British Coioniai Poiicy and the Decision to Abandon Madagascar to the French, 1882-1883 Tara Sethia The French takeover of Madagascar in the late nine- teenth century often has been viewed as the British aban- donment of that island. There is a general consensus among historians that the British bartered away Madagascar at the Anglo-French convention in August 1890.1 The con- vention was the logical outcome of a treaty between Ger- many and England signed in July 1890, whereby Germany was given Heligoland in the North Sea for recognition of an undisputed British protectorate over Zanzibar. The subse- quent Anglo-French convention was an extension of this treaty. At this meeting. Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, solidified the British claim to Zanzibar by recognizing the French protectorate over Madagascar in exchange for similar French recognition of Britain's claims to Zanzibar. Tara Sethia received her B.A. and M.A. in History from the University of Rathasthan, Jaipur, India. She also received an M.A. in History from the University of California, Los Angeles. She is currently working on a Ph.D. at the University of California, Los Angeles, con- centrating on Nineteenth Century British Imperialism. 73 ^ — 74 UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL The British abandonment of Madagascar has been inter- preted in many ways. It has been seen by some, particu- larly by the members of the London Missionary Society, as a "premature" move on the part of the British. The basis of this interpretation is that the British gave up Mada- gascar at the Anglo-French convention which took place five years before the actual French conquest of the is- land in 1895. William Edward Cousins — a British mission- ary who served in Madagascar in the late nineteenth cen- tury— typifies this point of view. Showing his dismay over British recognition of the French protectorate over Madagascar, he explained that "[t]he English have taken but a languid interest in Madagascar affairs, or such a cool giving away of people who had always regarded us their friends would have been impossible . "2 Subsequently, Sonia E. Howe, in The Drama of Madagas- car (1938) , suggested that when British and French inter- ests collided over Madagascar in 1882, Britain was too preoccupied in Egypt to give serious attention to Madagas- car affairs. In short, Howe believes the problem con- fronting the British was "one of Madagascar versus Egypt there could be no doubt where the emphasis lay. "3 Hence, when the Malagasy ambassadors arrived in London to seek support from Her Majesty's Government against French ag- gression, they received a cold response. Nonetheless, ac- cording to Howe, things remained unsettled until 1890 when Britain and France "fixed the price to their mutual satis- faction" and recognized each other's respective claims to Madagascar and Zanzibar.^ A more recent and better-documented work by Phares M. Mutibwa presents an interpretation which differs only slightly from that of Howe. This "representative of the Malagasy viewpoint" interprets the fate of Madagascar as a part of the phenomenon of the "scramble for Africa." Ac- cording to Mutibwa, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had left the French frustrated and angry. This state of affairs tied the hands of the British who could not alienate France "on such secondary issue as Madagascar," and thus they could not aid the Malagasy ambassadors. Yet no specific commitments were made by Britain until the 1890 Anglo-French convention when Britain ended this thorny problem by giving up all claims to Madagascar in exchange for French recognition of British claims to Zanzibar. Mutibwa concludes, "there was no doubt that it was Zanzibar in particular and Britain's overall interests in the Far East in general, which forced Salisbury's hand in acquiescing to French ambitions in Madagascar." The British desertion of Madagascar, to Mutibwa, was all the more striking in that Britain previously had been Madagas- car's best friend and ally in Europe . 5 Similar views are presented in works by Richard Lovett, Jean Valette , Norman Goodall, and Mervyn Brown. Despite the persuasive cases presented by some of the ^ MADAGASCAR 75 above authors, for all practical purposes British abandon- ment of Madagascar took place by 188 3 —well before the Anglo-French formalities of 1890. This de facto British repudiation of its interests in Madagascar, which facili- tated the eventual establishment of the French protector- ate, was as much a result of the policies pursued by the Liberal government in England from 1880 to 1885, as of the French Republic's feverish craving for colonies. This study, however, will focus on the British role because it was Britain's action (or inaction), more than the French designs on Madagascar, which proved decisive in the even- tual establishment of the French protectorate over Mada- gascar. These actions bore, to a large extent, an imprint of the personality of Lord Granville, the Foreign Secre- tary, but they were also guided by Britain's overall in- ternational policy considerations. The most important shifts in British attitude toward Madagascar occurred be- tween October 1882 and February 188 3. It was during this period that the British attitude became increasingly am- bivalent toward both France and Madagascar. And while the French were in a position to take advantage of this by es- tablishing their control over Madagascar, the Malagasy people had no choice but to become victims of it. Belying the ease with which the British yielded to the French in the early 1880s were long-standing British interests to promote British trade and extend the "civi- lizing influence" in Madagascar. Madagascar was a market for Manchester cotton goods. Even after the French con- quest of the island, British cotton imports in Madagascar totaled more than that from all other countries combined. There were also vast sugar plantations owned by British subjects in Madagascar.' Moreover, the London Missionary Society had a very strong hold over the Hova people, who constituted about fifty percent of the total population of Madagascar. The missionaries introduced compulsory educa- tion in most of the Malagasy towns and villages by 1880, and they built a great number of churches and educational institutions . The French, on the other hand, also had long-term, if imprecise, claims to Madagascar. Occasionally the French claimed sovereignty over parts of the island, and they did secure acceptance of their sovereignty over the neighbor- ing islands of Sainte Marie and Nossie Be. Strengthening French claims, the Reunionese colonists regarded Madagas- car as an El Dorado, a promised land. Nonetheless, under British pressure, in 1843 France renounced colonial ambi- tions in Madagascar "publicly and by name."^ The French subsequently accepted the British proposal that "one gov- ernment should do nothing in Madagascar without consulting the other," This understanding was reaffirmed several times prior to 1882.10 This policy of balance was most effective as long as the trade route to India passed by Madagascar. But with a 76 UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Madagascar lost much of its earlier importance. Though this change was not perceived for some time, the opening of the canal, in effect, "sounded the death knell of Madagascar's independ- ence" because a strategic balance of power in that area was no longer necessary. H Madagascar became one more minor pawn to be used in world-wide colonial struggles. The opening of the Suez Canal, however, was not the only factor which disturbed the status quo of the island. The French deeply regretted losing the Indies, Canada, and Louisiana to the British, and for over a hundred years this had been a festering wound in French pride. To salve the wound, French colonial policy in the 1880s was charac- terized by an aggressive pursuit of influence, power, prestige, and glory. 12 as a result, it was not difficult for the French to find grounds to press for political as well as territorial gains in Madagascar. One such ground was the Malagasy preference for the British Protestant missionaries over the French Catholic missionaries — preference viewed by the French as a political move engi- neered by the Malagasy government in league with the Brit- ish "to elbow them [the French] out of the country alto- gether. "13 The French bore various such grudges, both real and imagined, and they were looking for opportunities to avenge their humiliation. The early 1880s provided France with such an opportunity in Madagascar. Aiding these desires was the nature of the British government during the 1880s. The Liberal government of 1880-1885 in Britain was ineffective as a governing body, especially in matters concerning foreign and colonial relations. i^ Prime Minis- ter Gladstone was a follower of Lord Aberdeen, who re- jected an aggressive foreign policy and strove to acquire French friendship. Compounding Aberdeen's meek foreign policy was Gladstone's poor health and his lack of mastery of foreign affairs. Attacks of influenza left him low and weak, and internal cabinet factions became more assertive when Gladstone admitted his limited knowledge of foreign matters. 15 if anything really engrossed him, it was Ire- land. In affairs such as Madagascar, his knowledge was so shallow that he was often accused of giving wrong informa- tion and making contradictory statements in the House of Commons. 16 The Foreign Office was headed by Lord Granville, who occupied the post of Foreign Secretary with consummate un- interestedness. His diplomatic abilities were limited. His nickname was "Puss. "17 The radical Cabinet members. Sir William Harcourt and Joseph Chamberlain, had little interest in Madagascar. Lord Derby's paralyzing influence merely added to the tendency of Cabinet meetings to be typified by prolonged discussions without any decisions.