When Does Diffusing Protest Lead to Local Organization Building
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The Noncommunist Left, Social Constituencies, and Political Strategies in Russia
The Noncommunist Left, Social Constituencies, and Political Strategies in Russia PAUL T. CHRISTENSEN efining and identifying the noncommunist Left in Russia is in many ways an Dexercise in frustration. Whereas the organizations of the noncommunist Left in Russia are somewhat more permanent than that analogy suggests, the sugges- tion that we are dealing with tenuous political formations, with few exceptions, very much to the point. There are many such organizations in Russia; some are relatively stable and have a history, many are not; and all of them are relatively small and have problematic constituencies. There are three central questions to address if we are to understand the potential political import of these groups for Russia’s political future. First, what are the organizations and parties of the non- communist Left that have any stature and political salience? Second, what are their actual or potential social constituencies? Third, what are the political strate- gies of the noncommunist Left, and why does it seem to have such a problem in carving out a political space in contemporary Russia? Before discussing the specific questions raised above, it is important to situ- ate the noncommunist Left in Russia, and indeed the entire Russian political spec- trum, on the conceptual map of political ideologies used in Western social science. Left—historically centered around socialist and communist movements—puts a high value on democracy in the economic as well as in the political realm, on eco- nomic egalitarianism, and traditionally views an expansive role for the state and organized social interests in the operation of society as necessary and positive. -
Putin's Youth
Putin’s Youth: Nashi and the Pro-Regime Youth Movement in Russia, 2000-2012 Angela Lee Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in History May 2013 © 2013 Angela Lee Table of Contents page I. Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………iii II. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1 III. Background: The Komsomol, 1918-1991 ……………………….………………...…………4 IV. Chapter 1: Idushchie Vmeste, 2000-2005……………………………………...……………17 V. Chapter 2: Nashi Emerges, 2005-2008………………………………….…………………..31 VI. Chapter 3: Nashi Recedes, 2008-2012…………………………….………………………...55 VII. Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………………………..66 VIII. Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………69 ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Nina Tumarkin for her patience, sound guidance, and endlessly good humor. I would also like to thank all my History professors at Wellesley for their dedication to teaching and their passion for the subject, and also to the Russian Language Department for making the process of learning Russian a joy during this past year. I am grateful to those who were part of the History Honors Thesis Seminar for the rich discussions and thought-provoking questions. I am thankful to Professors Mark Kramer, Ivan Kurilla, Valerie Sperling, and Elizabeth Wood for their willingness to direct me to the right sources for my research. And finally, I am indebted to the love and support of my parents and siblings for all these years. iii Introduction “The question for Russia now is what to do next. How can we make the new, market -
The Youth Movement Nashi: Contentious Politics, Civil Society, and Party Politics.1
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Birkbeck Institutional Research Online The youth movement Nashi: contentious politics, civil society, and party politics.1 Maya Atwal and Edwin Bacon Abstract The youth movement Nashi was established in Russia with the support of the Putin regime in 2005. The success of anti-regime demonstrators in Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 had been noted in Moscow, and Nashi’s role was to serve as a pro-regime force to be mobilised against opposition. Its focus was the contentious politics of the street. Nashi represents an interesting theoretical case from the perspective of contentious politics and its relationship with civil society and formal party politics. Nashi’s role has developed to include facilitating young people’s engagement with party politics and business. Its early centralised control has been ameliorated somewhat by a reorganisation focused on local action. Nonetheless, Nashi exists with state support. Its continued role in contentious politics in support of the Putin regime, for example, countering opposition demonstrations in Moscow in December 2011, makes problematic its identification as a component of democratic civil society. Keywords: Russia; civil society; contentious politics; parties; youth movements; Nashi. Introduction This article explores the dialectic between ‘street politics’ and ‘party politics’. In particular, it focuses on the role played by the pro-Kremlin youth movement Molodezhnoe demokraticheskoe anti-fashistskoe dvizhenie Nashi (‘Democratic anti-fascist youth movement Ours’ – hereafter referred to as Nashi). Although Nashi is not formally linked to any political party, its creation was supported by key Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov, the movement explicitly adopts a pro-Putin stance, and some of its members have gone on to become parliamentary deputies for the ‘party of power’, United Russia. -
Zavadskaya Et Al Russia Electoral Authoritarian
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 25: 4 (Fall 2017): 455-480 ELECTORAL SOURCES OF AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN RUSSIA: VARIETIES OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE, 2007-2016 MARGARITA ZAVADSKAYA EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY AT ST. PETERSBURG MAX GRÖMPING THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY FERRAN MARTINEZ I COMA GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY Abstract: Elections do not always serve as instruments of democracy, but can successfully sustain modern forms of authoritarianism by maintaining political cooptation, signaling the regime’s invincibility, distributing rent among elites, and maintaining linkages with territorial communities. Russia exemplifies electoral practices adapted to the needs of authoritarian survival. Recent institutional reforms reflect the regime’s constant adjustment to emerging challenges. This study traces the evolution of the role of elections in Russia for ruling elites, the opposition, and parties. It argues that the information-gathering and co-optation functions of elections help sustain authoritarian rule, whereas insufficient co-optation and failure to signal regime strength may lead to anti-regime mobilization and Dr. Margarita Zavadskaya is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the European University at Saint Petersburg and senior research fellow at the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics (Russia). Contact: [email protected]. Dr. Max Grömping is Research Associate with the Department of Government and Interna- tional Relations, University of Sydney (Australia). Contact: [email protected]. Dr. Ferran Martínez i Coma is Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane (Australia). Contact: [email protected]. 455 456 Demokratizatsiya 25:4 (Fall 2017) weaken the regime. -
The Electoral System of the Russian Federation
The original of this publication was published as the research commissioned by the Policy Department for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament within a framework contract with IRIS. The original version was published separately by the EP (Policy Department for External Policies) in 2011 (number PE 433.688). Copyrights belong to the European Parliament April 2011 THE EU-RUSSIA CENTRE REVIEW The electoral system of the Russian Federation Issue Seventeen CONTENTS Executive summary 4 Introduction 6 Background 6 The evolution of electoral law 7 Roles of legislative and executive branches 9 The Federal Assembly 9 Presidential powers 9 Elections under each President 10 The Yeltsin years 10 New constitution – President versus Parliament 10 Development of political parties under Yeltsin 11 The first three legislative elections 11 Presidential elections 1991 – 1996 13 International Reactions 13 Assessment of the Yeltsin period 15 The Putin years 16 Rise of United Russia 16 Presidential Elections 2000 - 2004 17 Changes during Putin‘s presidency 17 Control of the Media 18 International reactions 18 Assessment of Putin‘s presidency 21 Medvedev‘s Presidency 21 Modernisation Strategy 22 Electoral changes under Medvedev 22 Recent developments 23 Assessment of Medvedev‘s presidency 23 Political parties and electoral support 23 2 Russia‘s party system 23 Law on political parties 23 Funding of parties 24 Role of parties 25 Voter turnout 27 Voter attitudes 28 On political opposition 28 On electoral rules 28 On a personal cult of Putin 28 International reactions 28 Conclusion 29 Annex I: Presidential Election Results 1991-2008 33 Annex II: State Duma Election Results 1993-2007 35 Annex III: The Levada Centre surveys – Public Opinion 37 Bibliography 41 3 A study for the European Parliament by Professor Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College, London, member of the Advisory Board of the EU-Russia Centre1. -
Performing Political Opposition in Russia
2014:8 SOCIOLOGY PUBLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 2014:8 PERFORMING POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN RUSSIA RUSSIA IN OPPOSITION POLITICAL PERFORMING Russian civil society is often described as weak and Russians as politically apathetic. However, as a surprise for many, tens of thousands of people gathered on the streets of Moscow to protest the fraud in the parliamentary elections in December 2011. Nevertheless, this ‘awakening’ did not last for long as Vladimir Putin took hold of the Presidency again in 2012. Since then, the Russian State Duma has passed new legislation to restrict civic and political activism. This, together with the fragmentation of the opposition movement, has hindered large-scale and sustained mobiliza- tion against the government. In 2013, the number of protests has plummeted when the risks of demonstrating are high and the benefits to participate in political activism appear non-existent. Why is it impossible for the Russian opposition to find a common voice and to sustain contentious action? This book analyzes how political opportunities and restrictions in contem- porary Russia have affected the opposition activists’ activities at the grassroots level. The book examines Russian civil society, contemporary activist strategies, and democratization from the − THE CASE OF THE YOUTH MOVEMENT OBORONA OBORONA MOVEMENT YOUTH THE OF CASE THE perspective of the young activists participating in the liberal youth movement Oborona (Defense) in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Before its dissolution in 2011, Oborona was an active participant in the Russian opposition movement, and thus it is an interesting case study of the living activist traditions in Russia. The research illustrates how the Soviet continuities and liberal ideas are entangled in Russian political activism to create new post-socialist political identities and practices. -
LAWS of ATTRITION Crackdown on Russia’S Civil Society After Putin’S Return to the Presidency WATCH
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS OF ATTRITION Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency WATCH Laws of Attrition Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency Copyright © 2013 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-0060 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org APRIL 2013 ISBN: 978-1-62313-0060 Laws of Attrition Crackdown on Russia’s Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency Summary ............................................................................................................................. 1 Recommendations -
R Ussian O Utlook
Spring 2011 Nyetizdat: How the Internet Is Building Civil Society in Russia By Leon Aron In the past decade, Russia has experienced explosive growth in the spread of the Internet and its applica- tions. As in other authoritarian regimes, where the national media are state controlled, censored, or self- censored, the Russian “net” has become “a shelter in the world of censorship.”1 In this “shelter” capacity, “Ru.net,” as it is known in Russia, is reminiscent of samizdat (literally, “self-publishing”), an under- ground network of banned fiction and nonfiction copied and clandestinely disseminated in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s. Samizdat was central to preserving at least a trickle of uncensored infor- mation during the bleakest years of the Brezhnev “stagnation,” and in doing so paved the way for pere- stroika and glasnost. In breaking outside the perimeter of officially sanctioned public debate, Ru.net harks back to its legendary predecessor. It thus may be named nyetizdat, since in Russian “no” and “net” have Russian Outlook Russian an identical spelling and sound.2 Growing daily in penetration and sophistication, nyetizdat is a major and evolving factor in Russian politics today and, even more so, tomorrow. f course, just as today’s authoritarian Russia Ois not the totalitarian Soviet Union of the 1970s, so too does nyetizdat differ from samizdat, Key points in this Outlook: not only in its medium but also in the regime’s • Russia can be divided into two nations: the management of it. Unlike the producers and con- “television nation” and the “Internet nation.” sumers of nyetizdat, those caught publishing, dis- Although most Russians still get their daily seminating, and reading samizdat could be fired from their jobs and expelled from colleges; at news from television, the minority who rely worst they were sent to prisons and camps. -
Russian Democrats' Stance on the LGBT Community
Russian Democrats’ Stance on the LGBT Community: An Attitudinal Shift Written by Artem Patalakh Russian Democrats’ Stance on the LGBT Community: An Attitudinal Shift https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/11/russian-democrats-stance-on-the-lgbt-community-an-attitudinal-shift/ ARTEM PATALAKH, MAY 11 2020 One normally expects to read about appalling incidents or oppressive measures when seeing the words ‘LGBT’ and ‘Russia’ in one headline. Chechen anti-gay purges, the spread of gay hunting communities, the censorship of gay scenes and characters in movies, the 2013 ‘gay propaganda’ ban – this is hardly a complete list of what makes Russia one of the least LGBT friendly places in Europe; ranking higher than only Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey in the Rainbow Index. Nonetheless, there is an encouraging – and seemingly under-discussed – a political trend which might fail to reverse the unfavorable status quo today, but it lays the foundation for future progress in this regard: the increasing adoption and support of the LGBT agenda by the Russian democratic opposition. Changing Political Trend Before Putin’s third term, the LGBT community was largely neglected or denounced by Russian democrats. As the founder of Moscow pride Nikolai Alexeev said in 2010: a phobia of homosexuality is, unfortunately, peculiar not only to the Russian authorities, but also the Russian opposition and Russian human rights activists, that is, the people who are supposed to fight for the rights of all citizens. Indeed, in 2010, the late opposition leader Boris Nemtsov offered to arrange and lead a straight pride parade to make the gay pride parade which, in his view advocated ‘a provocative standpoint,’ ‘look like a comedy.’ At a meeting of the liberal Solidarnost movement, the people who rose a rainbow flag were labelled ‘provocateurs’ and expelled. -
The Statist Core of Vladimir Putin's Civilisational Discourse
State Civilisation: The Statist Core of Vladimir Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422) Putin’s Civilisational Discourse Vol. 12, No. 1 DOI: 10.1515/pce-2016-0002 and Its Implications for Russian Foreign Policy1 FABIAN LINDE Abstract: The essay examines Vladimir Putin’s civilisational discourse, which arose in earnest with the publication of his presidential campaign articles in 2012. It argues that what makes Putin’s rendering of Russia’s civilisational identity distinctive is its strongly emphasized Statism, understood as a belief in the primacy of the state. This suggests that while his endorsement of a distinct civilisational identity represents an important conceptual turn as regards how national identity is articulated, there are also significant lines of continuity with previous presidential periods, given that state primacy has been at the heart of Putin’s political agenda since the very begin‑ ning of his presidential career. This detail also reveals a great deal about the political rationale behind Putin’s commitment to a Russian civilisational identity. It provides the government with a theoretical justification of an illiberal political course. There are important implications for foreign policy ‑making as well. In relation to the West, there is an attempt to limit its normative reach by depicting liberal values as less than universal. In regional affairs, Russia is attempting to legitimate its involvement in the near abroad on civilisational grounds. The loose definition of ‘co‑patriots’ as foreign nationals experiencing some affinity with Russia gives it plenty of leeway in this regard. Lastly, Russia has petitioned for Ukraine’s neutrality based on the argument that the country is straddling a civilisational fault line. -
Mapping Runet Politics and Mobilization
Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere: Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization By Bruce Etling, Karina Alexanyan, John Kelly, Robert Faris, John Palfrey, and Urs Gasser at Harvard University Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2010-11 October 19, 2010 Public Discourse in the Russian Blogosphere Table of Contents Abstract 1. Introduction 2. The Russian Media Ecology 2.1 Traditional Media in Russia 2.2 Internet Penetration and Usage in Russia 3. Methods Overview and Network Structure 3.1 The Structure of the Russian Blogosphere 4. Political Discourse and Mobilization in the Russian Blogosphere 4.1 Internationally-linking Public Discourse 4.2 Russian Media-focused Public Discourse 4.3 Nationalist 4.4 Democratic Opposition 4.5 Business, Economics, and Finance 4.6 Social and Environmental Activism 5. Outlinks and News Sources 5.2 YouTube and Politics 6. Conclusion Future Research Questions About this paper The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, with funding from the MacArthur Foundation, is undertaking a two-year research project to investigate the role of the Internet in Russian society. The study will include a number of interrelated areas of inquiry that contribute to and draw upon the Russian Internet, including the Russian blogosphere, Twitter, and the online media ecology. In addition to investigating a number of core Internet and communications questions, a key goal for the project is to test, refine, and integrate various methodological approaches to the study of the Internet more broadly. More information about the project is available on the Berkman Center website: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu. The authors would like to thank our coders: Gregory Asmolov, Slava Nepomnyashchy, Veronica Khokhlova, Marina Reshetnyak, Masha Pipenko, Aleksei Gornoi, Ivan Popov, Sergei Rubliov, and Egor Panchenko. -
Making Sense of the News in a Hybrid Regime: How Young Russians Decode State TV and an Oppositional Blog
Florian Toepfl Making sense of the news in a hybrid regime: how young Russians decode state TV and an oppositional blog Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Toepfl, Florian (2013) Making sense of the news in a hybrid regime: how young Russians decode state TV and an oppositional blog. Journal of Communication, 63 (2). pp. 244-265. ISSN 0021-9916 DOI: 10.1111/jcom.12018 © 2013 International Communication Association This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/49239/ Available in LSE Research Online: April 2014 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Making Sense of the News in a Hybrid Regime: How Young Russians Decode State TV and an Oppositional Blog Dr Florian Toepfl London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Manuscript of an article published in the Journal of Communication , Volume 62, Issue 2, pages 244–265, April 2013 The definitive version is available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcom.12018/abstract Please quote as: Toepfl, F.