“Collective Memory” Does Ex- Ture

The Robinson Chronicles

“CollectiveFrom the 20s through theMemory” 90s: The way we think we were

By Michael J. Robinson

obert Dole says the strangest Carl Jung actually offered up some ideas lective memory correspond with the things. But it didn’t start with about the “collective unconscious” three- pretty picture Dole painted? And if it R weird commercials about the quarters of a century ago, so collective doesn’t, what is the shape of Americans’ heartbreak of “E.D.” Back in 1996, memory has a lineage as old as psycho- “memories?” Dole said something even more curious. analysis. But whether one has a Jungian Surprisingly, during his acceptance perspective or a more More important in building a theory is speech at the Republican National Con- the “existential” question: Do Ameri- vention, Dole promised the cans really have a meaningful— nation that, if elected, he’d shared—collective memory? And, tied move America backward, to directly to that is the “size,” or “vari- the past. ability” question: Is there more—or less—collective memory about the old Not so surprising was Bill days than the more recent past? Clinton’s response. In his acceptance speech, Clinton prom- s usual, there’s also a ised that if re-elected, he’d move methodological question. If the nation forward, to the fu- A “collective memory” does ex- ture. ist, is there a legitimate way to measure it? Obviously, survey re- Least surprising of all: Clinton search is a reasonable option. Sur- won. vey research is, after all, the aggre- gation of individual impressions. Dole’s speech was obviously a big mistake. But, actually, he’d been In April and May 1999, the Pew giving it for years. Born in 1923, Research Center polled more Dole said he remembered the past than 1,500 people, asking scores because he’d been there, he knew it of questions about America’s was a better America back then. past—things like public per- ceptions about the progress Dole’s remembrances are both per- made these last fifty years, or sonal and experiential. But what about www.silent-movies.com whether individuals remem- the rest of “us,” the public? As a modern ber where they were when they heard public, we could not possibly have take on all this, “collective memory” Ronald Reagan had been shot. Luckily been “there.” Still, we can have impres- is still less a theory than a notion—one for us, Pew also included a novel item we sions about the nation’s past. And re- that seems to provide more questions can refer to as the “decades question.” cently, social scientists have taken to than answers. calling these impressions our “collective People were asked, “What word or phrase memory.” That’s where Bob Dole comes in. It’s best describes your impression of the Dole’s memories that provide us with 1920s?; the 1930s?,” and so forth. De- questions that might lead to some an- cade by decade, here’s a compendium of swers about “collective memory.” the way we think we were these last Michael J. Robinson is retired associate eighty years—a fin de siècle photograph professor of government, Georgetown Uni- For starters, there’s the “shape” of our of our collective memories. versity, and consultant to the Pew Research collective memory: Does American col- Center for the People & the Press.

14 Public Perspective, January/February 2000 The 20s: “Roaring” Then; fact, among the “expressives,” 33% use that collective memory about some of “Boring” Now the very word “Depression” as their term our public past is ephemeral, even chi- of choice. But the responses to the ’30s merical. What is surprising is that so Unlike any other decade, the ’20s obli- question suggest some problems with much “collective amnesia” occurs here, gate us to adopt a cliché for a label. our theory. during an era so integral to our history. When asked to describe the ’20s, people offer up the same word: “roaring.” And Forty-two percent decline to say any- Collective memory about the ’30s is also if their preferred modifier isn’t “roar- thing about the ’30s—the record level of surprisingly apolitical. For an epoch one ing,” it is quite likely to be a synonym: “declination” for any decade. And might expect to be remembered as very “swinging,” “care-free,” “wild,” or “wide- “decliners” prove to be numerous among political, responses to the “decades ques- open.” demographic groups one would presume tion” indicate otherwise. Franklin to be very much aware of the era. Roosevelt and his New Deal stand at the Consider the numbers. Nearly two- center of the ’30s. But a mere one thirds of respondents express an opinion percent of all the references to the ’30s of some kind about the ’20s. (From here allude to Roosevelt, the New Deal, or on out I use the word “expressives” in the programs associated with either. referring to people who actually answered the question). The ’30s also provides evidence that some people actually do view hard times Among the “expressives,” 47% depict nostalgically. There is near consensus the ’20s as being fun—“Spring Break” that the ’30s were miserable. But just for adult America. References are either under 15% of the “expressives” dissent, about living it up, or about the symbols proffering a view of the ’30s as a time of of doing just that: “Flappers;” “swing;” hope, safety, or rebuilding. What’s more, “the Charleston;” “speakeasies;” “prohi- those who actually lived during the De- bition;” “bathtub gin.” But, every other pression are most likely to feel that way. noun, adjective or gerund pales in con- Somehow, 21% of the expressive elderly trast to “r-o-a-r-i-n-g.” One in seven of remember the Depression favorably. Old the “expressives” (14%) says specifically and nostalgic, these folks might well be that “roaring” is the single best word to thought of as “Dolesters.” encapsulate the decade. The ’40s: “The Not-So-Big-One” So, the ’20s are definitely roaring in the American collective memory. But they www.classicphotos.com In colloquial American, the Second are mostly boring for us, as students of World War is known as “the Big One”— collective memory. It’s not so much that Among those who have graduated from a sobriquet that reflects the scope of the we’re duty-bound to use a label that is college, nearly a third (31%) go mute conflict and the righteousness of the hackneyed. Asking people about the when asked to say anything about the cause. World War II was—and is— ’20s doesn’t tell us much that’s exciting, ’30s. And, in the black community— central to 20th century American his- other than this: there is a collective whose fundamental political loyalties tory. If the public did not regard the ’40s memory about that era. shifted dramatically during the ’30s be- as the “war years,” there’d be grounds for cause of the Depression—the figure declaring the concept of “collective The ’30s: “Hard Times” reaches 58%. memory” a failure here and now.

There also appears to be a meaningful Perhaps it’s Democrats who surprise Collective memory passes this test, but collective memory about the ’30s. And, most. The ’30s may have saved the not with distinction. Among again, the best label offers no surprises: national Democratic party from politi- “expressives,” 54% describe the decade I’ve called the era “Hard Times.” cal oblivion. But, as of today, 41% say in words that translate easily into the nothing about their party’s salvation, or “Big One,” references that start with Among the “expressives,” 60% speak about anything else relating to the ’30s. “Pearl Harbor” and end with about the ’30s in terms of “struggle,” “Hiroshima.” “poverty,” “sadness,” and, of course, This is the Depression we’re talking about “Depression,” with a capital “D”—the here. Even so, there’s a big gap in our But again, we face the nemesis of “decli- semi-official word for this decade. In collective recall. And that gap tells us nation.” The number of respondents

Public Perspective, January/February 2000 15 The ’50s: “Happy Days” was always presented in a frivolous ’50s and “Modernity” mode. “Happy Days” ran eleven seasons and had a cult following long before it I had expected the ’50s to be ever went to reruns. something of a bagatelle. That I’d discover the ’50s to “Laverne and Shirley” and “Happy Days” be little more than a na- made Marshall a fortune, and made tele- tional joke. As it turns out, vision history. But what makes Marshall’s the ’50s are remembered col- programming relevant to us is that it also lectively as a trifle. But, in seems to have “made” collective memory. another tasty irony, the ’50s What the public says about the ’50s also turn out to be a water- corresponds near-perfectly with the im- shed. In our recall of the ages and themes served up by “Happy ’50s, collective memory Days.” Nobody mentions Joe McCarthy. achieves modernity. Despite the loss of nearly 40,000 Ameri- can lives, a meager one percent mentions Public impressions of the the war in Korea. No, it’s Richie ’50s are just about what one Cunningham’s life that serves as a tem- would expect, especially if plate for almost everything Americans one is a Garry Marshall fan. remember about the era. One of TV’s most successful producers, Marshall A fifth of all respondents speak in terms National Archives spent much of the ’70s and of happiness, optimism and fun. An- who decline to answer the ’40s question ’80s creating sitcoms about the ’50s. other fifth make reference to pop-cul- is virtually identical to the number who tural icons that were at the core of the mention the “Big One.” And there is a Marshall gave us “Laverne and Shirley,” “Happy Days” state of mind. Half those third group here which does not think of a sitcom about two simple-minded ’50s references are to “rock-n-roll.” The rest the ’40s as the war years. girls working in a Milwaukee brewery. are vintage ’50s stereotypes: Elvis; cool Through eight successful seasons, they cars; family values; television; the baby- It is only by the slimmest plurality that continually engaged in ’50s-style high- boom. Pop-culture and the “good life” respondents define the decade in terms jinks but never once behaved like Ally account for 42% of all impressions. of war. Nearly two-thirds do not. The McBeal. ’40s, as seen through the prism of collec- orrelation is not, as they say, tive memory, are the era of the “Not-So- Marshall also gave us “Happy Days,” a causality. There is no proof here Big-One.” fabulously successful sitcom about al- Cthat Garry Marshall manufactured most nothing, but a nothingness that our collective memory about this decade. What renders “the Big One” not-so-big? Youth is part of the problem. Almost half (47%) of the under-30 crowd decline to answer the ’40s question. But it’s also the oldest Americans who somehow fail to reach the level of consensus that the ’40s were the “war years.”

Fifteen percent of expressive seniors label the ’40s as “good years,” or years of patriotism and national unity. That’s nearly four times the percentage for the other age groups sampled. As was the case for the ’30s, there exists here a disproportionate share of the old who are nostalgic about an era most Ameri- cans consider a tribulation. Though few in number, the “Dolesters” are at it again. UConn Special Collections

16 Public Perspective, January/February 2000 But media maven Marshall is, himself, a metaphor for what happens to collective memory, beginning with the ’50s and continuing on until the ’80s. In our recall of the ’50s, collective memory goes modern. And at the heart of this particular hybrid of “modernism” is an increasingly mass-mediated collective thought.

It’s not until the ’50s that the collective recall of any given decade com- ports almost entirely with what the media give us. Until television begins defining our decades, collective memory tracks with history, not with sitcoms. Garry Marshall and “Happy Days” are symbols of those changes. UConn Special Collections

The modernity of collective memory been no mention made here either to veyed remember exactly where they were manifests itself in several ways, all of “expressives” or to “decliners.” All the when they heard the news. And yet, which tie into mass media. To begin, percentages relating to this decade have when asked to offer an overall impres- when people remember the ’50s, they been based on everybody in the survey. sion of the ’60s, it’s as if the first five years mention the media. When thinking The reason? Starting with the this de- hadn’t happened or didn’t matter. about the ’20s, nobody mentions vaude- cade, the level of “declination” declines. ville. When thinking about the ’30s, What does matter are the two faces of the nobody mentions movies. And nobody Between the ’20s and the ’40s, nearly late ’60s: social change and political considers radio, popular as it is with 40% of the public has no answer for the upheaval. When reconstructing the ’60s virtually every American, to be the sym- “decades question.” For the ’50s through in their minds, almost 30% of the public bol of any decade. the ’90s that percentage is cut in half. thinks “sociologically.” And another The biggest dropoff comes in the “Happy 20% thinks “politically.” No other cat- But when thinking about the ’50s, one Days” era. With the ’50s we leave be- egory of collective memory even comes percent do mention TV. Another one hind the middle ages of “don’t know” close. When one says “the ’60s,” one says percent mentions specific programs. and enter the modern age of expression. “sociology” or “politics,” or one says Granted, two percent isn’t much. But, nothing at all. compare that to “history.” Almost twice The ’60s: The Cultural Revolution, as many people remember the ’50s for American Style For the first time, however, we face the trivial television as for the anything-but- problem of two major collective memo- trivial “Cold War.” It’s easy to make a case that the ’60s were ries existing simultaneously. And a split two separate eras. “Camelot,” the “Great like that raises the question of a collec- Collective thinking about mid-century Society” and “Motown” symbolize the tive memory versus contradictory collec- also goes to celebrity. Until people start first. “Haight-Ashbury,” Vietnam, and tive memories. recalling the ’50s, nobody uses celebrity the Beatles epitomize the second. to define an era. But for the ’50s we do. In this instance, the issue is soluble. In About 3% of the public cite Elvis Presley But collective memory draws no such the ’60s, the sociological was the politi- as being the very best symbol of the age. distinction. The ’60s are remembered cal, and the political was the sociological. History and historians may consider these overwhelmingly for what transpired af- “Hippies,” flower children, and to be the “Eisenhower Years.” But there ter 1965. As to symbols, the first half of “Woodstock” are, as examples, mainly are almost seven times as many references the decade draws a collective-memory sociology. The anti-war movement and to Elvis as to Ike. blank. the civil rights movement are mainly politics. But all of these symbols are Thinking about the era has one final, People do remember events of the early parts of a socio-political whole. To- modern element. When the public starts ’60s. In fact, the single most memorable gether they stand for the “American Cul- recalling the ’50s, the public also begins event of the entire century is the Kennedy tural Revolution”—the collective to express itself a whole lot more. There’s assassination of 1963; 90% of those sur- memory of this important epoch.

Public Perspective, January/February 2000 17 political, sometimes even the mass psyche unless it reaches deep ideological. In fact, more down through the social order, and not people say the ’60s are best just to the level of the cognoscenti. To- remembered as “liberal” gether, Nixon and Watergate rocked the (4%) than say they are best Establishment. But they merely bumped remembered as drug- against the public at large. addled. There’s one more thing about the ’70s. Let’s give credit where due. The tendency for the young to trivialize It takes a lot to get Ameri- reaches its peak with this era. For almost cans to reminisce in politi- every decade, the young “remember” a cal terms. The ’60s had more foolish past. But for the ’70s the what it takes. gap between the young and the not-so- old is extraordinary. Among those un- The ’70s: Decade Disco der 30, 38% define the ’70s “pop-cultur- ally.” For those over 50, that figure is If the ’60s had what it takes, just 7%. Somehow, war and constitu- the ’70s definitely did not. tional crises notwithstanding, the ’70s No decade fails as badly as produce a level of banality in the think- the ’70s in getting the pub- ing of young Americans that goes un- lic to think politically, let matched. alone seriously. The ’80s: “Me,” Or Nothing At All Ask a sophisticate what

UConn Special Collections typifies the ’70s and there’s Tom Wolfe said that the ’70s were the a good chance he or she “Me Decade.” But if public opinion is will mention Richard the standard, Wolfe was off by around What makes the ’60s unique is that they Nixon, the Watergate scandals or the ten years. There are about four times as are remembered by the general public as constitutional crisis they engendered. many people who regard the ’80s—as “political” years. In fact, unless one Pew asked the man and woman on the opposed to the ’70s—as an era of defines war as “political”—a debatable street that question, and the answer turns “meism.” Adding together those who proposition, especially for World War out to be disco dancing, music and de- mention “meism” with those who feel II—then the ’60s are the only political signer drugs. Precisely one-quarter of all that conspicuous consumption, crass decade in “memory”. respondents remember the ’70s in terms materialism, and “yuppies” are the sym- of popular culture. Another tenth an- bols of that era, the total is 7%. And yet the ’60s have been tagged with swer in social terms, typically saying the a moniker that is anything but political. ’70s were about “fun.” That 7% may be enough to discredit Whether you lived then or not, chances Tom Wolfe’s theory, but it’s hardly are you’ve heard the ’60s were the era of The big non-story is politics. Neither enough to proclaim a collective memory “sex, drugs and rock-n-roll.” the war in Vietnam, which ended, fi- into existence. So, let’s be more inclu- nally, in 1975, nor the Nixon presidency sive. In the context of the ’80s, let’s That label describes the truth, but defi- which ended, abruptly, in 1974, comes assume that money is tantamount to nitely not the whole truth. Two percent close to being a major shared memory. “meism.” If we add “money items” to of respondents do mention “free love” There are nearly three times as many “meism,” then the “money and me” cat- and “open marriage” as signs of the times. references to disco and John Travolta egory represents about an eighth of all Three percent mention drugs, LSD, or (6%) as to Vietnam, Watergate, and respondents. That still isn’t enough. psychedelics. And another 3% mention Nixon combined. Few as they are, rock-n-roll. So sex, drugs and rock-n- Travolta, alone, gets nearly three times So, let’s add in “hedonism”: Drugs; roll are a part of our ’60s images. as many references as does Nixon. popular music; dancing; health clubs; big or bad hair-styles, etc. If we are But the label is misleading. “Sex, drugs Why do the two horsemen of the ’70s willing to do all that, then we can come and rock-n-roll” depicts this most politi- apocalypse—Nixon and Watergate—do up with a catch-all category that includes cal of decades as an apolitical bacchana- so “badly?” Perhaps the best explanation just over a fifth of the sample (22%). lia. Yet our survey-based reminiscence is is that no political crisis imprints itself on

18 Public Perspective, January/February 2000 And yet, if we assume that no collective Public thinking about the ’90s is neither Second, Decade DotCom, such as it is, memory is worth a name unless a third of collective nor amnestic. It is, for the first exonerates the “DotCom Generation.” the public mentions it, then the ’80s time, cacophonous. For the ’90s, Pew It’s about the ’90s that the young express should flunk our admittedly arbitrary came up with 27(!) separate response not just the plurality opinion, but also a test of meaningful collective recall. And categories to the “decades question.” plurality opinion that isn’t puerile. In flunk they do. As such, henceforth, they fact, “DotComers” (between the ages of shall go nameless. Still, there has to be one category with a 18 and 29) outdistance every other age plurality. And, not surprisingly, that group in offering an impression about The ’80s fail to make a name for them- category is “high-tech.” “High-tech” the ’90s that emphasizes something sub- selves. But their failure helps to educate references—including e-mail; the web; stantive. The young are nearly twice as the rest of us about what may be the the ’net; computers—account for 12% likely to mention high-tech as those over newest phase of collective memory. The of the total. So, if it’s the decade of 30. Now that they are a part of the ’80s prove to be the first decade to flunk anything at all, it is the DotCom De- definition of a decade, the “DotComers” the test, but they are not the last. The cade. Or the age of “Whatever.” finally manage to recognize something same thing happens in the ’90s, only as serious as software and hardware as more so. It’s the beginning of a two- There are two other things worth men- symbols of an era. decade trend. tioning about the ’90s. First, even though “high-tech” doesn’t score very many So, the ’90s do help to rehabilitate the So, the ’80s lack collective coherency. points, it does beat out some intriguing young. But the ’90s also serve as an But do they also go wanting for any kind competition. indictment for anybody peddling a theory of political theme? Republican readers of collective memory. We decided to are probably asking themselves, “What This has been the longest peace-time flunk the ’80s because only a fifth of the about the Reagan Revolution?” As they economic expansion in our history— population could agree about a particu- say in Jersey, “Fuggetaboudit.” Which is and it comes close to being the longest of lar theme. In the ’90s only an eighth can exactly what the public has done. any kind, ever. So, this could have agree. We now have our second failure. turned out to be the Mutual Funds De- People are almost as unwilling to con- cade or the NASDAQ age. But, in spite Two cases do not a thesis prove. But the jure Reagan in their thinking about the of it all, only 5% define the ’90s in numbers are telling. Up until the ’80s, ’80s as they were unwilling to conjure economic terms. Roosevelt in their thinking about the ’30s. Reagan and his revolution get 2% Bill Clinton is the first impeached Presi- Continued on page 44. of the references; FDR and his New Deal dent in 130 years. got one. Think of it as “bipartisan But only 5% con- nonpartisanship.” sider the “moral breakdown”—his or The ’90’s: Decade DotCom, the nation’s—to be or WhatEVER the measure of our time. This is not the “The ’90s is a decade without a definition: “Age of Monica.” no bumper sticker; no catch phrase, no And despite all our epitaph.” So concludes the Associated Press military adven- after having interviewed a goodly number tures—from Iraq on of pundits, futurists and academics. In the through Kosovo— sardonic words of Studs Terkel, “The ’90s almost no one (1%) should be remembered as “The Decade of mentions anything National Alzheimer’s disease—forgetful- about an American ness of yesterday; forgetfulness of history.” imperium, or our un- contested super- Yes and no. In fact, there is considerable power status, or even opinion about the ’90s; nearly 90% of the Gulf War. Pew’s respondents express some word or phrase that defines the decade—a record level of expressiveness. It’s just that there’s so little shared opinion.

Public Perspective, January/February 2000 19 That’s One Giant Leap for NASA Arttoday.com uppose the public could choose an Oscar winner for S “Best Public Policy in a Single Century.” Well, suppose no more.

The Pew Center is not the Film Academy, but it did ask respondents what they thought the government’s “greatest achievement” has been during these last hundred years.

Their answers are as ballots in an Oscar-style competition. And with the balloting completed, we now know the nominees and the winner of this race for the “Policy Award.”

The Nominees Are...

Asked this open-ended question about “government achieve- Our other great “victory”—the Cold War—is only a decade ment,” precisely a third of the public answered, “Duh.” As removed from today, yet only 3% cited that “victory” as the for those who did make a choice, they gave answers that fit into government’s finest hour. four general categories: “prosperity;” “victory;” “partisan programs,” and finally, the Winner. Washington actually got more credit for waging peace than for waging war. Adding together the votes for “diplomacy,” As for the winner... it isn’t “Prosperity” for “America’s stature in the world,” and for the government’s role in promoting peace—the “Pax Americana”—we come Americans love prosperity. But only 8% of those with an up with 11% of the total vote. The victories over fascism and opinion considered ongoing “wealth and prosperity” to be the communism totaled just 8%. government’s greatest achievement. ...it isn’t “Partisan Programs” Americans probably consider themselves to be the real win- ners when it comes to building a successful economy. So the Ask a policy wonk about governmental achievement and government got only minimal credit for its role in what you’re not likely to hear anything about “winning a war” or economists call fiscal policy. “preserving the peace.” Those things are government actions, not policies per se. ...it isn’t “Victory” Wonks think programmatically. And they think about poli- Vince Lombardi insisted that “winning isn’t everything; win- cies and programs that have some partisan or ideological ning is the only thing.” Not so. Just 4% considered America’s underpinning. But Pew didn’t ask wonks; it asked the public. victory in World War II as the greatest success. In fact, people And the public doesn’t think “programmatically.” It thinks gave more credit to the government for promoting public even less in terms of programs that are typically identified with health (5%) than for beating the Nazis. either political party or any major political “ism.”

It’s been almost three generations since America defeated Culling through the data I came up with three categories of fascism. But it isn’t merely the passage of time operating here. programmatic response: fiscal conservatism (balancing the

Continued from page 19. he graph of collective memory, decade by decade, produces something akin to a bell-shaped curve. TFor the ’20s on through the ’60s, the level of collective the level of shared opinion—the degree of collective memory memory continues to increase. With the ’70s the level falls about those early decades—accounted, on average, for more back. Then the ’80s and the ’90s are visited upon us. And than a third of all responses. Since the ’80s, the level has fallen neither has produced a widely shared theme. Consensus is off by about half (see Figure 1, pp. 46). out; dissensus is in.

44 Public Perspective, January/February 2000 federal budget); social welfarism (maintaining the “safety than Platonic. Americans grant this award to government- net”); and social justice (promoting civil rights and liberties). sponsored science because they think science has “helped.” Helped to improve their economy. Helped to make their Three percent of the vote went to balancing the budget; 9% travel, communication and work less burdensome. Helped to to the “safety net,” and 13% to civil rights and liberties. All prolong their lives. Even helped America look great in the eyes told, 25% of the votes cast went to these three programs, each of the world. of which can be tied to “conservatism” or to “liberalism.” These are the practical and objective reasons. But beyond Not bad. But not what a wonk would have imagined. In fact, those are the cultural, and more subjective, aspects of this fewer votes went to all these “political” programs combined science thing, especially this space thing. than to that one very popular program that has neither partisan nor ideological colorations... emember “collective memory”? That it was more about R fun than about ideas? More about celebrity than about The Envelope, Please issues? More about success than about failure? And more about anything than about ideology? ...And this century’s “Greatest Achievement” award goes to the producers of the Apollo project, the space shuttle pro- It’s all of a piece. Our specific collective memory about the gram, and the Hubble telescope. In an acronym: NASA. government’s greatest success simply reflects generalized collective thinking about our public past. Space and science and Sharing the award with the producers at NASA are the technology all do well in collective recall, in part, because directors of those government programs that sponsor science none of them is political and all of them are a kick. and technology (S&T). Space, above all, wins an Oscar for “Best Policy in a Single Taken together, space, technology and science got 28% of all Century” because space is most in keeping with our collective votes cast for “greatest achievement.” That’s about three “thought process.” Space exploration is “gee-whiz” entertain- times as many ballots for space and S&T as for “peace.” And ment—fun. Space programs produce an ongoing supply of nearly four times as many for space and S&T as for “prosperity.” heroes—celebrities. And space—moon shots, particularly— put us in touch with another, older collective notion: that we The really big stars were space exploration and the Apollo are the world’s pathfinders and explorers—pioneers of ac- program. Twenty-two percent of all the ballots went there. complishment. Space accounted for three-quarters of all the vote going to space and to S&T combined. As an added bonus, space exploration has no partisan ideology. John Glenn and Neil Armstrong. Or Meriwether Lewis hat space, science and technology should win this award and George Rogers Clark. Government employees, all. And Tis more than a little ironic. Americans say they love each made a name for himself implementing federal public science, but they also countenance a system of education that policy. But each man and each policy can fairly be remem- proves their love is false, or at least shallow and fickle. bered as outside politics or partisanship of any kind.

More than half the math and science teachers in America did Space is part national achievement; part national pride, and not major, or minor, in college math or science! So, this Oscar part a national theme park of the mind. It’s our space-age should not be interpreted as evidence that Americans love “Frontierland.” And nothing ought to fit better with the science as some sort of Platonic ideal. social-psychological dimensions of American collective thought than a place called “Frontierland.” Apparently, The “objective” reasons for this outcome are more practical nothing does. —Michael J. Robinson

But why? There are three plausible theories: “recency;” “Reality” theory is history. The more memorable the history, “reality;” and a “restructured” media. “Recency” theory is the greater the shared memory. But the real history of the last cognitive psychology. Recency involves nothing more pro- twenty years has been less than cataclysmic. Without a found than the notion that the closer in time the public is to cataclysm to recall, Americans remember many things, but “everything,” the more likely it is to remember anything. few decade-defining things—no signature. Being most recent, the last two decades should, as “recency” would have it, elicit more impressions, but no single theme. “Restructured media” involves changing information sys-

Public Perspective, January/February 2000 45 tems. Between the ’20s and the ’60s vanced in age. Not once, in any decade, peevish. But Americans—especially America increasingly relied on central- did these “nostalgics” account for even a young Americans—do bethink a history ized broadcasting as its information sys- tenth of the population. that is more a cultural cartoon than a tem. But in the ’70s and ’80s America shining city on the hill. We turn out to moved to cable. And with cable came “Dolesters” remember the past as be not nearly so nostalgic as we think we “narrowcasting.” Norman Rockwell painted it. As such, are. The portraits of our collective they help us understand how Dole came memory are painted now more with the In the ’90s America has moved again, to misinterpret American collective brush of a Garry Marshall than a Norman toward the web and the ’net. So now it’s memory. But the general public is not Rockwell. “cybercasting,” the most personalized nearly so Rockwellian as Dole figured it form of instantaneous communication to be. • Resolving Existential Angst: Collective since the telephone, and the most inter- memory may be a new concept. But is it active since word-of-mouth. • Finding A Common Denominator: No a true concept? Is there enough of it, single decade can symbolize eighty years regardless of its quality, to merit so pro- Narrowcasting and cybercasting render of collective thinking. So, we’ll have to digious a name? centralized mass media as nice, but not settle for a common denominator as we so necessary. As such, narrowcasting and attempt to describe the “shape” of collec- For six of the eight decades, a third of the cybercasting should produce a “post- tive thinking. public does express a widely shared re- membrance. As they say, three out of four ain’t bad. And there’s a second Figure 1 reason to believe. The ’70s are the excep- Percent of Respondents Expressing “the” Collective Memory tion; but for all the other decades, the leitmotif of public opinion at least reso- 51% nates with what historians have com- 42% posed. From the roaring ’20s on through 35% 35% the DotCom ’90s, the theme offered up 30% 32% by the public has a ring of objective truth 22% to it. 12% • Wither collective memory? The level of collective memory has most definitely waxed and waned as we’ve considered

(Roaring) these last eighty years. We have much less of it when reflecting on the more 20s (Hard Times) (Happy Days) (The Big One) (Disco Decade) 30s (Money and Me) recent past compared with much earlier 40s 50s 60s (Am.Revolution) Cultural (Decade DotCom) 70s 80s days. We have much more of it in 90s recalling the “middle years” than for any Note: Collective Memory established by the plurality of responses to the “decades question.” other time. Given that distribution, it would appear as if we have three separate modern” public opinion—a public opin- There is a common thread that wends its stages of collective memory: paleo; meso; ion inherently short-lived and disparate. way through most of our imagined past. and neo. In the “cyberized” world of the future, But it is not a reverie for America’s idyllic any memory might well be collective. yesteryears; it’s more an impression of Paleo—For the ’20s through the ’40s, But for only about 15 minutes. rollicking days-gone-by. our collective memory looks to be mainly “historical.” Collective memory about e started with four questions; In our national rearview mirror we con- these decades is widely shared; it seems we’ll end up with answers to jure up impressions of our history mostly based in the lessons one would have W five. as fun: the boozy ’20s; the happy-go- learned in a decent high school social lucky ’50s; the dance-crazed ’70s; the studies curriculum. • Resurrecting Robert Dole: There are “go-go” ’80s; the “wired” ’90s. Even the some “Dolesters” out there—people who ’60s are remembered more for the ex- Meso—For the ’50s through the ’70s, feel the ’30s were character-building and citement than for the turbulence. collective memory transmogrifies into the war years edifying. But “Dolesters” something much more “pop-cultural.” are as few in number as they are ad- My view of collective memory may seem Collective memory about these years is

46 Public Perspective, January/February 2000 very wide—and shallow. And with the the exigencies of collective memory— might do to us; or, more importantly, vivid exception of the ’60s, collective especially its limitations. If those profes- what the ongoing diminution of it might memory in the middle years corresponds sionals fail, for instance, to recognize the mean. increasingly with the jejune images that apolitical basis of collective memory, they one might pick up watching lots of prime- also put themselves at risk—at risk of The real issue here is political integra- time television. writing survey questions that won’t tion—that essential element of politics “work;” news stories that won’t attract that binds us to the political system, and Neo—For the ’80s and the ’90s collec- an audience; books that won’t be based all the other citizens within it. Collective tive memories look “kaleidoscopic.” In on a valid model of public opinion. memory is important, above all, because this most recent phase, collective memory it is a reasonable indicator of how politi- is characteristically fragmented and dis- cally integrated we are. If the level—or jointed. To the degree they exist at all, even the quality—of collective memory our most recent impressions reflect not “Collective memory is a is actually diminishing, that might also much of anything in particular, other mean our level of political integration is than the increasingly myriad sources of proverbial canary in a somehow in jeopardy. information that convey them. coal mine. If she up and Collective memory is a proverbial canary We should not be too deterministic in a coal mine. If she up and dies, then about all this. If a genuine catastrophe dies, then we know we we know we have a problem somewhere. should occur, this three-stage dialectical have a problem some- But collective memory is neither the coal would probably explode. And, it’s quite dust nor the gas. It can’t kill us; it just possible that in 50 years people will have where.” warns us. However interesting collec- a collective theme to offer about the ’80s tive memory may be, it is an epiphenom- and ’90s. No single survey conducted in enon—an effect much more than a cause the present can ever begin to test for that. Educators probably have the most to lose of what really matters in the political by ignoring the vicissitudes of collective process. But the ebb and flow of public recall memory—particularly the changing about these last eight decades must mean underpinnings of collective memory As the century ends, our canary of collec- something. And as we stand at the very during the last half century. All the tive memory isn’t dead. She’s merely ebb, it’s hard not to conclude that “the evidence here suggests that social studies looking dissipated. So we definitely have Era of Big Collective Memory” is over. teachers—in fact, the entire system of mixed signals here. What we don’t have Given the post-modern ways in which education—no longer play the leading is much hope of rebuilding a system that we now rediscover ourselves, it’s prob- role in creating our collective memory. would resuscitate collective memory. ably going to take a lot to bring it back. And they haven’t since the ’50s or ’60s. Instead, we have a ’90s America that says, “Hey, why not just buy another • Bonus Question: Who Cares/SoWhat? It is an open question as to whether canary?” Suppose that even half of what’s been educators can reassert themselves in this argued here is true. Which types of people process, can reclaim their role as inculca- At the end of the millennium we do seem would profit from knowing it? And tors of the public past. But without to be losing our public past. We are most what might the broader implications be? knowing the realities of modern collec- certainly losing our collective present. tive memory, schools and teachers are So, first, we might want to find another, Let’s start with politicians. They need to almost certain to fail. more “contemporary” indicator of po- know something about collective litical integration—to transcend our need memory, and for the most practical of nd what about the rest of us—the for collective memory as suggested here. reasons. Political leaders lacking good citizenry? What are the lessons Second, we might need to find other instincts about the realities of collective A and the implications for our re- ways for ensuring a level of political memory put themselves at risk. A poli- publican government, given the protean integration that every pluralist govern- tician who believes, for example, that size, shape and sources of collective ment requires. We will probably do Americans regard their past as a better memory? both of those things in the next century; place is a politician not likely to have it’s just that very few Americans will much of a future. As it was for the professions, the most remember—or even notice—that we ever important lessons and implications have needed or managed to do either. Pollsters, journalists and political scien- to be understood in the “negative”— tists all need to know something about what misreading of collective memory

Public Perspective, January/February 2000 47