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Ammour, L A 2013 ’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis. stability Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 28, pp. 1-11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bp

ARTICLE Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Laurence Aïda Ammour*

While is confronting a deep political cri- The Strategic Surprise of the “Arab sis with a still serious risk of territorial split Spring” and Libya is descending into increasing insta- In the context of the Arab uprisings, the bility, Algeria appears reluctant to assume Algerian regime repeatedly emphasized the the responsibilities of a hegemonic power. country’s differences compared to its neigh- Algeria’s refusal to consider any joint strat- bors, a statement which aimed to underscore egy with its neighbors and other interna- both Algeria’s traditionally strong nationalis- tional actors towards the Malian crisis shows tic sentiments and its self-defined exception- it has once again succumbed to the fear of alism. “We don’t need lessons from outside”, encirclement that characterized its policies declared the then Algerian Prime Minister, in the 1970s. Ahmed Ouyahia, in a speech delivered at a Behind this refusal, there lies a desire to mass rally held in Algiers a day before the maintain its position as a pivotal actor in 2012 May elections. In the same speech he regional security matters while conducting a also described the Arab Spring as a “plague” wait-and-see diplomacy, an approach which and the revolutions that followed it the many observers and regional leaders have “work of and NATO”, while adding deemed incomprehensible. Internal power that “our spring is Algerian, our revolution of struggles at the highest levels of government 1st November 1954”.1 have also without a doubt permeated Alge- Nationalist rhetoric has also been used by ria’s policy vis-à-vis the regional crisis, ham- the government to warn the Algerian people pering Algiers’ ability to act regionally and that foreign entities intend to destabilize weakening its position as a regional leader. the country, and was thus also employed to The initial lack of commitment could in fact frame the discussions concerning a possible be the result of conflicting positions and military intervention in northern Mali. At divergent interests within the regime and of the same time, continued pressure from dif- the lack of transparency in decision-making. ferent countries and actors (, the US, These factors are crippling its diplomatic Qatar, ECOWAS) may delight the Algerian power. Today, three revealing events are authorities since they can use this to reaf- symptomatic of Algeria’s loss of hegemony firm the regional importance of Algeria. For within the region: The Arab Spring, the crisis instance, the new Algerian Prime Minister in Mali and the attack against the Tiguentou- Abdelmalek Sellal, has called for “an inter- rine gas plant. nal strong front able to protect the coun- try from malicious hands” (Matarese 2012). Calls for national unity have also been taken * Bordeaux Institute for Political Science, France up by President Bouteflika in his May 2012 Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Spain GéopoliSudconsultance, France speeches: “Young people will know how to [email protected] face the enemies of the country and the pro- Art. 28, page 2 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis tagonists of the Fitna [discord among Mus- Libyan regime with military equipment and lims] who try to divide us and try to support personnel in 2011 (Reuters 2011).4 the foreign intervention”(Matarese 2012). This conspiracy ideology is deeply rooted The Mali Crisis in the fear of borders’ internationalization Algeria has long positioned itself as a tradi- that goes back to the genesis of the sovereign tional mediator of conflicts in the , at Algerian territory (Ammour 2013). A con- times in apparent competition with Gad- tinuing need to resort to a nationalistic nar- dhafi. Algeria mediated peace processes that rative illustrates both the regime’s internal brought a precarious end to previous Tuareg fragility and its regional weakness. By using uprisings in Mali in 1991–1995 and 2006. rhetoric that seems to highlight the external Indeed, the Algerian treatment of the Tuareg threats to the Nation’s survival, the Algerian issue was always motivated by the fear of government shows that it has no hold over contagion among Algerian Tuaregs and its regional environment. by the desire to contain Libya or any other At the regional level, Algeria was simul- neighboring state’s influence. Algeria knows taneously trying to create a “refusal front” what is expected on it in this crisis, given by garnering allies who would support a its status as the regional military power, its local political solution to the Sahelian con- influence in the far northern part of Mali flict.2 In October 2012, Algerian Minister for (), as intermediary in previous crises in Maghrebi and African Affairs Abdelkader northern Mali, and as the original home of al Messahel together with a military delega- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).5 tion, started a tour in (which at Algeria also attempted to utilize this that time was still opposed to any military influential role to convince Tuaregs to fight intervention), (which always asked for against the Salafist Group for Preaching and French government to act quickly against Combat (GSPC) groups in the Sahel. Many “terrorism” in Mali and calling for an active former Malian Tuareg rebels offered their role from Algeria), and Mali. services and join the specialized unit set- Yet, instability within Libya has exposed tled after the 2006 “Tamanrasset Accords” Algeria to many uncertainties and unex- (Accords de Tamanrasset) signed under the pected threats that have paralyzed the gov- auspices of Algiers, which were supposed to ernment. Algiers fears that popular protests maintain security in northern Mali. may spread to Algeria and that, combined After condemning the military coup in with years of demonstrations and protests in March 2012, Algeria opted for a (10,000 in 2011 according to the Minister of low profile, and the government remained Interior), the regime would very well collapse. silent in the following months, issuing occa- The inertia of the Algerian government and sional statements of concern about Mali’s its ambiguity prior to the popular uprising in growing instability. This relative absence from Libya explain the very late recognition of the the international policy response was first Libyan National Transitional Council, leading interpreted as a cautious position related to the increased isolation of Algeria on the to the 2012 April abduction of seven Alge- regional scene. This position clearly showed rian diplomats in the Malian city of by to what extent the regional uprisings had the radical group Movement of Uniqueness taken the Algerian authorities by surprise. and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Algiers’ It also showed that the political matrix of wait-and-see attitude can also be attributed Algeria has not changed; President Abdelaziz to political internal preoccupation with Bouteflika belongs to the same generation domestic affairs and the internal competi- of Arab leaders as Muammar Gaddhafi.3 tion within the elite over the upcoming This may explain why Algiers supported the 2014 presidential elections.6 It would seem Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 3 of 11 that Algeria has been waiting to see how the rebels in order to calm down a potentially regional situation plays out before making explosive situation. any decision and thus leaving the risks of The Mali dossier (as well as the Western resolving the crisis to others. one) has always been led by the Alge- Algiers’ opposition to participation in rian intelligence services, the Département a regional intervention force is formally de la Sécurité et du Renseignement (DRS) expressed in a constitutional article which (Ammour 2013). Convinced that it should forbids its forces from taking part in military hold the monopoly of mediation with regards action outside its own territory. Algeria has to the northern Mali crisis, Algeria’s attitude been continually invoking this constitutional was no longer necessarily to wait and see: principle, thus justifying why its forces have Algeria has expressed its preference for a not crossed into Mali to eradicate AQIM, even political solution in Mali.7 ECOWAS and Mali when invited to do so by its Sahelian neigh- transitional authorities were wondering how bours, particularly by Niger. Yet the Algeria- Algiers could contribute to a negotiation pro- led CEMOC (Joint Military Chief-of-staff cess with the armed groups, particularly Ansar Committee) was created in 2010 for precisely al-Dine, whose head Iyad Ag Ghali is well this purpose. However, on 20 December known in Algeria. He is among those leaders 2011, a few weeks before the National Move- of the working closely with ment for the Liberation of (MNLA) the DRS.8 proclaimed the of Azawad, He came to prominence in 1988 when he Algerian army forces crossed into Mali. This founded a Tuareg secessionist movement in move occurred exactly five days before Iyad northern Mali. Moreover, he was the main ag Ghaly announced the creation of a new leader of the Tuareg rebellion that began in jihadist group called Ansar al-Dine (defend- 1990 and ended with the peace ceremony at ers of the faith) in Northern Mali. The ques- in 1996. During that period, Iyad tion then is why Algeria had some forces came under the eye of the DRS who were entered in Mali if Algeria is so keen not to concerned that the rebellion might spread intervene militarily on foreign soil? It is into Algeria. His first involvement with the not clear what kind of forces were sent, but GSPC/AQIM was in 2003 when he facilitated according to the official Algerian statements, the liberation of the 14 out of 32 hostages Malian military elements were reported to abducted in the Algerian Sahara by Abder- be training with Algerian military counter- razak Lamari (a.k.a El Para), a former Algerian parts in . Algeria withdrew its parachutist to be said a DRS agent.9 As a local so-called military advisors from Mali and cut notable, Iyad ag-Ghaly recycled himself in off military assistance at the end of 2011 the hostage liberation business, taking large when the conflict was clearly about to begin percentages of the ransoms, and playing all (Keenan 2012). sides of the table. In the summer 2012 context of entrench- That may explain the off-the-record set of ment of radical groups in northern Mali talks Algiers led along the 2012 summer. In with uncertain implications, Algeria has first July, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika discretly maintained contacts with a wide range of received envoys from Ansar al-Dine, MNLA, actors, and seemed to be prioritizing access and even from MUJWA (the kidnapper of to information and influence over a clearly algerian diplomats in Gao). Few days after, formulated strategy. On the international the MNLA publicly excluded the mediation front, the situation was immensely embar- of Algiers and accused the algerian govern- rassing for Algeria who was accused of pas- ment of expelling the injured Tuaregs who sivity and perceived it had little choice, but are seeking a shelter in southern Algeria, to try and negotiate a deal with all Tuareg and of infiltrating the MNLA with agents Art. 28, page 4 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis from the DRS. The Algerian authorities never legalization of a Salafi party in Algeria (the officially acknowledged that meeting took Front of the Free Awakening). Paradoxically, place. In October 2012, another secret del- however, Algiers still permitted a Malian egation of Ansar al-Dine visited Algiers. The Salafist to build up his credibility among same month the Algerian government sent other protagonists of the peace process. a humanitarian convoy and three military At first, Algeria’s stance on the Mali crisis vehicles to Kidal, under the control of Ansar appeared to echo a greater number of stake- al-Dine. Another Algerian convoy reached holders: the UN Secretary General’s report Gao under the control of MUJWA. In both dated 29 November 2012, for instance, urged cases, Islamist organizations were in charge caution and dialogue. On the other hand, of distributing the food to local populations. West African officials condemned the UN for The same month, French intelligence ser- being “out of touch” over its lack of urgency vices assessed that Iyad Ag Ghali received a in taking action in Mali, and were pushing medical treatment in Aïn-Naadja military the Mali government to cut an autonomy hospital in Algiers, thus confirming that the deal with Tuaregs in exchange for their join- Islamist leader is at home in Algeria. ing the fight against al-Qaeda. It seemed then more profitable for Algiers It seemed then that Algeria succeeded in to portray the MNLA as a destabilizing finding out an opportunity to regain its tra- force, but one which was unable to found ditional role as regional power-broker and a State according the sacrosanct principle mediator in any Tuareg conflict. By using of self-determination. Algiers had more Ansar al-Dine as a proxy in northern Mali, interest in dealing and negotiating with a Algeria could pretend to provide an appar- familiar interlocutor, who would be easier ent peacemaker foreign policy, and retrieve to manage (to manipulate), whom ideologi- a consistent leadership after decades of dip- cal principles fluctuate, and whose interests lomatic decline. However, further serious might be limited to a consistent financial setbacks came to contradict the Algerian gain. Thanks to Algiers, Iyad ag-Ghaly was strategy and prove that it was far from being imposed as an unavoidable interlocutor in wise in dealing with such a complex interlac- the regional conflict exit strategy plan, to ing context. such an extent that even the ECOWAS repre- First, on the ground, the jihadist groups sentative eventually held talks with him in have strengthened their hold on the north- Ouagadougou in November 2012. But even ern part of Mali and were preparing them- if Iyad ag-Ghaly announced he had given up selves for the possible military confrontation implementing law throughout Mali with the African forces. On November 28, (but in Kidal), some Malian and Western 2012, AQIM announced the creation of a 6th observers would still have been suspicious brigade called “Youssef ben Tachfine”, made of such sudden reversal. up mainly of Tuaregs residing in northern The longstanding ties between the DRS Mali. It was headed by El Kairuani Abu Abdel- and some key-individuals of Ansar al-Dine, hamid al-Kidali (“from Kidal”), a local Tuareg the blood ties between and member of the group’s al-Ansar brigade, Abdelkrim al-Targui who leads the AQIM- whose leader is Abdelkrim al-Targui, the katiba al-Ansar, and the presence of Ansar al- cousin of Iyad ag-Ghaly. Such a new ethnic Dine men in southern Algeria’s supply base distribution system was the result of grow- and base camp, demonstrated that Algeria ing resentment by non-Algerians after they was apparently monitoring the Mali crisis were denied leadership positions. It was also dossier through the use of personal con- an alarming sign that locally-rooted djihadist tacts.10 Keen to avoid criticism related to this katibas had consolidated prior to the French connection, Algiers would later on refuse the military intervention in January 2013. More- Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 5 of 11 over, at that time, concerns were raised about continuation of our global jihadi pro- the extension of in West Africa by ject and the preserving of the Azawad Oumar Ould Hamaha, a former associate of Islamic project, while developing it and Mokhtar Belmoktar, then head of MUJWA in avoiding its failure. …. As for internal Gao, and future leader of Ansar al-Sharia.11 activity, in this we would be under the Hamaha declared: “We want to enlarge our emirate of . Our emir would zone of operation throughout the entire follow their emir and our opinion Sahara, going from Niger through to would follow their opinion. By internal and ” (Joscelyn 2013). activity, we mean all activity connected Second, Iyad ag-Ghaly’s apparent negotia- to participating in bearing the respon- tions’ agenda revealed other hidden political sibilities of the liberated areas.”.12 ambitions, related to his coordinating pro- jects with AQIM: just after the signature of Third, on 30 September 2012, the US Africa an agreement with the MNLA under Algiers’ Command chief, General Carter F. Ham, auspices (21 December 2012), Iyad-ag-Ghaly clearly aligned his view with the political broke off the accord at the end of December, solution route favored by the Algerian gov- and took the lead of the Islamists offensive ernment saying “One of the key aspects of towards southern Mali cities (Konna and seeking a resolution to the security chal- Dyabali). The confidential letter from Abdel- lenges in northern Mali will be to separate malek Droukdel (head of the AQIM north- terrorist organizations from non-terrorist ern Algeria katiba) to the islamists leaders organizations”. This US alignment with Alge- in northern Mali found out in Timbuktu in rian stance is to be understood in the light February 2013, proves that a real synchroni- of the strong partnership that emerged after sation between AQIM and Ansar al-Dine did 9/11 when Algeria needed to be firmly inte- exist, and that the gathering of all the radi- grated into the new dynamic and the North- cal forces was part of a long-term strategy of South security system in order to retrieve a entrenchement in the Azawad region: place on the international scene after almost ten years of isolation due to the civil war. “We must not go too far or take risks By joining the “Global War on Terrorism” in our decisions or imagine that this the Algerian government found the oppor- project is a stable . It is too tunity to regain its international legitimacy early for that, God knows. Instead, it is and transform its foreign policy into a new necessary to be cautious in the matter source of legitimacy for its domestic policy. and we must be more realistic and look The strengthening of ties with Washington at it from a broader and more complete resulted in a flurry of visits to Algiers by perspective to see a historic opportunity American officials and regular invitations to that must be exploited to interact with the White House for Algerian ministers and the Azawad people, including all its President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. On the secu- sectors, with the aim of uniting it and rity level, there has been an increase in the rallying it behind our Islamic project, number of joint operations and initiatives. by adopting its just cause and achiev- The FBI has opened a field office in Algiers, ing its legitimate goals, while giving it Algerian officers have been trained in the an authentic Islamist tinge. … That de- United States, and there has been a series mands of us to establish a new frame- of joint intelligence missions between high- work regulating the organizational ranking DRS officers and their American relationship with Ansar Dine and de- counterparts. The two countries have there- fining the nature of the appropriate fore established relations that are primarily activities, in a way that combines the focused on the security issue, with Washing- Art. 28, page 6 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis ton formulating and determining the princi- gest natural gas field and the hub of the Alge- ples, methods, and strategies. rian gas industry. All the gas pipelines to Italy On February 2013, the US State Depart- (Transmed), to Europe through Tunisia and/ ment designated Iyad ag-Ghaly as a wanted or through the Gibraltar Strait (The Maghreb- terrorist (US Department of State 2013). One Europe pipelines), and to the Mediterranean month later, Ansar al-Dine, was designated liquefied natural gas terminals, come from a foreign terrorist organization by the State Hassi R’Mel. Department, because of its close coopera- These dramatic events that occurred witin tion with al-Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa. six-month of each other, suggest Algiers This move not only shows the contradictions was unable to evaluate the threat environ- and the incoherencies of the US administra- ment and revealed strong failures in the ter- tion policy, but points out the difficulties ritorial security, in particular in the Sahara Washington D. C. has had in understanding region which acts as the heartland of the the complexity of the Malian situation from Algerian economy.15 the start. Algeria is not used to being on the front The decision to designate Iyad ag-Ghaly line and the government was embarrased and its organization as terrorist may have by the criticisms coming from Western part- been interpreted as a move to distance itself ners regarding the management of the In from the Algerian government strategy of Amenas operation. As a result, the hostage compromise, and be seen as an implicit crisis shook up the internal political scene. disavowal of Algiers’ short-term vision. It Harsh criticisms about President Bouteflika’s remains to be seen if the Algerian authori- passive approach to the Sahelian crisis led ties will draw the lessons of their rapproche- some military individuals to loudly state that ment with a Salafist organisation, even if it is Bouteflika’s choice to negotiate with - a Tuareg one. ists from northern Mali had not led at all to the neutralization of the threat on the south- The attack against the Tiguentourine ern borders of the country. gas plant Yet the way the In Amenas counter-offen- The attack against a Saharan strategic indus- sive has been conducted reflects the way the trial plant by the katiba Algerian power structure greatly differs from (combat unit)13 on 16 January 2013, repre- its neighbors. The complex distribution of sented not only another strategic surprise power not only makes it hard to assess per- but also a tipping point for the Algerian sonal responsibility, but also shows that a government, since it dragged Algeria straight handful of military officers have enjoyed a into the Sahelian crisis. This came after two monopoly over domestic and foreign politics critical suicide attacks in 2012 orchestrated and have benefited disproportionately from by MUJWA: in March against the Gendarme- oil and gas revenues. The regime and the rie nationale barracks in Tamanrasset, and on army are in fact two sides of the same coin 29 June 2012 against the 4th Regional Com- (Cook 2007). mand of the Gendarmerie nationale in Ouar- Moreover, the power struggle within the gla. This town is a mere 86 kilometers from military and security apparatus, created Hassi Messaoud oil field, the central node of many different nodes of decision-making national production.14 which are difficult to identify. In fact, dur- Ten days after the attack against In Ame- ing the In Amenas hostages crisis, the high nas, the Bouira gas pipeline (125 kilometers military command, namely General Othman from Algiers) that dispatches the gas from Tartag (number two of the DRS)16, ardent sup- the Hassi R’mel field, was also the target by porter of forceful actions, ended up taking armed Islamist groups. Located 126 km from the lead of the operations in Tiguentourine, the town of Laghouat, Hassi R’mel is the big- opposing the decision of the other local mili- Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 7 of 11 tary commands (Gendarmerie, Special Forces In return, Algeria should play a more pro- and Parachutists) (Intelligence Online 2013). active role in the region, a role of proxy state. Surprisingly, the aftermath of the crisis The aim of this deal is to limit as much as resulted in an unexpected rapprochement possible the interference of other western between Algiers and Washington in the actors in Sahelian affairs, especially since the field of intelligence and defense. The United Serval Operation was activated in emergency States proposed to share with Algeria some and has caught the two countries by surprise. intelligence data provided by their drones, Does this mean that we will see an uptick in order to facilitate the securitization of the in Algerian operations in the border areas in southern borders, and under the condition return for an increasing aid from Washing- of accepting the opening of a cross border ton? This is what some recent assessments Algeria-Mali fly-zone (Schmitt, Sayare 2013; by Algerian officials to the Pentagon sug- Campbell 2013): 17 gest: “American officials also sense a possi- ble change of heart by Algerian officials to “Under one plan, information from move away from their longstanding policy American surveillance drones would not to conduct military operations out- be provided to Algerian forces to en- side the national borders. Algerian officials able them to engage in operations recently told the United States that they both inside Algeria and possibly, in a were prepared to conduct operations in bor- limited way, across its borders. The der areas, one American official said” (Gor- United States is already providing sur- don, Schmitt 2013). veillance information to the French- led military operation in Mali to help Conclusion combat militants there who last year Two years of turbulence in the Sahel have seized the northern half of the country. shown to what extent the Algerian govern- In a cable to the State Department last ment has difficulties to adapt to the new week, according to administration offi- regional and international relations environ- cials, Henry S. Ensher, the United States ment. Without a clear geostrategic vision envoy in Algiers, urged that the pur- that would forge a more realistic foreign suit of the Algerian militant Mokhtar policy, Algeria still carries a blind spot in Belmokhtar, the mastermind of the gas diplomatic activity on the Sahel question. field attack, be made a priority. Toward As Ahmed Adimi, a professor of political sci- that end, he recommended that the ences describes, Algeria’s diplomacy is not a Obama administration tell the Alge- state diplomacy but a regime diplomacy. rians that if they allowed the United Algeria’s position is the subject of much States to fly unarmed drones over the speculation. Many neighbors think the coun- border area of Algeria as well as over try is playing a double game that seeks, first, Mali, the Americans would share the to perpetuate a domestic terrorist threat information with the Algerian govern- that could be used to demonize a possible ment”. (Gordon, Schmitt 2013) Algerian Spring, and second, to ensure exter- nal military funding (Ammour 2012). That On the other hand, in the frame of a growing should also give the DRS the continuous US effort to bolster Algerian military forces, opportunity to play a key-role in the issue the US intended to provide Algeria with of terrorism and all security related regional advanced surveillance satellite (UPI 2013). dossiers, including in the southern part of “It still remains unclear whether the satellite the Algerian territory and beyond. would be operated by Algeria or under the The diplomacy which once was once a key command of American military and intelli- pillar of Algeria’s prestige has become out- gence officials in the region” (Muñoz 2013). dated amidst today’s new regional geostra- Art. 28, page 8 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis tegic challenges. The old elites whose princi- family has been seen as added proof of ples are still rooted in the 1960s and 1970s the Algerian support to the Libyan re- ignore the effects of the globalization, and gime. Even if Algeria and Libya were long- the way the Arab uprisings have dramatically standing competitors on the Sahelian altered the regional framework. The choice scene, Algeria preferred the preservation of a routine diplomacy, in the absence of any of an authoritarian but familiar regime in strategic vision, is not viable in the long term its immediate vicinity to the uncertain- since it causes more damages to the credibil- ties of an unknown leadership. ity of the State’s regional policy than a stri- 5 The Kidal region (Adrar of Ifoghas moun- dent position and/or a real soft power strat- tains) where most of the leaders of the egy that addresses key Sahelian concerns MNLA, the MIA (Movement of Islamic such as economic development. Azawad, a splinter group from Ansar Algeria remains reluctant to accept the al-Dine created in January 2013), and new regional balance and has thereby failed Ansar al-Dine come from, is locally re- to take advantage of the power vacuum cre- nowned to be the influence zone of Al- ated by Gaddhafi’s elimination. Instead, geria where cross border trafficking of Algeria tries to keep on with old solutions for food, oil, and various licit goods has been new and more complex problems. common practice since the 1960s. The Algerian subsidised foodstuffs sold illic- Notes itly in north Mali have created a shadow 1 This date refers to the first day of the in- economy that allows the poor region of dependence war against French colonial Kidal to maintain a degree of food secu- rule. rity. Even the Malian President Amadou 2 This phrasing alludes to the group of Arab Amani Touré admitted this to be the case nations first called “The Firmness Front” in 2009 by saying Northern Mali is Alge- and composed of Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Lib- ria’s 49th province. See Ammour 2012. ya, Southern Yemen and PLO, created in 6 Today opacity within the regime has 1977 at the Tripoli Summit in memory worsened after the President’s stroke and of the 6-day war defeat, and in opposi- his hospitalization in Paris in April. De- tion to any peace agreement or negotia- spite promises to step down from pow- tions with . In 1979, in Baghdad, the er, internal speculations over the future Front became the Refusal Front and cut power struggles over an eventual fourth its diplomatic relations with Egypt at a term in the next presidential election time when the Camp David agreement have heightened concerns about the sta- were about to be signed. This term is still bility of the country. striking in the Arab world since it under- 7 A position reiterated five months later lays the official stance of most Arab states (Le Soir d’Algérie 2012; Yacoub H 2012, not only against Israel but also against La Tribune). western interference in Arab affairs. 8 After the French military intervention in 3 As well as the former Syrian President Mali, three leaders of Ansar al-Dine found Hafez al Assad, and his son Bashir today shelter in Tamanrasset after some negoti- supported by Algiers. ations with the DRS. (Boufatah 2013). On 4 In 2011, Hafez Ghoga, the spokesperson the links between Iyad ag-Ghaly and the of the Libyan National Transitional Coun- DRS see (Keenan 2013). See also (Nossiter cil, suggested reinforcements were sent A, MacFarquhar N 2013). to Gaddhafi from Niger, Mali, Kenya and 9 His real name is Amari Saifi. He joined Algeria. The asylum offered by Algeria to the armed Islamist movement in 1992 and some members of Muammar Gaddhafi’s later on became the second-in-command Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 9 of 11

of the GSPC. He came to prominence See Associated Press 2013. Another 79 through the kidnapping of 32 tour- page-document written by Abdelmalek ists in the Sahara. After the release of Droukdel, entitled “Roadmap relating to the hostages he flew to northern Chad Islamic Jihad in Azawad” was discovered where he was captured by a rebel Chad- in a television station in Timbuktu by a ian group. Today he is believed to be im- French journalist of Libération. It has not prisoned in Algeria. An investigation led yet been translated. by Salima Mellah et Jean-Baptiste Riv- 13 Three groups operated in the Sahara- oire asserts that Saifi was in fact a DRS Sahel: two of them under the control of agent. See their article from 2005. See Abdelhakim Abu Zeid (who was killed in also Keenan 2009. March 2013 during the fights with the 10 Not only Iyad ag-Ghaly, but also Ahmada Chadian forces in the Adrar of Ifoghas Ag-Bibi, a.k.a. “the man of Algiers” who mountains) and AQIM central structure lives in Tamanrasset and was in charge of led by Abdelhamid Droukdel in north- the food supplying of Ansar al-Dine; Sen- ern Algeria; the third one operating da Ould Bouamama, former right-hand of independently under the command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was the leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The three groups of Ansar al-Dine in Timbuktu (in May were engaged in a sort of emulation at 2013 he surrendered to the Mauritanian kidnapping and criminal activities. This authorities); Deity Ag-Sidamou, who was competition led Mokhtar Belmokhtar to based in southern Algeria where he man- found his own katiba, « The Signatories aged the gas supplying for Ansar al-Dine with Blood », in December 2012. Well through his own local illicit networks; equipped with arms bought in Libya in and finally Nabil Jazaïri (The Algerian), March 2012, he met at least twice with who previously served in the Algerian the leaders of Ansar al-Dine and MUJWA army, and was chief of the Kidal area and in Timbuktu in April and May 2012. He in charge of the training camps of Ansar already knew Iyad Ag Ghali who is likely al-Dine. to have rubbed in negotiations for the re- 11 He is known as the man with the red lease of hostages. Hamada Ould Moham- beard. He was one of the most active ed Kheirou, the new leader of MUJWA, is founders of MUJWA and was responsible a former friend of him in AQIM. And all of for the kidnapping of three humanitarian them have shared functions and areas of workers in the Rabouni-Tindouf Sahrawi influence in northern Mali. refugees camp (Algeria) in 2011. Early 14 The 18th Parachutists Regiment is also December 2012, he created a new armed based in Hassi Messaoud. movement, Ansar al-Sharia, mainly com- 15 However, in order to better secure the oil posed of Azawad Arabs and Berabish and gas fields, in June 2012, the govern- (like him) from Timbuktu. He is also the ment had already announced the creation brother in law of Mokhtar Belmokhtar. of two new military Regions: one associ- He is said to have been killed in March ated to the 4th Military Region (Ouargla) 2013 by Arabs of the tribe in the and the other associated to the wider . under-equipped 6th Region (Tamanras- 12 This letter has been translated in English set) that hosts the Joint Operational Chief by the Associated Press. Only three out of of Staff Committee (CEMOC), and where six chapters are readable. The other chap- an attack against the Gendarmerie bar- ters are missing. It has been written after racks occurred in March 2012. Their main a meeting on 18 March 2012 between A. missions consist in the borders monitor- Droukdel and five Sahelian commanders. ing (an electronic surveillance system is Art. 28, page 10 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis

announced to be set-up soon) and the D.C., February; Available at http://afri- oil and gas fields security under autono- cacenter.org/2012/02/regional-security- mous commands. cooperation-in-the-maghreb-and-sahel/ 16 On 21 December 2011 he was appoint- Ammour L A 2012 Decyphering Algeria- ed to the Interior Security Department Mali Relations, Conference given at the (Direction de la Sécurité Intérieure). Be- Executive Analytic Exchange on Algeria, tween 1990 and 2001, Othman Tartag US State Department, Arlington, Virginia, (then commander) headed up the Centre 15 October. Principal Militaire d’Investigation (Main Associated Press 2013 Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sa- Military Investigation Center, or CPMI in hara Playbook, Chapter 2, page 1, Asso- Algiers), one of the main centers where ciated Press, April; Available at http:// opponents were tortured and killed, hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_in- which was under a branch of the DRS. He ternational/_pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf is seen as the probable successor of the Boufatah M 2013 Le groupe d’Iyad ag Ghaly DRS current Chief, Mohamed Médiène, en totale déroute: Les chefs d’Ansar Eddine a.k.a. Tewkik. se réfugient à Tamanrasset, L’Expression, 17 On 22 February 2013, President Obama 20 April. announced that about 40 United States Campell J 2013 Drones in Niger: What military service members arrived in Ni- they could mean for US Foreign Policy ger, bringing the total number of those in Africa, The Christian Science Monitor, deployed in the country to about 100 27 February; Available at http://www. people (mainly Air Force logistics special- csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa- ists, intelligence analysts and security of- Monitor/2013/0227/Drones-in-Niger- ficers). The new drone base, located for What-they-could-mean-for-US-foreign- now in the capital, Niamey, will be soon policy-in-Africa transferred in Agadez (northern Niger) in Cook S A 2007 Ruling but not Governing. order to conduct surveillance of the Sahel The Military and Political Development through unarmed Predator aircrafts that in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey. Baltimore: may be armed if necessary. This did not John Hopkins University Press. prevent Bemokhtar katiba and the MU- Gordon M R, Eric Schmitt E 2013 U.S. JWA from perpetrating a double suicide Officials Propose Sharing Drone Sur- attacks against a military base and the veillance with Algerians, The New York Arlit uranium plant in Northern Niger on Times, 26 February; Available at http:// 23 May 2013. www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/world/ middleeast/john-kerry-diplomatic-trip. References html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Ammour L A 2013 (forthcoming) The Alge- Intelligence Online 2013 Dossier Spécial rian Foreign Policy on Western Sahara, in Nord-Mali: la Poudrière Sahélienne, In- Anouar Boukhars & Jacques Rousselier telligence Online, February. Available at (eds.), Western Sahara Reader: Between http://www.intelligenceonline.fr/rensei- Myths, Nationalisms and Geopolitics, gnement-d-etat/2013/02/15/nord-mali- Rowman and Littlefield. Available at -la-poudriere-sahelienne,107945139-DO3 www.geopolisudconsult.com Joscelyn T 2013 Al Qaeda central tight- Ammour L A 2012 Regional Security Cooper- ened control over hostage operations. ation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s The Long War Journal, 17 January; Avail- Pivotal Ambivalence. Africa Security Brief able at http://www.longwarjournal.org/ (18), Africa Center for Strategic Studies, archives/2013/01/analysis_al_qaeda_ National Defense University, Washington ce.php Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 11 of 11

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How to cite this article: Ammour, L A 2013 Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 28, pp. 1-11, DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bp

Published: 24 June 2013

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