TERRORISM RISK

TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 JUNE 2017

Islamic Extremist Groups Merge in North Africa

KEY POINTS

• The leaders of at least three Islamic extremist groups are believed to have met in Mali in March 2017. • An agreement was made to merge their organizations, creating a unified Islamic Jihadist group. • The new group continues to be affiliated with Al Qaeda in the region.

Reported incidents of terror groups active in the Sahel region and subsequent fatalities from 2007-2016 (Data Source: ACLED Conflict Data).

SITUATIONAL SUMMARY

Terrorism: The leaders of three established Islamic extremist groups that operate in North Africa have decided to merge their organisations following a meeting in Mali. It is unclear when this meeting took place, but it is likely to have occurred in early March 2017. The leaders of Ansar Dine, Al Mourabitoun and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have joined forces to create Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). The name roughly translates to “support of Islam and Muslims”. The leader of the new group is thought to be Iyad Ag Ghaly, the former leader of Ansar Dine. JNIM has pledged its allegiance to Al Qaeda and its leaders, in addition to their allegiance to Abu Musab al Zarqawi. The organisation is primarily based in Mali, but has subsidiary groups which operate throughout the North Africa region.

Contact: +44 ( 0 ) 1202 795 801 SOLACEGLOBAL.COM 1 of 3 TERRORISM RISK

TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 JUNE 2017

SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT

The merging of Islamic extremist groups in Mali has both domestic and regional implications. All three subsidiary groups have been active in Mali, which has been the site of serious conflict in recent years. Both Mali and neighbouring Algeria have had historic Islamic insurgencies. Following the Arab Spring protests of 2011, these insurgencies gained momentum. In particular, the anarchy in Libya helped fuel domestic conflict in Mali; this was a result of heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries returning from Libya, who began fighting the government of Mali. Al Qaeda affiliated groups seized upon this conflict. Groups such as Ansar Dine and AQIM represented religious alternatives to local Islamic communities, who were being targeted by secular Tuareg militias and government forces. Islamic extremist groups utilized the power vacuum left by domestic conflict to seize some territory in Mali; they were later removed from these strongholds by a joint French-Malian intervention which started in 2013. However, they continued to conduct terrorist attacks in Mali, and increasingly outside of the country in the wider region.

Ansar Dine is the militant group responsible for the majority of attacks in Mali. These have primarily been small scale gun attacks, targeting security forces in the country. Ansar Dine has also attacked and kidnapped foreign aid workers and civilians suspected of aiding government forces. The leader of Ansar Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly, is now the leader of JNIM. Al Mourabitoun is responsible for a smaller number of attacks; however, these have had a larger impact. In January 2017, Al Mourabitoun was responsible for the suicide bombing of a military camp in Gao, which killed 77 people. The leader of the group is Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian jihadist with significant links to AQIM. Belmokhtar is likely using his already established networks to advance the international actions of JMIN. He has experience of this, having coordinated an attack between Al Mourabitoun and AQIM against the Grand Bassam hotel in the Ivory Coast on 13 March 2016. Al Qaeda in the Maghreb is a coalition of groups, which has a regional presence. Its inclusion into JNIM is likely due to local level militants wishing to combine forces with other larger groups in Mali and the wider region.

Prior to this merger, all three of the subsidiary groups were established terror networks. This merger into JNIM is a result of significant losses by the various organizations in Mali. French military forces are heavily involved in the country, and have been aiding government forces in combatting the threat of Islamic extremism. This has had a debilitating impact on local extremist groups. In addition, Tuareg militias have begun joint patrols with Mali forces. This is part of a 2015 peace agreement reached between the two parties, and indicates that Tuareg and Malian forces have resolved some of their differences. This threatens to reduce the internal conflict and power vacuum within with Islamic extremist groups thrive. As such, this is a political blow to the subsidiary groups of JNIM in Mali. The combined effect of French intervention and decreased internal discord in Mali has severely weakened Islamic extremist movements in the region. The creation of JNIM is a possible reaction to this.

Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen has pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. In particular, Iyad Ag Ghaly praised the actions of Osama Bin Laden and the current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri. This is not surprising, as all of JNIM’s subsidiary groups had at some point pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. In addition, the group also praised the actions of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the founder of the Islamic State (IS) group. This is likely to increase the group’s appeal to Islamic State supporters, while not actually allying the group with IS. The reason for this is that Al Qaeda and Islamic State have established differences in ideology. JNIM seeks to gain the support of Islamists through the ideology normally associated with Al Qaeda, yet does not wish to alienate those that support Islamic State. Indeed, this may point to a weakness within JNIM. Because of the diverse subsidiary groups which make up JNIM, there are disparate and competing religious ideologies within the group. Most are allied with Al Qaeda, but some may prefer the religious ideology espoused by the Islamic State. This may lead members of JNIM to split off, and start splinter organizations of their own. This has already occurred in the past, particularly within AQIM.

Following the creation of JNIM, the situation in Mali is unlikely to drastically change. Terrorism will continue in the country, as will clashes between JNIM and Tuareg militias and government forces. In the immediate short term, JNIM is likely to increase its terrorist actions, in an initial show of strength. This has already been seen, with JNIM claiming several recent attacks in Mali, which have killed at least a dozen people. The specialties of the individual subsidiary groups are likely to come to the fore in these

Contact: +44 ( 0 ) 1202 795 801 SOLACEGLOBAL.COM 2 of 3 TERRORISM RISK

TRAVEL ADVISORY • 16 JUNE 2017

instances. Already, there have been both gun and improvised explosive attacks. There may be an increase in attacks on government security forces, foreign nationals, and international organizations. Already, United Nations troops and aid workers have been targeted. Multiple UN peacekeepers have already been killed in Mali. As well as this, a French soldier was killed by an explosive device near the border with Burkina Faso.

JNIM, although founded in Mali, will not confine its actions to that country. Mali has fluid borders with Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Mauritania. All of these neighbouring countries have been impacted to some extent by Islamic terrorism. The subsidiary groups view borders between countries in the Sahel as artificial, and are adept at crossing between states in the region. Indeed, in the past this has been a specific evasion tactic. Militants being pursued by forces in one country have in the past simply crossed the border into neighbouring states. JNIM is likely to extend its reach throughout the Sahel region to conduct further terror attacks. However, because the subsidiary groups rely upon local, tribal ties, it remains to be seen if the group will be able to sustain such a large sphere of influence. Indeed, the success of jihadist groups in Mali and Algeria has been because they are able to act unhindered in the large, ungoverned, and relatively unpopulated areas of the Sahel. In light of this, JNIM may not need extensive territorial strongholds, due to the nature of their sporadic terror attacks across the region.

SECURITY ADVICE

HIGH TERRORISM RISK

Solace Global would advise clients to employ the highest possible security measures and journey management planning when visiting Mali and the countries in the Sahel. The risk of kidnapping by terrorist or tribal group is high throughout the region. Solace Global would advise clients to employ a fully-armed and armoured transportation detail, including a secondary convoy vehicle. Hostile Environment and First Aid Training (HEFAT) is also recommended prior to arriving in country. We would also advise travellers to use travel-tracking technology in order to gain rapid access to the latest incidents and to notify others should an incident occur. These enhanced security measures are required throughout Mali and the Sahel region, as the risk of travellers becoming caught up in terrorist attacks or armed conflict are high, regardless of the level of militarisation in the area.

Contact: +44 ( 0 ) 1202 795 801 SOLACEGLOBAL.COM 3 of 3