Insurance Times: A decade later, power of Andrew remembered Insurers weren’t financially prepared for most expensive storm in U.S. history September 3, 2002, Vol. XXI No. 18 by Adrian Sainz Associated Press

MIAMI — On radar, the storm was a spherical mass barreling into the coast, with red, yellow and blue hues warning of deadly wind and torrential rain. That abstract image of 's fury was swiftly replaced with a devastation all too real — flattened homes, trees reduced to toothpicks, dazed residents walking through neighborhoods that looked like war zones. “I know what it's like to think that you're going to die, and for God to spare you,'' said John Cosgrove, who huddled in a closet with his wife and children as their home fell apart around them a decade ago. “We lost everything.'' Andrew's winds, 14-foot , heavy rain and tornadoes spared and Fort Lauderdale. But early on the morning of Aug. 24, 1992, the hurricane roared through Homestead, Florida City and other small cities farther south. Forty-three deaths were blamed on Andrew in the , 126,000 homes were destroyed, and 80 percent of the area's farms were wiped out. With $30 billion in damage, it remains the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. It also continues to impact South Florida, where it changed lives and everything from insurance regulations and construction codes to the very location of the National Hurricane Center. Last week, scientists ended a decade of debate on the storm's intensity by announcing that what was once thought to a Category 4 storm is now believed to have hit 165 mph — making it only the third Category 5 storm to hit the United States in recorded history. “There's really no question in my mind that it was a Category 5, based on the damage,'' said Herbert Saffir, who devised the scale to measure hurricane intensity.

****** When Andrew arrived, Max Mayfield was already a 30-year veteran at the hurricane center, which was then in suburban Miami's Coral Gables. The storm kept him from getting home to his wife and three children. “The hurricane center owns my soul during an event like that,'' said Mayfield, now director of the center. As the hurricane marched, Mayfield took to the airways and delivered the news in his soothing accent. Around him, windows were shattering even though they were protected by hurricane shutters. Winds gusting up to 164 mph blew the center's radar off the roof, knocking out its ability to produce local images of Andrew's path. “I said to myself, 'Hmm, that's not supposed to happen!''' Mayfield said. A new center was later built farther inland. Andrew overpowered homes and businesses in large swaths of southern Dade County. Tent cities sprouted and supplies, food and volunteers streamed in by the airplane-load. Half the damage — about $16 billion — came in insured losses. More than 600,000 claims were filed, and 25 percent of the nation's insurance adjusters came to south Florida to help out. As claims skyrocketed, insurance companies bailed out: Eleven went bankrupt, and 30 others lost more than 20 percent of their surplus. Some 930,000 policyholders were left with no coverage options. “Insurance America was not prepared for the kind of losses in Florida,'' said Cosgrove, a former state legislator. He was dropped four times by insurance companies after Andrew. Lawmakers responded with state-created insurance pools for homeowners who live in hurricane-prone areas. The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund was also created to provide reinsurance, or coverage for private writers. That fund is capped at $11 billion and is intended to make certain insurance companies aren't overexposed if there is ever another hurricane like Andrew. The federal government directed $823 million in grants to rebuild roads, utilities, businesses and homes, many of which were easily shredded by the storm. The construction project was massive and messy: Homeowners complained of shoddy building practices and a lack of code enforcement, and insurers sued developers for construction flaws. State prosecutors looked into alleged construction flaws by the developers, but stopped short of leveling criminal charges. A new building code approved in 2000 is based on national models that outline high-risk areas for storm damage. It covers everything from roofing requirements to inspections to window protection.