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ABSTRACT

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS 1923-1929

ZALYAEV, Ramil

Ph. D., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı

September 2002

This doctoral dissertation deals with the official Soviet attitude towards Turkey during the years between 1923-1929. It is the aim of this dissertation to elicit the objectives of the Turkish and Soviet foreign policy towards each other during the period in question, and to ascertain what factors played a role in the determination of those policy objectives.

During the period between 1923 - 1929, the contiguity of the Turkish territory to the USSR, as well as internal and external weakness of the Soviets, were factors that determined the Soviet policy objectives towards Turkey. The Soviet government desired Turkey to be the State with a friendly manner towards the USSR. Besides, it wished that Turkey would not take part in aggressions against the USSR, and not allow other powers to use the Turkish territory as a springboard for an attack on the

USSR. The Soviet government supposed that a friendly Turkey would be a factor of security for the USSR.

The USSR was also of great importance for Turkey. The Turkish government aimed at preserving the Turkish national state within certain national boundaries and intended to consolidate its military victory by economic reconstruction of the country.

The Turkish government was in need of time in order to recover the economy of the

5 country and to consolidate the regime. Proceeding from this, it was its foreign policy priority to prevent any aggression against Turkey.

As it shared a long sea and land frontier with the USSR, the Turkish government also desired the USSR to be the State with friendly attitude towards

Turkey. It believed that the USSR with a friendly attitude towards Turkey would be a favourable factor for the security of its north-eastern and eastern parts of the frontier with the USSR.

As a result of the Neutrality, Non-Aggression and Non-Participation Treaty of

December 17, 1925 and the Ankara Protocol of December 17, 1929, the USSR and

Turkey achieved their policy objectives. They also needed the benevolence of each other direly. They knew that only by behaving so, they could achieve their policy objectives. In this sense, the relations between Turkey and the USSR in the period between 1923-1929 were mutually beneficial relations.

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ÖZET

1923 İLE 1929 YILLARI ARASINDA SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ'NİN TÜRKİYE'YE KARŞI TUTUMU

ZALYAEV, Ramil

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı

Eylül 2002

Bu doktora tezinde Sovyetler'in 1923 ile 1929 yılları arasında Türkiye'ye karşı tutumu ele alınıyor. Doktora tezinin maksadı Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki bu yıllardaki karşılıklı politikalarının amaçlarını meydana çıkartılması, bu dış politika amaçlarının belirlenmesinde hangi faktörlerin rol oynadığını anlatılmasıdır.

1923 ile 1929 yılları arasında Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliğiİnin topraklarının bitişikliği ve Sovyetlerin iç ve dış zayıflığı Sovyetler Birliğinin Türkiye'ye karşı olan siyasetini belirleyen faktörler olmuştur. Sovyet hükümeti Türkiye'nin Sovyetler

Birliği'ne karşı dost devlet olmasını arzuluyordu. Bundan başka, Sovyet hükümeti

Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı olabilecek saldırılara katılmamasını, diğer güçlere Sovyetlere karşı saldırılarda Türk topraklarını köprübaşı olarak kullanılması için müsaade etmemesini diliyordu. Sovyet hükümeti dostane Türkiye'nin Sovyetlerin güvenliğinin bir faktörü olacağına inanıyordu.

7 Aynı şekilde Türkiye için de Sovyetler Birliği önem taşıyordu. Türk hükümetinin amacı milli Türk Devletinin belirli milli sınırlar içerisinde muhafaza edilmesi, ülke ekonomisini yeniden kurarak askeri zaferi sağlamlaştırılması idi. Ülke ekonomisinin yeniden kurulması, rejimin kuvvetlenmesi için Türk hükümetinin zamana ihtiyacı vardı. Bundan dolayı, Türkiye'nin dış politikası Türkiye'ye karşı olabilecek saldırıları engellenmeyi amaçlıyordu.

Sovyetler Birliği'yle çok uzun deniz ve kara sınırını paylaştığı için Türk hükümeti Sovyetler Birliği'nin dostâne bir devlet olmasını diliyordu. Türkiye hükümeti Sovyetlerin dostâne bir ülke olmasının Türkiye'nin kuzey-doğu ve doğu sınırlarının güvenliğinin önemli bir faktörü olacağına inanıyordu.

İki devletin 17 Aralık 1925 tarihli Tarafsızlık Anlaşması ile 17 Aralık 1929 tarihli Ankara Protokolü imzalanmasıyle Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği yukarıda belirtilen amaçlara ulaşmışlardır. Bu iki devletin birbirinin hayırhahlığına ihtiyacı vardı. Her iki devlet karşılıklı iyilik davranışları göstererek bu münasebeti karşılıklı faydalı yapmıştır.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iii

ÖZET v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS viii

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE - THE BEGINNING OF THE TURKO-SOVIET CONTACTS 7

The relations between the Soviet Government And the 7

The Beginning of National Resistance Movement in Anatolia 9

The Leaders of National Resistance Movement and their Startegy as regards to Soviet Republic at the beginning of the Movement 12

The R.S.F.S.R. and the East 17

The Establishment of Contacts between the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet Government 26

The Difference of Stands on the issue of the Frontier 35

The Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921 43

CHAPTER TWO - TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS in 1923 62

The Lausanne Conference and the Question of the Straits 62

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The Difference of Views of the Turkish and Soviet Delegations at the Lausanne Conference 69

The Strained Relations 71

The Intention of Both Governments to Maintain Friendly Relations 82

The Military and Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Basin After the Lausanne Conference. The Soviet Point of View 88

The Importance of Turkey for the Soviet Republic after Lausanne 93

The revolutionary Importance of Turkey for the Soviet Government 95

The Overthrow of the Sultanate 97

The Economic Congress in Izmir 98

Declaration of the Republic of Turkey 101

The Abolishment of Caliphate in Turkey 104

The Soviet's Dread of the Turkish Pan-Turkism 106

The Importance of the USSR for Turkey 109

CHAPTER THREE - ZIGZAGS IN THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY 121

The Temporary Conditions for the Soviet Consulates in Turkey 121

Lenin's Death and Turkey 126

Continuation of the Problems concerning Consulates 130

Presentation of the Letters of Credence by Yakov Surits, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR, on February 27, 1924 131

Presentation of the Letters of Credence by Ahmet Muhtar[Mollaoğlu], the Ambassador of Turkey, on April 9, 1924 134

Continuation of Difficulties 135

Bessarabia and its Reflection of the Turko-Soviet Relations 140

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CHAPTER FOUR - THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND TURKEY ON DECEMBER 17, 1925 ON NEUTRALITY, NON-AGGRESSION AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILE COMBINATIONS 152

The Soviet Proposal of September 1924 157

The Turkish Project of February 22, 1925 161

The New Turkish Draft of March 24, 1925 161

Difference between Soviet and Turkish Drafts 165

Discussion of Articles concerning the League of Nations 168

The Proviso with regards to Persia 171

The Conference of Locarno 177

The External Situation of Turkey 180

The Conclusion of the Treaty 183

The Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of December 17, 1925 184

The Treaty as a Part of the Soviet Eastern Policy 188

The Importance of Treaty for Turkey 191

The Exchange of Notes 195

CHAPTER FIVE - THE TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1926. THE TRIP OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER, TEVFIK RÜŞTÜ BEY [] TO ODESSA 199

The Repatriation of Turkish and Russian Civilian Prisoners and Prisoners of War 199

The Decision of the League of Nations on Mosul and Turko-Soviet Relations 208

The Trip of Tevfik Rüştü Bey to Odessa 213

The Metting of Tevfik Rüştü Bey with Chicherin in Odessa 218

Significance of the Meeting in Odessa 227

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The First Flight from to Ankara 231

Misunderstandings on the Turko-Soviet Frontier and the Drawing of the Frontier Line 234

The Convention on the Use of the Waters of Frontier Rivers, Streams, and Brooks 238

The Permission to Migrate to the Soviet and Turkish Territories 239

CHAPTER SIX - MUTUAL STEPS TOWARDS MAINTAINING OF GOOD NEIGHBOUR RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE. THE ANKARA PROTOCOL OF DECEMBER 17, 1929 243

Turko-Soviet Conventions of August 6, 1928 252

The Works on the Elaboration of a new Convention 254

The Forcible Eviction of Trotsky to Turkey 265

The Emigres from in 272

The Protocol between the USSR and Turkey on Extension of the Treaty of December 17, 1925 275

The Difficulties in the Turko-Soviet Trade Relations 285

The USSR, Turkey, and Communism 288

CONCLUSION 295

BIBLIOGRAPHY 306

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INTRODUCTION

This doctoral dissertation deals with the official Soviet attitude towards Turkey during the years between 1923-1929. On March 16, 1921, the delegations of the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet government signed the Treaty between Russia and Turkey in Moscow. The main substance of this

Treaty was the establishment of the frontier line between Turkey and the Soviet

Republics of and . The Treaty of , which was signed by the new

Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and on the one side, and Turkey on the other, with participation of the government of the RSFSR, confirmed it with some small change.

The Soviet government, worn out by the Civil War and the foreign intervention, and its economy destroyed, could give some material help to the Ankara government.

It was in its interest to give assistance to the Ankara government, since the latter struggled against the foreign invaders who were equally hostile to the Soviets. As far as the Ankara government was concerned, owing to these treaties, it could untie its hands in eastern Anatolia, and concentrate all its limited power on the Western Front for the last and decisive blow against the enemy.

After the remarkable military victory of the Ankara government in western

Anatolia in August-September 1922, it was invited to take part in the Lausanne

Conference. There, the Ankara government won another important and brilliant

14 diplomatic victory. At the Conference, the Western Powers recognized the independence of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire

In 1923 the Turko-Soviet relations entered a new period. The outcome of the

Lausanne Conference created a new situation in their relations. Having successfully concluded the War of Independence in Anatolia, Turkey entered into the complicated arena of the international politics.

This work will cover the events which took place in the Turko-Soviet relations until the end of 1929. The choice of 1929 is not an arbitrary one. The matter of the fact is that, on December 17, 1929, Turkey and the USSR signed the Ankara Treaty

(or Protocol as it was referred to as such). By this Protocol, they mutually pledged not to initiate any negotiations without notification of each other for the purpose of concluding political agreements with state, which where in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood. This Treaty also signified the beginning of a new period in the Turko-

Soviet relations, since it implied active contact and notification of each other about supposed agreements with neighbours of each country.

Regrettably, the history of the Turko-Soviet relations of the period after the

Lausanne Conference has been the subject of very few scholarly studies whether in the , Turkey, or the West. Moreover, all of these works were of a general nature. As for the history of the Turko-Soviet relations of the period 1923-1929, the situation is even more deplorable, since no special study that covered specially this period exists.

The Soviet literature (Moiseev, Rozaliev, Gasratyan) described these relations as a "successful development of good-neighbour relations" and "the strengthening of good-neighbour relations and friendship." The Turkish authors (Gürün, Bilge) also

15 state that the relations between these two countries continued to be friendly and balanced.

The Soviet authors did not bring forward the true objectives of the Soviet foreign policy towards Turkey. The usual ideological necessity to prove that the

USSR always treated the Eastern peoples with sincere and inviolable friendship, and that the Soviet government always strove to help them, prevented the Soviet authors to offer a more objective picture. Thus, the interpretation of documents and events was built on this formula. It should also be noted that like many parallel studies, the

Soviet authors did not utilize Western sources. They approached them with bias and almost indiscriminately regarded the western historians as "bourgeois falsifiers."

A very limited amount of primary sources were available to the Turkish authors.

The Soviet sources were practically inaccessible for them. The overwhelming majority of the archival documents in the Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry was

(and still is) unclassified and in accessible. Therefore, the Turkish authors were obliged to base the coverage of the period on the information provided on memoirs like that of İsmet Pasha [İnönü], on the collection of documents such as Atatürk'ün

Milli Dış Politikası, and Jane Degra's Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. These published materials, undoubtedly, are important; however, these editions contain a few handpicked documents on the Turko-Soviet relations of the period under consideration.

Apparently, the discouragingly scarce and scattered nature of the relevant source material must have been one of the major impediments for the development of this field. Apart from barely accessible unpublished sources, even some published material of utmost importance, such as the collection of Soviet documents in many volumes Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, Documents on British Foreign Policy

16 1919-1939, as well as the bulk of contemporary periodicals, has disappointingly not yet been utilized or analyzed in full measure, with very few and limited exceptions.

It is the aim of this dissertation to elicit the objectives of the Turkish and Soviet foreign policy towards each other during the period in question, and to ascertain what factors played a role in the determination of those policy objectives. It is only by doing so that, it will be possible to determine the true nature of their relations during the period between 1923-1929. This study will attempt to do this by consulting the currently accessible and available sources. The largest parts of the published materials consulted are publications in Russian, Turkish, and English. In this respect, the Soviet publications, which were issued in the 1920s and the 1930s, were utilized for the first time.

The published Soviet materials of the 1920s are especially important, since during these years the Soviet authors were still able, relatively speaking, to freely express their views, and, at times, unique information can be extracted from their works. It should also be noted that the Soviet collection of documents in many volumes of Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR is also of great importance for the purpose of this study. The documents of this edition shed light to many unknown and unstudied events in the Turko-Soviet relations.

Another importance of this Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSRs edition is that it contains not only correspondence between the Soviet diplomats in Turkey and the

People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the reports of these diplomats, but also documents concerning the Soviet foreign policy towards other countries and correspondence, as well as reports of the Soviet diplomats in Britain,

France, Italy, Germany, , Romania, Persia, Afghanistan to Moscow. These documents also contain a valuable material pertinent to the Turko-Soviet relations.

17 This study will utilize for the first time the original materials from the Archives of the Turkish Prime-Ministry, and, in particular, the decrees of the Cabinet of

Ministers of Turkey. The tradition of Turkish record keeping requires the inclusion of a quite detailed introductory part to the final document. Therefore, the decrees of the

Cabinet of Ministers concerning the Turko-Soviet relations contain not only the decrees themselves but also information leading to the issuing of these decrees. From these introductory parts, much vital information can be drawn. Besides, some archival material from Public Record Office (London), The Russian Centre for Preservation and Study of Documents of the Most Recent History (Moscow), and the National

Archives (Washington, D.C.) were also utilized.

The leading Turkish and Soviet newspapers such as Pravda (Moscow), Izvestiya

(Moscow), Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara) were also thoroughly consulted. The Turkish dailies Cumhuriyet and Hâkimiyet-i Milliye were of great value for the purpose of this study. These newspapers contain editorials of Yunus

Nadi and Mahmut Bey [Soydan]. Both not only were prominent politicians in Turkey then, but, at the same time, revolved within the close circle of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

Therefore, their articles concerning the Turko-Soviet relations in many cases reflected

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's own views.

In order to elucidate the historical sitting, and to demonstrate the roots of factors that influenced their policy objectives towards each other, information (when necessary, and in detail) pertaining to earlier periods will be given. Throughout this study, transliterations of all Turkic names and words are rendered in accordance with the standard Turkish Latin orthography of Turkey. This includes the surnames of individuals and toponyms. The Turkish alphabet of Turkey is phonetic and most of all letters phonetically to their usage in English. The exceptions are:

18 C: "j" in judge,

Ç: ''ch'' in chest,

ı: back ı, similar to ''a'' in final,

J: French ''j'' in Jacques,

Ö: German ''ö'' in möglich,

Ş: ''sh'' in ship,

Ü: German ''ü'' in Bürger.

Transliterations of Russian words from Cyrillic to Latin orthography are based on the Library of Congress system with minor modifications, such as "sovetskaya" not ("sovetskaia"), "Turetskuyu" (not "turetskuiu").

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CHAPTER ONE

THE BEGINNING OF TURKO-SOVIET CONTACTS

The Relations Between the Soviet Government and the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman and the Russian Empires were at war in the First World War. As a result of the military operations, the Russian Army advanced far from the Turko-

Russian frontier of 1914 and eventually captured Erzurum, Trabzon, Erzincan, the districts around the Lake of Van, and most of the vilâyets of Muş and Bitlis.1

However, the October upheaval in Petrograd on November 7, 1917 and the advent of the to power changed the situation radically. The Soviet Government in its first governmental act, in the Decree on Peace, proposed to all belligerent powers to conclude an armistice and to start negotiations immediately.2 As it happened, only the

1 For detailed account on Turco-Russian military operations in the Caucasian front during the First World War see: N. G. Korsun, "Kampaniya 1914 g. na Kavkazskom Fronte," Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Moscow), 1940, N 5, pp. 25-48; N. G. Korsun, Alasshkertskaya i Khamadanskaya Operatsii na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v 1915 godu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940); N. G. Korsun, Sarakamyshskaya Operatsiya na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v 1914-1915 godu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1937); N. G. Korsun, Erzurumskaya Operatsiya na Kavkazskom Fronte Mirovoy Voyny v 1915-1916 g.g. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1938); W. E. D. Allen - Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border. 1923-1921 (Cambridge University Press, 1953); Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1990. In 1864 the Ottoman Empitre had been divided between twenty seven Vilâyets (large administrative divisions). The vilâyet was divided into Sancâk (administrative unit in size between Vilâyet and Kazâ). Sancâk into Kazâ (district). Kazâ into Nâhiye ( a smal rural district). Nâhiye into villages. 2 "Dekret o Mire, 26 Oktyabrya (8 Noyabrya) 1917 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1957), v. I, pp. 11-14.

20 governments of the , to whose advantage was to put an end to the fighting on the , heeded the Decree on Peace.3

The peace negotiations started at Brest-Litovsk in December 1917, and on

December 15, Germany, Bulgaria, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire signed with Soviet Republic an armistice.4 In accordance with this armistice, the Soviet and the Ottoman governments were to determine the terms of the armistice on the

Caucasian Front. In this connection, on December 18, 1917, in Erzincan, an armistice was signed between the Russian and the Ottoman armies operating on the Turko-

Caucasian Front.5 Finally, on March 3, 1918, the Central Powers and the Soviets signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In article 1 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Soviet

Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire announced that the state of war between them was at an end.6 The same day, the Soviet Government and the Sublime Porte signed a Supplementary Treaty that stipulated the establishment of diplomatic and consular contacts, and the exchange of the prisoners of war.7

With the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, diplomatic contacts were established between Soviet Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman envoy

Galip Kemalî Bey [Söylemezoğlu] arrived in Moscow on April 23, 1918.8 These contacts, however, lasted only for six months. Following the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the

3 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1953. Lenin. Revolution and Power (London: Longman, 1982), translated by Valence Ionescu, v. I, p. 78. 4 "Dogovor o peremirii mezhdu Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Bolgariey, Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey i Turtsiey, s drugoy storony, zaklyuchyonnyy v Brest-Litovske 2(15) Dekabrya 1917 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1957), v. I, pp. 47-51. 5 "Dogovor o peremirii mezhdu Russkimi i Turetskimi armiyami, deystvuyushchimi na Kavkazsko- Turetskom teatre voyny," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 53-56. 6 "Mirnyy Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey, Bolgariey i Turtsiey - s drugoy, 3 Marta 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 119-124. 7 "Russko-Turetskiy Dopolnitel'nyy dogovor k Mirnomu dogovoru, zaklyuchyonnomu mezhdu Rossiey, s odnoy storony, i Germaniey, Avstro-Vengriey, Bolgariey i Turtsiey s drugoy, 3 marta 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 199-204. 8 Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1990, p. 401.

21 Ottoman Army began advancing towards the Caucasus and on September 15, 1918 it captured . Besides, the Soviet Government did not give its consent to the results of the plebiscite in the vilâyets of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which was carried out by the Ottoman authorities in accordance with Article 4 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.9

The population of these vilâyets had given its consent to remain in the Ottoman

Empire. However, the Soviet Government asserted that the Ottoman authorities, beforehand, was terrorizing the population of these vilâyets and the voting had been held under the Turkish control.10 In this connection, the People's Commissariat for

Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and annulled the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on October 29, 1918.11

Very soon, on October 30, 1918, having lost more than a million killed and wounded in the First World War, the Sublime Porte signed an armistice with the

Entente on the British warship Agamemnon in Mudros (on the island of Lemnos) on

October 30, 1918. Under the terms of the armistice, the lands of the Empire were clearly placed in the hands of the British and the allies and the Straits were opened to their warships. On November 13, 1918, the warships of Britain and France dropped their anchors in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace, the residence of the glorious Sultan.

With the Mudros Armistice, the Ottoman Empire, so long in decay, became half dead.

Now fallen under practical Allied influence, and later occupation, any diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the moribund Ottoman Government was out of the question.

The Beginning of the National Resistance Movement in Anatolia

9 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del Ministerstvu Inostrannykh Del Turtsii, 20 Sentyabrya 1918 g. ," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, pp. 490-491. 10 Ibid., p. 491. 11 Ibid., p. 402.

22

Such an easy advent of the hostile fleet to Istanbul was a hard sad blow for the

Turks, who had stopped this fleet with heavy losses in Çanakkale in 1915. At the same time, it was a blow, which triggered the National Resistance Movement.12 There had been resistance groups as early as autumn of 1918. Local "Associations for the

Defence of Rights" [Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri] had sprung up all over Anatolia and Thrace as a result of the initiatives of local landowners, teachers, craftsmen and religious notables. Initially, these associations had little connecting among themselves. Only with the participation of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who landed in

Samsun in May 1919, the Resistance Movement assumed a much more all-embracing nature. Subsequent practical steps in the organisation of the movement were taken in the congresses, which were held in Erzurum and in Sivas.

In particular, the passed important resolutions, which were embodied in a declaration, formed the basis of the subsequent National Oath (Mîsâk-ı

Millî). The declaration stated that the eastern provinces of Erzurum, Diyarbakır,

Elazığ, Van, Bitlis, and the district of Canik (Samsun), were integral parts of the

Ottoman territories within the national boundaries. The national forces would be mobilised in order to procure the integrity of the Ottoman homelands, the inviolability of the Sultanate-Caliphate and national independence.13 The Congress also appointed a Representative Committee [Hey'et-i Temsiliye], which included Mustafa Kemal

Pasha, Kâzım [Karabekir] Pasha (the XVth Army Corps Commander), and Bekir

Sâmi [Kunduh] to act as executive organ and to supervise the National Resistance

Movement.14

12 Kemal Kahraman, Milli Mücadele (İstanbul: Agac, 1992 ), p. 41. 13 "Erzurum Kongresinin 7 Ağustos 1335 (1919) Tarihli Beyannamesi,'' in Mahmut Goloğlu, Erzurum Kongresi (Ankara: Nüve Matbaası), 1968, pp. 187-188. 14 Ibid., p. 203.

23 The next congress was held in Sivas, which decided that, all territories within the national boundaries on the signature of the Armistice, and inhabited by a majority of Muslim population, constituted integral part of the Ottoman State.15 It amalgamated all national and patriotic organizations with identical objectives into one entity known as a Society for the Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and

Rumelia [Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Milliye Cemiyeti].16 The Congress also demanded the Sultan to convoke the Ottoman Parliament.

As a result, in December 1919, new elections were held in Thrace and Anatolia for the Ottoman Parliament and an overwhelming nationalist majority was returned to the Parliament, which assembled in Istanbul on January 12, 1920. On January 28 the deputies approved the National Pact (Mîsâk-ı Millî), based on the declarations of

Erzurum and Sivas Congresses. The Mîsâk-ı Millî consisted of six articles and affirmed the unity and independence of those territories in Anatolia and Thrace

'inhabited by the Ottoman Muslim majority.' Certainly, this program was not admissible for the Allies, who clearly intended an absolute political and economic enslavement of the Ottoman State.17 The Allied Supreme Council decided on a reinforced occupation of Istanbul and a firm control over the Straits.18 On March 16,

1920, the Entente Powers employing mainly British forces occupied Istanbul.

Besides, the martial law was put in force in the city and in its environs, the National

Parliament was dispersed, some of the deputies were arrested and sent to Malta, and those who were able, fled to Anatolia. Consequently, the Hey'et-i Temsiliye decided to convoke a new Parliament in Ankara. On April 23, 1920, the new Parliament, "the

15 ''Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti'nin Sivas Kongresine Kabul edilen prensipleri ve tüzüğü,'' Mahmut Goloğlu, Sivas Kongresi (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası), 1969, p. 219. 16 The Society presided in Sivas. On December 27, 1919, the Hey'et-i Temsiliye moved to Ankara. 17 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Istoriya Revolutsii v Turtsii (Moscow: Mir, 1923), p. 105. 18 Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires. Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918-1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), p. 78.

24 Grand National Assembly of Turkey" (the GNA), invested with the extraordinary power, inaugurated its work. The GNA of Turkey proclaimed itself the sole legal government, exercising the will of people.

The Leaders of the National Resistance Movement and their Strategy

as regards Soviet Republic at the beginning of the Movement

In Amasya, as far back June 19, 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, together with

Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], former Naval Minister and Ottoman Delegate to Mudros, Ali

Fuat [Cebesoy], Commander of the XXth Army Corps in Ankara, Refet Pasha [Bele], the highst-ranking member of Kemal's own staff, and Selaheddin Bey, the IIIrd Army

Corps Commander, had discussed the matters regarding Bolshevism. At the end of

April 1919, the Red Army began the counter-offensive against the Army of Admiral

Kolchak in Siberia, which was one of the principal grain-producing areas. As a result of the offensive, the Red Army had captured a substantial portion of Siberia.19 In

Amasya, they pondered over the issue about the possible resources and means the

National Resistance Movement, and, principally, taking into account of the scarcity of means in Anatolia of those days, whether it would be favourable to establish contacts with Soviet Russia.20 Then, they had come to the conclusion that "since the Islam population of Kazan, Orenburg, and the Crimea had accepted Bolshevism, it would

19 B. N. Ponomaryov (ed.), History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), pp. 322-323. 20 Feridun Kandemir, Atatürk'ün Kurduğu Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Sonrası (İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası), 1965, p. 22.

25 not jeopardize the country."21 They had also decided to use their contacts with the

Bolsheviks in order to make the Allied troops leave the country and to insist on the

Allied Powers that the stay of the Allied troops in the country might be the reason for the incursion of the Bolsheviks into the country.22

For that moment, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his friends had concluded that it would be a good idea to send incognito some earnest men to the Bolsheviks, and to initiate negotiations with them. It was also assumed that it would be a step that would prevent the entry of the Bolsheviks into the country with power and in great quantity.

At the same time, Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not put aside the possibility of the receiving of the Soviet extraordinary representatives and thus, to negotiate with them regarding whether they were able to provide with weapons, ammunition, technical means and in case of need with people.23 It was also supposed that in case of concluding an agreement with the Bolsheviks, it would be expedient to keep them on the other side of the frontier as a weapon in order to make the Allied troops leave the country. Consequently, as far back the initial stage of the National Resistance

Movement, its leaders had the intention of establishing contact with the Bolsheviks.

The Turkish leaders had hopes of obtaining from the Bolsheviks arms, equipment, and ammunition for the movement. On the other hand, they considered the Bolsheviks as an "instrument of intimidation", which could be used against the Entente. At this stage, the leaders of the National Resistance Movement were not yet proposing co- operation with the Bolsheviks. All these considerations were expounded by Mustafa

Kemal Pasha in a letter to Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, dated June 23, 1919.

21 "Mustafa Kemal to XVth Army Corps Commander, His Excellency, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha, 23 April 1919," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi), 1969, the Second Edıtıon, p. 56. 22 Ibid., p. 57. 23Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 56.

26 In early July, 1919, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha had reviewed all these matters with

Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Rauf Bey in Erzurum. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha shared these considerations to some extent.24 He had related about the measures, which he had already taken in the matter of the establishment of contacts with the Bolsheviks.25

However, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha held that even if Bolshevism could be harmless and even appropriate, the Russians would still be the previous "Moskof"

[Muscovite].26 He advised them to abstain from concluding any agreement with the

Bolsheviks without his knowledge, since the essence of their policies was yet unknown.27 Consequently, the Turkish resistance leaders concluded that the

Bolshevism would expose the resistance movement into decomposition. In order to avoid misunderstandings, Kâzım Karabekir proposed that himself be named as the only authorized and responsible person, who would directly contact with the

Bolsheviks. Taking into account that Kâzım Karabekir Pasha was the Commander of all military forces of the National Resistance Movement in the eastern Anatolia and his connections, he was granted this authority.28 It should be noted that Kâzım

Karabekir had started organizing the collection of information regarding Soviet

Republic and operations of the Red Army as far back in April 1919. During his stay in

Trabzon, he had even published a newspaper, where it had been said, "since the

Bolsheviks are enemy of our enemy, hence they might be our natural ally."29 Further, in accordance with their agreement in Erzurum in , he sent Doctor Fuat

24 Feridun Kandemir, p. 24. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid.; Moskof is a name, by which the Ottoman Turks, with bitter memories, usually called the Russians. 27 Feridun Kandemir, p. 24. 28 Ibid. 29 Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 21. Kâzım Karabekir Pasha had installed a radio set and had employed an official for receiving news in Russian and French. He began receiving news of Moscow radio, Berlin and Paris news agencies, and sometimes from the ships in Istanbul and in the Black Sea. see: Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 24.

27 Sabit and Doctor Ömer Lûtfü Bey to Baku, and the former was charged to come into direct contact with the Bolsheviks.

The Hey'et-i Temsiliye was intending to create a split in the ranks of the Entente and to enlist the moral support of Western opinion.30 To this end, as early as

September 1919, Mustafa Kemal Pasha received the American Military Mission under General James Harbord.31 Despite their belief that Britain was mainly responsible for the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks, the leaders of the National

Resistance Movement had considered it unwise to isolate themselves from Britain completely, even if their relations were restricted to unofficial casual meetings between Army officers.32

Towards the end of 1919, the Entente Powers showed some interest and wish for concluding a peace with Turkey. However, the peace was not concluded. In

Mustafa Kemal's view, there were two reasons. The first reason was that the Allied

Powers could not arrive in a common agreement regarding the matter of the Straits.

The second reason was the success of the Bolsheviks and the Allied suspicions that the Turks would dive in to the Bolsheviks.33

In February 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, analysing the policy of the Entente as regards the National Resistance Movement, came to the conclusion that the Entente had drawn up a plan, which would make Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the

Governments of North Caucasus a barrier to prevent the Turks from the contacts with the Bolsheviks.34 He realized that if this plan would be implemented, Turkey would

30 Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923. Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Sage Publications: London, 1975), p. 23. 31 Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, p. 23. 32 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 33 '' From Mustafa Kemal to the XVth Army Corps Commander Kâzım Karabekir, 6 February 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 441. 34 Ibid.

28 be unable to carry out resistance.35 On the other hand, the establishment of the contacts with the Bolsheviks would give the Turks an opportunity for getting weapons, ammunitions and other technical means for the Resistance Movement from the R.S.F.S.R. [the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic].36 On February 6,

1920, he expounded these considerations in a telegram to Kâzım Karabekir and stated that the Caucasus was 'the only possible front where the Turkish National Movement could initiate a counter attack against the Allied Powers. Mustafa Kemal Pasha urged that the Turks should do everything in the Caucasus to facilitate the Bolshevik control of the region.37 Thus, in his view, the extermination of the Caucasus barrier had become one of the most immediate necessities.

It should be noted, however, in February 1920, Mustafa Kemal, firstly, had intended urgently to get into contact with the Islamic government of Daghestan and

Azerbaijan and to learn their attitude to the Entente' plan.38 He proposed to make arrangements with the Bolsheviks only in case if the Caucasian nations were willing to play the role of barrier against the National Resistance Movement in Anatolia, as the Allies would tide them to become.

Kâzım Karabekir Pasha did not share this view. In his opinion, the occupation of the country from all sides and the destruction of the country as a result of the creation of the Caucasian barrier by the Allied Powers were impossible.39 Therefore, there was no necessity at all to start military operations in the eastern provinces.40 In his view, while the Bolsheviks had not yet crossed the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, such

35 Ibid. p. 442. 36 Ibid. 37 "From Mustafa Kemal to Kâzım Karabekir, 6 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 443. 38 ''From Ankara to the Commander of the XVth Army Corps, Ankara 6/2/1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 443. 39 "From Kâzım Karabekir to the XXth Army Corps Commander, 14 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 443. 40 Ibid.

29 a move would expose the National Resistance Movement to danger of being crushed by the Allied Power and the country would be destroyed.41 He advised Ankara to wait for the right moment, and for the time being, to be careful and circumspect, at the same time doing everything to obviate the despair of the people and its hopelessness.42

The R.S.F.S.R and the East

Until the end of October 1919, all those measures, which the Soviet

Government had accepted for the establishment of mutual relations between Soviet

Russia and the East, had been accidental.43 There was no planned and steady policy in this matter.44 The pronouncements of the Bolshevik leaders on policy on Asia at this time scarcely went beyond the assertion of the right of self-determination for oppressed peoples and the denunciation of imperialism.45 Until 1919, the question of revolutionization of the East had existed in the mind of only a few Bolshevik leaders.46 For instance, in November 1918, Stalin, addressing the First Congress of

Muslim Communists in Moscow, said "the liberation of the peoples of these countries

[Persia, India, Afghanistan, and ] from the yoke of the imperialists world …

41 Ibid. 42 "From Kâzım Karabekir to the XXth Army Corps Commander, 14 February 1920," in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 444. 43 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy (Kazan: Gasyr, 1998), p. 199. 44 Ibid. 45 Edwart Hallet Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1953), v. III, pp. 233- 234

30 undermine imperialism at its very foundation."47 However, the Congress confined its attention primarily to the Muslims of the former .48 Owing to the lack of knowledge concerning the East and as consequence of this fear of the East, the idea of participation of the East in the world revolution was profaned.49

European or world revolution was the acknowledged condition of the building of socialism in Russia and the very survival of the regime. The Bolsheviks held that if the peoples of Europe did not arise and crush imperialism, the Soviet regime would be crushed.50 The Bolsheviks thought that revolutionary ferment among the working classes of Britain, France, Germany, and America, where, in their opinion, material and moral power of world imperialism had been collected, could give rise to the world social revolution. The Bolsheviks believed that there were all conditions for the progress of the social revolution in the developed countries of the West. For them, the working classes of these countries had already understood that capitalism was exploiting them.51

However, during the two years since the October revolution, there was no social revolution in the West. In January 1919, the Spartacist Union, a group that split off from the majority of socialists and favoured the seizure of power by violent means, was decapitated in an unsuccessful uprising by the killing of its two leaders, Rosa

Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.52 Then, the majority of the socialists turned the

46 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in M. Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 200. 47 Ibid. 48 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 234. 49 Ibid. 50 Vtoroy Vserossiyskiy S"ezd Sovetov (Moscow: 1928), pp. 86-87. 51 In connection with this, the Communist Party of Bolsheviks was carrying on intensive propaganda in the West. With that end in view, within a few weeks of the revolution the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) had established a section for propaganda under . For this, see: Edward Hallet Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (London: Macmilan, 1966), v. III, p. 18 52 Moore - J. R. Barrington, "Power Politics in the West," in Arthur E. Adams (ed.), Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy. Theory and Practice (Boston: Health and Company, 1961), p. 55

31 conservative forces in the army to suppress the uprising. Similar outbreaks in Munich on April 7, 1919, and in Hungary on March 21, 1919, ended likewise in failure.

In the face of these frustrations, in early 1919, the Bolsheviks began turning their eyes to the East. The First Congress of the Commintern, which met in March

1919, did not concern itself greatly with the Eastern Question.53 Still, in this

Congress, Mevlevizade Mehmet Mustafa Suphi, a Turkish Communist émigré and a member of the Central Bureau of the Muslim Organizations of the Russian

Communist Party, vigorously argued that revolution in the East was of central importance in impelling the proletariat of the West to seize power.54 By revolting against their colonial masters, Suphi believed, the East would deprive the industrial nations in the West of raw materials, thereby generating crises that would inevitably bring down the capitalist system. Thus, to Suphi, revolution in the Orient was necessary "not only for the liberation of the East from European imperialism, but for the support of the Russian Revolution as well."55 The Congress, in one section of its manifesto, after referring to a "series of open rising and revolutionary unrest in all colonies," observed that "the purpose of Wilson's programme, on the most favourable interpretation, is merely to change the label of colonial slavery". It also declared that

"the liberation of the colonies is thinkable only in connection with the liberation of the working class in the metropolitan countries."56

Later, in the same month at the Eight Congress of the Russian Communist

Party, Nikolay Bukharin pointed out that if the Communist Party propounded the solution of the right of self-determination for the colonies, it would lose nothing by it,

53 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 235. 54 George S. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University, 1967), p. 55 55 Ibid. 56 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 235.

32 for the national gain as whole would damage foreign imperialism.57 The Congress adopted a revised party programme which noted that the world-wide growth of imperialism had brought about "a coupling of civil war within particular countries and of oppressed peoples against the yoke of the imperialist Powers," and demanded "a policy of bringing together the proletarians and semi-proletarians of different nationalities for a common revolutionary struggle against landowners and bourgeoisie."

In October 1919, Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, the leading Kazan Tatar Bolshevik, the

Chair of the Central Moslem Military Board under the People's Commissariat for

Military Affairs, in his article Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok [The Social

Revolution and the East], which appeared in parts in October and November issues of

Zhizn' Natsional'nostey, the organ of the Commissariat of Nationalities, also accentuated the importance of the East for the revolution. He came to the conclusion that "the Eastern Question was one of the problems, to which the revolution was advancing in practical form", and that "in conditions of the present-day reality and political situation in the world, this question was no more no less as one of the phases of the natural development of the world social revolution."58 He considered it necessary to learn the Eastern Question comprehensively not only in social-economic but also in international-political aspects in order to settle it. Moreover, in order to define the attitude of the Bolsheviks to it once and for all, he also suggested that the

Bolsheviks should consider and pre-determine all forms of the development of the

East could take.59

57 Vos'moy S"ezd RKP (B), 19-23 Marta 1919 g. (Moscow: Institut Marksa-Engel'sa-Lenina, 1933), p. 49. 58 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 199. 59 Ibid., p. 200.

33 Sultan-Galiev put forward a thesis that the Western bourgeoisie was the world bourgeoisie, and for overthrowing which, it necessitated concentrating on the revolutionary will and energy of all proletariat, including the proletariat of the East.60

He forewarned that if the Bolsheviks struggled against the world bourgeoisie only with the proletariat of the Western Europe, they would leave to the world bourgeoisie complete freedom of action and manoeuvre in the East.61 He wrote, "as long as world imperialism would have the East as a colony, where it was the owner of all natural resources, the world imperialism would be successful in all skirmishes with workers in mother countries, and it would have a possibility to stop workers' mouth, satisfying their economic demands."62 In his opinion, even if the workers won a victory over their bourgeoisie, Soviet Russia would have to encounter with the East, since the bourgeoisie of Western Europe would concentrate all its power in "outskirts" and, in the first place, in the East."63 In the final part of his article Sultan-Galiev grounded a revolutionary importance of the East. In his opinion, the East was the main resource of world imperialism and, therefore, imperialism without the East would pine and die of its natural death.64

At the same time, he wrote, "the East was a cradle of despotism and that there was no guarantee that Eastern imperialism, having won a victory over imperialism, would not revive. In his opinion, there was also no guarantee that the feudal of China,

India, Persia, and Turkey, having been freed from foreign yoke with the help of

Soviet Russia, would not join the imperialists of Japan and Europe and would not take

60 Ibid., p. 201. 61 Ibid., p. 200. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 M. Sultan-Galiev, "Sotsial'naya Revolyutsiya i Vostok," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 203.

34 the field against their 'liberators' in order to escape from the 'infection' of

Bolshevism.65

Sultan-Galiev's article had appeared on the eve of the Second All Russian

Congress of Muslim Communist Organizations, which was held in Moscow from

November 22 to December 3, 1919. The delegates of the Congress discussed the

Eastern Question. It was supposed that the Congress would carry the energy of

Communism from Soviet Republic to the East in order to excite it.66 Lenin spoke openly of the need to translate the true communist doctrine which was designed for the communists of more advanced countries into the language of each nation. Sultan-

Galiev repeated once again that the World Social Revolution could not be put into effect without the participation of the East.67 He stated that "in the first place the

Soviet government needed to have done with the World bourgeoisie," and, for this purpose, "it had to support any movement which shared this aim."68 He pointed out that the Bolsheviks would have to support these movements until World imperialism was overthrown and the worker class of the Western Europe established the authority of the Workers and Peasants Deputies Soviets in Western Europe.69 He said that after the defeat of World imperialism, Eastern imperialism could be born, and the imperialists of Turkey, Persia, India, China, and Japan would start a campaign against

Europe.70 He stated that it would be a new robbery. He suggested to follow a policy

65 Ibid. 66 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "II Vserossiyskiy S"ezd Kommunisticheskikh Organizatsiy Narodov Vostoka. Rech' Pri Otkrytii S"ezda, 22 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 205. 67 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Doklad po Vostochnomu Voprosu, 26 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 216. 68 Ibid., p. 219. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.

35 aimed at setting up the Communist Parties in the East, and to group socialist elements, which, subsequently, could be the nucleus of the Communist Parties.71

On November 26, 1919, the Congress passed the Resolution on the Eastern

Question that declared the problem of the international social revolution to be insoluble without the participation of the East, and determined the task of Communist

Parties in the East. In accordance with it, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was to set up gradually Communist Parties in the East as sections of the Third

Communist International, and to support to a certain extent the national movements in the East, which aimed at overthrowing of power of the Western imperialism there.72

Consequently, towards the end of 1919, not only the workers of the developed countries of the Western Europe, but also of the East were regarded by the

Communist Party of Bolsheviks as part of the world revolutionary movement.

The failure of the peace decree to evoke any response from the Entente and the pressing need to end the war with Germany first forced on the Soviet leaders the conception of a policy directed to meet national interests and national requirements.

The Bolsheviks strove to uphold and maintain the authority of the State against the encroachments of other states until such a time as their dream of revolution in Europe should come true.73 They had at all costs to take the Soviet Republic out of the war.

In this respect, another significant factor had made its appearance. The East, and the Middle East in particular, from the point of view of national security, began gaining exceptional importance. As matter of fact, the British contingents in the

Caucasus and in the Central Asia made in the first months of 1919 several moves

71 Ibid., p. 220. 72 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Proekt Rezolyutsii po Vostochnomu voprosu, 26 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, pp. 222-223. 73 Edwart Hallet Carr, p. 21.

36 openly directed against Soviet forces.74 Mikhail Pavlovich, a leading Soviet

Orientalist, stated the situation as such:

Britain tries to draw the Mohammedan masses into struggle against us [the Soviet Republic]. Leaning on the support of the propertied classes, landowners, big merchants, speculators, and high ranking clergy in Bokhara, Afghanistan, Persia, and partly, in the Ottoman Empire, Britain is preparing a front against us from the Asia Minor through north-eastern Persia (Khorasan), Afghanistan, the mountainous Bokhara and the Russian Pamirs to the basmaci Fergana, where the Basmaci mutinied. … In response to our striving for consolidating the working-masses of the East, Britain begins making advances to the Pan-Islamist movement and tries to turn the whole Mohammedan world against us. Britain is preparing a Holy War of the Mohammedans against Soviet Russia, carries out intrigues in the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Fergana, and supports the devastating operations of the Basmacis (the Fergana brigands).

In that way, Britain tries to encircle us by the iron ring of states that are hostile towards us. These states will have to play the role of a buffer between the Soviet Republic and the British possessions and colonies in the East. On the other hand, Britain provokes the Mohammedan world against us, and incites it to Holy War against us. Britain, implementing this plan, pursues defensive ends, i.e., the defence of the avenues of approaches to India, Persian Gulf, and the Bosphorus, but, at the same time, it pursues offensive ends.75

Consequently, the Middle East became in 1919 the theatre of an all but declared war between Great Britain and the RSFSR.76 As Istanbul, the Black Sea, and Anatolia were the parts of this geography, the Soviet government began to strive to prevent any attacks against Soviet Republic from these parts of the Middle East. For this purpose, at first, the Soviet government tried to rely upon the workers and peasants of Anatolia in order to stir them up against the Sultan and the Allied Powers. With this end in view, on September 13, 1919, Chicherin, the Foreign Affairs , issued a broadcast appeal to the workers and peasants of Turkey. The appeal read:

74 Ibid., p. 235. 75 Mikhail Pavlovich, "Revolyutsionnaya Turtsiya," in Mikhail Pavlovich, Sobranie Sochineniy (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1927), v. IX, pp. 310-311. (Translation mine).

37 Comrade Workers and Peasants of Turkey!

Your country has always been a military camp. The European Great Powers, considering you a "sick man," have not only failed to offer you a care, but, on the contrary, have intentionally maintained your condition, because each of these Powers has aimed at driving you away from the European continent, at seizing the Straits, or, at least, at bleeding, weakening, and enslaving you…

The salvation of your country and of your rights from alien and domestic vultures is in yourselves… Your brothers, the workers and peasants of Russia - fed up with the meanness of their own domestic vultures and bloodsuckers, who were in the habit of selling Russia to foreign vultures, the European robbers - have now decided to take the government into their own government.

But that is not enough. A union of the toilers of the world against the world oppressors is necessary. Therefore, the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Government hopes that you, the workers and peasants of Turkey, in this decisive and momentous hour will stretch out your fraternal land to drive out the European vultures by joint and united effort, to destroy and to make impotent those within your own country who have been in the habit of basing their own happiness upon your misery.77

However, neither the workers nor peasants of Anatolia and Istanbul could rise on their own against the Sultan. In all probability, the Soviet authorities were little, if at all, acquainted with the situation in Anatolia. In most cases, Soviet papers were informed about events in Anatolia and in the East in general, by relying upon the foreign press.78

The workers of Turkey were very small in number. Most of them were working in small-scale enterprises, which employed either one or two workers. Furthermore, the coup d'etat of 1908 had been a purely military affair. True, in 1908, several peasants did follow Enver and Niyazi then, but they were only Macedonian peasants.

The six years of the rule of the Young Turks were the years of ceaseless political

76 Ibid. 77 "Obrashchenie Narodnogo Komissara Po Inostrannym Delam RSFSR k Rabochim i Krest"yanam Turtsii, 13 sentyabrya 1919 g.," Izvestiya (Moscow), 13 September 1919: For the text in English, see: "Soviet Appeal to the Workers and Peasants of Turkey, September 13, 1919," in Jane Degras, Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Goeffrey Cumberlege, 1951), v. I, pp. 164-167.

38 struggle. However, this struggle was not of the type which would embrace of segments of the society. The Young Turks, having come to power, isolated the workers and peasants with great care from the politics.79 In the colourful expression of

Gurko-Kryazhin, a leading Soviet Orientalist, "the workers and peasants had kept silence during all this time," and "up to the end of the First World War, Anatolia had been fast asleep."80

Besides, at the moment of the appeal, there was already the Representative

Committee [Hey'et-i Temsiliye], a body of authority of the National Resistance

Movement in Anatolia. Therefore, Chicherin's appeal cannot have been wholly agreeable to the Turkish national leader.81 The appeal had undermined the discipline in the army and encouraged the resistance of the .82

The using of only appeals did not meet the Bolshevist cause. The matter required the working out of other measures. On November 26, 1919, as it has been said above, the Second All-Russian Congress of Muslim Organizations passed the resolution, in accordance with which, the Soviet Government would start supporting the national movements in the East.83

The Establishment of Contacts between the Government of the Grand

National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet Government

78 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Polozhenie Turtsii v poslednee vremya," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 277. 79 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, p. 57. 80 Ibid. p. 45. 81 Edward Hallet Carr, p. 246. 82 A Speech Delivered By Ghazi Mustafa Kemal 1927 (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 414-415.

39

On March 16, 1920, the Allies occupied Istanbul. All the official buildings in

Istanbul, including the Chamber of Deputies was forcibly occupied by the troops of the Entente Powers and a great number deputies, who were acting in accord with the aims of the National Resistance Movement, were arrested. The same day, the XVth

Army Corps Commander, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha received a telegram from the

General Staff, where some provisions of the future peace treaty with Turkey had been set forth. In particular, it read as follows: "Syria, Palestine, and Iraq are to be separated from Turkey. Syria will be granted independence but under some restrictions. In Izmir, the Greek administration will be set up under the Ottoman Law.

The local administration in Thrace will be established under the French protectorate."84 Kâzım Karabekir Pasha came to the conclusion that since the British and the Army of Denikin had suffered an absolute defeat in the Caucasus, the British, with their measures threatening the Turkish nation, were endeavouring to hand eastern to Armenia in order to establish contacts with the British forces through Mosul.85 In this connection, with the purpose of precipitating a contact with the Bolsheviks, the Representative Committee in Ankara approved Kâzım Karabekir's proposal regarding the giving permission to proclaim Bolshevism in Batum and asked him for starting the realization of this plan.86 On April 23, 1920, the Grand National

Assembly opened, and the liberation of Anatolia assumed systematic and organized character. The GNA got down to work under an extremely difficult situation. The

Allied Powers who numbered some 200,000 men had occupied large areas all around

83 Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, "Proekt Rezolyutsii po vostochnomu voprosu, 26 November 1919," in Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Izbrannye Trudy, p. 222. 84 ''Kâzım Karabekir to Hey'et-i Temsiliye and the Army Corpses, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 503. 85 ''Kâzım Karabekir to Hey'et-i Temsiliye and the Army Corpses, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 503.

40 the country. Together with this, different Armenian detachments amounting to 10,000 men and detachments of the local Greeks, seeking an independent Pontus State, numbering from 20,000 to 30,000 men, and other detachments of the local Greeks, operating with the Greek Army in the western Anatolia, were supporting the occupiers. These internal upheavals, which began against the national organisation spread rapidly throughout the country.87 It was clear that the idea of the National

Resistance had not yet been assimilated by the whole population of the country. In that way, the newly established government of the GNA was forced to fight on external and internal fronts. Moreover, the leaders of the National Resistance

Movement expected the intensification of pressure on the part of the Allied Powers.88

The National Resistance Movement was in dire need of financial sources.

Because of the rupture of contacts with Istanbul and, the resulting impossibility of getting money out of Istanbul, financing provincial administrations became extremely difficult.89 The large-scale agricultural centres, which specialised in commodity production, were on the western shore of the Sea of Marmara (Thrace), in the southern Aegean districts (Izmir, Aydın), and in the Adana district.90 Moreover, the basic industrial plants were concentrated in Adana, Bursa, Izmir, and Istanbul.91 All these territories were now under the occupation of the Allied Powers. There were no

86 "From Mahmut, the XXth Army Corps Commander to Kâzım Karabekir, 16 March 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 505. 87 Anzavur's insurrection which began on September 21, 1919, north of Balıkesir, was repeated on the same ground on February 16, 1920 and on May 11, 1920; on April 13, 1920, a band of 400 men in the districts of Bolu and Düzce also rose; on March 14, 1920, Postacı Nazım, and Çerkes Kara Mustafa rose in revolt in the village of Kaman belonging to Yenihan; for these occassions, see: A Speech Delivered By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927 (Istanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 1963), pp.383-389. 88 ''From Kâzım Karabekir to Their Excellencies Halil and Nuri Pashas, 17 March 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 509. 89 ''From Mustafa Kemal to His Excellency Kâzım Karabekir Pasha 26 April 1920,'' in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, p. 626. 90 Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye (İstanbul: Yurt Yayınları), 1993, p. 17. 91 Ibid., p. 66.

41 military plants in Anatolia. It was the "Achilles heel" of the Government of the GNA that was in need of not only artillery but also rifles and cartridges.

In that way, the expansionist policy of the Allied Powers as regards Turkey, the barest necessity to run the blockade around the country, the urgent need of arms and financial sources for carrying out military operations against occupiers, forced the

Ankara government to appeal to the Soviet government in April 1920, who was extremely uneasy about the presence of the Allied Powers so close to its domains. In a letter, dated April 26, 1920, the Government of the GNA of Turkey, in the first paragraph, proposed the Soviet government to "join forces and operations against the imperialist Governments and for the liberation of oppressed people under their rule and servitude." With the purpose of running the blockade and establishing a direct contact with Soviet Government, the government of the GNA offered that "if the

Bolshevik forces conduct military operations in the direction of Georgia or can ensure the enclusion of Georgia into the Bolshevik union through political means and influence, and can ensure that Georgians themselves expel British forces stationed there, the government of Turkey will undertake to conduct military operations against the imperialist Armenian government and to ensure the inclusion of the Azerbaijan government within the group of Bolshevik states."

In the third paragraph, the Ankara government requested the Soviet government to supply five million pieces of gold, and ammunition, other technical war material, medical supplies … in the amount to be discussed."92

92 As a matter of fact, the first draft of this letter with five paragraphs had been prepared by Kâzım Karabekir and it had been dispatched to the Hey'iet-i Temsiliye on April 8, 1920. (see: "Kâzım Karabekir to Hey'et-i Temsiliye, 18 April 1920." in Kâzım Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, pp. 595-596). Then, it was supposed that a plenipotentiary military mission would deliver it to Baku. Some amendments had been introduced into the draft. But the main points had been the same. The letter, dated April 26, 1920, had been again dispatched to Kâzım Karabekir. As the letter had no title and epilogue, Kâzım Karabekir had inserted them, and ordered Colonel Ali Riza Bey to deliver the letter to the Turkish Communist Party in Baku. However, since the Red Army had entered into Azerbaijan, Ali Riza Bey ordered Lieutenant Ibrahim Efendi to deliver the letter directly to Moscow.

42 On May 3, the deputies elected the Hey'et-i Vükela [Council of Ministers], the

Government of the GNA of Turkey. The Council of Ministers met on May 5, under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal, to discuss foreign policy. The Minister of

Economy, Yusuf Kemâl [Tengirşenk] stated that as the Entente Powers had not yet made the Ankara Government an official offer, though, their possible behaviour could be estimated by the Ankara Government, and he suggested that under the circumstances, it would be useful to learn the stand of the Soviet Republic as regards

Ankara.93 For this purpose, he proposed that Bekir Sâmi, the Foreign Minister of the

Government of the GNA of Turkey, elucidate it.94 The Council approved this suggestion and decided to send a mission to Moscow under the leadership of Bekir

Sâmi, Yusuf Kemâl, and a deputy for Lazistan, Osman Bey [Özgen]. The mission left for Moscow on May 11.95 Mustafa Kemal's letter was delivered to Moscow on June 1,

1920. On that same day, Chicherin gave, with Lenin, careful consideration to the letter.96

At the moment of receiving the letter, Lenin was about to finish his

Pervonachal'nyy Nabrosok Tezisov Po Natsional'nomu i Kolonial'nomu Voprosam

[The Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions]. As it has been mentioned above, it was decided at the Second All-Russian Congress of Muslim

Organizations to support the national movements in the East. Lenin developed this idea further. In his point of view, the global political developments could be summarized as such: the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet

Republic, around which were inevitably grouped, on the one hand, the Soviet

93 Yusuf Kemâl Tengirşenk, Vatan Hizmetinde (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1981, p. 141. 94 Ibid. 95 In Erzurum, Kâzım Karabekir Pasha included also Doctor Ibrahim Tali [Öngören] and Sefi Bey in the mission. Doctor Fuat Bey, with whom the mission acquisented in Moscow, also entered the mission.

43 movements of the advanced workers in all countries, and, on the other, all the national liberation movements in the colonies and among the oppressed nationalities.97

Proceeding from this, Lenin came to the conclusion that for Soviet Russia only supporting national movements would not be enough. In his opinion, "a policy must be pursued that will achieve the closest alliance with Soviet Republic, of all the national and colonial liberation movements.98 However, the form of this alliance was to be determined by the degree of development of the communist movement in the proletariat of each country, or of the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement of the workers and peasants in backward countries or among backward nationalities.99 Lenin also put forward the idea that the Communist International would support bourgeois- democratic national movements in colonial and backward countries only on condition that, in these countries, the elements of future proletarian parties, which would be communist not only in name, would be brought together and brained to understand their special task, i.e., at of the struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nations.100

The national liberation movements in the East were to prepare conditions for the social revolutions there. At the same time, they were to serve the national interests of the Soviet Republic, i.e., to fight against imperialist Powers, thus to weaken their positions in the East and to deprive them of their ability to attack the Soviet Republic.

The Middle East, and Istanbul, the Black Sea, and Anatolia in particular, were for the

Soviet Republic very sensitive parts from the strategic point of view.

96 S.I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoy Literatury, 1961), p. 16. 97 V. I. Lenin, "Pervonachal'nyy Nabrosok Tezisov Po Natsional'nomu i Kolonial'nomu Voprosam," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV, pp. 286-287. 98 Ibid., p. 287. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., pp. 289-290.

44 Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet government replied to the Ankara government that "the Soviet government is happy to lay a stable foundation of friendship, which will have to tie the Turkish and the

Russian peoples," and proposed "the resumption of diplomatic relations."101 It was done in order to show that the Soviet government was the only government, which renounced to use coercion as regards to the East, and, in that way, to win the Ankara government's benevolent attitude.

The internal situation in Soviet Russia was making the soviet government do this. When the Soviet government received the Ankara government's letter, it had almost finished with the Civil War and the foreign intervention in the country.

General Denikin's Army, which held the entire south of Russia, which included the main fuel areas - the Donetsk coalfield and the Groznyy oilfields, was defeated in

December 1919. In the spring of 1920, the Red Army forces operating on the

Caucasian front drew near the boundary of Transcaucasia. On April 28, 1920, Baku became a Soviet city. The defeat of Denikin on the Southern front and Admiral

Kolchak's troops in Siberia also made it possible to complete the liquidation of the

Turkestan fronts.

On February 2, 1920, the RSFSR and Estonia signed a peace treaty. In January

16, 1920, the Supreme Council of the Entente found it necessary to allow the exchange of goods with Soviet Russia.102 In fact, it meant the lifting of the blockade.

The Soviet government immediately set about rehabilitating the economy of the country, disrupted by the Civil War and the foreign intervention. The prospects of

Socialist construction during the new period of respite were outlined by the Ninth

101 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe Kemal'-pashe, 3 iyunya 1920 g.," Pravda (Moscow), 9 June 1920. 102 C. Yu. Vygodskiy, S. A. Gonionskiy, I. M. Gorokhov (eds.), Istoriya Diplomatii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1965), p. 195.

45 Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which met from March 29 to

April 5, 1920. The Soviet government decided to draw part of the army units into economic construction.103 As a result, labour armies were formed in Ukraine, the

Urals, the North Caucasus, near Petrograd and in the Middle Volga region. However,

Lenin stated that "although the lifting of the blockade gives us some facilitation, nevertheless, the bourgeoisie, in all probability, will try to fight us. Therefore, it is necessary to be in alert once more and prepare ourselves to the new aggressions."104

Therefore, the primary task of the Soviet government was to prevent any aggression against the Soviet Republic, and, thus, to prolong this breathing space, which were critically necessary for the rehabilitation of the Soviet economy.

Article 1 in the Armistice made at Mudros between the Allied Powers and the

Ottoman Government on October 30, 1918, transferred the naval control of the Straits

(and therewith of the Black Sea) from the Ottoman Empire to the Allies. This extension of their sea power enabled the Allies immediately to establish direct political and military liaisons with the Russian White movement under General

Denikin, and with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.105 Denikin was supplied with technical assistance and munitions.106 The Soviet government held that the providing military and financial assistance by the British and the French through the Black Sea during these years strengthened the southern Russian counter-revolution critically.107

On August 28, 1919, the British troops were progressively withdrawn from the whole

103 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, 1920), p. 328. 104 V. I. Lenin, "Rch' na VII Soveshchanii VTsIK," in Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV, p. 21. 105 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923 (London: 1927), p. 363. 106 The Soviet edition of Istoriya Diplomatii (v. III) gives the following data: There were several hundreds of the British officers in the Army of General Denikin. The 47th Squadron of the Britesh Air Forces had participated in the military operations in the environs of Tsaritsyn and Chernyy Yar. For this, see: Istoriya Diplomatii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskaya Literatura, 1959), v. III, p. 180. 107 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy (Moscow: Nauchnaya Assotsiatsiya Vostokovedeniya Pri Ts.I.K. S.S.S.R., 1925), p. 61.

46 of Transcaucasia except Batum.108 But Britain still kept advantageous position in the

Middle East that it had gained in late 1918.109

Moreover, besides, the Conference of San Remo, which met from April 19 to

April 26, 1920, confirmed the mandate of Britain on Mesopotamia and Palestine, and agreed on the occupation of Syria by France. The Soviet government regarded the presence of these Powers in the territories, which were close to Soviet Russia, as a direct threat to its security. Therefore, the Soviet government held that the Ankara government, which was struggling against the foreign invaders in Anatolia, would destroy the system of mandates and frustrate the Allied Powers' designs in these territories, and, in that way, to weaken them, and would not allow them to consolidate their positions there. Thus, the Ankara government with its active struggle was regarded by the Soviet government as a factor contributing to the strengthening of

Soviet Russia's defences. In this respect, the National Resistance Movement in

Anatolia under the leadership of the Ankara Government was a power which was meeting the Soviet intentions, and was creating a favourable external situation for the

Soviet government, owing to which, it could concentrate on the economic rehabilitation of the country.

One can assume that all these things had been discussed between Chicherin and

Lenin after receiving Mustafa Kemal's letter. Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin replied to Mustafa Kemal on June 3, 1920.

However, at this time, the Soviet leaders were not fully confident that Mustafa

Kemal and his adherents would be staunch in the struggle for the National Pact.110

108 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1823, p. 364; The British troops were also withdrawn from Batum on July 7, 1920. 109 Irandust, "Zigzagi Angliyskoy Politiki na Blizhnem Vostoke," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, N4, p. 25. 110 G. Astakhov, Ot Sultanata k Demokraticheskoy Turtsii (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1926), p. 13.

47 Therefore, the Soviet government simultaneously continued to conduct business with adherents of as well, supposing that they would be more irreconcilable against the Entente.111 Besides, many leading Bolsheviks held that the workers and peasants would be the leading power in the awakening of the East. In this connection, the Soviet government pinned its hopes on the yet-nonexistent Communist Party of

Turkey. The Bolsheviks would write about the might of the proletariat in the Turkish seaports, and considered Ethem the "Circassian" as a Bolshevik.112 Thus, the Soviet government seemed to have put to the test all available means in Anatolia.

Furthermore, at the time of reception Mustafa Kemal's letter, Azerbaijan had already fallen to Communist power on April 27, 1920. Chicherin replied that the

Soviet government was ready to support the resistance movement in Anatolia, but instead of the Turkish proposal to start military operations against Georgia and

Armenia, expressed its readiness to set the mutual boundaries of Turkey, Persia, and

Armenia.113 Chicherin's view was that coercive policies would only discredit Soviet

Russia in the eyes of the small peoples and, on June 30, 1920, he warned the members of Politburo against leaning toward one national element against another and that such a move "would be a fatal mistake for the whole Soviet policy in the East."114 Besides, at the negotiations between Armenian and the Soviet governments that started in

Moscow on May 28, 1920, Chicherin expressed the wish of Soviet government to reconcile Armenian-Turkish differences.115 Taking upon itself to do the mediation, the

Soviet government was intending to prevent the Armenian government from

111 Ibid. 112 G. Astakhov, p. 13. 113 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe Kemal'-Pashe, 3 iyunya 1920 g., N 11/551," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1958), v. II, p. 555. 114 Richard D. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), v. IV, p. 58. 115 Ibid., p. 49.

48 intervening in Mustafa Kemal's campaign against the Entente Powers.116 At the same time, Soviet government hoped to hinder further closing of Armenia with the Allied

Powers and in that way, bar the use of the Armenian territory by them in order to develop military operations against the Soviets.117

The Difference of Stands on the Frontier

On June 20, Mustafa Kemal wrote to Chicherin that Turkey was prepared to accept the Soviet mediation. Nevertheless, he invoked the Brest-Litovsk and the

Batum treaties as the basis for establishing just boundaries and friendly relations with the neighbouring countries of Persia and Armenia.118 The Government of the GNA considered that in accordance with these treaties Kars, Ardahan, Batum, Artvin,

Ahalkelek (Akhalkalaki), Ahıska (Akhaltsikh), the whole Surmalu and parts of

Erevan and Daralgiaz uezds were to be included into the Turkish territories. However, the Soviet government not only had not recognised the and but also had repudiated the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Thus, as back at the beginning of the contacts between the two governments, the difference of stands as regards the future boundaries arose between them. As for the mediation proposal to the Armenian government, it remained unreplied on the part of the latter.

Meanwhile, the delegation of the Ankara Government of five men (the Foreign

Minister of the Government of the GNA, Bekir Sâmi, the Minister of Economy of the

Government of the GNA, Yusuf Kemâl [Tengirşenk], Doctor Ibrahim Bey, Seyfi Bey,

116 Ibid. 117 S. F. Oreshkova-N. Yu. Ul'chenko, Rossiya i Turtsiya (Problemy formirovaniya granits) (Moscow: IV RAN, 1999), pp. 94-95. 118 Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1927-1958 (Seattle, 1959), p. 70; The Batum Conference was held in Batum from May 11 to June 4, 1928. There, the Ottoman government

49 Osman Bey). The delegation had been charged with concluding an agreement and alliance with the Soviet Government.119 By means of this agreement and the alliance, the Ankara Government intended to acquire external support in the struggle for the independence of the country.120

During the first negotiations between the delegation of the government of the

GNA and Soviet authorities in Moscow in July-August 1920, Assistant Foreign

Affairs Commissar Lev Karakhan, expressed that it was unreasonable for Turkey to demand the reestablishment of the Brest-Litovsk boundaries, and that the whole would have to be re-examined. For him, Turkey should not try to regulate affairs on the Russian side of the 1914 boundary.121

On August 24, 1920, the Soviet-Turkish draft treaty was initialled. The draft consisted of a preamble declaring the intent of the two sides to live in friendship and brotherhood, and followed by eight articles stipulating the necessary measures for the establishment of friendly relations. Article 1 committed the contracting parties not to recognize any treaty or obligation forcibly imposed on the other, and the Soviet government specifically recognised the Grand National Assembly as the sole representative of Turkey and pledged to reject any international instrument that had not been deliberated and ratified by thet body. Article 2 declared as null and void all the previous treaties between Russia and Turkey.122 A secret annex committed the two governments to keep one another informed about all developments pertaining to the relations with other countries.123 By and large, the Soviet government accepted the

concluded separate treaties with Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. For the Batum Treaty, see: Akdes Nimet Kurat, Türkiye ve Rusya, pp. 474-478. 119 "Ahmet Muhtar's speech at the fourth secret session of the GNA on January 17, 1921," in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 1985, v. I, p. 340. 120 Ibid. 121 Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, pp. 158-161. 122 For the text of the treaty, see: Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, v. IV, pp. 159- 160. 123 Ibid., p. 160.

50 legitimacy of the Turkish National Pact and agreed to base the future relations on equality, friendship, and mutual support.124

In the draft treaty, the word 'Turkey" meant territories that had been determined in the Mîsâk-ı Mill of January 28, 1920.125 These territories would have to include all territories determined in the Brest-Litovsk and the Batum treaties, as well as the

Mosul region. There could be no doubt that such cities of the eastern Anatolia as Muş,

Bitlis, and Van were within the Mîsâk-ı Millî. Therefore, when Chicherin, three days after initialling the draft treaty, in a meeting with Bekir Sâmi, expressed that it was essential that a part of the provinces of Van and Bitlis be given to the Armenians, the

Turkish representative was obliged to suspend talks.

However, notwithstanding the fact that the draft treaty was only initialled, the military commission continued its labours. As a result, the first party of arms was prepared on the spot in Moscow and Rostov, and Osman Bey remained to load it.126

At the same time, the Soviet government decided to give 5,000,000 rubles in gold to the Ankara government, 1,000,000 of which Yusuf Kemâl had driven to Ankara in

September 1920.127

Undoubtedly, the Ankara Government was gaining more importance for the

Soviet Government. The fact that the Soviet Government became seriously anxious that the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres, which had been signed on August 10,

1920, would present a danger to the security of Soviet republic. In this respect, the

Ankara Government embodied the resistance to the treaty.

Again, at the Second Congress of the Communist International, which was held in Moscow from July 15 to August 7, 1920, the delegates discussed whether it would

124 Ibid. 125 Kamuran Gürün, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (Ankara:) TTK, 1991, p. 38. 126 Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, pp. 78-79. 127 S. I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy, p. 22.

51 be right or wrong, in principle and in theory, to state that the Communist International and the Communist parties must support the bourgeois-democratic movements in backward countries.128 It was decided to substitute the term "national-revolutionary" for the term "bourgeois-democratic." It had been done in order not to obliterate distinctions between the reformist and the revolutionary movements. Therefore, the

Congress decided that the communists "should and will support bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies only when they are genuinely revolutionary, and when their exponents do not hinder the Third International and the Communist Parties' work of educating and organizing in a revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the masses of the exploited."129 If these conditions did not exist, the Communists would have to combat the reformist bourgeoisie.

The approach of the Soviet government vis-à-vis Ankara could be considered as somewhat deviated from the above-mentioned line. Apparently, by giving arms and providing financial assistance for the Ankara government, the Soviet government did not hesitate before the fact that whether the Ankara government was genuinely revolutionary or bourgeois-democratic in nature. For the Soviet government, the most important factor was that the GNA was fighting against the Entente and her plans in the very close avenues of approach to Soviet Republic. In other words, the Ankara government was serving Soviet national interests.

Nevertheless, the Soviet government would play safe. Therefore, it was continuing to rely upon other means as well.

That, the cessation of some parts of the vilâyets of Van and Bitlis had been laid down as a necessary condition for signing the treaty, gave occasion to serious doubts

128 V. I. Lenin, "Doklad Komissii po Natsional'nomu i Kolonial'nomu Voprosam 26 iyulya, 1920 g.," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV, p. 352. 129 V. I. Lenin, "Doklad Komissii po Natsional'nomu i Kolonial'nomu Voprosam 26 iyulya, 1920 g.," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV, p. 353.

52 as to the sincerity of the Soviet government as regards its struggle against imperialism and capitalism.130 On September 2, 1920, at the meeting of the cabinet of Ministers, in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha also participated, it was resolved to change the proposals that had been brought forward in the Turkish letter of April 26, 1920. In order to establish contacts with Azerbaijan, it decided not to wait for the consent of Moscow as regards the action against the Armenians, and in this respect, take advantage of the first convenient moment.131 At the same time, because of military and financial difficulties, the cabinet of Ministers would not expect big sums from the Soviet government, and decided to launch the transportation of all that the Soviet government was able to provide at that moment.132

During the military operations of the XVth Army Corps in the eastern Anatolia, which started on September 13, 1920, the Turkish Army under the command of

Kâzım Karabekir Pasha recaptured Oltu on September 13, Sarıkamış on September

29. In Surmalu a detachment of Turkish regulars and Kurdish partisans captured

Khalfalu and Sultanabad, southward Iğdır, the district capital. This line was penetrating slightly into the eastern (Russian) part of the Turko-Russian frontier of

1914, which was being demanded by the Soviet government.

On September 30, the Armenian government, declaring the country under a state of siege, established martial law, issued mobilisation orders for men up to thirty- five years, and exhorted the populace with the call "Everyone toward the front!"133 In this connection, Chicherin advised, the Chairman of the Eleventh Army's Military

Revolutionary Cauncil [Voinskiy Revolyutsionnyy Sovet] and of the Russian

130 "From the Cabinet of Ministers to Bekir Sâmi, 2 September, 1920," T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi [Republican Archive of the Turkish Prime-Ministry] (Ankara), hereafter cited as, BCA [Ankara] Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no: 030. 18. 01 / 01. 15. 9. 131 "The decision of the Cabinet of Ministers on Policy As Regards to Soviet Russia, 2 September 1920," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no:, 030. 18. 01 / 01. 12. 2.

53 Communist Party's Burea [Kavburo], Sergo Ordhonikidze to be extremely prudent in relations with the Kemalists, the Armenians, and the Georgians, and to carry out a peaceful policy in order to prevent a crisis in the Transcaucasia.134 He also instructed

Ordzonikidze to advise the Kemalists that the continuation of the campaign was considered untimely, as it could provoke the Entente Powers into renewed military involvement.135

The Soviet troops in Azerbaijan were weak, popular discontent in that country was increasing, and thousands of Musavat (Equality) supporters were ready to revolt.136 At that time, a provisional Russo-Polish agreement was not yet signed, and the Soviet troops from the Caucasian Front, from Turkestan, and from Siberia had been transferred to the Southern front for a final blow to Wrangel.137

In a short space of time, the Turkish army started its offensive again further eastwards and captured Kars on October 30. The fall of Kars sealed the fate of

Aleksandropol (Gümrü). On the basis of Kâzım Karabekir's terms of the cease-fire, the Turkish infantry and cavalry, took possession of Alexandropol railway station and inner fort on the evening of November 7, and on November 18, the Armenian government signed the armistice agreement.

On November 11, the Soviet government, anticipating that further military operations would cease, offered once again both sides its mediation, and informed that it was sending into the area of military action its liaison Mdivani.138 The acting

132 Ibid. 133 Richard D. Hovannisian, p 198. 134 Sh. M. Amirkhanyan, Iz Istorii Bor'by Za Sovetskuyu Vlast' v Armenii (Erevan: Ayastan, 1967), p. 48. 135 Richard D. Hovannisian, p. 217 136 Richard D. Hovannisian, p. 217. 137 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command. A Military-Political History 1918-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 105. 138 "Radiogramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, Komanduyushchemu Vostochnym Frontom Turtsii Karabekiru, Predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov Armenii S. Vratsyanu, Polnomochnomu

54 Foreign Commissar of the government of the GNA Ahmet Muhtar avoided explicit acceptance of mediation but expressed his deep appreciation of the Soviet sides humanitarian motivation.139 In his radiogram, Prime Minister of the Armenian

Republic, Hamazasp Ohanjanian accepted Mdivani as a mediator.140 Meanwhile, the

Soviet plenipotentiary in Armenia, Legran, at the meeting with Bekzadyan, the

Armenian diplomatic representative in Tiflis, proposed that if Armenia would renounce the Treaty of Sevres and place itself under Russia's wing, the Soviets would coerce the Turks to withdraw to the pre-war frontier.141 Legran insisted that intervention, to be effective, would require the introduction into Armenia of at least two Red Army regiments. Ohandjanian rejected the proposal.142

The advance of the Turkish army towards Aleksandropol was accompanied by rumours that the Entente had promised the Ankara government Azerbaijan in return for a front against Bolsheviks.143 These rumours gave birth to uneasiness in

Moscow.144

For the Soviets, the Caucasus was the source of foodstuffs, raw materials, and oil.145 The existence of the Soviet Republic without Baku oil would be difficult. On the other hand, the Caucasus was between Europe and Asia, and the most important economic and strategic roads passed through it (Batum-Baku; Batum-Tabriz; Batum-

Predstavitelyu RSFSR v Armenii B. V. Legranu, 11 Noyabrya 1920 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 139 Richard D. Hovannisian, p. 345. 140 Ibid. 141 Z. I. Adaliya, Iz Istorii Angliyskoy Interventsii v Gruzii (1918-1921) (Sukhumi: Abgosizdat, 1961), p. 210. 142 Richard D. Hovannisian, p. 360. 143 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin,, p. 131. 144 For this, see: V. I. Adaliya, Iz Istorii Angliyskoy Interventsii v Gruzii (1918-1921), pp. 204-208; "Ahmet Muhtar's speech at the secret sitting of the GNA on January 24, 1921," TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. I, pp. 351-352. 145 "Beseda I. V. Stalina s sotrudnikom gazety Pravda o polozhenii na Kavkaze,", Bor'ba Za Pobedu Sovetskoy Vlasti V Gruzii. Dokumenty i Materialy (1917-1921 g.g.) (: Sabgota Sakartvelo, 1958)

55 Tebriz-Erzurum). Therefore, the whole point for the Soviet government was who would posses oil and important roads.146

The Soviet leaders had misgivings about the intentions of the Ankara government. They regarded the defeat of Armenia by the Kemalists, while the Entente had been absolutely neutral, the hearsay that Thrace and Izmir would be returned to the Turks and that Ankara was negotiating with the Sultan, and the slackening on the

Western front as a flirting of the Entente with the Kemalists and as a shift of the latter to the right.147 They also suspected that the Turks would use the territories which they had gained as a springboard for attack on Soviet Azerbaijan. The Soviet leaders also believed that in case of further Turkish advance, the Turks would be able to contact with the Entente through Tiflis and Batum, the more as, so the Soviet government was anticipating the landing of the Entente troops in Batum.148

On November, 18, the Armenian government accepted the Turkish truce terms.

Five days later, on November 23, Hmazasp Ohanjanian handed over the premiership to Simon Vratzian. In Erevan, Legran, once again urged Vratzian to proclaim

Armenia a Soviet republic or at least to invite the Red Army to protect the country.

However, Vratzian rejected this proposal, and the Armenian delegation entrained for

Aleksandropol to negotiate the peace treaty with Kâzım Karabekir.

Under the circumstances, in order to avoid the attack on Baku, the Soviet government considered it necessary to establish Soviet Power in Armenia. First, on

November 29, Soviet Power was proclaimed in Ijevan (Kervansaray), and on

December 2, after the negotiations between Legran, and representatives of Armenian government, Armenia was proclaimed an "independent" Soviet Republic. At 6 o'clock

146 Ibid. 147 Ibid.

56 in the evening of that same day, the previous government of Armenia withdrew from power, and all power was transferred to Dro [Drastamat Kanayan], the Minister of

Military Affairs in the previous Armenian government under the premiership of

Simon Vratzian) until the arrival of the Revolutionary Committee.149 The next day, the Armenian delegation, which had been nominated by the previous Armenian government, signed the Treaty of Aleksandropol (Gümrü).

In accordance with the treaty, the state of war between Turkey and the Republic of Armenia came to an end. The new boundary was drawn along the Arpaçay and

Aras rivers, leaving the province of Kars and the county of Surmalu on the Turkish side. A mixed commission was to determine the exact frontier within two weeks after the treaty had been signed. The administrative system of the Sharur-Şahtahtı-

Nakhichevan region was to be determined by a future referendum, in which Armenia was not to interfere. For the time being, a local administration was to be created and function there under the protection of Turkey.150

By this treaty, Armenia ceded to the Ankara Government the districts which the

Ottoman government had lost in the campaigns of 1876-1877.151 Thus, the territory of

Armenia came to the frontier, which had been determined by the Treaty of Batum in

1918 and included the districts of the Ararat valley and the Lake of Sevan.152 Thus, the frontier line was passing far from the pre-war Russo-Turkish frontier, in favour of

Turkey.

148 "Telegramma Narkomindela RSFSR G. V. Chicherina lordu Kerzonu s protestom protiv namereniya Antanty okkupirovat' g. Batum, 26 Noyabrya 1920 g., "Bor'ba Za Pobedu Sovetskoy Vlasti v Gruzii. Dokumenty i Materialy (1917-1921 g.g.) (Tbilisi: Sabgota Sakartvelo, 1958), pp. 632-633 149 Richard D. Hovannisian, pp. 383-390. 150 For the , see: Richard D. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, v. IV, pp. 399-396. 151 A Speech Delivered By Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Istanbul, 1963), p. 418. 152 S. F. Oreshkova - N. Yu. Ul'chenko, p. 98.

57 The end of the Turko-Armenian war found the Ankara-Moscow relations strained almost to the breaking point.153 Both parties acted ratıonaly, however.154 The two governments agreed to hold a conference in Moscow.155

The Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921

On March 16, 1921, a treaty between Soviet Russia and the Ankara government was signed in Moscow.156 The main substance of the Soviet-Turkish treaty was a territorial delimitation.157 The Soviet government renounced its idea of the pre-war frontier line with Turkey. In this respect, the Treaty between Soviet Republic and

Turkey was a compromise.

The Soviet government agreed "not to recognize any international acts bearing on Turkey and not recognised by the National Government of Turkey represented by her Grand National Assembly.'158 This meant that the Soviet government did not

153 Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, p. 54. 154 Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires.Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, p. 86 155 "Nota Pravitel'stva RSFSR Pravitel'stvu Turtsii, 9 dekabrya 1920 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, pp. 371-372; At the secret sitting of the GNA on January 24, 1921, Ahmet Muhtar, the Acting Foreign Minister of the Government of the GNA, pointed out that the Soviet Government had proposed the Ankara Government to conclude a political agreement and a military alliance. See: "Ahmet Muhtar's speech at the secret sitting of the GNA on January 24, 1921," in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. I, p. 352. 156 Accrding to Yusuf Kemâl Tengirşenk, the head of the Turkish delegation in Moscow, the treaty was signed either on March 22 or on March 23, 1921. In his memoirs, he states that he had suggested to Chicherin that the Turco-Soviet friendship treaty should carry the date of March 16 as the date of its signuture to mark the opening of a new era of friendship between the two countries on the first anniversary of the formal occupation of Istanbul by the Allied troops on March 16, 1920. Yusuf Kemâl says that this proposal was accepted by Chicherin. For this, see: Yusuf Kemal Tengırşenk, 'Milli Mücadelede Ruslarla İlk Temaslaramız,' Yakın Tarihimiz, 4, N 43, 20 December 1962, p. 97. Ali Fuad Cebesoy, who also signed the treaty, maintains that the treaty was signed on March 18 and upon the request of Chicherin it was agreed to publish the text of the treaty on March 18 without changing its date of signuture. For this, see: Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları, p. 155. 157 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Ofitsial'nomu Predstavitelyu RSFSR v Velikobritanii L. B. Krasinu, 20 Marta 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1969), v. IV, p. 11. 158 "Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey i Turtsiey, 16 marta 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 598; For the text of the treaty in English, see: "Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey, 16 March 1921," in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London, Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1951), p. 238.

58 recognize the Treaty of Sevres. "Turkey" was defined as the territories included in the

National Pact of January 28, 1920.159 Its north-eastern frontier was now laid down from the point where it touched the Black Sea to the point where it abutted on Persia.

The treaty secured the territorial acquisitions according to the Treaty of Alexandropol, with the exception of the city itself, which remained on the Armenian territory.160 The province of Kars, the districts of Artvin, Ardahan, Oltu, Kağızman, the kazâs of

Tuzluca and Iğdır were included in the Turkish territory.161 In the kazâs of Tuzluca and Iğdır the frontier now passed on 45 kilometres eastwards from the previous frontier of 1878, and took inside the Mountain Big Ararat (Ağrı Dağı).162 In this way, the territories with the area of 23,600 square kilometres and a population of 522,000 peoples that had been part of the Russian Empire previously were included in the

Turkish territory.163 The Nakhichevan district was to be autonomous under the protection of Azerbaijan, on condition that the latter Republic should not cede this protectorate to any third state. The boundaries of Nakhichevan district were to be delimited by a mixed commission on which Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were to be represented.164

The Soviet government, taking these decisions, first of all, proceeded from her difficult internal and external situation. The situation at home seemed to be desperate for the Bolsheviks. Soviet Russia had been living under 'war communism' since 1918, and now it was proving intolerable, and the leaders had to face several simultaneous crises, some of which led to unprecedented explosions.165 The majority of the

159 Ibid. 160 S. F. Oreshkova - N. Yu. Ul'chenko, p. 111. 161 The kazâs of Tuzluca and Iğdır had been acquıred by the Russıan Empıre from Persıa ın accordance wıth the Turkmenchay Treaty 162 Fahrettın Erdoğan, Türk Ellerinde Hatıralarım (İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa), 1954, p. 271. 163 S. I. Kuznetsova, p. 50. 164 Ibid. pp. 598-599. 165 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Lenin. Revolution and Power (London: Longman, 1982), p. 119.

59 peasants were suffering severely under famine, cold and excessive taxation.166 Lenin himself confessed that the Soviet government had made a definite mistake in the war with Poland.167 The matter was that, in the autumn of 1920, the amount of grain collected from the peasants was over 250 million poods. By February 1, 1921 the figure was estimated at 235 million poods, as against the 210 million poods for the whole of the previous year, that is to say, more was collected in a much shorter period than for the whole of the previous year. It turned out, however, that of these 235 millions collected by February 1, 1921, the Soviet State used up 155 million poods within the first six months, that is, on average of 25 million or even more poods a months. The Soviet government, thus, failed to see the full danger of the crisis approaching with the spring and succumbed to the desire to increase the starving workers' ration.168 As a result, the revolt broke out in February 1921 in the province of

Tambov and from there spread to the east, the Volga, the Urals and western Siberia.169

The peasants not only refused to comply with the requisitions and no longer recognised any authority, but they also stopped the convoys of wheat going towards

Moscow.170 The surplus-food appropriation system in the rural districts hindered the growth of the productive forces and proved to be the main cause of the profound economic and political crisis.171

166 V. I. Lenin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo Na Soveshchanii Predsedateley Uezdnykh, Volostnykh i Sel'skikh Ispolnitel'nykh Komitetov Moskovskoy Gubernii, 15 oktyabrya 1920 g., " in V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1931), v. XXV, pp. 425-426. 167 V.I. Lenin, "Desyatyy Syezd Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii, 8-16 marta 1921 g., " in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVI, p. 205. 168 Ibid. 169 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 120. 170 Ibid. 171 V. I. Lenin, "II Vserossiyskiy Syezd Politprosvetov 17-22 oktyabrya 1921 g., " in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 40.

60 The grave internal political crisis in Soviet Russia brought also to light discontent among a considerable section of the workers.172 Lenin was upset that the proletariat, which the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considered as its advance guard and main support, was declassed, dislodged from its class groove, weak, and enfeebled.173 The Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was afraid of that the whole machine would collapse.174 In such state of affairs, the Soviet government was unable to carry on any military operations, and tried her best to avoid a winter campaign. Any new involvement in the war could give rise to the burst of indignation among the workers and peasants all over the country against the Soviet government.

Taking this into consideration, the Soviet government was hurrying to prevent any conflict with the Turks and to conclude a treaty with the Ankara government.

The settlement of issues with the Ankara government as regards the future frontier, in the Soviet statesmen' view, was one of the conditions for the prevention of conflicts in the Caucasus.175 Indeed, on April 9, 1921, Lenin, in a report to the meeting of representatives of the cells of the R.K.P. (B.) of Moscow and the Moscow guberniya, pointed out that "only the peace treaty with Turkey saves us from the perpetual wars in the Caucasus."176

In order to save the Soviet regime, nothing was left for the Soviet government but to take prompt economic measures. The Soviet leadership was conscious that unless it restored the economy in the country, it would fail to extricate the country from the crisis. Following the signing of the peace treaty with Poland on October 28,

172 V. I. Lenin, "IV Kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala 3 noyabrya - 3 dekabrya 1922 g., " in V. I. Lenin, Sichineniya, v. XXVII, p. 345. 173 V. I. Lenin, "Novye vremena, starye oshibki v novom vide," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 7. 174 V. I. Lenin, "XI Syezd R.K.P. (B.). Politicheskiy Otchyot Tsentarl'nogo Komiteta R.K.P. (B.) 27 marta 1921 g.," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 256. 175 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 116. 176 V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV.

61 1920, and the defeat of the army of Baron Petr Wrangel in November of that same year, the Soviet government proceeded to the economic recovery of the country.

In November 1920, the Soviet government considered the international situation as unfavourable for the Soviet Republic. Lenin stated that "an alliance of all the world's powerful capitalist countries against Soviet Russia - was the real basis of international politics" and that "there was not a corner of the earth, which was not under the control of a small group of capitalist countries."177 He held that, although at that time these capitalist countries could not think of an immediate resumption of the war, the respite would be temporary, as "the existence of a Soviet Republic surrounded by capitalist countries - was so intolerable to the capitalsits that they would seize any opportunity to resume the war."178 In Lenin's opinion, given the complicated international situation, "to renounce any conciliation or compromise with possible allies (even if they were temporary, unstable, vacillating or conditional allies) in a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie would be ridiculous in the extreme."179 The Soviet statesmen realized that the task of the economic recovery of the country would to take a long time, and, according to Lenin, for the successful implementation of it, the Party needed a 'breathing space'. The Soviet leaders held that only by preventing attacks and wars against the Soviet Republic and securing the frontier of the country, would they be able to obtain such a necessary space of time.180

In this respect, Anatolia was of exceptional importance for the Soviet Republic.

It was washed by the Black Sea and adjacent to the Caucasus. The Soviet government felt herself insecure, as the Entente Powers were still in Istanbul, the British fleet

177 V. I. Lenin, "Rech' na Vserossiyskom soveshchanii politprocvetov gubernskikh i uezdnykh otdelov narodnogo obrazovaniya, 3 noyabrya 1920 g.," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXV, p. 450. 178 V. I. Lenin, "O Kontsessiyakh," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVI, p. 12. 179 N. Lenin, "Detskaya Bolezn' Levizny V Kommunizme," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 212.

62 ruled over the Black Sea and her forces had been stationed in Mesopotamia. In her view, Istanbul, the Black Sea, and Anatolia could be used as military bases in the war against the Soviet Republic. Therefore, the Soviet government considered it necessary to settle all existing issues with the Ankara government as soon as possible, and to win its friendship. The Soviet government considered that as far as the Ankara

Government was fighting against occupiers, it would be the power ensuring the security of the Caucasian frontiers of Soviet Republic, and, thus, provide the Soviet government with the "breathing space."

The Conference of London, which was held on the eve of the Moscow negotiations on February 21, 1921, hastened the necessity of winning the Ankara government over to the Soviet side. At the conference, the principal Allied Powers carried on negotiations with the representatives of the Athens, Istanbul, and Ankara governments. On January 26, a month before the conference, it appeared in The

Manchester Guardian that "the Conference of London will mean de facto recognition of Kemal's government by the Allies, and now he should choose between the Allies and the Bolsheviks."181 The Soviet representatives in Trebizond and London also reported that "the Kemalists are building the bridge with the Entente," and that "an agreement between the Entente and Turkey is evident," and "a new Turkish offensive into the Caucasus is not unlikely."182 The Soviets could not but picture that if all these were actually the truth, then, it would mean for the Soviet Republic a permanent threat in its southern flanks, and, at worst, the new involvement into the war. In order to prevent it, the Soviet government was to satisfy as much as possible the interests of

Ankara. Therefore, it was also one of the reasons which forced the Soviet government

180 F. Rotshtein, "Nasha politika mira za desyat' let," Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow), 1927, N 10-11, p. 3. 181 S. I. Kuznetsova, p. 31. 182 S. F. Oreshkova - H. Yu. Ul'chenko, p. 110.

63 to make a compromise and abandon the above mentioned territories, including the province of Kars, which from military and strategic points of view was a key to the eastern Anatolia, in the possession of Turkey.

The Soviet government also hoped that the Ankara government, as a result of the struggle against occupiers would drive away all foreign troops from Anatolia, recapture Istanbul, and take control of the Straits. It realized that the future security of the Soviet Republic would depend on this.

In order to guarantee the freedom of the Straits and the free passage through them for trade relations of all peoples, they agreed to hand over the final draft of an international statute governing the Black Sea and the Straits to a special conference of delegates from the littoral states, on condition that the decisions made by the conference should not infringe the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of

Turkey and her capital, Istanbul.183 This was another reason for the Soviet government to support the Ankara government.

It should also be noted that there was a factor, which also was forcing the Soviet government conclude a treaty on conditions favourable for the Ankara government.

The matter was that the Soviet government called the Ankara government "the

Revolutionary Turkey".184 The revolutionary importance of the Ankara government for the Soviets laid in the fact that it was the first country of the East, which started the organized struggle against the "counter-revolutionary and the imperialist West".185

The Communist Party of Bolsheviks held that the assumption of the leadership of the

Anatolian peasants in the struggle against the Treaty of Sevres by the petty and middle bourgeoisie of Turkey, added to the Turkish National-Liberation Movement

183 "Dogovor mezhdu RSFSR I Turtsiey, 16 marta 1921 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. II, p. 599. 184 Mikhail Pavlovich, p. 306. 185 Ibid. pp. 307-308.

64 deep-progressive and revolutionary character.186 Therefore, by signing this treaty, the

Soviet government took account of the perspective of the future Soviet politics in the

East, expected to win the confidence of the peoples of the East.187

At the same time, the Communist Party of Bolsheviks held that although Turkey of the Ankara government was not pre-war Turkey, it, had not yet become a country of Workers' and Peasants' Power and of social revolution.188 From this point of view, the Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey was considered by the Russian Communist

Party (Bolsheviks) as a great act, which would hasten the social revolution in the whole Muslim East and in Turkey.189

At the Moscow Conference, the Turkish representatives also made concessions to the Soviet side. They agreed to leave Batum and parts of the districts of Batum with roads and railway supplying the city on the Georgian territory.190 It was done on condition that the local population should be granted a wide administrative, cultural, and religious autonomy and that goods in transit from or to Turkey through Batum should be duty free.191 First of all, they proceeded from the task of the National resistance Movement. As Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated at the secret session of the

GNA on April 24, 1920 "our task is the independence of our State and the inviolability of it within the exactly defined frontiers."192

The Ankara government aimed at winning independence for the Turks within the national boundaries, which had been defined in the Mîsâk-ı Millî.193 To get into an

186 Ibid. p. 305. 187 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 116. 188 Mikhail Pavlovich, p. 237. 189 Ibid. 190 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 110. 191 "Dogovor mezhdu RSFSR and Turkey, 16 marta 1821 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR,, v. III, p. 598. 192 "The Fourth Secret Session of the GNA of Turkey, 24 April, 1920," in T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 1985, v. I, p. 5. 193 "Mustafa Kemal's speech at the secret sitting of the GNA on January 17, 1921," in T.B.M.M. Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. I, p. 333.

65 argument with the Soviet government would be a very big risk for the Ankara government.194 The matter was that the Entente countries had done everything that they could to render impossible any more or less normal relations between it and the

West-European countries.195 By time of the Moscow conference, they had not made any concessions that could satisfy the Ankara government. It was still isolated and the occupation of Anatolia by the Allied troops was in progress. In mid-December, 1920, the Greek Army had started an offensive against the Army of the Ankara

Government. Everything indicated that the war would go on for a long time. Under the circumstances, to obtain arms from the Soviet Republic was the important thing.196

The Soviet government, after the negotiations between Bekir Sâmi Bey and

Chicherin in August 1920 had already started rendering financial assistance to the

Ankara government and had begun dispatching arms and other equipment from

Tuapse through the Black Sea. True, the rumours during the military operations of the

Turkish Army in the eastern Anatolia that the Ankara government had anti-Soviet intentions, had made the Soviet government hold up the dispatch of arms. However, very soon, having made certain that there was no conciliation between Ankara and the

Entente, Chicherin had instructed Sergo Ordzhonikidze to resume the dispatch of arms.197 Thus, the Soviet Republic was still the one and only source, where the

Ankara government could obtain arms for the struggle. In this connection, to arrange matters with the Soviet government about financial and arms assistance was one of

194 Cezmi Tahir Berktin, Erzurumdan Lozana ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa, p. 97. 195 V. I. Lenin, "O Kontsessiyakh," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v, XXVI, p. 27. 196 Dr. Rıza Nur'un Moskova-Sakarya Hatıraları (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları), 1993, p. 111. 197 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu RSFSR v Turtsii A. L. Sheymanu, 10 dekabrya 1920 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 374.

66 the main tasks of the delegation of the Ankara government at the negotiations in

Moscow in March, 1921.198

Besides, the proclamation of the Soviet regime in Armenia, and, in this connection, the vagueness with the implementation of the Treaty of Aleksandropol, also forced the Ankara government to enter into negotiations with the Soviet government. Undoubtedly, the Treaty of Aleksandropol was very advantageous for the Ankara government. In accordance with it, the Turkish and Armenian representatives agreed on that the ratified copies of the treaty would be exchanged in

Ankara within one month.199 However, with the fall of the Armenian government, with whose delegation Kâzım Karabekir Pasha had signed the treaty, one of the contracting parties had simply ceased to exist. It presented difficulty for the Turks to implement the treaty. But the worst thing that they could face was that the treaty could remain in effect.

The Ankara government sought to fix her frontiers in the eastern Anatolia as soon as possible. Owing to the settlement of the matters regarding the frontier, the

Ankara government could untie its hands in eastern Anatolia and concentrate all its attention on the Western front. As Armenia, was now becoming Soviet Republic, the

Soviet government became one and only authority with whom the Ankara government could settle the frontier issues.

The Ankara government was satisfied with the Moscow Treaty. The Soviet government recognized the Ankara government as the only government of Turkey.

Owing to this, the Ankara government broke through her isolation. In the preamble to the treaty, the two sides expressed their solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and the desire to establish enduring and cordial relations between them and sincere

198 Dr. Rıza Nur'un Moskova-Sakarya Hatıraları, p. 46. 199 Richard D. Hovannisian, p. 396.

67 and unbreakable friendship based on the mutual interests of both sides.200 Both sides, taking note of the points in common between the movement of the Eastern peoples for national emancipation and the struggle of the workers of Russia for a new social order, solemnly recognized the right of these peoples to freedom and independence and in like manner their right to choose a form of government in accordance with their wishes.201 The Soviet government, considering a regime of capitulations incompatible with the free national development of a country, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, regarded as null and void any kind of act or right having any connexion whatever with this regime.202 Besides, the territorial settlements, either party pledged itself not to harbour, in territories under its own effective control, sai-disant governments or other organizations hostile to the other party.203

The was signed only between Moscow and Ankara.

However, the frontier line, which was determined there, concerned the territories of

Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The treaty provisions regarding the new frontier line could be put into effect only with the legalization of relations between Turkey and the Transcaucasian republics.204 The Soviet government wanted the Ankara government to sign a single treaty with all these three Transcaucasian republics, including the Soviet Republic. The matter was that the Russian Communist Party

(Bolsheviks) intended to lay down the foundations of the Transcaucasian Federation, which was to be tied with Moscow not only economically, but also politically. Lenin was anxious to achieve quickly the economic unification of Transcaucasia and

200 "Dogovor mezhdu RSFSR i Turtsiey, 16 marta 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 597. 201 Ibid., p. 599. 202 Ibid., pp. 599-600. 203 Ibid. p. 600. 204 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 160.

68 particularly to integrate the Georgian transport facilities with those of Azerbaijan and

Armenia with which they had been traditionally linked.205 In this respect, the Treaty of Moscow, from the economic point of view, was very advantageous for the Soviet government, since it was leaving all necessary transport infrastructures in the

Transcaucasia intact. Above all, the single treaty with the Ankara government would mean that it was signing the treaty with the single unit, and this single unit was becoming an arbiter of that frontier on the Soviet side.

The Treaty of Moscow was ratified by the Extraordinary Session of the All-

Russian Central Executive Committee on March 20, 1921, and by the GNA of Turkey on July 22, 1921. The two governments exchanged the instruments of ratification in

Kars on September 26, 1921. Following this, the representatives of the Georgian SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijanian SSR, and the Soviet government signed with the Ankara government the on October 13, 1921.

The Treaty of Kars reaffirmed the consent of the Ankara government as regards the frontier line between Turkey and the Soviet Transcaucasian republics, which had been determined in the Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921. The Ankara government, defining her north-eastern frontier exactly in this treaty, fulfilled partially its national aspirations, which had been determined in the Misâk-ı Milli.206

Consequently, with the treaty, RSFSR, as the friendly State, began to be a factor of security for Turkey on its north-eastern flanks. If the Ankara government wished to reserve for itself this security, it would have to maintain constantly a friendly attitude to the Soviet government. At the same time, the maintenance of friendly relations with the Soviet Republic was for the Ankara government an instrument by means of which the latter sought to prevent the Soviet government from any military action

205 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p, 266.

69 against Turkey. The generation of the Turks who had fought against the Russian

Empire was yet alive. The relations between the two Empires had been characterized by the mutual animosity during almost two centuries. Certainly, the majority of the

Turks in 1921 treated the Soviet Republic with distrust.

The Ankara government also procured Soviet aid.207 Besides, the Ankara

Government acquired more bargaining power with the Entente Powers, who were greatly perturbed with the Turko-Russian rapprochement.208 The Entente was not intending to revise the Treaty of Sevres. Yusuf Kemâl [Tengirşenk], the Minister of

Economy of the Government of the GNA and the head of the Turkish delegation at the negotiations in Moscow stated that "imperialism cannot renounce its intentions.209

It appeared in July 1920 in Açık Söz, published in Kastamonu, the city in Anatolia, north of Ankara, that "Britain is faced with two decisively important matters:

Bolshevism and Islam."210

Although, Britain and France had been pursuing the different policies as regards the Ankara government, they were unanimous in that the Ankara-Moscow alliance had to be prevented.211 The foreign policy makers in Ankara knew very well that neither Britain nor France wished any rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow.

206 Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, p. 65. 207 Doctor Rıza Nur writes in his memoirs that the Soviet Government gave to the Ankara Government 5,000,000 rubles in gold. Ali Fuad Cebesoy took from that amount 1,000,000 rubles in gold in order to buy arms in Germany. Thus, the Turkish delegation brought to Ankara 4,000,000 rubles in gold. For this, see: Dr. Rıza Nur'un Moskova-Sakarya Hatıraları (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları), 1993, p. 121; From December 27, 1920 to January 1921 the Soviet Command of the Caucasian Front gave to the Turkish mission in Tuapse six pieces of ordnance and 6,000 shells, and grenades. On January 20, 1921, Ordzhonikidze informed Moscow that the dispatch of arms was in progress. On February 14, 3,733 rifles and more than 5,000,000 cartridges were send from Tuapse through the Black Sea to Anatolia. In all, during 1921, the Soviet Government dispatched to Ankara 6,500,000 rubles in gold, 33,275 rifles, 57, 986,000 cartridges, 327 machine-guns, 54 pieces of ordnance, 129,479 shells, 1,500 sabres, 20,000 gas-masks. On October 3, 1921, the Soviet Government gave to the Turkish Command in Trabzon the two sea-destroyers Zhivoy and Zhutkiy. For this, see: S. I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie Sovetsko- Turetskikh Otnosheniy, p. 57, p. 58. 208 Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, p. 65. 209 "Russko-Turetskaya Konferentsiya. Ot Narodnogo Komissariata Po Inostrannym Delam," Pravda (Moscow), 1 March 1921.

70 Therefore, from the first stages of the National Resistance Movement, its leaders regarded the friendship with Moscow as "an instrument of intimidation," that could be used against enemies in case of need.

The Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) announced its New Economic

Policy (Novaya Ekonomicheskaya Politika) at the Eleventh Congress of the Party, which was held in Moscow in March-April 1921. Lenin wrote "the creation of the economic basis of the socialist system … is our soundest basis, soundest from the point of view of the R.S.F.S.R., and from the international point of view."212 First of all, it was necessary for the Soviet government to give the masses of the peasants practical assistance, otherwise, it could lose their support.213 The Russian Communist

Party (Bolsheviks) considered the trade as the only possible economic link between small farmers and large-scale industry.214

Besides, as far back as the summer of 1921, the first indications of the famine appeared. In a short space of time, the famine spread to the Ural, the Don, the

Ukraine, and the Crimea.215 Although it is impossible to determine the exact number of the hungry men, in Hakan Kırımlı's calculations, their number must be no less than

30,000,000.216 The consequences of the famine were very serious, since it paralyzed the economy of the country. Moreover, the famine was a great and grave disaster,

210 "Soyuz Kommunizma i Islama protiv Anglii," Byulleten' N.K.I.D. (Moscow), 18 October 1920, N36, p. 38. 211 Doğan Avcıoğlu, Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi), 1985, p. 777. 212 V. I. Lenin, "O znachenii zolota teper' i posle polnoy pobedy sotcializma," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 82. 213 V. I. Lenin, "Politicheskiy Otchyot Tsentral'nogo Komiteta R.K.P. (b.) XI S"ezdu R.K.P. (b.), 27 marta 1921," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 83. 214 V. I. Lenin, "O znachenii zolota teper' i posle polnoy pobedy sotcializma," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 83. 215 H. Kırımlı, "Golod v Povolzh'e i Ural'skom Krae v 1921-1922 godakh i pomoshch' iz Turtsii," Voprosy Istorii (Moscow), 2002. 216 Ibid.

71 which threatened to nullify the results of all Soviet organizational and revolutionary efforts.217

In Lenin's view, all work in the field of economy could be fulfilled only if there were be no intervention.218 The Soviet government was doing all it could in the diplomatic field to avoid it. It held that intervention could occur any day.219 At the

Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which was held on December 23-28, 1921,

Lenin indicated that "…for our part, we must display the utmost caution. And the first precept of our policy, the first lesson that emerges from our governmental activities for the past year, the lesson, which must be learned by all workers and peasants, is to be on the alert, to remember that we are surrondered by people, classes, governments, who openly express the utmost hatred for us," and that "we must remember that we are always a hair's breath away from invasion, and we shall do all in our power to prevent this misfortune."220

The Ankara government was continuing the struggle against the occupiers. In this respect it was the "Red Army" for the Soviet government. The existence of the

Ankara government, struggling against "imperialists" meant the existence of the

Soviet government. The Soviet statesmen held that they were the parts of the one chain. The defeat on the Turkish front would mean for the Soviet government the defeat on the Soviet front. All these made the Soviet government support the Ankara government and keep friendship with it.

As far as back at the very beginning of the War of Independence in Anatolia, the future leaders of the War of Independence in Anatolia, taking into account of the

217 V. I. Lenin, ""Pyat' let Rossiyskoy revolyutsii i perspektivy mirovoy revolyutsii. Doklad na IV Kongresse Kominterna 13 noyabrya 1921 g.," in V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 347. 218 V. I. Lenin, "Politicheskiy Otchyot Tsentral'nogo Komiteta R.K.P. (b.) XI S"ezdu R.K.P. (b.) Partii, 27 marta 1921 g.," in V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 256 219 Ibid.

72 scarcity of means for the war against foreign invaders, had the intention of getting a material support from Soviet Russia. Knowing about the fear of the Allied Powers of possible Turko-Bolshevik alliance, the leaders of the War of Independence in

Anatolia knew that their intention to contact with Soviet Russia would also frighten the Allied Powers and would made them leave Anatolia. Thus, the contact with Soviet

Russia was considered by them something as the instrument of intimidation, which could be utilized against enemies.

After the dispersal of the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul by the Allied Powers, the leaders of the War of Independence were forced to establish the Ankara government, and, due to the extraordinary difficulties, even appealed to the Soviet government and invited it to join forces and operations against imperialists. The

Soviet government was against alliances, and, instead, it proposed to establish diplomatic relations. It wanted the Ankara government to be a government with benevolent attitude towards the Soviet government. The reason for that was that, by this time, the Soviet government defeated the armies of General Denikin and Admiral

Kolchak, and intended to engage in the rehabilitation of the ruined Soviet economy.

In this connection, the primary objective of the Soviet foreign policy was the prevention of any attack on the Soviet Republic, and, thus, to gain the time for the successful rehabilitation of its economy. In this respect, the Ankara government took on special significance for the Soviet government. It feared the strengthening of

Britain in the Middle East. The active fighting of the Ankara government against the

Allied Powers meant for the Soviet government the frustration of the Allied Powers' plans and the weakening of them.

220 V. I. Lenin, "O vnutrenney i vneshney politike respubliki. Otchyot V.Ts.I.K. i S.N.K .IX Vserossiyskomu S"ezdu Sovetov, 23 dekabrya 1921 g.," in V.I. Lenin, Sochineniya, v. XXVII, p. 117.

73 Thus, the need of each other appeared in their relations, and, this need, the critical necessity for the Soviet government to concentrate on economic reconstruction in order to safe the Soviet regime after the end of the Civil War, and, no less critical necessity for the Ankara government to secure its eastern frontiers in order to concentrate all its forces on the Western front, and an aggressive policy of the

Allied Powers towards the Ankara government, resulted in the Treaty of Moscow of

March 16, 1921 between Russia and Turkey. In this Treaty, they agreed to make mutual territorial compromise and establish a common frontier.

The establishment of common frontier on March 16, 1921, and their internal and external situation, became factors of great importance, which began to shape their foreign policy towards each other. Soviet Russia was exhausted by the Civil Was and the foreign intervention, and the Soviet government embarked on the economic recovery of the country. Otherwise, the situation could take a bad turn and result in political catastrophe of Bolsheviks. Therefore, it needed a time, or the so-called

"breathing space" for the critically important economic reforms. The Soviet leadership believed that these reforms could be successfully fulfilled only if there would be no aggression against Soviet Russia. Therefore, one of the Soviet foreign policy priorities was the prevention of aggressions against Soviet Russia. As Turkey was an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Republic, the Soviet government wanted

Turkey to show a friendly attitude towards Soviet Russia. The Soviet government supposed that the Ankara government with a friendly attitude towards Soviet Russia would be a factor of the security of the Turko-Soviet frontier in the Transcaucasia.

The Soviet government realized that in order to win the friendly attitude of the Ankara government, it would also have to show to it the same friendly attitude. Besides, the

Soviet government considered it necessary to give material and financial help to the

74 Ankara government, since its struggle against the foreign occupiers in Anatolia frustrated their plans in Anatolia, weakened them, and did not allow them to use

Anatolia as a springboard for the attack on the Soviet Republics.

Besides, the struggle of the Ankara government against foreign invaders, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, was a revolutionary precedent for other eastern countries, which were also along the Soviet frontiers. Their struggle against

"imperialists" was to contribute not only to the idea of the world revolution, but also to the security of Soviet Russia and the survival of the Soviet State.

The Ankara government also wanted Soviet Russia to show a friendly attitude towards itself. As a result of the Treaty of March 16, 1921, the Ankara government, which aimed at the establishment of the independent State for the Turks within certain national boundaries, fixing its north-eastern and eastern frontiers in Anatolia, implemented some of its National Oath. It was supposed that Soviet Russia, the friendly attitude towards the Ankara government would be not only a guarantee for the preservation of this achievement, but would also be a guarantee of the inviolability and security of the Turko-Soviet frontier. In order to win such an attitude, the Ankara government would have to show the Soviet government the same friendly attitude.

Besides, Soviet material and financial help was essential for the Ankara government to continue its struggle and survive. The Turkish leadership's idea of the

Turko-Soviet contacts as the instrument of intimidation of possible enemies also preserved its urgency.

The Ankara and Soviet governments knew that they were in need of the benevolent attitude of each other. The matter was that, while such a benevolent attitude towards each other served to meet their own interests, at the same time, it strengthened the position of their neighbour. Both the Ankara and Soviet governments

75 were interested in the strengthening of the position of each other. The Soviet statesmen held that Turkey and Soviet Russia were on the same boat. For the Soviet government, the demise of the Turkish front, would mean its own defeat. In that way, the mutual benevolent attitude towards each other was meeting their mutual interests and was making these relations mutually beneficial.

In 1921-1922, the Ankara and Soviet governments showed a benevolent attitude towards each other. As a result, the Soviet government secured the Transcaucasian frontiers and obtained the time for the economic reconstruction in the country. The

Ankara government untied its hands in north-eastern and eastern Anatolia, and concentrated all its power on the Western front. Moreover, the Ankara government acquired more bargaining power with the Entente Powers, who were greatly perturbed by the Turko-Soviet rapprochement. Although it considered it impossible that Soviet

Russia would attack Turkey, nevertheless, the maintenance of the benevolent relations with the Soviet government was an additional guarantee against such an attack.

76

CHAPTER TWO

TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1923

The Lausanne Conference and the question of the Straits

The Soviet government pinned its great hopes on the Lausanne Conference.

There, it intended to gain favourable decisions in issues as regards its defense, and, first of all, in the matter of the Straits. Undoubtedly, the whole question of the Straits was a matter of great concern to the Soviet Republic, since its southern frontiers and its important economic regions such as Donbass, Kuban, and the Transcaucasian

Republics were on the shores of the Black Sea or very close to it. The Soviet government feared that if the Black Sea would be an open, in case of absence of the defence in the Black Sea, a fleet from any country, which had no common frontiers with the RSFSR, could appear on the Soviet shores.

The Straits were also of paramount importance for the Soviet Republic from an economic point of view. It comprised a large landmass extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Pacific Ocean.221 In spite of the fact that it possessed a network of rivers and waterways, it basically remained a landlocked country, since all its rivers

221 The total area of the USSR in 1924, excusive of the considerable internal water area was 20,890,600 square kilometres. In regard to extent of territory, the USSR held the second place in the world, the British Empire, with all its colonies and dominions, being first. For this, see: Louis Segal - A. A. Santalov (eds.), Commercial Year-Book of the Soviet Union 1925 (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1925), p. 18.

77 flew in the directions that made the useless as a link to the outside world.222 Because of the ice, such ports as Petrograd and Murmansk remained open only a few months through the year. The main Soviet ports such as Batum, Poti, Odessa, Sevastopol,

Feodosiya, Taganrog, Kerch, Mariupol, Berdyansk, Novorossiysk were on the shores of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The port of Nikolaev was on the bank of the

Yuzhnyy Bug, the port of Rostov-on-Don was on the bank of the Don, and the port of

Kherson was on the bank of the Dnepr. However, all these rivers fell into the Black

Sea.

Before the First World War, the Russian export through the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Straits totalled almost 60 per cent of all sea-trade export and 46 per cent of all Russian export.223 According to the statistics of 1910, more than 70 per cent of the whole export of corn from Russia was shipped from the ports of the Black

Sea and the Sea of Azov.224 The World War, the Revolution and the Civil War made alterations in these figures. The destruction of transport (railway and sea), the damage of port structures, the extraordinary disorganisation of economy, the economic blockade, all these were among the most critical reasons of the hardest decline of the

Soviet foreign trade.

However, the Black Sea continued to maintain its significance in the aggregate export. For instance, in 1922, the export through the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov totalled 14,9 per cent of the all-Soviet export.225 The oil industry, which was one of the most valuable branches of industry in the Transcaucasia, could not produce the surplus for the export. It was necessary for the Soviet government to reconstruct and

222 Sunita Pathania, Soviet Policy Towards Turkey 1945-1965 (New Delhi: Khama Publishers), p. 10. 223 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy (Moskow: Nauchnaya Assotciatsiya Vostokovedeniya pri TsIK SSSR, 1925), p. 44. 224 "Zayavlenie Predsedatelya Sovetsloy Delegatsii G. V. Chicherina na Lozannskoy Konferentsii, 4 dekabrya 1922 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow; Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1961), v, V, p. 63.

78 re-equip them. It made the Soviet government import machines, metallurgical goods, and chemical materials. These categories of goods totalled 31,5 per cent of all the

Soviet import.226 Therefore, it was supposed that the importance of the Black Sea transport would increase with the rehabilitation of the economy of the Soviet

Republic. Moreover, territories attached to the Black Sea were producers of the main provisions (wheat in Kuban and the Ukraine, oil in Baku, and bituminous coal in

Donbass).

Indeed, in 1923, the Soviet government began exporting its cereals and oil. The

Soviet government also considered the export of cereals as a significant revolutionary factor.227 It held that "famine in the Soviet Republic intimidated the retrograde elements of the workers movement in the West and served the opportunists' purpose" and that "the export of the Soviet cereals would allay their apprehensions and hearten them."228

In 1923, the Soviet government broke through the oil blockade. The oil output, which in 1921-1922 was 275,000,000 poods, increased to 322,000,000 in 1923.229

The considerable work was also carried out for the improvement of the oil industry in the Baku area. At the same time, the oil output in Groznyy was also assuming growing importance. While in 1913, Groznyy's share was only 13,9 per cent, as compared with 83,9 per cent from Baku, 0,85 per cent from Maykop, 1 per cent from

Emba, and 0,35 per cent from Fergana, in 1922 the output from Groznyy constituted

225 Ibid., p. 64. 226 Ibid., p. 65. 227 M. Tanin, Mezhdunarodnaya politika SSSR 1927-1924 (Moscow: Rabotnik Prosveshcheniya, 1925), p. 10. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid.

79 31,4 per cent of the total, as compared with 64,3 per cent from Baku, 1,2 per cent from Maykop, 2,8 per cent from Emba, and 0,3 per cent from Fergana.230

Since 1920 considerable repairs had also been executed in the refineries, and new machinery was installed. One of the principal constructions destined to improve and cheapen the transport of Soviet oil was being investigated, and it was supposed that pipe-lines Groznyy-Novorossiysk, Groznyy-Poti, and Baku-Poti would facilitate exports abroad.231

The Soviet government could not consent to the opening of the Straits to the battleships of any country, and, in particular, that of Britain.232 The Soviet government supported the idea that only the mercantile ships were to have the right of the free passage through the Straits. This clause was determined in the Turko-Soviet

Treaty of March 16. 1921.233 For the Soviet government, the formula of the open

Straits were supported by Britain, signified control by Britain, the biggest naval power, of vitally important the sea routes for the Soviet Republic, and permanent military threat to its southern outlying districts.

The Soviet Republic had already experienced the consequences of an unimpeded passage of foreign warships through the Straits into the Black Sea during the Civil War and foreign intervention. The British and French occupation of Istanbul had meant for the Soviet Russia a persistent Allied threat to its southern districts and the Transcaucasia. Even when the intervention was over, the Soviet Republic

230 Louis Segal - A. A. Santalov (eds.), p. 107. 231 Ibid. 232 "Nota Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Ministru Inostrannykh Del Velikobritanii Kerzonu, 12 sentyabrya 1922, N1082" Dokumenty Vneshney Pilitiki SSSR, v. V, p. 575 233 Ibid, p. 575; Article V of the Turko-Soviet Treaty of March 16, 1921 ordered that "in order to secure the opening of the Straits and freedom of passage through the Straits for the commerce of all nations, both contracting parties agree to entrust the final elaboration of an international statute for the Black Sea and and the Straits to a special conference of delegates of the littoral countries on condition that any decisions they arrive at shall not involve any derogation of Turkey's complete sovereignty or of the security of Turkey, and its capital, Constantinople." "Dogovor mezhdu RSFSR i Turtsiey, 16 Marta

80 continued to suffer from the open Straits. When Mustafa Kemal's Army was on the offensive in western Anatolia in August and September 1922, Britain had declared the blockade of the Straits and had prohibited passage to all mercantile ships, stemming to the Black Sea as well coming from there. The British government had ordered to open fire at all ships violating this claim.234 The Soviet government had found itself under trying conditions as it had just begun receiving ordered goods and provisions from other countries. In this connection, the Soviet government made a severe protest against Britain.235 In so doing, the Soviet government intended to prevent Britain from breaking through the Straits and, thus, to avoid inevitable clashes in the Black Sea.236

The policy of the Soviet government on the Straits question was basically designed to safeguard its own security against encroachment in the Black Sea.237 The best formula on the Straits for the Soviet government would be, if: 1) The open Straits without the coastal fortifications and the right to erect them were unacceptable; 2) In this time of capitalism and imperialism, the closing of the Straits for all warships of all nations in time of peace was the least evil; 3) The sovereignty of Turkey over the

Straits was recognised, and in order that Turkey should preserve its sovereignty, it must fortify the shores of the Straits and close the Straits; 4) Turkey should remain the guard of the Straits: 5) Turkey would have the right to let some battleships, which has no military aim, pass; 6) The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles must be open to all mercantile ships and non-military aircrafts.238 These clauses were entered into the

1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1958), v. III, p. 598. 234 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p, 760. 235 "Nota Pravitel'stva RSFSR Pravitel'stvam Velikobritanii, Frantsii, Italii, 30 sentyabrya 1922," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 605. 236 "Extract From An Interview By Trotskiy On The Lausanne Conference, 5 November 1922," in Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Dokuments On Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p.345 237 Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927, p. 124. 238 L. N. Nezhinskiy, "Sovetskaya Diplomatiya i Lozannskaya Konferentsiya 1922-1923 g.g.," in L. N. Nezhinskiy - A. V. Ignat'ev (eds.), Rossiya i Chernomorskie Prolivy (XVIII-XX Stoletiya) (Moskow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1999), pp. 365-366.

81 Resolution on the matter of the Straits, which was passed by Politburo on October 18,

1922.

As it is seen from the resolution, Turkey of the Grand National Assembly was expected to become the key element of a mechanism that would provide the Soviet

Republic with security in the Black Sea and in the Straits. Therefore, the Soviet government intended to re-establish and maintain the right of the Turkish people over the Turkish territory, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles. From the point of view of security, the sovereignty of the Turks over Istanbul and the Straits was indispensable for the Soviet government.239 The Soviet government supposed that if both Istanbul and the Straits were in the possession of the Turks, which had a friendly attitude to the

Soviet government, it would deprive the Entente of having Istanbul as its operational base.

As a result of military operations of the Army of the GNA in western Anatolia, the British agreed to the immediate evacuation of the Greeks from Eastern Thrace and the restoration to Turkey of all Thrace as far as the Meriç River. On October 11, 1922 an armistice was concluded at Mudanya, a small Marmara port. After the Mudanya armistice, the Ankara government agreed to go to Lausanne to negotiate a peace treaty with the Western powers.

The Western powers were manoeuvring to exclude the Soviet Republic completely from any international conference which would decide the future of the

Straits.240 Realizing that the presence of the Soviet government was unavoidable,

Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, finally gave in and invited it to the conference, but insisted that it could participate only in that part of the conference

239 "Vystuplenie Predsedatelya Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy delegatsii G. V. Chicherina na zasedanii Komissii po prolivam Lozannskoy konferentsii, 19 dekabrya 1922g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1962), v. VI, p. 101.

82 which would discuss the Straits question. On October 27, 1922, a formal invitation on these lines was handed to the Soviet government. In this connection, Chicherin stated that it was totally inadmissible and completely unjustifiable to exclude the Soviet

Republic from the conference when all other questions were to be decided.241 The invitation of the Allied Powers to the discussion of only the question of the Straits was considered in Moscow as an attempt to violate the right and interests of the

Soviet Republic in the field of foreign affairs and to damage its international position.242 The Soviet government held that the attempt to settle the question of the

Straits apart from all other unsettled Near Eastern question could not yield the expected results and would not settle the question of the Straits.243 However, the persistence of the Soviet government in the participation of the Soviet delegation in all sessions of the Conference did not yield results. There was nothing to be done, but take part in the sessions on the matter of the Straits.

The Lausanne Conference opened on November 20, 1922 and the discussions on the Straits, to which the Soviet delegation was invited, began on December 4. At the Conference, the Soviet delegation could not champion its interests and prevent the delegates from signing the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits, which gave to the warships of the West a free access to the Soviet shores. In particular, the

Convention, which was signed on July 24, 1923, established complete freedom of passage for warships by day and night under any flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever.244 The warships were subject to the restriction that "the maximum

240 Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927. A study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, and Afghanistan (Geneva: Impemerie Genevoise, 1966), p. 117. 241 "Nota Pravitel'stva RSFSR Pravitel'stvam Anglii, Frantsii i Italii, 2 noyabrya 1922 g., N 1273," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 651. 242 Ibid. 243 "Nota Pravitel'stva RSFSR Pravitel'stvam Anglii, Frantsii i Italii, 2 noyabrya 1922 g., N 1273," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 651. 244 "The Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits and Turkey, July 24, 1923," in The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924).

83 force which any one Power may send through the Straits into the Black Sea was not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea existing in the sea at the time of passage."245 In conformity with the Convention, the

Powers reserved to themselves the right to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all circumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship would exceed 10,000 tons.246

The clauses of the Convention in no way met the Soviet security interests in the

Black Sea. It is not difficult to assume that the Soviet government was disappointed with the stand of the Turkish delegation at the sessions on the question of the Straits.

As a whole, the Soviet government, analysing the tactics of the Turkish delegation at the Conference, came to the conclusion that a shift came about in the Turkish policy as regards the Soviet Republic.247

The Difference of Views of the Turkish and Soviet Delegations

at the Lausanne Conference

The joint Russian-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation went to Lausanne to demand the closure of the Straits for the warships of all nations with the exception of

Turkey.248 Such a decision would suit completely the Soviet interests. However, the delegation of the Soviet government could not realize its plans in Lausanne. At the first session of the Conference on the Straits, Lord Curzon, on behalf of the Allies, asked Ismet Pasha to set forth the Turkish programme as regards the matter of the

245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 M. Tanin, p. 9. 248 Godovoy Otchyot NKID za 1923 god k XI Syezdu Sovetov (Moskow: NKID, 1924), p. 10.

84 Straits. In reply, Ismet Pasha proposed the principles which had been proclaimed in the National Oath of January 20, 1920. The Fourth Article was the following:

The security of the city of Istanbul … and the Sea of Marmara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid.249

Ismet Pasha also stood firm on this position during next session as well. From the very first session of the Straits, Chicherin understood that the Soviet delegation remained alone at all, and that the Straits was the very question in which the Turks decided to yield if Allies would satisfy their interests in other matters.250

At the same time, Chicherin, at the earliest sessions of the conference, came to the conclusion, that although the Turkish delegation had no concerted action with

Allies, the Turks had come to understanding with them on certain points.251 Chicherin held that the Turks had committed themselves to Allies not to fortify the Straits and agreed on passage of the warships within some limits through the Straits.252 First and foremost, Ismet Pasha's tactics at the conference made him think so. On the face of it,

Ismet Pasha strove persistently against the Entente, but he gave in systematically in the matters of the Straits.253

On December 12, 1922, Chicherin sent a long letter to Moscow, where he wrote about the matters at the Lausanne Conference. In particular, he complained that the

Turks were not fulfilling their obligations in respect to the Soviet Republic.254

Chicherin wrote that, first of all, the Turks were taking up only security of their inner

249 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (New York: Haward Fertig 1970), p. 32 250 Godovoy Otchyot NKID za 1923 god k XI S"ezdu Sovetov, p. 9. 251 "Pis'mo Predsedatelya Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy delegatsii na Lozannskoy konferntsii Zamestitelyu Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR M. M. Litvinovu, 12 dekabrya 1922 g., N 9," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 72. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid.

85 territories, that they were not struggling in the question of passage of the warships through the Straits into the Black Sea, and that they were displaying willingness to sign a treaty without the Soviet Republic.255

At the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish delegation also negotiated with the

Allies at the meeting of experts. The Soviet delegation suspected that the Turkish delegation was not constantly and wholly keeping the Soviet delegation informed about the course of the negotiations in this meeting.256 Therefore, Chicherin was very much upset that the Soviet delegation could not carry out concerted actions with the

Turkish delegation at the meeting of experts. Besides, the Soviet delegation did not agree with the Turkish point of view that the Turkish delegation was to care about the situation only in the Straits, and that the Soviet delegation was to care about the situation only about the Black Sea.257

The Strained Relations

In April 1923, Semyon Aralov, the Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government at

Ankara, after one year and three months of diplomatic service, left Turkey.258 M.

Rosenberg remained the Acting Plenipotentiary until the arrival of a new charge d'affaires.259 In June 1923, Yakov Surits, the new Plenipotentiary, arrived in Ankara and immediately sent a report to Moscow. In particular, Surits described his feelings as follows:

254 Ibid., p. 74. 255 Ibid. 256 "Pis'mo Predsedatelya Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy delegatsii na Lozannskoy konferentsii Zamestitelyu Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR M. M. Litvinovu, 17 dekabrya 1922 g., N 19," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 83. 257 "Pis'mo Predsedatelya Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy delegatsii na Lozannskoy Konferentsii Zamestitelyu Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR M. M. Litvinovu, 12 dekabrya 1922 g., N9," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 73. 258 S. I. Aralov, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Diplomata, p. 201.

86

"The state of affairs which I have found in Angora is the most depressing. The Representation is almost ignored. The notes remain without reply. The Turks avoided personal meetings under different pretexts … The Representation is subject to severe isolation: [we] are enclosed from all man and beast with the Great Wall of China. [They] inspired such a terror that no soul dares to take the risk of dropping in at the Russian sefaret [Embassy]".260

First and foremost, the Ankara government became angry at the close links which were established between the Soviet diplomats in Ankara and the leadership of the Peoples Communist Party of Turkey. The fact was that in mid-July of 1922, with the approval of the Ankara government, the Central Committee of the Turkish

Peoples Communist Party [Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası] announced its plans to convene its first Congress in Ankara on August 15, 1922.261 The pending Congress was also of enormous importance for the Soviet Representation in Ankara. The Soviet government intended to learn more about the situation in Anatolia, to establish contacts with communists and workers, and to set up and elect the Central Committee of the Party.262 Moreover, the Soviet diplomats aimed at setting up an influential party, which would be able to start a potent propaganda against other political forces, in time of the retrogression of the Turkish government and if the Ankara government began its anti-Soviet policy.263 Therefore, the Soviet Representation in Ankara took the lead in the organization of that Congress.264

On August 12, 1922, having been acquainted with the agenda of the pending

Congress, which intended to consider tactics of the Peoples Communist Party of

Turkey, the workers movement, and forms of the struggle against imperialism, Rauf

259 Ibid. 260 A. N. Kheyfets, Sovetskaya Diplomatiya i Narody Vostoka, (Moskow: Nauka, 1968), p. 211. 261 George S. Harris, The Origin of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), p. 112. 262 Bilal Şen, ''TKP'ye İlişkin Tarihsel Tartışma,'' Toplumsal Tarih (Istanbul), 2000, November, p. 45. 263 Ibid. 264 Ibid.

87 Bey, the Prime Minister, banned the Congress.265 The invitation of communists from

Germany, France and the Soviet Republic was also among other reasons for the banning of the Congress.266 Although Ankara authorities refused to rescind their ban, the party leadership convened the Congress on schedule, but on the premises of the

Soviet Consulate267 Semyon Aralov, the Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Ankara, represented the Soviet Republic at the Congress.268

The Congress was mostly devoted to the analysis of the inner state of affairs in

Turkey, agrarian issues, and the trade-union movement. The delegation of Comintern,

28 delegates and 11 candidates, which represented 303 members of the Peoples

Communist Party of Turkey, arrived at the Congress.269 The Congress worked out a common plan of work of the Party, laid down its tactics and promised supporting the

Ankara government, in case, it continued struggling against "reformists- reactionaries."270

An unpleasant incident happened during the Congress. Some members of

Comintern ran into unpleasant relations with the Turkish officials. For instance,

Sergey Zorin, a 32-year-old Russian propagandist and the head of the delegation of

Comintern at the Congress, in connection with the ban of the Congress of the

Communist Party of Turkey, entered into a squabble with Rauf Bey.271 Following the squabble, they even threatened each other. In all probablity, Sergey Zorin was acquainted neither with the state of affairs in Anatolia, nor with the Turkish traditions and with the principles of behaviour which took shape in Turkey in the course of centuries. Hüseyin Rauf had been the Minister of Navy in the Ottoman Government.

265 Arslan, Sovremennaya Turtsiya (Moscow: Krasnaya Nov', 1923), p. 42. 266 Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler , p. 198. 267 George S. Harris, pp. 112-113. 268 Ibid. 269 Arslan, p. 43. 270 Arslan, p. 43.

88 He was born in a family which was held in respect and had prestige with the Ottoman community. Thus, Sergey Zorin's squabble not only oversteped all limits of diplomatic politeness, but was also obvious intervention into home affairs of Turkey.

After two weeks, the Turkish government arrested two communists, who were workers of a post office and all teachers, who had taken a part at the Party

Congress.272 When the delegation of Comintern left Ankara, the Turkish government handed an ultimatum to the Central Committee of the Peoples Communist Party of

Turkey and demanded dissolution from the Party during 24 hours, otherwise, the government would do it itself.273 In the course of October and November 1922, the

Ankara government carried out an extensive round up of communists in Anatolia on the grounds that they were "plotting to overthrow the existing order".274

There can be no doubt that the Ankara government was aware of the fact that the Soviet diplomats took a hand in the organization of the Congress of the

Communist Party of Turkey. The Turks came to the conclusion that the Soviet government was doing business behind the Ankara Government's back. On November

9, 1922, Yunus Nadi [Abalıoğlu], the editor-in-chief of Anadolu'da Yeni Gün had a talk with Aralov in the editorial office and made it clear to the Soviet diplomat that he knew that the members of the Communist Party of Turkey (THIF) got money from the Soviet Representation in Ankara. Yunus Nadi forwarned Aralov that when the question was the financing of the Communist Party, the Ankara government did not make distinctions between the Representation of the RSFSR and the representatives of Comintern, and between the Soviet government and Comintern.275 In spite of all these points, Aralov began giving assistance to the families of the Turkish

271 George S. Harris, p. 112. 272 Arslan, p. 45. 273 Ibid. 274 George S. Harris, p. 114.

89 communists who were arrested.276 After a while, some of the communists in prison were released. For eight communists, who were still in prison, Aralov even engaged two lawyers for their defence in the court.277

Besides, the hostile policy of the Comintern towards the Ankara government also strained relations between Moscow and Ankara. The delegates of the Fourth

Congress of Comintern, which was held in Moscow from November 5, 1922 to

December 5, criticised frankly the Ankara government. Their blunt diatribes could not but displease the Ankara government. On November 14, 1922, Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, sent a letter to Lenin, Trotskiy, Radek, and Bukharin and asked them to take measures in order to stop the ongoing persecution of the Turkish communists.278 Karl Radek made it clear that in the future, the Communist

International would advise the Turkish communists to back Mustafa Kemal Pasha

"only on condition that the Turkish government would understand that in the struggle against world capitalism, it must be supported by the broad masses."279

In early 1923, Aralov understood that a policy of supporting local communists was erroneous. On January 18, 1923, he sent a letter to Safarov, the Secretary of the

Eastern Department of Comintern, in which he expounded his views in connection with the attempts to set up the Communist Party in Turkey. In his mind, there were no experienced people and true Marxists in Turkey, who would be able to set up a strong and clandestine organization.280 Aralov wrote to Safarof that in Turkey it was impossible to establish even a simple cell of the Party without support of the Soviet

Representation and that those people, whom they tried to organize, regarded

275 Bilal Şen, ''TKP'ye İlişkin Tarihsel Tartışma,'' Toplumsal Tarih (Istanbul), 2000, November, p. 45. 276 Ibid., p. 46. 277 Ibid. 278 Bülent Gökay, The Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism 1918-1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), p. 149. 279 Harish Kapur, p. 122.

90 themselves as employees in the Soviet Consulate and were unhappy when they were not paid their salaries.281 The absence of the working class in Turkey, according to

Aralov, was also at the bottom of impossibility to establish a strong organization.282

In the letter, Aralov also touched upon the land question and indicated that this question did not play such a role in Turkey as it had played in Russia.283 As a result of the long war, the Anatolian peasants were weakened, lived in poverty, were illiterate and were in the grips of money-lenders and clergy. Besides, the question of the land was not studied in Turkey and statistical data was also absent. Aralov said that the bourgeoisie and the clerical-feudal opposition struggled with each other and propagandized in order to win over population to their side.284 In his view, the Party would not be able to win political influence.285 Aralov acknowledged that the existing part of communists was artificial. He confessed that the party, which had been set up by them, was the mistake of the Soviet Representation in Ankara, and that this mistake had been done more than once.286

Serious tension arose between the two governments over the brusque manner in which the local Soviet authorities in Armenia had forced the Turkish Consular to close his mission in Erivan and leave for Ankara.287 The fact was that after the incorporation of Armenia into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (the USSR) in

December 1922, Moscow wished to obtain the withdrawal of the Turkish mission from Erivan. Ankara, however, was reluctant to comply with this wish.288

280 Bilal Şen, ''TKP'ye İlişkin Tarihsel Bir Tartışma'', Toplumsal Tarıh, 2000, November, p. 46. 281 Ibid. 282 Ibid. 283 Ibid. p. 47. 284 Ibid., p. 46. 285 Bilal Şen, ''TKP'ye İlişkin Tarihsel Bir Tartışma'', Toplumsal Tarıh, 2000, November, p. 47 286 Ibid., p. 46. 287 Harish Kapur, p. 132. 288 Ibid.

91 On January 15 1923, the Ankara government decided to restrict the area of the activity of the Soviet Consuls in Kars and Erzurum.289 In conformity with it, from now on, the Soviet Consuls could fulfil their duties only within the cities of Kars and

Erzurum, and they were prohibited to run any activities outside of those cities. In response to the Turkish decision, the Soviet government undertook counter measures.

The Georgian government, obviously upon the orders of Moscow, restricted the area of activities of the Turkish Consulate in Batum. Now, the Turkish Consulate in Batum could act only within the city.290 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey received a cipher telegram from its Consulate in Moscow that the Soviet authorities were intending to restrict the area of activity of the Turkish Consulate General in

Moscow.291

The Turks had six Consulates in Soviet Russia, five of which were in the

Caucasus.292 Ankara considered the number of their Consulates in the Soviet

Republics as insufficient and was anxious for restricting of the area of activities, as it would create difficulties for the Turkish diplomats in fulfilling their duties.293

On May 6, 1923, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and the Directorate of Political Affairs [Umur-i Siyasiyye Müdüriyyeti] passed a resolution, in accordance of which, the Soviet Consulates in Turkey could fulfil their duties only in cities where they were located. The Cabinet of Ministers of GNA also approved this resolution at its sitting on May 6, 1923.294

289 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, May 6, 1923," T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Ankara) [The Archives of the Prime Ministry], hearafter cited as, BCA (Ankara), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararlari [The Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fund, no: 030. 18. 01/ 07. 18. 12. 290 Ibid. 291 Ibid. 292 "Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald, May 21, 1924," Public Record Office (London), P.O. 418/61. 293 "Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald, May 21, 1924," Public Record Office (London), P.O. 418/61. 294 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, May 6, 1923," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurumu Kararlari [The Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fund, no: 030. 18. 01/ 07. 18. 12

92 Another event occurred in May 1923. The fact was that Ravich, a new Soviet

Consular in Samsun, was accused of organizing agents for propaganda among officers and soldiers of the Turkish Army.295 On May 7, 1923, the Turkish Prime Ministry discussed this problem at its sitting and decided to evict Ravich from country.296

Finally, the Soviet pressure on the Turkish government and its delegation at the

Lausanne Conference were among the reasons that caused strained atmosphere in the relations. One can assume that the involvement of the Soviet Plenipotentiary

Representation in Ankara in the activity of the Peoples Communist Party of Turkey was one of the reasons for such measures.

It was under the circumstances, the Soviet government was striving to enlist the support of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference. On October 26, 1922,

Ismet Pasha [İnönü] assumed the post of the Foreign Affairs of the Ankara government.297 Until then, the Soviet government had had no clear idea about the

Ankara Government's point of view on the question of the Straits.298 At about the same time, Aralov, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Ankara, handed the Politburo's Resolution of October 19, 1922 on the Straits to the Ankara government.

The Soviet government was very much upset when it learned about the Ankara government's reply of October 4, 1922, to the proposal of the Entente to convene a peace conference. In the reply note, the Ankara government evaded the question of the participation of the Soviet delegation in all sessions of the conference, and only

295 Ibid. 296 Ibid. 297 İsmail Soysal, Türkiye İçin Kılavuz Dış Politikası İncemeleri (1919-1993) (İstanbul, Eren), 1993, p. 43. 298 "The Resume of the Conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the Government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, November 9, 1922," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, v. I, p. 461.

93 asked the Allied Powers to invite the Soviet delegation to participate in the discussion of the matter of the Straits.299

On October 30, 1922, the Soviet government also asked the Ankara government for help at the opening of the Conference. The Ankara government was to demand the participation of the Soviet delegation in all sessions of the conference.300 The Soviet

Government feared that if the Soviet delegation joined to the discussions of the question of the Straits only after the main questions were solved, the Soviet delegation would achieve only limited decisions on the question of the Straits.301

On October 31, 1922, Aralov met with Ismat Pasha and discussed all these matters with him. At the meeting, Ismet Pasha said that the delegation of the Ankara government would discuss at the conference those measures, which were necessary for the security of Istanbul and the Sea of Marmara. He also endeavoured to assure that, in this respect, it would work in touch with the Soviet delegation and that the

Ankara government had no commitments to anyone without the knowledge of the

Soviet Government.302 As to the Resolution of Politburo on the Straits, Ismet Pasha stated that the Soviet formula as regards the regime in the Straits was overstepping the limits of the National Pact and the Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921.303 The

Turkish Foreign Minister, saying that while the Ankara government shares the Soviet

Republic's views entirely, at the same time, it could not propose the Soviet formula to the Conference. Ismet Pasha argued that in such a case the Western states would

299 "Nota Komissariata Inostrannykh Del Turtsii ot 5 noyabrya 1922 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 647, p. 761. 300 "Nota Narodnogo Komissariata Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Komissariatu Inostrannykh Del Pravitel'stva Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii, 30 oktyabrya 1922 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 647. 301 "The Resume of the Conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the Government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, November 9, 1922," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, v. I, p. 460. 302 S. I. Aralov, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Diplomata (Moskow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy, 1960), p. 130. 303 Ibid.,

94 understand it as a desire of Ankara for closing the Straits. He feared that this would create a disadvantageous situation for the Ankara delegation.304 However, Ismet Pasha endeavoured to convince Aralov that in case of the possession of the both shores of the Straits and absence of fortifications there, it was also possible to prevent the warships from passing through the Straits.305 In reply to Aralov's question how the security could be provided without fortifications in the Straits, Ismet Pasha answered that ''we will always find such means''.306 Further, Ismet Pasha declared that Turkey would not make in question of the Straits any step without knowledge of Russia.307

The Ankara government held that the participation of the Soviet delegation in all works of the conference would be inappropriate.308 In Bursa, on November 2,

1922, Mustafa Kemal, on a question of the Petit Parisien's correspondent whether he accepted the offer about holding the conference in two parts, replied that " the issues regarding the establishment of peace between Turkey and Greece, and the Allies concern exclusively them." However, he said that "a special conference must be assembled to take a decision on the question of the Straits, ant it would be preferable if the Soviet Government participated in the Conference.309

The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also tried to convince Ankara that the participation of the Soviet delegation in all sessions of the conference would be favourable to Turkey's vital interests.310 However, the statements that Turkey

304 Ibid., p. 171. 305 Ibid. 306 S. I. Aralov, p. 172. 307 Ibid. 308 A. Suat Bilge, Güç Komşuluk Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964 (Ankara: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 1992, p. 85. 309 Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, v. III, p. 50. 310 "Nota Narodnogo Komissariata Inostrannykh Del Komissariatu Inostrannykh Del Pravitel'stva Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii, 30 noyabrya 1922 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. VI, p. 647.

95 would be unable to defend its rights without the Soviet assistance only offended the

Ankara government.311

Ismet Pasha, in his memoirs, relates about his conversations with Chicherin after the sessions. One day, Chicherin, criticizing Ismet Pasha's stand on the question of the Straits, overstepped the limits of diplomatic politeness to tell him that Ismet

Pasha's policy was exactly same of that of Damad Ferid. Moreover, when it became clear that the Turks were ready to accept the British proposal with some minor modifications, the Soviet delegation accused the Turks of a capitulation, which would put Turkey under the political yoke of the British imperialism.

On January 1, 1923, the Soviet Plenipotentiary in Ankara, Aralov, in a talk with

Rauf Bey, the Turkish Prime Minister, also stated that Turkey's stand at the conference was weak because of the differences of opinion between the Soviet

Republic and Turkey there.312 Such a behaviour of the Soviet representative could not but hurt the Turkish national pride. Besides, it also served as a factor that could push the Ankara government a way from the RSFSR. Indeed, the Soviet stand in the matter of the Straits at the Lausanne Conference was taken in Ankara as a policy, first of all, aimed at meeting the interests of the RSFSR.313

The Soviet government was also dissatisfied with some steps of the Ankara government. The Turkish authorities began to create difficulties for the

Representatives of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade [Vneshtorg] in

Turkey.314 On October 26, 1922, the Soviet authorities were ordered to close the office of the Soviet Trade Mission, as the Ankara government could not give its

311 "The Resume of the Conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the Government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, November 9, 1922," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, v. I, p. 461. 312 "The Resume of the Conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the Government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, January 1, 1923," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, v. I, p. 479.

96 representatives any diplomatic immunity so long as there was no commercial agreement between the two countries.315 On November 13, 1922, the Turkish gendarme appeared on the premises of the Soviet Trade Office for the second time, and insisted on the removal of the Soviet flag and emblem.316

Another incident happened at the Soviet Consulate in Ağrı (Doğu Beyazıt).

Soviet diplomatic courier carrying mail for the Soviet Consulate in Ağrı was arrested by the local police and had to undergo investigation and to surrender his diplomatic pouch.317 Only with the arrival of the Soviet Consul at the police station, was the

Soviet diplomatic courier released.318 As a result, the Plenipotentiary Representation of the Soviet government in Ankara consented to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that all these incidents were doing damage to the prestige of the Soviet Consulate.319

On November 9, 1922, Aralov, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the

RSFSR in Ankara, had a meeting with Hüseyin Rauf Bey. When the talk turned to the

Consulates, Rauf Bey complained of the behaviour of Maltsev, the Soviet Consul in

Bayazıt.320 Rauf Bey stated that Maltsev exceeded his authority and that there were evidences about his unceremonious activities among the . Rauf Bey added that

Maltsev, from the beginning of his appointment to Bayazıt, had an improper

313 A. N. Keyfets, pp. 210-211. 314 S. I. Aralov, "V Turtsii Atatyurka," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1960, N11, p. 139. 315 "Nota Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva RSFSR v Turtsii Komissariatu Inostrannykh Del Pravitel'stva Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii, 26 oktyabrya 1922 g., N 1864," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 634. 316 "Nota Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva RSFSR v Turtsii Komissariatu Inostrannykh Del Pravitel'stva Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii, 14 noyabrya 1922 g., N 2014," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 682. 317 "Nota Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva RSFSR v Turtsii Komissariatu Inostrannykh Del Pravitel'stva Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii, 1 noyabrya 1922 g., N 1903," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. V, p. 650. 318 Ibid. 319 Ibid. 320 "The Resume of the conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, November 9, 1922," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara), v. I, p. 463.

97 behaviour.321 He also stated that his further residence in Bayazıt would make the mutual reconciliation difficult.322 In his turn, Aralov also complained about a Turkish deputy who had slapped one of the Soviet employees in the face and that the Soviet

Consulate had not yet got any response from the Turkish Government.323

The Intention of both Governments to Maintain Friendly Relations

In spite of all these frictions, the two governments started the intensive expression of their friendship to one another. First and foremost, it was necessary for the Soviet diplomacy to overcome the existing impediments, which were hampering the development of the Turko-Soviet relations. On June 23, 1923, the new

Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Ankara, Yakov Surits, presented his credentials to

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Chair of the GNA of Turkey. In his speech, Surits defined relations between the Turkish and Russian peoples as brotherly, and said that these relations were based on the shared destiny of both peoples.324 He also said "the

Western imperialism endeavours to deliver a blow on us on the economic front. I am confident that we will be able to stop these attempts of encroachments into the economy by concerted efforts and by start of the new era of the Turko-Russian

321 Ibid. 322 Ibid,; S. Aralov writes in his memoirs that Bayazıt was one of the Kurdish centres, and that the Kurds often rose. Therefore, in his view, the Turkish government did not want the Soviet government to open its Consulate there. He also writes that neither Ismet Pasha nor Rauf Bey said directly about that, but mainly, complained of Maltsev. For this, see: S. I. Aralov, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Diplomata, p. 162 323 "The Resume of the Conversation between Hüseyin Rauf [Orbay], the Prime Minister of the Government of the GNA and Aralov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative, November 9, 1922," in Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara), v. I, p. 463 324 "Iz Rechi Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya RSFSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa pri vruchenii Veritel'nykh Gramot Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe kemalyu, 23 Iyunya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 360.

98 friendship. In the first place, it is necessary to adjust our mutual economic relations."325

In reply, Mustafa Kemal Pasha accentuated that "it was unnecessary to say how the GNA and its government strive for the development of mutual relations."326 He continued that "the Turkish people were inspired with the feelings of friendship in regard to the Russian people."327

On July 28, 1923, Ahmet Muhtar [Mollaoğlu], the Ambassador of Turkey in the

USSR, sent a letter to Chicherin, in which he informed him that the peace had been signed between Turkey and the Entente on July 24, 1923.328 Further, he wrote:

In the course of our happy and fruitful political collaboration, which was aimed at liquidating of the external attempts on our political and economic independence and rendering the oppressed East assistance for its prosperity, our countries, perhaps with difficulty, have gained numerous victories, which are of global importance. …I want to hope for that this collaboration, which has yielded so happy results to both countries, will be continued in the future for the welfare of the peace in the Middle East and the Eastern Europe.329

In his letter, the Turkish diplomat gave high praise to the Soviet statesmen, the

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Commissar, Chicherin. In particular, he wrote, "I consider it my duty to congratulate and thank the Soviet statesmen, who carry out this collaboration tirelessly and systematically, and, especially, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which is led by You, Monsieur

Commissar, who is the fieriest advocate of the Turko-Soviet friendship."330 As at follows, the Ankara government, apparently, strove for maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Republic.

325 Ibid. 326 "Otvetnaya rech' Mustafy Kemalya," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 361. 327 Ibid. 328 "Pis'mo Ahmeda Mukhtara G. V. Chicherinu ot 28 iyulya 1923 goda, N 782", Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 407. 329 Ibid. (Translation mine). 330 Ibid

99 On August 4, 1923, Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, sent a reply to Ahmet Muhtar. In particular, he wrote, "I subscribe to the considerations in your letter that our peoples have gained happy results during their fruitful collaboration and the struggle against the same threats. I also share completely

Your conviction of the necessity to continue this collaboration for the sake of our interests. … It is still necessary to struggle against the encroachments of the World capital on economic independence of peoples; they are to be on the alert in order to secure their political independence."331 Further, Chicherin also congratulated Ahmet

Muhtar for his contribution to these results, and asked him to convey his congratulations to "the great creator of the present peace, Ismet Pasha, and to the participants of the historic negotiations in Moscow, Yusuf Kemâl Bey, Rıza Nur Bey, and Ali Fuad Pasha."332 He also congratulated all the Turkish statesmen and called

Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha the "outstanding and eminent political and military leader."333 Yakov Surits handed this telegram to Mustafa Kemal.

On August 14, 1923, in connection with the opening of a new session of the

GNA, Surits, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Turkey, sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Chair of the GNA of Turkey. He wrote, "People of

Russia and the Union Republics share the triumph of the friendly Turkish people. The happy collaboration between our countries will continue, bring its fruits and make our friendship more intimate."334

On the same day, Ismet Pasha, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent a reply letter to Chicherin. He said, "Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Turkish government

331 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Poslu Turtsii v SSSR Akhmedu Mukhtaru, 4 avgusta 1923 g., N 836/p.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 406. 332 Ibid. 333 Ibid.

100 have been very much moved by the congratulations of the Soviet government."335

Ismet Pasha also made it clear that the Turkish government was concerned with the friendly relations with the Soviet Republic. He wrote, "the Turkish people will never forget the friendship between the Turkish people and the people of Russia and the

Soviet Republics, and I am convinced that a new era of peace will strengthen more the friendly relations between the two countries."336

Many factors were making the two governments demonstrate their friendship to one another. The Soviet government was engaged in the economic recovery of the country. The event of greatest importance, which took place in 1923, was the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR). On December 30,

1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in

Moscow, a treaty was concluded between the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet

Republic (the RSFSR), the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the Belorussian

Socialist Soviet Republic, and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet

Republic (the TSFSR), which comprised the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijanian

Socialist Soviet Republics, for formation of a Union. Practically, the treaty came into existence in 1923, with the coming into operation of the Union Constitution at the meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 6, 1923.337

Economically it appeared that the New Economic Policy (the NEP) was developing with success. Agricultural output in 1922 had raised enough to resume the export of grain.338 By 1923, cereal production had increased by 23 per cent over the

334 "Pis'mo Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 14 avgusta 1923 g., N 4548/104," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 411. 335 "Otvetnoe pis'mo komissara inostrannykg del Turtsii Ismet-pashi ot 14 avgusta 1923 g. na imya G. V. Chicherina," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 412. 336 Ibid. 337 Robert M. Slusser-Jan F. Triska (eds.), p. 37. 338 Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 155.

101 total recorded for 1920.339 Domestic industrial recovery also gathered pace. In the same three years output from factories rose by 18,4 per cent.340 However, as the retail prices of industrial goods were three times greater than they had been in relation to agricultural goods back in 1923, the State's policy had turned the terms of trade against the peasantry, which responded by refraining from bringing its wheat, potatoes and milk to the towns.341 Consequently, the NEP was put at risk.

Since Lev Trotsky's speech at the Twelfth Party Congress, the efforts of the

Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government were directed towards "closing the blades of the scissors," i.e., towards bringing agriculture and industrial prices into their pre-war relation. The campaign waged for this purpose was intensified in autumn of 1923, when the sales crisis of the Soviet industry showed how low the purchasing power of the peasants actually was.342

The chief method advocated for raising agricultural prices was the export of cereals. At the same time, the demand for currency to finance the purchase of grain from the peasants led to vast over issue of paper money. The chervonets, the Bank notes issued by the State Bank, had to be saved at any cost, and the Soviet government therefore met the currency demand by exceeding the quota of roubles issue, which had been fixed in July 1923 at a maximum of 15,000,000 gold roubles per month.343 Over 50,000,000 roubles worth of paper were issued over and beyond the legal quota, and this flood soon made itself felt. The rouble began to depreciate at the rate of five or more per cent per day. This meant that the peasants selling their

339 Ibid. 340 A. Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London, 1962), p. 194. 341 Robert Service, p. 155. 342 "Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald, March 10, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F.O. 418/61. 343 Ibid.; A decree was issued on October 11, 1922, conferring upon the State Bank of the Soviet Republic the right to issue bank notes expressed in the new monetary unit, the chervonets, containing 1 zolotnik 78,24 dolyas pure gold, and equal in its gold content to the pre-war Russian 10 rubl' coin. The chervonetss bank notes were issued in denomination of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25, and 50 chervonetss. For this, see: Louis Segal - A. A. Santalov (eds.), p. 342.

102 grain for this depreciating paper lost heavily. As a whole, from the economic point of view, the country was still weak. Many of its factories and plants were at standstill.

As it could not produce the means of production, it needed foreign machinery and equipment. Most of all, it needed the extension as much as possible of the "breathing space" (peredyshka) for the recovery of its economy.

The Soviet vision of the international politics was based on the idea that the bourgeois world would never reconcile itself to the existence of the Soviet Union and that contradictions between them would not run low.344 The leaders of the Russian

Communist Party (Bolsheviks) also held that the animosity to the USSR on the part of the bourgeois world would be intensified with the growth of the former and that the bourgeois world, with its recovery, would start to think of making it smart.345 The

Soviet statesmen called this period "the breathing space". With this word, they were pointing at the temporary nature of the peaceful existence with the bourgeois world and that such an existence could break at any moment. On May 12, 1923, Chicherin, in his speech at the plenary session of the Moscow Soviets, said that "the extreme reactionaries, who are in power in Britain, which is the leading Power of the Entente, are striving to take advantage of this favourable moment in order to shake the workers' and peasants' power in the Soviet Republics."346 Therefore, the main task of the Soviet foreign policy was to prevent any aggression against the USSR.

344 F. Rothstein, "Nasha politika mira za decyat' let," Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow), 1927, N 10-11, p. 8. 345 Ibid.

103

The Military and Strategic Situation in the Black Sea Basin after

The Lausanne Conference. The Soviet Point of View.

The Soviet government was very anxious about the military and strategic situation in the Black Sea basin that arose as a result of the Lausanne Conference and the Convention Relating to the Regime in the Straits. In accordance with the

Convention on the Straits, the Black Sea and the Straits were to be opened for the warships of all Powers. The Soviet government held that, inspite of the limitations in the number of warships, the new order represented a constant military threat to the

Soviet coast from the fleets of the more powerful naval Powers and would necessarily compel the Soviet Republic to spend on armament in the Black Sea and on its coast large sums which might otherwise be used for economic reconstruction.347 The Soviet government feared that the opening of the Straits and the Black Sea, in case of need, would give the naval Powers the possibility of capturing Istanbul and the Straits, and using them against the Soviet Republic.348

Paragraph A of Part I of Article 2 of the Convention on the Straits determined that "the maximum force, which any one Power might send through the Straits into the Black Sea was not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral

Powers of the Black Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage."349 Besides the

Soviet Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were also the littoral Powers of the

Black Sea. As a result of the incurred losses during the Civil War and because of a sizeable part of warships that had been carried off by General Wrangel to Bizerta in

346 "Rech' Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR G. V. Chicherina na plenume Moskovskogo Soveta, 12 maya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 305. 347 Ibid., p. 361. 348 Ibid., p. 391.

104 1920, the Soviet Black Sea fleet proved to be extremely weak.350 Therefore, it was simply unable to defend the Soviet southern coasts.

Bulgaria, as the defeated State in the First World War, had no fleet at all. As to

Romanian fleet, it consisted of the gunboat Elizabet and four gunboats, which it received from France, two new destroyers, and nine destroyers, seven of which it received from Austria for police and custom services.351 Romania also had a river flotilla on the Danube, which was quite powerful and consisted of eight armoured river gunboats.352 Thus, Romania was the most powerful naval Power in the Black

Sea.

It is also interesting that the clause in the Convention on the Straits that "the maximum force, which any one Power might send through the Straits into the Black

Sea was not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea" had been proposed by France, a Romanian ally.353 Naturally, such a state of affairs was disadvantageous for the Soviet Republic, since it had a problem with Romania on the question of Bessarabia. Moscow regarded the province of

Bessarabia as illegally annexed by Romania. This issue determined the nature of the

Soviet Romanian relations.354 The Soviet government was anxious that in case of a conflict with Romania, and if Romania was supported by any Western Power, then, according to Article 2 of the Convention on the Straits, this Western Power could bring into the Black Sea a fleet equal to the most powerful naval Power in the Black

349 ''Konventsiya o Rezhime v Prolivakh'', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 1, p. 188. 350 I. A. Khormych, ''Ot Lozanny do Montryo (Sovetskiy Soyuz i problema Chernomorskikh Prolivov v 1924-1936 g.g." in L. N. Nezhinskiy - A. V. Ignat'ev (eds.), Rossiya i Chernomorskie Prolivy XVIII-XX stoletiya (Moskow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1939), p. 392. 351 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.,'' Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 26. 352 Ibid. 353 "Telegramma Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy delegatsii na Lozannskoy Konferentsii Zamestitelyu Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR M. M. Litvinovu, 4 dekabrya 1922." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 41. 354 Louis Fisher, The Soviets in World Affairs (London: Butler & Tanner, 1930), v. II, p. 510.

105 Sea. In this case, as it has been mentioned, Rumania was the most powerful Power in the Black Sea. Even if the Soviet Republic possessed the most powerful fleet, it would make no difference, as the adversary would possess the fleet equal to the most powerful fleet plus the Rumanian fleet. The Soviet government held that this Article of the Convention on the Straits would place the Black Sea and its coasts under control of the Entente, since Britain and France would keep that quantity of the vessels in the Black Sea, which were permitted by the Convention on the Straits.

The Soviet naval strategists subjected the Convention on the Straits to a sharp criticism. They held that the Convention on the Straits was prepared only for the

Western Powers. For instance, A. Sobolev wrote that "if the limit 'the maximum force, which any one Power may send through the Straits into the Black Sea is not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage' would have been invariable, in case of a successful battle, it could give a chance to the Black Sea countries."355 He considered that this case was also provided for in the Convention by the Western Powers, since, it was said in Paragraph B of Part 2 of Article 2 that "in time of war, Turkey being neutral, these limitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its rights in the Black Sea."356 As regards this, A. Sobolev wrote that "this paragraph makes Turkey, in case of war between Britain and any littoral Power of the

Black Sea, to allow the passage of all the British fleet through the Straits, in other words, 18 dreadnoughts, over 50 light cruisers, 150 destroyers.357 Britain could regard the prohibition of passage, as a violation of the right.

355 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 27. 356 ''Konventsiya o Rezhime v Prolivakh'', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 1, p. 189. 357 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 27.

106 The Soviet strategists apprehended that at first look, the above mentioned paragraph was losing its force in time of war and Turkey being belligerent. However, they feared the Paragraph C of Part 2 of Article 2, which stipulated that "the measures, which had been taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships and aircraft from using the Straits were not to be of such nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships and aircraft with either the necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose."358 They suspected that these neutral ships, which would not be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea, would be drawn in a war.359 Therefore, the Soviet government considered this paragraph as an outflanking movement.

In accordance with Article 4 of the Convention on the Straits, both shores of the

Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to be demilitarized.360 In the demilitarized zones,

Turkey was prohibited to station armed forces except the police and gendarmerie forces. The Soviet strategists held that under the existing conditions, whether Turkey was neutral or belligerent, the dreadnoughts could pass through the Straits without any obstacle. 361

Paragraph A of Part 2 of Article 2 determined that "in time of peace the Powers reserve to themselves the right to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all circumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship exceed 10,000 tons."362 The Soviet Government interpreted this paragraph as the attempt of the Great Powers to insure themselves against occasion if any of the Black

358 For the paragraph, see: "Konventsiya o Rezhime v Prolivakh," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 1, p. 189. 359 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 28. 360 "Konventsiya o Rezhime v Prolivakh," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 1, p. 191 361 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 28. 362 "Konventsiya o Rezhime v Prolivakh," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 1, p. 189

107 Sea country took a decision to go to the disarmament.363 Such an attempt had already been done by the Soviet Russia at the Moscow Conference on Disarmament in 1922.

According to the Article 10 of the Convention on the Straits there should be constituted in Istanbul an International Commission called the "Straits Commission", which shall be composed of a representative of Turkey, who should be the President, and the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece,

Romania, Russia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.364 The Straits Conmmission was to have an official link with the League of Nations. For the Soviet government, the reservation to the Council of the League of Nations of the right to take decision in the event of danger threatening Istanbul and the Straits, represented only the usurpation on the part of that coalition of a few Powers.365 Moreover, neither the League of

Nations nor these states recognized the Soviet government.

The Convention on the Straits was considered in Moscow as contrary to the

Soviet interests.366 In Chicherin's view ''the regime, which is to be established under the Convention on the Straits, was recognized by the Soviet delegation as wholly unsatisfactory, and as a further example of the aggressive intentions of the imperialist

Powers."367 According to the Soviet experts on the Near East, it established a predominate role of Britain in the Black Sea and in the Straits.368 It appeared in the

363 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 28. 364 A. Sobolev, ''Morskaya Politika Evropy i Krasnyy Flot na poroge 1923 g.'', Krasnyy Flot (Moscow), 1922, 9, p. 26. 365''Telegramma Chicherina k Massagli, Secretaruy Lozanskoy Konferentcii, 19 Iulay 1923g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 407. 366 M. Tanin, p. 14. 367 "Telegramma Predsedatelya Rossiysko-Ukrainsko-Gruzinskoy Delegatsii na Lozannskoy Konferentsii General'nomu Sekretaryu konferentsii Massigli, 19 iyulya 1923g., N 409," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 391. 368 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy (Moscow, 1925), p. 128.

108 French Le Temps that "with realization of this Convention, Istanbul could be quite defenceless, and it would be very easy to draw Turkey into a war."369

The Importance of Turkey for the Soviet Republic after Lausanne

Turkey shared with the USSR about 602 kilometres of land border in the north- eastern and eastern Anatolia.370 It began at a point south of the village of Sarp, ten mile from Batum on the Black Sea, went along the Çoruh River Valley, followed the drainage divides up to Kanlı Dağ, finally moving along a tributary of the Aras River to the Turko-Iranian border. In the East, it shared the border with the Georgian and

Armenian SSRs, which were the constituent parts of the USSR. In addition to the land frontier, Turkey faced the USSR on the Black Sea, on the nearly 966 miles (1554 kilometres) of its coastline.371 In other words, 33 per cent of the coastline of the Black

Sea belonged to Turkey.372

Turkey, by virtue of its geographical situation, on the one hand, adjoined such mandated territories as Syria and Iraq. On the other hand, as the south-eastern

Rumelia was in the possession of Turkey, it was contiguous to Bulgaria and Greece, and, thus, it entered into the complicated political life of the Balkan peninsula. Owing to its geographic situation, Turkey also reserved for itself a significant role in the political life in the eastern half of the Mediterranean.373

369 Ibid. 370 O. Gurskiy, "Turtsiya," Pogranichnik (Moscow), 1945, N 24, p. 67. 371 Sanita Pathania, p. 5. 372 O. Gurskiy, "Turtsiya," Pogranichnik (Moscow), 1945, 24, p. 67 373 B. Zherve - A. Petrov - E. Shvede, Sredizemnoe More (Moscow: Voennyy Vestnik, 1927), p. 52.

109 Soviet military experts held that the capitalist world was preparing a plan of operation against the USSR. In accordance with this alleged plan, all limitrophes

(Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania) would attack the USSR, and their attack would be bolstered up with the heavy flank strikes of the Entente from the

Baltic Sea, and, especially, from the Black Sea.374 They supposed that the fleet of the

Entente would advance from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea through the Straits, and further to Odessa, the Crimea, and the Caucasus.375 In order to be successful in such an operation, the Entente would have to use Istanbul and the zone of the Straits as its base.376 In this connection, Turkey was assuming great significance for the security of the USSR.

In this connection, from the strategic point of view, it was necessary for the

USSR that Turkey should not have allowed the Western Powers to use the Turkish territory as their base in case of war against the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet government did not want Turkey to participate in anti-Soviet political and economic alliances. One can assume that the Soviet strategists could not put aside the possibility of a joint action with Turkey in case of war between the Western Powers and the

USSR. A similar idea appeared in the article, which was written by Stürmer, the

German expert on Turkey, in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'. In his opinion, in spite of the demilitarization of the Straits and all conventions, Turkey could have closed the

Straits for the British warships.377 Turkey could bring a few batterys of heavy howitzers by field rail, which could be quickly constructed, and could apply up-to- date bombers.378

374 Ibid. 375 B. Zherve - A. Petrov - E. Shvede, p. 51. 376 Ibid. 377 H. Stürmer, "Turtsiya posle Lozanny," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, N 2-3, p. 60. 378 Ibid.

110 From the standpoint of view of the Turko-Soviet relations, the Soviet statesmen regarded the as the beginning of the epoch of "peaceful introduction" of the foreign capital into Turkey, the attempt of the West to tame the

Turkish nationalism, to drive a wedge between Ankara and Moscow, and to use

Turkey against the USSR.379 In the Soviet leaders' mind, the Treaty of Lausanne did not mean for Turkey the giving up the further struggle against the Western imperialiasm and the renunciation of its friendship with the USSR, which was the enemy of the Western imperialism.380 Turkey intended to get a breathing space and enlist the foreign capital for the recovery and strengthening of its economy and military power. The Soviet leaders were anxious that all these were complicating the

Turko-Soviet relations.381 They were conscious that, as Turkey was entering into the arena of the world politics and its network of diplomatic links would enlarge, it was quite possible that Turkey, from time to time, would walk away from the USSR.382

Therefore, if the Soviet government wished to have a friendly State on its southern flanks, it would have to be very prudent as regards its steps towards Turkey. In other words, the Soviet government would have to avoid everything that could give rise to the frictions, conflicts, and distrust.

At the Lausanne Conference, Ismet Pasha, in a private conversation with

Chicherin, said, "we [Turkey and the Soviet Russia] would remain friends as long as relations between us be friendly and trustful. Then, it would be impossible to begin the military operations against the Soviet Russia behind Turkey's back. All depends

379 M. Tanin, p. 82. 380 M. Tanin, p. 82. 381 Ibid. 382 I. Mayskiy, Vneshnyaya politika RSFSR 1927-1923 (Moscow: Krasnaya Nov', 1923), p. 167.

111 on the continuation of reliable and enduring relations between us. We would act in this direction."383

The Revolutionary Imporatnce of Turkey

The Soviet Government regarded Turkey as a revolutionary factor for other nations of the East. Notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish delegation had not supported the Soviet proposal on the Straits at the Lausanne Conference, the Soviet government realized that the Turks, who were exhausted by almost twelve-years of incessant war, though they emerged victorious, could not expect the realization of all their wishes.384 In the opinion of the Soviet statesmen, Turkey achieved a great success at the Lausanne Conference, as it broke there the pernicious principles, which were putting the peoples of the East in an unequal status compared to the imperialist

Powers.385 In this respect, "it was a triumph of policy, which the Soviet Republic always followed and intended to follow in the future." First and foremost, the Soviet government meant that the Treaty of Lausanne was an act, which fixed the release of

Turkey from the capitulations and the regime of political and economic predominance of the foreign capitalism.386 The Soviet government held that the Entente could not regard itself the victor, as the concessions, which were made by the Turks to them at the Conference, did not shift the essence of the matter.387 The important matter was that Turkey cleared a field for its economic and political development.388 In this respect, the Soviet leaders considered that Lausanne was a new era not only for

383 Ismet İnönü, Hatıralar (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi), 1985, v. II, p. 72. 384 Godovoy Otchyot za 1923 g. NKID k XI S"ezdu Sovetov (Moscow, 1924), p. 9. 385 Ibid. 386 G. Astakhov, Ot Sultanata k Demokraticheskoy Turtsii (Moskva-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1926), p. 97. 387 Ibid.

112 Turkey but also for all countries of the colonial and semi-colonial East. There was no precedent in the history of the East, when a semi-colonial Asiatic country not only beat a united front of the imperialist Powers in the battlefield, but also made them recognise their defeat on the table. Therefore, in Moscow. It was believed that this example would remain the indeliable example for all colonial countries of the East.

The revolutionary significance of the Treaty of Lausanne was making the Soviet government forget the enforced concessions, which were made by Ismet Pasha at the

Conference.389

The Overthrow of the Sultanate

On October 30, 1922, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey passed a resolution on the overthrow of the Sultanate. The Soviet government regarded this event as the event of great significance from the point of view of revolutionary nature and propaganda effect in the Near East.390 Pyotr Simonov, a Soviet expert on the

Middle East, wrote "it showed clearly that Mohammedans were not such religious fanatics as they were usually depicted" and "they placed their struggle for independence much higher than even the religious questions. Till now it was believed that it was impossible to establish a republican order in a Mohammedan country, however, the abolishment of the Sultanate showed the incorrectness of such an assumption."391 Some Soviet specialists on Turkey even called this event as "a

388 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, p. 41. 389 Ibid. 390 Pyotr Simonov, "Sverzhenie Sultana-Khalifa," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1922, N17, 8. 391 Ibid. p. 13.

113 genuine revolutionary act, which turned Turkey from the theocratic monarchy into

Republic at one go."392

Some steps in the field of education, which were taken by the Ankara government, also pleased the Soviet government. Mustafa Kemal's group subordinated the People's Commissariat for Education under its control. Vehbi Hoca was removed from the post of the Minister of Education, and Ismail Safa Bey, a sophisticated, European educated man, a merchant and deputy for Mersin, was appointed to this post. His appointment did not simply mean the change of person, but it was also interpretated as the change of system in the matter of Education. Ismail

Safa Bey stated "I was not satisfied with the former work of the ministry and the absence of methods in the matter of the Education. Up to now, we had been impoverished in this sphere. My first goal was to determine the direction of the

Education. For this purpose, all powers would be mobilized and the press would play the first role. We were in need of help of educationalists and intellectuals in general."393 The Soviet government considered that this plan was a progress in the field of education in Turkey, and "in the East, where up to now the People's Education was proceeding from narrow clerical principles, and the Koran was the only base of education and upbringing, such declarations, which did not mention a word about religion, but appealled to the community, sound quite enough in a revolutionary way."394

On November 3, 1922, Chicherin, on behalf of the Government of the RSFSR, sent a telegram of congratulation to the Government of the GNA of Turkey on the occasion of the desposition of Sultan and transmission of absolute power to the Grand

392 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, "Krakh Anglo-Grecheskoy Interventsii v Turtsii," in M. Pavlovich - V. Gurko-Kryazhin - F. Raskol'nikov (eds.), Turtsiya v Bor'be za Nezavisimost' (Moscow, 1925), p. 118. 393 G. Astakhov, p. 45. 394 Ibid.

114 National Assembly. In the telegram, Chicherin said that "the Sultan had acted against the Turkish People's interests and had driven Turkey into the subordination to the yoke of the Western Powers."395 Rauf Orbay, in response, expressed the Turkish

Government's strong conviction that the ties of friendship and brotherhood between the two nations were strengthening even more.396

The Economic Congress in Izmir

The First Turkish Economic Congress was held on February 17, 1923 in Izmir.

The Government of the GNA of Turkey invited Semyon Aralov, the Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Ankara, and Abilov, the Plenipotentiary of the Transcaucasian

Socialist Federative Soviet Republics in Ankara. However, the Soviet

Plenipotentiaries could not arrive at the Congress on time. In view of it, the organizers of the Congress decided to adjourn the Congress for two days.397 Mustafa Kemal

Pasha asked Aralov and Abilov to make a speech at the Congress.398 At his request,

Aralov, addressing the delegates of the Congress, related about the measures, which were taken by the Soviet government after a heavy and bloody war for the reconstruction of its economy and development of culture. He also noted that Turkey had successfully completed the war, had banished adversaries and had won victory over a fuedal regime and imperialism.399 Abilov made his speech in his native Azeri

Turkish. He elucidated the state of economy in Azerbaijan in detail. The Soviet

395 "Privet Turetskomu Narodu Osvobodivshemusya ot Despotizma Sultana. Telegramma Chicherina Turetskomu Pravitel'stvu," Izvestiya (Moscow), 5 November 1922. 396 "Radiotelegramma Predsedatelya Soveta Komissarov VNST Reuf-Pashi Narodnomu Komissaru po Inostrannym Delam Chicherinu, Angora, 24 noyabrya 1922," Izvestiya (Moscow), 6 December 1922. 397 G. Astakhov, p. 60. 398 S. I. Aralov, p. 210. 399 Ibid.

115 Plenipotentiaries were given a warm welcome and their speeches were met with ovations in honour of the Soviet Union.400

The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in its yearly report to the

Eleventh Congress of the Soviets, pointed out that the meeting of the Soviet

Plenipotentiaries in Izmir and ovations of the delegates, underlined and demonstrated that all productive forces in Turkey saw the Soviet Republics as the one and only reliable ally in the struggle on the economic field.401 It was also significant that no foreign representatives had been presented at the Congress with the exception of the

Soviet Plenipotentiaries.402

The Soviet government realized that this Congress was not that of the Soviets.

Measures, which were discussed there, in most cases were absolutely deprived of any socialist nature.403 However, the Congerss was important since it was the first congress in the East with the participation of those strata of society that had hitherto not actively participated in political life nearly or at all.404 The Soviet leaders saw how the Turkish businessmen aspired to release the country from the preponderance of foreign capital. This aspiration was reflected on all measures which were discussed at the Congress.405 All delegates shared the idea that the foreign capital could be allowed to enter into the country, but only as a collaborator, which would obey the law of the country.

In the Soviet leaderships' view, the Congress clearly demonstrated that the "sick man" had been rotten long ago and, now a new, absolutely 'healthy man' had got up on his place and, this new 'healthy man' goes with firm step towards his aim and

400 Ibid. 401 Godovoy Otchyot za 1923 god. NKID k XI S"ezdu Sovetov (Moscow, 1924), p. 95. 402 Ibid. 403 G. Astakhov, pp. 60-61. 404 Ibid. p. 54. 405 Ibid. p. 61.

116 knows how to catch those who pick his pocket."406 It could not but escape the Soviet

Plenipotentiaries' attention how Mustafa Kemal strikingly and sharply stigmatized the

Western imperialists for their centuries-old oppression of Turkey and his words about the rigid determination of the Turkish people to carry the struggle to the conclusion.407

At the Congress, Mustafa Kemal declared that "we were in need of capital, we were ready to give them everything necessary if they would act in compliance with our laws."408 He also added that "in the former times, the foreign capital had occupied a priviledged position in Turkey and our government had been a gendarmery of the foreign capitalists."409 Having heart these words, Astakhov, the head of the

Information Bureau at the Soviet representation in Ankara, remarked that "here we have clearly heard Soviet motif."410

The Economic Congress passed the "Economic Oath", which was regarded as the supplement to the "National Oath". According to Aralov, just as the National Oath stired people to the action for the National independence, the Economic Vow called upon the nation for the struggle for the economic independence.411

Declaration of the Republic of Turkey

On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declared formally the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Three days later, Ahmet Muhtar informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs about the Grand National

Assembly's decision. The Turkish Plenipotentiary also notified the Sovnarkom that

406 Ibid. 407 Ibid. p. 52. 408 Ibid. p. 53. 409 Ibid. 410 Ibid. 411 S. I. Aralov, p. 210.

117 Mustafa Kemal Pasha had been elected the President and Ismet Pasha appointed as the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.412

The proclamation of the Republic in Turkey was met in the USSR with sympathy. This act was putting an end the monarchist regime in the country.413 The most important thing for the Soviet government was that this event was frustrating the plan of the world capitalists in Turkey, territory of which was contiguous to the Soviet territory. The Soviet government held that the world capitalism was at one with the

Sultan.414 The decision of the GNA of Turkey was regarded in the Soviet Union as a new incentive for the intensification of the Turkish revolution.415 On the other hand, the decision of the GNA strengthened Mustafa Kemal's prestige to an even greater degree.416 After four years, he got supreme executive power. The Soviet government evaluated it as the entry of the Turkish Republic into the new era of the reconstruction and inner consolidation.417

The Soviet government interpreted the proclamation of the Turkish Republic with its implications on the future foreign policy of Turkey. As the Soviets saw it, the national liberation of peoples of the East could be achieved, on the one hand, through their struggle against imperialism. On the other hand, it could be achieved through the destruction of the old feudal and semi-feudal modes of life, which were the centres of influence of the imperialists in the East.418 The foreign policy of the countries of the

East was the continuation of their inner politics. The inner struggle in the countries of the East influenced their foreign policy. In this respect, the victory of one or another

412 "Turtsiya-Respublika," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923. 413 "Telegramma Predsedatelya Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta SSSR Prezidentu Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 31 oktyabrya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 493. 414 "Telegramma Predsedateley Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta ZSFSR Prezidentu Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 5 noyabrya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 495. 415 Godovoy Otchyot za 1923 god k XI S"ezdy Sovetov, p. 7. 416 Ibid. 417 "Turtaiya - Respublika," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923.

118 of the political forces in the country determined its external orientation.419 Therefore, the Soviet government wished the consolidation of those elements which was supporting friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In this respect, the Soviet government welcomed the election of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as President of the

Republic of Turkey. It pinned its hopes on him and assumed that he, "the eminent leader of the heroic struggle of the Turkish people against the invasion of the foreign enslavers" would make the friendship between the two governments closer."420

This event was also important from the point of view of propaganda. It was believed that the creation of the independent Turkish republic was showing the peoples of the East that, henceforth, they would have to increase their efforts tenfold in the struggle for their liberation against the world capitalism.421

On the occasion of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the Soviet and

Turkish leaders exchanged telegrams. On October 31, 1923, Mikhail Kalinin, the

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR sent a telegram to

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and, on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, greeted heartily the Turkish Government and the Turkish people. In particular, he named the Turkish people as brotherly and the Turkish government as a friendly.422

On November 4, 1923, in his reply, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, on behalf of the

Turkish people and the Turkish government, wholeheartedly thanked Kalinin for his congratulations. Mustafa Kemal conveyed that "the dissolubility of the ties of friendship, which were binding the two nations would grow and contribute to the both

418 V. Nadezhdinskiy, "Turtsiya i Sovetskiy Soyuz," Front Nauki i Tekhniki (Moscow), 1932, N 6, p. 56. 419 Ibid. 420 "Telegramma Predsedatelya Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta SSSR Prezidentu Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 31 oktyabrya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 494. 421 "Telegramma Predsedateley Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta ZSFSR Prezidentu Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 5 noyabrya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 495. 422 "Telegramma Predsedatelya Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta SSSR Prezidentu Turtsii Mustafe Kemalyu, 31 oktyabrya 1923" Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 493.

119 nations' happiness and further the prosperity of the both states."423 In his turn,

Chicherin sent a salutatory telegram to Ismet Pasha. He congratulated him on his appointment to the post of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He also expressed his confidence that the collaboration between the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the Foreign Ministry of

Turkey would continue promoting the international peace and settle international conflicts.424 Yakov Surits, the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Ankara, also congratulated Mustafa Kemal Pasha and underlined that he, as the President of the

Republic of Turkey was pledge of success of the peaceful reconstruction in the

Turkish Republic.425 Surits also pointed out that the Turko-Soviet friendship would get stronger and develop, as Kemal had been one of its founders.426 Mustafa Kemal, thanked him for congratulations, and said, "it was necessary for Turkey to get stronger and develop the friendship with Russia."427

The Abolishment of Caliphate in Turkey

As it was noted, the Soviet government wished the consolidation of those forces in Turkey, which supported the friendly relations with the Soviet Union, in other words, the political forces led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. However, the continued existence of the Caliphate in Turkey was a considerable threat for these forces. The decision of the GNA of November 1, 1922, undoubtedly, undermined the Caliph's power in Turkey, and he was left only with the supreme religious prerogatives.

423 "Telegramma Mustafy Kemal' Pashi Predsedatelyu TsIK SSSR M. I. Kalininu, Angora, 4 noyabrya 1923 goda" Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 158. 424 "Turtsiya - Respublika," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923. 425 "Podrobnosti Izbraniya Kemalya. - Naznachenie Ismet-Pashi. - Otnoshenie k Sovetskoy Rossii," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923. 426 Ibid.

120 However, in practice, the Caliph was even deprived of his religious power. Indeed, in theory, he had the right to communicate on his own with the Mohammedans of India,

Syria, and Egypt. However, in the presence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in

Ankara, which had taken over all foreign correspondence, such communications of the Caliph were becoming impossible. In theory, the Caliph had the right to appeal to the population with the religious fetva. In fact, in such a case, the GNA and the

Ministry of Interior would regard it as the usurpation of their rights.

In spite of all these limitations, in the eyes of both the Kemalists and the

Soviets, the Caliph remained the center of all political intrigues and the point of crossing of the different forces in opposition.428 Therefore, from that point of view, the abolishment of Caliphate in Turkey would have to save the country from dualism in foreign and inner policy of the country.

On the other hand, the abolishment of the Caliphate meant the economic consolidation of the progressive nationalist forces. The fact was that the huge proportion of the land was in the possession of the Vakıfs, which, in their turn, were in the possession of the different religious organizations. The State was suffering a great damage, since these lands were not liable to tax. The country was experiencing the economic dislocation, and, therefore, the land tax was assuming the great importance.

Besides, the government was suffering from the chronicle financial crisis, and it was unable to defray the deficit in the budget. It was assumed that the sale of these lands would be a way out of a situation.429

The abolishment of the Caliphate in Turkey was also important for the USSR itself, since this event promoted the Soviet regime in the republics with the Muslem

427 "Podrobnosti Izbraniya Kemalya. - Naznachenie Ismet-Pashi. - Otnoshenie k Sovetskoy Rossii," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923. 428 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy, p. 180. 429 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy, p. 180.

121 population. The Soviet power regarded the clergy as a reactionary force and a threat to the Soviet order. These "reactionary forces", in the Soviet's opinion, had oriented themselves towards the Caliphate, and the Caliph had been their steering wheel.430

Now, they lost wheel and did not know from whom take their cue.431

The post-Lausanne Turkey, with its political and economic reforms was a serious threat to the colonial might of the Great Powers.432 At the same time, the

Soviet government regarded the Republican Turkey as a country which had not yet completed its struggle for the national independence, since it had achieved magnificent but no complete successes in Lausanne.433 Therefore, the Soviet government realized that the USSR was bound to help the Republican Turkey by all available means. Certainly, the USSR was still weak economically, and, in this respect, it could do little for Turkey. But, its friendship as regards Turkey, was strengthening Turkey in the international arena. The Soviet government realized that the Turkish government was concerned in the friendship with the USSR, since this friendship would exert influence upon its external adversaries. To keep the Western

Powers out of Turkey was also meeting the Soviet interests. In other words, this friendship was strengthening Turkey in the international arena and was securing the independence of the Turkish Republic. It was advantageous for the USSR, since the independent and friendly Turkish Republic on the southern flanks of the USSR was a guarantee against any aggression against the USSR from the Turko-Soviet frontier.

The Soviet's dread of the Turkish Pan-Turkism

430 Umar Aliev, Natsional'nyy vopros i Natsional'naya Kul'tura v Severo-Kavkazskom Krae (Rostov- na-Donu: Sevkavkniga i Kraynatsizdat, 1926), p. 15. 431 Ibid. 432 "SSSR i Turtsiya. Beseda s polpredom v Turtsii t. Suritsym," Pravda (Moscow), 25 December 1923. 433 Ibid.

122

There were a great number of the Turkic peoples in the RSFSR and in republics around it. They lived in Turkestan (Uzbeks, Kazaks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks,

Uyghurs, Turks), in European Russia and Siberia (the Volga Tatars, the Crimean

Tatars, Chuvashs, Bashkirs, Yakuts, Gagauz, Tuvinians, Khakas, Altays, Shors,

Dolgans, Karaims, Tofas) and in the Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus

(, Kumyks, Karachais, Balkars, Nogays).434 On the other hand, there were very large and populous emigrant communities from the Crimea, the Northern

Caucasus, and to a lesser extent from the Volga-Ural region and Turkestan in Turkey.

It should be noted that Turkisation was the integral part of the principle of strict centralization in the Republican Turkey after the Lausanne Conference. In 1923, there were no more than 10,000,000 of population within the Turkish borders, out of which the "Turks" numbered only 5,000,000 - 6,000,000.435 A Soviet specialist, B. Aboltin, printing out the critical ethnic balance in Turkey quoted the Turkish daily Tefhid-i

Efkâr, which wrote that "only a small number of the Turks remains on vast space of our country. Because of wars, inner uprisings, disease, mortality, the number of the

Turkish population in Anatolia decreases considerably."436 The non-Turkish Muslims such as Kurds, Laz, Cherkess, formed a considerable part of that population. There were no guarantees that these peoples would have no aspirations of separatism in the future.

On the other hand, because of the absence of ways of communication with regions, where these peoples had been living, their cultural and economic ties with the

Turkish Anatolia were very weak. Therefore, the preservation of the former the

434 Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: KPI, 1986), 2nd ed., p. 389. 435 B. Aboltin, "Natsional'nyy sostav Turetskoy Respubliki," Novyy Vostok (Moscow), 1924, 7, p. 115. 436 B. Aboltin, "Natsional'nyy sostav Turetskoy Respubliki," Novyy Vostok (Moscow), 1924, 7, p. 115.

123 Ottoman's system of de-centralization threatened to the new Turkey with serious dangers, even up to the seizure of outlying districts from Turkey.

Moscow held that so far as the way of the national-Turkic development was one of the main ways for the new Turkey, it was possible in the future, the birth and rise of chauvinistic and great-power tendencies among the new generation of the Turks. It also supposed that the Turkism, renovated, centralized, and Europeanized, might gaze at the Turkic peoples living in the USSR.437

A Soviet expert on the East, S. Kabulskiy held that there must be some reasons and conditions such as the weakening of the USSR and complete Turkey's reconciliation with both Britain and France, so that Kemalist's Turkism could take the form of the Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanianism of the Unionists (İttihadçılar) nature.438 Another German specialist, Shtürmer, considered that if rapprochement between the new Turkey and Western Europe would come true in the future, then the extent of Turkey's Pan-Turkism in the Caucasus, would depend on relations between the Western Powers and Russia.439

As far back in 1919, the Soviet Government commenced taking protective measures. For instance, the administrative realignment was to block the possibility of the development of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic aspirations.440 With the purpose of breaking the Volga Tatars' pretensions to being the vanguard of Muslim identity within the country, the Bashkir Autonomous Republic had been created in the same year. The Bashkirs were linguistically very close to Tatars and still used Tatar as a written language. One year later, the Republic of Tatarstan was created, which would

437 S. Kabul'skiy, "Politika vozrozhdyonnoy Turtsii," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 7, p. 24. 438 Ibid 439 H. Shtürmer, "Turtsiya posle Lozanny," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 2-3, p. 77. 440 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. 66.

124 be completely encircled by the Chuvash, Udmurt and Mari Autonomous Regions.

Thus, the Volga Tatars were effectively downgraded from the elite status among the

Turkic and Muslim peoples of the empire to that of one small people among others. In order to make the Bashkirs a nationality in the full sense, a literary language was fabricated for them.441

In Central Asia it was the unitarian idea of Turkestan, which Moscow wanted to eradicate at any costs.442 Therefore, specific nationalities were developed among the

Turcophone populations, accentuating existing linguistic differences and practically fragmenting the area into different Soviet Republics. These were the measures which were taken in the country.

The post-Lausanne Turkey was an absolutely exhausted country. The necessity of tenacious efforts for the inner reconstruction, which required many years, demanded from the Turkish government carefully well-considered foreign policy.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha stated "we do not have to take in part in deceiver's groups that pursue illusions and want to realize the unrealisable. Up to now, we have suffered much because of that false policy. From now on, let us come back to our natural boundaries, to our legal boundaries, let us return here."443 Mustafa Kemal Pasha aimed at the preservation of the Turkish national State within the national boundaries.

Notwithstanding the grandiose diplomatic victory of Turkey at the Lausanne

Conference, it still had unsettled questions with some Western countries. In case of the complications of Turkey's relations with the West, Turkey could rely only on the

USSR, which was the only possible source of material and moral support.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha favoured the existence of the Soviet State and the Soviet regime, since its existence as the State with friendly attitude towards Turkey was

441 Ibid. 442 Ibid.

125 favourable condition for the security of the Turko-Soviet frontier and, thus, for its strengthening. The Turkish government, by no means, wanted the weakening of the

USSR. In spite of these statements the Soviet government was anxious, and it realized as long as it would maintain friendly relations with Turkey, it would be able to prevent Pan-Turkic tendencies.

The importance of the USSR for Turkey

Mustafa Kemal Pasha realized that the military victory in Anatolia was insufficient for the development of the country, and that this victory even could die away in a short space of time.444 In his opinion, for the continuation of the Turkish triumph, it was necessary to develop the economy of the country and acquire economic sovereignty.445 He wished that the new Turkish state should be an economic state."446 On February 17, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Pasha opened the country's first economic congress in Izmir. In his address to the delegates of the Congress, ha said,

"the nation's economy is directly bound up with the nation's life. If we investigated the Turkish history, one can see that the economy had been at the bottom of either rising or decline. In the first place, it is necessary to give consideration to economy, in order to rise the new Turkey to a deserved level."447

The unceasing wars which had been waged by Turkey for twelve years affected the economy of the country drastically. Whole districts were completely destroyed as a result of the military operations. For instance, the north-eastern and eastern

443 Tahsin Ünal, Türk Siyasi Tarihi 1700-1958 (İstanbul: Kutluğ Yayınları), 1974, p. 565. 444 Alptekin Müderisoğlu, Cumhuriyetin Kurulduğu Yıl Türkiye Ekonomisi (Ankara: T. C. Ziraat Bankası), 1998, p. 94. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid. 447 Alptekin Müderisoğlu, p. 94.

126 provinces of Anatolia were destroyed by the Russian and Ottoman armies during the campaign of 1915-1917. Cilicia had suffered from the French occupation, and the

Western districts (Izmir and Bursa) were ravaged as a result of four years of occupation of the Greeks. Approximately 73,000 houses in cities and 88,000 houses in villages had been demolished in the Western Anatolia. As a whole, no less than

300,000 houses had been demolished in Anatolia.448

The post-war destruction also heavily affected the agriculture of the country. It was deprived of approximately 2,000,000 hands. The migration of the minorities such as the Greeks and the Armenians from Anatolia also contributed to the reduction of capable working men. These minorities were engaged in the most developed agricultural districts in Izmir, Bursa, Cilicia, and the Black Sea. They possessed the practical skills and the necessary means for the cultivation of the land and the growing of the industrial corps (cotton), and fruits (grapes and others). The shortage of labour force was one the critical reasons of the decline of production in agriculture in 1923 to the level below the level of production in 1913.449

The huge diminution of the cattle, owing to the military deliveries and requisitions, also affected the state of affairs in the agriculture. Almost all branches of agriculture suffered from the war. The harvest of the opium was reduced to 50 per cent, and in 1923, only 2,000 boxes, instead of usual 4,000, were gathered.450 The beggarly population was unable pay for the wrapping, transportation by rail. As a result, only quarter of the harvest was exported, and the half of harvest perished. The diminution of figs alone was 5,500,000 TL.451

448 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy, p. 160. 449 Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye (1923-1929) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları), 1993, second edıtıon, p. 174. 450 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy, p. 161. 451 Ibid.

127 The same thing happened with the harvest of olives and nuts in the Black Sea districts. However, the production of a row silk was among the most suffered sectors of agriculture. The prosperity of the districts of Bursa and Izmit depended on this industrial crop. However, there, mulberry trees had been felled, and the production of silkworm eggs had been given up.

The difficult economic situation, which Turkey was experiencing, could not but affect the trade balance of the country. In 1922, the import of Turkey was 73,000,000

Turkish Liras, whereas its export was 33,000,000 Turkish Liras.452 The trade balance, which was showing a loss, absorbed almost all its financial resources and prevented the accumulation of Turkish capital.453

The Turkish finances reflected the post-war economic dislocation. It is true that, owing to the abolishment of capitulations, the absence of the foreign financial control, and most importantly, the significant reduction of the debts of the State, the financial state of affairs in Turkey was in a more favourable situation in comparison to the pre- war period. Up to the Lausanne Conference, the debts of Turkey were 155,263,360 in

Turkish lira.454 In accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, the debts were distributed among countries, which separated from the Ottoman Empire. Owing to this, the debts of Turkey reduced to 90,608,000 in Turkish lira.

As a whole, notwithstanding all military and political victories, the financial situation of the country was still weak. The small-scale enterprises prevailed all over the country. There were no capitals and credits. As in old days, usury was flourishing.

It was obvious that it was impossible for the Turkish government to recover the economy of the country only by its own means. In this connection, it intended to draw

452 Ibid. 453 "V. İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin Programı, 5 September 1923,'' in Nuran Dağlı-Belme Aktürk (eds.), Hükümetler ve Programları (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi), 1988, p. 17. 454 V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, Blizhniy Vostok i Derzhavy, p. 162.

128 in the foreign capital to the country. However, owing to political instability, the decline in the value of the Turkish currency, the post-war impoverishment, and, mainly, to the abolishment of capitulations, the Western capital was regarding Turkey most cautiously.

Besides, in 1923, the Turkish army had no sufficient quantity of military equipment. In 1923, the budget of Turkey was small. It totalled 105,000,000 Lira.

Therefore, the State was unable to allot some substantial sum of money for the army.455 Moreover, there was a necessity for putting right the production of the military equipment and ammunitions within the country.456

On October 29, 1923, a new Cabinet of Ministers in Turkey was formed under

Ismet Pasha. The main task of the foreign policy of the government was to safeguard the existence and integrity of the Turkish Republic, and to pursue its national interests.457 On the base of these tasks, the government was to develop and strengthen peace and benevolent relations with other countries.458

Mustafa Kemal Pasha had to subordinate the foreign policy of the State to its inner politics. He spoke more than once, about that foreign policy should be dominated by the internal economic situation.459 The Turkish statesmen were aware that the realization of the vital task of social and economic reconstruction would take a long time. This grandiose work could be fulfilled only if there was no actual foreign threat against Turkey.

455 "Recep Bey's [Peker} speech at the secret session of the GNA of Turkey on November 18, 1925," in T.B.M.M. Gizli Zabıtları (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 1985, v. IV, p. 541. 456 "V. İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin Programı, 5 Eylül 1923,'' in Nuran Dağlı-Belma Aktürk (eds.) Hükümetler ve Programları (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi), 1988, p. 20. 457 "Başvekilliğe Seçilmiş Bulunan İsmet Paşa'nın Başvekilliğe İntihabı Dolayısıyla Söylemiş Olduğu Nutuk, 29 October 1923,'' in Nuran Dağlı-Belma Aktürk (eds.) Hükümetler ve Programları (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi), 1988, p. 24. 458 Ibid. 459 Clair Price, The Rebirth of Turkey (New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1923), p. 223.

129 In this respect, maintaining friendly relations with the USSR was vital for the

Turkish interests.460 Turkey shared with the USSR 1505 kilometres long sea border on the Black Sea and 602 kilometres long land border in the north-eastern and eastern

Anatolia. It should be noted that the Turkish leadership was assuming that it was possible that the Bolsheviks, conforming to the old principles and pursuing desires of the former empire, would undertake to capture Istanbul.461 However, the Turkish leadership regarded this possibility as hardly possible.462 In their opinion, the

Bolshevik Russia was not the same as the tsarist Russia. In every opportunity, the

Soviet government was expressing its wish for the friendly relations with Turkey.

Therefore, the Turkish government would favour the Bolshevik Russia over the tsarist

Russia.463

On the other hand, the Turkish government, nevertheless, strove for playing safe and preventing any undesirable misgivings. Many still remember the Turko-Russian

War of 1877-1878. In that war, the Russian army had reached the Erzurum valley and began threatening with the occupation of Anatolia. Then, all communications with the northern and the eastern parts of the Erzurum valley were cut short. Since that time, one of the main tasks of the Ottoman-Turkish foreign policies was the blockage of the lowering of the Russians to the southern and to the western parts of the Erzurum valley, which was the geopolitical lock of Anatolia.464 Therefore, the friendship with the USSR was providing Turkey with security in that parts of the country and preventing any aggression against Turkey on the part of the USSR.

460 "Şükrü Bey's speech at the secret session of the GNA on February 4, 1925,'' in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. IV, p. 474. 461 Ibid., p. 475. 462 Ibid. 463 Ibid. 464 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejık Derinlik. Türkiye'nin Uluslararsı Konumu (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları), 2001, p. 56.

130 On the other hand, Turkey had not yet settled all its external issues. The Treaty of Lausanne had not yet ratified by other states. Besides, the question of Musul was yet to be settled. Lord Curzon succeeded in Lausanne in securing the agreement that

"the frontier between Turkey and Iraq would be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two governments in the time mentioned, the dispute would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations". Moreover, the question of the Ottoman debts to France and the question of the frontier with the Syria were the main contradictions in Turko-French relations after the Lausanne

Conference.465

After the War of Liberation, the Turko-Italian relations were far from that of friendly. Italy was going through critical migration crisis. There was insufficiency of land space in Italy for growing number of its population. The emigration grew up year out. The Italian government was fixing its eyes on Anatolia. To be sure, it could not but give rise to anxiety in Turkey.466 Therefore, the friendship with the USSR was assuming importance in such a strained external situation of Turkey, since the friendship with the USSR was advantageous for Turkey.467 The Turkish statesmen were confident that this friendship would exert influence upon the external foes of

Turkey.468 In other words, In case of pressure on Turkey on the part of any Western

Power, Moscow's friendly attitude to Turkey could be a deterrent.

As it was noted, Turkey was important for the USSR from the point of view of security of the Soviet Union and as a revolutionary example for the other countries of

465 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Narkomata Oborony Soyuza SSR, 1940), p. 120. 466 A. Mel'nik, Respublikanskaya Turtsiya (Moscow-Leningrad: Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1927), p. 51. 467 "Şükrü Bey's speech at the secret session of the GNA on February 4, 1925,'' in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. IV, p. 475. 468 Ibid.

131 the East. It was in the interests of the Soviet government to maintain friendly relations with the Turkish Republic and avoid any misgivings, which could jeopardize that friendship. However, the policy of the Soviet government relative to the Turkish government was notable for its inconsequent and manifest contradictions.

In the course of 1923, the improvidence of the Soviet government created strained relations. For instance, a newspaper Yeni Fikir, which was published in

Turkish in the USSR, was imported to Turkey, in particular, to Trabzon through the eastern vilayets and was also forthcoming in the Soviet Consulates in the east of

Turkey as well. In July 1923, the Headquarters of the Eastern Front of Turkey notified the Ministry of Inner Affairs [Dahiliye Vekaleti] and the Chief Directorate of Security

[Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyyeti] that Yeni Fikir contained communist ideas and intentions and, thus, it created confusion in the minds of the Turkish people.469 The

Headquarters of the Eastern Front warned that the import of the newspaper to Turkey could break public order.470 In this connection, the Headquarter of the Eastern Front recommended the Ministry of Inner Affairs and the Chief Directorate of Security to place for consideration the prohibition of import of Yeni Fikir to Turkey.

Having considered the Headquarter's recommendation, the Ministry of Inner

Affairs and the Chief Directorate of Security appealed to the Prime Ministry (Icra

Vekilleri Heyeti) with the same proposal. On July 22, 1923, the Prime Ministry of

Turkey decided to prohibit the import of Yeni Fikir to Turkey.471

469 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, July 22, 1923," BCA (Ankara), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fund, no: 030. 18. 01/ 07. 25. 17.. 470 Ibid. 471 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, July 22, 1923," BCA (Ankara), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fund, no: 030. 18. 01/ 07. 25. 17.

132 Besides this newspaper, other newspapers Kommunist in Russian, Yeni Hayat and Baş Kurt both in Turkish were also imported to Turkey.472 The Chief Directorate of Telegraf of Turkey informed the Ministry of Inner Affairs and the Chief

Directorate of Security that these newspapers were wholy of communist nature. In their turn, the Ministry of Inner Affairs and the Chief Directorate of Security prepared letters for the Prime Ministry. As a result of careful consideration of the problem, on

September 1, 1923, the Prime Ministry of Turkey decided to ban the importation of these newspapers into Turkey.473

As it was noted, in 1920-1922, the struggle of the Ankara government against the Western invaders had served the interests of the Soviet government squarely.

Turkey, frustrating the plans of the Western imperialism, safeguarded the southern frontiers of the Soviet Republic and gave the Soviet government a chance to concentrate on the recovery of economy of the country. At the same time, the Ankara government had been a revolutionary precedent for all Eastern peoples. The revolutionization of the East would mean for the Soviet government the collapse of plans of the Western imperialism along the whole length of the Asiatic frontier of the

Soviet Republic. Therefore, the revolutionization of the East served the World revolution and the safety of the Soviet Republic. On this basis, the Soviet government maintained friendly relations with the Ankara government. In this connection, as long as the Ankara government carried out the War of Liberation, moral, political supporting and pecuniary, which the Soviet government rendered the Ankara government, was enough for the Soviet government to meet its interests. Although, after the Lausanne Conference, such a support kept a considerable significance in the

472 "The decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, September 1, 1923," BCA (Ankara), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fund, no: 030. 18. 01/ 07. 30. 11. 473 Ibid.

133 Turko-Soviet relations, new conditions demanded other diplomatic instruments from the Soviet government.

On December 21, 1923, Yakov Surits came from Ankara to Moscow.474 On 24

December, he gave an interview to Pravda, where in regards to the state of Turko-

Soviet Relations, he pointed out that first of all, it was necessary to renounce what he called the "trivial" things.475 The Consular and Trade Conventions had not yet been worked out. In the Turkish point of view, the signing of these Conventions would put everything in mutual relations in order.476

The Soviet government also intended to conclude these Conventions as soon as possible. In summer 1923, problems of the Turko-Soviet relations were investigated by a special commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party

(Bolsheviks).477 The Commission instructed the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Ankara to make more active the negotiations on the trade treaty.478

The fact that the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference did not support

Soviet project of the closing the Straits to warships of all countries, except Turkey, in time of peace and war, did not lead to the deterioration of the Turko-Soviet relations.

The Soviet government was preoccupied with the difficult task of the economic reconstruction of the country. It was in critical need of time for it, and, by all means, strove to prevent aggression of the Western Powers against the Soviet Republic, which it considered inevitable.

474 "Priezd Polpreda v Turtsii", Pravda (Moscow), 22 December 1923. 475 "SSSR i Turtsiya. Beseda s Polpredom v Turtsii t. Suritsym", Pravda (Moscow), 25 December 1923. 476 ''V. İcra Vekilleri Heyetinin Programı, 5 September 1923,'' ın Nuran Dağlı-Belma Aktürk (eds.), Hükümetler ve Programları, p. 21. 477 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 213. 478 Ibid.

134 By this time, the USSR had been established. The Georgian and Armenian

Soviet Republics had entered into this union, and, now, Turkey shared a long and critically important sea and land common frontier with the USSR.

The Soviet government regarded the military-strategic situation, which arose in the basin of the Black Sea as a result of the Lausanne Conference and the Convention on the Regime in the Straits, as extremely unfavourable for the Soviet government.

Because of the opening of the Straits for warships, the Soviet military strategists supposed that the attack of enemy fleet through the Straits and the Black Sea was possible, and that the success of such an operation demanded from them the use of

Istanbul as their operational base. They also believed that an attack on the southern

Soviet territories would be made through the Turkish territory. Consequently, the significance of Turkey for the Soviet government for its security grew greatly after the Lausanne Conference.

The Soviet government desired to keep in the security of this critical long

Turko-Soviet frontier, and, the main condition for that was that Turkey should be the

State with the friendly attitude towards the USSR. It was supposed by the Soviet government that Turkey as the friendly State of the Soviet government, would minimize the possibility of such attack or, at the best, to make such attack impossible.

Owing to this friendly attitude, it was supposed that Turkey would not allow the

Western Powers to use the Turkish territories for attacks against the southern regions of the Soviet Republic. The Soviet government realized that in order to win the friendly attitude of the Ankara government towards the Soviet government, it also would have to show the same friendly attitude towards the Ankara government.

Moreover, it also realized that it would have to be very prudent as regards its steps

135 towards Turkey, and to avoid everything that could give rise to the frictions, conflicts, and distrust.

Owing to the avoidance of everything that would endanger the friendly attitude of Turkey towards the USSR, in the opinion of the Soviet leadership, Turkey would abstain from entering into close contacts with the Western Powers, and, thus, it would serve for the prevention of the independence of Turkey, which itself, was regarded by the Soviet leaders as a guarantee for security of Soviet southern frontiers.

Besides, the overthrow of the Sultanate, the declaration of Republic of Turkey, the Economic Congress in Izmir, the abolishment of Caliphate, were regarded by the

Soviet government as events, which were serving for the strengthening of independence of Turkey, the destruction of powers in Turkey, which favoured the close contacts with the West, and the consolidation of powers under the head of

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who more than once spoke about the necessity of collaboration with the Soviet Republic and the maintenance of friendship with it. Therefore, it was another reason that made it necessary to maintain a benevolent and good neighbourly relations with Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As many Turkic peoples lived in the

Soviet Republics, the maintainence of the benevolent relations with Turkey, was considered by the Soviet leaders as the prevention of the beginning of the Pan-

Turkism on the part of the Ankara government.

After the Lausanne Conference, Turkey concentrated all its efforts on the economic recovery of the country. It won a great diplomatic victory at the

Conference, and, now, it strove to preserve its achievements. However, it did not settle all its problems with the western countries. Most important, it distrusted them.

Proceeding from this situation, the Turkish government also wanted the Soviet State would be the State with a friendly attitude towards Turkey. The Soviet government

136 with a friendly attitude towards Turkey was considered by the Turkish government a factor that would contribute to the security of its long sea and land frontiers with the

USSR. The friendly Soviet State was also considered the guarantee of the Turkish achievements. The Soviet Republic was the only source of material and moral support in case of aggression against Turkey, or the complication of its relations with the

West. The Ankara government always kept the Turko-Soviet benevolent relations as a reserve as an instrument of intimidation or as deterrent, which it could utilize in case of if any Western Power would attempt to make a pressure on Turkey.

Consequently, all these factors made them needy of each other. Moreover, there was another important factor. They not only needed each other, but each of them also knew very well that they also had to show a benevolent attitude towards its neighbour not only to win it’s the same benevolent attitude, but in order to not weaken the position of their neighbour. Any difficulty created for one of the two countries could worsen the position of the other. The mutual benevolent attitude towards each other was meeting the mutual interests and was making the relations between the two countries mutually beneficial.

137

CHAPTER THREE

ZIGZAGS IN THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY

The Temporary Conditions for the Soviet Consulates in Turkey

As far back as June 3, 1920, Chicherin, in his letter to Mustafa Kemal, offered to set up diplomatic and consular relations immediately in order to establish friendly relations and the stable friendship between the two governments.479 Soon, on July 2,

1920, the Soviet diplomatic mission left Moscow and arrived in Ağrı (Karaköse) on

August 30.480 The Soviet diplomatic mission reached Ankara on November 9,

1920.481 Shalva Eliava was appointed as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the

Soviet government in Ankara. However, he could not leave for Ankara for reasons of health. Instead, Ya. Upmal-Angarskiy was nominated the acting Plenipotentiary

Representative.482 On December 15, 1920, Budu Mdivani began fulfilling the duties of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet government in Ankara.483

479 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Predsedatelyu Velikogo Natsional'nogo Sobraniya Turtsii Mustafe Kemal'-Pashe, 3 iyunya 1920g, N 11/551," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1959), v. III, p. 555. 480 M. A. Gasratyan - P. P. Moiseev (eds.), SSSR i Turtsia 1917 - 1979 (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 31. 481 Godovoy Otchyot NKID k IX S"ezdu Sovetov (Moscow: Izdanie NKID, 1921), p. 42; The Soviet diplomatic mission went to Ankara through Erzurum. The British colonel Rawlison, who, at that time had been under the house arrest in Erzurum, writes in his memoirs that the mission of the Bolsheviks arrived at city, in honor of which, the big welcome demonstration and a parade had been arranged. A, Rawlison, Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922 (London, 1923), p. 295 482 M. A. Gasratyan - P. P. Moiseev (eds.), p. 31. 483 Kemal Girgin, Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz (Teşkilât ve Protokol) (Ankara:Türk Tarih Kurumu), 1992, p. 119; In the Turkish diplomatic sources his position was defined as Selahiyetter Müamessil that means the Plenipotentiary Representative. In the Decree of the Soviet of the People's Commissariat Ob Organizatsii Konsul'stv (On the Establishment of Consulates) of October 19, 1918, the Soviet government decided to set up the Consulates of the RSFSR in countries, in which the RSFSR and its citizens had business intercourse. For this, see: "Dekret Soveta Narodnykh

138 In the Article XIV of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey of March 16, 1921, the signatories agreed to conclude the Consular Convention in the near future.484 On

September 26, 1921, the Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijanian SSRs, and the RSFSR signed the Treaty of Friendship with Turkey in Kars. In the Article XIX of the Treaty of Kars, they pledged to conclude the Consular Convention within three months.485

As a result of the two months correspondence, the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs agreed to start negotiations in Ankara and informed the Ankara government that the delegation of the RSFSR would leave for Ankara in the near future.486 In January 1922, Semyon Aralov, the new Soviet Plenipotentiary

Representative arrived in Ankara.

The negotiations on the Consular Convention did not begin at once. The fact was that the delegation of the RSFSR arrived in Ankara only on October 28, 1922.487

On March 1, 1923, Mustafa Kemal stated in the GNA that it was necessary to hope for that the negotiations would end successfully and keep interests of both nations.488

Despite the fact that the Ankara and Moscow had not yet concluded the

Consular Convention, they already had their mutual Consulates in both countries. For instance, at the beginning of 1923, the Soviet government had its consulates in almost

Komissarov ob obrazovanii Konsul'stv, 18 oktyabrya 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1957), v. I, p. 523. In the Decree of June 4, 1918, the Soviet of the People's Commissariat abolished the title of Ambassador and introduced for the Soviet Representatives, which would be accredited in other states, a new title of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR. For this, see: "Dekret Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov ob uprazdnenii rangov diplomaticheskikh predstaviteley i ob imenovanii takovykh Polnomochnymi Predstavitelyami Rossiyskoy Sotsialisticheskoy Federativnoy Sovetskoy Respubliki, 4 iyunya 1918 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. I, p. 345. 484 "Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey i Turtsiey 16 marta 1921.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politcheskoy Literatury, 1959), v. III, p. 601. 485 "Dogovor o Druzhbe mezhdu Armyanskoy SSR, Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR i Gruzinskoy SSR, s odnoy storony, i Turtsiey - s drugoy, zaklyuchyonnyy pri uchastii RSFSR v Karse, 26 oktyabrya 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1960), v. IV, p. 426. 486 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Poslu Turtsii v RSFSR Ali Fuadu, 11 yanvarya 1922 g., N11/75," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1961), v. V, p. 48.

139 all large cities of Anatolia: Ankara, Samsun, Trabzon, Kars, Erzurum, Artvin,

Bayazıt, Mersin.489 To the close of 1922, the Ankara government had its the

Consulate General in Moscow and Kazan (opened in August 1922), Consulates in

Tuapse (opened in October 1920), Novorossiysk (opened in ) and in the Transcaucasia: in Tiflis, Baku, Erivan, Batum, and Aleksandropol (Gümrü).

On December 30, 1922, a treaty was concluded between the Russian Socialist

Federative Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the

Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic for the formation of a Union.490

On July 19, 1923, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in the Ukrainian Socialist

Soviet Republic notified the representatives of foreign powers that foreign relations had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.491

On July 21 a similar announcement was made by the Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs of the Belorussian SSR, and the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the

Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republics at Tiflis.492 On July 21 and 23,

Chicherin notified the representatives of Turkey about these changes.

Up to this decision, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which had constituted the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, had diplomatic relations with Turkey and conducted these relations on their own through their People's

487 A. N. Kheyfets, Sovetskaya Diplomatiya i Narody Vostoka 1921-1927 (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), p. 193. 488 Kemal' Atatyurk, Izbrannye Rechi i Vystupleniya (Moscow), pp. 292-293. 489 For this, see: "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, 9 November 1922," Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi [Republican Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry] (Ankara), hearafter cited as, BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers] 030. 18. 11 / 6. 35. 9; "The Decree of Cabinet of Ministers, 9 January 1923," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], 030. 18. 01 / 06. 44. 11; "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, 30 January 1923," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], 030. 18. 11 / 6. 47. 18. 490 "Postanovlenie X Vserossiyskogo S"ezda Sovetov po dokladu ob obrazovanii Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik, 26 dekabrya 1922 g.,." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1962), v. VI, p. 112. 491 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del RSFSR Poverennomu v delakh Germanii v RSFSR Radovitsu, 21 iyulya 1923 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 394.

140 Commissariats of Foreign Affairs.493 As far back August 12, 1920 the Ankara government had nominated Memduh Şevket [Esendal] the Plenipotentiary

Representative [Mümessil-i Murahhas] to Baku.494 At the same time, he was a person empowered to act for the Ankara government all over the Caucasus.495 In October

1920, the Ankara government opened its Plenipotentiary Representations in Tiflis, where Kâzım Bey [Dirik] was nominated as the Plenipotentiary Representative.496

On July 9, 1922, the Ankara government signed the Consular Convention with

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in Tiflis and supplementary Conventions of

Testament and Guardianship, and the Convention of Inheritance.497 The Consular

Convention allowed the signatories to play host to Consulars General in cities and ports that were in their territories. The signatories reserved for themselves the right of not allowing the opening of Consulates in some parts of their territories. This restriction was to be applied equally for all states.498

The inclusion of the Transcaucasian republics into the USSR was seen in

Ankara as a blow which abolished their sovereignty. The Turks feared that the USSR would liquidate the Turkish Consulates in the Transcaucasian republics. Indeed, this was what exactly happened. As it was noted that after the incorporation of Armenia into the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in December 1922, Moscow asked the withdrawal of the Turkish mission from Erivan.499 However, Ankara was reluctant to

492 A. Ya. Vyshinskiy - S. A. Lozovskiy, Diplomaticheskiy Slovar' (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1948), p. 564. 493 Ibid., pp. 563-564. 494 Bilal N. Şimşir, Bizim Diplomatlar (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi), 1996, p. 75. 495 Bilal N. Şimşir, p. 78. 496 Ibid., p. 80. 497 "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti ile Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan Sosyalist Soviyet Cümhuriyetleri Hükümetleri arasında 9 Temmuz 1338 tarihinde Tifliste akit ve imza olunan konsolosluk mukavelenamesi ve buna zeylen tanzim edilen hukuki aile ve ehliyeti hukukiye mütedair mukavelename," Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 6, pp. 257-275. 498 Ibid. pp. 258-259. 499 Haris Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927, A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan (Geneva: Impimerie Genevoise, 1966), p. 132.

141 comply with this wish and the latter was entitled to maintain its Representation in the

Armenian capital.500 Thereafter, long correspondence ensued between the two countries but without any satisfactory solution. A serious tension arose when the local

Soviet authorities in Armenia forced the Turkish Ambassador to close his mission in

Erivan and leave for Ankara. The Turkish representative at Erivan had been turned out of the town, and flag over his house was torn down.501 This was carried out during the third week of October 1923.502 Under the circumstance, the Soviet authorities closed the Baku-Batum and Tebriz-Tiflis-Batum routes to Europe for European travellers, and the Soviet authorities granted transit visas only under very special circumstances.503 The Turkish representatives had also been withdrawn from Tiflis and Baku.504

The Turks supposed that in the place of their Diplomatic Representatives they would be allowed to appoint a sufficient number of Consuls to protect the interests of the large number of their nationals residing in Russia, and more particularly in the

Caucasus.505 However, it was found that the Soviet authorities could not be induced to allow Turkey to appoint an adequate number of Consulates within the territories of the Soviet Union.506 The USSR did not keep to the principle of mutuality.

At the beginning of 1924, both sides decided to find a temporary solution to the question. On February 3, 1924, the Turkish government passed a resolution where it was stated that "the Soviet Consuls would be treated the same way as the Western

Consuls and that the matter with the Soviet Consular Convention would be considered

500 Haris Kapur, p. 132. 501 R. M. Burell (ed.), Iranian Political Diaries (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1997), v. 6, p. 648. 502 Haris Kapur, p. 132 503 Iranian Political Diaries, v. 6, p. 655. 504 Ibid. 505 "Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald, 21 May 1924," Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/61. 506 Ibid.

142 as completed with the forthcoming mutual exchange by letters of credence."507 On

February 7, 1924, Surits, the Plenipotentiary Representative in Ankara and Ismet

Pasha, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Turkey, exchanged the

Consulate Notes. In accordance with this note, the Soviet government had the right to establish its Consulates in Istanbul and Izmir.508 The Soviet Consulates in Kars,

Artvin, Erzurum and Trabzon were to continue their activities. The Soviet Consulates in Mersin and Samsun were to be abolished.

In conformity with the notes, Turkey was to transform its diplomatic representations in Tiflis, Baku and Erivan into consulates.509 The Consulate General of Turkey in Moscow was to terminate its functions. These functions were to be transferred to the Embassy of Turkey in that city.510 The Turkish consulates in Batum,

Novorossiysk and Aleksandropol (Gümrü) were to continue their activities. The

Plenipotentiary representations of the USSR in Turkey were to fulfil the consulate functions as before. Thus, up to conclusion of the Consular Convention in future, both

Turkey and the USSR established the provisional regime of the consulate establishments. In the course of that provisional regime, employees in the consulates of the two countries were to abide by the principles of the International Law.

Lenin's Death and Turkey

507 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, 3 February 1924," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], 030. 18. 01 / 08. 50. 10. 508 "Obmen Notami mezhdu Pravitel'stvom SSSR i Pravitel'stvom Turtsii o Konsul'skikh Uchrezhdeniyakh" Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo), v. VII, p. 93. 509 S. Yu. Vygodskiy, U Istokov Sovetskoy Diplomatii (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1968), p. 273. 510 Ibid. p. 94

143 Semyon Aralov, in his memoirs, related how the Turkish peasantry had questioned him about Lenin on his way to Ankara at the end of 1921.511 Aralov seemed to have been surprised at when one of them, looking at the artillery, which was passing by their village, had said, "it was said that Lenin had made presented these guns to our Mustafa to beat enemy."512

Lenin and Mustafa Kemal never met. However, Lenin, giving instructions to

Aralov, who was about to leave for Ankara, said that "Mustafa Kemal Pasha is not a

Socialist, but, to all appearance, he is an excellent orginizer, a very clever man. [He] placed himself at the head of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and will give imperialists a boor on the tooth. I am sure that he will defeat the Sultan with all his gangs. It is said that people believes him strongly. It is necessary to help him".513 As for Mustafa Kemal, he, in his letter, which he sent to Lenin on 10 April 1922, had benevolently called Lenin Mon Cher President (My Dear President).514

Turkey learned about Lenin's death through Ahmet Muhtar Bey [Mollaoğlu], the Plenipotentiary Representative of Turkey in Moscow. The correspondence between the Turkish Plenipotentiary Representative in Moscow and his government clearly shows the intention of Turkey to maintain friendly relations with the USSR.

On January 22, 1924, Ahmet Muhtar Bey sent a cipher telegram, where he had said the following:

Lenin died at 6. 50 p.m. in the evening of 21st January. I am of the opinion that if the President and his Office send a letter of condolence before other states do so, it will produce a good impression [on the Soviets].515

511 S. I. Aralov, "Vypolnyaya Ukazaniya Lenina," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, 2, p. 19. 512 S. I. Aralov, Vospominaniya Sovetskogo Diplomata (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy, 1961), p. 51. 513 S. I. Aralov, "Vypolnyaya Ukazaniya Lenina," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, 2, p. 18. 514 "Iz Perepiski M. K. Atatyurka s V. I. Leninym," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, 5, p. 115.

144 Having received this telegram, Ismet Pasha sent a telegram at once to Mustafa

Kemal, who, at that time had been in Izmir. He informed him about the Lenin's death on 21 January 1924, and also said, "it is necessary to send the telegram of condolence to the Soviet government before other states."516 Right away, Ismet Pasha sent a second telegram to Mustafa Kemal. There, Ismet Pasha asked Mustafa Kemal for approving the draft of the telegram of condolence for Mikhail Kalinin.517 Mustafa

Kemal approved the draft and asked Ismet Pasha for sending the telegram immediately. The telegram, which was in French, was sent to Mikhail Kalinin with the Mustafa Kemal's signature on 23 January 1924. Two days later, Mustafa Kemal's telegram of condolence was published in Pravda.518 In his turn, Ismet Pasha sent a telegram of condolence to Chicherin, where he said, "Deep-touched with irretrievable loss of Lenin, I beg you for taking my ardent condolences."519

Ahmet Muhtar held that sending a wreath on behalf of the Turkish government would create a very favourable impression as well. He sent a telegram to Ankara and asked for instructions as regards that matter. On January 23, Ismet Pasha sent him cipher telegram, where he was said, "it would be appropriate to send the wreath on behalf of the Republic to Lenin's funeral."520

Many Turkish newspapers gave quite detailed forms of Lenin's biography and printed his portraits.521 Hâkimiyet-i Milliye of January 27, 1926, the semi-official

515 Bilal N. Şimşir, p. 116. 516 Ibid. 517 Bilal N. Şimşir, p. 117. 518 "Turetskaya Angora," Pravda (Moscow), 25 January 1924. 519 P. Moiseev - Yu. Rosaliev, K Istorii Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1958), p. 38. 520 Bilal N. Şimşir, p. 118. 521 "Blogadarnost' za Pomoshch v Chyornye Dni," Pravda (Moscow), 30 January 1924; On January 24, the regular session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was held at 2 p.m. Celal Nuri, the Chief- in-Editor of İleri and the Deputy for Van, made the deputies an offer to send the condolence to the Soviet government in connection with Lenin's death. The Chair of the session red the offers of Celal Nuri and Hakkı Bey. In the offer it was said the following: The death of Lenin, the Commissar of the Russian Soviet Government, had grieved all of us. From the forming of our National Government, during our struggle, in the most difficult days and right up to the

145 organ of the ruling People's Party reported about funeral arrangements in Moscow.522

Yeni Gün wrote that "Lenin's death, who were a great leader of the Soviet Republic, the friendly country to Turkey, stirs up sorrow in Turkey."523 Ileri wrote that "Lenin had been a honest, hard-working and staunch revolutionary. Even his adversaries had respected him for his moral substance fibre and honesty. Lenin had won and had died.

However, that victory came uneasily, only after great struggle. That struggle had changed all social order and way of life in Russia. Lenin is one of the great men in the world. Marx had been for Lenin the same as Koran is for true believers"524.

The funeral ceremony was also held at the Residence of the Soviet

Plenipotentiary Representative on Thursday, on January 24, from 2 p.m. to 4 p.m., in

Cebeci district of Ankara. Besides the foreign official representatives and the press, the representatives of the Turkish government and the representatives of the Turkish newspapers presented their condolences to Surits. In particular, Abdülhalük Bey

[Renda], the Minister of Finances, Kâzım Pasha and his aide-de-camp, on behalf of the Minister of Defence, Ibrahim Tali and Kamil Bey, consultants of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, participated in the funeral ceremony at the Residence of the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in

Ankara.525

victory, he had rendered us help. Using every opportunity, he had welcomed the labours of our Meclis. In connection with the death of the immortal, on behalf of Highly respected Assembly, we offer to send the condolence to the Russian Soviet Federative Republic, our neighbour. Following this, Celal Nuri took the floor. In his speech, he added that Lenin had started revolution, influence of which could be seen all over the world. Celal Nuri also appealed to the deputies to send a letter of condolence to the Soviet government. After that, the Chair of the session put Celal Nuri's offer to the vote. The deputies lifted up their hands, the voices "unanimously" resounded from the Hall. In that way, the GNA decided to send the condolence to the Soviet government in connection with Lenin's death. For this, see: For this, see: Türk Parlamento Tarihi TBBM - II Dönem 1923-1927 (TBBM Vakfı Yayınları N2), 1993, v. II, p. 471. 522 "Lenin İçin," Hâkiimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 27 January 1924. 523 "Blagodarnost' za Pomoshch v Chyornye Dni," Pravda (Moscow), 30 January 1924 524 Ibid. 525 "Rus Sefaretinde," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 25 January 1924.

146 In the morning, on January 27, many foreign representatives took part in the ceremony of bearing-out of Lenin's body from the Hall of Columns in Moscow. Here,

Hüseyn Hakkı Bey, the Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, presented the

Turkish Republic.526

In connection with Lenin's death, Ahmet Muhtar also wrote a cordial letter to

Chicherin, where he, on behalf of his Government and his behalf, presented their condolences and also expressed the best wishes to the Soviet State.527 In his turn,

Chicherin thanked Ahmet Muhtar in length and flaming letter, remarking that they were touched by the Turkish Representative's kindness to them at these difficult days.

Chicherin also thanked him for the wreath and asked Ahmet Muhtar for telling the

Turkish Government gratitude for friendly gesture and that the policy of the friendship with Turkey, which had been started by Lenin, would be continued.528

Continuation of the Problems Concerning Consulates

In spite of the fact that both countries had established provisional conditions for the Consulates, the complications continued. The matter was that the Soviet authorities were dragging their feet to offer visas to the Turkish Consuls appointed to

Batum, Tiflis and Baku.529 The British diplomatic representative in Istanbul explained it by the ongoing process of expelling numbers of Turkish subjects, who had been long established in the Caucasus by the Soviet authorities and that the latters wished to delay the Consuls visas until the process of expulsion was complete.530 Ahmet

Muhtar Bey, in a talk with the British representative to Moscow, R. M. Hogson,

526 "Inostrannye Predstaviteli na Vynose tela V. I. Lenina," Pravda (Moscow), 30 January 1924. 527 Bilal N. Şimşir, p. 118. 528 Ibid. 529 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924," Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/61.

147 remarked that the Russians were demanding that the consular officers selected for service in the Soviet Union should await the grant of their exequaturs before proceeding to their posts.531

Immediately, these events found their reflection on the pages of the Turkish newspaper Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, which sharply expressed its dissatisfaction with the non-acceptance of the Turkish Consuls by the Soviet Union. Hâkimiyet-i Milliye stated that "Russia intended to pursue the unilateral policy only with one friendship and only with its own interests."532 The newspaper reminded to the USSR that

"Turkey builds its relations on the basis of the principle of mutuality and the equal right" and that "the Turko-Soviet friendship could be preserved only in the framework of that principles".533 Only two weeks had passed as the new Soviet diplomats had arrived in Turkey.534 The fact that the Soviet authorities did not permit the Turkish diplomats to go to the USSR, according to Hâkimiyet-i Milliye's definition, was a diplomatic robbery, as all the Soviet officials that had been sent to Turkey could freely go every place in the country.535

Presentation of the Letters of Credence by Yakov Surits,

the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR, on February 27, 1924

These difficulties notwithstanding, the Turkish Government accepted Surits's letter of credence. Yakov Surits, on his arrival in Turkey, had already presented his letter of credence on June 23, 1923, in the capacity of the Plenipotentiary

530 Ibid. 531 Ibid. 532 "Rusya'nın Bize Karşı Olan Vaziyeti," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 9 February 1924. 533 Ibid. 534 Ibid. 535 Ibid.

148 Representative of the RSFSR.536 The two weeks later, the Central Executive

Committee of the USSR confirmed the Treaty for the formation of the USSR. Thus,

Surits would have to present his credentials once more, but in this case, in capacity of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR.

On February 27, 1924, the presentation of the letters of credence was held in

Istanbul. On that day, the political representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Turkey, Kamil Bey, made for the Soviet Consulate at 3. 30 p.m.. Having accompanied

Surits, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative and his entourage of officials, he conveyed them in cars at the Presidential Office. A guard of honour in two rows and a military band were formed up opposite the Presidential Office. When, Surits and accompanying officials went out the cars and came up to the guard of honour, the guard welcomed the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative and the military band began playing International.

After that, the Chief of the Presidential Office, Hayati Bey and aides-de-camp went out to receive the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative. Hayati Bey invited

Surits to the building, where they took a rest for a while. After a while, Gazi Mustafa

Kemal Pasha, the President of Turkey, received Surits, the Soviet Plenipotentiary

Representative.

Mustafa Kemal received Surits standing. Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, took also part in the official ceremony.

Surits took the floor first. In his speech he said the following:

Your Excellency the President of the Republic, I have the honour to present to you the letters of credence containing my appointment to you by the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in the quality of Plenipotentiary bearing the title of Representative Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. I am proud of being

536 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, pp. 360-361.

149 the Representative of the USSR, which had ties of friendship with Turkey for a long time. That glorious friendship had been the first step that Turkey had undertaken during his struggle for the national liberation, which ended with the great victory and with the creation of the Turkish Republic.537

Surits gave his high praise to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the President of the

Turkish Republic, and told that "to have such a President, who represents the mind of the Turkish nation and who is determined and convinced, will bring Turkey happiness."538 Surits, in his speech, accented the necessity of the preservation of friendship between the two states. Surits said, "the USSR would welcome the future

Turkey's victories and successes in the field of economy and culture."539 He offered the active political collaboration and pointed out that "the cordiality, which had been rendered by the Turkish people in connection with Lenin's death, had displayed that all strata of the Turkish community were supporting the idea of the necessity of persistent collaboration."540 He also added, "Lenin had been a most determined adherent of that idea and this idea would always be the basis of the Soviet policy."541

When Mustafa Kemal Pasha took the floor, he expressed that he had been touched by the friendly feelings of the people of the USSR in regards to the Turkish people. He said that all Turkish people entertained the same feelings towards the peoples representing the Soviet republics. He assured the Soviet Representative that

Turkey would go firmly and resolutely to economic and cultural successes in the framework of peace and security and, at the same time, Turkey would be glad for the progress of peoples of the USSR. In conclusion, Mustafa Kemal Pasha assured Surits that the Government of the Turkish republic would render him support in his efforts for the preservation of existing friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the

537 "Rus Büyükelçisi'nin İtimatnamesi," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 28 February 1924. 538 Ibid. 539 "Rus Büyükelçisi'nin İtimatnamesi," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 28 February 1924. 540 Ibid.

150 two states. Mustafa Kemal Pasha replied in a shorter but not less cordial speech.

Nevertheless, his not long and concrete sentences told Surits about questions that were to be settled by the Soviet Government in the matters concerning Turkey.

When the interchange of greetings ended, Surits introduced his accompanying officials to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. When accompanying officials went out the Hall,

Ismet Pasha and Surits stayed for a talk. After that, the Turkish representatives saw

Surits and accompanying officials off. The Soviet representatives expressed to the

Turkish protocol their inspiriting with the hearty welcome.

On April 17, 1924, the Consulate General of the USSR was opened in Istanbul.

When, the Counsellor of the Plenipotentiary Representation announced the inauguration of the Consulate General, the red Soviet flag was hoisted over the

Consulate General, to the solute of the guard of honour and to the strins of the

International.542

Presentation of the Letters of Credence

by Ahmet Muhtar [Mollaoğlu] on April 9, 1924

On April 9, 1924, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Turkey in the USSR, Ahmet Muhtar presented his letter of credence to Mikhail Kalinin.543 By that letter of credence, Ahmet Muhtar was accredited in quality of Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Turkish Republic to the USSR. In the ceremony, Ahmet Muhtar delivered a speech, where he assured Mikhail Kalinin that

541 Ibid. 542 "Torzhestvennoe Otkrytie General'nogo Konsul'stva v Konstantinopole," Pravda (Moscow), 19 April 1924 543 The Primeministry of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey appointed Ahmet Muhtar [Mollaoğlu], the former Representative to Tiflis, to the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary representation (Sefır-i Kebirlik) to Moscow on 9 November 1922. For this, see: "The Decree of the

151 the Turkish people would invariably remember the valuable supporting of the Soviet government and those signs of kindly feelings cherished by the Soviet peoples to the

Turkish people, when the Turkish people had started its struggle. Ahmet Muhtar stated that the Turkish government wished for maintaining and still more strengthening friendly relations and confidence between both republics.544 The

Turkish Ambassador emphasized that Turkey had taken care of its independence. It seems that, first and foremost, it was said in order to make it clear to the Soviet government that Turkey was not intending to fall under any western country's influence. On the contrary, that Turkey was intending to pursue independent foreign policy, maintain friendly relations with the USSR. In particular, he declared that "the

Turkish people, which with zeal takes care of its independence, and which had been won at the cost of heavy sacrifice, firmly decided not to digrees from the line of maintaining lasting and enduring peace in the East and Turkey will go after that way in full accord and unanimity with the Soviet peoples."545

Following Ahmet Muhtar Bey's speech, Mikhail Kalinin took the floor. Having expressed his satisfaction in taking the letter of credence from the Turkish

Ambassador, he pointed out that the friendship, which had been laid in difficult but glorious times, would remain unforgettable.546 Mikhail Kalinin also declared that the

Soviet government intended to establish peace and lasting collaboration between peoples in the Near East and, therefore, the Soviet government welcomed the analogous aspirations of the Turkish Republic.

Cabinet of Ministers, 9 November 1922," BCA [Ankara] Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers] 030. 18. 01 / 06. 35. 8. 544 "Rech' Posla Turtsii v SSSR Ahmeda Muhtara," Izvestiya (Moscow), 10 April 1924. 545 Ibid.

152 The Continuation of Difficulties

On February 9, 1924, Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, which was very close to Mustafa

Kemal Pasha, inserted an article "The Russian Stand to Us". The article asked the question: "Why did the USSR pursue the provocative policy against us?"547 One of the reasons for such a question was that the number of Soviet newspapers in Russian and Turkish, which contained articles severely critical of the position of the Turkish government, had been continued to be imported into Turkey.548 Hâkimiyet-i Milliye drew a conclusion that as these newspapers had been printed both in Russian and in

Turkish, then they had been destined for propaganda against Turkey in Turkey itself as well as outside of the USSR.549

If the Soviet authorities regarded Turkey as of strategic and revolutionary significance, then they would have to take notice of it and take proper measures.

However, such measures had not been taken. On March 31 1924, Pravda inserted an article, which was written by P. Kitaygorodskiy. The author, in relation to the question of the abolishment of Caliphate in Turkey, said, "economic base of the big feudal - large land-owners remained inviolable."550 In author's view, it was "halved, timid and indecisive act of the GNA, which reflected the whole nature of the Turkish radical petty bourgeoisie."551 P. Kitaygorodskiy wrote, "all this happened, since the ruling Kemalist group had been afraid of the masses and, this group, speaking

546 "Rech' Predsedatelya Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta SSSR, M. I. Kalinina pri vruchenii veritel'nykh gramot Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Ahmedom Muhtarom, 9 aprelya 1924 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo), v. VII, p. 183. 547 "Rusya'nın Bize Karşı Olan Vaziyeti," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 9 February 1924. 548 "Rusya'nın Bize Karşı Olan Vaziyeti," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 9 February 1924. 549 Ibid. 550 P. Kitaygorodskiy, "Khalif ushyol, no korni ego Zhivy," Pravda (Moscow), 21 March 1924. 551 Ibid.

153 monopolistically on behalf of the whole nation, in fact, had feared to lean on genuine working-peoples - workers and peasants."552

The Soviet government's official point of view, which had repeatedly been spoken, was that the Turko-Soviet relations would become stronger as Kemal was one of its founders.553 In other words, the Soviet government counted on Mustafa Kemal.

Although the article was written by P. Kitaygorodskiy, however, in Turkey, ideas in the article were taken as the Soviet State's point of view. It was known in Turkey, that the press in the USSR was the State's property and that it was the State's creation and therefore, Turkey regarded those, who worked there as the State employees, carrying out orders of the State.554 In connection with such articles, Hâkimiyet-i Milliye wrote that "these newspapers gave rise to melancholy feelings among the Turks" and that

"these Soviet newspapers were not full of hatred for Turkey, but rather they reflected carelessness towards Turkey."555

The difficulties with visas also continued. The Soviet authorities did not issue visas to the Turkish diplomats until May 1924. The Turkish government intended to appoint its Consuls to Sevastopol and Odessa. There were thousands of Turkish subjects in the Crimea.556 Secondly, The Soviet Union carried out its trade with

Turkey mainly through Odessa. Therefore, Turkey held that the protection of the

Turkish interests in these cities were the natural course of things.557 Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet government announced that it would not accept any foreign

552 Ibid. 553 "Turetskaya Respublika," Pravda (Moscow), 2 November 1923. 554 "Rusya'nın Bize Karşı Olan Vaziyeti," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 9 February 1924. 555 "Rusya'nın Bize Karşı Olan Vaziyeti," Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 9 February 1924. 556 "Rusların Yaptığı Bir Değil, İki Değil Ki …," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 11 May 1924. 557 Ibid.

154 Consuls in Odessa, the German Consul arrived in there at the beginning of May

1924.558 This event could not but raise feelings of offence in Turkey.

It was also alleged that a certain Tahsin Bey, the first secretary of the Turkish

Embassy in Moscow, had been arrested on his way to the Soviet capital. He was accused of smuggling, and was subjected to such a treatment, so inconsistent with his diplomatic credentials that he had attempted to commit suicide.559 The Ankara government communicated with Moscow on this matter. Ahmet Muhtar Bey had a talk with the British Representative to Moscow R. M. Hodgson, and the Turkish diplomat alluded that the Turkish subjects were continually being arrested, imprisoned for long periods and expelled without any justification.560 Ahmet Muhtar found it quite impossible to get justice for his nationals or to get Moscow to bring effective measures to bear upon local Governments in the Caucasus.561

In May 1924, some Turkish newspapers inserted articles, which complained bitterly of the unfriendly attitude of the USSR towards Turkey. On May 11, 1924,

Cumhuriyet wrote "the new policy of the USSR did not differ from that of the former tsarist government" and that "the Soviet policy, which was not compatible with friendship, had taken the shape of hostility."562 The article in Cumhuriyet put questions: What are the Turko-Soviet relations? Whether they are friends or enemies?

The article answered at once that "if these relations were friendly, then problems would arise because of the Russian stand and if they were adversaries, then the nation

[the Turks] would not keep silence against it."563

558 Ibid. 559 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Macdonald, May 14, 1924," Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/16. 560 Ibid. 561 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Macdonald, May 14, 1924," Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/16. 562 "Rusların Yaptığı Bir Değil, İki Değil Ki …," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 11 May 1924. 563 Ibid.

155 In response to the hold-up of visas on the part of the USSR, the Turkish government renewed its decree, in conformity with which, the Soviet citizens could enter Turkey only by the Ministry of Inner Affairs' prior permission.564 This decree was renewed in connection with the analogous decree of the Soviet government.565

The Turkish Vatan stated that "in response to the expulsion of the Turkish subjects from the Caucasus, the Turkish authorities introduced new restrictions for the Soviet citizens.566

However, at the same day, the Soviet government undertook measures for the settlement of these problems. The Consulate General in Istanbul issued visas for the

Turkish Consuls leaving for Batum, Baku, and Tiflis.567 It appeared in Tanin

(Istanbul) of May 11, 1924, that "the Soviet authorities in Baku had apologised for the incident with Tahsin Bey, but the Turkish government was still discussing this matter with Moscow.568 It should be noted that no particulars of the incident had been given to the public. The British Representative in Istanbul, in his dispatch to London, remarked that it seemed not improbable that Tahsin Bey was in fact engaged in smuggling.569

In connection with these measures, which had been undertaken by the Soviet government, Cumhuriyet wrote, "it seemed that the Russians had understood that their policy had been improper."570 The newspaper also indicated that "these measures might have been enough in order to put an end to the tension, which had been existing in relations between the USSR and Turkey during some time."571 Cumhuriyet

564 "Rus Meselesi," Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 13 May 1924; "Uluchshenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy," Pravda (Moscow), 16 May 1924. 565 "Uluchshenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy," Pravda (Moscow), 16 May 1924. 566 Ibid. 567 "Rus Meselesi," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 13 May 1924. 568 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/16. 569 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/16. 570 "Rus Mesalesi," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 13 May 1924. 571 Ibid.

156 expressed its wish for that the USSR should act benevolently in regards to the Turkish subjects.572 In conclusion, the newspaper conveyed its belief in necessity of mutuality and inviolability of the Turkish national pride.573 Three days later, a review of

Cumhuriyet's article appeared in Pravda and called it as the improvement of the

Turko-Soviet relations.574

The outburst of hostility in the Turkish press against the Soviet Union did not led to severance of diplomatic relations between the two states. It was usual and recurrent friction between the two Governments.575 Indeed, on March 4, 1924,

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his programme speech in the GNA, pointed out that "we intended frankly to maintain friendly ties with the USSR and, in every possible way, favoured its prosperity and we want the impediments would be settled in practical ways."576

However, the Soviet government realized that these minor issues could assume importance if the USSR would be involved in serious difficulties, for example with either Romania or Poland.577 The relations between Turkey and Rumania could be described as cautious but amicable.578 Poland appeared to be anxious to stand well with the Turks.579 On May 9, 1924, it was announced that the Turkish military mission shortly to visit that country.580

On May 24, 1924, Surits informed the Turkish government about his departure to Istanbul for a month.581

572 Ibid. 573 Ibid. 574 "Uluchshenie Sovetsko-Turetskikh Otnosheniy," Pravda (Moscow), 16 May 1924. 575 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F. O. 416/61. 576 "Polozhenie v Turtsii," Pravda (Moscow), 4 March 1925. 577 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/61. 578 "Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald, May 14, 1924), Public Record Office (London), F. O. 418/61. 579 Ibid. 580 Ibid. 581 "Rus Sefiri Istanbul'a Gidiyor," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 25 May 1924; In this connection, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative gave a supper at the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representation in Ankara.

157 On May 28, 1924, Surits gave an interview for the Istanbul Tevhid-i Efkâr, where he touched the Turko-Soviet relations. In Surits's view, there were arguments between the two countries concerning minor questions and, at the whole, the principles of both countries did not change.582 Further, in order to dispel Turkey's distrust of the USSR, Surits explained that "the USSR had close and cordial relations with Turkey" and that "the USSR did not want to intervene in Turkey's affairs" and that "the USSR fully appreciated the role and great value of the Turko-Soviet relations."583

Bessarabia and its Reflection on the Turco-Soviet Relations

The serious dispute over Bessarabia prevented the Soviet Russia from the establishment of good relations with Romania.584 The Soviet government renounced the 'historic rights' of the Czardom over Bessarabia, but at the same time declined to recognize either the resolutions in favour of union with Romania, which had been passed in 1928 by the Bessarabian Council, or the inter-Allied treaty of the October

28, 1920.585 The Romanian government accepted the Council's vote together with the conditions attached to it. However, on November 27, 1918, after the collapse of the

Central Powers and on the eve of the Peace Conference in Paris, the Romanian government cancelled the conditions of April 8, and Bessarabia merged in Greater

Tevfik Rüştü, Tevfik Kamil, the Counsellor of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doctor Refik Bey, Hüseyin Bey, the Minister for Health, the Minister for Trade, the Chief secretary of Exchange, took part in the supper. 582 "Rus Sefiri Surits Yoldaş'ın Beyanatı," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 30 May 1924. 583 Ibid. 584 Bessarabia was the name of the territory between the River Pruth, the River Dniestr and the Black Sea, which had been transferred from the Ottoman Empire to Russia by the Peace Treaty signed at Bucharest on May 28, 1812 and had been administered as a Russian province. For this, see Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey Of International Affairs 1920-1923 (Humphley Milford, Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 273-278.

158 Rumania. On October 18, 1920, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Romania signed the

Paris Protocol, which declared Bessarabia Romanian property.586 The protocol acquired legality only after the ratification of it by all its signatories. Britain ratified first on May 19, 1922.587

Early in February 1924, the Soviet Union and Rumania agreed to hold a

Conference at Vienna. The Conference was held from March 22 to April 12, 1924 in

Vienna.588 At the Conference Soviet delegation proposed that the question of the national preference of the Bessarabians should be settled by a plebiscite. However, as far back March 11, 1924, the French Parliament had decided to ratify and put into force the Paris Protocol of October 28, 1920.589 At the Conference, the Soviet government's demand for a plebiscite in Bessarabia was definitely rejected by the

Rumanian delegation. Until the plebiscite, the Soviet Government regarded

Bessarabia as integral part of the Soviet Ukraine and the USSR.590

From time to time, tensions in relations between Rumania and the USSR were leaving its work on the course of the Turko-Soviet relations as well. For instance, at the end of April 1924, some information that Turkey was about to conclude an alliance with Rumania and Japan against the USSR appeared in the Istanbul newspapers.591 As regards this, it appeared in the foreign newspapers that allegedly the negotiations had started in Ankara and that Surits had handed a note of protest to the Turkish government.592 Cumhuriyet made a request from the responsible officials

585 On April 8, 1928, the Bessarabian Council voted for political union with Rumania on certain clearly defined conditions of local Autonomy. 586 Luis Fisher, v. II, p. 510. 587 Ibid. 588 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VII, p. 706. 589 Ibid. 590 "Zayavlenie Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR M. M. Litvinova predstavitelyam pechati o sryve Sovetsko-Rumynskoy Konferentsii v Vene, 8 aprelya 1924 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VII, p. 184. 591 "Türkiye-Rusya Münasebeti," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 April 1924. 592 Ibid.

159 for explaining the issue. On April 28, 1924, having got explanations from circles whose name was not mentioned. Thus, it was stated in Cumhuriyet that the information about the alliance was a fabrication."593 Cumhuriyet also wrote that "the

Rumanian political leaders' wish for visiting Turkey, which had been expressed by them a day or two ago, was at the bottom of spreading such rumours."594

In the first half of April 1924, Lev Trotskiy arrived in Tiflis.595 There, Trotskiy declared that "the Rumanian policy was dictated by France, which had made attempts to embroil us with Turkey, and at the same time, France had said the it had no problems with us."596

One can assume that the provocative allegations as an alliance between Turkey and Romania, while there was the question of Bessarabia between the USSR and

Romania, aimed at shaking the Soviets confidence in Turkey and to weaken Turkey's position in international arena. It is not impossible that French or English circles were responsible for such allegations. Indeed, France had problems with Turkey. As a matter of fact the question of the Ottoman debts was one of the principal contradictions between France and Turkey at that time.597 The outstanding question of the Ottoman debts deeply concerned France.

The Syrian northern frontier with Turkey was another troublesome question between France and Turkey. That frontier had been envisaged in Article VII of the

Turko-French Treaty of 1921 and had been confirmed by the Trearty of Lausanne.

The Turko-French frontier commission was set up for the demarcation of the controversial eastern sector of the frontier between Nusaybin and Al-Jaziral.

593 Ibid. 594 Ibid. 595 "Tov. Trotskiy v Tiflise," Pravda (Moscow), 13 April 1924. 596 Ibid. 597 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhyonnykh Sil Soyuza SSSR, 1949), p. 261.

160 However, the Turks were refusing to take part in such a commission, unless administrative privileges would be given for Iskenderun (Alexandretta) and Antakya

(Antiochia), both of which had large Turkish populations.598

In fact this question infringed on the French interests in Syria and in the

Mediterranean Sea. Iskenderun was the only convenient harbour on that littoral.

Therefore, this part was important for France as a first-class naval base like Bizerta in

Tunisia.

The destiny of the French schools in Turkey was the third question. After

Lausanne, Turkey succeeded in limiting the number and activity of the French schools in Turkey and in putting an end to their former propagandistic activities.599

Thus, the French programme in Turkey was rather defensive. France intended to save the former French positions and, at the same time, defend itself against the possible Turkish danger in the northern Syria. Therefore, the strengthening of Turkey and its international position was not playing into France's hands.

The Soviet-French relations also remained strained. Steklov in his article in

Izvestiya of February 9, 1924, wrote that "France, not knowing how to behave, tries to pinpoint the former policy of piling up of obstacles on our way. The French government wants still to destroy us. France attempts to make arrangements with the

British government for coming out in a united front against us in the question of the old debts. On the other hand, on eve of the inevitable recognition of the Soviet government, France wants to shoot the Parphinian arrow and hamper our future international position."600 Consequently, as the Soviets believed, ties between the

598 Ibid. p. 66. 599 B. Dantsig, p. 66. 600 Mikh. Pavlovich (M. Vel'tman), Russkiy Vopros v Angliyskoy Vneshney Politike (1922-1924) (Moscow: Nauchnaya Assotsiatsiya Vostokovedeniya pri Tsentral'nom Ispolnitel'nom Komitete SSSR, 1924), p. 52 .

161 USSR and Turkey, France was depriving Turkey of supporting, in case of conflict between France and Turkey.

In early June 1924, information from foreign newspapers, about the USSR's aggressive designs, continued to come to Turkey. For instance, in a telegram from

Athens, it was said that Lev Trotskiy declared in Podolsk that "Russia regards

Bessarabia as a way leading to Istanbul".601 In this case, the source of this information was Bern, Switzerland.602 Tanin inserted the alleged statement of Lev Trotskiy, where it read:

We [the USSR] do not have to give up good aspects in the foreign policy of the old government [the tsarist government]. Both Istanbul and the Straits were those rare questions over that the Czarism did not hesitate. We ought to declare loudly: We need Istanbul. …We categorically require Bessarabia, because it is the first stage on the way to Istanbul … Even if both France and Britain want to hamper us, we will have the Straits all the same.603

In this connection, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to Turkey was obliged to give an explanation. Surits refuted 'the Trotskiy's statement' and declared that "the news from Bern was not true, and Trotskiy, neither in Podolsk nor in other place delivered any speech about Istanbul and the Straits" and that "the capture of Bessarabia, Istanbul and the Straits were as contrary to the Trotsky's thought as to the political principles of the Soviet government, therefore, the alleged statement of Trotskiy is only a rumour."604 The Soviet Government declared repeatedly that it did not engaged in preparation for a war against Romania.

As Trotskiy did not leave Moscow after his return from the Caucasus, it was impossible that he delivered a speech in Podolsk. The Italian Corriere della Sera of

April 24, 1924 wrote that in an interview given to the American journalist in Moscow

601 "Rus sefiri Diyor ki: İstanbul'da gözümüz Yok," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 June 1924. 602 Ibid.

162 in late April, Trotskiy was reported to have categorically denied that the USSR intended to go to war with Romania over the Bessarabian question.605

Although these developments did not arouse an open tension in the Turko-

Soviet relations, however, it cannot be asserted that this event did not arouse suspicions in Turkey at all. On June 9, 1924, the Turkish government discussed the question of Turko-Soviet relations.606 The Turkish government came to the conclusion that the Turko-Soviet relations were on good stage of development.607 On

June 7, a high Turkish official declared to Cumhuriyet that "we are friends with

Russia" and that "it is impossible that such a leader as Trotskiy made a statement, which causes damage to our friendship."608 However, from the second part of that statement, it is clear that the Turkish official assume that Trotskiy and any other

Soviet leader could have such an idea. He asked "the sense of that statement is illogical so much that even if either Trotskiy or other Soviet leader have such an idea, what good will it do?" Further, the Turkish official said, "Maybe, it is necessary to revise the mutual arrangements in order to not to make customary aroused omissions.609 On June 10, 1924, Cumhuriyet wrote that "Surits, the Soviet

Plenipotentiary Representative, refuted the 'Trotskiy's statement' to the right degree, however, the Soviet Government's refutation would very brightly demonstrate the friendship that exists between the two states to both the friends and foes."610

The slightest carelessness on the part of the USSR could inflame suspicions about Soviet aggressiveness, which took deep root in the Turks' minds. Chicherin realized that. On May 16, 1924, he sent a letter to Surits, where he wrote, "the Vienna

603 "Rus sefiri Diyor ki: İstanbul'da gözümüz Yok," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 June 1924. 604 Ibid. 605 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (London: 1928), p. 265. 606 " Türk-Rus Münasebeti İyi Bir Seferdedir," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 10 June 1924. 607 Ibid. 608 "Rus Sefiri Diyor ki İstanbul'da Gözümüz Yok," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 June 1924.

163 Conference had suggested an idea everywhere that we [the USSR] want to restore territories that had been a part of the Russian Empire."611

The Soviet government did not delay to issue an official refutation. It was already ready on June 8, 1924.612 It was prepared by the Department of the Press of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and it was told Turkey through the

Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union on the next day. Cumhuriyet published the refutation on June 10, 1924.613 In the official refutation, the People's Commissariat of

Foreign Affairs had said the following:

Rumours about Trotskiy's statement and that Soviet Russia wants both Istanbul and the Straits has again been worked out in Bucharest. The question of capture of Istanbul and the Straits had been the tsarist government's sacred aim. However, that question contradicts the essence of the Soviet government and is far from Trotskiy's ideas.614

At the beginning of April 1924, the Politburo discussed the question of the demarcation of Central Asian republics. The Politburo's plans gave rise to the anxieties in the Eastern countries.615 The Turkish Embassy at Moscow also learned about these designs.616 Chicherin himself held that, from the point of view of the

Soviet Republic's international position, such a measure would be most untimely.617

He conjectured that the abolishment of the two ancient Muslim states such as

609 "Rus Sefiri Diyor ki İstanbul'da Gözümüz Yok," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 June 1924. 610 "Türk-Rus Münasebeti İyi Bir Seferdedir," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 10 June 1924. 611 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 216. 612 Ibid. 613 Ibid. 614 Ibid. 615 "Chicherin to the Politbyuro of TsK RCP (B), May 16, 1924," Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii [Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 15. 616 Ibid. 617 "Chicherin to Stalin, April 5, 1924), Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii -Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p. 13.

164 Khorezm and Bukhara would undermine the Soviet position in the East and could create the greatest complications.618

Chicherin, in a letter to Stalin, wrote that "the aim of the Soviet Eastern policy was uniting the USSR with all the Eastern states against imperialism."619 Chicherin realized that if the USSR annexed parts of the territories of Eastern states, it would harm all Soviet Eastern policy.620 For the purpose of preventing such a risky step, he wrote letters both to Stalin and Zinoviev. For instance, in his letter dated June 6, 1924, to Stalin concerning the Soviet annexation of the theoretically independent Peoples'

Republics of Khiva and Bukhara, Chicherin wrote, "this national repartition will deteriorate our relations with the Muslim states."621 The Soviet Commissar for

Foreign Affairs was fully confident that strong public opposition against the USSR would appear in Turkey.622 He asked Stalin "what for we create commissions for the improvement of relations with Turkey, if we makes all Muslim states our adversaries with these decisions."623

The People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm (Khiva) were political formations under communist control, which had formal self-rule.624 Both Bukhara and

618 Ibid. p. 18. 619 "Chicherin to Stalin, April 5, 1924), Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii -Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p.20. 620 Ibid. 621 "Chicherin to Stalin, June 6, 1924), Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii -Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p. 19. 622 "Chicherin to the Politbyuro TsC RCP (B), May 16, 1924), Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii -Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p. 15. 623 "Chicherin to Stalin, June 6, 1924), Rossiyskiy Tsenter Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii -Russian Centre For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p. 19. 624 The agreement between Soviet Russia and the Khorezmian Soviet People's Republic, which was signed on September 13, 1920, granted the RSFSR on the territory of Khorezm certain economic privileges, such as the right to exploit natural resources, import and export without the payment of tariffs, and to use Russian currency. In all other respects, Khorezm remained an independent republic. A similar agreement was signed on March 4, 1921, with the Bukharan People's Soviet republic. For this, see: Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), Revised Edition, pp. 254-255.

165 Khorezm maintained direct diplomatic relations with Turkey. As far back as

November 8, 1921, the Cabinet of Ministers of the GNA decided to open its representatives (Mümessillik) in Bukhara and at Khorezm.625 However, as a result of the national repartition in Central Asia, Turkey would have to abolish its

Representatives in that cities. The Soviet intentions were once more made clear that the Soviet government was seeking to annex territories belonged to the former tsarist

Russia, and it could not but give rise to the fears in Ankara.

Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was aware that the

Soviet policy as regards Turkey had been zigzag.626 He realized that the Soviet government would have to make concessions to the Turks. On the other hand, he held that these concessions, by no means, would have to be made only on account of some ungracious actions on the part of the Ankara government with respect to the Soviet government.627

In this connection, in May 1924, a special commission for the examination of the Turko-Soviet relations was made up under the Central Committee of the Russian

Communist Party (Bolsheviks).628 The Commission included prominent leaders of the

Russian Communist Party such as Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign

Affairs, Krasin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Ordzhonikidze,

Menzhinskiy. As a result, on June 6, 1924, the People's Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs sent round its Representations in Turkey a circularon the simplification of issue of visas for the Turkish merchants. In October and November, the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Trade issued an order, which enlarged a list of the Turkish goods, which could be exported to the USSR without a licence. On November 5,

625 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, 8 November 1921," BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers] 030. 18. 01/ 04. 36. 15. 626 A. N. Kheyfets, p. 217. 627 Ibid.

166 1924, a new Asiatic Customs Tariff was put in force on the Turko-Soviet land frontier.

The Turko-Soviet relations, in the year after the Lausanne Conference, were developing with difficulties. The Soviet government did not issue the visas for a long time to the Turkish diplomats appointed to the Caucasian cities. This event displeased the Turkish government and, by reason of which, it even accused the Soviet government of pursuing only its own interests. Moreover, in this period, some articles containing criticism as regards to Turkey appeared in some Soviet newspapers. All of these testified to the fact that the Soviet government had no well thought-out policy towards Turkey. The Soviet leaders realized that the Soviet policy towards Turkey was full of zigzags, and, at the same time, realized that certain measures would have to be taken in order to eliminate these zigzags.

However, proceeding from the fact that Turkey was an immediate neighbour of the USSR, the Soviet government wanted Turkey to be the friendly State towards the

USSR. The Soviet government was engaged in the enormous task of the economic reconstruction of the country and, it needed time for its successful fulfilment. The

Soviet leaders believed that "imperialist" countries would attack the USSR some time or other. Therefore, in their opinion, the necessary time could be only obtained by preventing aggressions against the USSR. As the USSR shared with Turkey a long sea and land frontier, the benevolent attitude of Turkey towards the USSR would be a guarantee against aggression from that part of the frontier, and Turkey would be a reliable back of the USSR. In order to win Turkey's benevolent attitude towards the

USSR, it would have to show the same friendly attitude towards Turkey and to

628 Ibid. p.. 216.

167 maintain the mutual relations on benevolent and friendly level. Moreover, the Soviet government desired active political collaboration with Turkey as well.

In spite of the fact that the Soviet government's policy towards Turkey was full of zigzags, the Soviet government did not lessen the significance of Turkey for the

USSR. In the official correspondence, and at the meetings with the Turkish officials, the Soviet government and its diplomats, in order to underline its benevolent and friendly attitude towards Turkey and their desire for the keeping friendly relations with it, called mutual relations as glorious friendship, close and cordial relations.

They expressed the desire of the Soviet government for the preservation of friendly relations. Thus, in this period, the desire for the maintenance of friendly relations on the part of the Soviet government alternated with steps of Soviet insufficiently considered policy towards Turkey.

However, Turkey also wanted the USSR to be a friendly State with Turkey and was also concerned with the keeping of good neighbourly relations with the USSR. It was also engaged in critically important work on the reconstruction of its economy and the inner reforms. It also took care of security of its frontiers. It distrusted the

Western Powers. In such circumstances, the friendly Soviet State was a guarantee of security of its sea and, north-eastern and eastern land frontiers. Moreover, the USSR continued to be only reliable source of material and moral support in case of complications of relations between Turkey and the Western Powers. Another factor that also made Turkey to maintain good neighbourly and benevolent relations with the

USSR was that the Turkish government supposed that these relations would effect possible adversaries of Turkey.

Thus, the maintenance of good neighbourly relations served their interests and certain misgivings in their relations in this period did not lead to the severance of their

168 diplomatic relations and did not change their basic principles towards each other.

They tried to find possible ways for the solution of some issues. They agreed on the temporary status of consulates, looked for possible ways for the development of the trade relations. The Soviet government considered the state of affairs in the Turko-

Soviet relations at the Politburo.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND TURKEY

OF DECEMBER 17, 1925 ON NEUTRALITY, NON-AGGRESSION AND

169 NON-PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILE COMBINATIONS

On October 8, 1924 the British Labour Party was defeated in Parliament. The notorious Zinoviev letter, wherein the head of the Commintern allegedly called on the

British Communist Party to subvert the royal armed forces, cause a monumental scandal in Britain. In the subsequent elections, the Conservatives won a phenomenal victory. On November 21, 1924, the Foreign Office informed Rakovskiy that

Parliament refused to ratify the Treaty with the Soviet government, which had been signed by the Cabinet of James Ramsay Macdonald on August 8, 1924.

In the face of these developments, at a meeting of the textile workers Rykov outlined his own position and that of the Soviet leadership as such: "There is no doubt that recognition of the USSR by a large number of states was the result of our success in the reconstruction of our economy. It is incorrect to think that the loans are given to the poor. Loans are given to the wealthy. Europe refuses us loans now; but if we continue the process of economic reconstruction over the forthcoming years… they will give us a loan. We will receive one. For this reason … the centre of gravity lies in our internal policy."629

Speaking to the Thirteenth Congress, which took place on May 23, 1924,

Nikolay Bukharin, addressed that capitalism was achieving a certain stabilisation.630

Unemployment had declined in a number of countries, and on the whole the financial condition of the West was improving. In June 1924, Zinoviev also professed to see

"certain symptoms of capitalism's consolidation."631 Stalin believed that "stabilisation is not stagnation, it is a strengthening of the present position and a further

629 Rykov, A., Statii i Rechi (Moskow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1924), v. III, p. 338. 630 Trinadtsatyy S"ezd Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii Bolshevikov: Stenograficheskiy Otchyot (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1926), p. 323.

170 development."632 The theory of stabilisation fundamentally changed the basic premises of the party line.633 Anglo-American cooperation in providing Dawes Plan aid to Germany made Moscow's recent rebuffs particularly poignant.634

Internationalists such as Trotsky, Radek and Zinoviev had worked for a revolution in Germany, in the wake of the French occupation of the Ruhr region and ensuing inflation, but this had come to nothing.635 Greater stability in Central Europe appeared to minimise any chance for a successful European revolution. With the fall of Macdonald, one of Soviet's most influential sympathisers in the West disappeared from the scene. It was clear to Stalin that the Soviet Union would have to pursue its revolution alone.636

Lenin stated that socialism, by which he meant an economically and culturally advanced society with advanced technology and an educated populace participating actively in the process of government, would have to be built and that its construction would be a lengthy process.637 According to Lenin, the transformation could never occur in Russia alone; it would require the most active cooperation of at least several advanced countries among which he certainly classified Russia."638 Thus, for the orthodox Marxist-Leninist, the Russian revolution was part of a wider movement, and it could not stand-alone.

In the latter months of 1924, Stalin and his staff made an exquisitely ingenious use of Lenin's writings to turn ideology on its head.639 They came up with some

631 Pyatyy Vsemirnyy S"ezd Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala: Stenograficheskiy Otchyot (Moscow: 1925), p. 439 632 Richard B. Day, and the Politics of Economic Isolation (Cambridge, 1973), p. 96. 633 Ibid. p. 97. 634 Ibid. 635 Alex De Jonge, Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union (New York: William Morrow and Company), 1986, p. 201. 636 Ibid. 637 Tucker, R., Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879-1929, p. 369. 638 Ibid., p. 370. 639 Alex De Jonge, p. 201.

171 pieces Lenin had written in 1915, which maintained that, in view of the unequal development of capitalism in various lands, revolution, too, might develop in difficult fashions and break out in a single country.640 Stalin used this passage to justify his own spectacular theory 'Socialism in One Country', which maintained that, although the cooperation of the proletariat of several countries was necessary to guard against the restoration of a bourgeois order, it was possible to build socialism in one country alone.

It was considered that the developed economy with heavy industry producing machinery and means of production was to be the base of socialism. With that end in view, the reconstruction of the country's economy was the main line of the Soviet internal policy.641 The Soviet Government had already taken steps in this direction. In

December of 1923, The Central Committee of the Communist Party had passed a resolution consisting of arrangements, which would have to be done to improve the industry of the country, to bring down coast of industrial goods, to help the peasants economy, to improve a trade and money circulation.642 The Thirteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which took place in Moscow in May

1924, set the Communist Party a task to complete the reconstruction of industry at the earliest possible date and secure the growth of Soviet heavy industry.643 All of these, naturally, required much time.

However, the problem was that Stalin often said that the international bourgeoisie hated the Soviet order and looked for the opportunity to begin a new intervention. Many a party spokesman also concluded that Chamberlain, the arch-

640 Lenin, O Lozunge Soedinyonnykh Shtatov Evropy, v. XIX, p. 325. 641 "Rech' Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherina na III S"ezde Sovetov SSSR, 14 Maya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 288. 642 S. Yu. Vygodskiy, Vneshnyaya Politika SSSR 1924-1929 g.g., (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963), p. 31.

172 imperialist, would coordinate Europe in fresh interventionist plots.644 Therefore, the

USSR was badly in need of peaceful conditions for its existence, as it was a major prerequisite for the successful reconstruction of its economy. Moreover, for the

USSR, it was necessary to obtain a guarantee that imperialism would not succeed in establishing a continuous chain of hostile states against the USSR. The Central

Executive Committee instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to continue its activities, which were designed to extend the connections of the USSR and to consolidate its peaceful relations with other states, … to show unshakeable resistance to all attempts on security of the Republic.645 In other words, the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was instructed to disperse combinations directed against the USSR, avert and paralyse whatever plans for the encirclement of the

Soviet Union.

In late 1920, after the end of the Civil War, the Red Army and Navy, which were organized on a regular/cadre basis, numbered 5,500,000 men.646 Since then there has been a constant reduction in the size of the Red Army. By September 1, 1921, it numbered 1,800,000, by September 1, 1922, it numbered only 850,000 men.647

Therefore, at first, the Soviet government supposed that a complete disarmament would have to become a guarantee against aggression against the USSR.648 The

Soviet government took the first step in this direction at the Genoa Conference on

643 Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1970), v. IV, the Second Book, p. 339. 644 Richar B. Day, p. 97. 645 "Resolution of the Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 19 October 1924," cited in Jane Degras, The Documents on the Soviet Foreign Policy, v. I. 1917-1924, p. 471. 646 David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union. A History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 31. 647 Louis Segal-A.A. Santalov (eds.), Commercial Year-Book of the Soviet Union, 1925 (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1925), p. 22; At the beginning of 1923 there was a further reduction to 610,000, including absolutely all land, naval and air forces, and the total strength in July 1924, was 562, 967. 648 F. Rothstein, "Nasha politika mira za desyat' let," Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya politika (Moscow), 1927, N 10-11, p. 8.

173 April 10, 1922.649 However, then, Chicherin failed to precipitate a disarmament debate. Moscow despaired of drawing the big Powers into a discussion of the question, but hoped, nevertheless, to achieve practical results by convening a meeting of the Soviet Republic's immediate neighbours.650 With this end in view, the Moscow

Conference, with the RSFSR, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland opened in Moscow on December 1, 1922. At the Conference, Moscow agreed, after some wrangling, to the priority of political discussions. The Soviet delegation and the delegations of

Poland, Latvia, Finland and Estonia now adopted a convention providing for mutual abstention from armed aggression, neutrality in case any country which was not a party to the convention would commit an act of aggression against one of the signatory Powers, and the peaceful arbitration of all conflicts.651

In connection with a revolutionary situation in Germany in autumn of 1923, the

Soviet government, in order to prevent Poland and all Baltic states from aggression against Germany, proposed them to conclude an agreement, in accordance with which, sides would have to keep strictly neutrality as regards Germany.652 Hereupon, principles of non-aggression and neutrality underlay the Soviet foreign policy, the content of which was directed increasingly towards satisfying the requirements of

Soviet security by preventing the formation of anti-Soviet armed leagues and combinations. In its turn, it connected automatically with the active diplomatic process of building up a security system designed to frustrate and out-distance armed intervention.653 Through such a system the buffer state was assigned a positive role in

649 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1961), v. V, pp. 191-192. 650 Louis Fisher, The Soviets in World Affairs (London: Butlet & Tanner Ltd, 1930), p. 374 651 Ibid., p. 375. 652 F. Rothstein, "Nasha politika mira za desyat' let," Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow), 1927, N 10-11, p. 10. 653 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command. A Military-Political History 1928-1941 (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 290.

174 Soviet calculations.654 Non-aggression and commitment to neutrality were tied closely with the "active defence" policy of the Soviet government, and the conclusion of neutrality and non-aggression treaties with every neighbouring country individually would have to secure the country, when there was no war and for the event of war against the USSR as well.

The Soviet government decided to work out a new treaty with Turkey, since the

Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921, no longer satisfied the security requirements of the USSR. The Treaty of March 16, 1921, had been rather a detailed plan of measures, which both sides had to fulfil. Many articles of the Treaty had already been implemented. Many articles, for instance, concerning the return to

Turkey of all Turkish prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Russia, the conclusion of the Consular Convention, as well as agreements regulating all economic, financial, and other matters necessary for the establishment between the two countries of friendly relations, were to be fulfilled.

The Soviet Proposal of September 1924

On September, 8, 1924, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in

Turkey, Yakov Surits, in a talk with Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister of Turkey, on the instructions of the Soviet government, proposed to broaden the Turko-Soviet

Treaty of March, 16, 1921. Ismet Pasha, on behalf of his government, stated that he was willing to start negotiations and asked Surits for giving concrete definition of the

Soviet proposal.655 On September 19, 1924, Chicherin wired Surits that "the Soviet government is supposing to supplement the Treaty of March 16, 1921, with an

654 John Erickson, p. 290.

175 agreement on friendly neutrality in case of a war of one of the contracting parties with third parties and with commitment to take no part in hostile combinations directed against the other side.656

However, the Soviet government could not present its proposal to the Cabinet of

Ismet Pasha.657 Due to the sickness of Ismet Pasha and the Cabinet crisis in Turkey, the negotiations on the future treaty were suspended temporarily. On November 22,

1924, Ismet Pasha resigned from the post of the Prime Minister. New elections were carried out, and, eventually, the Cabinet of Fethi Bey [Okyar] entered upon its duties on November 21, 1923.658

On November 30, the Cabinet of Fethi Bey presented the Program of the new

Cabinet to the GNA. There, he underlined that the government would strive for strengthening further friendly relations with the USSR.659 On November 26, 1924,

Fethi Bey had a talk with Surits and expressed his wish for the continuation of the exchange of views.660

On January 6, 1925, Fethi Bey met with Surits. The Turkish Premier confirmed the consent of the Turkish government to broaden the treaty with a point on friendly neutrality and asked Surits to elaborate a formula. However, Fethi Bey was against an agreement, in conformity with which, the two countries would commit themselves to taking no part in hostile combinations. He held that such a formula would be elastic and would offend the principle of sovereignty.661 Principally, Fethi Bey apprehended

655 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1963), v. VIII, p. 766. 656 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 766. 657 Kamuran Gürün, Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1920-1953) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), p. 113. 658 M. Gökman, 50 Yılın Tutanağı, 1923-1972 (İstanbul: Hürriyet, 1973), p. 35. 659 Nuran Dağlı-Belma Aktürk (eds.), Hükümetler ve Programları (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi), 1988, v. I, p. 31; The Program also appeared in Pravda For this, see: "Deklaratsiya Novogo Turetskogo Pravitel'stva," Pravda (Moscow), 2 December 1924. 660 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 766. 661 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 7 yanvarya 1925," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 23.

176 that such an expression could impede the entering of Turkey into the League of

Nations.662 The Turkish Premier also stated that he was an ardent advocate of contact and concordance of questions concerning mutual interests and expressed his willingness to give assertions relative to concrete moments of the Turkish foreign policy, which had given rise to the doubts in the USSR.663

After a week, on January 13, 1925, Surits met with Şükrü Bey [Kaya], the

Turkish Foreign Minister. During the meeting, they exchanged views on the future treaty. The Cabinet of Fethi Bey seemed to have not been in a hurry with the new treaty. Though Şükrü Bey regarded the conclusion of a concrete agreement as important matter, he also thought that, at first, it was necessary to liquidate all existing questions between the two countries and to clear a ground for the negotiations.664 For instance, the two governments had not yet come to an agreement about provisions of the Trade Treaty. The state monopoly of foreign trade in the USSR was continuing to be an obstacle for the development of economic relations between the two countries.

Having agreed, Surits added, however, that the liquidation should not be bound up with the conclusion of the treaty, since owing to their nature, the settlement of some questions could be deployed.665 The Soviet government was convinced that some questions, incongruously occupying a lot of room, would be pushed to the background, when the treaty, which would secure healthy situation for the future relations, would be concluded.666

662 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 7 yanvarya 1925," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII,. p. 24. 663 Ibid. pp. 23-24. 664 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 55. 665 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Shukri Kaya, 13 yanvarya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 53. 666 Ibid.

177 On January 25, 1925, Surits passed the text of the Soviet formula to Şükrü

Bey.667 The Soviet draft, which was presented by Surits, contained four articles:

Article 1 In case of military action being taken against either Contracting Party by third or other states, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain benevolent neutrality as regards the first Contracting Party.

Article 2 In case of the emergence of any kinds of alliances or agreements of the third states directed against political, commercial or financial interests or interests of military security of one of the Contracting Parties, or in case of actual emergence of hostile line of behaviour as regards one of the Contracting Parties, or hostile actions by third powers in aforesaid questions, the second of the Contracting parties will take no part in whatever form in aforesaid alliances and agreements and likewise, will take no part in actually established as regards the first of the Contracting Parties hostile line of behaviour, or in hostile actions of third powers in aforesaid questions, irrespective of whatever it will be manifested in either direct or indirect form.

Article 3 In case of entry of one of the Contracting Parties into the League of Nations, as a result of which certain obligations for Turkey before the League of Nations will appear being at variance with the other Contracting Party because of both the Treaty of March, 16, 1921, and with the present its supplement, the aforesaid Contracting Party pledges to stipulate for its participation in the League of Nations by non-usage with the respect to this Party of Article 16 and Article 17 of the Charter of the League of Nations. Besides that, after its entry into the League of Nations, the aforesaid Contracting Party pledges to show preference to the second Contracting Party in all cases pertinent to the relations with this second Party and to the concluded treaties with this second Party, when obligations emerging for the first Contracting Party owing to its entry into the League of Nations will contradict to that treaties.

Article 4 Both Contracting Parties undertakes, in the case of emergence of misunderstandings or conflicts in connection with passage of military or merchant ships of other Contracting Party through the Straits, to render to each other assistance by all possible means to promote a free passage of their military and merchant ships through the Straits.668

667 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 26 yanvarya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 97; The draft of the treaty was also handed to Enis Bey, the charge d'affaires of Turkey in the USSR, by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on January 20, 1925.

178

The Turkish Project of February 22, 1925

On February 22, 1925, Şükrü Bey handed Surits the Turkish version of the draft treaty, which contained only one article. The formula of the Turkish article read:

In case of military aggression against one of the Contracting Parties on the part of one or a number of third powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain benevolent neutrality as regards the first Contracting party.669

The Cabinet of Fethi Bey was not able to take the country out of the state of isolation, on the contrary, its relations, especially with Great Britain became much more deteriorated.670 On March 2, 1925, the Cabinet of Fethi Bey resigned. On March

3, 1925, Ismet Pasha formed his second government. Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] was nominated the Foreign Minister.

The new Turkish Draft of March 24, 1925

Early 1925 was momentous from the point of view of the Turko-Soviet relations, since Turkey was clearly inclined to become good friends with the USSR.671

One of the reasons was that Turkey's relations with the U.K. after the Lausanne

668 "Proekt Dopolnitel'nogo Dogovora Mezhdu SSSR i Turtsiey," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, pp. 97-98; (Translation mine). 669 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 770. (Translation mine). 670 S. Kabul'skiy, "Sovremennaya Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1925, 3, p. 78. 671 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstaviyelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 27 marta 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 192.

179 Conference were dominated by the dispute about the possession of the vilâyet of

Mosul, that is the definition of the frontier between Iraq and Turkey.672 Turkey felt the exceedingly intensifying British pressure from the British ultimatum of October 1924, and these feelings reached their highest point in connection with the mutiny of Sheikh

Said in February 1925.673

Şükrü Bey, at the secret session of the GNA on February 4, 1925, asserted that

Britain was not interested in the oil in Mosul, it was planing to create a hostile massif against Turkey and was aiming at surrounding Turkey from the East.674 Turkey suspected Britain of that it followed policy of weakening of Turkey, since Britain regarded the independent existence of Turkey as an obstacle and threat to the British

672 In the Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, Article 8 left the frontier between Turkey and Iraq to be drawn by friendly agreement between Great Britain and Turkey. If this were not accomplished within nine months, the dispute was to be laid before the League of Nations Council. The Turko-British Conference on the Mosul question, or Khalich Conference, which had been held in Istanbul in May 1924, ended without achieving its purpose on June 5, 1924, in consequence of Great Britain's new and additional demands. The fact was that, Fethi Bey [Okyar], the head of the Turkish delegation at the Conference, demanded frontiers, which began at the foot of Jebel Khamrina (to the north-east of Bagdad). For this, see: T. C. Dış İşleri Bakanlığı Cumhuriyetinin ilk On Yılı, Balkan Paktı (1923-1934) (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Genel Müdürlüğü), 1974, p. 83; However, Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner, demanded the inclusion of three kazas of the sancak Hakkari into Iraq. He justified it that Britain could not leave Nestorians under the dominion of Turkey. For this, see: Irandust, "Bor'ba za Mosul," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 4-6, p. 104; Britain then brought the matter before the League of Nations on August 6, 1924, and a ommission was appointed to report on conditions on the Mosul vilayet. Until then the status quo was to be maintained. 673 At the beginning of September, when the Session of the League of Nations was going on its labour, the Ayssorian troops, which were supported by the British aeroplanes, began military actions against the Turks in the mountain areas of Hakkari. The Ayssorian troops extended their operations to the whole sancak of Hakkari. The Vali (Governor) of Van vilayet started response operations against the Ayssorian troops. For this, see: V. Gurko-Kryazhin, "Chetyre Konflikta," Novyy Vostok (Moscow), 1925, 7, p. 62; The Ayssors, escaping from the Turks, poured into the territory of Iraq. As a result, the British concentrated all its troops on the frontier. The attempts of the Turkish troops to liquidate raids of the Ayssorian troops made the British Government produce an ultimatum to Ankara on October 9, 1924, which demanded the Turkish authorities to evacuate places pointed in the British ultimatum in forty eight hours. Otherwise, the British Government intended to begin military operations. For this, see: Irandust, "Bor'ba za Mosul," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 4 - 5, p. 95; In this connection, the Turkish Government answered in restrained tone that Turkey did not infringe upon status quo established by the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of September 30, 1924. On October 15, 1924, Macdonald, the British Prime-Minister, appealed to the League of Nations to convoke an extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations. As a result, on October 27, 1924, the 31st Session of the Council of the League of Nations was held in Brussels, and on October 29, it drew a provisional frontier line, the so-called Brussel line, which would have to be respected by both sides until the permanent frontier would be determined between Turkey and Iraq. According to the resolution, Süleymanıye was left southwards from the previous line. This decision was severe blow to the Turks' hopes.

180 mandated territories in the East and Asia.675 In opinion of the Turkish government,

Britain strove for representing Turkey in Europe as a country, which was following policy of the unification of the Islam, and which was instigating India and Egypt to revolt, and, at the same time, Britain was propagandizing in the Mohammedan countries against the Turks, stating that the Turks had become Bolsheviks, had driven

Caliph out, had become infidels.676

The second threat for Turkey was Italy. As a result of the concentration of the

Italian forces on the island of Rodhos at the end of May and at the beginning of June

1924 gave also rise to trouble in Turkey.677 By time, this event coincided with the beginning of the Turko-British conference in Istanbul.

Italy was going through swift transition to the intensified industrialisation. It was greedily looking for new markets, sources of the new materials for its industry, and territories for its growing population. Italy had no coal, oil, iron-ore, and depended on this matter on Great Britain and France. Its population, which numbered of 40,000,000, was squeezed on the territory of 320,000 square kilometres.

On February 21, 1924, Benito Mussolini, in his program speech, absolutely openly stated that "Italy can go only to the East. On the West, Italy is faced with the powerful completed state formations. We can send there only our labour force and, one fine day, these states can put barriers to these hands. Hence, precise and true lines of Italian expansion lead only to the East."678 The Turkish Republic took care of these developments with a great suspicion. The fact that Italy possessed the Archipelago

Dodekanez, which was adjacent to the western cost of Anatolia and, which could

674 "Şükrü Bey's [Kaya] speech at the secret session of the GNA on February 4, 1925," in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 1989, v. IV, p. 474. 675 Ibid. 676 Ibid. 677 "Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhin' (Moscow), 1924, 4 - 5, pp. 243-244.

181 serve as convenient military base for attacks on the Turkish territory was the biggest danger for Turkey.

The strained atmosphere lessened when Mussolini made a statement about absence of any aggressive intentions with respect to Turkey.679 However, these statements were met with obvious distrust by the Turkish circles and there was a dissonance in Turkey's relations with Italy.680

The mutiny of Sheikh Said was also momentous event in the Turko-British relations. The Turks declared that the mutiny was an orthodox religious movement of protest against the Ankara government's attempted modernization and secularism.681

Although such motives played a part, yet the mutiny was mainly nationalist.682 This event confirmed the thesis of Ankara that so long as Mosul would remain at the

British hands, it would be the breeding ground of intrigues and would represent a real threat for the Turks.683 Undoubtedly, these events made Turkey look for the friendship with the USSR and France to counterbalance the British and Italian policy.684

In these circumstances, on March 24, 1925, Tevfik Rüştü, the new Foreign

Minister of Turkey, handed Surits a new draft, which contained four articles:

Article 1 In case of military aggression against either one of the Contracting Parties on the part of one or a number of third powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain benevolent neutrality as regards the first Contracting Party.

678 G. Kurdetsov, "Politika Italii v Sredizemnom More," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 1, p. 19. 679 "Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 4 - 5, p. 244. 680 "Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1924, 4 - 5, p. 244. 681 Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East (New York: Howard Fertly, 1969), p. 227. 682 Arnold J. Toynbee, The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement (Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 508 683 S. Kabul'skiy "Sovremennaya Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1925, 3, p, 40. 684 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 27 marta 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, pp. 192-193; S. Kabul'skiy, "Sovremennaya Turtsiya," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1925, 3, p. 40.

182 Article 2 Each Contracting Party undertakes not to participate in any alliance or agreement of a political character directed against the other Contracting Party

Article 3 Both Contracting Parties consider the present agreement as a regional, not presenting an obstacle for entry of one of them into the League of Nations.

Article 4 The present agreement will come into force from the moment of its signature and will be in force for three years. After that, it will be recognized automatically prolonged for one year, if one of the Contracting Parties will not notice of its denunciation six months before.685

Difference Between Soviet and Turkish Drafts

The new Turkish draft, which was presented by Tevfik Rüştü, completely repeated the Article 1 of the draft, which had been presented by Şükrü Bey. However,

Tevfik Rüştü inserted three new articles. The absence of points concerning the League of Nations and the Straits in the Turkish draft, the Soviet government regarded that the Turks would have wanted to sign such a treaty, which would not bind them in questions of neutrality and non- participation in hostile combinations.686 From the point of view of the Soviet government, the point on neutrality in the Turkish wording was allowing wide interpretations, which was absolutely depreciating neutrality.687

In the Article 1 of the Turkish draft, the term "military actions", which had been proposed in the Soviet draft, had been substituted for the term "military aggression".

Tevfik Rüştü argued that the term "military actions" in the Soviet draft could be

685 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 780. (Translation mine). 686 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 27 marta 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 193.

183 widely interpreted.688 In his opinion, this term was so indistinct that, in theory, even military manoeuvres could be brought under it.689 Tevfik Rüştü proposed that word

"war", which might be a more apt term.690 Besides, the Turkish government was unconfortable with the Soviet draft, which might have given the impression of an offensive alliance to the other countries.691

In the Soviet government's opinion, the term "military aggression" in the

Turkish draft, was narrowing the application of benevolent neutrality.692 The Soviet side was also of opinion that the term "military aggression" was depriving the Soviet draft of its steadiness. The Soviets were anxious about the possibility that an attacking power could arrange the emergence of military actions so that it would have the possibility to decline any accusations of initiative in aggression and to shift off accusations on other side.693

The Soviet government was also discontented with the Article 2 of the Turkish draft, since it had mentioned only hostile "political" combinations to the Contracting

Parties, and had passed over in silence about hostile military, trade, and financial combinations.694 For instance, the Soviet government regarded mutual commitments on non-participation in hostile combinations threatening the military security of other country as a development of its Article 1.695 The matter was that the Soviet

687 Ibid. 688 Ibid. 689 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 213. 690 Ibid. 691 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 213. 692 Ibid. p. 212 693 Ibid. 694 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 17 marta 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 193. 695 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 214.

184 government was foreseeing the benevolent neutrality not only after the beginnings of military actions against one of the Contracting Parties on the part of third power, but it was also intending to extend this condition to the time of peace.696 In general, the

Soviet government regarded this commitment as one of the most important and basic conditions for the strengthening and intensification of friendly relations.697 Owing to this point, the Soviet government would have secured its sea and land frontiers in the south, and would have prevented Turkey from any hostile action against the USSR in time of peace. However, it should be noted that the omission of this part of the Article did not mean that the Turkish government disagreed to take upon itself to take no part in hostile combinations threatening to the military security of the USSR. Simply, this part appeared to the Turkish government as superfluous.698 On April 8, 1925, during the discussions of the drafts between Tevfik Rüştü and Surits, the Turkish Foreign

Minister, wishing to dispell doubts of the Soviet government, agreed to include this commitment into the Turkish draft.699

As it was noted, mutual commitments about non-participation in financial and economic agreements had also been omitted in the Turkish draft. At that time, these conditions were unacceptable for the Turkish government, since there was no trade agreement between Turkey and the USSR. As a result, economic relations between the two were yet to be improved and reorganized, and, therefore, there was no material base for the statement of such a question.700 Therefore, the Turkish government raised an objection against this part of the Soviet draft, since it could

696 Ibid. 697 Ibid. 698 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 214. 699 Ibid. 700 Ibid.

185 create big difficulties when it intended to draw the foreign capital into the country.701

At that time, Turkey was in such a financial and economic state that it could not renounce the help of the foreign capital. At the same time, Turkey could not count on the USSR as well, because of the economic weakness of the latter.

In contrast, these commitments were of critical importance for the USSR. The

Soviet government had vexed questions concerning the old tsarist debts with a number of governments. The USSR did not exclude that these governments would declare a financial boycott against the USSR for the purpose of impelling the Soviet government to agree to undertake to return the tsarist debt. Therefore, the Soviet draft of January 25, 1925 stipulated the abstention of Turkey from the participation in financial agreements of third powers directed against the USSR.

As far back March 27, 1925, Chicherin sent a letter to Surits, in which he asked him for sounding the Turks during discussions of drafts.702 On April 8, 1925, Surits met with Tevfik Rüştü and offered the Foreign Minister of Turkey to start discussions of the drafts presented by both states.703 The Turkish government did not hurry to conclude the new treaty. One of the reasons was that the Turkish government apprehended that the future treaty would produce a huge effect outside the country.

Other reason was that the conclusion of such a treaty required of careful consideration. Both Ismet Pasha and Tevfik Rüştü underlined that the conclusion of the treaty was the matter of orientation.704

Discussion of Articles Concerning the League of Nations

701 Ibid. p. 215 702 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 27 marta 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 193. 703 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 212.

186

The attitude of the Soviet government to the League of Nations was clear. The

USSR expressed its stand openly in statements and addresses, stating that the League of Nations was merely a tool of capitalists and anti-Soviet machinery. In Chicherin's opinion "any people entering into the League of Nations lays down its freedom, if it does not belong to the victorious states."705 Not surprisingly, the Soviet government was against the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations. For the Soviets, Turkey continued to be the revolutionary country, and an example for all peoples of the East to follow. The USSR regarded the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations as a loss of this revolutionary country and, consequently, as a political defeat of the USSR in the Near East, and as economic capitulation of Turkey before the West.

First of all, the Soviet government worried that in case of the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations, Turkey would have to accept the Article 16 and Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Article 16 stipulated the compulsory participation of all members of the League in actions against states, which could be recognised by the League of Nations as aggressor. In such a case, members of the

League were to allow military forces of member states of the League to use their territories for passage through them.706 According to Article 16, members of the

League of Nations was to put an end to their financial, commercial relations with those states, which infringed the Covenant of the League of Nations.707 Thus, the

Article 16 stipulated a complete isolation and establishment of blockade against the

Aggressor State.

704 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 15 aprelya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p.p. 228-229. 705 "Tov. Chicherin o politicheskom momente," Pravda (Moscow), 6 October 1925. 706 The Legue of Nations 1920-1946 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996), pp. 164-165. 707 Kukudzura Isii, Diplomaticheskie Kommentarii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1942), pp. 166-167.

187 Article 17 specified arbitration in the case of conflict between two states. The

Soviet government feared that any military expedition ordered by the League of

Nations in the event of trouble between the Soviet Union and, say, Poland, and when the Soviet Union would be branded as the aggressor, this whole matter might turn into an "anti-Soviet crusade" with Turkey's support.

The Turkish draft of March 24, 1925 stipulated that "both Contracting Parties consider the present agreement as a regional one, which does not hinder any one of them from entering into the League of Nations."708 The People's Commissariat for

Foreign Affairs of the USSR was aware that the Turks would not accept the initial article about the League of Nations.709 In connection with this, the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs decided to propose the Turks in extremely cautious form to come to an agreement about that "in case of entry of one of the sides into the

League of Nations other side receives the right to cancel the treaty."710

On May 14, 1925, Chicherin sent a telegram to Surits, in which he asked him for handing this proposal to the Turkish government. With that end in view, Surits met with Tevfik Rüştü on June 15, 1925. Tevfik Rüştü said that the Soviet stipulations concerning the articles 16 and 17 were logical and fair, and if the Turkish government could not accept them, then the Soviet wish for the stipulation of them was a just demand.711 Tevfik Rüştü also explained Surits that he was not afraid of the

Soviet proposal, since the issue of the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations was

708 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 780. 709 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 14 maya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 303. 710 Ibid. 711 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 16 iyunya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 371; On June 16, 1925, Surits sent a telegram to Chicherin, in which he explained that there was no unity of opinion in the Turkish Cabinet relative to the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations, and that Tevfik Rüştü, himself, was an opponent of that.

188 the matter of far future. He promised Surits to hand the Soviet proposal to the Cabinet for consideration.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR also decided to propose Turkey that "if one of the Contracting Parties will conclude a treaty or any political, economic, trade agreement with the third State bordering upon the other

Contracting Party, then the first Contracting Party undertakes to inform the text of that treaty or agreement to the other Contracting Party."712 As for the term "military actions", the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR decided that it would be more expedient to give a negative form: "military actions" should not be understood as military manoeuvres, which would not give any damage to the other side.713 Chicherin asked Surits to ask the Turks to present their formula concerning this matter, if the Soviet formula would not satisfy them.714

The Proviso with regard to Persia

In early 1925, an acute conflict between the Turkish and Persian governments was about to emerge.715 Şükrü Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, in a conversation with Surits stated that Persia was carrying out anti-Turkish propaganda was distributing money and presents to the Kurdish chieftains.716 The Persian authorities were trying to discredit the prestige of the Turkish government in the frontier districts.

With that end in view, Şükrü Bey asserted that the Persian authorities persecuted and

712 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 14 maya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 303. 713 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 14 maya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p.p. 303-304. 714 Ibid., p. 304. 715 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 26 yanvarya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 102. 716 Ibid.

189 beat the Turkish citizens publicly, and invited the Kurdish chieftains to Teheran.717

Ankara had no doubt that under all of these was the British hand.718 The Turkish government even intended to resort to the harsh measures if the diplomatic attempts would not be successful.719 In view of this, Şükrü Bey asked Surits on January 25,

1925, whether the Soviet government could interfere in the conflict between Iran and

Turkey.720

As regards this, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR decided: 1) To make a statement to Ankara and Tehran about the readiness of the

Soviet government to offer its service for the settlement of the misgivings existing between them; 2) To include this question in the negotiations with the Turks on the broadening of the Treaty between RSFSR and Turkey of March 16, 1921; 3) To inform the Turkish government that the commitment to the benevolent neutrality, which had been stipulated by the Article 1 of the Soviet draft of the future treaty, would not apply in case of military actions being taken by Turkey against Persia, and vice versa.721

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR informed Surits about its decision on February 2, 1925. Chicherin also asked Surits, before making a statement to the Turkish government, to send his opinion about this decision to the

Commissariat.722

The USSR was against a military conflict between Turkey and Persia. Such a conflict would not suit the policy of the USSR towards the countries of the East, which intended to unite all countries of the East with the USSR in the struggle against

717 Ibid. 718 Ibid. 719 Ibid. pp. 102-103. 720 Ibid., p. 103. 721 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 2 fevralya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 114.

190 imperialism. The Soviet Government feared that the war between Turkey and Persia would only Britain.723 It was anxious about that as a result of military conflict between Turkey and Persia, Britain would take advantage of it, and would gain advantageous strategic positions in the territories adjacent to the USSR. Therefore, the

Soviet government, by all means, intended to prevent the two countries from such a military conflict.

The Soviets realized that if their own draft would be agreed upon with Turkey without any proviso with regard to Persia serious complications might arouse. Since the Article 1 of the Soviet draft stipulated that "in case of military action against either

Contracting Party by third or other states, the other Contracting Party undertakes to maintain friendly neutrality as regards the first Contracting Party", in case of military conflict of Turkey against Persia, the USSR would be a cover of the Turkish flank.

The Soviet government argued that the benevolent neutrality, which was mentioned in

Article 1 would not apply to the case of military actions of Turkey against Persia, and, thus, Turkey could not rely upon the benevolent neutrality of the Soviets. It was supposed that Turkey, in such a case, would abstain from military actions against

Persia. The Soviet government was an advocate of peaceful settlement of misgivings between them.724

However, the mutiny of Sheikh Said, which started in the village of Pınar of the district of Bingöl on February 11, 1925, slowed down the discussions. Only on June

15, 1925, Surits could put forward a proviso about Persia to Tevfik Rüştü, the

Minister of Foreign Affairs.725 However, Tevfik Rüştü was of the opinion that both countries should not confine themselves to this negative formula, and they should

722 Ibid. 723 Ibid. 724 Ibid.

191 come to an agreement about their common policy in the East.726 For instance, the

Turkish Foreign Minister pictured the future treaty roughly as a pact guaranteeing the territorial inviolability of the countries of the East, and a pact, which would encourage them in the collaboration.727 The Turkish Foreign Minister promised Surits to work out and present the draft.

Soon, Tevfik Rüştü Bey notified Surits about the Turkish proposal with regard to Persia. First of all, the Turkish government turned down the proviso to the Article 1 with regard.728 The Turkish government proposed that the USSR and Turkey should pledge to propose Persia to conclude guarantee pacts between Turkey and Persia, and between the USSR and Persia.729 These guarantee pacts would have to include commitment to non-aggression, the respect for the existing frontiers, and the first two articles of the Soviet draft.730 The Turkish government proposed to carry out negotiations with Persia independently. However, it asked the Soviet government for the preparation of favourable conditions in Tehran beforehand.731

At the meeting with Surits on July 1, 1925, Tevfik Rüştü Bey forewarned him that the contact with the Persian government would have to be carried out by the

Soviet government extremely cautiously, since he had documents, which proved that the British were being informed about all negotiations immediately, and all these were carried out by the Persian Foreign Minister himself.732 He also added that the Persian

Foreign Ministry was full of British agents.733 Therefore, he advised the Soviet

725 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 16 iyunya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 370. 726 Ibid. 727 Ibid. 728 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 1 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 403. 729 Ibid., p. 402. 730 Ibid. 731 Ibid. 732 Ibid. pp. 402-403. 733 Ibid., p. 403.

192 government to contact Reza Khan only tete-a-tete.734 The Turkish government also proposed the Soviet government to include a protocol about mutual commitments into the future Turko-Soviet treaty. Ankara had nothing against the signing the Turko-

Soviet treaty before the guarantee pacts. At first, however, it would prefer to sign a guarantee pact with Persia.

As a matter of fact, the Turkish government had sufficient data concerning the possibility that Persia could be used as a bridgehead by Britain for the attacks against

Turkey.735 Besides, the preparation of the Persian-Iraqi agreement also gave rise to apprehensions in Ankara.

Owing to the intention of the Turkish government to conclude the Turko-

Persian and the Soviet-Persian guarantee pacts, the Soviet government found itself in a tight corner for some time. Chicherin was upset that everything stopped in

Ankara.736 On July 16, 1925, Chicherin urgently asked Yurenev, the Plenipotentiary

Representative of the USSR in Persia, by a way of private conversation with Reza

Khan, to inquire whether the Persian government consented to sign a guarantee pact on non-aggression, friendly neutrality and non-participation in hostile combinations.737 In connection with this, Yurenev met with Reza Khan and presented him the Soviet proposal. Reza Khan offered to wait for two months, and, at first, to settle some old questions, and by that way, to create a favourable ground for negotiations.738 The Persian government seemed to have been not keen to sign such a pact with the USSR, since this pact could make huge difficulties in relations with

734 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 1 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 403. 735 Ibid. 736 "Telegrammma Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Persii K. K. Yurenevu, 16 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 439. 737 "Telegrammma Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Persii K. K. Yurenevu, 16 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 439. 738 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 24 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 449.

193 Britain, and even the expulsion from the League of Nations.739 The Persian

Ambassador in Moscow also explained to Chicherin that "Britain was behaving in

Persia in conformity with the theory of equilibrium, and as a result of this, Britain would demand some compensation."740

By the end of July 1925, however, the Turkish government accepted the Soviet comment on "military manoeuvres" and agreed not to mention about the League of

Nations in the future the Turko-Soviet treaty.741 The Turkish government was still ready to conclude with the USSR either the treaty without any mention of Persia, or with the protocol on mutual commitments to start negotiations on guarantee pacts between Turkey and Persia, and between the USSR and Persia, or to postpone the signing of the Turko-Soviet treaty until the end of negotiations on guarantee pacts.742

The Turkish government was aware that if it would have signed such a treaty with the

USSR, it would give rise to a storm abroad, and that it would be considered as an orientation of Turkey towards the Soviet Union.743 It was also convinced in that the

West would prohibit the import of arms to Turkey.744

On July 30, 1925, at the meeting with Surits, Tevfik Rüştü Bey explained him about the possible consequences for Turkey. The Turkish Foreign Minister, beforehand, strove for preventing unnecessary after-effects. With that end in view, he handed the Soviet Plenipotentiary the intention of the Turkish government to secure

739 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 30 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 461. 740 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR v Politbyuro TsK VKP (b), 2 yanvarya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1964), v. IX, p. 7. 741 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predtstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 30 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 460. 742 Ibid. 743 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predtstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 30 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 461. 744 Ibid.

194 the transit of arms and munitions from Germany and Sweden via the USSR.745 The

Turkish government did not want Britain to exploit the treaty and to exert influence on Sweden at the pending session of the League of Nations in September. Therefore, the Turkish government asked the Soviet government for not publicizing of the future

Turko-Soviet treaty until its ratification, and to bring to the attention of the Soviet government the question of the purchase and order of arms and munitions in the

USSR, and also to the transit of arms via the USSR.746

In the process of further negotiations, the two countries coordinated. The text of the Article 1 of the treaty stipulated a benevolent neutrality in case of aggression against one of the Contracting Parties.747 Article 2 stipulated the non-participation of the Contracting Parties in the hostile combinations and in actions of third powers against the Contracting Parties.748 With regard to Article 3, the two countries agreed to exclude from the article the condition about the entry of one of the Contracting

Parties into the League of Nations.

The Conference in Locarno

The Locarno Conference with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of

France, Germany, Britain, Italy and Belgium started on October, 4, 1925. The major success of Locarno was the prevention of a German-Russian combination.749 In

745 Ibid. 746 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predtstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 30 iyulya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, pp. 461-462. 747 Ibid. p. 799. 748 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 799. 749 Piotr S. Wandyez, France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 367.

195 Locarno, France, Belgium and Germany signed non-aggression treaties while Britain agreed to defend any signatory, which was attacked by another of them.750

The Conference in Locarno caused anxiety in Turkey. Cumhuriyet, implying its recent war of independence against the Entente Powers, concluded once more that the struggle was not over yet.751 Although there was a good amount of rhetoric about the preservation of peace in Locarno, Turkey asserted that as long as a general treaty, which would not throw overboard any nation would be concluded, the ideas on reliability and security could not be perceived as valid and functional.752

Turkey regarded Locarno as the attempt of Britain to assemble by his side

France and other imperialist states.753 On November 1, 1925, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, addressing to the delegates at the opening of the regular session of the Grand National

Assembly, stated about Locarno the following:

In the political world, we see efforts for provision with mutual security. However, these efforts, as long as will not spread to all nations, will be considered as providing with freedom of action for one nations against other nations, than directed for provision with peace.754

The Deputy for Siirt, Mahmud Bey [Soydan] wrote in Hâkimiyet-i Milliye that

"all these states, promising security and arms limitations, use every good opportunity to arm themselves."755 Mahmut Bey said that "these offensive arms destined for using exclusively against the East. We have evidences at our disposal."756 Yunus Nadi, the

Editor-in-Chief of Cumhuriyet, wrote that "today Great Britain, which has succeeded in leading all Europe, is the state, which creates one right for Europe and other right

750 John Robert Perris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919- 1926 (Ithacai: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 149. 751 ''Rusya'dan Bir Seda,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 October 1925. 752 Yunus Nadi, ''Hükümetimiz ile Rusya Hükümeti Arasında Bir İttifak Akdedildi,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 23 December 1925. 753 ''Biz Rusya ile Ne İçin Birleşiyoruz?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 December 1925. 754 Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası 1923-1938, v. II, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1981, p. 46. 755 ''Türk-Rus Mukavelesini İhdas Eden Amel,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 27 December 1925. 756 Ibid.

196 for Asia. By any means, we are not opponents of civilized Europe and European culture, which is a common achievement of Humanity, however, we are opponents of the present barbarian thinking of European diplomacy, which wishes for using this culture against a half of humanity."757

The Soviet government held that although there was no anti-Soviet block at the conference, there was its embryo.758 Most of all, it apprehended that Germany, pledging to fulfil decisions of the League of Nations, would have to fulfil anti-Soviet decisions of the League of Nations.759

In these circumstances, Turkey decided to invite Chicherin to Turkey.760 With that end in view, Ismet Pasha appealed to Velichko, the Acting Plenipotentiary of the

USSR in Turkey. On November 9, 1925, he renewed this request once more.761 He referred to Mustafa Kemal's statement that states, staying out of the Treaty of

Locarno, would have to raise a question that to what extent this Treaty was against them.762 The Turkish Government placed its great hopes in Chicherin's trip to Turkey and expected to get favourable effect from it. However, Chicherin could not go to

Turkey. The Soviet government thanked Turkey for the invitation and declined it politely, since, Chicherin had already been for a trip to Poland, Germany, and France.

This trip was organized in order to break up diplomatic combinations against the

USSR.763

757 Yunus Nadı, ''Türkiye-Rusya İttifakı,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 december 1925. 758 "Tov. Rakovskiy o Vzaimootnosheniyakh s Angliey i Frantsiey," Pravda (Moscow), 14 January 1926. 759 "XIV Moskovskaya Gubpartkonferentsiya. Otchyot TsK VKP (b). Doklad A. I. Rykova," Pravda (Moscow), 8 December 1925. 760 "Telegramma vremennogo Poverennogo v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 9 Noyabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 660. 761 Ibid. 762 Ibid. 763 S. Yu. Vygodskiy, Vneshnyaya Politika SSSR 1924-1929 g.g. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1963, p. 115.

197 Turkey watched Chicherin's trip with animation, and linked it with the Soviet

Union's intention to break through blockade prepared by Britain. Hâkimiyet-i Milliye considered this moment as " the intensification of merciless duel between two greatest powers in the world: Britain and the USSR."764 The newspaper also wrote that

"talented Chicherin is acquainted with the skill of duel and is good at breaking with the British blockade."765

On November 21, 1925, Maksim Litvinov, the Vice-Commissar for the Foreign

Affairs of the USSR, was informed that the Turkish Ambassador wanted urgently to meet with him.766 At the same day, Litvinov received Zekai Bey. The Turkish government held that in connection with Locarno, policy of Turkey and the Soviet

Union would have to be the same.767

Litvinov expressed his full consent with Turkey's point of view concerning

Locarno events.768 Litvinov expressed his government's wish for friendship with the countries of the East, and in the first place, with Turkey.769

At the meeting, Litvinov, expressing his confidence in that the moment was ripe for giving these intentions the legal form, proposed to proceed with negotiations, which were broken off in August, and, with joint efforts, resolve the differences of opinion.770 However, the Turkish government had still supported the idea that, at first, the guarantee pacts with Persia should be signed.

The Soviet government had vexed questions with Persia, and, therefore, the latter, at first, wished for the settlement of existing questions. The fact was that the

764 "Inostrannaya pechat' o Poezdke Chicherina," Pravda (Moscow), 2 October 1925. 765 Ibid. 766 "Zapis' besedy Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Zekyai-beem, 21 noyabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 676. 767 Ibid. 768 Ibid. 769 Ibid. 770 "Zapis' besedy Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Zekyai-beem, 21 noyabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 676.

198 Soviet-Persian frontier was very elastic. Owing to this, in 1925, two incidents occurred on the Soviet-Persian frontier: one, in the north-east of Persia in Mogan steppe, other, on the frontier eastwards from the Caspian Sea.771 Thus, the Soviet government would have to determine the exact frontier line with Persia before concluding the guarantee pact with it. The settlement of all these questions required quite a lot of time. It was also not known with what results the negotiations would end. At the same time, the Soviet government did not want to postpone the conclusion of the Turko-Soviet treaty.772 Taking into account the situation, the Soviet government started working out a new formula.

One can assume that in the course of a few days a formula, which could satisfy both sides was found. On December 24, Litvinov, giving Pravda an interview, explained that when Surits came back to Moscow, he reported to the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs concerning Turkey, and, after that, the formula, satisfying both sides, was found.773

The External Situation of Turkey

During Locarno, Turkey had also been pending the decision of the League of

Nations concerning Mosul. To some extent, Turkey was hoping for the support of

France in this matter. However, this hope melted away with the Locarno accords. In

Locarno, France secured its eastern frontiers with the help of Britain against a Soviet-

German combination. Locarno meant that France had knucked under to Great Britain, and, by yielding to the British demand to evacuate the Ruhr and by bringing in the

771 R. M. Burell (ed.), Iranian Political Diaries 1881-1965 (Oxford: Archive Editions, 1997), v. 7, pp. 363-364. 772 "Zapis' besedy Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Zekyai-beem, 21 noyabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 677.

199 British as guarantors of the Franco-German frontier, completely abandoned any hope of an independent policy or of any return to it.774

As a result of the insurrection of the Druzes in Syria, which was troublesome enough because of the events in Morocco and the financial crisis in the country,

France found itself in desperate straits in the Near East.775 The Druze insurrection found a broad response among the Arabs in Palestine, and Trans-Jordan.776 The insurrection disturbed Britain as well. So, on the occasion of the Syrian insurrection in the autumn of 1925 a close cooperation took place between France and England.777

During the negotiations between Chamberlain and de Juvenel, the High Commissar of

France in Syria, concerning events in Syria, Chamberlain stated that "French and

British governments expressed their wish for touching their friendly relations and close collaboration in Syria."778 It is very interesting that the most ferocious threat concerning Turkey appeared not in the British press but in that of France. For instance, not The Times or The Manchester Guardian, but the French Le Temps, Echo de Paris, and Information advised Turkey to submit to the decisions of the League of

773 "Tov. Litvinov o Sovetsko-Turetskom Dogovore," Pravda (Moscow), 24 December 1925. 774 Richard D. Challener, "The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot," in Gorden A. Craig-Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 81-82. 775 M. Tanin, "Blizhnevostochnoe Lokarno - Anglo-Frantsuzskaya sdelka za schyot Aravii i Turtsii," Pravda (Pravda), 9 December 1925. 776 Ibid. 777 Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 124; Then, the growth of the Pan-Arab movement made the British diplomacy take some necessary measures. On November 1 and 2, Britain concluded two agreements on inviolability of frontiers between Trans-Jordan and Nejd. It was noteworthy that these agreements delimited the frontiers of Ibn Sauds Kingdom with Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia, the two British mandated territories recovered their common frontier. For this, see: Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 318; As a result, Nejd had lost a common frontier with Syria. It was done to isolate Syria, which were under the mandate of France, from Arabia, in order to prevent Ibn-Saud from rendering support to the Arab movement in Syria. For this, see: Irandust, "Zigzagi angliyskoy politiki na Blizhnem Vostoke," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 4, p. 22. 778 Istoriya Diplomatii, v. III, p. 455.

200 Nations, and come to terms with Britain peacefully.779 Otherwise, they threatened by the blockade of the coasts of Asia Minor and occupation of Istanbul by Britain.780

On December 9, 1925, it appeared in Pravda that "in return for the assistance on the part of Britain, France will support Britain relative to the question of Mosul in the

League of Nations, and in the case of the Turko-British war, [France] will put the part of the rail-way Maydan-Enbez-Shabanbez, which crossed Syria, at Britain's disposal."781 The USSR regarded all these events in the Near East as the Near Eastern

Locarno, and that the London agreement between Britain and France intended to create a front against the revolutionary and national-liberation movements in the East, against all peoples of Arabia, Syria, and against Turkey, which, in Moscow's opinion, had not yet concluded its struggle for independence.782

On September 3, 1925, the League of Nations started discussing the report of the Commission on Mosul. The Commission concluded, "the territory of Mosul must be included in Iraq, if Iraq remains under the mandate of the League of Nations during the next twenty five years." Tevfık Rüştü made a statement that Turkey did not consider the decisions of the League of Nations as compulsory, since the League of

Nations would only play the role of a mediator in the question of Mosul. As a result, the Council of the League of Nations got into deadlock because of the Turkish

Minister's statement.

In connection with this, the Council of the League of Nations applied to the

International Court in the Hague to elucidate the competence of the League.783 In the middle of November, the International Court inferred that "the decision of the League

779 V. Gurko-Kryazhin, "Mosul i Irak," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1925, 12, p. 44. 780 Ibid. 781 M. Tanin, "Blizhnevostochnoe Lokarno - Anglo-Frantsuzskaya sdelka za schyot Aravii i Turtsii," Pravda (Moscow), 9 December 1925. 782 Ibid. 783 Hasan Berke Dılan, Türkiye'nin Dış Plitikası (1923-1939) (İstanbul: Alfa), 1998, p. 44.

201 of Nations on the question of Mosul was compulsory for two sides and would definitively establish the frontier between Turkey and Iraq, and that this decision must be accepted unanimously.784

This decision made Turkey conclude that "henceforward, the League of Nations would be an instrument at the hands of the British hegemony, and it had been condemned to become a machine, working for camouflage the British robberies and forays, coercion and peeling."785 The situation was reminiscent of that hopeless situation, when in the period of the War of Independence, Ankara had to face a hostile world. Again, it was necessary for Ankara to look for all possible ways to maintain its sovereignty and implement its inner economic and social reforms.

The Conclusion of the Treaty

While Chicherin was still in Europe, Tevfık Rüştü Bey was representing Turkey at the session of the League of Nations in Geneva, which was discussing and preparing to decide on the question of Mosul. As soon as it became clear that the decision of the League of Nations would go against Turkey, Tevfık Rüştü, on

December 16, 1925, withdrew the Turkish delegation from Geneva and, on the instructions of its government, proceeded to Paris.786

It is difficult to tell who first suggested Paris as a place of meeting. Litvinov, stating on the Turko-Soviet Treaty, noted that both governments had taken advantage of simultaneous stay of both Chicherin and Tevfık Rüştü in Western Europe, and, thus, the signing of the treaty had been a chance.787 It appeared in the French press

784 Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1939 (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi), 1996, pp. 73-74. 785 "Biz Rusya ile Ne İçin Birleşiyoruz?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 26 December 1925. 786 Lord Kinross, Atatürk The Birth of a Nation (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1981), p. 408. 787 "Tov. Litvinov o Sovetsko-Turetskom Dogovore," Pravda (Moscow), 25 December 1925.

202 that when Tevfık Rüştü Bey arrived at Paris, Chicherin had already been there.788

However, on December 13, a few days before the signing the treaty, Chicherin and

Tevfık Rüştü Bey had already met. It was testified by Chicherin's letter to the People's

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, which was written in Paris on December 16, 1925.

In the letter, Chicherin wrote, "it is impossible that the visit of the Turkish Foreign

Minister remained unknown for the French authorities."789 Thus, Chicherin and

Tevfık Rüştü had a meeting before signing the treaty. Therefore, one can assume that the meeting in Paris on December 17 had been planned.

On December 17, 1925, Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü Bey spent four hours together, in the course of which, they drafted the treaty. During the negotiations,

Chicherin, taking into account the statements of both governments concerning their wish to conclude guarantee pacts with Persia, decided to sign the treaty without proviso to Article 1 with regard to Persia.790 Both sides agreed to replace the term

"benevolent neutrality" in the first draft by the term "neutrality". At the same day,

Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü concluded the treaty.

The Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of December 17, 1925

Article 1 In the case of military action against either Contracting Party by one or more other powers, the other Contracting Party pledges to maintain neutrality towards the first Contracting Party.

Article 2 Each Contracting Party pledges to abstain from any aggression against the other; it likewise pledges not to participate in any alliance or aggrement of a political character with one or more other powers directed against the other Contracting Party, or in any alliance of aggrement with one or more other powers directed against the military or naval security of the other Contracting Party. Furthermore,

788 S. Yavorskiy, "Mezhdunarodnaya Nedelya," Pravda (Moscow), 25 December 1925. 789 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh del SSSR v NKID SSSR, Parizh, 16 dekabrya 1925. g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 731. 790 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 809.

203 each of the two Contracting Parties pledges not to participate in any hostile act by one or more other powers directed against the other Contracting Party.

Annotation: The term "military actions" should not include "military manoeuvres", as they do not cause harm to other side.

Article 3 The present Treaty will enter into force from the moment of its ratification and will be in force for three years. After that, the Treaty would automatically be recognised to be extended for one-year period, if one of the Contracting Parties would not notice of its intention to denounce the Treaty six months before its expiration.791

The guaranteeing of external security of the country and the prevention of possible wars and attacks against the USSR were one of the main objects of the Soviet foreign policy.792 The Soviet government held that this object would have to create necessary conditions for the implementation of a critically significant inner economic program. On the other hand, the Soviet government followed the policy of the unification of all countries of the East with the USSR in the struggle against imperialism.793 Therefore, the Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of December 17,

1925 should be considered within the framework of these two directions of the Soviet foreign policy.

The Treaty can be divided into two parts. The first part, including Article 1, determined commitments of the two states at the time of aggression. The second part, including Article 2, determined the commitments of the two states both states at the time of peace. As a whole, for the two states it was a defensive treaty, with the help of which, they intended to avert aggressions against the country and prevent hostile military, economic, political combinations against one another.

791 "Dogovor mezhdu SSSR i Turtsiey, 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 1, pp. 24-25. 792 F. Rothstein, "Nasha Politika mira za desyat' let," Mirovoe Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow), 1927, 10-11, p. 3. 793 "From Chicherin to Stalin, 30 October 1924," Rossiyskiy Tsentr Khraneniya I Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveyshey Istorii (Moscow), [Russian Center For Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History], f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, p. 20.

204 Security of the Soviet Union in the zone of the Turko-Soviet frontier would have to be achieved with the help of two principles: non-aggression and neutrality.

These principles were specified in Article 1 and Article 2 of the Treaty. In opinion of the Soviet government, a military aggression against the USSR could be undertaken by aggressive imperialist states.794 Therefore, the neutrality of Turkey in case of military actions against the USSR was advantageous for the latter, since, in such a case, Turkey would be a cover for the southern flanks of the USSR. Moreover,

Turkey, keeping neutrality in case of military action against the USSR, undertook not rendering direct or indirect support to those, who would initiate a military action against the USSR. Besides, it meant that in case of war, Turkey would not offer any parts of its territories as military bases and would not allow any military power to pass through its territory.

Article 2 of the Treaty determined the commitments of the two states towards one another at the time of peace. In particular, Turkey pledged to take no part in any alliance or agreement of political character with one or other third powers directed against the USSR, or in any alliance or agreement with one or other third powers directed against the military or naval security of the USSR.795

The Soviet government held that the treaties, which were concluded between

Western countries in Locarno, aimed at preparing combinations and blocks to pursue aggressive policy and to prepare imperialist war.796 At the same time, the Soviets suspected that the "imperialists" would create the necessary circumstances in Turkey for bringing it to the anti-Soviet block.797 In this matter, the Soviet government was

794 R. G. Saakyan, Sovetsko-Turetskie Otnosheniya v 1925-1935 g.g. Avtoreferat dissertatsii na soiskanie uchyonoy stepeni kandidata istoricheskikh nauk (Erivan, 1961), p. 9. 795 "Dogovor [mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 740. 796 Irandust, "Blizhne-vostochnye pakty," Za Partiyu (Moscow), 1928, 7 (11), p. 77 797 V. Nadezhdinskiy, "Turtsiya i Sovetskiy Soyuz," Front Nauki i Tekhniki (Moscow), 1932, 6, p. 57.

205 particularly suspicious of Britain.798 Thus, Turkey, pledging not to take any part in any alliance or agreement of a political character directed against the USSR, refused to participate in treaties similar to Locarno in Europe and in the Near East.

In the Protocol II to the Treaty, the two countries also agreed that the term

"political character" used in the Article 2 of the Treaty should include all financial and economic agreements between powers, which were directed against other Contracting

Party.799 Thus, Turkey committed itself to take no part in any financial and economic boycotts directed against the USSR.

The Soviet government had never dissembled its negative attitude relative to the

League of Nations, whom it regarded as "a clique, which was trading in nations its own discretion."800 Therefore, the expression "alliances and agreements of political character", in the first place, implied the League of Nations, and, with the Article 2 of the Treaty, the Soviets intended to prevent Turkey from the entering into the League of Nations.801

As it was noted, in the Article 2 of the Treaty, Turkey undertook to take no part in any alliance or agreement directed against the naval security of the USSR.802 This article was necessary for the USSR, since it had a long naval frontier with Turkey. It was also important that Turkey would not permit the third parties to use its coast for

798 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Narkoma Oborony Soyuza SSR, 1940), p. 119. 799 "Dogovor [mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 740. 800 "XIV Moskovskaya Gubpartkonferentsiya. Otchyot TsK RKP (b). Doklad A. I. Rykova," Pravda (Moscow), 8 December 1925. 801 As regards this, the French press, in different forms but unanimously, ascertained that "the treaty must be a blow against the League of Nations." For this, see: "Kommentariy k Sovetsko-Turetskomu Dogovoru," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 2, p. 14; It appeared in the French La Temps that "the Treaty, which has been signed in Paris, meant that not only Russia, but also Turkey have no intention to enter into the League of Nations." For this, see: S. Yavorskiy, "Mezhdunarodnaya Nedelya," Pravda (Moscow), 3 January 1926; A columnist of Bulleten concluded: "most of all, the Treaty seems to be directed against the League of Nations." For this, see: "Kommentariy k Sovetsko- Turetskomu Dogovoru," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 2, p. 14. 802 "Dogovor [mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, p. 740.

206 the construction of navy bases, and would not take part in any military manoeuvres and blockades against the USSR. At this time, the strengthening of the influence of

Britain in Greece troubled the USSR. The fact was that the British-Greece Convention of May 2, 1925 had given wide powers to the British naval mission in Greece.803

Besides, there were rumours concerning the new British naval base in Romania.804

In the Protocol III to the Treaty, the two states undertook to take negotiations for the purpose of determining the procedure of the settlement of disputes, which could emerge between the two countries, and which could not be settled with the help of usual diplomatic ways.805 Thus, the USSR and Turkey accepted negotiations and peaceful means as the instrument for the settlement of disputes. This way was also mutual guarantee against interference on the part of the League of Nations.806

In the Protocol I, the two countries agreed that each of the Contracting Parties would have the full freedom of action in their relations with other powers, besides limits of those obligations, conditions of which were established in the Treaty.807

The Treaty as a Part of the Soviet Eastern Policy

This Treaty was also important for the Soviet government from the point of view of its eastern policy. The Soviets intended to unite all countries of the East with the USSR in "the struggle against imperialism". The Soviet leadership wished the countries of the East to be with the USSR in wars to come.808 Therefore, one of the

803 B. Boshkovich, "Igry Imperializma na Balkanakh," Pravda (Moscow), 8 October 1926 804 "V Chernomorskom Flote. Beseda s chlenom Revvoensoveta Chernomorskogo Flota," Pravda (Moscow), 26 August 1926. 805 Ibid. p. 741. 806 "Angliyskaya pechat' o Turetsko-Sovetskom Dogovore," Pravda (Moscow), 30 December 1925 807 "Dogovor [mezhdu Soyuzom SSR i Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 740. 808 Irandust, "Blizhe-vostochnye Pakty," Za Partiyu (Moscow), 1928, 7 (11), p. 80.

207 objects of the Treaty was to further the closing in with Turkey.809 In the opinion of the

Soviet statesmen, the commitments, which were included in the Treaty, would have to be the instrument for friendly relations with the countries of the East and for the closing in peoples of the east.810

Besides, the Soviet government intended to intensify its political and economic relations with Turkey. Chicherin pointed out that "the Treaty on neutrality, non- aggression and non-participation in hostile combinations, which has been signed with

Turkey in Paris, has been an example of peaceful policy and friendly relations."811

The Treaty was to eliminate any aggressive and hostile relations between the USSR and Turkey.812

A few days before the conclusion of the Treaty, the American and British newspapers had alleged about the signing of an agreement between the USSR and

Italy, and that some of parts of this agreement was directed against interests of

Turkey.813 In Turkey, the allegations were rejected as absurd rumours, as Cumhuriyet commented "our Russian friends will not commit such a self-sacrifice, which will refute their principles."814 However, in the same Turkey, it was said that the duty of the refutation of this news was the obligation of the Soviet Union than that of

Turkey.815

Besides, The Morning Post maintained that "the USSR has not rendered support not only in the question of Mosul, but also has aggressive plans and strive for

809 "Zapis' besedy Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa s Ministrom Inostrannykh del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 8 aprelya 1925 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 215. 810 Irandust, "Nash Dogovor s Turtsiey," Pravda (Moscow), 24 December 1925. 811 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR v Politbyuro TsK VKP (b), 2 yanvarya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 7. 812 "O Mezhdunarodnom Polozhenii i Vneshney Politiki SSSR v 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 612. 813 Irandust, "Nash Dogovor s Turtsiey," Pravda (Moscow), 24 December 1925. 814 Yunus Nadi, 'Türkiye-Rusya İttifakı,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 26 December 1925. 815 Ibid.

208 capturing of Istanbul."816 It appeared in the French newspapers that "the USSR will not tie its hands because of the Treaty with Turkey, since the Soviets themselves has been dreaming of the concluding an agreement with the West."817 On December 16,

1925 the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union [TASS] refuted the existence of such an agreement and of rumours concerning an agreement between the USSR and other countries at the expense of the interests of Turkey.818 This refutation appeared in

Pravda on December 22, 1925.

In this respect, the Treaty was a strong refutation of rumours, which had depicted the USSR behind anti-Turkish alliances.819 Yunus Nadi, the Editor-in-Chief of Cumhuriyet wrote, "the document proves the real state of affairs."820

Litvinov, the Vice-Commissar of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, stated that "the signing of the Treaty should put an end to those alarmist rumours and dispel any fears or doubts about the firmness of Soviet-Turkish friendship among the public of both countries."821 Chicherin declared to the German newspapers "the

Treaty has been signed in order to strengthen sincere relations between the two countries. On these grounds, we hope that peace will be strengthened not only in the

West, but also in the East.822 On December 24, 1925, Litvinov said in a press statement "the formal consolidation of these relations and the hastening of the signing

816 Irandust, "Nash Dogovor s Turtsiey," Pravda (Moscow), 24 December 1926. 817 Ibid. 818 "Imperialisty pytayutsya sorvat' Sovetsko-Turetskuyu Druzhbu," Pravda (Moscow), 22 December 1925. 819 Yunus Nadi, ''Türkiye-Rusya Ittifakı,'' Cumhuriyet (Ankara), 26 December 1925; "O Mezhdunarodnom Polozhenii i Vneshney Politiki SSSR v 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 613. 820 Yunus Nadi, ''Türkiye-Rusya İttifakı,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 26 December 1925. 821 "Tov. Litvinov o Sovetsko-Turetskom Dogovore," Pravda (Moscow), 24 December 1925. 822 ''Türk-Rus Muahedesi ve Tesirat," Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 December 1925.

209 of the Treaty was partly a response to the false rumours appearing from time to time in the Aglo-American press.823

Why Did Turkey Sign the Treaty?

The Turkish Republic was engaged in the grandiose work of the country's rapid modernisation through westernization, nationalism and secularism.824 The destiny of the republican regime in Turkey, to a considerable degree, if at all, depended on the successful implementation of this program. No doubt, this task required a long period of time, and, especially, it was necessary to prevent all eventual inner and external obstacles, which could impede or even make impossible the implementation of this task. Proceeding from these considerations, the Turkish foreign policy, with all possible means, strove to avoid the drifting of Turkey into military actions and intended to prevent any military aggression against it. The Turkish leadership realized that it was necessary to take concrete measures for the security of the country with states which were regarded as both hostile and friendly to Turkey alike.825 Like the

USSR, Turkey intended to create a ring of friendly states around the country. At that time, it was beyond the power of Turkey to wage a war.826 The Turkish finances were then in a most deplorable state.827 Besides, Turkey's program of modernization would be frustrated by a war.

823 "Press Statement by Litvinov on the Soviet-Turkish Treaty, 24 December 1925," in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, v. II, p. 79. 824 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics. The Transition To a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 444. 825 Yunus Nadi, ''Hükümetimiz ile Rusya Hükümeti Arasında Bir İttifak Akdedildi,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 23 December 1925. 826 A. Mel'nik, Turtsiya (Moscow-Leningrad: Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1929), p. 152. 827 "From the delegation of the USA in Ankara to the Secretary of State, 17 December 1925," The National Archives (Washington, D.C.) Records of department of State, Inquiry Documents, "Special Reports and Studies," M 27, Roll 2.

210 In this respect, the Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of December 17, 1925 was meeting the objectives of the Turkish foreign policy. On February 17, 1926,

Tevfik Rüştü Bey, addressing to the deputies of the GNA, stated that the object of this

Treaty was the peace and a peaceful life.828 In other words, Turkey, firstly, committing not to attack the USSR and to be neutral in case of a military action against the USSR, saved itself from being drafted in any military actions against the

USSR and from the heavy burden of such military actions. On the other hand, Turkey, securing the commitment of the Soviet government to be neutral in case of of a war against Turkey, and not to attack Turkey, guaranteed the Turko-Soviet land and sea frontiers.

The Treaty, to no a small degree, would have to remove the apprehensions of

Turkey, which, from time to time, were occurring due to the news in the foreign press or actions of the Soviet government. There was no guarantee that such apprehensions would not occur again, as the Soviet government aimed at maintaining good relations with the states of the West. However, the Turkish government seemed to have been satisfied with the terms of the Treaty concerning this point. The Treaty would have to make the Turko-Soviet relations clear.829 For instance, the Turkish newspaper Vakit openly and clearly stated that "the entire world must now understand that there is no possibility whatsoever of any conflict between the Soviet Union and Turkey."830 The deputy for Çorum, Ismail Kemal Bey also pointed out that "our relations with the

Russians led to the creation of the document of security. The objective of the Treaty is

828 ''Tevfik Rüştü Bey Hariciye Vekili, 17 February 1926,'' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1981, v. II, p. 124. 829 Ibid. 830 Harish Kapur, Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1922 (Geneva: Imprimerie Genovaise, 1926), p. 139

211 not aggression, on the contrary, the Treaty expresses the common wish of both countries for working in peaceful conditions."831

It was supposed that this Treaty would help Turkey and the USSR to become good friends with each other. As regards this, Hâkimiyet-i Milliye wrote, "this Treaty witnesses the direction of attention of Turkey towards its mighty friend, policy of which is contrary to policy of other states, which are united in the League of

Nations."832 At the beginning of the negotiations for this Treaty, Turkey hesitated in its choice, since the Turkish leadership realized that such a treaty could give rise to anti-Turkish sentiments in some countries of the West. However, the British stand on the issue of Mosul, Locarno, and the decisions of the League of Nations concerning

Mosul, had made Turkey to become good friend with the USSR. Especially, Turkey was exceedingly upset over the question of Mosul.

In connection with all these developments, the situation was so critical that some Turkish politicians, privately, were even saying that if the British sent their fleet to Istanbul, then Turkey would begin working in conjuction with the Bolsheviks in the

British colonies, and that France could also fuel the effects, for after all, Turkey only had to raise its finger in connection with Syria.833

Cumhuriyet wrote, "the Western imperialism does not wish the survival of the

Turkish people and, therefore, endeavours to ruin it with all its strength. We [the

Turks and the peoples of the USSR], who are the two nations of the East, have found, absolutely invincible and perfect strength in the efforts and will of each other."834 La

Republique, the leading French language paper in Istanbul stated "it demonstrates that

831 ''Tevfik Rüştü Bey Hariciye Vekili, 17 February 1926,'' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası, v. II, p. 124. 832 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya, p. 119. 833 "From the delegation of the USA in Ankara to the Secretary of State, 17 December 1925," The National Archives (Washington, D.C.) Records of department of State, Inquiry Documents, "Special Reports and Studies," M 27, p. 27. 834 ''Rusya'dan Bir Seda,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 October 1925 .

212 the reasons, which have dictated the two countries to sign the Treaty of Friendship of

March 16, 1921, exist today too. At that time, Turkey and Russia have formed a common front against imperialism. The community of interests makes the two states natural allies. This is the sense of the Treaty of Friendship of that time and this is the sense of the Treaty of neutrality of today."835 Action Françaıse also stated that "the

League of Nations, Locarno, and Mosul succeeded in the realization of miraculous unification of historic enemies: Russia and Turkey836

The friendship with the USSR was advantageous for Turkey, since it held that this friendship would exert influence on its external adversaries, and, in the first place,

Britain.837 Turkey, concluding such a treaty with the USSR, was acquiring a trump card against its adversaries. Turkey was contiguous to the British and French mandated territories. It appeared in Hâkimiyet-i Milliye that "the Turko-Soviet Treaty and friendship between hundreds of millions peoples of the East is enough that the

British imperialism should turn to common sense.''838 Yunus Nadi wrote in

Cumhuriyet that "there is a big assumption that those, who are not satisfied with this sincere raprochment of the two neighbouring nations, will ask each other and us: it is interesting how far will bounds and effects of this collaboration reach out?"839

The foreign representatives in Turkey, in the great part, remained dissatisfied with ovations, which were given to the treaty in Turkey.840 Most of all were interested in what could hide inside of this treaty besides friendship.841

835 Harish Kapur, p. 138. 836 "Kommentariy k Sovetsko-Turetskomu dogovoru," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 2, p. 141. 837 "Şükrü Bey's [Kaya] speech at the secret session of the GNA on February 4, 1925," in TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, v. IV, p. 475. 838 "Biz Rusya ile Ne İçin Birleşiyoruz,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 25 December 1925. 839 Yunus Nadi, 'Hükümetimiz ile Rusya Hükümeti Arasında Bir İttifak Akdedildi,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 23 December 1925. 840 Yunus Nadi, ''Türkiye-Rusya İttifakı,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 25 December 1925. 841 Ibid.

213 Besides, Ankara realized that the strong and developing Soviet Union was a factor playing a role of no small importance in the preservation of the sovereignty of

Turkey. It appeared in Cumhuriyet that ""those, who are under the same threat, are united with their defence. A violator, who is able to beat Russia, in the end, will reach us and will influence on us. To be sure, we will do our utmost to render these efforts useless and futile."842 Therefore, it can be said that Turkey, favouring the strenghtening of the defence capability of the USSR, at the same time was strengthening its own defence capability.

Like the USSR, Turkey, too, by concluding this Treaty intended to use it as an example to improve its relations with its eastern neighbours. The deputy for Kars,

Ahmet Agaoğlu, the Deputy for Kars and the renoewed politician of Azerbajani descent, considered that having concluded the Treaty, Turkey and the Soviet Union, which were the leaders of the East, laid the grounds of defensive measures, which were extremely necessary for the existence of the peoples of the East.843 Turkey also held that the existence of its eastern sovereign and independent neighbours would provide it with security. In the Turkish leaders' opinion, the conclusion of such treaties between them would break the plans of those Western powers, which would try to establish their influence in these countries. It was also stated that "the British imperialism takes measures for the purpose of killing the movement of awakening, which emerged in the East. We unify with the purpose of defending themselves and standing guard of awakening of the East. Their object - raids, robbery, and violence, our are liberation and freedom of nations."844

The Exchange of Notes

842 ''Rusya'dan Bir Seda,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 9 October 1925. 843 ''Biz Rusya ile Ne İçin Birleşiyoruz?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 December 1925.

214

The Treaty was ratified by the USSR on January 8, 1926, and by Turkey on

February 11, 1926.845 On December 17, 1925 Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü exchanged notes. Both notes were identical. For instance, both Ministers said the following:

Monsieur Minister

In addition to the Treaty, which has been signed by both governments today, I consider it necessary to point out clearly that sincere friendship, which have always been existing between both sides since the moment of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, remains inviolable and will serve as a base for their relations even if one of the Contracting Parties would find itself in a state of war with one or third powers.

Take, Monsieur, assurances in my deep respect.846

The end of 1924 and early 1925 were momentous for the USSR. The implementation of Stalin's theory of "Socialism in One Country", which meant that it was possible to build socialism in one country alone, became for the Soviet government a top priority task in the country. It was supposed that in order to implement this task successfully, it was necessary for the Soviet government to develop the industrial production in every possible way, to speed up the construction of new plants, mines, and to re-equip the existing industrial works.

However, the Soviet leadership believed that the international bourgeoisie looked for the opportunity to begin a new intervention against the USSR. Therefore, in order to prevent such an intervention and, thus, to gain time for the strengthening of the country, the prevention of aggression against the USSR and the break up of possible alliances against the country were priorities of Soviet foreign policy. In this

844 Ibid. 845 Robert M. Slusser-Jan F. Triska, p. 54. 846 "Obmen notami mezhdu Narodnym Komissarom Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherinym i Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi v svyazi s podpisaniem dogovora mezhdu SSSR i Turtsiey ot 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, pp. 741-742.

215 respect, the policy of Turkey that it would follow towards the USSR was of great importance for the Soviet government.

Turkey was an immediate neighbour of the USSR and shared with it a long land and sea frontier. In all probability, the Soviet government did not believe that Turkey would attack the USSR. However, it wanted to play safe and have a concrete guarantee of it. It also intended to prevent Turkey from taking part in alliances directed against the USSR and allowing other powers to use its territory for the attack against the USSR. The Treaty of Moscow of March 16, 1921 no longer satisfied the security requirements of the USSR. It needed concrete instruments, which would prevent it from any danger from the Turkish territory and secure Soviet back from the

Turkish side.

The Turkish government strove to preserve its achievements and the existence of the national Turkish State within the national boundaries. All these could be achieved if it could prevent any aggression against Turkey. In this respect, as it shared a long sea and land frontier with the USSR, it wanted the USSR to be the State with friendly attitude towards Turkey. Moreover, in this period, the external situation of

Turkey was critical, owing to the question of Mosul. Therefore, the Turkish government, by all means, strove to preserve its good neighbourly relations with the

USSR, since it could be in need of the material and moral support of the former.

However, in order to secure the Turko-Soviet frontier, the Turkish and Soviet governments were in need of additional concrete guarantee that two countries would not undertake actions that could do harm to each other. By offer of the Soviet government, the two countries agreed to accept the principles of neutrality, non- aggression, and non-participation in alliances and agreements directed against them. It was supposed that by them, that observance of these principles would contribute to

216 the strengthening of confidence and certitude in each other, in which they were in extreme need.

The Soviet government supposed that as Turkey's relations with other countries would extend, it was possible that it would walk away from the USSR from time to time. However, important thing was for the USSR that Turkey should not undertake actions against it.

As far as Turkey is concerned, it was also in need of a concrete guarantee as regards to its immediate neighbour, since, from time to time, apprehensions occurred in Turkey due to the news in the foreign press about the actions of the Soviet government. The Soviet government also supposed that these principles would consolidate relations between Turkey and the USSR, and would prevent Turkey from the fall of it under influence of the Western Powers, and, thus, would promote the independent development of Turkey, which was also one of the guarantees of the security of the Turko-Soviet frontiers.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TURKO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN 1926.

THE TRIP OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

TEVFIK RÜŞTÜ BEY [ARAS] TO ODESSA

217

The Repatriation of Turkish and Russian civilian prisoners and

Prisoners of War

The Ottoman and Russian Empires fought against each other during the First

World War. At the Caucasian front, following fierce and extremely bloody battles, the

Russian Army advanced far from the pre-war Turko-Russian frontier. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 3, 1918, the Turkish Army launched its offensive towards the Caucasus, recovering not only of the lost Ottoman territories, but victoriously advancing as east as Batum and Derbent on the Caspian shores. In the course of war, many civilians, officers, and soldiers from both sides were taken prisoner.

In the Article XIII of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey, which was signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921, the Soviet government undertook to return to Turkey all Turkish prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Russia. Soviet Russia, thereby, pledged to send them at its own expense, within three month for European Russia and the Caucasus, and six months for Asiatic Russia, dating from the signature of the

Treaty,.847 Turkey undertook the same obligation in regard to those Russian prisoners, who were still in Turkey.

The details of this repatriation were set up in the Convention [between the

RSFSR and Turkey on the Repatriation], that was signed in Moscow on March 28,

1921.848 In the Article IX of the Convention, the Soviet and Turkish representatives agreed to set up a special delegation of three members, which would have to further

847 "Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey i Turtsiey, 16 marta 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1959), v. III, p. 601. 848 On the part of the Soviet government, this Convention was signed by I. Yakubovich, A. Sabanin, and Ya. Yastrebov, and, on the part of the Turkish government, by Sayfi Bey, Savfet Bey, and Mithat Bey.

218 the implementation of this Convention, to render the prisoners help and support, and to see to the implementation of this Convention.849

In accordance with this Convention, the two governments were to set up

Bureaus of the Registration of Prisoners in their countries. It was agreed that the repatriation of prisoners of war would be implemented only of prisoners own accord, and forced repatriation would be inadmissible.850 Therefore, one of the duties of these bureaus was to collect a detailed information about civilian prisoners and prisoners of war, which had announced their unwillingness to return home. The collected information was to be transmitted via the Official Commission to the other country.

In conformity with this Convention, the prisoners were to be taken into intermediate points. In the territory of the Soviet republic such intermediate points were established in Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Batum and Aleksandropol [Gümrü], and, for Turkey, in Inebolu, Trabzon, and Aleksandropol. The transportation of prisoners and their baggage within the country, where they were in captivity as far as the intermediate points, was to be carried out by the host country at its own expense

In the Article 16 of the Treaty of Kars, which was signed in Kars on October 13,

1921, the Georgian SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijanian SSR, the RSFSR and

Turkey agreed to repatriate former prisoners of war and civilian prisoners resident on the territory of either of the contracting parties within two months of the signing of the Treaty of Kars.851

On May 3, 1922, the Cabinet of Ministers had that the necessary amount of money for the transportation of civilian prisoners by way of the Black Sea as far as

849 "Konventsiya [mezhdu RSFSR i Turtsiey o repatriatsii], [28 marta 1921 g.]," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 34. 850 Ibid., p. 32. 851 "Dogovor o druzhbe mezhdu Armyanskoy SSR, Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR i Gruzinskoy SSR, s odnoy storony, i Turtsiey s drugoy, zaklyuchyonnyy pri uchastii RSFSR v Karse, 13 oktyabrya 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IV, p. 425.

219 the first Turkish sea port and for their nourishing, would be covered from a special fund of the Ministry of Defence of the Ankara government.852 However, the War of

Independence in Anatolia was still in progress, and the Ministry of Defence was in the need of money for the Turkish army. Therefore, on August 24, 1922, the Cabinet of

Ministers of the Ankara government obliged the Ministry of the Public Health and the

Social Security to meet these expenditures of the Ministry of Defence.853 In this connection, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to allocate to the Ministry of the Public

Health 20,000 Liras.854

The Turkish prisoners of war were not only in the indicated intermediate points in the Soviet Republic. For instance, in early 1923, some part of the Turkish prisoners of war concentrated in Crimean port of Sevastopol [Akyar]. This city had not been defined as the intermediate point. Therefore, the Turkish prisoners of war found themselves in a difficult position, since they had no money and there were no Turkish ships there. However, Aziz Bey, a Persian employee in Sevastopol, provided accomodation for them, paid for their food, hired a Soviet ship, and sent 339 Turkish officers and soldiers to Turkey.855

The Turkish prisoners of war were scattered on different places in the Soviet

Republic. Therefore, wherever it was possible, the Turkish embassies and consulates took part in the repatriation of the Turkish prisoners of war and civilian prisoners.856

Their repatriation continued for four years. It could be completed only by the close of

852 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ankara Government, 24 August 1922," Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşiv [Republican Archives of the Turkish Prime-Ministry]. Hearafter cited as, BCA [Ankara}, Bakanlar Kurulu Karaları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no: 030. 18. 01 / 5. 25. 10. 853 Ibid. 854 Ibid. 855 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ankara Government, 8 May 1923," BCA [Ankara}, Bakanlar Kurulu Karaları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no: , 030, 18. 01 / 02. 19. 11. 856 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey, 20 December 1925," BCA [Ankara}, Bakanlar Kurulu Karaları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no:, 030. 18. 01 / 017. 80. 20.

220 1925. In this connection, on December 20, 1925, the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkey decided to cancel the Article 13 of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey of March

16, 1921 and the Convention between the RSFSR and Turkey on the Repatriation of

March 28, 1921.857

For Turkey, 1923 was the first year of breathing space after many years of the military struggle. The next year became a year of the reconstruction in Turkey and the resumption of the interrupted ties with the world market. The year 1925 witnessed a considerable growth of the Turkish economy.

The Turkish Government's economic policy pursued the following objects: 1)

Strengthening the agricultural economy; 2) Development of cotton industry based on agriculture with the purpose of setting up of large-scale industry for processing agricultural products into prepared food and finished articles for the country and for the export; 3) Attainment of active foreign trade balance.858

The Turkish Government started taking measures for the achievement of these objects. In spring 1925 it abolished aşar. This measure would have to give a considerable incentive to the development of the marketability of agriculture. The

Turkish Ministry of Agriculture suggested a project of credit cooperations for villages. For this purpose, it was supposed to create agricultural associations with the network of the savings banks in the countryside.

It was also necessary to link inner provinces with Ankara and with the seaports.

Therefore, the construction of new railways met the requirements of the Turkish economic policy. In connection with this, Ankara started constructing two new railways: Ankara-Sivas-Erzincan-Erzurum and Samsun-Sivas-Mersin, which would connect the Black Sea littoral with the Mediterranean Sea and give a possibility for

857 Ibid.

221 the transportation of agricultural products of central-eastern provinces to the sea ports.859

With the obvious growth of the Turkish economy notwithstanding, in 1925, the budget of Turkey had a deficit of 31,000,000 the Turkish Liras.860 Only the uprising of Sheikh Said in the Eastern Anatolia in February-March 1925 cost the Turkish

Republic 20,000,000 the Turkish Lira.861 In connection with this, the Ankara

Government started to carry out a series of measures in order to decrease deficit. For instance, new taxes were introduced.

Towards the end of 1925 and in early 1926, the Turkish economy also experienced other economic difficulties. Turkish exports included such products as nuts, fruits, tabacco, and figs, and their export often depended mainly on a price-wave on those products in the world markets. Therefore, the insufficient familiarity of the

Turkish merchants with the world market and their insufficient regard for the world prices were the reason for constant crises of sale of export products. In its turn, it gave rise to the fluctuations in the rate of the Turkish Lira and to a general derangement of economy.

The Spring 1926 did not improve the situation. On the contrary, a number of branches of the Turkish companies in Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun, and Adana became bankrupt.

The peasants also could not sell their products and found themselves in a hopeless condition, for they were unable to pay for agricultural machines and loans, which they took on credit. In many cases, banks confiscated the peasants' property

858 M. Pavlovich, "Revolyutsionnaya Turtsiya" in M. Pavlovich (M. Vel'tman) Sobranie Sochineniy (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1927), v. IX, p. 277. 859 M. Pavlovich. pp. 286-287. 860 V. Petrin, ""Turtsiya pered mosul'skim soglasheniem,", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 6, p. 10. 861 V. Petrin, p. 10.

222 The crisis of sale of export products entailed the crisis of sale of import products. The purchasing capacity of the population decreased. On the other hand, new taxes on consumer goods promoted the rise of the prices of import goods. The general crisis intensified as a result of insufficiency of capital in the country and the conciseness of credit.

Under such a state of affairs, the Turkish foreign policy aimed at preventing any attacks against Turkey and hampering any possible hostile combinations directed against the country. The first step in this direction was taken by Turkey at the end of

1925, when Tevfik Rüştü Bey signed with Chicherin the Treaty on Neutrality, Non-

Aggression and Non-Participation in hostile combinations on December 17, 1925.

In August 1925, Greece pushed in the foreground a project of the alliance between Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. The Soviet government suspected that this project was advanced at the bidding of Britain, and it was also a part of the British anti-French plan of the Balkan-Danube Federation with the participation of Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Italy, and the countries of the Little

Entente (Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia).862 Turkey had already signed the Treaty of friendship with Bulgaria on October 18, 1925. A few days later Turkey signed the Agreement of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations with the Serbo-

Croat-Slovenian State on October 28, 1925 in Ankara.863 Tevfik Rüştü Bey was aiming at bringing about a Turko-Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement.864 He believed, such a rapprochement would isolate both Romania and Greece.865 The

862 V. G. Trukhanovskiy (ed.), Istoriya Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy i Vneshney Politiki SSSR 1917- 1939 gg. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1961), p. 301. 863 Ismail Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası İncemeleri İçin Kılavuz (1919-1993) (İstanbul: Eren), 1993, p. 44. 864 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1964), v. IX, p. 738. 865 Ibid.

223 Turkish Foreign Minister also wanted the USSR to take active part in this combination.866

On 6 January 1926, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tevfik Rüştü

Bey met with the King of Yugoslavia, the Prime-Minister Pashich, the Minister for

Foreign Affairs Nanchich, and with the former Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the meeting, Tevfik Rüştü Bey and the Yugoslavian dignitaries exchanged opinions about steps that Yugoslavia could undertake as regards to the USSR.867 At first, for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR, the Yugoslav government wanted to communicate with other governments of the Little Entente. However, the Yugoslav authorities stated that Yugoslavia was ready to commit itself immediately before the

USSR to adjust official relations between the USSR through the mediation of Turkey, and to conclude immediately a treaty with the USSR just as the Turko-Soviet Treaty on Neutrality of December 17, 1925.868 The Yugoslav authorities also stated that if this offer would be accepted by the USSR, Yugoslavia and the USSR would transmit the Turkish Foreign Ministry their statements about mutual non-participation in hostile combinations and about the maintenance of friendly standing.

At the meeting, the Yugoslav officials pledged that the Yugoslav government would not allow officers and soldiers of the former army of General Wrangel to carry out hostile acts against the USSR, and to pay benevolent attention to all proposals of the USSR concerning the army of Wrangel.

Tevfik Rüştü Bey remained in Belgrade for 48 hours. Right after the meeting, he sent a cipher telegram about the meeting to Zekai Bey, the Ambassador of Turkey

866 Ibid. 867 "Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Zekyai- beem, 2 yanvarya 1926 g." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 14. 868 Ibid.

224 in Moscow.869 In this connection, on 7 January 1926, Zekai Bey had a talk with

Chicherin, where the Turkish diplomat, on the instructions of Tevfik Rüştü Bey, red the cipher telegram.870

The Soviet government was also ready to conclude a treaty with Yugoslavia, analogous to the Turko-Soviet Treaty on Neutrality.871 However, it considered that this treaty would have to be signed directly by the representatives of both sides. The

Soviet government supposed that the negotiations could be carried out either in

Ankara or in Istanbul, and at first, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs could invite the representatives of both countries to Turkey that would give them a possibility to start the negotiations, and that later on the negotiations could be carried out directly between the Soviet and Yugoslav diplomats. The Soviet Government also intended to ask the Yugoslavian government to disband and disarm the White Army organizations in Yugoslavia.872

On 11 January 1926, Chicherin met with Zekai Bey and let him know of the

Soviet official reply to the Yugoslavian proposal. Having acquainted with the official

Soviet proposal, in the evening of January 13, 1926, Tevfik Rüştü Bey met with the

Acting Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey, Velichko. The Turkish Foreign said that he would wire immediately Belgrade the Soviet proposal to start the direct negotiations in Ankara.873 Tevfik Rüştü Bey made his mind to ask Ninchich to send

Zhivkovich, the Yugoslav envoy, to Ankara, where the Turkish Minister for Foreign

869 Ibid. p. 13. 870 Ibid. 871 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Vremennomu Poverennomu v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii L. I. Velichko, 11 yanvarya 1926 g." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 18. 872 Ibid. 873 "Telegramma Vremennogo Poverennogo v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii narodnomu Komissaru Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherinu, 14 yanvarya 1926 g." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 27.

225 Affairs intended to arrange his meeting with the Soviet Plenipotentiary.874 For his part, Tevfik Rüştü Bey promised to pursue the Yugoslav government to accept the

Soviet proposal.875 However, he was afraid that the Soviet demand to recognise the

USSR immediately and openly would put the Yugoslav government in an awkward position. Pashich and Ninchich told Tevfik Rüştü Bey that it was necessary to keep the agreement with the USSR secret for some time and that, first of all, it was essential to prepare the ground for it in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, Tevfik Rüştü Bey considered it important to bind Belgrade as soon as possible. With that end in view, Tevfik Rüştü Bey proposed the Soviet government to offer the Yugoslav government to undertake mutual commitment immediately. However, he suggested a new wording of this commitment. In the new wording, it was said, "Yugoslavia and the USSR consider themselves bound with a commitment of the mutual neutrality and non-participation in hostile groups from a moment of the beginning of the direct negotiations in Ankara. They have to register these commitments officially in the treaty and determine a moment of the inauguration of normal diplomatic relations."876 After the conversation with the

Turkish Foreign Minister, the Acting Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Turkey,

Velichko, informed Chicherin about Tevfik Rüştü Bey's proposal.

The Soviet government accepted the formula in the wording of Tevfik Rüştü

Bey.877 However, on January 25, 1925, Surits, the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in

Turkey, informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that Nunchich treated the Turkish proposal with restraint. Surits wrote that "the Turkish envoy in Belgrade

874 "Telegramma Vremennogo Poverennogo v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii narodnomu Komissaru Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherinu, 14 yanvarya 1926 g." Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 27. 875 Ibid. 876 Ibid. 877 Dokumnety Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 713.

226 and Tevfik Rüştü Bey himself account it for the British pressure, and that Britain exploits a moment of negotiations on debts in Paris."878

The Decision of the League of Nations on Mosul

and the Turko-Soviet Relations

On December 16, 1925, the Council of the League of Nations decided to give

Mosul to Iraq, which was a mandated territory of Britain. This decision favoured the

British case, but created a severe crisis in the Turko-British relations. It also created in

Turkey atmosphere of war against Britain.879

The meeting between Chamberlain and Mussolini at Rapallo on December 29,

1925 was regarded in Turkey as the attempt of Britain to close the ring around

Turkey.880 The Daily Herald, commenting upon the meeting at Rapallo, supposed that

"the British diplomacy was busy with the preparation of alliance against Turkey with the purpose of returning quick attack on different parts of Turkey in case of possible unrest in Mosul."881 The British newspaper, commented that this object could be fulfilled by both Italy and Greece, which would officially act on behalf of the League of Nations, and if the latter would notice Yugoslavia and Bulgaria that they should not attack Greece.882

The Soviet press also discussed this situation. S. Yavorskiy wrote in Pravda,

"Britain is unable to advance sufficient forces against Turkey in case of military

878 Dokumnety Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 713. 879 Ibid. 880 V. Petrin, "Turtsiya pered mosul'skim soglasheniem," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 6, p. 12. 881 "Ne mir v Evrope, a voyna v Azii. Deyli Geral'd o svidanii Chemberlena i Mussolini," Pravda (Moscow), 3 January 1926. 882 Ibid.

227 conflict with the latter over Mosul."883 According to him, only some littoral cities in

Turkey could run the danger of an aggression on the part of the British fleet, and therefore, Greece was to enter into the western parts of Turkey, while Italy would be used as auxiliary force.884

On February 18, 1926, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, on the part of the Turkish government and de Jouvenel, on the part of the French government initialed the Convention of

Friendship and Good Neighbourliness. The Turko-French convention was contrary to the British interests.885 Britain worried that, by this Convention, the Turkish troops could be concentrated on the Iraqi frontier.886 In connection with this, Britain pressured France, causing France to postpone signing the Turko-French

Convention.887 Ekrem Bey, the Turkish deputy for Rize, in his speech at the GNA on the decision of the League of Nations on Mosul, stated that "the French policy is completely a captive of the British policy."888 Turkey seriously contemplated the possibility of war, since it believed that Britain could well go to war over the Mosul dispute.889

On February 18, 1926, Surits arranged a party in Ankara at the request of

Mustafa Kemal Pasha.890 Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, the Chairman of the GNA, Kazım Pasha and Mustafa Kemal's friends had also been invited to the party. Mustafa Kemal delivered an inflammatory speech against imperialist

883 S. Yavorskiy, "Mezhdunarodnaya Nedelya," Pravda (Moscow), 3 January 1926 884 S. Yavorskiy, "Mezhdunarodnaya Nedelya," Pravda (Moscow), 3 January 1926. 885 Irandust, "Zigzagi angliyskoy politiki na Blizhnem Vostoke," Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' (Moscow), 1926, 4, p. 32. 886 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhyonnykh Sil Soyuza SSR, 1949), p. 261. 887 Ibid. pp. 261-262. 888 ''Musul Meselesi hakkında Hariciye Vekili Doktor Tevfik Rüştü Beyin beyanatı,'' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Cumhuriyet Dönemine aıt 100 Belge) 1923-1938 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı), 1981, p. 111. 889 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, ''Turco-British Relations Since the 1920s,'' in William Hale-Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), (North Humberside: The North Eothen Press, 1984), p. 84. 890 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 19 fevralya 1926," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 118.

228 intrigues.891 Towards the end of the party, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had two hours long talk with Surits, during which Mustafa Kemal asked Surits to inform Moscow that he regarded the preparation of the Turko-Soviet alliance as the main aim of his policy, and that he considered the Paris Treaty on Neutrality of December 1925 as only the first step in this direction.892 Moreover, Ismet Pasha said to Surits that "he should not pay undue attention to the economic frictions," and that "[Turkey] would not allow economic questions to overshadow bigger political interests."893

What Mustafa Kemal Pasha said was a very serious proposal. In all probablity,

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in case of military conflict over Mosul, intended to enlist the military support of the USSR, for the Paris Treaty on Neutrality was not an alliance and its clauses did not make provisions for the support of Turkey by the USSR in such a case. Therefore, such a case would have to be premeditated. The Soviet government, in every possible way, strove to avoid involvement in a military conflict. Otherwise, the Soviet government would not have concluded the Treaty on Neutrality with

Turkey in December 1925. It seems that, this was one of the factors, albeit a lesser one, which made the Turkish government to cede Mosul to Britain.

April and May 1926 also passed in panic mood in connection with Italian military preparations. Sir M. Cheetham, in his report from Athens dated March 26,

1926, indicated that Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia were making plans of aggression against Turkey in a convenient moment.894

Some British newspapers also discussed the possibility of an Italian attack on

Antalya and Izmir, while the Greek troops would invade Thrace.895 The Chicago

891 Ibid. 892 Ibid. 893 Ibid. 894 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri (1919-1926) (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi), 1978, p. 302. 895 Ibid.

229 Tribune inserted the main clauses of a secret treaty allegedly signed between Greece and Italy. By this treaty, Italy and Greece were to render assistance to propaganda in

Turkey for the restoration of caliphate there; Greece was to get districts, which it had tried to annex but had failed in the war of 1922; Italy was to get the whole southern part of Asia Minor.896 Later, Greece and Italy presented their refutations. However,

The Daily Herald, the organ of the British Worker's Party, remarked that "the refutations in connection with the agreement between Italy and Greece sound not very convining, but it is quite possible that Foreign Office agents, themselves, spread rumours about this agreement with the purpose of terrorizing the Turkish public opinion and preparing of the ground for an agreement about Mosul."897 At the same time, The Daily Telegraph informed that all men in age of from 19 to 25 were mobilized in Turkey, and that the Turkish troops had already been concentrated in

Izmir and Mersin, and that Turkey would defend itself to the bitter end, but itself would not be the party who would start a war."

In the first half of 1926, the atmosphere of the inevitability of the military conflict with Italy prevailed in Turkey. The Turkish leadership supposed that in case of complications on the Iraqi frontier, a war on two fronts could occur.

On April 19, 1926, Mustafa Kemal Pasha attended a party, which was arranged by the Soviet Representation in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal Pasha conversed with Surits.

He was in an unusual martial mood and said that "he will be even glad, if both Italy and Greece start the war now", and also added that "I do not wish a war and in every way possible, I avoid it, but if war be pressed on us, I have powers enough more than defence."898

896 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, p. 302. 897 Ibid. 898 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 22 aprelya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 248.

230 Mustafa Kemal Pasha also told much about the necessity of military alliance between Turkey and the USSR in the near future. Before that, however, he desired to strengthen the work on the rallying of the East.899 Mustafa Kemal Pasha explained that the game on differences between some imperialist states had practically given anything, and that Turkey would be able to hold its ground only if it would rally closely with the USSR and the East, and that for the time being, Turkey had to manoeuvre and make a compromise.900

By that time, the Turkish leadership seemed to have been discussing about the concessions of Mosul to Britain. Telling about the negotiations between Turkey and

Britain over Mosul in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal told Surits that "he does not want to delude him and assure that he declines any compromise with Linsday, the British

Ambassador in Turkey."901 However, he assured him that he would not go to such a compromise, which would be contrary to his line of friendship with the USSR.902

Mosul in hands of Britain would have been a constant threat to Turkey. Therefore, the close friendly relations with the USSR would have to remain one of the main orientations of the Turkish foreign policy.

Up to 1921, the telegraph communication had been practised by the line Tiflis -

Aleksandropol (Gümrü) - Kars - Erzurum - Trabzon. However, during the Civil War, that line was destroyed. Now, in agreement with the Turkish government, the

Transcaucasian district of communication started the reconstruction of this telegraphic line.903

899 Ibid. 900 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 22 aprelya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 249. 901 Ibid.. 902 Ibid. 903 "Vosstanovlenie Telegrafnoy Svyazi Tiflis-Erzurum-Trapezund," Pravda (Moscow), 4 February 1926.

231 In early February 1926, a group of the Turkish manufacturers arrived at

Moscow. They intended to ascertain conditions and the possibility of the sale of the

Turkish cotton.904 On February 2, the Turkish delegation visited the textile fabric

Tryokhgornaya Manufaktura, where the Turkish guests were acquainted with the textile production and expressed their amazement on the occasion of the quick reconstruction of the textile industry, and, especially, in the sphere of industrial construction.905 On February 15, the delegation left for Odessa. In the opinion of the

Turkish delegates, the close economic collaboration with the USSR would have to become the main condition for Turkey's economic development.906

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Moscow, on March 16,

1921, Chicherin and Tevfık Rüştü Bey exchanged telegrams, where both Foreign

Ministers expressed their hopes for further development of friendly relations and collaboration between the two countries. Chicherin and Tevfık Rüştü Bey emphasized that these relations served for the welfare of both peoples and the peace in all over the world.907

The Trip of Tevfik Rüştü to Odessa

On October, 7 1926, Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister of Turkey, during his talk with Surits, offered him to arrange a meeting between Tevfık Rüştü Bey and

Chicherin.908 Ismet Pasha stated that "the Turkish government attaches a great

904 "Turetskaya promyshlennaya delegatsiya u tekstil'shchikov Moskvy," Pravda (Moscow), 5 January 1926. 905 "Turetskaya promyshlennaya delegatsiya u tekstil'shchikov Moskvy," Pravda (Moscow), 5 January 1926. 906 "Ot"ezd Turetskoy Delegatsii," Pravda (Moscow), 17 February 1926. 907 "Obmen telegrammami mezhdu Chicherinym i Rushdi beem po sluchayu 5 letiya 1-go Sovetsko- Turetskogo dogovora zaklyuchyonnogo v Moskve 16 marta 1921 g.," Pravda (Moscow), 25 March 1926. 908 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 737.

232 importance to the meeting between Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Chicherin in the matter of further strengthening of the Turko-Soviet collaboration."909 At the same day, Tevfik

Rüştü Bey also had a talk with Surits.910 The Turkish Foreign Minister explained that he himself would be abroad for a few weeks.911 His preoccupations, notwithstanding, he suggested to meet with Chicherin at one of the Soviet ports in the Black Sea.912

Surits sent a telegram containing the Turkish offer to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Chicherin also wanted to meet with Tevfik Rüştü Bey and considered the meeting very important.913 However, Chicherin's poor health prevented him to go for such a trip.914 Moreover, he could not leave Moscow owing to certain political reasons.915 Therefore, he was planing to make a short trip either to Odessa or the Crimea in the future.916 When all details of the organization of the meeting had been given careful consideration, it was decided that Tevfik Rüştü Bey would visit

Odessa on November, 10, 1926.

In the first place, we can suppose that the complex international situation of

Turkey was one of reasons of this meeting. For instance, Britain, with purpose of separating Turkey from the USSR, began using measures bearing a resemblance to an economic boycott, and these measures were also used as an instrument of pressure on

Turkey.917

909 Ibid. 910 Ibid. 911 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 737. 912 Ibid. 913 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 14 oktybrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 499. 914 Ibid. 915 Ibid. 916 Ibid. 917 Louis Fisher, The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929 (New Jersy: The Princeton University, ), v. II, p.p. 612-613.

233 Italy also continued filling Turkey with apprehension.918 During 1926, Italy displayed a tendency to play increasingly large part in the affairs of the South-East

Europe - a tendency that created the impression that Italy bade fair to succeed France.

Therefore, the members of the Little Entente remained, indeed, on the friendliest terms with France.919 An illustration of the change in the relations between Italy and the Little Entente states was afforded by the declarations to the press made by the

Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, in accordance with their usual practice at the conclusion of the Bled Conference on June 18, 1926.920

Benes declared that no differences existed between Czechoslovakia and Italy, and that intimate relations were desired .921 Ninchich, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, remarked that the efforts of Italy and the Little Entente were directed towards the same end - that of preparing an atmosphere in which it would be possible to conclude a .922

In mid June 1926, Romania and Italy agreed on the repayment of Rumania's outstanding War time debts to Italy. Romania committed itself to pay its debt of

164,000,000 lira in fifteen years with interest of 1,59 %.923 Italy also arranged a new loan for Romania: one loan of 200,000,000 lira, bearing interest at 7 per cent, and repayable in ten years, and another of 100,000,000 lira without any interest, which was to be used for the purchase of materials in Italy.924 For all, on September 16,

1926, the Pact of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration was signed by the two

918 B. Dantsig, p. 262. 919 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1926 (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 156. 920 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1926 (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 156. p. 157. 921 Ibid. 922 Ibid. 923 B. Boshkovich, "Igra imperializma na Balkanakh," Pravda (Moscow), 8 October 1926. 924 Ibid.

234 countries. During 1926, there was also a notable rapprochement between Italy and

Bulgaria.

Italy also strove for maintaining close relations with Greece.925 Italy concluded the Trade agreement with Greece, in conformity with which, it secured orders from the Greek government on the military ships and equipment.926 There were also rumours that a formal agreement against Turkey had been signed between Italy and

Greece.927 In relations with Greece, Italy pursued the policy of rapprochement between Greece and Bulgaria.928

The possibilities of a regional guarantee pact on the Locarno model had been much discussed during the months following the Locarno Conference in Central and

South-Eastern Europe.929 It seems that these developments also gave rise to the anxiety in Ankara. The settlement of Greco-Yugoslav disputes was the prerequisite of any formal negotiations for a regional guarantee pact. Moreover, such a system was to include Bulgaria. A temporary improvement in relations between Greece and

Yugoslavia was marked by the signing, on August 17, 1926, of a Greco-Yugoslav

Treaty of Friendship together with a series of technical conventions dealing with the long standing dispute over Yugoslav access to the sea at Salonica.930

As it has been mentioned, the intention of Tevfik Rüştü Bey concerning the

Balkans included a Turko-Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement.931 He intended to isolate Romania and Greece.932 Tevfik Rüştü Bey intended to help the USSR and

Bulgaria to establish friendly relations between each other. On July 10, 1926, he, in

925 Ibid. 926 Ibid. 927 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1926, p. 160; Corriere della Sera, on April 20, 1926, made a dementi of the existence of an Italo-Greek pact directed against Turkey. 928 B. Boshkovich, "Igra imperializma na Balkanakh," Pravda (Moscow), 8 October 1926. 929 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1926, p. 154. 930 Ibid. 931 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 738. 932 Ibid.

235 his talk with the Bulgarian General Consular in Istanbul N. Ndev, mentioned that it would quite good for Bulgaria to establish contact with the Soviet Consulate in

Ankara.933

Shortly before the meeting in Odessa, on October 14, 1926, Chicherin, in a letter to the Board of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, assumed that

Tevfik Rüştü Bey would put forward issues concerning the Balkans, and would try to pursue the Soviet government to take active part in such combinations.934

It seems that taking into consideration all these unfavourable international conditions, Turkey, with the trip of Tevfik Rüştü Bey to Odessa on board of the military cruiser Hamidiye, intended to demonstrate to all probable adversaries that

Turkey was not solitary. Shortly before the meeting in Odessa, Chicherin, on

November 9, 1926, sent a telegram to all Soviet Plenipotentiary Representatives abroad. Chicherin pointed out that "the meeting - the act of politeness, in which close friendly relations between two countries becomes apparent. It will be a friendly visit."935

On the other hand, there were mutual suspicions between Turkey and the USSR.

For instance, since the settlement of the question of Mosul, Britain was making

Turkey enter into the League of Nations.936 According to Britain, if Turkey entered the League of Nations, it would be able to defend itself against the intentions of Italy

933 "Doklad na B"lgarskiya Vitsekonsul v Istanbul Nedyu Nedev za Otzivite v Turtsiya Sled Ratifitsiranetto ot Narodnato S"branie na B"lgaro-Turskaya Dogovor za Pritalstvo ot 1925 g. (10 yuli 1926 g." Belgelerle Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri (1913-1938) Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Yayın No: 16, 2002, p. 249. 934 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 738. 935 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR vsem Polnomochnym Predstavitelyam SSSR za granitsey, 9 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 534. 936 Mehmet Gönlübol - Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiyenin Dış Politikası (1919-1938) (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi), 1991, p. 72.

236 and Greece as regards to Turkey.937 The Turkish Ambassador in Bucharest, Huseyin

Ragip Bey went to Geneva in the character of an observer of the League on

September 1926, and, there, had a talk with Chamberlain. The Turkish diplomat, insisting that he was speaking only for himself, stated that an assurance that on the entry Turkey would receive a temporary seat on the Council would no doubt have great weight with Turkish opinion, and would render it much easier for the

Government to win over the opposition.938 Moscow regarded the Legue of Nations as an organization of the Great Powers and minded the entrance of Turkey into that organization.

Further, the Soviet government possessed some information about rendering assistance to the White officers living in Turkey by the Turkish authorities.939 The assertions about Turkey's intentions concerning the Caucasus also caused discomfort in Moscow.940 The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also viewed Poland's approach to Turkey with great concern.941 On the other hand, Tevfik Rüştü Bey had an information at his disposal about organizational work among the Kurds by the citizens of the USSR.942

The meeting of Tevfik Rüştü Bey with Chicherin in Odessa

937 Ibid. For this,see: "Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople) to Sir A. Chamberlain, 6 June 1926," Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1938 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1968), Series Ia, v. II, p. 511. 938 "Sir A. Chamberlain (Geneva) to Mr. Hoare (Constabtinople) 14 September 1926," Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1938 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1968), Series Ia, v. II, pp. 810-911. 939 "Zapis' besed Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 543. 940 Ibid. 941 Ibid. 942 Ibid.

237 On November 11, 1926, the train carrying with Chicherin and the officials of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs arrived in Odessa. The Turkish

Ambassador to the USSR, Zekai Bey with his wife had accompanied them during the same journey. The Soviet and Turkish dignitaries were saluted. The Red Army men were ordered to present arms.

Shlikhter, the Representative of the Ukrainian Government, Petrenko, the

Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Union in

Odessa, the Turkish Counsil in Odessa, the Turkish community in Odessa, the representatives of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Black Sea Navy, a

Representative of the Military Command came to meet Turkish quests. Chicherin and

Zekai Bey exchanged greetings with the representatives of numerous organizations which also came to the train station.943

At the same time, the preparations for the visit of the Turkish light cruiser

Hamidiye were going on at the port. Hamidiye which itself had taken place in the bombardment of Odessa back in October 1914 was now the first Turkish men-of-war, which was to come in the Soviet waters since the First World War. On November 11,

1926, the whole sea-front was packed by workers since the morning. However, as it turned out, the Turkish cruiser had put from Istanbul to sea on November 10, at 18 o'clock in the evening, and it was expected to come in Odessa on November 12, at 9 o'clock in the morning.944

At first, it was intended to reach Odessa in twenty-four hours. However, because of unfavourable weather conditions the voyage had to be prolonged.945

943 "Tov. Chicherin v Odesse," Pravda (Moscow), 12 November 1926. 944 "Beseda s Turetskim poslom v SSSR Zakai bey," Pravda (Moscow), 12 November 1926. 945 ''Odessa Mulakatı Musolini-Çemberlen Mulakatı Kadar Mühimdir,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 12 November 1926.

238 On Friday, on November 12, Hamidiye came in sight behind a light-house. The ship greeted the Soviet nation firing a salute of twenty-one salvoes. In response, the

Soviet cruiser Nezamozhnik also fired salute of twenty-one salvoes. When Hamidiye was entering in the port, Nazamozhnik saluted with nineteenth fires the Turkish

Foreign Minister's flag. During the dropping anchor, Hamidiye also saluted with nineteenth salvoes Chicherin, who was on the sea-front.946 On finishing salute, dozens of ships from different parts of the port greeted guests with horns, sirens, and whistles. Zekai Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in the USSR, representatives of the

Turkish colony in Odessa and representatives of the Black Sea navy put to the sea and accompanied Hamidiye as far as stop on the inner roadstead.

The first meeting between the Soviet seamen and Tevfik Rüştü Bey, the Turkish

Foreign Minister, took place in on the board of Hamidiye.

Shortly after, a big ten-oar with Tevfik Rüştü Bey got detached from Hamidiye.

The boat crossed the harbour and made its way towards an arch, where, Chicherin and

Shlikhter were already waiting for the Turkish Foreign Minister. When the boat moored to the arch. Chicherin welcomed Tevfik Rüştü Bey in French, and, on behalf of the Soviet government, said that "we had met in Moscow, when the foundation of our relations had been laid, we had met in Paris, when this foundation had been extended and intensified, and a personal contact has the great importance for success of our common work on the base of these agreements and for the welfare of peoples of our republics."947 At the end of his greeting Chicherin exclaimed "Long live the new Turkey!"948

946 "Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindel t. Tevfik-Rushdi-beem. Torzhestvennaya vstrecha v portu," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926. 947 "Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindel t. Tevfik-Rushdi-beem. Torzhestvennaya vstrecha v portu," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926. 948 Ibid.

239 Tevfik Rüştü Bey thanked for kind welcome and stated that "he is happy to arrive at the USSR at that moment, when the friendship between two countries is strengthening and developing, and I am proud of feelings of friendship, which bound me with you [Chicherin]."949 Further, Shlikhter, on behalf of the Ukrainian government, Myshkov, the Chair of the District Executive Committee, and the workers' representative of the plant Marti also welcomed Tevfik Rüştü Bey. Tevfik

Rüştü Bey, accompanied by Chicherin and other guests reviewed the guard of honour and greeted the Red Army men.

The Turkish Foreign Minister also gave an interview for Pravda. He explained that his visit was wish for the strengthening friendly relations with Chicherin, whom he was holding in high respect. Further, he said that the Turkish foreign policy intends to maintain a universal peace and friendly relations with neighbours of Turkey.950 In his opinion, the Turko-Soviet friendship was one of the necessary conditions for the universal peace, and peaceful atmosphere in the Near East.951

On November 12, at 11.30 in the morning, Tevfik Rüştü Bey visited Chicherin at residence of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. At 13 o'clock in the afternoon, Chicherin paid a return visit. The meeting was held on the board of

Hamidiye, where Chicherin greeted Tevfik Rüştü's wife and his daughter. When

Chicherin was leaving the cruiser, a salute of nineteenth salvoes was fired in honour of the Soviet Foreign Minister. At the same day, the Turkish Foreign Minister visited the Chair of the District Executive Committee of the Communist Party, Myshkov.

The closest friendly relations were established between the Turkish and Soviet seamen. On November 12, at 12 o'clock afternoon, the captain of Hamidiye with other officers visited the Soviet Nezamozhnik. The Turkish captain and officers were

949 Ibid. 950 "Beseda s Tevfik Rushdi beem," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926.

240 cordially welcomed by Isakov and Dranitsyn, the representatives of the Revolutionary

Military Soviet, the captain of Nezamozhnik and other officers. The captain of

Hamidiye assured the Soviet seamen that the Turkish fleet and its seamen kept up with great pleasure the rebirth of the Soviet fleet and the successes in construction of the USSR's navy. The Turkish seamen were invited at the ward-room, where a warm friendly talk took place.

At 13 o'clock in the afternoon, Isakov and Dranitsyn, the Representatives of the

Revolutionary Military Soviet and the captain of Nezamozhnik left for Hamidiye.

Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Zekai Bey were on Hamidiye. A warm friendly talk took place between the Soviet and the Turkish representatives.

As it is known, the Soviet cruisers Nezamozhnik and Petrovskiy had visited

Istanbul in 1925. The Soviet seamen, taking opportunity of the meeting, thanked the

Turkish seamen for their cordial hospitality.952 Next morning, Tevfik Rüştü Bey went sightseeing. After that, he gave a luncheon in honour of Chicherin on Hamidiye. After the luncheon, both Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü Bey had a private talk three hours long, during which they discussed the topical problems.

On November 13, 1926 the Command of the Soviet Black Sea Navy gave a banquet in Hamidiye's seamen honour, where Chicherin, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, Hüsnü

Bey, the captain of Hamidiye, Zekai Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in the USSR,

Shlikhter, the Representative of the Ukrainian Government, Isakov, the

Representative of the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Black Sea Nevy, also participated.953 Seamen and officials were sitting in a jumble. Isakov, talking with the

Turkish guests, called them with the Turkish word kardeş (brother). This Turkish

951 "Beseda s Tevfik Rushdi beem," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926. 952 ''Odessa'da Bir Muahede mi İmzalanıyor?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 14 November 1926; ""Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindelom t. Tevfik-Rushdi-beem," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926.

241 word became a popular expression among the Soviet seamen.954 Chicherin, also talking with the Turkish guests, said that "today cannons do not thunder, although the struggle is going on, but in other shape, and, the both peoples, bound with common revolutionary ideas, wish for independence, and are full of yearning for struggle against pressure of imperialism, which hinders the peaceful construction."955 At this moment, as if in unison, the Turkish sailors started a song, the main hero of which was Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Both Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Zekai Bey also joined in the song.956

At the banquet, Chicherin addressed a long speech in honour of the Turkish sailors.

In his speech, he assured all guests that the time, when the tsarist diplomacy aspired for the domination over Istanbul and the whole Turkey, was over.957 In his address,

Chicherin pointed out that there had been notable parallelism in the fate of two countries in the recent past. While the imperialist occupants and their White Guard followers were destroying Odessa, young Turkey, exerting its forces to the utmost, was fighting against the imperialist invaders. Further, he said:

Both countries concentrate on a peaceful work, and now, both peoples are struggling against the attempt of the world capital to enslave them. Turkey with the greatest energy is defending itself against the encroachment of the world imperialism. The Turkish sailors are the main support of Turkey in the struggle against the world imperialism. We are celebrating young Turkey, which had risen from its ashes. Long Live the young Turkish Republic.958

953 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 738. 954 "Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindel t. Tevfik-Rushdi-Beem," Pravda (Moscow), 14 November 1926. 955 Ibid. 956 Ibid. 957 "Rech' Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherina na bankete v chest' turetskikh moryakov v Odesse, 13 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 540. 958 Ibid.

242 In reply, Tevfik Rüştü Bey thanked Chicherin for friendship, and especially for praise of the Turkish army and its fleet, and also greeted the Red Army and Fleet.959

After that, Zekai Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in the USSR, took the floor. In particular he said the following:

I am happy to be the Ambassador in the most friendly country. I am very glad because of the meeting between Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Chicherin, and also, because of coming the Turkish cruiser and sailors in the Soviet waters. The friendship between Turkey and the USSR is result of the great efforts and cares on the part of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Chicherin, Rykov, who had made too much for the strengthening of this friendship. The actual friendship must be continued, as it is a guarantee of peace not only in the East, but also in the West.960

Following Zekai Bey, Shlikhter, the Representative of the Ukrainian

Government, also addressed to the Turkish quest. He said the following:

The peoples of the USSR and Turkey, bound up with a territory, are very close to each other due to their difficult struggle for the freedom and their interests in the Black Sea. The Black Sea is a way connecting two neighbourly countries in a field of economic interests, from which political interests rise. This intimacy will grow and get stronger. If it is necessary, both countries will be able to defend their interests in the Black Sea. Long live the glorious Turkish people and Kemal Pasha, the leader of the struggle for national independence!961

During these three days, Tevfik Rüştü Bey was continuously with Chicherin.

Between mass meetings and banquets they held four conferences two-three hours long.962 The main conversations between the two foreign ministers were held on 12

959 Ibid. 960 Ibid. 961 "Rech' Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherina na bankete v chest' turetskikh moryakov v Odesse, 13 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 540. 962 "Hariciye Vekaletine Recep Beyefendiye,'' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara), 1981, v. II, p. 141.

243 and 13 November respectively.963 At this meetings Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Chicherin jointly examined questions of interest to two Governments.964

At one of the meetings two Foreign Ministers gave careful consideration to the issue of the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations. Tevfik Rüştü Bey stated that there was no such question in Turkey and the Turkish government had not brought forward such a request.965 He said, however, that Turkey, due to its present situation, was liable to deal with those questions, which, in accordance with the Treaty of

Lausanne, could be submitted for the consideration to the League of Nations, and, therefore, the Turkish government could not declare its refusal to take part in the

League of Nations.966 Tevfik Rüştü Bey made a reservation. He stated that Turkey would enter into the League of Nations only if Turkey would be given a permanent membership at the Council of the League of Nations.967

In this respect, Chicherin remarked that even the permanent membership would not provide an absolute guarantee, as there was a project of the abrogation of the principle of unanimous vote.968 The Soviet Foreign Commissar added that those who took part in conflicts did not have the right to vote.969 He gave an example: if Italy attacked Turkey, and if Britain accused Turkey of aggression, the voting would be taken without the participation of the parties of, and Turkey's membership in the

Council would not be a source of security for Turkey.970

963 Documenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 541. 964 "Sovetsko-turetskoe kommyunike o vstreche Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherina s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi v Odesse, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 541. 965 "Zapis' besed Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannylh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 541. 966 Ibid. p. 542. 967 Ibid. p. 541. 968 "Zapis' besed Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannylh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 541. 969 Ibid. p. 543. 970 Ibid.

244 Thus, from the conversation it became apparent that Turkey, in principle, did not object to the entry into the League of Nations. However, as Tevfik Rüştü Bey stated "the present Turkish Government and he himself would not wish for the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations.971 Tevfik Rüştü Bey held that the entry of

Turkey into the League of Nations could harm the relations between Turkey and the

USSR.972

At the meetings, the two foreign ministers also advanced their opinions concerning the Balkans. Chicherin made it clear that it was impossible for the USSR to take part in any combinations of the Balkan countries.973 However, Tevfik Rüştü

Bey wanted the USSR to indicate on some appropriate occasion that it was not disinterested in the Balkans.974

The Foreign Ministers agreed that Greece would not have to be a base for the permanent western orientation, and that it would be in their interests to support each other in that country and to stimulate the orientation of Greece towards Turkey and the USSR.975 In connection with this, the Soviet government was ardently in favour of

Graeco-Turkish rapprochement.976

In order to dispel any doubts of Chicherin about the Turkish politicies towards the USSR, Tevfik Rüştü Bey assured the Soviet colleague that in dealing with

Romania, Turkey always took into account the relations between the USSR and

Romania.977 Finally, Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Chicherin concluded that it was necessary

971 Ibid. p. 542. 972 Ibid. 973 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 738. 974 "Zapis' besed Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 542. 975 "Zapis' besed Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 542. 976 Ibid. 977 Ibid.

245 to maintain regular contacts between the USSR and Turkey concerning the

Balkans.978

Further, they proceeded to the questions of mutual relations. As has been mentioned, the Soviet government possessed information about the assistance of the

Turkish authorities to the former officers and soldiers of the White Army then residing in Turkey. At the meeting, Chicherin expressed the dissatisfaction of the

Soviet government as regards to this issue. In response, Tevfik Rüştü Bey said that these cases were unknown to him, but he promised to take all measures against such kind of activity, and he also asked Chicherin for giving him precise information concerning these cases.979

Chicherin also mentioned that there were rumours about the Turkish intentions with respect to the Caucasus. The Turkish Foreign Minister categorically stated that such statements were devoid of foundation, and that Turkey, in the full sense of the word, was a guarantee for the security of the Caucasian border of the USSR.980

Significance of the meeting in Odessa

The meeting in Odessa was not first one between Chicherin and Tevfik Rüştü

Bey. Almost a year ago, in December 1925, they had already met in Paris, and had signed the Treaty on Neutrality. They had discussed several questions of interest to their governments, but lack of time severely restricted their conversations. However,

978 Ibid. p. 543. 979 Ibid.

246 the meeting in Odessa was the first case, when the Foreign Minister of Turkey paid the USSR an official visit.

During direct conversations with Chicherin, he could account for the Turkish foreign policy and relations with other states, explained his government's attitude to the principal political questions. During frank conversations, he did his the best to dispel the doubts of Chicherin concerning the allegations about intentions of Turkey in the Caucasus. Tevfik Rüştü succeeded in safeguarding friendly relations with the

USSR. On November 14, 1926 he sent a cipher telegram to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Turkey, where he pointed out that "the meeting had given a new sincerity to our mutual relations."981

Tevfik Rüştü Bey also wanted to show to all adversaries that Turkey was not alone, that there were close relations with the Soviet Union. The friendship with the

USSR was the trump card for Turkey, and it knew how to use it in quandary. Indeed, since arrival of the Turkish guests, they were presented with pomp and respect and continued friendly attitude.982 The Turkish Ambassador to the USSR, Zekai Bey wrote to Ankara that "on the whole, there were very graphic demonstration of sincerity and brotherly feelings with respect to both Turkey and the Turkish nation."983

The sudden visit of Tevfik Rüştü Bey also provoked a big interest in the West.

The fact was that his voyage had been kept in strict confidence to the last moment.984

In connection with this, on November 11, 1926 many foreign journalists accredited in

Turkey applied to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, they could not

980 Ibid. 981 'Hariciye Vekaletine Recep Beyefendiye,' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara), 1981, v. II, p. 141. 982 Ibid. 983 'Hariciye Vekaletineö 14. 11. 1926,' Atatürk'ün Milli Dış Politikası (Ankara), 1981, v. II, p. 139.

247 get any satisfactory answer concerning the voyage of Tevfık Rüştü Bey to the

USSR.985

The Daily Telegraph, commenting upon Chicherin's meeting with the Turkish

Foreign Minister in Odessa wrote, "there can be no doubt that this conference in

Odessa is, partly, the continuation of negotiations between Soviet, Turkish, Persian,

Afghan and Chineese diplomats in Ankara, where, it is rumoured, questions about the conclusion of a pact between these five states had been discussed," and that "Moscow is dreaming of the Asian League of Nations under the aegis of the USSR and seeks to keep Turkey from entry into the League of Nations."986

The Italian press considered Chicherin's meeting with Tevfik Rüştü Bey as an event of paramount political importance. For instance, Laboro d'Italia, commenting upon the news from London about the probability of the Turko-Soviet-Persian-

Afghan alliance, stated that "such a bloc, united with common of military and economic interests, would be a serious threat, especially for Britain".987 Journale d'Italia regarded Chicherin's meeting with Tevfik Rüştü Bey as the intensification of the Soviet policy against Britain in Asia.988

The meeting in Odessa also made a strong impression in Germany and gave occasion to different rumours. It appeared in Deutsche Algemeine Zeitung that an agreement about alliance would be signed in Odessa, however, it was yet not known whether Persia would take part in that alliance. Further, the report run that the alliance would be positioned against a possible Italian-Greek-Bulgarian collaboration against

984 ''Odessa Mulakatı Musolini - Çemberlen Mulakatı Kadar Mühimdir,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 12 November 1926. 985 Ibid. 986 "Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindel t. Tevfik-Rushdi-beem," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926. 987 Ibid. 988 Ibid.

248 Turkey in the matters concerning the Turkish parts of Thrace.989 Asian-Ost-Europa-

Dinap telegraph agency reported that the following four questions were to be discussed in Odessa: 1) The conclusion of an trade agreement; 2) The pan-Asian unification; 3) Possibility of the conclusion of Asian Locarno; 4) Establishment of the united oil policy, drawing in Persia.990 The American Journal of Commerce pointed out that rumours about the Asian League aimed at provoking a hostile attitude to the

East.991 A correspondent of The Daily Telegraph put a question: "is it possible that

Soviet Russia, whose relations with Italia has been quite satisfactory, will commit itself to fight for Turkey in case of Italian invasion of Anatolia in the future, when

Italia can have more powerful allies than Bulgaria?"

It appeared in Izvestiya on November 12, 1926 that "up to now, Turkey had declined all attempts to draw itself in the anti-Soviet international system. Especially,

London, pursuing simultaneously a policy of threat and promises in respect to the

Eastern countries, on the one hand, wants to frighten Turkey, on the other hand, instigates it to expand into the Caucasus. The meeting of Tevfik Rüştü Bey with

Chicherin witnesses that all these threats and promises could not harm relations between the USSR and Turkey.992

The Soviet government was aware of the significance of the external effect of this meeting for Turkey. Equally, such a stand would also serve the objectives of the

Soviet government, since the vivid manifestation of the strong friendship with Turkey was also the trump card of the Soviet government. Furthermore, the USSR was engaged in internal economic construction. Therefore, for the Soviet government the securing the internal reconstruction was imperative.

989 "Svidanie tov. Chicherina s Turetskim Minindel t. Tevfik-Rushdi-beem," Pravda (Moscow), 13 November 1926. 990 "Ukreplenie Sovetsko-Turetskoy Druzhby," Pravda (Moscow), 16 November 1926. 991 Ibid.

249 The keynote that appeared from the conversations with Tevfik Rüştü Bey was that Turkey was following the provisions of the Treaty of Neutrality, which had been signed in Paris on December 17, 1925. In other words, Turkey was not taking part in any political and economic combinations directed against the USSR. In the Soviet-

Turkish press communiqué on the meeting, it was stated that "not one of the existing questions could change the direction of the policy of the two states."993 Both countries concluded that it was in the highest degree desirable to make these relations closer and that commitments, which had been undertaken in the Treaty on Neutrality and would serve even greater degree as a base for the relations between Turkey and the

USSR.994 At the same day, Chicherin also sent a telegram to Tevfik Rüştü Bey, where he thanked his Turkish collegue for his great friendship and active participation in their joint labours in Odessa, and expressed his hope in achieving their common objectives.995

The First Flight form Moscow to Ankara

The First World War had elicited the great importance of air forces as a critical instrument of aggression, defence, transport, and communication, and, therefore, the

Great Powers began considering military and naval aviation as a necessary element of

992 ''Odessa'da Bir Muahede mi İmzalanıyor?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 14 November 1926. 993 "Soviet-Turkish Press Communique on the Meeting Between The Soviet Foreign Commissar and the Turkish Foreign Minister at Odessa, 14 November 1926," Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), v. II, p. 142; for the text in Russian see: "Sovetsko-Turetskoe kommyunike o vstreche Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR G. V. Chicherina s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi v Odesse, 14 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 54. 994 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Predsedatelyu Soveta Ministrov Turtsii Ismet-pashe, 17 noyabrya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, p. 545.

250 their armed forces.996 For instance, the British Minister of Aeronautics, Samuel

Hoare, in one of the banquets in London said, "if the air defence is the most important questions concerning the British air forces, then, the question about the imperial air communication should be given the second place. From the point of view of the defence, the best air communication will facilitate us the settlement of a number of vital questions in the Near East."997 In 1924, the Vice-Minister of the French Civil

Aviation said that "we must direct our efforts to commercial, and, especially, to the postal aviation. Our international lines will bear our interests, our banners and our ideals."998

The USSR was anxious that in post-Versailles Europe, in the Balkans, and in many new "mandated territories" carved out in the Near East, aviation was becoming a serious political weapon and the instrument of communication for Britain.999

Moreover, the USSR considered the aviation at their hands as a weapon of imperialistic expansion and oppression of weak nations.1000

In mid 1926, there already were big air routes: London-Paris-Zurich-Vienna-

Belgrade-Bucharest-Istanbul-Ankara; London-Paris-Rome-Istanbul-Ankara.1001 In connection with this, the air bases and aviation junctions acquired importance.

Especially, Istanbul was one of the important junctions, since it was the key to the

European-Asiatic and European-African air routes.

The USSR watched these tendencies closely. In July 1926, Aviakhim of the

USSR organized a flight from Moscow to Ankara. The route was to pass through

Kharkov, Sevastopol, and Inebolu. One of the main objects of the flight was to get

995 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR , v. IX, pp. 545-546. 996 V. Zarzar, "Bor'ba za Gegemoniyu v Vozdukhe," Pravda (Moscow), 22 August 1926. 997 Ibid. 998 V. A. Zarzar - V. L. Lakhtin, Bor'ba za Vozdukh. Problemy Sovremennoy Vozdushnoy Politiki i Eyo Pravovoy Reglamentatsii (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Osoaviakhima, 1927), p. 13. 999 Ibid.

251 over the Black Sea. For this flight two pilots had been chosen: the Commander,

Mezheraup and the mechanic, Golovanov. Pravda's own correspondent, Mikhail

Koltsov was also included in the flight as a passenger. The aeroplane The Red Star took off from Moscow at 2 o'clock in the morning on July 19, 1926. Landing in

Kharkov was successfully fulfilled and the Ukrainian Aviation prepared all necessary things for the continuation of the flight. The Turkish meteorological station on the cost of the Black Sea informed the Soviet authorities that the weather at the Turkish coast was not favourable for the flight, and due to this, the crew could take off only at

3.55 a.m. on July 20.1002

The aeroplane flew at an altitude of one thousand and six metres and two thousand metres above the sea. During the flight over the Black Sea, the motor of the aeroplane had two or three misfires and three springs on the cylinder valves came off.1003

At a distance of 30 kilometres from the Turkish coast, Mezheraup turned the aeroplane to the right because of continuous cloudiness and decided to fly as far as

Istanbul, which had a good geographical location and, therefore, the city could be seen from far. However, in a few minutes, the sky cleared and the crew head again for

Ankara. The crew flew over the Black Sea in a two hours.

This flight was very helpful from the point of view of the adjustment of the

Turkish and Soviet maps. The matter was that it was difficult to understand the existing maps, as mountain ridges, valleys, rivers, and the rail ways were not clearly seen and all were confusing.1004 Therefore, Mezheraup was obliged to fly approximately two hundred kilometres over Anatolia by compass. The Turkish

1000 Ibid. pp. 12-13 1001 V. Zarzar, "Bor'ba za Gegemoniyu v Vozdukhe," Pravda (Moscow), 22 August 1926. 1002 "Priezd Uchastnikov Perelyota Moskva-Angora," Pravda (Moscow), 9 August 1926. 1003 Mikhail Kol'tsov, "Perelyot," Pravda (Moscow), 12 August 1926.

252 heights were so disorderly that it was difficult for him to find a suitable place for landing. When the aeroplane approached Ankara, it made three circles over the city and made a landing at 7. 40 p.m. The aeroplane covered a distance of 650 kilometres from Sevastopol to Ankara in three hours and thirty minutes. The aircraft engine worked well and smoothly. The aeroplane was found high-capacity, high-speed, and in spite of that the aeroplane was meant for two pilots, it shown it’s the best flying qualities during the flight over the Black Sea and the Turkish territories.1005

The Soviet crew was solemnly welcomed in Ankara, and the Turkish government and organizations gave banquets in honour of the Soviet pilots.1006 In their turn, the Soviet pilots presented the special badges of Aviation to the leaders of aviation of Turkey.1007

In connection with the flight from Moscow to Ankara, Chicherin and Tevfik

Rüştü Bey exchanged letters. Chicherin, in his letter of July 17, 1926, underlined that organization of the flight from Moscow to Ankara was evidence of close ties, existing between two peoples, which took cordial and mutual friendship as a principle of their politics.1008 The Soviet Foreign Minister also expressed his confidence in settling all economic issues between two countries in the near future.1009

Tevfik Rüştü Bey sent a reply on July 27, 1926, where he called the flight as an happy occasion, and that this flight had been brilliantly realized.1010 He also expressed his confidence in that owing to understanding of mutual interests by both sides, all efforts to find stable and true base for economic relations between the USSR and

1004 Ibid. 1005 "Priezd Uchastnikov Perelyota Moskva-Angora," Pravda (Moscow), 8 August 1926. 1006 M. A. Gasratyan - P. P. Moiseev, SSSR i Turtsiya 1917-1979 (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 88. 1007 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 731. 1008 "Pis'mo Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Ministru Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfiku Rushdi, 17 iyulya 1926 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 370. 1009 Ibid. 1010 "Otvetnoe Pis'mo Tevfik Rushdi ot 27 iyulya 1926 g. na imya G. V. Chicherina," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 370.

253 Turkey would be crowned with success in the near future and all economic questions would be settled.1011

For the Soviet Union this flight was not a simple aviation show but, political and technical development with revolutionary implications. For instance, the correspondent of Pravda Mikhail Koltsov wrote "the aeroplane had been up to the last screw in a revolutionary country, in a backward, semi-Asiatic country… Is not this direct line from the capital of the revolutionary and independent Russia to the capital of the revolutionary and independent Turkey a revolution?"1012

Misunderstandings on the Turko-Soviet Frontier and

The Drawing of the Frontier Line

During the second half of 1923 and the first half of 1924, heavily armed bandits violated the frontiers and conducted surprise raids from the Turkish territory on the inhabitants living along the borderland on Soviet side. Bandits never penetrated deep into the Soviet territory. Each time they moved away towards the Turkish frontier, and in that way they hid themselves from the pursuit of the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet frontier authorities informed the People's Commissariat of Foreign

Affairs that the Turkish frontier authorities, often, not only sheltered bandits in the

Turkish territory, but also opened fire at pursuing Soviet troops. Sometimes, the inhabitants of settlements which were assaulted, were acquainted with the personality of bandits, since before the First World War these territories were parts of the Russian

Empire.

1011 Ibid. 1012 Mikhail Kol'tsov, "Perelyot," Pravda (Moscow), 12 August 1926.

254 From September 19, 1923 through June 6, 1924, Chicherin, the People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent nine notes to the Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary of Turkey in Moscow, Ahmet Muhtar Bey.1013 The Soviet authorities informed Ankara about the numerous attacks of armed bands from the Turkish territory on the Soviet frontier districts and that these bands had robbed the Soviet citizens, had taken them prisoner, and had stolen their cattle.1014 The People's

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs also made protest against the behavior of the local

Turkish authorities in all these incidents. Although, the latter repeatedly ensured about the measures for preventing the border crossing of the bandits, the encroachments continued. In this connection, Chicherin stateded to Ahmet Muhtar that "behaviour of the local authorities is exciting apprehension, and owing to their behaviour, such attacks will be possible in the future."1015

Chicherin gave instructions to the Soviet frontier authorities to reinforce the defence of the frontier, especially in those parts of it, where raids from the Turkish territory had taken place. The frontier guards were also ordered to pursuit raiders wherever they were. The Soviet government considered that the Turkish government was responsible for these attacks, and that the Soviet government had the indisputable right to demand the compensation for material damage.1016 In its reply notes, the

Turkish government denied any the responsibility for the raids from the Turkish territory on the Soviet territory.1017

On February 6, 1925, Chicherin sent a note and a memorandum to the charge d'affaires of Turkey in the USSR, Enis Bey. In the memorandum, Chicherin gave

1013 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Poslu Turtsii v SSSR Akhmedu Mukhtaru, 21 iyulya 1924 g., N VB/812," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VII, p. 401. 1014 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX,. p. 714. 1015 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Poslu Turtsii v SSSR Akhmedu Mukhtaru, 21 iyulya 1924 g., N VB/812," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VII, p. 402.. 1016 Ibid.

255 account of fifty-five incidents on the Soviet-Turkish frontier, which took place from

May 1, 1924 through November 29, 1924.1018 In the note, Chicherin asked Enis Bey to convey to the Turkish government the Soviet request about the urgent necessity for regulating the situation in the districts adjacent to the Turko-Soviet frontier.1019

In 1924, to execute Article 1 and Article 2 of the Treaty between RSFSR and

Turkey of March 16, 1921, a Joint Frontier Commission was formed again.1020 The

Commission's aim was to draw the frontier line. The Soviet side supposed that the completion of works on the drawing of the boundary line would favourably affect the settlement of incidents in the frontier districts.1021

The Turkish and Soviet governments decided to start works on the drawing of the frontier line as far back in 1922. With that end in view, the Turkish government sat up a group, which was to prepare maps. This group, which included Captain

Midhat Bey [Bayrı], Halit Bey [Tekmen] and Lieutenant Münir Bey [Alumur], had been sent to Sarıkamış the same year.1022 At first, the Commission carried out preliminary works, during which the technical instructions had been considered, conformed and confirmed.1023 Both sides planned to complete preliminary labours by

February 15, 1925. The same day, the Commission was to meet at the point of confluence of the Nizhniy Karasu into the Aras (Araks) and from there, to start drawing the boundary line. Galip Bey and Karklin were at the heads of the Turkish and Soviet delegations respectively.

1017 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1953), v. VII, p. 715. 1018 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 773. 1019 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Poverennomu v Delakh Turtsii v SSSR Enis- beyu, 6 fevralya 1925 g., N 108, " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VIII, p. 118. 1020 S. F. Oreshkova -N. Yu. Ul'chenko, Rossiya i Turtsiya (Problemy Formirovaniya Granits) (Moscow: Iv RAN, 1999), p. 121. 1021 "O Mezhdunarodnom Polozhenii i Vneshney Politiki SSSR v 1925 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 640. 1022 Cevat Ülkeul, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Haritacılık Tarihi (İlk On Yıl) (İstanbul: Dönence), 1998, p. 144.

256 Having finished the preliminary labours, the Turko-Soviet Joint Commission started its labours on the frontier on March 19, 1925.1024 This time, the Turkish government appointed Captain Ibrahim Hilmi Bey [Hoşrik] and Lieutenant Kemal

Hamid Bey to the Joint Commission.1025 Within a short space of time, by the beginning of April 1925, the Joint Commission drew 140 verst of the boundary line.1026 In October 1925, the Joint Commission suspended its labours.1027 Because of the winter, the settlement of some questions were postponed.1028 It was supposed that these questions would be regulated no later than March 1926.1029

However, the representatives of the Commission could meet in Tiflis only on

June 11, 1926. In 1926, Captain Ibrahim Hilmi Bey and Lieutenant Kemal Hamid Bey continued their work at the Commission and Colonel-General Fahri Bey [Belen] as the head of the Turkish delegation.1030 Rıfat Bey and Celal Bey were also members of the Turkish delegation. On arrival at Tiflis, the Turkish delegation visited the

Chairman of the Soviet delegation in the frontier commission, the Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in the Transcaucasia, Karklin.1031

In September 1926, the works of the delimitation of the Turko-Soviet frontier were completed, and on September 8, the Head of the Soviet delegation, Karklin, sent

1023 "V Sovetsko-Turetskoy Pogranichnoy Komissii," Pravda (Moscow), 8 January 1925. 1024 SSSR. NKID. Godovoy Otchyot za 1924 g. k III S"ezdu Sovetov SSSR (Moscow. NKID, 1925), p. 104. 1025 Cevat Ülkeul (1998) p. 144. 1026 SSSR. NKID. Godovoy Otchyot za 1924 g. k III S"ezdu Sovetov SSSR (Moscow. NKID, 1925), p. 104. 1027 "O Mezhdunarodnom Polozhenii i Vneshney Politiki SSSR v 1925 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 640. 1028 "K Provedeniyu Sovetsko-Turetskoy Granitsy. Pribytie v Tiflis Turetskoy Delegatsii," Pravda (Moscow), 12 June 1926. 1029 "O Mezhdunarodnom Polozhenii i Vneshney Politiki SSSR v 1925 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 639. 1030 Cevat Ülkeul, (1998), p. 144 1031 "K Provedeniyu Sovetsko-Turetskoy Granitsy. Pribytie v Tiflis Turetskoy Delegatsii," Pravda (Moscow), 12 June 1926.

257 a telegram of congratulation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tevfik

Rüştü Bey.1032 In turn, Tevfik Rüştü sent a reply telegram, where it read as follows:

I am very glad to receive your telegram of congratulation on the occasion of the drawing of the frontier in the sectors of Vilayets of Artvin and Ardahan. I entirely share your opinion that the settlement of question as regards to the frontier is a new evidence of friendship, which exists between Turkey and the people of the Soviet Union.1033

The Convention on the Use of the Waters of Frontier Rivers,

Streams, and Brooks

It should be noted that in certain cases, the frontier line intersected a number of villages, leaving one part in Turkey and the other part on the Soviet territory. The frontier also passed across the Çoruh River and in some parts continued along the bed of Posof (Poskhov) Çayı, Karzamet Çayı, Arpa Çayı, and Aras (Araks).1034 Therefore, it was necessary for both countries to establish common regulation regarding the use of the waters of the frontier rivers, streams, and brooks.

In this connection, the Turkish and Soviet governments included their water engineers into the Joint Commission on the drawing of the frontier line. For instance, on August 11, 1926, the Turkish Cabinet of Ministers, on its session, decided to include the chief water engineer of the Vilayet of Artvin Hasan Sa'deddin into the

1032 "Telegramma Turetskogo Ministra Inostrannykh Del," Pravda (Moscow), 8 August 1926. 1033 Ibid. 1034 "Prilozhenie 1 (A) k Dogovoru mezhdu Rossiey i Turtsiey, 16 mart 1921," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, pp. 602-603.

258 Commission.1035 His task consisted of the determination of the regulation of the use of the Arpa Çay and the Aras by both sides.

Following the labours of both sides, on January 28, 1927, Turkey and the Soviet

Union signed the Convention on the regulation of the Use of frontier Waters in Kars.

O. Karklin, A. Kalandadze, S. Shadunts signed the Convention on the part of the

USSR, and Fahri Bey, Vehbi Bey and Cemal Bey on the part of Turkey.1036

The Permission to Migrate to the Soviet and Turkish Territories

Article XII of the Treaty between Russia and Turkey of March 16, 1921, stipulated that all inhabitants of the territories which used to be a part of Russia until

1918, and those which the Government of the RSFSR recognised on the basis of that

Treaty as now under the Turkish sovereignty, were free to leave Turkey and to take with them their goods and property or the proceeds of their sale.1037 This right was also extended to the inhabitants of the territory of Batum.1038 This clause had also been confirmed in Article XII of the Treaty of Kars on October 13, 1921.1039 The inhabitants that were mentioned in this article had the right to adjourn on one month their military service from the date, when they notified their desire to leave the territories in question.1040

1035 "The Session of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey, 11 August 1926," T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi [Republican Archives of the Turkish Primeministry] (Ankara), Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers] 030. 18, 01 / 020. 52. 13. 1036 "Convention with Turkey for the regulation of the Use of frontier Waters, and Protoc," in Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), v. II, pp. 147-152. 1037 "Dogovor mezhdu Rossiey i Turtsiey, 16 marta 1921, "" Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. III, p. 601. 1038 Ibid. 1039 "Dogovor o Druzhbe mezhdu Armyanskoy SSR, Azerbaydzhanskoy i Gruzinskoy SSR, s odnoy storony, i Turtsiey - s drugoy, zaklyuchyonnyy pri uchastii RSFSR v Karse, 13 oktyabrya 1921," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IV, p. 425 1040 Ibid.

259 The Soviet and Turkish governments recognised as necessary to determine the term for the realization of Article XII of the Treaty of Moscow and the Article XIII of the Treaty of Kars. Following the spadework, a special protocol was prepared. On

May 31, 1926, Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Zekai Bey, the Ambassador of Turkey in Moscow, signed this protocol in

Moscow.

In accordance with the Protocol, the inhabitants of the territories that were mentioned in the Article XII of the Treaty of Moscow and Article XII of the Treaty of

Kars, had the right to leave the territory of the country where they had resided within a year from the day of the entrance of this Protocol into force.1041 On June 8, 1926, the

Grand National Assembly of Turkey also ratified the Protocol, and, on August 13,

1926, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee also ratified the Protocol.

The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Ankara on March 11, 1927, and on exchange of the instruments of ratification the Protocol entered into force.

In 1926 the Turko-Soviet relations remained friendly. The internal and external situation of Turkey made the maintenance of friendly relations with the USSR the aim of the Turkish government. Turkey was preoccupied with the modernization of the country. However, it was not all plain sailing. In early 1926, Turkey experienced the deficit of the budget and the crisis of sale of the export products. Therefore, the friendly relations with the USSR was a guarantee for Turkey of its north-eastern and eastern frontiers, and, thus, this friendship was allowing the Turkish government to concentrate on economic issues in the country.

Besides, the first half of 1926 was marked by the Mosul crisis. Turkey refused to recognize the decision of the League of Nations concerning Mosul, and the

260 relations between Turkey and Britain had become aggravated to the extreme. Much more unfavourable for Turkey was the threatening demarches of Italy. The aggressive policy of Britain and Italy in the first half of 1926 towards Turkey and the task of the defence of independence of Turkey required the preservation and strengthening of friendship with the USSR.

The Soviet government did its the best to avoid any involvement of the country into a military conflict and to prevent any aggression against the USSR. However, there can be no doubt that in case of military conflict between Turkey and any other western power or powers, the Soviet government would have rendered the Turkish government material and moral support. The Turkish leadership realized that as far as the threat on the part of some western powers continued to exist, the breaking from the USSR would have meant for Turkey the loss of sole support and the surrender of all positions, which had been gained as a result of the War of Independence in

Anatolia and reforms in the country after the Treaty of Lausanne.

In early 1926, the Turkish leadership stirred the Turkish foreign policy to greater activity. Turkey also strove for preventing hostile combinations against it. In this respect, Turkey enlisted the cooperation of the USSR. For instance, in case of its role in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations, Turkey, not only worked to foster own its interests, but also intended to help the Soviet government to start diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

The meeting in Odessa between Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Chicherin was another example of the cooperation between the two countries. Turkey was anxious about the events in the Balkans, and it was important for the Turkish government to demonstrate that Turkey was not alone. The meeting in Odessa served this purpose,

1041 "Protokol [ob ustanovlenii godichnogo sroka dlya lits, zhelayushchikh vospol'zovat'sya pravom vykhoda iz grazhdanstva putyom pereseleniya na sovetskuyu i turetskuyu territoriyu po

261 and it gave rise to the discomfort in the western capitals and created the repercussions of the Turko-Soviet solidarity.

This meeting was helpful for the two governments from the point of view of the discussions of issues, which were in their interests. For instance, the open discussion of the issue of the entry of Turkey into the League of Nations, revealed that Turkey was not intending to enter that organization, and this dispersed misgivings of the

Soviet government.

The Soviet government was also engaged in the economic recovery of its country, therefore, it strove for the prevention of any aggression and any hostile combinations against the USSR. The friendship with Turkey was essential for the attainment of this aim. Thus, the two governments very much needed friendly relations with each other. Proceeding from this, they strictly abode by the Treaty on

Neutrality of December 17, 1925 and were very careful not to shake their mutual faith.

prinadlezhnosti], 31 maya 1926 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IX, p. 293.

262

CHAPTER SIX

MUTUAL STEPS TOWARDS MAINTAINING GOOD NEIGHBOURLY

RELATIONS AND CONFIDENCE. THE ANKARA PROTOCOL

OF DECEMBER 17, 1929

In 1925, the League of Nations passed a resolution on the preparation of the international conference on the reduction in armaments and arms limitation. A special preparatory commission was entrusted with the task of the preparation of this conference. At that time, although the Soviet government had accepted the invitation of the League of Nations to participate in this conference, it did not take part in the first three sessions of the Preparatory Commission, which were held in Geneva

(Switzerland), as the Soviet government had no diplomatic relations with Switzerland since the murder of Vorovskiy, a prominent Soviet diplomat in 1923.1042

After the liquidation of the conflict between Switzerland and the USSR in April

1927, the latter, for the first time, took part in the work of the Fourth session of the

Preparatory Commission, which was held at the end of November 1927. At that session, the Soviet delegation submitted a proposal of the general and complete disarmament.1043 The Soviet government proposed to disband the personnel of land, naval and air forces completely, to annihilate all types of weapons and ammunitions,

1042 V. G. Trukhanovskiy (ed.), Istoriya Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy i Vneshney Politiki SSSR 1917- 1939 gg. (Moscow: IMO, 1961), v. I, p. 317.

263 to liquidate all warships and military aeroplanes, to annihilate all strongholds, naval and air bases, military plants, and to stop the allotment of means for the military task.1044 The Soviet delegation proposed to start the realization of this general and complete disarmament as soon as an appropriate convention would come into force. It believed that in such a case all this work would be fulfilled within a year. The Soviet government also proposed that, in case of the denial of the Soviet proposal of the complete annihilation of the regular armies by the Western states, the complete disarmament would be carried out by all contracting states in consecutive order within four years. However, other participants of the Commission postponed the Soviet proposal till the next session.1045

The Soviet government realized that it would be very difficult for the Soviet delegation alone to persist in its program of the general and complete disarmament.

Apparently, the Soviet government intended to enlist the support of Turkey in this matter. At first, however, it was necessary for the USSR to secure the participation of

Turkey at the coming fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, which would be held in March 1928. The Soviet government started to take necessary measures for it.

On February 22, 1928, Mikhail Litvinov, the Deputy People's Commissar for

Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Preparatory

Commission, wired Yakov Surits, the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in

Turkey, that the Soviet Union held that the participation of Turkey at the forthcoming fifth session of the Preparatory Commission would be desirable, and that, in case of need, the Soviet delegation at the Preparatory Commission would raise a question

1043 Ibid. 1044 V. G. Trukhanovskiy (ed.),., pp. 317-318. 1045 "Iz doklada Predsedatelya Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta SSSR M. I. Kalinina na Vsesoyuznom s"ezde kolkhoznikov, I iyunya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1966), v. XI, p. 352.

264 about the invitation of Turkey to that commission.1046 On February 28, 1928, Tevfik

Rüştü Bey, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, at the meeting with Surits, said that he had not yet had a time to discuss the invitation of Turkey to the Preparatory

Commission with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Ismet Pasha, and that he himself welcomed the Soviet initiative.1047 Tevfik Rüştü Bey held that the Soviet initiative would produce an immense effect in Turkey. He also said to the Soviet diplomat that the German and Czechoslovak Ambassadors had already talked to him over this matter, and he had refused their mediation on the entry of Turkey into the Preparatory

Commission.1048 The Turkish Foreign Minister explained the he considered the mediation of the USSR in this matter as the only acceptable choice, and that only the

Soviet delegation would save Turkey's face.1049

Tevfik Rüştü Bey asked Surits that the USSR should be very cautious when it would rise a question about the invitation of Turkey to the Preparatory Commission. It was necessary for Turkey that it would not create the impression that it was the origin of this initiative.1050 In order to prevent such an impression, Tevfik Rüştü Bey intended to propose Mustafa Kemal Pasha the following formula: the Soviet delegation would note about the absence of Turkey at the session, would point out that the presence of Turkey was desirable and would propose immediately to invite it if this proposal would be accepted, he [Tevfik Rüştü Bey] would immediately leave for Geneva, where he would act hand in hand with the Soviet delegation.1051 The next day, on February 29, 1928, Tevfik Rüştü Bey informed Surits that "Mustafa Kemal

Pasha and the Turkish government welcomes the Soviet initiative with joy and,

1046 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 703. 1047 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 29 fevralya 1928 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 126. 1048 Ibid. 1049 Ibid., pp. 126-127. 1050 Ibid., p. 126.

265 without waiting for the arrival of the Soviet delegation at Geneva, Mustafa Kemal

Pasha asked the Soviet government to apply to the League of Nations to invite Turkey to the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission.1052

Proceeding from this Turkish suggestion, Litvinov, on March 6, 1928 sent a telegram to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, Drummond. In the telegram, he proposed to invite Turkey to the Preparatory Commission. In particular, he said that "in view of the fact that Turkey played important role in the world politics and in view of its geographical situation, the Soviet delegation believed that the works of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament would considerably benefit in case of the participation of the Turkish Republic in the works of this Commission."1053

Having received this telegram, on March 6, 1928, Drummond passed it to the Council of the League of Nations, since only its terms of reference covered the admission of new members to the Preparatory Commission.1054 In its turn, the Council examined the Soviet proposal and on suggestion of a representative of Poland at the Council, decided to invite Turkey to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament.1055

The Turkish government learned about this decision on March 10, 1928. Enis

Bey, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in a talk with Potyomkin, the adviser of the Plenipotentiary Representation of the USSR in Turkey, stated that this result had arisen from the initiative of the Soviet government and that the invitation of

1051 Ibid., p. 127. 1052 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v, XI, pp. 703-704. 1053 "Telegramma Predsedatelya sovetskoy delegatsii v Podgotovitel'noy komissii po razoruzheniyu General'nomu sekretaryu Ligi natsiy Drummondu, 6 marta 1928 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 136. 1054 "Otvet Drummonda na telegrammu Litvinova, 6 marta 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 136. 1055 "O reshenii Soveta Ligi Natsii. Pis'mo Drummonda, 8 marta 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 136.

266 Turkey had been a new demonstration of the Turko-Soviet friendship.1056 Enis Bey described the role of Poland in this matter, as an attempt to seize an initiative of the

Soviets.1057 In view of Enis Bey, Poland had failed to get an effect, which it had expected to receive.1058

The Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament was held in

Geneva from March 15, 1928 to March 24, 1928. Tevfik Rüştü Bey, the Turkish

Foreign Minister and the Head of the Turkish delegation at that Commission, joined in the work of the Commission on March 19, 1928. Shortly before the opening of the

Session, the Soviet government sent its draft of the Convention on general, complete and immediate disarmament. On March 19, 1928, at the third meeting of the Fifth session of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, Litvinov asked the

Commission whether it would agree to assume the principle of general and complete disarmament as a basis of its further work, and whether it would be willing to carry out the first stage of disarmament.1059

The Soviet and Turkish governments did not discuss the Soviet proposal of general and complete disarmament before the Fifth Session of the Preparatory

Commission.1060 Litvinov in his report on April 10, 1928, pointed out that his first meeting with Tevfik Rüştü Bey before the third meeting of the Fifth Session of the

Preparatory Commission, Litvinov concluded that the Turkish Foreign Minister did not sympathize with disarmament, and, therefore, would not support the Soviet

1056 "Zapis' besedy sovetnika Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva SSSR v Turtsii s Zamestitelem Ministra Inostrannykh Del Turtsii, Enis-beem, 10 marta 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 152. 1057 "Zapis' besedy sovetnika Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva SSSR v Turtsii s Zamestitelem Ministra Inostrannykh Del Turtsii, Enis-beem, 10 marta 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 152. 1058 Ibid. 1059 "Rech' Predsedatelya sovetskoy delegatsii M. M. Litvinova na tret'em zasedanii V sessii Podgotovitel'noy komissii konferentsii po razoruzheniyu, 19 marta 1928 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 174.

267 proposal of complete disarmament.1061 During that meeting, Tevfik Rüştü Bey explained that since they fought against propaganda of pacifism in Turkey, he could not appear in international conferences as a pacifist.1062 Tevfik Rüştü Bey said that he wanted to propagandize the Turko-Soviet idea of the non-aggression and neutrality pacts.1063 At the same time, he promissed Litvinov to avoid such declarations that could be interpreted as a divergence between Turkey and the USSR.1064 Litvinov wrote in his report that it was very difficult to redeem this promise, since Revfik

Rüştü Bey's first speech, he emphasized the importance of security for Turkey, remark hardly in support of disarmament1065

Litvinov intended to propose the Commission open voting on the question of the acceptability of the idea of complete disarmament. Tevfik Rüştü Bey, however, stated definitely that he, in such a case, would vote against it.1066 Thus, Litvinov had to renounce his intention. Notwithstanding the divergence of views between Turkey and the USSR on the question of disarmament, Turkey did its best to give the impression of harmony with the USSR. With that end in view, Tevfik Rüştü Bey proposed Litvinov that he [Tevfik Rüştü Bey], after the opening address of Litvinov, would make a statement that would demonstrate accord between the two delegations.1067

Germany, Turkey, Italy, France, Britain, Japan, Canada, Holland, Swiss, USA,

Poland, Belgium, Cuba, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Finland, Greece, Argentin, and Chili took part in the discussions concerning the Soviet proposal on general and complete

1060 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 11 aprelya 1928 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 261. 1061 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 709. 1062 Ibid. 1063 Ibid., p. 710. 1064 Ibid. 1065 Ibid. 1066 Ibid. 1067 Ibid.

268 disarmament. With the exception of Germany and Turkey, all of them spoke against the Soviet proposal.1068 Tevfik Rüştü Bey, in his speech in the debates concerning the

Soviet proposal, avoided expressing opinion on the substance of the Soviet proposal.1069 He stated that "the Soviet delegation demonstarted its devotion to the ideal of peace," and that "even if this proposal may seem too radical, it gave a possibility to give carefull consideration."1070 He congratulated the USSR on this activity, and also proposed to discuss the Soviet proposal at the plenary meeting of the

Preparatory Commission.1071 The semblance of an accord between Turkey and the

USSR was thus achieved. The speeches of Tevfik Rüştü Bey and Bernsdorff, the head of the German delegation were understood as a support of the Soviet proposal.1072

After the debates, a resolution on the decline of the Soviet proposal was passed by the Preparatory Commission. When this resolution was put to the vote, only

Litvinov and Bernsdorff voted against it. Tevfik Rüştü Bey said nothing against the resolution, and, therefore, he was included in the list of the adherents of the resolution.1073 This fact was used by the press as a fact of divergence between Turkey on the one hand and the USSR and Germany on the other hand.1074

After the Soviet proposal was voted down, it put forward another proposal for progressive-proportionate partial disarmament.1075 The new Soviet proposal stipulated a reduction in half in armaments by large states, and 1/3 and 1/4 reduction in armaments by small states.1076 As Litvinov had voted against the resolution, he could introduce any amendments into it. Nevertheless, he wanted the Preparatory

1068 Ibid., pp. 710-711. 1069 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI,, p. 712. 1070 "Rech' Predsedatelya Sovetskoy delegatsii tov. Litvinova. Tevfik Bey privetstvuet initsiativu SSSR," Pravda (Moscow), 21 March 1928. 1071 Ibid. 1072 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 710. 1073 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 710. 1074 Ibid 1075 V. G. Trukhanovskiy (ed.), p. 319.

269 Commision to take a decision and considered the second Soviet proposal at the next session of the Commission.1077 With that end in view, Litvinov asked Stein, the

Secretary of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, to ask Tevfik Rüştü Bey to introduce into the resolution on his own behalf such an amendment.1078 At first, Tevfik Rüştü

Bey gave this job to Munir Bey, a member of the Turkish delegation, who could only ask the Chairman of the Commission to explain certain parts in the resolution. The

Chairman of the Commission gave him that part of the resolution. Only after that,

Tevfik Rüştü Bey proposed to submit the Soviet proposal to an international conference.1079

The divergence of views between the Soviet and Turkish delegations concerning the disarmament at the session of the Preparatory Commission gave occasion to the sharp statements on the part of some Soviet leaders. Klement

Voroshilov, in his report to the All-Army Conference of the Secretaries of the VKP

(B), which was held in early April 1928, stated that the Turkish delegation had behaved ambiguously in Geneva.1080 This statement of Voroshilov irritated the leading Turkish circles.1081 In order to avoid possible complications, the Turkish government instructed Tevfik Bey, the Ambassador Extraordinary of Turkey in the

USSR, to meet with Chicherin, and explain the Soviet government the Turkish stand towards the USSR.

Tevfik Bey, on the instructions of his government, met with Chicherin on April

10, 1928. At the meeting, Chicherin complained to Tevfik Bey that some of the

Western newspapers had used the stand of Tevfik Rüştü Bey in Geneva to trumpet

1076 V. G. Trukhanovskiy (ed.) p. 318. 1077 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 710. 1078 Ibid. 1079 Ibid 1080 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 11 aprelya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 260.

270 about the break of Turkey with the USSR.1082 The Turkish diplomat solemnly affirmed that the friendship with the USSR was the fundament of the Turkish policy.1083 He also pointed out that the statement of Voroshilov could create an impression that there was a divergence between the USSR and Turkey, and this would weaken the international situation of the two countries.1084 At the end of the talk,

Tevfik Bey again reaffirmed the unchangeable nature of the friendship between the two countries.1085

Neither of the two countries wanted the break of these mutually beneficial relations. They held that the friendship between Turkey and the USSR would hamper the plotting of their enemies.1086 The Soviet government, therefore, intended to collaborate with Turkey on all international matters.1087 Turkey continued to implement strictly the clauses of the Treaty between the USSR and Turkey of

December 17, 1925. Only the goodwill of the USSR towards Turkey could preserve the security of the Black Sea and the Caucasian frontiers of the USSR. The Soviet government supposed that the friendship with Turkey strengthened its resistance against imperialism.1088

The USSR, implementing the clauses of this Treaty, would also secure Turkey against foreign aggression. Besides, on May 31, 1927, Turkey bought from the USSR a considerable amount of ordnance at the price of 3,800,000 the USA dollars.1089 The

1081 Ibid., p. 261. 1082 Ibid. 1083 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 11 aprelya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, pp. 260- 261. 1084 Ibid., p. 261. 1085 Ibid. 1086 "Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara po Voennym i Morskim Delam SSSR K. E. Voroshilova s Poslom Turtsii v SSSR Tevfik-beem, 20 marta 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 180. 1087 Ibid. 1088 S. Irandust, "K chetvyortoy godovshchine Turetskoy Respubliki," Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 October 1927. 1089 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 709.

271 Soviet government granted Turkey the right to pay by instalments within five years.1090 On November 7, 1927, Mustafa Kemal Pasha took part in a state reception on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the October revolution, which was held at the Soviet Representation in Ankara. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in his talk with Yakov

Surits, stated that he did not believing the representatives of the "old world" and held that the alliance between Turkey and the USSR was stronger than ever.1091 Mustafa

Kemal Pasha also asked Surits to convey the Soviet leadership that "as long as he was at the head of the State, the alliance with the Soviet republics would be regarded as of paramount importance for the Turkish foreign policy."1092

Turko-Soviet Conventions of August 6, 1928

In 1928, Turkey and the USSR continued their joint work on the settlement of some issues on the Turko-Soviet frontier. The matter was that back in March 20,

1922, in order to settle the border issues between Turkey and the Georgian SSR, the two sides had signed the "Convention Concerning Crossing the Border by the

Inhabitants of the Border" in Tiflis.1093 This Convention had been signed in accordance with the Article 7 of the Treaty of Kars.1094 The Convention came into force on April 15 of that same year and was to be valid for five years. Although the two governments had agreed to have their parliament ratify the Convention within

1090 Ibid. 1091 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. X, p. 481. 1092 Ibid. 1093 For the text of the Convention, see: ''Türkiye ve Sosiyalist Sovyet Gürcistan Cümhuriyetinin manatıkı hududiyesinde sakin ahalinin hududu sureti mürurları hakkında mukavelename,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 6, pp. 236-243 1094 Article 7 stated that "The Government of the Georgian SSR and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey agree to facilitate the crossing of the frontier by residents in the frontier zone, on condition that the relevant regulations drawn up by the mixed commission regarding customs, police, and sanitary matters are observed," in "Dogovor o druzhbe mezhdu Armyanskoy SSR,

272 three months after its signature, they could not fulfil it. In fact, at the end of 1922,

Georgia had become constituent part of the USSR and ceased to exist as a diplomatic entity. In this connection, on September 24, 1923, Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, wrote a letter to Ahmet Muhtar Bey, the Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Turkey in Moscow that the Soviet government would consider this convention in force and that it would be ratified in the near future.1095 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Central Executive

Committee of the USSR ratified the convention only on April 13, 1925 and on

January 8, 1926 respectively.1096 The acts of ratification were exchanged in Ankara on

March 11, 1927.

The main substance of this Convention was that the inhabitants of the frontier zone of the Georgian SSR and the Turkish Republic, who had the permanent residence in villages and towns situated on either side of the frontier to a depth of fifteen versts were entitled to cross this frontier without a visa.1097 Inhabitants of the frontier zone could cross the frontier only at the posts where there were the taxation employees, or at the posts, which would have to be determined and shown by the common consent of the two countries.

On March 20, 1922 in Tiflis, the representatives of the Ankara and Georgian governments signed also the "Convention between Turkey and the Georgian SSR of

Concerning the use by Citizens of both Countries of Pastures Lying on the Opposite

Side of the Border." This Convention had also come into force on April 15 of the

Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR i Gruzinskoy SSR, s odnoy storony, i Turtsiey - s drugoy, zaklyuchyonnyy pri uchastii RSFSR v Karse, 13 oktyabrya 1921 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. IV, p. 423. 1095 "Nota Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Poslu Turtsii v SSSR Akhmedu Mukhtaru, 24 sentyabrya 1923 g., " Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 458. 1096 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.), A Calendar Of Soviet Treaties 1927-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 30. 1097 ''Türkiye ve Sosyalist Sovyet Gürcistan Cümhuriyetinin manatıkı hududiyesinde sakin ahalinin hududu sureti mürurları hakkında mukavelename,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 6, p. 237

273 same year.1098 This Convention was ratified by the GNA of Turkey on April 13, 1925 and by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on May 12, 1926.1099 The two governments considered this Convention as one of the measures, which would regulate misunderstandings on the Turko-Soviet frontier. In accordance with this

Convention, the inhabitants of Turkey and the Georgian SSR had the right to take their cattle across the Turko-Soviet frontier and to use the winter and summer pastures in the territory of these countries. For instance, the inhabitants of the Georgian SSR were allowed to use the pastures in the sancâks of Artvin, Ardahan, and Kars.1100 In turn, the inhabitants of Turkey had the right to use the pastures in the district of

Batum, Ozurgeti, and in uezds of Ahaltsikhe (Ahıska), and Akhalkalaki.1101 The owner of herd had to pay for the use of these pastures. However, there was no definite payment for the use of the pastures, and the Convention only stipulated that the inhabitants of the two Contracting Parties would be treated just as local populations.1102

The Works on the Elaboration of new Conventions

Despite of these two Conventions, however, misunderstandings because of the crossing of the frontier by the inhabitants of the frontier zone, the use of pastures on both sides of the frontier and cases of smuggling and stealing of cattle continued to

1098 For the text of this Convention, see, ''Türkiye ve Sosyalist Sovyet Gürcistan Cumhuriyeti ahalisisnin hududun diğer tarafında bulunan mar'alardan sureti istifadelerine dair mukavelename,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 6, pp. 245-253. 1099 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.), p. 30. 1100 ''Türkiye ve Sosyalist Sovyet Gürcistan Cumhuriyeti ahalisisnin hududun diğer tarafında bulunan mar'alardan sureti istifadelerine dair mukavelename,'' Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 6, pp. 246-247. 1101 Ibid., p. 246. 1102 Ibid., p. 247.

274 take place throughout this period.1103 For instance, when the "Convention concerning the Use by Citizens of both Countries of Pastures" was put into practice, a number of misunderstandings took place on the frontier. For instance, the Soviet government was dissatisfied with the fact that the Turkish authorities were raising duties from the

Georgian cattle breeders, in spite of the fact that this Convention made no provisions for such duties.1104

The Soviet government started working out new drafts of these Conventions., and by the decree of July 5, 1927, the USSR Council of People's approved the draft of a new convention concerning use of pastures.1105 In this connection, on September 18, 1927 the Soviet government sent a note to the Turkish government, which included a request for modification of the Convention of March

20, 1922 concerning the Use by Citizens of both Countries of Pastures.1106 This Soviet note also fixed the termination of this Convention on September 18, 1928.

By the decree of September 27, 1927, the USSR Council of People's

Commissars approved the draft of a new convention on border crossing.1107 In this connection, on October 17, 1927, the Soviet government sent another note, which also included a request for the modification of the March 20, 1922 Convention concerning

Crossing the Border.1108 This note also fixed the termination of the former Convention on November 17, 1928.1109

1103 SSSR. NKID. Godovoy Otchyot za 1924 g. k III S"ezdu Sovetov SSSR (Moscow? NKID, 1925), p. 104-105 1104 M. A. Gasratyan-P. P. Moiseev, . (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), p. 74. 1105 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.), p. 64. 1106 "The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey, 11 August 1926," T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi [Republican Archives of the Turkish Primeministry] (Ankara), Heareafter cited as, BCA [Ankara], Bakanlar Kurulu Kararları [Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers], Fond, no: 030. 18. 01 / 027. 71. 6. 1107 Ibid. 1108 Ibid. 1109 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska , p. 64.

275 The Soviet government proposed to prepare a new convention, which would put an end to the smuggling on the frontier.1110 In its turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and the General Staff of Turkey informed the Ministry of Interior of

Turkey. The general Staff and the Ministry of Interior approved this proposal. The

Ministry of Agriculture of Turkey proposed to abrogate the Convention concerning the Use of Pastures as soon as possible. The Ministry pointed out that inhabitants of eight or ten villages in the Turkish frontier zone were using little the pastures on the

Georgian territory. However, the great number of cattle-breeders with hundred of thousands of cattle were coming from the Georgian territory.1111 It was becoming a serious problem for Turkey. Moreover, cattle epidemics spread on the frontier zone.

On December 25, 1927, the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkey decided to hold a conference with the Soviet government in short space of time in order to maintain the congenial atmosphere in the frontier zone and preserve mutual interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey informed the Soviet representative in Ankara about this decision.

On February 12, 1928 the Plenipotentiary Representation of the USSR in

Turkey conveyed Tevfik Rüştü Bey that the Soviet government was willing to hold negotiations in Ankara regarding the conclusion of three conventions; The

Convention concerning the Use of Pastures; the Convention concerning Crossing of the Frontier; The Convention concerning Procedure for consideration and settlement of border disputes.1112 Although these were different conventions, the Soviet

1110 Ibid. 1111 Ibid. 1112 "Nota Polnomochnogo Predstavitel'stva SSSR v Turtsii Ministerstvu Inostrannykh Del Turtsii, 12 fevralya 1928 g., N 18/213," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1965), v. XI, p. 92.

276 government considered it expedient to appoint one delegation for the conclusion of these conventions.1113

Apart from these, the Turko-Soviet Veterinary Conference was held in Batum in

1927. The Conference worked out the Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning prevention of the spread of animal diseases across the border between the

Georgian SSR and Turkey, which was initialled on January 28, 1927.1114 The two governments, working out this Convention, intended to settle all problems on the frontier comprehensively.1115

The negotiations started in Ankara on May 3, 1928 and ended on August 6,

1928. As a result, Turkey and the USSR concluded four conventions: The Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning border crossing by the inhabitants of border zones; The Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning the use of pastures across the border by the citizens of both states; The Convention between the

USSR and Turkey concerning procedure for consideration and settlement of border disputes; The Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning prevention of the spread of animal diseases across the border between the Georgian SSR and

Turkey.1116

As compared with the "Convention concerning Crossing of the Turko-Georgian

Frontier" of March 20, 1922, the new "Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning Border Crossing by Inhabitants of Border Zones" contained new clauses and introduced some restrictions regarding the crossing of the frontier. For instance,

Article 2 of the Convention of March 20, 1922 stipulated that the "inhabitants

1113 Ibid. 1114 ''Türkiye ve Gürcistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetleri hudutlarının sari hastalıklarının istilasına karşı usulü muhafazası hakkında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Şuralar Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında mün'akit mukavelenamenin tasdikına dair kanun, 23 Şubat 1929,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 10, p. 451. 1115 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. X, (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1965) p. 592.

277 permanently domiciled in villages and towns situated on either side of the frontier to a depth of fifteen verst had the right to cross the frontier."1117 As Russian linear measure

15 versta corresponded to 15,9 kilometres, the inhabitants, which were living in this zone, had the right to cross the frontier. However, the Article 1 of the new Convention determined that the "inhabitants of the contiguous districts of the Georgian SSR and the Turkish Republic permanently domiciled in villages and towns situated on either side of the frontier to a depth of 10 kilometres had the right to cross the frontier.1118

Hence, the number of villages and towns, consequently, of people, which could cross the frontier were lessened.

In the new Convention, places, where the inhabitants of the frontier zone had the right to cross the frontier, were definitely fixed. On the Georgian territory, they could cross the frontier at Sarp, Maraditi, Orjeshani, and Karzakhi, and, on the

Turkish territory, they could cross the frontier at Sarp, Maradeti, Badela, and Kenar

Bel.1119 The Convention also enumerated the reasons on account of which inhabitants were permitted to cross the frontier. For instance, inhabitants of the frontier zone were permitted to cross the frontier to do their agricultural and constructional works, to search their lost or stolen cattle and property, to give medical assistance or consult with physicians, to trade, on family affairs, to render assistance in case of misfortunes

(fires, floods, etc.).1120 The purpose, on account of which a person intended to cross the frontier, was to be indicated in a special Pass, and this person could cross the

1116 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 698. 1117 ''Türkiye ve Sosiyalist Sovyet Gürcistan Cümhuriyetinin manatıkı hududiyesinde sakın ahalinin hududu sureti mürurları hakkında mukavelename,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 6, pp. 236-243. 1118 ''Hudut mıntakası Ahalisinin Türkiye-Sovyet hududundan mürurlarına dair Türkiye Cumhuriyetile Sosyalıst Şuralar Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında aktolunan mukavelename,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 10, p. 412. 1119 Ibid., p. 413. 1120 Ibid., pp. 413-414.

278 frontier only on the presentation of this Pass.1121 This Pass was to be issued by the district authorities in the Georgian SSR, and by authorities of the nâhiye, kâza, or vilâyet in the Turkish Republic. The Convention of March 20, 1922 had also established the term of validity of such a Pass as twenty-one days. The new

Convention shortened this term to fifteen days.

On the crossing the frontier, it was necessary to present a Certificate of Identity together with the Pass.1122 It was done in order to prevent the handing of the Pass to other persons. Moreover, persons, who had crossed the frontier, had the right to move freely on the territory of the other State only within the 10-kilometre frontier zone, and they should register their Passes with the local authorities.1123

The Convention also determined the category of persons, who did not have the right to cross the frontier. This category included persons, who were guilty of handing their Pass to other persons, who used the Pass, which did not belong to them, persons, which had been punished under the laws of other side for smuggling, unauthorised crossing of the frontier or banditry, and persons, awaiting or on trial.1124

The Convention was signed in Ankara on August 6, 1928 by Yakov Surits,

Vladimir Potyomkin, Andrey Ivanchenko, and Andrey Kalandadze on the part of the

USSR, and by Zekai Bey, the Deputy for Diyarbakır on the part of Turkey. The

Contracting Parties agreed that if neither of the Contracting Parties denounced it or requested its amendment six months before its expiration, it would be extended for another year. The Convention was to be valid for five years and was to enter into force upon the exchange of the acts of ratification.

1121 Ibid., pp. 414-415. 1122 ''Hudut mıntıkası Ahalisinin Türkiye-Sovyet hududundan mürurlarına dair Türkiye Cumhuriyetile Sosyalist Şuralar Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında aktolunan mukavelename,'' Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 10, p. 415. 1123 Ibid., p. 416. 1124 Ibid., p. 417.

279 Following the signing of this Convention, Surits, the Plenipotentiary

Representative of the USSR in Turkey and the Head of the Soviet Delegation on the

Negotiations, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey exchanged notes. In the notes, they enumerated the cases when the authorities of both countries had the right to apply the laws of their countries to persons, whose term of sojourn in the neighbouring country expired.1125

This Convention was ratified by the USSR on January 2, 1929, and by Turkey on February 23, 1923, and entered into force on December 2, 1929, on exchange of instruments of ratification in Ankara.1126

On August 6, 1928, the representatives of the Turkish and Soviet delegations also signed the "Convention between Turkey and the USSR concerning the Use of

Pastures Across the Border by Citizens of Both States" in Ankara. This Convention consisted of seventeen articles. As a whole, it represented the code of rules, which an owner of herd and drover would have to follow during the driving on the herd to the pasture on the other side of the frontier, at the frontier posts, and at the pastures as well.

This Convention reaffirmed that the inhabitants of the frontier districts of the

Georgian SSR and the Republic of Turkey had the right to take their herds across the frontier and to use the summer and winter pastures on the other side of the frontier.1127

Inhabitants of the Turkish Republic had the right to use the pastures, which were in the former district of Batum, the former okrug of Ozurgeti, and within the frontiers of uezds of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe. The inhabitants of the Georgian SSR had the

1125 For instance, these cases were the following: If a person was taken away from the country because of the same misdemeanour; If that to whom it was decided to take him away from the country opposed this decision or evaded this decision; If these misdemeanours were committed with a group. For this, ''Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı Fevkalade Murahhas ve Büyük Elçisi Müsüyü J. Suritz Hazretlerine, 45363/45 numaralı nota, Ankara: 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 10, p. 425. 1126 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.) p. 66. 1127 ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında hududun tarafeyninde bulunan mer'aralardan her bir taraf ahalisinin istifadesine dair aktolunan mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, p. 385.

280 right to use the pastures, which were within frontiers of the Turkish vilâyets of Artvin and Kars.1128

The Convention also put a ban on the leasing of pastures to other persons, the selling of the pasture and the moving of grass for the purpose of transporting it to other place. Compared with the previous Convention of March 20, 1922, the new

Convention specified the procedure of presenting the application. In compliance with the new Convention, the inhabitants of both countries were to apply for the pasture to the authorities of other side via the authorities of their country or their representatives no less than two weeks before the beginning of the season.1129

Besides, the new Convention specified the sum, which the owners of cattle were to pay for one season. The sum contained the price for the place and time during which the pasture would be used.1130 Duty for the veterinary examination was to be

1128 Ibid., pp. 385-386. For this once, Turkey and the USSR specified every pasture in the notes, which were exchanged following the signature of the Convention by the head of the Soviet delegation and the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Turkey, Yakov Surits, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tevfik Rüştü Bey. For this, see: ''Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı fevkalade murahhas ve büyük elçisi Müsyü J. Suritz Hazretleri, 45363/44 numaralı nota, Ankara Ağustos 1928''; ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hariciye Vekili Beyefendi Hazretleri 200 numaralı nota,'' Düstur, Üçüncü Tertip, v. 10, pp. 406-409. In conformity with these notes, inhabitants of the Georgian SSR had the right to graze their cattle in the pastures of Akbaba, Kısır Dağ, Çatakef, Kaserit, Gök Dağ (Çaldı), Bülbülan, Yasemal, Telil Garmani, Cin Dağ (Ayderesi), Gomvan (Merisi), Tbeti Gogadze, Kar Çıhal. Inhabitants of the Turkish Republic could use the pastures in the Georgian territory in Ahaldaba, Cinal (Ciroh), Kara Şalvar, Gonya, Çürüksu (Çoroh), Çakvistavi, Uzurgeti (from north and north-west of Uzurgeti as far as the Black Sea). In the notes, Turkey and the USSR agreed that instead of the pasture of Alagöz in the Turkish territory, which had been used only by the local cattle-breeders and ha d not been allotted to the Georgian cattle-breeders, a new pasture near to the frontier would be allotted to the latter. The two delegations also decided that cattle-breeders would not have the right to use pastures, which were within fifteen kilometres around the military fortified areas. Such military fortified areas were Kars in Turkey, and Batum in the Georgian SSR. For this, see: ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında hududun tarafeyninde bulunan mer'aralardan her bir taraf ahalisinin istifadesine dair aktolunan mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, p. 386. 1129 Ibid., pp. 386-387. 1130 ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında hududun tarafeyninde bulunan mer'aralardan her bir taraf ahalisinin istifadesine dair aktolunan mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, p. 389. The cattle- breeder was to pay 15 Kuruş for every head of sheep including 5 Kuruş for the veterinary examination and 15 Kuruş for every head of goat including 3 Kuruş for the veterinary examination. The cattle- breeder was to pay 52 Kuruş for every head of neat cattle including 30 Kuruş for the veterinary examination. For every head of horse, the owner of cattle wa to pay 75 Kuruş including 50 Kuruş for the veterinary examination. The employees of administartion, municipality, nahiye had no right to demand the payment more than above-mentioned sum. For this, see: ''Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile

281 taken by the employees of the other side on the arrival of the herd on the frontier post.

The remainder of the pasturable sum was to be paid by the owner of the herd to the local administration or a person that would have to be nominated by the local authorities within two weeks from the moment of arrival of the herd on the pasture. In case if this sum would not be paid within this time, the local authorities had the right to take this sum in accordance with the existing laws.1131

The Article 5 of the new Convention fixed the frontier posts, where the cattle- breeders had the right to cross the frontier with their herds. For instance, in accordance with this Article, they could cross the frontier only at Gök Dağ, which was near the remnants of the sentry building on the road Sulda-Başköy, Kenarbeli-Tatalet,

Badela-Orçoşan, Gramani-Titil, Sarı Çayır-Demir Kapı, Tibeti-Gogadeze, Gonvan-

Merisi, Zeda-Kertviz-Gorguzeti, Maraditi, Sarp.1132 In accordance with this Article, the local authorities were to be informed about the crossing of the frontier ten days before it. The crossing points would have to be open fourteen days beginning from the day, which had been determined in the application.

As for the other articles of this Convention regarding the Customs Certificate of the Passage, the Certificate for Cattle, the custom rules, they were identical with the

Convention of March 20, 1922. The Convention was to be valid for five years. If neither of the Contracting Parties denounced it or requested its amendment six months before its expiration, it would have to remain in force for another year. This

Convention was ratified by the USSR on January 2, 1929, and by the GNA of Turkey

Sosyalist Sovyetist Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı arasında hududun tarafeyninde bulunan mer'aralardan her bir taraf ahalisinin istifadesine dair aktolunan mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, p. 389. 1131 Ibid., p. 390. 1132 Ibid., p. 391-392.

282 on February 23, 1929, and entered into force on May 2, 1929, on exchange of the instruments of ratification in Ankara.1133

The Convention between the USSR and Turkey concerning prevention of the spread of animal diseases across the border between the Georgian SSR and Turkey was also concluded in Ankara on August 6, 1928. It introduced new measures, which would have to prevent the spreading of infectious diseases such as the cattle-plague and small-pox, which could be brought from the other side of the Turko-Georgian frontier by cattle. With that end in view, Turkey and the USSR decided to take the zone of fifteen kilometres long on both sides along the Turko-Georgian frontier under their veterinary control.1134 Both delegations agreed to establish four veterinary- control stations in this zone.1135 In accordance with this Convention, the territorial authorities of the two countries were to register and to brand all cattle in the frontier zone of fifteen kilometres long.1136

Following the signature of this Convention, the Plenipotentiary representative of the USSR, Surits, and the Zekai Bey, the Deputy for Diyarbakır, signed a protocol with the purpose of the elucidation of some articles of this Convention.1137 This

Convention was ratified by Turkey on February 23, 1929, and by the USSR on March

27, 1927, and entered into force on April 3, 1929, upon the exchange of the acts of ratification in Ankara. This Convention was to be valid for five years. Conditions for

1133 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.), p. 66. 1134 ''Türkiye ve Gürcistan Sovyetist Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti hudutlarının sari hayvan hastalıklarının istilasına karşı usulü muhafazası hakkında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Şuralar Cumhuriyeti İttihadı arasında mün'akit mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası), 1934, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, p. 453. 1135 Ibid. These veterinary stations were to be made of a veterinary, his assistant and sufficient number of the veterinary militia. 1136 ''Türkiye ve Gürcistan Sovyetist Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti hudutlarının sari hayvan hastalıklarının istilasına karşı usulü muhafazası hakkında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Sosyalist Şuralar Cumhuriyeti İttihadı arasında mün'akit mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur, Üçüncü tertip, v. 10, pp. 454-455. 1137 For instance, with the purpose of the facilitation of the passage of cattle across the frontier into pastures, both sides agreed to open two provisional the frontier crossing points: Gökdağ (on the road Sulda-Başköy and Karzamet-Tatalet). They also decided to establish the veterinary control stations on the Turko-Armenian frontier in the future.

283 validity were the same as those for the Convention concerning the use of pastures.

This Convention would be considered invalid on denunciation of this Convention.1138

Another convention that the delegations of the Soviet and Turkish governments signed in Ankara on August 6, 1928 was the "Convention between the USSR and

Turkey concerning Procedure for Consideration and Settlement of Border Disputes".

The aim of this Convention was to simplify the investigation and settlement of minor frontier disputes and incidents.1139 The frontier Commissioner on the part of the

USSR and the chief frontier on the part of Turkey were authorized to examine and settle minor incidents and disputes.1140 Decisions concerning the matters to be examined by the frontier commissioners or persons authorized by them were to be taken by mutual agreement between them. The frontier commissioners of both sides had the right to cross the frontier in order to meet with authority of the neighbour country and to investigate conflict.1141

This Convention was ratified by the USSR on January 2, 1929 and by Turkey on February 23, 1929, and entered into force on September 10, 1929 one month after the exchange of the acts of ratification in Ankara. This Convention was to be in force for three years.

1138 Robert M. Slusser- Jan F. Triska (eds.), p. 66. 1139 The term minor incidents and disputes was interpreted as such: Isolated cases of shooting at posts, sentries, and private persons in the frontier area, provided that such shooting does not cause death, wounding, or material damage; Crossing of the frontier without the necessary permission by local residents, customs officials, or frontier guards, provided that such crossing was of an accidental character and not effected with evil intent; Detention of domestic animals which had crossed the frontier; Carrying off cattle or other property from across the frontier; The Crossing of the frontier by armed persons, provided it was not of a political character; Damage to installations on water or land which were in the direct neighbourhood of the frontier. For this see; ''Türkiye ile Sosyalist Şuralar Cumhuriyetleri İttihadı hududunda zuhur eden ihtilafatın usulü tetkik ve halli hakkındaki mukavelename, 6 Ağustos 1928,'' Düstur, v. 10, pp. 432-433. 1140 Ibid. p. 433. 1141 Ibid., pp. 435-436.

284

The Forcible Eviction of Trotsky to Turkey

Lev Davidovich Trotsky [Bronstein] was born into Jewish farmers, the

Bronsteins, in the village of Yanovka, not far from Kherson in the Ukraine, near the

Black Sea and the River of Dnepr on November 7, 1879. "Trotsky" is his revolutionary name de guerre. In March 1897, he joined one of the many circles of young people in Nikolaev seeking to overturn the Tsarist regime and, thus, he began his revolutionary career. Trotsky was a leader in Russia' October Revolution in 1917, the first People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government, and the

Commissar of War.

In the struggle for power following Lenin's death in January 1924, Joseph Stalin emerged as victor, while Trotsky was removed from all positions of power. In

October 1923, Trotsky addressed a wide-ranging critique to the Central Committee, stressing especially the violation of democracy in the party and the failure to develop economic planning. This, served only as the signal for a massive propaganda counterattack against Trotsky and his supporters on grounds of functionalism and opportunism.1142

Early in 1926, following the split between the Stalin-Bukharin leadership and

Zinoviev-Kamenev group, Trotsky joined forces with his old adversaries Zinoviev and Kamenev to resume the political offensive. For a year and a half this "Joint

Opposition" stressed the themes of party democracy and economic planning, condemned the leadership's concessions to bourgeois elements, and denounced

1142 R. V. D.., "Trotsky Leon," in The New Encyclopedia Britanica (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995), v. 11, p. 945.

285 Stalin's theory of "Socialism in one country," as a pretext for abandoning world revolution.

The opposition, led by Trotsky, suffered a continuous series of defeats, ending with Trotsky's expulsion from the Politburo in October 1926 and a year later he was dropped from the Central Committee in October 1927. In January 1928, he was deported with his family to Alma Ata.

By the end of 1928 Stalin had come to the conclusion that Trotsky could no longer stay in Alma Ata. In the middle of January 1929, Stalin spoke for the first time at the Politburo of the need to isolate Trotsky. Then, he proposed to deport him abroad.1143 Maksim Litvinov received a confidential letter from the General

Secretary's Secretariat, signed by Lev Mekhlis.1144 Litvinov was asked to find out the chances of obtaining for Trotsky a visa for any country whatever.1145 Shortly after,

Stalin also called Litvinov and said: "You will greatly oblige me personally if you get him a visa. You understand that otherwise he will come to a bad end. I do not want our Revolution to devour its own children."1146 From this telephone conversation with

Stalin, Litvinov concluded that Stalin simply feared Trotsky's death and the possibility that terror might be used against him.1147 To kill Trotsky at that time would have aroused opposition on the part of some members of the Politburo and could have enraged a young Trotskyite to the point of making an attempt on Stalin's life.1148 At this time, all people visiting Stalin's office had lately been searched with increased

1143 Dmitri Volkogonov, Trotsky. The Eternal Revolutionary (New York: The Free Press, 1`996), p. 314. 1144 Mekhlis, Lev Mikhailovich. One of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants. Chief Political Commissar of the Red Army. 1145 Maxim Litvinov, Notes For a Journal (New York: William Morrow, 1955), p. 83. 1146 İbid. 1147 İbid. 1148 Jean van Heijenoort, With Trotsky in Exile. From Prinkipo to Coyoacan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 6.

286 thoroughness, and even the People' Commissars were required to leave behind all weapons before entering his office.

The Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs received negative replies from ten countries, to which it applied for a visa for Trotsky.1149 Only Mustafa Kemal

Pasha, the President of the Republic of Turkey said that he saw no objection to granting a visa to Trotsky, but warned that he would have to stay at the Embassy or

Consulate of the USSR.1150

By February 5, 1929, the Turkish government permitted Trotsky to reside in

Turkey on condition that the ex-Soviet commissar would stay only at the Soviet

Consulate and would go out of the Consulate only accompanied by an employee of the Consulate and the Turkish police.1151 The Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet wrote that the ex-Soviet statesman Trotsky had been issued a visa for six months.1152

Trotsky, his wife Natalya and their son Lyova were evicted from Alma-Ata on

January 22, 1929 and now on the journey to the exile, he still did not known where he was being deported. Only a few days later, on February 7, 1929, in the Aktyubinsk

[Aktübe] district, he was informed about his deportation to Turkey.1153 Having heard this decision, he protested: "I will not go to there on my own free will and I will say so at the Turkish frontier."1154 He also wrote a protest letter to the Central Committee, the Soviet government, and the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

In particular, he wrote that "the GPU representative reported that I will be handed over to Kemal against my will. This means that Stalin has arranged for Kemal to deal with the opposition as their common enemy" and that "The GPU representative

1149 Ibid., p. 84 1150 Ibid., p. 87 1151 ''Troçki bugün yarın geliyor,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 5 February 1929. 1152 ''Troçkinin şehrimize geleceğine dair telgraf,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 3 February 1929 1153 ''Troçki Rusyadan nasıl çıktı? İstanbula nasıl geldi?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 7 March 1929; Leon Trotsky, My Life. The Rise and Fall of a Dictator (London: Thornton Butter Worth, 1930), p. 481

287 refused to discuss minimal guarantees against White Guardists - Russian, Turkish or any other - for my forced deportation. Behind this lies Stalin's obvious expectation from White Guards, which is essentially the same as the already secured cooperation of Kemal. The statement by the GPU representative to the effect that a 'security warrant' has been issued by Kemal for my possessions in exchange for my weapons, i.e. my revolvers, means I shall be unarmed while taking my first steps in front of the

White Guards."1155 Trotsky was afraid of that he would be a target for the White

Guards who had settled in Istanbul after their evacuation by the Allies from the

Crimea at the end of the Civil War in 1920.1156 Dmitri Volkogonov, a Russian historian, put forward an assumption that Stalin may even have sent him to Turkey with that in mind.1157 The train with Trotsky reached Odessa on February 10, 1929 and, at the same day, Trotsky and his family boarded the cargo ship Il'ich, which left for Istanbul.

Trotsky arrived in Istanbul on February 12, 1929. To the Turkish police who boarded the ship, he handed a letter, addressed to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the President of the Republic of Turkey. The letter said, "Dear Sir: At the gate of Constantinople, I have the honour to inform you that I have arrived at the Turkish frontier against my will and I will cross it only by submitting to force. I request you, Mr. President, to accept my appropriate sentiments.1158

On February 18, 1929, the Governor of Istanbul on Mustafa Kemal Pasha's order wrote a letter to Trotsky, where it was stated that "it was out of the question that he should be interned or exposed to any violence on Turkish soil" and that "he was free to leave the country whenever he chose or to stay as long as he pleased, and if he

1154 Ibid. 1155 Dmitri Volkogonov, pp. 316-317. 1156 Ibid., p. 320. 1157 Ibid.

288 were to stay, the Turkish government would extent to him every hospitality and ensure his safety."1159

At first, Trotsky and his family were put in the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul, where a wing of the building was placed at their disposal. They remained at the Soviet

Consulate for about two weeks. Although the Consular staff was respectful and almost friendly, Trotsky and his family feared that the secret service might steal or confiscate the documents they had brought with them: their correspondence with

Lenin, their collection of photographs, their correspondence with members of the opposition.1160 Besides, during the second half of February a series of articles treating the Soviet authorities very aggressively and giving his own account of the factional

'struggle' that had culminated in his exile appeared the New York Times, the Daily

Express of London and some other newspapers.1161 Trotsky also sent an article to the newspaper Journal, in which he wrote how he had been deported from the USSR.1162

The Times later published reports that Trotsky had come to Istanbul by arrangement with Stalin, to prepare for a military conquest of the countries of the Near East.1163

As soon as Moscow heard about Trotsky's articles in the Western press, the

Soviet Consulate in Istanbul was instructed by the Politburo to suggest Trotsky find other accommodation.1164 As a result, he was ordered out of the Consulate. In this connection, the Soviet government seemed to have started negotiations again with the

Turkish authorities and had asked them to permit Trotsky to stay somewhere out of the Soviet Consulate. Such permission was given by the Turkish government, and, on

1158 Ibid. 1159 Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast. Trotsky: 1929-1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 5-6. 1160 Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky, The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky (London: Wildwood House, 1975), translated by Arnold J. Pomerans, p. 163. 1161 Joel Carmichael, Trotsky. An Appreciation of His Life (New York: St. Martin's, 1975), p. 371. 1162 ''Troçki Rusyadan nasıl çıktı? İstanbula nasıl geldi?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 7 March 1929. 1163 Leon Trotsky, p. 485. 1164 Dmitri Volkogonov (1996), p. 321.

289 March 5, 1929, Trotsky with his family left the Soviet Consulate and stayed a few days in the Tokatlıyan Hotel on the Grand Rue de Pera [İstiklal Caddesi].1165 Trotsky moved into the Hotel under the surname of Zadev and, in the hotel, they stayed in the room 68.1166 A few days later, their moved into a furnished apartment, found by his son Lyova, in the quarterhood of Bomonti in Şişli.1167 At the end of April, a Russian airman, to whom Trotsky had shown kindness in the past helped them to rent the Izzet

Pasha villa in Büyük Ada (the largest of the Prinkipo Islands).1168 That villa was on the northern coast of the island.

In Turkey, Trotsky wrote some of his most brilliant books: his autobiography,

My Life, and The History of the Russian revolution. Here, he tried to revive the

"degenerated" revolution by establishing his own journal, The Bulleten of the

Opposition.1169

On March 1, 1931, a fire broke out in the villa. It destroyed not only Trotsky's library but the materials he had been collecting for the proposed book of political portraits of Marx and Engels and others as well.1170 The setback was only temporary, for Trotsky eventually replaced his losses. Investigation revealed no evidence of GPU responsibility for the fire1171

When the Izzet Pasha villa was damaged by fire, Trotsky moved for about four weeks to the Savoy Hotel in Büyük Ada.1172 At the end of March, he left the island for

Moda in Kadıköy on the Asian coast of the Bosphorus. He lived at Şifa Sokak,

1165 Jean van Heijenoort, p. 3. 1166 ''Troçki-Zadef. 68 numaradaki Rus misafir,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 12 March 1929 1167 Lean van Heijenoort, p. 6 1168 Victor Serge and Natalia Trotsky (1975), p. 164. 1169 Philip Pomper, Trotsky's Notebooks, Writings on Lenin, Dialectics, and Evolutionism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 13-14. 1170 Philip Pomper, p. 18. 1171 Ronald Segal, Leon Trotsky. A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), p. 341. 1172 Jean van Heijenoort, p. 6.

290 number 22. Finally in January 1932 he went back to the island, to settle in the new villa, on Hamlacı Sokak.

Throughout Trotsky's stay in Turkey there were no difficulties with the Turkish authorities. Jean van Heijenoort, his secretary, bodyguard and general assistant from

1932 to 1939, related an incident that had occurred at the beginning of 1930 in his book. One day Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to visit an official, who had a villa in the

Büyük Ada, near the Izzet Pasha villa, where Trotsky was then living. Mustafa Kemal

Pasha sent an aide-de-camp to ask whether Trotsky would receive him. In order to dodge the meeting, Trotsky answered that his health was not well.1173 Jean van

Heijenoort says that the probable reason was that Trotsky did not want to have any personal contact with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was then persecuting the Turkish

Communists.1174

Isaac Deutscher wrote that Trotsky remained convinced that Mustafa Kemal

Pasha was hand-in-glove with Stalin.1175 This episode indicates that Mustafa Kemal

Pasha did not consider Trotsky a man in exile. Trotsky was never molested in Turkey, his suspicion of Mustafa Kemal Pasha as an accomplice of Stalin was baseless.1176

Trotsky did not struggle against Mustafa Kemal Pasha, he struggled against Stalin.

Such a state of affairs did not cause inconvenience in Turkey. The good neighbourly relations between the USSR and Turkey, undoubtedly, played a significant role in the fact that Turkey gave a visa to Trotsky. The Turkish government was not afraid of

Trotsky, for there was no such power in Turkey on which he could lean on. It seems that unless Trotsky created a problem for Turkey, he could stay in this country as much as he wanted.

1173 Ibid., p. 22. 1174 Ibid. 1175 Isaac Deutscher (1963), p. 6. 1176 Joel Carmichael, p. 378.

291 The Turks behaved hospitably, even helpfully.1177 The police guards, placed at the gates of the villa, attached themselves so much to their ward that they also become part of the household, running errands, and helping in domestic chores1178

The White émigrés made no attempt to penetrate behind the high fences and hedges. In early 1929, the White Russians in Istanbul numbered only 1,500.

Moreover, the Turkish government was planning to evict them from Turkey and only a few, who had a capital and worked at the Turkish organizations would be permitted to remain in the country. Therefore, they were engulfed in their own business and did not want to bring unnecessary headaches upon themselves.

By mid-July 1933, Trotsky was issued a visa by the French government. He was allowed into the south of France on condition that he remain incognito under police observe and never came to Paris. On July 17, 1933, Trotsky left Turkey.

The Émigrés from Russia in Istanbul

The Russian refugees came to Turkey in three huge waves: the group consisting mostly of the aristocracy and those who opposed the Bolshevik regime in Russia after the October revolution in 1917, who came in 1919 to save their lives and belongings, the officers of the White Russian Army escaping over the Crimea in the spring of

1920, and those who came to Turkey in the fall of the same year. On November 16,

1920, forty-five French and Russian ships brought approximately 70,000 Russian soldiers and civilians to Istanbul.1179 Naval ships, torpedo boats, submarines, and auxiliary, merchant, and cargo ships brought 148,678 the Russian refugees to Istanbul

1177 Isaac Deutscher), p. 25. 1178 Ibid.

292 by November 24, 1920.1180 By November 27, 1920, Russian military refugees were settled in camps in European Turkey. General Kutepov's regular army corps of 26,

596 people were settled in Gelibolu (Gallipoli). The Don Cossacks, numbering 14,

653 men, were settled in Çatalca. Camps on the island of Limni (Lemnos) housed

16,050 Kuban and Terek Cossacks. In addition, there were nearly 4,5000 sick and wounded soldiers who were being treated in Istanbul. A council of Immigration was formed to help to refugees emigrate elsewhere, but only 35,000 were accepted by the

Balkan states and Tunisia.

Most of the emigrants from Russia used Istanbul as a "bridge" for finally settling in different countries such as France, the United States, Canada, and

Argentina. Those who remained in Istanbul either invested in business in order to secure their status or married Turkish subjects.1181 The emigres form Russia who had some financial resources opened cafés and restaurants in Istanbul. One of the most famous and elegant Russian restaurants in Istanbul, and a pet place of the Istanbul high society was Rejans (Regence). This restaurant was in the street apposite to the church of St. Antony in Pera. The restaurant belonged to Madame Vera and her husband. Mustafa Kemal Pasha also often dropped in here with his friends to have their dine and to listen to the Russian music.1182

In 1928, the émigrés from Russia in Istanbul numbered 6,000.1183 In 1929, in accordance with the decision, which had been accepted by the Turkish government, the émigrés from Russia residing in Istanbul, were to leave Turkey by February 6,

1179 Nur Bilgi Criss, "Istanbul: Die Russischen Flüchtinge am Bosporus." In Karl Schögel, Die Gro3e Exodus. Die Russısche Emigration and İhre Zenren 1917 bis 1941 (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1994. 1180 Ibıd. 1181 Jak Deleon, The White Russians in Istanbul (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995), p. 15. 1182 İsmet Bozdağ, Atatürk'ün Sofrası (İstanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık), 1975, p. 90. 1183 ''Beyaz Ruslar,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 22 February 1929.

293 1929.1184 In this connection, some of them applied to the Turkish government for

Turkish citizenship.1185 Eventually, some of the White Russians were admitted to the

Turkish citizenship.1186

In March 1929, the Turkish government, taking into account the applications of the White Russians to the Turkish government for Turkish citizenship, decided to extend their term of sojourn in Turkey for a year.1187 At the same time, it put forward conditions, on the basis of which, the White Russians would be admitted to the

Turkish citizenship. In particular, they were to have sufficient financial resources, to have profession, to take no part in political propaganda, and to employ people of

Turkish origin in their business.1188

These conditions, to some extent, throw light on the reasons due to which the

Turkish government was not indifferent to the matter of the White Russians in

Istanbul. It seems that the Turkish government did not want to have a separate community of individuals of foreign nationality in Istanbul or somewhere in Turkey.

Only those of the White Russians who had sufficient financial resources, and who had a profession could remain in Turkey. Turkey was critically in need of the high professionals who were able to contribute to Turkey and the Turkish economy, and who would be able to start business and employ the unemployed Turks. It is not impossible that the Turkish government supposed that the White Russians without profession and means of subsistence, in the conditions of the economic difficulties in

Turkey, could easily become object of political propaganda. One cannot help assuming that the Turkish government also proceeded from its intention to preserve benevolent relations with the USSR. As far as back November 1926, Chicherin,

1184 ''Beyaz Ruslar 6 Şubat^ta Gidecekler,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 1 February 1929. 1185 İbid. 1186 Ibid. 1187 ''Beyaz Ruslar Ne Şerait Dahilinde Türkiye'de Kalabilirler,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 28 March 1929.

294 during his meeting with Tevfik Rüştü Bey in Odessa, stated him that the Soviet government had evidence that the Turkish government rendered assistance to White

Guardians in Turkey.1189 With a law passed on June 6, 1936, all the Russians, living in Istanbul were given the opportunity of becoming Turkish citizens.1190

The Protocol between the USSR and Turkey

on Extension of the Treaty of December 17, 1925

On October 9, 1928, Potyomkin, the Acting Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Turkey met with Tevfik Rüştü Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, who confided his plans for next half a year to the Soviet diplomat. He said that he was planing to meet with Chicherin in February 1929, to establish a closer cooperation in the main directions of foreign policy of the two countries, and to prolong the term of the Treaty of December 17, 1925 between the USSR and Turkey.1191 In the opinion of

Tevfik Rüştü Bey, at that time, contradictions between states had become extremely aggravated, and the attempt of some states to create a unified front had been broken by the demand of those states that were intending to free themselves from the Anglo-

French hegemony.1192 Tevfik Rüştü Bey stated that he still considered the Turko-

Soviet collaboration the base of the Turkish foreign policy, and that the strengthening of the international situation of Turkey which had been achieved by Turkey latterly,

1188 ''Beyaz Ruslar Ne Şerait Dahilinde Türkiye'de Kalabilirler,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 28 March 1929. 1189 "Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Turtsii Tevfikom Rushdi, 14 noyabrya 1926," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. VI, p. 543 1190 Jak Deleon, p. 32. 1191 "Telegramma Vremennogo Poverennogo v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 10 oktyabrya 1928 g.,," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 535. 1192 Ibid.

295 was the fruit of this collaboration and the evidence of the correctness of this policy.1193

In the first half of May 1928, Amanulla Khan, the Padishah of Afghanistan, paid the USSR a friendly visit.1194 After the USSR, he went to Turkey. An alliance comprising the USSR, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan was one of the Afghan sovereign's dreams, and, in Moscow, he stated that close political friendship of these states was an absolute necessity.1195 The Soviet authorities in talks with Amanulla

Khan on this matter emphasized the desirability of further comprehensive political friendship between these four states on the base of existing pacts, and remarked that missing the Turko-Afghan and the Persian-Afghan pacts in this system of mutual pacts, should be concluded during his visit to Ankara and Tehran.1196 During his stay in Turkey, Amanulla Khan signed with the Turko-Afghan Treaty of Friendship,

Political and Economic Collaboration on May 25, 1928. Later, during his visit to

Tehran, the negotiations were continued, and, as a result, Turkey, Persia, and

Afghanistan came to an agreement that they would undertake anything in the Asian issues without a preliminary mutual notification about their supposed measures.1197

These countries kept this agreement a secret from the USSR until the end of October

1928.

1193 "Telegramma Vremennogo Poverennogo v Delakh SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 10 oktyabrya 1928 g.,," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, pp. 535- 536 1194 For this, see: "Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Korolyom Afganistana Amanulla-khanom, 7 maya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, pp. 302- 307. 1195 "Telegramma Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Persii Ya. Kh. Davtyanu, 1 iyunya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 362. 1196 "Pis'mo Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Afghanistane L. N. Starku," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 338. 1197 "Zapis' besedy Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Vremennym Poverennym v Delakh Turtsii v SSSR Talaat-beem, 26 oktyabrya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 552

296 The Soviet government supposed that Turkey wanted to take a leading role in the triple combination between Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.1198 In all probability, the formula of the preliminary mutual notification about the supposed measures in relations with other countries, was put forward by the Turkish side. The Turkish government held that such a formula was a new step towards the strengthening of mutual confidence.1199 The Turkish government would like the Soviet government to conclude similar agreements with Persia and Afghanistan.1200 As regards the future

Turko-Soviet agreement, the Turkish government seemed to have had in mind a widen formula than only the preliminary notification about the supposed measures in the Asian issues. Hikmet Bey, the Ambassador of Turkey in Afghanistan, in a talk with Stark, the Plenipotentiary Extraordinary Representative of the USSR in

Afghanistan, pointed out that Turkey just as the USSR, in addition to Asian policy, was carrying out European policy as well.1201

In early October 1929, Tevfik Rüştü Bey proposed the Soviet government to discuss a draft of the future Turko-Soviet protocol. He supposed to prolong the term of the Treaty of December 17, 1925 between the USSR and Turkey for two years. He also intended to introduce into this Treaty a new clause, which would read: "Each of the Contracting Parties declares that there are no obligations besides published acts between it and other states, which are in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood with the second Contracting Party. Each of the Contracting Parties will oblige not to start without consent of the other Contracting Party negotiations for the purpose of concluding political agreements with states which are in the immediate land or sea

1198 "Pis'mo Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Afghanistane L. N. Starku, 14 iyunya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 389. 1199 Ibid. 1200 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Afganistane v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 4 dekabrya 1928 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, p. 592.

297 neighbourhood with other Contracting Party.1202 Tevfik Rüştü Bey did not mind if

Britain would be included into the expression "the immediate land or sea neighbour".1203

By December 5, 1929, the Soviet government agreed to prolong the Treaty of

December 17, 1925 between the USSR and Turkey and to sign a protocol on mutual obligation not to conclude political agreements with neighbour states without the consent of the first contracting party.1204 It was also decided that the final content of this protocol would be discussed during L. Karakhan's visit to Turkey.

Long before Karakhan's arrival at Turkey, the Turkish newspapers wrote about the impending visit of the high rank Soviet diplomat to Turkey.1205 For instance, the

Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet of December 11 and 12, 1929 gave a short biography of

Karakhan, his program in Istanbul and Ankara, and stated that the guest would be received as a friend.1206 The newspaper called him "dear influential person of our friend - Russia".1207 It was obvious that Turkey attached a great importance to the forthcoming visit of Karakhan to Turkey.

Shortly before Karakhan's visit, Mustafa Kemal Pasha suddenly and unexpectedly departed from the capital for Yalova together with Şükrü Bey [Kaya]

1201 Ibid. 1202 "Telegramma Polnomochnogo Predstavitelya SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsa v Narodnyy Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, 10 oktyabrya 1929 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1967), v. XII, pp. 552-553. 1203 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 767. 1204 "Telegramma Zamestitelya Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstavitelyu SSSR v Turtsii Ya. Z. Suritsu, 5 dekabrya 1929 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, pp. 637-638. 1205 For this, see: ''Karahan. Rus Hariciye Komiseri'nin Ankara'yı Ziyaret Etmesi Muhtemel,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 5 November 1929; ''Rus Hariciye Komiseri Niçin Geliyor?'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul); ''Türk-Rus Dostluğu. Rus Hariciye Komiseri Karahan Yoldaş Ayın 25inde Geliyor,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 8 November 1929; ''Karahan Yarın bir Harp Gemisi ile Şehrimize Geliyor,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 11 December 1929. 1206 ''Karahan Yarın bir Harp Gemisi ile Şehrimize Geliyor,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 11 December 1929; ''Karahan Bugün Oğle Uzeri Geliyor. Misafirimizi Pek Dostane Bir Surette Karşılanacak,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 12 December 1929. 1207 ''Dost Rusyanın Kıymetli Rüknü Karahan Dün Geldi ve Ankara'ya Gitti.'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul). 17 December 1929.

298 and several of his cronies and he returned to Ankara only just in time to receive the

Soviet representative in audience.1208 Rumour at that time was rife that Mustafa

Kemal Pasha had little desire to meet this agent of a regime which, indirectly, had threatened Mustafa Kemal Pasha's own personal safety and that his well-known

Western leanings further contributed to his distaste for Karakhan's company, a distaste moreover which no doubt accentuated by the fact of Karakhan's Armenian origin.1209

It would not be wrong to say that there was not a word of truth in this rumour.

In all probablity, it was sat afloat by those who desired to deteriorate the Turko-Soviet relations. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was a strong man and noble. It would not be his standard to avoid the meeting with the Soviet diplomat. It would be beneath his dignity. Undoubtedly, he had known about the wording of the future Turko-Soviet

Protocol, which aimed at further strengthening of the mutual confidence between

Turkey and the USSR. Moreover, this wording had been proposed by the Turkish side. The Turkish representatives always stated that relations between Turkey and the

USSR were very friendly.1210

Karakhan arrived in Istanbul on the Soviet torpedo boat Dzerzhinskiy on

December 12, 1929 and, at the same day, he left for Ankara. As a result of negotiations, on December 17, 1929, Karakhan, Surits, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey signed the Protocol on Extension of the term of the Treaty on Neutrality of December 17,

1929 between the USSR and Turkey.

This Protocol read:

1208 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era. A Diplomatic Accord of Forty Years 1904-1945 (London: Hammond, 1953), v. II, pp. 841-842. 1209 Ibid., p. 842 1210 For this, see: "Sovetsko-Turetskaya Druzhba," Pravda (Moscow), 22 March 1929; "Druzhba mezhdu Turtsiey i SSSR," Pravda (Moscow), 27 February 1929; Yunus Nadi, ''Rusya ile Münasebatımız,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 16 July 1929.

299 Article 1

The Treaty on friendship and neutrality, which had been concluded between the USSR and Turkey in Paris on December 17, 1925, has been extended for two years from the day of its expiration. If one of the Contracting Parties will not notify the other Contracting Party about its desire to denounce this Protocol six months before its expiration, the Treaty will be regarded as automatically extended for an additional year.

Article 2

Each of the Contracting Parties declares that it has no obligations, besides acts, which has already been given publicity, with states that are in the immediate neighbourhood with the first Contracting Party. Each of the Contracting Parties obliges not to start negotiations without notification other Contracting Party about that negotıatıons for the purpose of concluding political agreements with states, which are in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood with the latter and to conclude such agreements only after the consent of the later. It has been established that acts aimed at establishing or maintaining normal relations with these states and intending to give publicity remain out of obligations stipulated above.

Article 3

The Present Protocol, which will be added to the Turko-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality, and which will be its indivisible part, is valid for a period of validity of the Treaty, which has been extended in accordance with provisions in the Article 1 of this Protocol.

At the same day, Karakhan, Surits, and Tevfik Rüştü Bey signed another protocol, where they specified the expression "states, which are in the immediate neighbourhood". For the USSR, such states were Persia, Afghanistan, China,

Mongolia, Japan, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and the British

Empire.1211 For Turkey, these states were Persia, Iraq, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and the

British Empire, and also authorities acting on behalf of Syria.1212

Shortly before the Turko-Soviet Protocol, Turkey had concluded a treaty with

Afghanistan, a protocol with Persia, neutrality treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and

1211 "Protokol [mezhdu SSSR and Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 661.

300 Italy, treaties with France. All these treaties and protocols were evidences of the active policy of the Turkish government to secure its borders by creating a circle of friendly states around Turkey and, thus, as much as possible to extend the breathing space necessary for the economic recovery of the country. In this respect, the Protocol between the USSR and Turkey on the extension of the Treaty of December 17, 1925, was a part of this active diplomacy of the Turkish government.

In the Treaty of December 17, 1925, the USSR obliged to be neutral in case of aggression against Turkey, not to undertake aggression against Turkey and not to take a part in hostile combinations against the latter. On June 8, 1929, the Italian hydroaeroplane squadron and two Italian aircraft carriers Kalatafimi and Palestro arrived in Odessa. On September 4, 1929, two Soviet destroyers Nezamozhnik and

Frunze also arrive in Naples. Although Turkey signed the Treaty on Neutrality with

Italy on May 30, 1928, the former distrusted Italy. With this new Protocol, Turkey strove not only to preclude the participation of the USSR in the hostile combinations against Turkey, but also to exclude negotiations on agreements, which could have a hostile character.

The Turkish obligation not to start without notification the Soviet government about negotiations on the political agreements with states, which were the immediate neighbours of the USSR, also met the interests of the latter. This formula, first of all, restricted a free hand of Turkey to conclude pacts with the most possible military adversaries of the USSR, and, in particular, with Poland and Romania.1213

Besides, the settlement of the Mosul question opened a new stage in relations of

Turkey with the West. The Mosul question was for Turkey as if a barrier, which put obstacles in the way of the conclusion of agreements with the Western countries, and,

1212 "Protokol [mezhdu SSSR and Turtsiey], 17 dekabrya 1925 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 661.

301 in the first place, with Britain.1214 After the settlement of the Mosul question, Turkey began to take measures in order to normalize its relations with the Western powers. It signed the Treaty on Neutrality with Italy on May 30, 1928, and, in June of the same year, Turkey signed the agreement with France, in which the Turkish government agreed to pay off its pre-war debt to France in sum of 86,167,000 Liras in gold.1215 At the same time, Turkey and France signed an agreement on the Turko-Syrian frontier, in accordance with which, Turkey handed over Syria strategically important territory near to the River of Tigris.1216 These treaties and agreements with Britain, France, and

Italy accounted not only for the intention of Turkey to secure its frontiers, but also its intention to draw the foreign credit in country on favourable conditions.1217

Since 1926, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union embarked upon the socialist reconstruction of the entire national economy the so-called

"industrialization". However, towards the end of 1927, it became clear that there were great shortages in the supply of grain. This serious grain shortages arose as a result of the entirely inadequate supply of industrial goods to the rural districts.1218 The difficulties with grain deliveries had an immediate and powerful effect on the entire

Soviet economy. The Soviet balance of trade became increasingly unfavourable, the government hastily reduced imports. The supply of many goods urgently needed in production was cut off, greatly aggravating the shortage of raw materials, especially in light industry. In February 1928, a number of factories were threatened with closure.

The metallurgical and metalworking industries experienced difficulties. Everywhere

1213 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 767. 1214 A. Mel'nik, Turtsiya (Moscow-Leningrad: Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1929), p. 152. 1215 B. Dantsig, Turtsiya (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhyonnykh Sil Soyuza SSR, 1949), p. 262. 1216 Ibid. 1217 B. Dantsig, p. 116. 1218 Tony Cliff, Trotsky: the darker the night the brighter the star 1927-1949 (London: Bookmarks, 1993), p. 21.

302 the exhaustion of industrial machinery and equipment began to have its effects. In

November 1927, industrial production was 18 % lower than had been projected.1219

The basic case of the difficulties of grain collection was the scarcity of industrial goods to induce the peasants to sell the grain. Many industrial consumer goods were in short supply, so the peasants were reluctant to convert their grain, which could easily be stored, into cash, which they could not use to buy the goods they wanted. Finally, the peasants were in a stronger position than the previous years to resist changes in the terms of trade, which were to their disadvantage. Their stocks of cash were higher, and by 1927 they had acquired sufficient basic consumer goods to be prepared to wait for the variety or quality they preferred.1220

The deep economic crisis caught the party leadership completely off guard, and extraordinary measures were needed to save the day. With that purpose in view, the

Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which took place in

Moscow from December 2 to December 19, 1927, decided on the all-out collectivization of agriculture, on switching over to large-scale, mechanized socialist farming, and it was decided to begin preparations for a Socialist offensive along the whole front.1221 The Fifteenth Congress adopted directives for the first Five-Year Plan of development of the Soviet economy.

Besides, it was stated at the Fifteenth Congress that the contradictions of the world capitalist system had become much sharper, and the Congress prognosticated the approach of new imperialistic wars and the revolutionary outcome of world

1219 For the difficult economic situation in the USSR at that time, see: M. Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism (London; 1987), pp. 43-44. 1220 Ibid., p. 39. 1221 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 420.

303 conflicts.1222 In the sphere of foreign policy, it instructed the Central Committee to establish closer economic ties with the capitalist nations.1223 An outbreak of hostilities between the great powers would necessarily interfere with the flow of foreign trade on which the success of the industrialization largely depended. Therefore, the Soviet government considered it necessary to raise the defence capacity of the USSR. It was greatly interested in postponing possible wars against the USSR until it shall have made real progress in the building up of its socialist system. Therefore, the prevention of imperialistic wars and aggressions against the USSR continued to be one of the priorities of the Soviet foreign policy. In this respect, the Ankara Protocol was for the

Soviet government a way to ensure once more that Turkey, which had a long sea and land border with the USSR, would not serve as a staging ground for an

"interventionist-minded capitalist coalition".

In November 1929, the Mediterranean squadron of the British fleet under the command of Admiral Field and consisting of the battleship Queen Elizabeth, the air carrier Courageous, the yacht Brawn, and three destroyers Wonder, Veteran, and Wold

Sun arrived in Istanbul.1224 During this visit, Admiral Field met with Mustafa Kemal

Pasha, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, and Abdülhalük Bey, the Defence Minister. The Soviet government regarded this visit of the British fleet to Istanbul as the capitulation of

Turkey before Britain.1225 Maksim Litvinov, the deputy People's Commissar for

Foreign Affairs of the USSR, held that the Turks were openly striving to restore their

1222 P. N. Pospelov, E. V. Bugaev, and others (eds.), Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1970), v. IV, the First Book, p. 517.. 1223 Ibid. 1224 "Turtsiya," Byulleten' Pressy Srednego Vostoka (Moscow), 1929, N 3, p. 73. 1225 "Turtsiya," Byulleten' Pressy Srednego Vostoka (Moscow), 1929, N 3, p. 72.

304 old alliance with the English, and that all the Soviet government could do was to weaken it.1226

All these developments gave rise to the talk in the USSR that Turkey was revising direction of its foreign policy.1227 In this connection, the Soviet government stated that the Protocol of December 17, 1929, was the effective demonstration of the deepening of the Turko-Soviet relations and put an end to such assumptions.1228 The

Soviet government held that the Ankara Protocol had given a guarantee that for some time, imperialism would not be able to create a circle of states hostile to the USSR.1229

The Difficulties in the Turko-Soviet Trade Relations

Although, the USSR and Turkey had concluded the Trade and Navigation

Agreement in March 1927, there were certain difficulties in the trade relations between these two countries. In the Agreement, Turkey agreed that the Trade delegation of the

USSR in Turkey formed an integral part of the Embassy of the USSR in Turkey, and that the trade representative and his two deputies were part of the Embassy staff and would enjoy personal immunity and other privileges and prerogatives granted to members of diplomatic missions.1230 The Agreement was a political success for the

USSR, as, with this Agreement, Turkey de-jure recognised Soviet system of the monopoly of the State on foreign trade. The two countries granted each other mutual custom privileges. Besides, Turkey was given the right of the import to the USSR

1226 Maxim Litvinov, Notes For a Journal (New York: William Morrow, 1955), introduction by E. H. Carr, p. 121. 1227 Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 767. 1228 Ibid. 1229 V. Nadezhdenskiy, "Turtsiya i Sovetskiy Soyuz," Front Nauki i Tekhniki (Moscow), 1932, N 6, p. 58. 1230 "Trade and Navigation Agreement between the USSR and Turkey, 11 March 1927," in Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, v. II, p. 168.

305 without a licence a certain contingent of the Turkish commodities and some privileges in the transit of commodities.

The Article 18 of the Agreement stipulated that the USSR retained the right, in regard to the transit of the products of the soil and industry of Turkey, to demand, on arrival of these products on Soviet territory, certificates of origin certifying that these products were products of the soil and industry of Turkey.1231 The often doubt on the part of the Soviet authorities in the custom about the origin of commodities brought by the Turkish merchants was giving occasion to frequent problems. The commodities of the Turkish merchants were kept until the elucidation of their origin.1232 Very often, such commodities were sent back to Turkey.1233 The Turkish merchants could take out

30 per cent of their profit.1234 However, after April 1929, the Soviet authorities refused

Turkish merchant to take out with them this part of their profit.1235 The prominent

Turkish artist, İbrahım Çallı who had an art exhibition in Moscow and whose pictures had been bought there, also complained to Mustafa Kemal Pasha that the Soviet authorities did not permit to take out even the Rubble. He said that the Russians gave with one hand, but took back with the two.1236

Chicherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, himself, in 1928, considered that although the Soviet system of the monopoly of the State on foreign trade was protecting the USSR from the economic enslavement of the USSR by the capitalist countries, at the same time, this system was creating difficulties in the economic relations of the USSR with the eastern countries, and that it was very

1231 Ibid., p. 176; These certificates were to be issued by the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture of Turkey, their local agencies, and also by the Chamber of Commerce. The said certificates were to be endorsed in Turkey by the trade delegation of the USSR or its agencies. 1232 ''Rusya'ya Eşya İhrac Eden Türk Tüccarının Şikayetleri,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 29 May 1929. 1233 ''Rusya İle Ticaretimiz Müşkülat Bir Safhaya Girdi,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 1 June 1929. 1234 ''T. Rüştü Bey'in Beyanatı,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 11 Aprıl 1929 1235 ''Rusya İle Ticaret,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 8 December 1929. 1236 İsmet Bozdağ, p. 96.

306 difficult to adapt this system to them.1237 By the same token, this system complicated the Turko-Soviet trade relations too.

The Turkish merchants, sometimes, resorted to the illegal methods. For instance, while selling their commodities, they indicated a sum that much more exceeded the real sum of the sold commodities. Doing so, they strove to get a greater amount of the foreign currency.1238 There were also numerous occasions, when the Turkish merchants placed into the wrapping more commodities than it was permitted by the

Trade Agreement.1239 Yunus Nadi, the editor of the Istanbul daily Cumhuryet wrote:

"Abolish this Trade Agreement, for it is damaging our friendship."1240

Although Turkey complained about the shortcomings in the Trade and

Navigation Agreement of March 1927 between the USSR and Turkey, at the same time, it was ready to discuss with the Soviet government what could be done to improve the situation in the trade relations. For instance, Cumhuriyet was very prudent in the analysis of the difficulties in the trade relations between the two countries and spoke for the preservation of the Turko-Soviet relations and wrote that "all what had been written about difficulties in the trade relations proceeded only from the apprehension that these difficulties could damage relations between the two countries."1241

These complications did not lead to the deterioration of relations between

Turkey and the USSR. Undoubtedly, both Turkey and the USSR attached great importance to the improvement of these trade relations. However, their most important task was to prevent possible aggressions against them. Friendly attitude either of

1237 "Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR s Korolyom Afganistana Amanulla- khanom, 7 maya 1928," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XI, pp. 304-305. 1238 "Pamyatnaya zapiska Narodnogo Komissariata Inostrannykh Del SSSR Posol'stvu Turtsii v SSSR, 13 aprelya 1929 g.," Dokumenty Vneshney Politiki SSSR, v. XII, p. 159. 1239 Ibid., p. 158. 1240 Yunus Nadi, ''Rusya İle Münasebatımız,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 28 May 1929.

307 Turkey or the USSR towards each other offered a guarantee against such an aggression.

The USSR, Turkey, and Communism

Turkey vigorously remained closed to everything that bore a relation to the inner politics of the Soviets. Although Mustafa Kemal Pasha maintained close and mutually beneficial relations with the USSR, he close the doors of Turkey to communist propaganda. Strong measures were provided for the suppression of communist ideas.1242

The Treaty of December 17, 1925 between the USSR and Turkey established principles on the basis of which, close and mutually beneficial relations between them could be maintained. These principles were neutrality, non-aggression, and non- participation in hostile combinations directed against them. The Soviet government seemed to have realized very well that if it started to support the Turkish communists or to carry out communist propaganda in Turkey, the latter would repudiate at once from these principles. However, in 1927, some "careless" articles appeared in the leading party magazine Za Partiyu.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held that the revolutionary movements in backward and oppressed countries, which had started as the national liberation movements, would have to pass consecutively through the bourgeois revolution of the united national front against imperialism, later to the bourgeois- democratic (agrarian) revolution, and finally to the socialist revolution.1243 The development of the agrarian revolution, thus, was the main moment for the

1241 Yunus Nadi, ''Rusya İle Münasebatımız,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 10 July 1929. 1242 Mahmut, ''Türkiye ve Komunizm,'' Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 24 September 1927.

308 intensification of revolution in the backwards countries. The Communist Party of the

Soviet Union held that only Turkey among such countries as Afghanistan, Persia, and the countries of the Arabian peninsula, entered into the first phase of the bourgeois- democratic revolution.

Stalin, addressing to the students of the University of Sun-Yet-Sen, stated that

"the Kemalist revolution is possible only in such countries like Turkey, Afghanistan, and Persia, where there is no possibility of a mighty agrarian-peasant revolution. The

Kemalist revolution was a revolution of the national trade bourgeoisie that had arisen in the struggle against foreign imperialism and, this revolution, in its further development, was directed against the workers and peasants, and against the possibility of the agrarian revolution itself."1244 Proceeding from this statement,

Irandust, a Soviet writer, concluded that Kemalism had two characteristic features, and, one of them was that the Turkish national bourgeoisie was a predominant force of this revolution, and this bourgeoisie was opposing the development of the proletarian elements in Turkey and the agrarian revolution.1245 In his opinion, this was the counter revolutionary feature of Kemalism.1246 Another writer, Lyufti, wrote that "there is no doubt that only the Turkish proletariat would be able to complete the democratic cleansing. The Turkish working class in the union with the Turkish peasants and with the help of the world proletariat will settle its historical issues.1247

At the same time, Soviet writers underlined that the bourgeois-democratic revolution of Kemalism arose from the struggle against foreign imperialism and aimed at political and economic independence of Turkey.1248 Therefore, the Soviets regarded

1243 Irandust, "Sushchnost' Kemalizma," Za Partiyu (Moscow), 1927, N 2, pp. 62-63. 1244 Ibid., p. 64 1245 Ibid. 1246 Ibid. 1247 Lyufti, "Turtsiya Segodnya," Za Partiyu (Moscow), 1927, N 4, p. 76. 1248 Irandust, "Sushchnost' Kemalizma," Za Partiyu (Moscow), 1927, N 2, p. 64.

309 that Kemalism was a revolutionary factor, as the Turkish national bourgeoisie had not yet completed the struggle against imperialism.1249 The fact that the Turkish government was carrying out a policy aimed at preserving the sovereignty of Turkey, meant for the USSR that Turkey, doing so, was breaking up the Western powers' plans in the territories adjacent to the USSR. If the independence of Turkey was a factor of security for the USSR, just as the friendship of Turkey with its principles of neutrality, non-aggression, and non-participation in hostile combinations against the USSR, was also the factor of security for the latter. Therefore, the Soviet government was concerned with the preservation of the Republican government of the Mustafa Kemal

Pasha. The chief task of the foreign policy of the USSR was to prevent possible aggression against the USSR and this task requested the Soviet government to refuse flatly from carrying out communist propaganda in Turkey or supporting Turkish communists.

The Sixth Congress of the Communist International, which took place in

Moscow in August 1928, was also en event of the great importance in this respect. It will be remembered that it was during this period that Stalin's "socialism in one country" gained official recognition. The Sixth Congress was entirely dominated by

Stalin and Bukharin and it had for its purpose to incorporate the doctrine of "socialism in one country" within the body of communist articles of faith.1250 The program, while preserving the whole of the revolutionary phraseology of the Communist Manifesto of

1848 and of the revolutionary writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, nevertheless introduced some fundamental changes in the general teaching of communism. Most important among these changes was the strong emphasis put on the part played by the

1249 Ibid., p. 65. 1250 Michael T. Florinsky, "Soviet Foreign Policy," in Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald Stourzh, and Marvin Zettrebaum (eds.), Readings in Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 190.

310 USSR as a revolutionazing element in the world. International revolution, of course, was the final aim of the Third International, but its immediate purposes were defined: the prevention of imperialistic wars and the defence of the USSR against the capitalist aggression.

It wass true that the world revolution through the forcible overthrow of the capitalist system and establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat remained an integral part of the communist teaching. However, it seems that Michael Florinsky was right to write that the Soviet government had sacrificed much of the Marxist-Leninist theory on the altar of expediency and Realpolitik.

The Turkish press responded to the "careless" articles in Soviet magazines with sharp replies. However, it never curried it to the point of the deterioration of relations between the two countries.1251 The Turkish government did not think that the Soviet government would support the Bolshevist propaganda in Turkey.1252 It realized that the Soviet government knew very well that such activities would only exasperate the

Turkish government.1253 Esat Bey, the Chief of the First Division of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Turkey believed that the Soviet Embassy had refrained from endeavouring to initiate the communist propaganda, since the Turkish government did not tolerate it.1254

The USSR and Turkey were concerned equally with the peace, which was a necessary prerequisite for the successful development of their economies. Their economies were weak and their reconstruction and development required a certain period of time. In other words, for them the peace meant the prevention of possible aggression and hostile combinations directed against them. Turkey and the USSR were

1251 Yunus Nadi, ''Türkiye ve Komunızm,'' Cumhuriyet (İstanbul), 30 September 1927. 1252 Mahmut, ''Türkiye ve Komunizm,'' Hâkimiyet-i Milliye (Ankara), 27 september 1927. 1253 Ibid.

311 the immediate neighbours, and they shared a long land and sea frontier. Turkey strove to prevent aggression on the part of the USSR, and, thus, to secure its north-eastern and eastern frontiers. The USSR's task was to prevent aggression from the Turkish territory and strove to keep Turkey from giving its territory as springboard to other the

Western Powers to attack the USSR. These were their interests and, for their achievement, they elaborated principles of neutrality, non-aggression, and non- participation in the hostile combinations directed against them. Therefore, in a period of time between the meeting of the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Bey and the

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin in Odessa in 1926 until the signing the Ankara Protocol in Ankara on December 17, 1929, Turkey and the USSR strictly observed these principles. Moreover, these principles gave them, to some extent, a guarantee for peace, and laid down the foundations for the confidence, and stimulated the strengthening of mutual relations. Besides, the observance of these principles made the relations between the two countries mutually beneficial.

The Turkish and Soviet governments realized that for the maintenance of the permanent confidence and certitude in each other, besides these principles, they had to underline permanently and confirm their friendly attitude towards each other in practice. In this respect, they signed the Trade and Navigation Agreement in March

1927, and four conventions in 1928, by means of which, they contemplated to settle some problems on the Turko-Soviet frontier.

The Turkish government's decision to stop the extension of the term of sojourn for some White Russians in Istanbul, or the issue of the visa for Trotsky, could be referred to the intention of the Turkish government to underline its benevolent attitude towards the USSR. The Turkish government avoided everything that could endanger

1254 "From Joseph C. Grew to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1930," [Embassy of the United States of America, Istanbul], Communist Activities 1920-1927, M 1224, Roll 2, 867.0013.

312 the Turko-Soviet relations. Turkey did not confide in the Western Powers. The USSR continued to be sole source of material and moral support in case of complications between Turkey and the Western Powers. Notwithstanding their common interest in the prevention of aggressions and non-participation in hostile combinations directed against either of the two countries, Turkey had different stand on the matter of disarmament. The Turkish government did not support the Soviet idea of the complete disarmament.

The same thing can be said about the Soviet government. Apart from some articles about Kemalism and leading forces in the bourgeois-national revolution in

Anatolia, it seemed to have abandoned the practice of supporting local Turkish communists and carrying out communist propaganda in Turkey.

The Soviet and Turkish authorities, diplomats, and the media called these relations cordial, inviolable friendship, firm friendship, good neighbourly relations.

During official receptions, the Turkish officials called the USSR the old and sincere friend. However, it would be more correct to describe these relations mutually beneficial relations, undoubtedly, with benevolent and friendly intentions towards each other. It should not be forgotten, however, that the necessity to respect the interests of each other allowed these relations to remain on good level.

The difficulties in the industrialization in the country, made the Soviet government develop close economic ties with "capitalist" countries. This decision of the Soviet government, undoubtedly, put Turkey on its guard. It seems that it also shattered the Turkey's confidence and certitude in the Soviet government. However, to break off relations with the USSR, would be unfavourable decision for Turkey. It was in need of the USSR, and, therefore, it looked for instruments that would contribute to the maintenance of confidence and certitude in each other. As a result, Turkey

313 proposed the Soviet government formula of not starting without notification other contracting party about negotiations for the purpose of concluding political agreements with states, which were in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood with other contracting party.

This formula was meeting the Soviet government's interests too, as Turkey had concluded some pacts and agreements with Italy, France, and other Balkan states.

Therefore, the Moscow Protocol of December 17, 1929, was a result of the fact that their confidence and certitude in each other shattered to some extent. As they were in need of each other. However, they strove to preserve their good neighbourly and mutually beneficial relations. This formula was step forward towards the strengthening of confidence and certitude in each other. Besides, it was giving them possibility even to coordinate their steps in order to observe mutual interests.

CONCLUSION

The Great Powers recognized the victory of Turkey at the Lausanne

Conference, and, thus, rendered null and void the Treaty of Sevres that annihilated the

Turkish independence. After the Lausanne Conference, Turkey continued to be of great significance for the USSR. The Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Georgia, and

Armenia also became constituent parts of this "Union". Thus, as of 1923, Turkey

314 shared with the USSR a critically important frontier in north-eastern and eastern

Anatolia, as well as a long sea frontier on the Black Sea.

In the aftermath of the devastating Civil War, the Soviet government was fully engaged in the economic rehabilitation of the country. By mid-1923, the New

Economic Policy that had been accepted by the Russian Communist Party

(Bolsheviks) in March 1921 started to yield some encouraging results. As a whole, however, the Soviet economy was still weak. There were enormous complications in the realization of this program, and a shortage of the industrial plants and means of production prevailed. Moreover, militarily the USSR was weak and vulnerable. There were serious defects in the Red Army, owing to which, it was threatened by disorganization. In February 1924, the Special Commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) reaffirmed that, at the present time, the

Red Army was unfit for active service. The Soviet government considered it necessary to carry out a reform in order to restore it into an efficient state.

The leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet government was in dire need of time for the realization of the reforms in the economy and army, and strove to utilize all means in order to extend the "breathing space." The Soviet leadership firmly believed that, some time or other, the "imperialist" powers would start an aggression against the USSR. In view of this, the Soviet foreign policy aimed at preventing such aggression and the possible creation of "imperialist" military combinations directed against the USSR. Consequently, the Soviet government, first of all, strove to conclude treaties of friendship with countries, whose territories were contiguous to the USSR.

During the period between 1923-1929, the contiguity of the Turkish territory to the USSR, as well as internal and external weakness of the Soviets, were factors that

315 determined "the Soviet policy objectives" towards Turkey. The Soviet government desired Turkey to be the State with a friendly manner towards the USSR. Besides, it wished that Turkey would not take part in aggressions against the USSR, and not allow other powers to use the Turkish territory as a springboard for an attack on the

USSR. The Soviet government supposed that a friendly Turkey would be a factor of security for the USSR.

On the other hand, after the Lausanne Conference, the USSR was also of great importance for Turkey. The Turkish government aimed at preserving the Turkish

National State within certain national boundaries and intended to consolidate its military victory by the economic reconstruction of the country. Not waiting until the end of the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish government started the recovery of the economy of the country. The Turkish economy was at the time in shambles. Turkey's recent victory against the Greeks notwithstanding, the Turkish army had critical shortcomings, too. Just as the USSR, Turkey was also in need of time in order to recover the economy of the country and to consolidate the regime. Proceeding from this, it was a foreign policy priority to prevent any aggression against Turkey, and the

Turkish government intended to gain the necessary space of time for the consolidation of the country.

As it shared a long sea and land frontier with the USSR, the Turkish government also desired the USSR to be "the State with friendly manner" towards

Turkey. The Turkish government believed that the USSR with a friendly attitude towards Turkey would be a favourable factor for the security of its north-eastern and eastern parts of the frontier with the USSR.

On the other hand, even after the Lausanne Conference, there remained some unsettled questions between Turkey and some of the Western countries, such as

316 Britain and France. In the case of pressure on the part of the Western Powers upon

Turkey, the Turkish government hoped to utilize the "friendship" with the USSR in order to force them to abandon their pressure upon Turkey. Besides, in case of complications with the West, Turkey could rely only upon the USSR, which was the only possible source of material and political support. Consequently, all these factors rendered the two countries in need of each other.

However, the first year after the Lausanne Conference showed that the Soviet government had no well-tailored policy towards Turkey. At times, its decisions were at variance with its policy objectives towards Turkey. For instance, the Soviet authorities held out entering visas for lengthy period of time for the Turkish diplomats who were appointed to the Turkish consulates in the Transcaucasian cities. On the other hand, the Turkish government had its own apprehensions. The importation of some newspapers in Turkish which were published in the USSR, and contained communist ideas and intentions worried the Turkish government. It was also uneasy about the Politburo's plans of the demarcation and division of Central Asian republics.

The manifest contradictions of the Soviet policy towards Turkey and certain misgivings in their relations did not lead to the severance of their diplomatic relations and did not change their attitudes towards each other. They were engaged in looking for possible ways for the solution of some issues. As a result, Turkey and the USSR agreed on the temporary status of the Soviet consulates in Turkey and looked for possible ways for the development of the trade agreement.

However, the Soviet government was very anxious about the military and strategic situation in the Black Sea basin, which arose as a result of the Lausanne

Conference and the Convention Relating to the regime in the Straits. In accordance with this Convention, the Straits were opened for the warships of all powers in time of

317 peace. The Soviet government regarded this situation as a constant military threat to the Soviet coast on the Black Sea from the fleets of the more powerful naval Powers.

The Soviet military strategists believed that an attack of "imperialist" states on the USSR would occur in the form of a military intervention of an "imperialist coalition" and that it could assume a wide variety of forms. In their opinion, one of the attacks on the USSR would be an attack on its southern flank through the Turkish territory. They supposed that the fleet of the Western Powers would advance from the

Mediterranean into the Black Sea through the Straits and further to Soviet southern coast on the Black Sea. The Soviet military strategists calculated that, in order to be successful in such an operation, the use of Istanbul and the Straits was obligatory for the Western Powers. In this connection, Turkey assumed a great significance for the security of the USSR. The Soviet government needed the guarantee that Turkey would not allow the Western Powers to use the Turkish territory as their base in case of a war against the USSR and would not take part in any aggression against the

USSR.

Moreover, following the Lausanne Conference, the confidence of the Soviet government vis-a vis to Turkey lessened. From the standpoint of the Turko-Soviet relations, the Soviets regarded the Lausanne Conference as the beginning of the epoch of the "peaceful introduction" of foreign capital into Turkey, the attempt of the West to drive a wedge between Ankara and Moscow and to use Turkey against the USSR.

The Soviet leadership was also conscious that as Turkey entered into the arena of world politics and the network of diplomatic links thus would entail, it was quite possible that Turkey would, at times, walk away from the USSR, even if nor for good.

Under the circumstances, the Treaty between Russia and Turkey, which was signed by the delegates of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Soviet

318 government in Moscow on March 16, 1921, no longer satisfied the security requirements of the USSR. By mid-1924, many articles of the Treaty had already been implemented, except for those articles concerning the repatriation of all Turkish prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in the Soviet Union, the conclusion of the

Consular Conventions, and as the agreements regarding all economic and financial matters.

As no socialist revolutions occurred in the West, and greater stability in Europe was attained by mid-1920s, contrary to the predictions and hopes of the Bolshevik leaders, any chance for a successful socialist revolution in Europe seemed minimal, if not non-existent. The Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) abandoned the orthodox

Marxist-Leninist idea that the transformation to socialism would not occur in Russia alone and that it would require the most active cooperation of at least several advanced countries of the West. Instead, they accepted Stalin's thesis of "Socialism in

One Country", which maintained that, although the cooperation of the proletariat of several countries was necessary to guard against the restoration of a bourgeois order, it was possible to build socialism in one country. As a result, the Soviet government started the industrialization of the country for the purpose of creating heavy industry producing machinery and means of production, which was to be the base of socialism.

The Soviet vision of the international situation around the USSR was based on the conviction that the international bourgeoisie hated the Soviet order and looked for an opportunity to begin a new intervention. As the USSR was in a deplorable condition economically and militarily, the Soviet government intended to develop peaceful conditions necessary for the industrialization of the country. Therefore, it aimed at preventing aggression against the USSR and the establishment of a continuous chain of hostile states against the USSR. In this respect, the part of success

319 of this task, to no small degree, depended on what policy Turkey would follow towards the USSR.

The Soviet government wished to have more certitude concerning Turkey, and to consolidate the friendly attitude adopted by the Turkish government towards the

USSR with a special treaty with concrete mutual commitments. As a result, after a fifteen-month period of negotiations, Turkey and the USSR signed the Treaty on

Neutrality, Non-Aggression and Non-Participation in alliances and agreements directed against either of them. In this Treaty, they pledged to abstain from any aggression against each other. In case of military action against either Turkey or the

USSR by third or more powers, they pledged not to take part in such an action and to maintain neutrality towards each other. Besides, they made a commitment not to participate in any alliance or agreement of a political character directed against either one of them.

As a whole, it was a defensive treaty, with the help of which, both parties averted the possibility of aggression from the flank of the Turko-Soviet frontier and gained some certitude that neither of them would take part in hostile military, political, and economic combinations against the other. Moreover, as the USSR wanted Turkey to be its reliable partner in the struggle against "imperialism," the

Soviet leaders hoped on that this Treaty would facilitate the consolidation of the

Turko-Soviet relations and the establishment of closer political relations.

The Treaty was also advantageous for Turkey. The latter was engaged in the grandiose work of the country's rapid modernization through westernization, nationalism and secularism. The destiny of the republican regime in Turkey, to a considerable degree, if not entirely, depended on the successful implementation of this program. The Turkish government began to eliminate all eventual inner and

320 external obstacles which could impede the implementation of this task. The Turkish foreign policy strove to avoid the drifting of Turkey into military actions and intended to prevent any military aggressions against it. After the decision of the League of

Nations on the issue of Mosul, the Turkish government started to pursue a more active foreign policy, with concrete measures for the security of the country, with states that were regarded as both hostile and friendly to Turkey and the USSR alike.

After the signing of this Treaty, both countries strictly abode by the principles of neutrality, non-aggression, and non-participation in alliances and agreements directed against the other party. Turkey, by doing so, at the same time gave the USSR what the Soviet government expected from Turkey, and vice versa. To give to each other what they expected from each other made the relations between Turkey and the

USSR mutually beneficial.

It should also be noted that, during the period between 1923-1929, the Turkish and Soviet governments not only wished that their immediate neighbour would show them a friendly attitude, but they also realized that they, themselves would have to show this friendly attitude towards each other, and were concerned with fully implementing obligations stipulated by the Treaty of December 17, 1925. On the other hand, such a policy was necessary for both them to achieve their policy objectives towards each other. It also promoted the strength of their defence capabilities and the ruling regime in these countries.

For instance, the Turkish government was strongly interested in the preservation the Soviet regime in the USSR and the strengthening of the Soviet state. First of all, the Soviet government with a friendly attitude towards Turkey, was a guarantee of safety of its north-eastern and eastern frontiers in Anatolia. Secondly, in case of complications of Turkey's relations with the West, the Turkish government could rely

321 only upon the material and political help of the Soviets. Another important reason was that the Turkish leadership believed that who ever would beat the Soviets, would eventually impose its will on Turkey, too.

The Soviet government, showing a friendly attitude towards Turkey, first and foremost, cared about its defence and intended to have a reliable rear. Besides, it also believed that observance by Turkey of the principle of non-participation in hostile alliances and agreements directed against the USSR would further the independence of Turkey and the republican regime in Turkey under the head of Mustafa Kemal

Pasha. The Soviet government was interested in seeing preserved and consolidated this regime which supported friendly relations with the USSR. Thus, it desperately wished Turkey, to remain independent and not fall into the orbit of the West. The

Soviet government regarded the very existence of independent Turkey as a blow to the plans of the "imperialist" powers in the territories close to the USSR.

Undoubtedly, the Treaty of December 17, 1925 gave both sides a certain degree of confidence and certitude in each other. However, it was vital for them to preserve and strengthen this mutual confidence and certitude in each other. With that end in view, after 1925, the Turkish and Soviet governments devoted themselves to settle many questions that existed between them. They concluded the work on the repatriation of prisoners of war and the civilian prisoners which were in the USSR.

The four conventions, which were signed on August 6, 1928, accomplished to a great extent the elimination of misunderstandings in the Turko-Soviet frontiers.

After the settlement of the question of Mosul, the Soviet government was anxious that Turkey would enter the League of Nations. However, the arrival of the

Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, in Odessa, where he and Chicherin, the

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, exchanged opinions on the

322 matters of their foreign policy, dispelled the Soviet government's anxiety to some extent. Besides, Tevfik Rüştü Bey, on his own initiative, took steps in order to help the USSR to establish diplomatic contacts with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments. In its turn, the Soviet government, at the Turkish government's request, secured the invitation of the Turkish government to the Preparatory Commission on

Disarmament in Geneva. At the official and private meetings, in the correspondence and at speeches, the Soviet and Turkish leaders, officials, and diplomats were always expressing that there was a frank and inviolable friendship between the two countries.

The Soviet government seemed to have abandoned the support of the local

Turkish communists and the communist propaganda in Turkey with the signing of the

Treaty of December 17, 1925,. The Soviet government realized that any ill-considered and purely ideological step towards Turkey would draw the Turkish government to renounce the principles stipulated in the Treaty. However, what was most important was that the Soviet government wished the consolidation of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's government in Turkey and did not want to weaken it.

However, all of these efforts notwithstanding, distrust and suspicions between the two countries often arose. For instance, in 1927, the Soviet government, at its regular congress, decided to establish close contacts with the leading countries of the

West in order to obtain necessary means for its economy. This decision could not but give rise to the uneasiness in Turkey.

On the other hand, the settlement of the questions of Mosul, opened a new stage in relations of Turkey with the West, and, the Turkish government took measures to normalize its relations with the Western countries. As a result, the Turkish government signed a neutrality treaty with Italy, a treaty with France, and, in 1929, the Mediterranean squadron of the British fleet paid Istanbul a friendly visit. The

323 Soviet government regarded this event as Turkey's intention to establish an alliance with Britain.

Therefore, in order to maintain good neighbour relations, mutual confidence and certitude in each other, the Turkish and Soviet governments decided to extend the term of the Treaty of December 17, 1925, and supplemented it with a protocol, where they obliged not to initiate negotiations for the purpose of concluding political agreements with the states which were in the immediate land or sea neighbourhood with them without notifying each other.

During the period between 1923-1929, the relations between Turkey and the

USSR became closer. However, these relations can not be described as friendly in the sense which implied strictly coordinated and combined actions, and unity of views, and, most important, constant mutual confidence and certitude in each other. Turkey and the USSR did not always have coordinated actions. Their points of view on many issues seriously differed, and, very often, they lost mutual confidence and certitude in each other. They strove to find instruments that would promote the creation of mutual confidence and certitude in each other. It should also be noted that, although Turkey maintained close relations with the USSR, it did not fall under the orbit of the Soviet government, and carried out an independent foreign policy. Both governments had to maintain friendship towards each other in order to defend themselves. Both countries shared the, real or perceived, feeling of being the political and diplomatic outcasts in a world dominated by their adversaries. Thus, they needed the benevolence of each other direly. They also knew that only by behaving so, they could achieve their policy objectives. In this sense, the relations between Turkey and the USSR in the period between 1923-1929 were mutually beneficial relations.

324

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