DOCSLIB.ORG

The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan Connection

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan Connection The killing of Osama Bin Laden: the Pakistan connection Standard Note: SN/IA/5947 Last updated: 3 May 2011 Author: Jon Lunn Section International Affairs and Defence Section 1) John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counter- Terrorism, briefs about the military operation, 2 May 2011 Extract: Q And if I could just ask, have you been able to determine how bin Laden was able to hide in this relatively prominent location, and do you believe the Pakistanis when they say that they had no idea that he was there? MR. BRENNAN: People have been referring to this as hiding in plain sight. Clearly this was something that was considered as a possibility. Pakistan is a large country. We are looking right now at how he was able to hold out there for so long, and whether or not there was any type of support system within Pakistan that allowed him to stay there. We know that the people at the compound there were working on his behalf, and that’s how we ultimately found our way to that compound. But we are right now less than 24 hours after this operation, so we are talking with the Pakistanis on a regular basis now, and we're going to pursue all leads to find out exactly what type of support system and benefactors that bin Laden might have had. Q But you don’t necessarily take them at their word that they didn’t know? MR. BRENNAN: We are pursuing all leads in this issue. Q Just to follow on that, is it really credible that Pakistani authorities had no idea that this compound was being built and that it existed -- such an elaborate compound? MR. BRENNAN: I think it’s inconceivable that bin Laden did not have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain there for an extended period of time. I am not going to speculate about what type of support he might have had on an official basis inside of Pakistan. We are closely talking to the Pakistanis right now, and again, we are leaving open opportunities to continue to pursue whatever leads might be out there. See video of briefing here. This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual. It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or information is required. This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public. 2) Senior Administration official briefs the press, 2 May 2011 SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We shared our intelligence on this bin Laden compound with no other country, including Pakistan. That was for one reason and one reason alone: We believed it was essential to the security of the operation and our personnel. In fact, only a very small group of people inside our own government knew of this operation in advance. Shortly after the raid, U.S. officials contacted senior Pakistani leaders to brief them on the intent and the results of the raid. We have also contacted a number of our close allies and partners throughout the world. Sine 9/11, the United States has made it clear to Pakistan that we would pursue bin Laden wherever he might be. Pakistan has long understood that we are at war with al Qaeda. The United States had a legal and moral obligation to act on the information it had. And let me emphasize that great care was taken to ensure operational success, minimize the possibility of non-combatant casualties, and to adhere to American and international law in carrying out the mission. 3) Steve Coll, “Notes on the death of Osama bin Laden”, New Yorker, 2 May 2011 Extract: Abbottabad is essentially a military-cantonment city in Pakistan, in the hills to the north of the capital of Islamabad, in an area where much of the land is controlled or owned by the Pakistani Army and retired Army officers. Although the city is technically in what used to be called the Northwest Frontier Province, it lies on the far eastern side of the province and is as close to Pakistani-held Kashmir as it is to the border city of Peshawar. The city is most notable for housing the Pakistan Military Academy, the Pakistani Army’s premier training college, equivalent to West Point. Looking at maps and satellite photos on the Web last night, I saw the wide expanse of the Academy not far from where the million-dollar, heavily secured mansion where bin Laden lived was constructed in 2005. The maps I looked at had sections of land nearby marked off as “restricted areas,” indicating that they were under military control. It stretches credulity to think that a mansion of that scale could have been built and occupied by bin Laden for six years without its coming to the attention of anyone in the Pakistani Army. The initial circumstantial evidence suggests that the opposite is more likely—that bin Laden was effectively being housed under Pakistani state control. Pakistan will deny this, it seems safe to predict, and perhaps no convincing evidence will ever surface to prove the case. If I were a prosecutor at the United States Department of Justice, however, I would be tempted to call a grand jury. Who owned the land on which the house was constructed? How was the land acquired, and from whom? Who designed the house, which seems to have been purpose-built to secure bin Laden? Who was the general contractor? Who installed the security systems? Who worked there? Are there witnesses who will now testify as to who visited the house, how often, and for what purpose? These questions are not relevant only to the full realization of justice for the victims of September 11th. They are also relevant to the victims of terrorist attacks conducted or inspired by bin Laden while he lived in the house, and these include many Pakistanis, as well as Afghans, Indians, Jordanians, and Britons. They are rightly subjects of American criminal law. 2 Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/notes-on-the- death-of-osama-bin-laden.html#ixzz1LH6Ma3qE 4) US Assistance to Pakistan [Adapted from Library Research Paper 10/45, The AfPak policy and the Pashtuns (June 2010)] On 30 September 2009 Congress passed The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (S. 1707), which tripled US non-military aid to Pakistan to US$1.5 billion a year between 2010 and 2014. The legislation has a strong focus on strengthening democracy, promoting development and improving education in Pakistan. It also authorises military assistance to Pakistan, requiring that funds go mainly towards counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.1 The conditions attached to non-military aid in earlier drafts of the legislation had been considerably watered down by the time the Act was passed, following protests by powerful elements within the Pakistani political and security establishment.2 A joint explanatory statement by Senators John F. Kerry and Howard Berman stated: The legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan’s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan’s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations. There are no conditions on Pakistan attached to the authorization of $7.5 billion in non-military aid. The only requirements on this funding are financial accountability measures that Congress is imposing on the U.S. executive branch, to ensure that this assistance supports programs that most benefit the Pakistani people. In January 2010 the Office of the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan published an Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, which provided the most detailed overview yet available of the concrete measures being pursued, with price tags attached, by the US Government, as it sought to implement the AfPak policy.3 Below is a list of activity headings, with an approximate US Dollar figure for the resources available for each initiative during Fiscal Year 2010 (that is, October 2009-September 2010) next to each heading. Afghanistan Deploying additional civilian expertise $400m Rebuilding Afghanistan’s agriculture sector $300m Strengthening Afghan governance $1.8bn Enhancing Afghan rule of law $400m Supporting Afghan-led reintegration $100m Combating the Afghan narcotics trade $1bn Building an economic foundation for Afghanistan’s future $2.5bn 1 “House passes bicameral legislation increasing assistance to Pakistan, improving US-Pakistan ties”, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, press release, 30 September 2009 2 K. Fischer, “The AfPak strategy: Reactions in Pakistan”, Afghanistan Analysts Network policy briefing, March 2010, p6 3 In December 2010, following the death of Richard Holbrooke, Frank Ruggiero was appointed the new Special Representative. 3 Pakistan An enhanced Partnership with Pakistan $2.3bn Enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities $455m4 General Disrupting illicit financial flows to extremists Not specified Countering extremist voices $250m Mobilising international support Not specified A plan for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, first proposed by former President George W. Bush in 2006, under which duty-free access to the US market would be granted for certain goods, as part of the promotion of economic activity in the FATA and Afghanistan, also remains – despite prolonged Congressional delays – on the agenda.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: a Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad
    The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad Michael Taarnby 9/5/2008 WP 20/2008 The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad Michael Taarnby Summary The current volume of publications dealing with Islamist militancy and terrorism defies belief in terms of its contents. The topic of this paper is a modest attempt to direct more attention and interest towards the much overlooked sub-field of historical research within Jihadi studies. Introduction The current volume of publications dealing with Islamist militancy and terrorism defies belief in terms of its contents. This can be perceived as part of a frantic effort to catch up for the lack of attention devoted to this phenomenon during the 1980s and 1990s, when this field of research field was considerably underdeveloped. The present level of research activity is struggling to keep pace with developments. Thus, it is primarily preoccupied with attempting to describe what is actually happening in the world right now and possibly to explain future developments. This is certainly a worthwhile effort, but the topic of this paper is a modest attempt to direct more attention and interest towards the much overlooked sub-field of historical research within Jihadi studies. The global Jihad has a long history, and everyone interested in this topic will be quite familiar with the significance of Afghanistan in fomenting ideological support for it and for bringing disparate militant groups together through its infamous training camps during the 1990s. However, many more events have been neglected by the research community to the point where most scholars and analysts are left with an incomplete picture, that is most often based on the successes of the Jihadi groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
    PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order Online
    UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order online Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Glossary 1. Executive Summary The 1999 Offensive The Chain of Command The War Crimes Tribunal Abuses by the KLA Role of the International Community 2. Background Introduction Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo in the 1990s The 1998 Armed Conflict Conclusion 3. Forces of the Conflict Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Paramilitaries Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility Stucture and Strategy of the KLA Appendix: Post-War Promotions of Serbian Police and Yugoslav Army Members 4. march–june 1999: An Overview The Geography of Abuses The Killings Death Toll,the Missing and Body Removal Targeted Killings Rape and Sexual Assault Forced Expulsions Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Destruction of Civilian Property and Mosques Contamination of Water Wells Robbery and Extortion Detentions and Compulsory Labor 1 Human Shields Landmines 5. Drenica Region Izbica Rezala Poklek Staro Cikatovo The April 30 Offensive Vrbovac Stutica Baks The Cirez Mosque The Shavarina Mine Detention and Interrogation in Glogovac Detention and Compusory Labor Glogovac Town Killing of Civilians Detention and Abuse Forced Expulsion 6. Djakovica Municipality Djakovica City Phase One—March 24 to April 2 Phase Two—March 7 to March 13 The Withdrawal Meja Motives: Five Policeman Killed Perpetrators Korenica 7. Istok Municipality Dubrava Prison The Prison The NATO Bombing The Massacre The Exhumations Perpetrators 8. Lipljan Municipality Slovinje Perpetrators 9. Orahovac Municipality Pusto Selo 10. Pec Municipality Pec City The “Cleansing” Looting and Burning A Final Killing Rape Cuska Background The Killings The Attacks in Pavljan and Zahac The Perpetrators Ljubenic 11.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
    Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Updated November 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41368 SUMMARY R41368 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations November 9, 2020 U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and have led to congressional action against Turkey, including informal holds on major new Jim Zanotti arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft) and efforts to impose sanctions. Specialist in Middle Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.- Eastern Affairs Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Clayton Thomas Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership. His biggest Analyst in Middle Eastern challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp Affairs decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic began. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan), and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration—affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent role. President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his actions in some of the situations mentioned above.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Conference Program
    Presented by the Center for Global Education in conjunction with the Peace Studies Program in Wilkinson College of Humanities and Science Welcome to this year’s academic conference highlighting the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh. Join us in welcoming our guest speakers, including keynote speaker Robert Bradtke, former co-chair of the Minsk Process, who will speak on the search for a peaceful settlement. Conference Program - 2 & 3 | Conference Fact Sheet - 4 | Speaker Biographies - 5| Campus Information- 12 | Acknowledgements - 15 Struggle Between the Seas Conference Schedule FRIDAY, MARCH 8th 2013 Bush Conference Center, Beckman Hall 404 8:30 AM Complimentary coffee and snacks 9:00 AM KEYNOTE SPEAKER: AMBASSADOR ROBERT BRADTKE “Nagorno Karabakh: The Minsk Group and the Search for Peace” 10:15 - 10:30 AM Coffee Break 10:30 AM - 12:00 PM Panel 1 AMBASSADOR RUDOLF PERINA “The Minsk Group Process: Is Time Running Out?” ASBED KOTCHIKIAN “No Exit in the South Caucasus?” TALEH ZIYADOV “Exhausting the Althernatives: The OSCE Minsk Group and its Limits” 12:00 - 1:00 PM LUNCH (attendees will break for lunch on their own) Speakers: Meet in Beckman Corridor Continued on next page | Conference Program - 2 | Struggle Between the Seas Conference Schedule FRIDAY, MARCH 8th 2013 Bush Conference Center, Beckman Hall 404 1:00 PM—2:30 PM Panel 2 ALEXANDROS PETERSEN “Energy Security Issues as affected by Nagorno Karabakh” TRACEY GERMAN “Security Implications of the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict for the Caucasus Region E. WAYNE MERRY “Turkey: The Missing Variable in the Karabakh Equation” 2:30 - 2:45 PM Break 2:45 PM - 4:15 PM Panel 3 GEORGE ZARUBIN “Nagorno Karabakh: Public Perceptions about Prospects for Reconciliation and Institutional Challenges in Armenia and Azerbaijan” THOMAS DE WAAL “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Clashing Narratives” JAMES J.
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo
    XJ[II Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo Ved P. Nanda HE MILITARY INTERVENTION by the nineteen,member North Atlantic T Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, a province of Serbia in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was the first ofits kind undertaken by the alli, ance. Under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty,l NATO was formed as are, gional security organization. With its mission to act in a defensive capacity to protect its members from external aggression, under the treaty the parties spe, cifically agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently ... if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self,defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.2 Thus, the intervention was arguably beyond NATO's intended mission. Equally important, by unilaterally intervening in Kosovo, NATO bypassed the United Nations. Its use of force clearly failed the test of strict compliance with Legal Implications of NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo the constraints of the UN Charter,3 for it did not seek prior authorization of the Security Council to use force. Although the UN eventually assumed an impor~ tant role in shaping the future of Kosovo, it was invited to perform that task only after the end of the conflict.4 I concede that it is too early to write a definitive commentary on the legal implications of this intervention.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey: Background and U.S
    Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Updated August 31, 2018 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41368 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, significantly affects a number of key U.S. national security issues in the Middle East and Europe. U.S.-Turkey relations have worsened throughout this decade over several matters, including Syria’s civil war, Turkey-Israel tensions, Turkey-Russia cooperation, and various Turkish domestic developments. The United States and NATO have military personnel and key equipment deployed to various sites in Turkey, including at Incirlik air base in the southern part of the country. Bilateral ties have reached historic lows in the summer of 2018. The major flashpoint has been a Turkish criminal case against American pastor Andrew Brunson. U.S. sanctions on Turkey related to the Brunson case and responses by Turkey and international markets appear to have seriously aggravated an already precipitous drop in the value of Turkey’s currency. Amid this backdrop, Congress has actively engaged on several issues involving Turkey, including the following: Turkey’s possible S-400 air defense system acquisition from Russia. Turkey’s efforts to acquire U.S.-origin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and its companies’ role in the international F-35 consortium’s supply chain. Complex U.S.-Turkey interactions in Syria involving several state and non- state actors, including Russia and Iran. Over strong Turkish objections, the United States continues to partner with Syrian Kurds linked with Kurdish militants in Turkey, and Turkey’s military has occupied large portions of northern Syria to minimize Kurdish control and leverage.
    [Show full text]
  • Carlotta Gall: Isi Sheltered Bin Laden in Pakistan
    CARLOTTA GALL: ISI SHELTERED BIN LADEN IN PAKISTAN The New York Times has just released an excerpt from Carlotta Gall’s upcoming book “The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014″. Recall that Gall lived in Afghanistan and covered Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Times from 2001-2013 (Declan Walsh also covered Pakistan from inside Pakistan until he was expelled just before the election in 2013). The biggest revelation in the excerpt is that Pakistan knew about, and Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, actively sheltered, Osama bin Laden when he was in hiding in Pakistan. Gall claims that then-ISI head Ahmed Shuja Pasha had direct knowledge of bin Laden’s presence: Soon after the Navy SEAL raid on Bin Laden’s house, a Pakistani official told me that the United States had direct evidence that the ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, knew of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad. The information came from a senior United States official, and I guessed that the Americans had intercepted a phone call of Pasha’s or one about him in the days after the raid. “He knew of Osama’s whereabouts, yes,” the Pakistani official told me. The official was surprised to learn this and said the Americans were even more so. Pasha had been an energetic opponent of the Taliban and an open and cooperative counterpart for the Americans at the ISI. “Pasha was always their blue-eyed boy,” the official said. But in the weeks and months after the raid, Pasha and the ISI press office strenuously denied that they had any knowledge of Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad.
    [Show full text]
  • Chechnya. Calamity in the Caucasus' and Goltz, 'Azerbaijan Diary
    H-Russia Mannteufel on Gall and Waal, 'Chechnya. Calamity in the Caucasus' and Goltz, 'Azerbaijan Diary. A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet-Republic' Review published on Wednesday, November 1, 2000 Carlotta Gall, Thomas de Waal. Chechnya. Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press, 1998. xiv + 416 pp. $26.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8147-3132-1.Thomas Goltz. Azerbaijan Diary. A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet-Republic. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. xxx + 528 pp. $39.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-7656-0244-2. Reviewed by Ingo Mannteufel (Journal OSTEUROPA. Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens, Aachen, Germany) Published on H-Russia (November, 2000) The Caucasus in the 1990s from the Perspective of War Correspondents The Caucasus in the 1990s from the Perspective of War Correspondents Since the last years of the Soviet Union the region around the Caucasus mountains has become an area of violent ethnic conflicts. The Armenian-Azerbaijan War for Nagorno-Karabakh, the hostilities in Georgia (South-Ossetia, Abkhazia), the clashes between Ossetians and Ingush within the Russian Federation, and last but not least the two large-scale Russian-Chechen Wars have drawn the attention of the international public to this up to then unknown region at the edge of Europe. But it was precisely this dangerous atmosphere that attracted journalists from all over the world to report directly from this new hot spot. Thomas Goltz, an American journalist who worked in Turkey during the 1980s, was one of these journalists.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kosovo Report
    THE KOSOVO REPORT CONFLICT v INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE v LESSONS LEARNED v THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO 1 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford Executive Summary • 1 It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, Address by former President Nelson Mandela • 14 and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Map of Kosovo • 18 Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Buenos Aires Calcutta Introduction • 19 Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Paris São Paulo Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw PART I: WHAT HAPPENED? with associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Preface • 29 Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the uk and in certain other countries 1. The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis • 33 Published in the United States 2. Internal Armed Conflict: February 1998–March 1999 •67 by Oxford University Press Inc., New York 3. International War Supervenes: March 1999–June 1999 • 85 © Oxford University Press 2000 4. Kosovo under United Nations Rule • 99 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) PART II: ANALYSIS First published 2000 5. The Diplomatic Dimension • 131 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 6. International Law and Humanitarian Intervention • 163 without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, 7. Humanitarian Organizations and the Role of Media • 201 or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation.
    [Show full text]
  • Policy Notes July 2021
    THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY JULY 2021 POLICY NOTES NO. 108 Deals, Drones, and National Will The New Era in Turkish Power Projection Rich Outzen he Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) attracted much attention in 2020 for its devastating employment of unmanned aerial vehicles during combat in TSyria, Libya, and the Caucasus. UAVs (drones) were just one dimension of Turkish regional interventions, but they were particularly potent symbols in an age of ubiquitous cameras and Internet connections.1 A number of analysts have assessed the tactical and operational impact of Turkish drones.2 Yet the Turkish drone program is just part of a revamped national approach to power Photo: Yasin Bulbul/ projection in neighboring regions—an approach with economic, diplomatic, Presidential Palace/Handout strategic, and reputational effects, as well as implications on the battlefield. via REUTERS An expanded network of Turkish military agreements and overseas basing, the maturation of partner and proxy relationships, the expansion of the defense industry beyond UAVs, military doctrine to integrate new sensors RICH OUTZEN DEALS, DRONES, AND NATIONAL WILL and weapons, and—perhaps most critically—the development of risk-tolerant political will in foreign Abbreviations affairs have enabled Turkey to become a formidable hard-power player in the Middle East, North Africa, GNA Government of National Accord (Libya) the Caucasus, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Scholarly analysis is therefore needed that LNA Libyan National Army both contextualizes new capabilities for Western audiences and assesses the role and impact of these MIT Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (Turkey’s developments for the coming years. Signaling larger National Intelligence Organization) change within the Turkish military, drones represent a technical leap wrapped in a “revolution in military PKK Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey) affairs” embedded in a regional realignment.
    [Show full text]
  • Policybrief Su M M A
    BR P olicy i EF AFTER “AFPAK”: Reframing EuRope’s Pakistan Policy Angela stanzel SUMM Since 9/11, Europe has viewed Pakistan through the prism Since 9/11, Europeans have seen Pakistan of Afghanistan, where it has paid a heavy price over the through the prism of Afghanistan – what became to be known as “AfPak”. But as NATO last decade. Of the 3,427 coalition deaths in Afghanistan, troops withdraw from Afghanistan, it is time more than 800 were from the 25 EU member states that, for a new approach to Pakistan. Despite between them, have deployed over 33,000 troops to the substantial European development aid, NATO-led International Stabilisation and Assistance Force Pakistan is arguably becoming less stable by (ISAF). Europeans also committed around €8 billion in aid the day. This is particularly frightening given Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. It therefore for the period 2002–2010 to Afghanistan’s stabilisation remains important for the EU to prevent and reconstruction.1 Given this investment, and the Pakistan becoming a failed state even as NATO importance of Pakistan to Afghanistan, it is understandable AR withdraws from Afghanistan. But the EU is not that European policy tends to focus on Pakistan above all keeping pace with developments in Pakistan, as “a partner in the fight against terrorism”.2 But if Europe which has an increasingly central role in the emerging regional competition between continues to view Pakistan through this prism alone, its external actors – in particular, China and India. policy is likely to keep failing. y It is time for Europe to move on from its “AfPak” Despite the resources Europeans have committed to focus and develop a new policy that takes into Pakistan since 2001, the country is arguably becoming less account regional dynamics and external actors.
    [Show full text]