Ammour, L A 2013 Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis. stability Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 28, pp. 1-11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bp ARTICLE Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Laurence Aïda Ammour* While Mali is confronting a deep political cri- The Strategic Surprise of the “Arab sis with a still serious risk of territorial split Spring” and Libya is descending into increasing insta- In the context of the Arab uprisings, the bility, Algeria appears reluctant to assume Algerian regime repeatedly emphasized the the responsibilities of a hegemonic power. country’s differences compared to its neigh- Algeria’s refusal to consider any joint strat- bors, a statement which aimed to underscore egy with its neighbors and other interna- both Algeria’s traditionally strong nationalis- tional actors towards the Malian crisis shows tic sentiments and its self-defined exception- it has once again succumbed to the fear of alism. “We don’t need lessons from outside”, encirclement that characterized its policies declared the then Algerian Prime Minister, in the 1970s. Ahmed Ouyahia, in a speech delivered at a Behind this refusal, there lies a desire to mass rally held in Algiers a day before the maintain its position as a pivotal actor in 2012 May elections. In the same speech he regional security matters while conducting a also described the Arab Spring as a “plague” wait-and-see diplomacy, an approach which and the revolutions that followed it the many observers and regional leaders have “work of Zionism and NATO”, while adding deemed incomprehensible. Internal power that “our spring is Algerian, our revolution of struggles at the highest levels of government 1st November 1954”.1 have also without a doubt permeated Alge- Nationalist rhetoric has also been used by ria’s policy vis-à-vis the regional crisis, ham- the government to warn the Algerian people pering Algiers’ ability to act regionally and that foreign entities intend to destabilize weakening its position as a regional leader. the country, and was thus also employed to The initial lack of commitment could in fact frame the discussions concerning a possible be the result of conflicting positions and military intervention in northern Mali. At divergent interests within the regime and of the same time, continued pressure from dif- the lack of transparency in decision-making. ferent countries and actors (France, the US, These factors are crippling its diplomatic Qatar, ECOWAS) may delight the Algerian power. Today, three revealing events are authorities since they can use this to reaf- symptomatic of Algeria’s loss of hegemony firm the regional importance of Algeria. For within the region: The Arab Spring, the crisis instance, the new Algerian Prime Minister in Mali and the attack against the Tiguentou- Abdelmalek Sellal, has called for “an inter- rine gas plant. nal strong front able to protect the coun- try from malicious hands” (Matarese 2012). Calls for national unity have also been taken * Bordeaux Institute for Political Science, France up by President Bouteflika in his May 2012 Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Spain GéopoliSudconsultance, France speeches: “Young people will know how to [email protected] face the enemies of the country and the pro- Art. 28, page 2 of 11 Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis tagonists of the Fitna [discord among Mus- Libyan regime with military equipment and lims] who try to divide us and try to support personnel in 2011 (Reuters 2011).4 the foreign intervention”(Matarese 2012). This conspiracy ideology is deeply rooted The Mali Crisis in the fear of borders’ internationalization Algeria has long positioned itself as a tradi- that goes back to the genesis of the sovereign tional mediator of conflicts in the Sahel, at Algerian territory (Ammour 2013). A con- times in apparent competition with Gad- tinuing need to resort to a nationalistic nar- dhafi. Algeria mediated peace processes that rative illustrates both the regime’s internal brought a precarious end to previous Tuareg fragility and its regional weakness. By using uprisings in Mali in 1991–1995 and 2006. rhetoric that seems to highlight the external Indeed, the Algerian treatment of the Tuareg threats to the Nation’s survival, the Algerian issue was always motivated by the fear of government shows that it has no hold over contagion among Algerian Tuaregs and its regional environment. by the desire to contain Libya or any other At the regional level, Algeria was simul- neighboring state’s influence. Algeria knows taneously trying to create a “refusal front” what is expected on it in this crisis, given by garnering allies who would support a its status as the regional military power, its local political solution to the Sahelian con- influence in the far northern part of Mali flict.2 In October 2012, Algerian Minister for (Kidal), as intermediary in previous crises in Maghrebi and African Affairs Abdelkader northern Mali, and as the original home of al Messahel together with a military delega- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).5 tion, started a tour in Mauritania (which at Algeria also attempted to utilize this that time was still opposed to any military influential role to convince Tuaregs to fight intervention), Niger (which always asked for against the Salafist Group for Preaching and French government to act quickly against Combat (GSPC) groups in the Sahel. Many “terrorism” in Mali and calling for an active former Malian Tuareg rebels offered their role from Algeria), and Mali. services and join the specialized unit set- Yet, instability within Libya has exposed tled after the 2006 “Tamanrasset Accords” Algeria to many uncertainties and unex- (Accords de Tamanrasset) signed under the pected threats that have paralyzed the gov- auspices of Algiers, which were supposed to ernment. Algiers fears that popular protests maintain security in northern Mali. may spread to Algeria and that, combined After condemning the military coup in with years of demonstrations and protests Bamako in March 2012, Algeria opted for a (10,000 in 2011 according to the Minister of low profile, and the government remained Interior), the regime would very well collapse. silent in the following months, issuing occa- The inertia of the Algerian government and sional statements of concern about Mali’s its ambiguity prior to the popular uprising in growing instability. This relative absence from Libya explain the very late recognition of the the international policy response was first Libyan National Transitional Council, leading interpreted as a cautious position related to the increased isolation of Algeria on the to the 2012 April abduction of seven Alge- regional scene. This position clearly showed rian diplomats in the Malian city of Gao by to what extent the regional uprisings had the radical group Movement of Uniqueness taken the Algerian authorities by surprise. and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA). Algiers’ It also showed that the political matrix of wait-and-see attitude can also be attributed Algeria has not changed; President Abdelaziz to political internal preoccupation with Bouteflika belongs to the same generation domestic affairs and the internal competi- of Arab leaders as Muammar Gaddhafi.3 tion within the elite over the upcoming This may explain why Algiers supported the 2014 presidential elections.6 It would seem Ammour: Algeria’s Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis Art. 28, page 3 of 11 that Algeria has been waiting to see how the rebels in order to calm down a potentially regional situation plays out before making explosive situation. any decision and thus leaving the risks of The Mali dossier (as well as the Western resolving the crisis to others. Sahara one) has always been led by the Alge- Algiers’ opposition to participation in rian intelligence services, the Département a regional intervention force is formally de la Sécurité et du Renseignement (DRS) expressed in a constitutional article which (Ammour 2013). Convinced that it should forbids its forces from taking part in military hold the monopoly of mediation with regards action outside its own territory. Algeria has to the northern Mali crisis, Algeria’s attitude been continually invoking this constitutional was no longer necessarily to wait and see: principle, thus justifying why its forces have Algeria has expressed its preference for a not crossed into Mali to eradicate AQIM, even political solution in Mali.7 ECOWAS and Mali when invited to do so by its Sahelian neigh- transitional authorities were wondering how bours, particularly by Niger. Yet the Algeria- Algiers could contribute to a negotiation pro- led CEMOC (Joint Military Chief-of-staff cess with the armed groups, particularly Ansar Committee) was created in 2010 for precisely al-Dine, whose head Iyad Ag Ghali is well this purpose. However, on 20 December known in Algeria. He is among those leaders 2011, a few weeks before the National Move- of the Tuareg rebellion working closely with ment for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) the DRS.8 proclaimed the independence of Azawad, He came to prominence in 1988 when he Algerian army forces crossed into Mali. This founded a Tuareg secessionist movement in move occurred exactly five days before Iyad northern Mali. Moreover, he was the main ag Ghaly announced the creation of a new leader of the Tuareg rebellion that began in jihadist group called Ansar al-Dine (defend- 1990 and ended with the peace ceremony at ers of the faith) in Northern Mali. The ques- Timbuktu in 1996. During that period, Iyad tion then is why Algeria had some forces came under the eye of the DRS who were entered in Mali if Algeria is so keen not to concerned that the rebellion might spread intervene militarily on foreign soil? It is into Algeria.