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Bringing the Judiciary Back In: an Analysis of the Impact of Executive-Judicial Relations on Democratic Institutional Stability in Venezuela

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Bringing the Judiciary Back In: an Analysis of the Impact of Executive-Judicial Relations on Democratic Institutional Stability in Venezuela BRINGING THE JUDICIARY BACK IN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE-JUDICIAL RELATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY IN VENEZUELA by Lesley Martina Burns B.A. (Honours), University of Guelph, 1999 M.A., University of Guelph, 2001 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2009 © Lesley Martina Burns, 2009 ABSTRACT Using a method of process tracing based on in-depth elite interviews, this dissertation examines the relationship between presidentialism and the rule of law in Venezuela. It finds that the perils of presidentialism—minority government, coalitions, deadlock, term limits and fixed terms— lead to institutional instability when they interact with low rule of law. Institutional instability occurs when one branch of government threatens or attacks another. Instead of exploring regime level stability this dissertation argues that state level factors more accurately capture problems associated with democracy. Rather than focusing on executive- legislative relationships, as much of the literature does, I argue that the judiciary is an important determinant of democratic governance. This dissertation shows how an examination of executive-judicial relationships helps explain dynamics leading to institutional instability in presidential systems. Interviews revealed that institutional instability was associated with judicial non-independence in three periods of Venezuela’s democratic history. During the Punto Fijo era political parties supplanted state institutions that are necessary foundations for democracy; in the transition period the gravity of the problems of a non-independent judiciary became evident; and during the Bolivarian period, the interaction between a low rule of law and presidentialism led to institutional instability. An examination of the precarious executive-judicial relationship in Venezuela builds on previous studies of instability to provide a more complete account for the decline of a seemingly stable democracy. Specifically, it provides a case study of an unstable presidential democracy to show how presidentialism contributes to institutional instability when the rule of law is weak. Finally, the dissertation contributes to shifting the analytical focus of the democratization literature from regime to state. This shift in analysis shows that satisfying the minimal regime criteria for democracy, such as elections, is insufficient to ensure institutional stability, and perhaps continued democracy. For free and fair elections to be meaningful state institutions must be capable of restraining executive power. ii CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ ii CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... iii LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................... v LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................... vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Key Hypotheses ................................................................................................................ 5 1.3 Data and Methodology ...................................................................................................... 7 1.4 Method of Investigation .................................................................................................... 8 1.5 Selection of the Case Study ............................................................................................ 10 1.6 Sources of Evidence ........................................................................................................ 18 1.7 Plan of the Dissertation ................................................................................................... 20 CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................... 24 2.1 Evaluating Democratic Stability ..................................................................................... 24 2.2 The Regime State Distinction ......................................................................................... 25 2.3 Democracy Defined ........................................................................................................ 28 2.4 The Various Meanings of Instability in the Democratization Literature ........................ 33 2.5 How the State Upholds Fair Elections ............................................................................ 38 2.6 Stability in Parliamentary versus Presidential Systems .................................................. 42 2.7 Quality of Democracy ..................................................................................................... 52 2.8 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 58 CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................. 60 3.1 The Rule of Law and Democratic Stability .................................................................... 60 3.2 The Rule of Law ............................................................................................................. 61 3.3 Existing Measures Related to the Rule of Law ............................................................... 63 3.4 Judicial Independence ..................................................................................................... 72 3.5 The Formal – Informal Divide ........................................................................................ 83 3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 85 CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................................... 87 4.1 Institutional Sources of Instability in Venezuelan Democracy ....................................... 87 4.2 Venezuela’s Pacted Democracy: 1958-1988 .................................................................. 92 4.3 The Functioning of the Judicial System 1958 to 1988 ................................................... 97 4.4 Decade of Transition: 1989-1998 ................................................................................. 107 4.5 The Judiciary in the Transition Years 1989-1998 ......................................................... 108 4.6 Judicial Reform Attempts in the Transition Years ....................................................... 114 4.7 Chávez as a Consequence of Dissatisfaction with the Previous System: 1999-2007 ... 118 4.8 The Bolivarian Revolution ............................................................................................ 120 4.9 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 121 CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................................... 123 5.1 Using a Popular Mandate to Reinvent Political Institutions ......................................... 123 5.2 Referendum Circumvents Congressional Minority ...................................................... 125 iii 5.3 Using the Judiciary to Introduce a Constitutional Assembly ........................................ 131 5.4 Structure of the Venezuelan Government under the 1999 Constitution ....................... 150 5.5 The Venezuelan Judicial System .................................................................................. 151 5.6 Stronger Executive, Weaker Judiciary .......................................................................... 154 5.7 The 2000 Elections ....................................................................................................... 160 5.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 162 CHAPTER SIX ....................................................................................................................... 165 6.1 From Polyarchy to Boliarchy ........................................................................................ 165 6.2 Centralizing the Administration of Justice into the Supreme Court ............................. 168 6.3 The Derailment of Constitutional Order ....................................................................... 176 6.4 Political Deadlock Provokes Court Expansion ............................................................. 181 6.5 Court Decision Revises Electoral Rules Retrospectively ............................................. 185 6.6 Popular
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