure was vague, and the political parties of the incumbent administration had expressed that they were not in favour of reclaiming right now, the newspapers correctly predicted that any final decision was still a long ways away.330 Formally, the SCD-procedure was now nearly at its end. With the policy proposal, the public participation period and now the SPC recommendation out of the way, all left was for the new administration to make a final decision, which would then be voted on by parliament.331 However, this final decision would not be made until 1990, when the contemporary minister of TWM decided to discontinue the effort to reclaim the Markerwaard. In the years between 1982 and 1990, a stalemate formed. Subsequent administrations had tried to appeal to both sides of this stalemate. However, the attempt at compromise, a so-called multifunctional polder, ultimately became the downfall of the Markerwaard. The next chapter will explain what happened in the years following 1982, why the decision took so long to make, and why ultimately it was in favour of those opposing reclamation.

Sub-conclusion In its final recommendation of April 1982, the Spatial Planning Council was unable to reach a majority decision on the Markerwaard. As such, it did something unorthodox: the council developed two alternative scenarios for the Markerwaard and subsequently voted on them, resulting in a split vote with the largest minority arguing in favour of reclamation. The scenarios are the most powerful expressions of both the hegemonic pro-reclamation imaginary and the resistant anti-reclamation imaginary discussed in this thesis. Although the divided recommendation led to a stalemate in the Markerwaard debate that would take nearly a decade to solve, the fact that the resistant imaginary was captured in the SPC-recommendation shows how powerful it was. This was a premonition to how this imaginary would ultimately be extended into the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation, a process that would ultimately topple the Markerwaard.

327 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 5-11. Also see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 341. 328 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘“Markerwaard moet worden ingepolderd”’, Trouw, April 29th 1982; Unknown author, ‘RARO voor inpoldering Markermeer’, Het Parool, April 29th 1982; Unknown author, ‘Advies: Markerwaard inpolderen’, Algemeen Dagblad, April 29th 1982. 329 See Henri Goverde & Willem-Jan van Grondelle, ‘Markerwaard kan nu van de kaart’, NRC Handelsblad, April 30th 1982. 330 See, for instance, Unknown author, ‘RARO adviseert regering de Markerwaard in te polderen. Slechts krappe meerderheid in Adviesraad’, Nederlands Dagblad, May 1st 1982. 331 See DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 51-52. Also see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 341.

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Chapter 5: The downfall of the Markerwaard

The council recommends to only reclaim the Markerwaard once there is a genuine societal demand to create new land for the socially required spatial functions, and once there is fertile ground among the Dutch society to realise another reclamation effort.332

332 A statement by the WMC, translated from the original Dutch quote: ‘De Raad is van mening dat het de voorkeur verdient om pas tot aanleg van een polder in het Markermeergebied over te gaan wanneer de daadwerkelijke behoefte aan nieuw land met het oog op de functies, die een Markerwaardpolder kan vervullen, is gebleken en de geesten rijp zijn voor realisatie daarvan’. See DHR 16/320 18, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat en Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied’, 1990-1991, November 2nd 1990, 2.

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In this chapter, I will discuss how and why the hegemonic STI on land reclamation changed due to the influence of the resistant STI, as expressed by those who opposed the 1980 policy proposal. First, I will discuss the political stalemate on the Markerwaard that came into being because of the divided 1982 SPC-recommendation. This stalemate lasted until 1990. Decisions made by the Dutch administration in 1985 and 1986 only prolonged the stalemate, even if in principle those decisions entailed a choice in favour of reclamation. Importantly, in 1985 the hegemonic STI on land reclamation was altered and through the process of extension elements of the resistant STI were incorporated. In this new imaginary, a so-called multifunctional polder was desirable. Thew new STI was an ugly marriage between the hegemonic STI and its counterpart. The polder reclamation was still presented as a desirable solution to spatial problems of the Dutch society. Importantly, however, reclamation would only take place if there was a genuine societal demand for it, which was in line with the resistant imaginary. This proved the death blow for the Markerwaard. Government administrations could easily argue that there was no current societal need for reclamation, especially given that by now a large part of the Dutch population opposed reclamation. Consequently, I discuss how in 1990 the Dutch government decided to discontinue the Markerwaard reclamation. The chapter will end with a brief discussion how the area developed once the Markerwaard was off the table, ending with an overview of the current construction of the Marker Wadden.

5.1 Stalemate Whereas in late 1981 the new Van Agt-II administration decided to reconsider the desirability of the Markerwaard, within a year this was reversed again. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Van Agt-II administration expressed its doubts on the reclamation project, which resulted in the strongly divided SPC-recommendation of early 1982. However, the Van Agt-II administration fell within year and elections were held again in September 1982. The election programmes of 1982 largely echoed those of 1981. For most political parties, their position on the Markerwaard was more or less the same as in 1981.333 As a result of the 1982 elections, the centrum-right Lubbers administration was formed. Upon its installation, this new administration made a clear statement on the Markerwaard: the government in principle supported reclamation but respected the insights that were presented in the participation procedure. A final choice was to be made quickly so the procedure could be finished.334 Although the administration thus prioritised the reclamation scenario, behind the screens the Marker lake option was seriously explored. The previously discussed IJsselmeer Discussion Group lobbied with the new minister Smit-Kroes (TWM), who promised to analyse a future Marker lake scenario, which was published by the ZPD in March 1983. 335 Protest and manifestations against the reclamation still took place, but like the previous years, the Markerwaard debate was not a major issue for a large part of the Dutch population. In June 1983, fishermen in Volendam once again held a manifestation together with water

333 The political parties VVD and CDA – who formed the new administration - both kept to their previous positions on the Markerwaard. For the VVD, efficiency was a priority, and they found it was necessary to balance the spatial merits of the Markerwaard with its consequences. The CDA was on principle not opposed to reclamation, but had wanted to wait for the completion of the SDC-procedure. See Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, Verkiezingsprogramma’s Tweede Kamerverkiezingen 8 September 1982, available online. 334 The coalition agreement stated: ‘Bij het voorbereiden van de regeringsbeslissing over de toekomst van het Markerwaardgebied zal de Regering de na het beleidsvoornemen in 1980 naar voren gekomen denkbeelden en inzichten in overweging nemen en streven naar een spoedige afronding van de besluitvorming.’ See DHR 17/555 7, W. Scholten, ‘Brief van de kabinetsinformateur’, 1982-1983, October 30th 1982, 20. 335 See Directie Zuiderzeewerken and Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders, Het Markermeer, informatie voor het beheer als open water (Lelystad, 1983). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/het-markermeer-informatie-voor-het-beheer-als-open-water.

95 recreationists (see Figure 23 and Figure 24).336 In April 1984, the coastal city of was host to a similar demonstration (see Figure 25 and Figure 26).337 New on the stage in this period were protests of those who were in favour of reclaiming the Markerwaard. These groups only organised public protests from 1984 onwards (see Figure 28 and Figure 29, for instance).338 Mainly farmers and inhabitants of the existing Zuiderzee polders participated in these protests. More playful pro- reclamation actions were also organised. The tourist organisation of Flevoland set up a competition in 1984, in which participants were asked to design their own favourite scenario for the Markerwaard, hoping that such activities would make the reclamation scenario more attractive.339 The general Dutch engagement with the Markerwaard issue was still relatively low. In 1985, opinion polls found that one in every ten Dutch people strongly opposed the Markerwaard. This might seem high, but the same poll found one in four strongly opposed new nuclear facilities and one in three strongly opposed nuclear missile placement. Even more people were opposed to the pope visiting the Netherlands, the poll found, than to the Markerwaard reclamation.340 Regardless of these demonstrations, a stalemate was reached in the Markerwaard debate that would last until 1990. This stalemate was a consequence of the divided SPC recommendation. Although the Lubbers administration had proposed in 1982 to quickly decide on the Markerwaard, it took the government until 1985 to make a choice, and this choice was not final. In 1985 the administration committed in principle to reclaiming the Markerwaard, but effectively postponed the project once again. Within a year, the reclamation was put on hold indefinitely.341 Effectively, this indefinite period lasted until 1990. Between 1982 and 1990, thus, a stalemate developed on the Markerwaard for various reasons. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss each aspect of this stalemate in detail. Table 7 summarizes the most important points of contention which kept the stalemate in place.342 Through this stalemate, the imaginary on land reclamation was indirectly affected. Elements of the resistant STI were extended in the hegemonic STI. I will discuss this in the next section.

336 Figure 23: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad2b0998-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 24: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad2b0736-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. 337 Figure 25: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f310-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. Figure 26: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f446-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84. 338 Figure 28: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad4e7590-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84 Figure 29: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad3d6516-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84 339 See Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 299–300. 340 See Unknown author, ‘Kleine meerderheid Nederlanders tegen polder Markerwaard’, Algemeen Dagblad, February 15th 1985. 341 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 263; Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 363. 342 This table is based on Goverde’s analysis; see Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 300–339. However, Goverde’s analysis stops in 1985, because his research ran until 1985 and his dissertation was published in 1986. Therefore, I assessed which key points of the debate continued through 1990, based on parliamentary documents. The table summarizes those key points. See DHR 16/320 16, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1984-1985, June 14th 1985; DHR 16/320 17, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1985-1986, September 11th 1986.

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June 1983 anti-reclamation demonstration

Figure 24: anti-Markerwaard demonstration in Volendam, June 25 1983

Figure 23: Boats in the Volendam Harbour during theJune 1983 demonstration.. The banner says ‘From salt sea to fresh water, and now they want grass’

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April 1984 anti-reclamation demonstration

Figure 26: Protest from a small boat in Hoorn, April 1984

Figure 25: protest in Hoorn, April 1984

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Table 7: points of discussion that were the cause of the 1982-1990 political stalemate on the Markerwaard Point of contention Basic premise of discussion

The Marker343 lake as a The Marker lake met the criteria to become a Special Protection Area of the 1979 European Bird European Bird Directive Directive. Protesters argued this made it illegal to reclaim the polder (See Figure 27).343 protection area Water Quality Researchers had difficulties determining the potential risk of the edge lakes of the Markerwaard becoming a potential breeding ground for blue-green algae. As such, whether or not to accept this risk became a political discussion. Spatial composition There was no clarity about the spatial composition of the future polder. In addition to the pre- existing ideas, new ideas were promoted during the stalemate. In 1985, for instance, plans to potentially create a nuclear facility in the Markerwaard fanned the flames of the societal debate. Land subsidence Research had demonstrated that the new polder would cause land subsidence in the province of Noord-Holland. This could result in serious damage to buildings in cities adjacent to the Markerwaard. Potential solutions were expansive, and the additional costs were widely debated. Agriculture Although originally the polder would provide space for agricultural recolonization, the necessity of this process was challenged during this stalemate. To what extent would the Netherlands benefit from more agricultural areas? Government funding or The economic crises of the 1980s and the rise of neoliberalism resulted in the Dutch government private funding seriously exploring options for the private funding of the Markerwaard reclamation. Employment Various organisations published reports on the effects of the reclamation on national employment rates. The numbers varied wildly, making it difficult to determine whether the Markerwaard would be beneficial for national employment rates. Agriculture/ Although originally the polder was planned to provide space for agricultural recolonization, the Spatial trade-off necessity of this process was challenged during this stalemate. To what extent would the Netherlands benefit from more agricultural areas? Was a place where farmers could be moved if they had to make place for urbanisation still necessary?

Figure 27: Reclamation is ‘forbidden’ based on the 1979 European Bird Directive. Signs put up by protestors during the 1984 demonstration in Hoorn.

343 The president of the European Parliament in 1983 – the Dutch social democrat Piet Dankert – used the new insights on the potential application of the new European Bird Directive to the Marker lake to put down protest signs near the Markerwaard, stating it was forbidden to reclaim the area based on the Directive. See Unknown author, ‘Vogelbeschermers verenigt u!’, Het Vogeljaar 31 (1983) 304. Figure 27: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo. https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f1d0-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

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1984 and 1986 Pro-reclamation demonstrations

Figure 28: January 9th, 1986: inhabitants of Lelystad protest in favour of reclamation during a visit from the Queen

Figure 29: September 20th, 1984: Farmers block the road demonstrating for reclamation of the Markerwaard

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5.2 On new land, a multifunctional society In 1985, the Lubbers administration re-committed to reclaiming the Markerwaard. Because the administration had promised at its installation that it would swiftly reach a decision, minister Smit- Kroes felt it was necessary to make a decision before the administration would finish its term in 1986, even though the stalemate was nowhere near broken. As such, in May 1985 the administration made its choice to reaffirm the policy proposal, arguing that the Netherlands would see more benefit from a reclaimed polder, than from a lake. Still, the reclamation process was not immediately started. A ‘wet spatial reservation’ was made so reclamation could take place in the future. Nor did the decision entail a complete spatial composition plan for the polder. The administration once again asked the Spatial Planning Council to provide a recommendation when to start the reclamation process, and how to designate the spatial composition of the new polder. 344 The only new element in the 1985 decision was the commitment that the polder would serve a ‘multifunctional’ purpose. Although it might not seem important, the focus on a ‘multifunctional’ polder implied a major departure from the pro-reclamation STI that was expressed in the 1980 policy proposal. Essentially, the new focus implied that the Markerwaard would only be reclaimed if two conditions were met: that there was a genuine societal demand to create new land, by which a variety of spatial functions could be placed in the new polder (hence ‘multifunctional’); and that the Dutch population largely agreed with this reclamation plan.345 In previous iterations of this imaginary, the undesirable future (rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad) and closure (reclaiming the polder) were always connected, and as such the reclamation of the Markerwaard was considered inevitable because of population growth. In contrast, in this new decision the undesirable future had disappeared altogether. Instead, several potential spatial functions which could be located on the Markerwaard polder were presented as the desirable future. The specifics of these spatial functions were not elaborated on, however. Moreover, the new policy hinged on societal demand. This was another departure within the STI, related to the interaction the target Dutch community. It implied that most of the Dutch society would have to be supportive of any reclamation plan before it would be considered. Given that popular support anti-reclamation groups had risen since 1971, it would be close to impossible to find such support in the near future. The policy acknowledged this, stating that as of 1985, there was no societal demand for reclamation. As such, elements of the anti-reclamation resistant imaginary were extended into the hegemonic pro-reclamation imaginary. Specifically, this concerns the anti-reclamation notion that reclamation would not solve any societal problems or answer to societal demands. As discussed in the previous chapters, the authors of Plan Waterlely and the various participants of the SCD- procedure argued largely along these lines. In the STI that was expressed in these arguments, spatial problems of the Old land should be fixed on the Old land, instead of reclaiming New land. This was translated to the hegemonic pro-reclamation imaginary through the new focus on a multifunctional, societally demanded reclamation. The desire for a multifunctional Markerwaard became a story-line in the 1985-1990 period. The SPC, which was asked when to start the reclamation process and how to designate the spatial

344 The minister argued that regardless of the ultimate value of reclamation, now was not the right time. ‘De beslissing houdt nog niet in, dat thans ook onmiddellijk tot uitvoering van het project zou moeten worden overgegaan. Het tijdstip van aanleg is afhankelijk van de daadwerkelijke behoefte aan nieuw land met het oog op de functies waarvoor de Markerwaard wordt bestemd; bovendien moet er in dat geval voldoende uitzicht bestaan op een verantwoorde financiering van de aanleg.’ See DHR 16/320 16, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1984-1985, June 14th 1985. See also Goverde, Macht over de Markerruimte, 343. 345 ‘Deze beslissing houdt in, dat het kabinet tot het oordeel is gekomen, dat ons land op den duur meer gebaat is bij een nieuw stuk land met verschillende functies [emphasis added] en grote randmeren dan bij het handhaven van het gehele Markermeer als grootschalig binnenwater.’ See DHR 16/320 16, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1984-1985, June 14th 1985, 2.

101 composition of the new polder, repeated the commitment to a multifunctional polder, arguing that it should be reclaimed sooner rather than later.346 During the 1986 elections, various political parties campaigned in favour of a multifunctional Markerwaard, including election winners CDA and VVD which until this election both had been in favour of reclamation.347 And, as will be discussed below, various private plans for the reclamation of the Markerwaard were dismissed precisely because they were not multifunctional enough.

5.3 Discontinuing the Markerwaard On the surface, the stalemate continued after 1986 in much the same manner as before, yet through the multifunctional-polder story-line various reclamation plans were rejected. Two non- governmental organisations proposed to privately fund the reclamation project. These were not the first private organisations to submit plans for reclaiming the Markerwaard – that had occurred in 1972 as well.348 However, these were the most extensive. The first, proposed by Stichting Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard in 1986, included a full reclamation plan. It desired a polder for mainly agricultural purposes. The association tried to appeal to the Dutch public through a major advertisement campaign, arguing that every Dutch citizen would see economic benefits from the reclamation (see Figure 30).349 The second, proposed by Stuurgroep Westelijk Flevoland in 1987, included a polder of only 230 km2, half the size of the 1980 policy proposal. The group desired to finish the Flevoland province by adding, in their words, the final piece of the puzzle.350 Again, a mainly agrarian polder was desired in this plan. Both plans were turned down by the ministry of TWM since they did not meet the multifunctional criteria. The minister also argued that neither plan had broad societal support.351 The plans were heavily criticised by the Water Management Council. The council scathingly argued that, due to their unilateral agrarian function, the plans missed nearly all elements that would make a reclamation project a positive and worthwhile activity.352 Given that the same

346 In contrast to its previous divided vote, the council voted with a large majority in favour of its recommendation (20 in favour, 6 opposed, 2 abstained). See DHR 16/320 17, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1985-1986, September 11th 1986, 2. 347 During the 1986 elections, all political parties positioned themselves on the Markerwaard issue. Only the reformed RPF and SGP were strongly in favour of reclaiming the polder. The winning CDA and VVD, who had also been in the previous administration, argued in line with the multifunctional-polder STI they had introduced. The other parties opposed any reclamation whatsoever. See Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma's 1986: Bijeengebracht en van een register voorzien door prof. dr. I. Lipschits (The Hague, 1986). 348 In 1972, three companies ( groep NV, the NV baggermaatschappij Holland and the Dutch contractor Zanen-Verstoep) proposed a plan to reclaim a piece of land in a triangle-shape between Hoorn, Enkhuizen and Lelystad. The plan included space for an airport and a water reservoir. See Unknown author, ‘Protest tegen IJsselmeerplannen van aannemers’, Het Parool, July 8th 1972; Unknown author, ‘Ontsteltenis over nieuw vliegveldplan’, Trouw, July 11th 1972. 349 The advertisement was, for instance, placed in NRC Handelsblad. Figure 30: See Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard B.V., ‘Elke Nederlander één procent erbij’, NRC Handelsblad, February 26th 1985. 350 This organisation was headed by Han Lammers, previously the head of the IJsselmeerpolders Public Body and before that alderman in Amsterdam. In all three positions, he had fought in favour of the Markerwaard, and became a figurehead for the reclamation of the Markerwaard. 351 See DHR 16/320 18, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat en Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied’, 1990-1991, November 2nd 1990, 2-3. 352 The WMC was very critical of both plans: ‘Het advies van de Raad is zeer terughoudend. Gesteld wordt o.m. dat omvang, ligging en het eenzijdige karakter van de polder maken dat het plan een positieve uitstraling mist; aanleg van Westelijk Flevoland de aanleg van een grote Markerwaardpolder, die tal van functies kan vervullen, praktisch uitsluit; [en] het plan vrijwel alle elementen mist die het omzetten van water in land tot een positief te beoordelen activititeit bestempelen. De Raad is van mening dat het de voorkeur verdient om pas tot aanleg van een polder in het Markermeergebied over te gaan wanneer de daadwerkelijke behoefte aan nieuw land met het oog op de functies, die een Markerwaardpolder kan vervullen, is gebleken en de geesten rijp zijn voor realisatie daarvan [emphasis added].’ See DHR 16/320 18, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat en Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied’, 1990-1991, November 2nd 1990, 2.

102 council was largely in favour of an agrarian-only reclamation in 1976, just a decade earlier, their statement is symptomatic of the powerful effect of the multifunctional-polder story-line. In the same period, various important pro-reclamation actors were removed from play. Following the SCP-recommendation, the new Lubbers-II administration unexpectedly decided to postpone the reclamation indefinitely due to financial constraints. Minister Smit-Kroes (TWM) explained that while she understood the benefits of reclamation, financial difficulties did not allow for any reclamation to take place soon.353 The IJDA was also dissolved in this period. Although the organisation saw this coming, as the IJDA was always intended to be temporary and in existence only until local government was installed, this was still a sign that the ministry of TWM had lost faith in the reclamation. The ministry decided in 1985 that the IJDA and ZPD would be merged in a new regional directorate of RWS. This new directorate would be responsible for the management of the existing Zuiderzee polders, but not for planning new ones. The merge was completed in January 1989.354 Finally, the 1989 elections were the last in which the Markerwaard still played a major role. Every single party except for the Christian reformed RPF and the CDA opposed the reclamation. The incumbent right-wing VVD was silent on the reclamation question.355 Upon the rejection of the polder plans, the new administration realised that no polder plan would be both multifunctional and answer to societal demands. Consequently, now that influential pro-reclamation actors had been removed from play, the new administration was both willing and able to decide to discontinue the Markerwaard reclamation project. Thus, the new minister Maij- Weggen (TWM) broke the stalemate in November 1990. She decided to withdraw the 1985 decision to reclaim the Markerwaard. This decision was the formal end of the SCD-procedure, since the previous 1982, 1985 and 1986 decisions had never fully committed to starting the reclamation process.356 As such, if new plans for a (partial) Marker lake reclamation were proposed, the Dutch government would have to determine to what extent they would be subjected to a public participation procedure. More immediately, the minister called for the establishment of an integral water management plan for the IJssel lake and Marker lake. The sustainable development of this area was the new policy goal, in particular reviving the ecological and recreational qualities of the lake.357 In the next elections of 1994 and 1998, for the first time since 1971 the Markerwaard was no longer a point of contention. Political parties now expressed themselves on how to attain an ideal

353 See DHR 16/320 17, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Brief van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat’, 1985- 1986, September 11th 1986, 2. Also see an interview with Minister Smit-Kroes in which she explained herself, stating: ‘In tijden dat we fors moeten bezuinigen op onderwijs, gezondheidszorg en welzijn moeten we er dubbel en dwars voor oppassen dat we aan werken beginnen waarvan de financiering onzeker is en waarvan we niet weten welke lasten dat op volgende kabinetten legt’. See Marieke Aarden, ‘Smit-Kroes ook tegen andere dure projecten. Na afwijzen Markerwaard overheerst bedrijfseconomische benadering’, De Volkskrant, September 13th 1986. 354 See Van Dissel, 59 jaar eigengereide doeners in Flevoland, Noordoostpolder en Wieringermeer : Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders 1930-1989, 261–271. 355 See Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma’s 1989: bijeengebracht en van een register voorzien door prof. Dr. I. Lipschits (Amsterdam, 1989). 356 See DHR 16/320 18, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat en Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied’, 1990-1991, November 2nd 1990, 2-3. 357 The new management plans echoed other national policies of that time, such as the fourth Spatial Planning whitepaper, the third Water Management whitepaper, and the first Nature Management whitepaper. See DHR 16/320 18, Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat en Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied’, 1990-1991, November 2nd 1990, 2-3.

103 future for the Marker lake. 358 The choice to discontinue the Markerwaard was finally confirmed in the 2001 Spatial Planning whitepaper.359

Figure 30: Elke Nederlander één procent erbij. Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard B.V., advertisement in National newspapers

358 See Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma’s 1994: bijeengebracht door het Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen te Groningen en van een register voorzien door prof. Dr. I. Lipschits (Meppel, 1994); also see Isaac Lipschits (editor), Verkiezingsprogramma’s 1998: bijeengebracht door het Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen en van een register voorzien door prof. Dr. I. Lipschits (Meppel, 1998), 359 Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, Nota Ruimte: Deel 4, samenvatting (tekst na parlementaire instemming) (The Hague, 2006), 36. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/nota-ruimte-ruimte-voor-ontwikkeling-deel-4-tekst-na- parlement-1. Also see Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 363; Van der Ham, Verover mij dat land. Lely en de Zuiderzeewerken, 370.

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Sub-conclusion The new criterium of multifunctionality was the result of an ugly marriage between the two opposing socio-technical imaginaries. The multifunctional-polder was a story-line intended to break through the political stalemate, but it proved untenable in the long term and led to the downfall of the Markerwaard. In this story-line, the Markerwaard was still presented as a potential boon to the Netherlands, which was core to the pro-reclamation STI. However, elements from the anti- reclamation STI were extended to this hegemonic imaginary. Specifically, two elements: that a polder should only be reclaimed if there was genuine societal demand for it, and that the Markerwaard should provide additional new functions to the Netherlands, instead of absorbing issues from the existing Old land. This altered the hegemonic imaginary to such an extent that it can be considered as a new imaginary. In contrast with earlier iterations of the pro-reclamation STI, it is remarkable that the powerful monster of rampant suburbanisation is missing in the argumentation in favour of reclamation. However, the new administration realised that no polder plan would be both multifunctional and answer to societal demands. As such, the new minister Maij-Weggen was both willing and able to discontinue the Markerwaard reclamation. Earlier administrations had been unable to make this decision. As such, the multifunctionality criterium was effectively the killing blow for the Markerwaard.

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Conclusion

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In this thesis, I aimed to find out in what ways the Dutch socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation changed between 1970 and 1990. First, in chapters 2, 3 and 4 I considered the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation. An influential hegemonic imaginary was present throughout the Zuiderzee reclamation process. It was embedded in institutions and virtually unchallenged until the 1970s. Policy documents Reconsiderations on the Markerwaard and the Development of the Markerwaard area express this imaginary. Parallel to this process, also discussed in chapters 3 and 4, I considered how an alternative resistant imaginary on land reclamation gained influence from 1970 onward. It was first publicly expressed in the APIJL’s Plan Waterlely. Two different groups in society – epitomized by the ZPD and the IJDA on the one hand, and the APIJL on the other – subscribed to these imaginaries separately. These groups were unable to understand each other’s point of view. As a result, the imaginaries competed and frequently clashed, especially during the Spatial Core Decision procedure of 1980-1982. In this procedure, the hegemonic imaginary was opposed by a variety of alternative arguments. There was no single resistant imaginary, although most respondents to the procedure agreed with the APIJL. The Spatial Planning Council’s recommendation on the Markerwaard issue was perhaps the most illustrative of this clash, portraying the two strongly different STIs side-by-side. As a result, a political stalemate commenced which prevented government administrations from making a final decision on the matter. During this period, however, elements of the resistant imaginary were extended into the hegemonic imaginary. This altered the hegemonic imaginary to such an extent that the outcome can be considered as a new, extended imaginary. I discussed this in chapter 5. In this new imaginary, a new criterium for land reclamation was central: pre-existing societal demand for a polder with a diverse array of multifunctional, spatial functions. Since the existing Markerwaard plans could not meet this requirement, the project was discontinued. I studied this change using the socio-technical imaginaries approach. By understanding socio- technical imaginaries as a sub-type of discourse, I was able to develop a framework for historical analysis of these imaginaries. I will discuss the merits of this operationalization in the second section of the conclusion. First, however, I will reflect on the changes to the hegemonic and resistant socio- technical imaginaries on land reclamation. Specifically, the goal of this section is to show what elements of the resistant STI affected the hegemonic STI, and which did not. To do so, I will use the key constitutive elements that were part of the STI-framework I developed in the first chapter: desirable and undesirable futures, target community, story-lines, closure, temporality, and important signifiers.

Desirable and undesirable futures are invoked in the imaginary as powerful visions of what a society should, or should not, look like. In the hegemonic socio-technical imaginary on land reclamation, expressed throughout the Zuiderzee reclamation project, this consisted of two elements: keeping the monster of flood damage at bay while simultaneously providing an opportunity to create a new, ideal society. What this ideal society should look like was continuously changed throughout the 20th century. The monster of flood damage subsided after the creation of the Enclosure dam. During the 1960s, a new monster came onto the stage: the rampant suburbanisation of the Randstad. Around that time, a resistant imaginary gained influence. In it, suburbanisation was similarly perceived as a problem. However, in this imaginary, the perceived threat of continuous reclamation – first the Markerwaard, then the Wadden sea – was considered as more dangerous. The problem of suburbanisation, therefore, had to be fixed with other means. In this resistant imaginary, therefore, a new spatial configuration for the Netherlands was developed to achieve that goal. As the Markerwaard debate continued, this difference in perceived desirable futures stayed largely intact. The hegemonic imaginary presented the Markerwaard as an ideal and desirable new

107 addition to the Netherlands, that would save areas like the Green Heart from urbanisation. In this imaginary, no alternative to this future were discussed. On the other hand, those who subscribed to the resistant imaginary argued in favour of combating overpopulation and overconsumption. This division strongly influenced the political stalemate of the 1980s. In the new extended imaginary that broke the stalemate, the threat of rampant suburbanisation had left the stage. In line with the resistant imaginary, it was conceived that these and other contemporary spatial problems could be solved without reclaiming new land.

The target community is the group of people among which the imaginary is distributed. It is especially relevant to consider how this group is involved in debating those (un)desirable futures, and their role in attaining or preventing them. Originally, the Zuiderzee reclamation was conceived as a nationalistic Dutch prestige project. The ZPD and the IJDA were successfully able to spread this nationalistic sentiment among the general Dutch population. However, the broader society considered the polder reclamations to be a largely local affair that did not affect them. This changed in the late 1960s, when the Markerwaard was considered as a location for a new airport. A wide variety of people demonstrated, realising that these decisions had nation-wide consequences. Still, in the first instances of the Markerwaard debate, the main actors of the debate considered the larger Dutch society to be unimportant for realising their goals. The ZPD conceded to only inform the Dutch public on plans for the Markerwaard, but did not really value their input. Inadvertently, this led to newspapers portraying the ZPD as opponents of the general Dutch population. The APIJL, on the other hand, focused on influencing the Dutch parliament in particular. Interacting with the larger Dutch population was of secondary importance. However, because the Markerwaard decision was put up in public consultation procedures twice – once on a minor scale in 1973, and then again on a major scale in 1981-1982 – the general awareness of the Markerwaard issue increased, and many people formulated an opinion on the matter. The number of people that became involved was not staggering, but nonetheless quite high compared to debates on other infrastructural projects. Various anti-reclamation protests were organised, while remarkably little pro-reclamation demonstrations were held. The decision-making power was torn from exclusively belonging to the ZPD, IJDA, and the ministry of TWM. Additionally, perhaps contingently, the Markerwaard was strongly politicised when the SCD-procedure ran parallel to the 1981 general elections. In the extended imaginary on a multifunctional polder that became prevalent in the late 1980s, the interaction with Dutch society changed. A reclamation project was not to be continued unless there was a general societal demand for it. The role of the Dutch population, as such, was reverted: instead of only being in the later stages, their opinion and demand for a new polder became primary.

Story-lines are the brief narratives that present a simplified understanding of problems and solutions related to the (un)desirable future. In the original hegemonic imaginary, reclamation was represented as a war-like situation. The Dutch fought the ‘waterwolf’ and annexed new land. This representation came to an end once the Enclosure Dam had been built and flood danger subsided. Elements of this battle-rhetoric, however, were kept intact for a long time. Meanwhile, during the 1960s the Old land/New land dialectic changed from a signifier (discussed below) to a story-line. In the hegemonic, pro-reclamation imaginary, this story-line narrated that the New land, the Markerwaard, was a necessity to solve spatial problems on the Old land. In the resistant imaginary, a competing story-line argued that this process was a matter of deflecting problems from the Old land to the New land. It should stop, as reclamation would only postpone real solutions. These differences continued throughout the SCD-procedure and the political stalemate of the 1980s. When

108 the stalemate was solved through the new criterium of multifunctionality, this story-line was also affected. In the new extended imaginary, Old land problems could in fact be solved on the Old land. This element of the resistant imaginary, as such, was extended to the new hegemonic imaginary.

Through closure, specific solutions are presented that bring the desirable future a step closer. Simultaneously, other solutions are framed out. In the hegemonic imaginary, land reclamation provided closure in the attempt to solve spatial problems of the Netherlands, such as suburbanisation. The proposed polder, therefore, had to become as large as possible, to accommodate as much space to solve these problems. The resistant imaginary continuously fought this notion, arguing that – in line with the story-line discussed above – such problems needed to be fixed on the Old land. In Plan Waterlely, for instance, a desirable vision of the Netherlands was presented, in which closure was realized through improved public transport connections between major cities, capstoned by the plan to construct a railway connection across the Enclosure Dam. These different interpretations lasted throughout the SCD-procedure. Similar to the story-line, the closure that was expressed in the resistant imaginary was ultimately extended to the hegemonic imaginary. In particular, this concerned the idea of a ‘multifunctional’ polder: a polder that did not exist to solve spatial problems, but to provide new opportunities for the Netherlands. Importantly, throughout the debate both imaginaries considered society to be engineerable. Infrastructural changes, be it constructing a railway across the Enclosure Dam or reclaiming the Markerwaard, were thought to be able to provide solutions for societal problems.

Temporality is invoked in an imaginary to connect the past and (un)desirable future. The past is perceived in a certain way, that subsequently affects the options available to attain a desirable future. The hegemonic imaginary presented a historical perception of righteousness of land reclamation. The Markerwaard reclamation project became a naturalised historical process, an inevitable event. The question was not whether to reclaim, but rather how to reclaim. The resistant imaginary challenged this notion and the general Dutch ‘habit’ of land reclamation. Interestingly, both saw an opportunity to prove their point by using the legacy of Cornelis Lely to their own advantage. During the SCD-procedure, the hegemonic imaginary portrayed the Markerwaard as urgent. The polder was not only inevitable, but also just within reach. It was the last piece to complete the puzzle to complete the Netherlands.

Signifiers and their signified play an important role as key elements in the imaginary. Frequently, these are widely used metaphors and figures of speech. One of the more influential signifiers in this debate was the Old land-New land dialectic. Reclaiming new land provided an opportunity to build a new society. In the process of modernisation, this new society could, and perhaps should, become an ideal society. As the reclamation process continued, this signifier changed when the new polders became more instrumental in national spatial planning issues. As discussed above, this resulted in several story-lines in which the New land absorbed problems of the Old land. Another influential signifier is the ‘wet heart’ of the Netherlands. This signifier refers to the larger IJssel lake area. It originated among the resistant imaginary and quickly gained ground. The notion that the IJssel lake region forms the heart of the Netherlands – similar to the agricultural area that is the ‘green heart’ of the Randstad – signifies not just the geographic central location of the lake, but also its importance to the country. As of today, this notion is still influential, although the concept has been updated and is now known as the ‘blue heart’.

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The merits of an STI analysis Studying socio-technical imaginaries – collective visions of desirable futures attainable through science and technology – provides scholars with a tool to analyse why major technological changes occur. By considering the imaginaries that are present in a community, such change can be studied through the eyes of society. Scholars can analyse how ideas reflect on and echo within society as a whole. The concept was recently coined by Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim. I expand on their original conception by providing an operationalization of the concept for the purposes of historical research. I argue that socio-technical imaginaries can be considered as sub-type of discourse. Therefore, the tools for discourse analysis provide a starting point for the framework I subsequently develop for analysing socio-technical imaginaries. This framework considers six elements that are constitutive of such imaginaries, listed in the previous section: (un)desirable futures, target community, story-lines, closure, temporality, and important signifiers. In this thesis, I have shown how hegemonic socio-technical imaginaries on land reclamation co-exist alongside resistant imaginaries. Both are not static, but change across time. Before the 1970s, for instance, the focus of the hegemonic imaginary on land reclamation shifted from fighting the ‘waterwolf’ to fighting suburbanisation. These changes are not sudden revolutions, but rather the result of a slow process in which certain elements of resistant imaginaries are extended to the hegemonic imaginary. This thesis analysed how this process took place during the Markerwaard debate. This debate, covering a period of two decades, saw a resistant imaginary on land reclamation gaining influence among the Dutch society. As a result, two particular elements of this imaginary were extended to the hegemonic imaginary: the role of societal demand in land reclamation, and the story-line (and related closure) in which the problem-deflection from the Old land to the New land was no longer continued. There are multiple reasons why this process of extension took place. The removal of pro-reclamation actors from the playing field played a vital role. But, perhaps more important was the sense of frustration and unnecessary drag that accompanied the Markerwaard project and its related political stalemate. The need to break through this stalemate resulted in a new criterium for the polder reclamation project. Inadvertently, this new criterium consisted of the above discussed elements of resistant imaginaries that thus affected the hegemonic imaginary. The hegemonic imaginary was affected beyond recognition, shifting to a new hegemonic imaginary. As a consequence, it was no longer possible to continue the Markerwaard reclamation project. Analysing the Markerwaard debate by considering how socio-technical imaginaries on land reclamation have changed provides new insights. This analysis shows that the Markerwaard debate was primarily not a clash on environmental problems, but clash on spatial problems. The analysis of imaginaries shows that the desired spatial futures for the Netherlands were at stake. The core question in this debate was: should spatial issues, and related societal problems, be fixed on the Old land, or should they be transferred – or deflected – to the New land? Importantly, throughout this debate, the hegemonic and resistant imaginaries both incorporated the notion that society was engineerable through infrastructural changes. This was a shared sentiment, an overarching idea that connected the competing imaginaries. The statue that is built on the Enclosure Dam to commemorate its completion, pictured on the front page, is an expression of this idea. On the statue, the phrase A living people build their own future is depicted. The Netherlands, as a society, still builds its own future, even if it has discontinued the practice of land reclamation for the gain of polders. Current environmental projects – including the creation of the Marker Wadden – illustrate this. Analysing socio-technical imaginaries provides a better understanding of the broader transition in Dutch society regarding the perception of creating and managing the environment. Similar to discourse, socio-technical imaginaries affect politics and society. By studying (un)desirable futures, scholars – including historians – can unravel the ideals behind political actions. Politics, as

110 such, is profoundly about bringing the realisation of imagined futures one step closer. Additionally, by studying socio-technical imaginaries, scholars can understand how desirable futures resonate among society, beyond the organisations that have expressed them. As such, the analysis helps explaining why different societies respond differently to technologies. Particularly for historians, the concept helps in analysing and historicising what has not been materialized yet, and perhaps never will be materialized. Studying imaginaries allows the historian to study and compare alternative futures, and how these alternative futures affected the present and the past. Employing a socio-technical imaginaries approach also has risks. When analysing imaginaries, the role of actors tends to fade away if scholars do not explicitly focus on them. Actors are not subscribed forever to an imaginary they express, and neither do all individuals in one organisation subscribe to the same imaginary. It is important to keep this in mind when in particularly analysing organisational documents. Additionally, when studying imaginaries, it is important to in fact analyse them instead of only describing them. A framework, such as the one I have developed in the first chapter of this thesis, might aid in that process. Keeping in mind these risks, this research hints at several opportunities for future research. One potential avenue of research that directly results from this analysis is to study the subsequent changes in the Dutch imaginary on land reclamation that occurred between roughly 1990 and 2010. It is puzzling why in this period first the Markerwaard was discontinued, but then the Marker Wadden were reclaimed. What changed in the imaginaries on reclamation, and to what extent are these reclamation projects comparable? However, given the recentness of this change, perhaps this is not a topic suitable for primarily historical research. More in general, those who are interested in the history of water management in the Netherlands can use the socio-technical imaginary concept to expand their histories beyond the actors of the Rijkswaterstaat and the government. The socio- technical imaginaries concept can be used to analyse how activities by the government and non- governmental organisations have influenced society, and how they vice versa have been influenced by society. For instance, while the Markerwaard was ultimately discontinued because of changing imaginaries, several other, large-scale infrastructure projects in the Netherlands were continued in the same period. The Rotterdam harbour, for example, was expanded with the Maasvlakte II reclamation between 2008 and 2013, after decades of serious societal debate and protests. Comparing the Markerwaard and the Maasvlakte II reclamations using the socio-technical imaginaries concept can help explaining this difference. Last, socio-technical imaginaries can be also used by environmental historians to study how big environmental problems, such as climate change or air pollution, have affected desirable futures imagined by affected communities. This will provide those historians with a framework to explain why such problems, and the technologies to solve them, have been accepted by some communities and rejected by others.

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Epilogue: From Markerwaard to Marker Wadden

Figure 31: The Marker Wadden in 2019 In the two decades following the 1990 decision, local and national government redirected their efforts to improving the ecological status of the Marker lake. Although some opponents of the Markerwaard had been arguing for some decades that the partial reclamation process would devastate the ecology of the lake, this only became the focus of mainstream research after the 1990 decision. Researchers indeed demonstrated that the Marker lake was an ecologically fragile area. As a result of the creation of the Houtribdijk in 1975, which separated the Marker lake from the IJssel lake, over time the Marker lake had slowly become filled with sludge. This had disastrous consequences for lifeforms on the lakebed and caused the lake to become very turbid. There was no easy solution for this problem apart from breaching the dike.360 As mentioned, programmes were established to ensure the long-term, sustainable management of the lake. In these programmes, the ecological revival of the lake was prioritised, but ample attention was given to the development of water recreation, nature development, tourism, transport, and fishing in the area.361 Even though

360 See, for instance, Samenwerkingsverband Toekomstagenda Markermeer – IJmeer, Toekomstbeeld Markermeer – IJmeer: natuurlijk ontwikkelen (Amsterdam, 2009), 18-21. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/toekomstbeeld-markermeer-ijmeer- natuurlijk-ontwikkelen. 361 One of the first management programmes, written in 1992, acknowledged the worsening ecological status of the Marker lake by using satellite images on its front pages, which clearly showed how the Marker lake suffered from algae and sewage sludge deposition. See Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, Integraal beheersplan IJsselmeer en Markermeer (Lelystad, 1992). Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/integraal-beheersplan--en-markermeer

112 the intent to reclaim the Marker lake had disappeared, these management plans sometimes left open various possible routes for alternative (partial) reclamations of the lake. Various plans were made; one of them was the plan to create the Marker Wadden. The Marker Wadden plan was coined in 2012 by the Dutch nature conservation organisation Natuurmonumenten together with dredger Boskalis and the Dutch lottery. It entailed the creation of a series of artificial islands on the north side of the lake. Nature protectors and land reclaimers had joined hands to stimulate the ecological revival of the Marker lake, which was still a problem. The organisations hoped that such islands would spawn salt marshes, which in turn would strongly benefit the ecology of the entire lake. Even though the Marker Lake has no tides, low, flat islands would still partially flood due to the effects of wind. Therefore, the islands were named the Marker Wadden, after the mudflat islands of the Wadden Sea. The archipelago would also boost tourism, and the main island would have a visitor centre.362 As of July 2020, the first phase of the Marker Wadden has been completed. Five islands have been reclaimed, totalling over 12.5 km2 of new land. These islands have become a welcome haven for migratory birds in particular, but also other rare breeding birds. The current ambition is to form an archipelago that will cover 100 km2 (see Figure 32 and Figure 31).363 If this will one day be realized, the new archipelago will be a quarter of the original Markerwaard polder’s size.

Figure 32: The Marker Wadden plan, once fully realised

362 Hakkenes, Polderkoorts: Hoe de Zuiderzee verdween, 363–368. 363 Sources: Figure 32, see Io Herodotus (Wikipedia handle), Wikimedia commons. Available online at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marker_wadden.jpg. Figure 31, see Natuurmonumenten, Marker Wadden. Available online at https://www.natuurmonumenten.nl/projecten/marker-wadden/projectbeschrijving

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Bibliography List of figures Figure 1: ChristiaanPR, Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marker_Wadden_2018_05_12.jpg.

Figure 2: Adapted from: Io Herodotus (Wikipedia handle), Wikimedia commons. Available online at https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31335976.

Figure 3: Harry Pot, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/a96c7f44-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 4: Johan Braakensiek, ‘Nederlands Annexionisme “Verover mij dat land!”’, De Amsterdammer, February 16th 1918. Available online at http://historisch.groene.nl/nummer/1918-02-16.

Figure 5: Verenigde Toeristenbedrijven Harderwijk, ‘Een heerlijke vacantiedag in LELYSTAD en HARDERWIJK!’, Arnhemse Courant, July 12th 1957.

Figure 6: Dick Coersen (ANP), Nationaal Archief / Collectie Spaarnestad

Figure 7: Stichting Markerwaard van de Kaart (Edam), poster, Archief Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. Available online: https://hdl.handle.net/10622/97D17FEA-DEB1-4697-A6AF-A8E865D07E5C.

Figure 8: Raad van de Waterstaat, ‘De Raad van de Waterstaat maakt bekend’, NRC Handelsblad, February 1st 1973.

Figure 9: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard (Lelystad, 1972), 24. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1

Figure 10: Dienst der Zuiderzeewerken, Beschouwingen over de Markerwaard [concept] (The Hague, 1971), attachment 3. Available at the databank of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management: http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/beschouwingen-over-de-markerwaard-1

Figure 12: Bert Verhoeff, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/aca1091e-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 13: Bert Verhoeff, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/aca109fa-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 14: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07dfc-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 15: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07b54-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 16: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acd07cf8-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 17: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7ba4-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 18: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7cc6-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 19: Marcel Antonisse, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/acfd7d98-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

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Figure 20: DHR 16/320 1-2, Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer & Minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat, ‘Nota Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel a, Beleidsvoornemen’, 1979-1980, September 5th 1980, 9.

Figure 21: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat & Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, ‘Inspraak Markerwaard’, NRC Handelsblad, October 14th 1980.

Figure 22: DHR 16/320 7-8, Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening, ‘De Ontwikkeling van het Markerwaardgebied, deel c, Advies’, 1981-1982, July 5th 1982, 12.

Figure 23: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad2b0998-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 24: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad2b0736-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 25: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f310-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 26: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f446-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 27: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo. https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad37f1d0-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 28: Rob C. Croes, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad4e7590-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 29: Rob Bogaerts, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, https://www.nationaalarchief.nl/onderzoeken/fotocollectie/ad3d6516-d0b4-102d-bcf8-003048976d84.

Figure 30: Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard B.V., ‘Elke Nederlander één procent erbij’, NRC Handelsblad, February 26th 1985.

Figure 31, Natuurmonumenten, Marker Wadden. Available online at https://www.natuurmonumenten.nl/projecten/marker-wadden/projectbeschrijving

Figure 32, Io Herodotus (Wikipedia handle), Wikimedia commons. Available online at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marker_wadden.jpg.

115

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119

Unknown author, ‘“Markerwaard moet worden ingepolderd”’, Trouw, April 29th 1982.

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Unknown author, ‘Deskundigen niet op hoorzitting’, De Tijd, July 24th 1971.

Unknown author, ‘Drees jr is duidelijk present. Na negentien jaar in de wachtkamer’, De Volkskrant, September 4th 1971.

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Unknown author, ‘GS willen snel beslissing over tweede luchthaven. Vijfde baan Schiphol ontlast Zwanenburg. Unieke mogelijkheden in Markerwaard’, De Tijd, March 13th 1971.

Unknown author, ‘Hiswa: kleinere Markerwaard met ‘ongedeeld’ water, NRC Handelsblad, February 19th 1981.

Unknown author, ‘IJsselmeerproblematiek in Broodje Cultuur’, Tubantia, November 1st 1974.

Unknown author, ‘Kabinet-Van Agt wil Markerwaard gaan inpolderen. Definitief besluit na inspraak-ronde’, Het Parool, June 21st 1980.

120

Unknown author, ‘Kamerleden tegen groter Schiphol. Nieuw vliegveld afwachten, De Volkskrant, March 11th 1972.

Unknown author, ‘Kleine 20.000 ondertekenaars menen: Markerwaard structurele verarming van het milieu’, Het Vrije Volk, August 21st 1971.

Unknown author, ‘Kleine meerderheid Nederlanders tegen polder Markerwaard’, Algemeen Dagblad, February 15th 1985.

Unknown author, ‘Lammers nodigt prof. uit voor een rondleiding’, Het Parool, February 19th 1973.

Unknown author, ‘Luchthavenplannen maken tegenstanders actief’, De Volkskrant, April 17th 1971.

Unknown author, ‘Markerwaard heeft nog kans. Besluit van kabinet allerminst definitief’, De Volkskrant, July 19th 1980.

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Unknown author, ‘Verwijt van hoogleraren. Studie Markerwaard nog beneden pijl’, De Volkskrant, February 17th 1973.

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Van Bossum, Bernard, ‘Minister Drees (Verkeer-Waterstaat) als bezuiniger in tweede kamer’, De Tijd, November 1st 1971.

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