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12-1-1991 The mmiE gration of the Soviet Jews to Israel Mark Edward Crosslin Western Kentucky University
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Recommended Citation Crosslin, Mark Edward, "The mmiE gration of the Soviet Jews to Israel" (1991). Honors College Capstone Experience/Thesis Projects. Paper 58. http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/stu_hon_theses/58
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors College Capstone Experience/ Thesis Projects by an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact [email protected]. • I I I THI!: 8l'lIGRATIOM OF THE SOVln JEWS TO ISRAEL I I p~ ••ent"'d to the Oepart.ent of Hlstory I '0' the Unlveralty Honors Proqra. I Western Kentucky Unlversity I ~ In Partial FUlfillment of the Requirements for Graduation r with Honors In IILstory and Graduation as • a University Scholar • by I Kark £d...rd Crosslin O.,ceJlber l'J'U I ( "pproved by r r r • I Table of Contents I Paqe I List of Tables and Fiqutell ...... •.... ····· ..... Ut Part Introduction , 1 • I Development and Determination of , the Je~i5h National ConscIOuSneSs 2
The TaaclI •... _..••...•.....••.•.....•. 2 • Lenin.••••••••....••••.•.•.....••.••••6 Stalin , 8 • 1953-1968 ..•...... 10 II £_I<;r"tlon Fro•• Soviet Standpoint: • policy, Causes and Effects · .12 • The First loIa"" ·····,········12 The Second liI"v'" ...... •• ····· .15 • The Thltd 1i14Y"' .•••..••.•..•••••.••..• 18 I II The SOViet-Jewish blqrllnt...... •. ········ 23 • The Early E.iqrants ······· .23 • soviet Jews Discover ~erica 24 Amerlca's Closed Door · .. 2' • IV Israeli Absorption of the soviet Jews 31 Housing 31 • Employment 32 I The Resettlement process · .. 33 I Absorption Success.s ··· ·· .35 Conclusion: The Pro~lse ········ .38 r Appendl11 ...... •...... •...... 39 Kotes ...... •....• , •....•••••...... (4 r Bibiloqraphy...... ••..•...... •••...•...... S1 I I I I
I Tables and Flqures Table
I 1 gaaiqratlon froa the i USSR since 1968 ••••••••••••• _ ••••••••• 40 Flqure I 1 Illraell IlIIIIIlqrllltlon .•••••••. '0' ._, .••••• 41 , Sovi"t Emlqrat Ion ...... •...... 42 I , Soviet Immigration I by Profe:ssLon ••.•.....•...••..•..•..•• 43 • Soviet Immlqratlon I by Age .•...•..•..••...••...••.••.••.•• 43 I I
'" I I I I "For next year 1n Jerusalem." Those words have a place
I on every JewLah holiday, In every Jewish religIous I ob:servance, and are even spoken In every Jewish prayer. In the Soviet Union as In other countries, the Holy Land forms
a true ba.sh fOl; the Jewll1h faith. But perhaps In the • Soviet Union, MFor neKt year In Jerusalem- La spoken with MOte anticipation than elsewhere In the world. Since 196',
• ho~eland the Jews of the U.S.S.R. have been leaving their • to return to what they consider to be their real home--the t state of Israel. Pe"klnq first In 1979 with 51,000 Jews e=lqratlnq. and then with a tremendous surge In 1990 of over 200,000 e=lqratlnq, there eKlsts what one can only • term an exodus of the Jewish people from the Soviet Union. • ThIs exodus, fot seveu,l teasons, Is beneficIal fot the three major parties Involved: the Soviet UnIon, whIch Is • findinq a new way to look at those of the Jewish faith even while bestowing upon them the freedom to leave Its • confines; the Soviet-Jewl:sh emiqrants, who now have the I freedom to seek for whatever reasons a different way of I life than they have known; and the state of l:sulel. a nation founded upon the idea of betoll.!nq a homeland and I safe haven fot Jews around the world. I I 1 I 2 i i Plitt I: Development ~nd Deter.lnaeian of the Jewish Katlonal Consciousness i
I Certainly the rise of the Jewish national consciousness I is a pIvotal issue when one considers an exodus of such magnitude. There are many factors to be considered when I tracIng thIs rise throuqh history. The ascendancy of a ~JewLsh Identity· appears to be very much dependent on the
I treatment or, rather, the ~istleatment of the Jews as a I separllte ethnic geeup. And the cultural background and ethnic identity which kept II nation of people cemented \ together when they were, In effect, homeless Is very much enhanced when they actually acquire II land of thelt own. I ay tracing the formative factors--includlnq governmental I leq151atlon, "ocial organi%atlon, and out"ide considetatlon,,--to the pre"ent, one may plot the I developMent of a Jewi"h natlonal con"clou"ne"" and con"ider Lts im.pUcatlon". I I
Throughout practlcally the entlre cour"e of hl"tory, the Jews have been con"tantly harried and maUgned. In 1127, following a precedent set flrst in fourteenth century England, then in France, and then In Spain in the sixteenth century, the Ru""ian "tate expelled the Jewish people. The
~-~- ~-~-- I I J
I eauses ranged fro. the sinqular threat they posed to a growing Russian ~tlonal consciousness to the growth of I Christianity. Th1s event set the stage for centurIes of I Russian and Sovl~ anti-SemitIsm. As the Muscovite state eVOlved Into the Ruaslan Emptre, I the perceived tht~at by the Jewish people to the nationalist Identity eased somewhat. To",y were permitted • back In the coun~, but the areas In which they were i allowed to setUe were restricted. Under CathetlrH~ II, the te[ll' ~P"le of the Jewl!:!h Settlelllent~ was first used. It i 4eflned the .re.s In which the Jews could dweLL freely. Under SUbsequent rulers, the ·Pale of the Jewish I Settle.ent- contLacted or expanded to fit the particular I need of the day. ~lexander I issued the most restricted decree, statin." t::l:lat all Je.... lIlust Live in urban areas I within the bounda%ies of the old "Pale.- Towards the end of the Imperial reqlme, the controls I placed upon the Jews became much harsher. Under Alexander II and Alexander III they were the subject of a ."roup of I measures known as the Kay La..... These requlations aqain I II.ited the possible settle....nts of the Je.... to town$ and yllla."e$ wIthin the ·Pale·; they restrIcted Je.... fro. r conductlnq busInes$ on Sunday$ and ChrIstian holidays; and they outlIned a quota $y$te. for Jewish entrance to r secondary schools and universities. The quota syste. was set up because Jewish students ·were 'quick in joinin." the ranks o"f the revolutlonary workers. '."- After years of • repression, the May Laws elicited some lnterestlng
["spons"" .
The fIrst reply to the constant [epresslon ~a" a ~5t eminently logical one: tn" Jewtl fled the country. In the lattet half of the nineteenth century, thell! Wete approKlmately four million Jews Ln the RussIan €mplre. 2 r.estet Eckman, founder of he Juo:1alc Resell[ch Inlltltute, "stlmat"s that by 1915 fully two mill Lon Jews had ellllgrated. 3 Although frel! emigration was "trictly forbidden, any Jew wishing to .ave west would almost certainly be granted an eXlt vis•. The second [espons" was somewhat more complicated and was not exactly 11~ltl!d to the Russian Jews. Thls wa" thl! development of various social movements, the one of paul.QUnt importance being that of 21on15ll1. J .S. Seheehtman, a leadlnq member of the Jewish Aqency and the \oIorld J"wish Conqress, points out that the f1rst meetlnq of
HovflvfI! Zion (Lovers of Zion) occurred In 1664, thirteen years before the first Zionist conference In Basel.· Thus, Zlonlsll' had sOme of Its deepest roots In Ru""la. Indeed, as Schechtman aqaln not"", the majorlty of the forty settle_nts that existed In PalestLne before World war I were of Russian orI91n.- The formative tenets of Zlonlslll were quite simple: the Jews should have a national homeland once ,,-qaln; their homeland should be where the ancient state of Israel was; and eventually the world's population of Jews would live In I , I I "that nation. There we.t" sevetaL factions within the Zionist movement, but by and large thes" basic belIefs were I constant. The fact that a large pottion of the Jews in Russia I wanted to form a separate nation did not seem to overly I alarm the government; howev"" the effect of Zionism on the ordinary Russian was extreme. Zionism to the everyday I Ivan on the stleet was regarded as an insidious plot by the Jews, already the source of all problems, to take Over the
I world. The first step--the militant organization of the I Jewlsh people--was already underway. The .tumors did much to Cause social unease and were often extreme enough to ~, cause .tlotlng and vicious pogroms. c Zionism, the most important responsive socIal movement, I was still only one movement. Some of the JeW$ took a very I opposite viewpoint and turned to a socIalist or Russian natlonallst Jewry as an answer to the represslon by the I TSiUS. These Jews, the most prominent of which formed a politIcal party known as the Farelnlkte, were to play an I instrumental part In the overthrow of the Tsarlst regIme. I They still believed there was hope for a viable Jewish faIth in the RussIan EmpIre, and all that was requIred to make that hope a reaiity was the soclal and polItical • change found In revolution. I with a massive wave of continuing emigration, and a social situatIon fIlled wIth ZIonist or natIonalist I organizations, the Russlan Empire headed lnto the First I ,
World War and .I revolution WhIch ,,",'lId chillnqe the polltical atmosphere of the natIon forever. With the overthrow of
NIcholas II and the toppllnq of the ProvL$lonal Oove"tnlllent, Vladl.er Lenin, leader of the Soviets, brouqht his Ideas and 1d,,,0109Y to the Russian Jewish scene.
LenIn
WIth Lenin's advent to power, the Jews appeared to be in a better posLrlon th..n ever before. Lenin cl... ll'I",d that he was a leader for the oppressed--and WhO was .ore opprea:sed than the Jews? II'" advocated e"luallty to all people, and he promised them a new kind of freedom. In his own poLitical party there were several pro.ln",nt Jews. In fact, anti-Semites tended to equate communism with the feared Jewish world consplu.cy. ~ and If the entire comaunlst -ove~nt ~ould be mistaken as ~ ~ompletely Jewish occurrence, surely this boded well for the Jews. The facts, however, fall" to bear out this conclusIon. Even thouqh Karl Karx was a Jew, he was bltrerly anti-Semltic.- LenIn usually followed Karx's teachlnqs.
He was not opposed to ~hanqlnq those teachings to suit his needs, thouqh. In the ~ase of the Jews, Lentn ~ould not afford to be ~ntl-Semttic for praq~tt~ reasons, and he did not choose to be ~nti-semttic for philosophical reasons. One of the puc:tlcal reasons was thet a qood part of the
Co~unist Party wes compoaed of Jews, usually those RussIan ,
natlonallst" exemplified by the me"'bets of the Facelnlktt:.
A second WliS thlle he needed and wanted a unHle:d Soviet nation, and overt anti-Semitism was dIametrically opposed to unification. Philosophically, the idea of anti-Selllitism was, to Lenin, II qreat hindrance to the equality he "ought.
Although Lenin apPolled antl-Selllltls111, his position "liS a bit mote narrow than most people perceived. Anti-Sellllt!"", was singling Out the Jew just because he was a Jew. 1'hls, Lenin W"",, ",qalnst. His feelings regardlnq what actually went Into being a Jew was a different story aLtoqether. 1'h" Jewl:5h cultural heritage was a hlndtllnce to nat tOnal assllllilatlon, and thus all the Jewish schools and ttadltlons "hould be done away with. Religion was not tolerated In a Communist country; the Jewish ways of wonhlp had to d1e. Uonlsm, w1th Its dream of a totally separate JeWIsh nation, was a definite hindrance to Soviet assi~lli!ltion and nationalization, ~nd could not be tOler.ted.
Under Lenin, 1..... were pa••ed -.hing ZionIsm, and indeed all Jewish polItical partIes, lilegeal. Jew1sh
InstItutions were dismantled, synagogues closed, and their posse••ions u:propr1ated. Everyone under eighteen ...s prohibited £roJa receiving a re11gious education outside the hOlle. Ironically, IIlOst of these decrees were either suggested or carried out by Jewish Communist,.
It can be argued that this was one o~ the Lowest ebbs
for the JewIsh national consciousness. The Jewish people I • I I "'",re spLit Into two very anta90ntstlc faction,,: The Co.-unl"t" and the Zionists. The unity I Jews. W5S attacking thos", very thIngs whIch had served as their strength and chelt stay throuqh centuries of I persecution under the Tsars. I stalln I Under Stalin, the Soviet-Jewish national consciousness I made perhaps mOr'" solidifying 'lain" than under any other I leader. During the first few yu',s. there was II continued attack carrled out by the Jewlsh Communists on the existing I 1lonist organizations. Around 1'30, however, such harassment dropped to ah,ost nothing. A propaganda I ca.-palgn was launched Instead, Its purpose .erely to re.lnd I the non4Jewa of the evLls of tlonis•. The official Party llne wall that tlon1s. was dead,- but for sOme reason, the I propaganda campalgn aqalnst it continued. W1th the outbreak of World War II, the party had to I take notice of 1ionis", once again. With the annexation of I portionll of Poland, BeSllllrllbill, Northern Bukov1na, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania the Soviet unton added well over two I 4 , mIllion Je_ to its populatIon. Mote than that, these Jews had not experienced the SovIet assault on ~e..lsh cultural identity. When the :zapildnlkl, the Westerners, came Into contact With their culturally deprived nelqhboIs, they were able to revive th.t Jewl$h spirit. :ticl'll:l1. was induced Into the SOViet-Jewish blOodstream like a vacclne--tr.nsfDt~lnq the ailing Jewish culture into somethlnq that the Jews could again be proud of. Stalin rude conllclous contributions ,HI well. As a ploy to gain worldwide support fot the Soviet cause, he publlcally eased his stance on the Jewish situation. ~e even sent Jewish envoys to plead for Zionist understanding and sympathy for the Soviet war effort. Ae a rlarural outgrowth of thIs strategy, StalIn had to declare hls support for a Jewish state In Palestlne. 8y the U_e the war was over, StalIn was touting a pro-JewIsh polIcy. The SOViet Union now llned up to back the Jewish state of Israel, and In 1948, :lust after the creatlon of the state of Israel, the USSR rece1ved her fIrst Israeli delegation, headed by Golda Hdr. The outpouring of :loy and the demonstrations held In her honor served l~presslvely to solidIfy the Sovlet Jews. At the same time StalIn was pUblicly on the JewIsh side, he was stIll executlng or exilIng II slgniflcant portion of the hlghest ranking Jewish leaders. As soon as Ks. Kelr left the Soviet Union, Stalin had any Jew who had taken part In the deMOnstrations either locked up or exiled.'" Emigration to l~rael was barred; Schechtman 5tates that "from 15 Hay 1948, till the end of 1951, only four old women and One disabled ex-serviceman "'ere permitted to leave for Israei.""-"- This peculIar type of hidden anti-Semitlsm contInued up until StalIn's death. When the news was announced of the "Ooctor's Plot," the ~lx Je",s invoived were charged as beIng "Zionist sple".""-" In the la"t years of hi" life, Stailn had ailo",ed relations with Israel to cooi considerably. Ho",ever, no", that SovIet Jews knew that the Jewish state exIsted, they seemed magnetically drawn together In what can only be described as a national Jewish identity. The beginnings of the Je"'lsh national consciousness was laid, fueled by Israel's exIstence but with its roots far back in the days of the Tsars. 1953-1968 Under G. Halenkov, InterIm le"der of the Soviet state, the grIpping waves of anti-Semitism ceased for a brief whIle. When N. Khrushchev, leader of the USSR untIL 1<;68, took over, there "'as a slow but inexorabie return to antI-Semitism. Khrushchev seemed to share StalIn's polley when it came to the Jewish question: publicly deny any knowledge of anti-SemitIsm but In secret do as much to the Jew as possible. Eckman propose~ that While de-StalInlzation was a primary goal of Khrushchev's, he I 11 I I still had to appease the Patty hard-liners who had approved of stalin, and thus he did nothlnq to help the Jews.~~ I Whether or not this was the casl!, It Is a fact that Khrushchev was challenql!d openly several times about his I [,,£,,:oals ""en to let families be united In Israel, and he I always avoided thl! IS5UI!.~4 During the "Thaw" after Stalin, Jewish national I consciousness surfaced, and the Jewish people werl! obviously dls:satlsfll!d with life In the Soviet Union. I Laurie Sallran, chait of the W. Averell Harriman I Institute'" Seminar on Soviet Republics and Reqional Is"ues_ poInts out, that the typical Soviet Jew 5tl11 I waited for do-e"tlc: [dorms up untll 1961-68, and It was not "ntll the SovIet govI'!rnaent took a pro-Arab and I aot1-["t5ell stance In the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and I subsequently Invaded C:echoslovakia that the JewIsh people began to reall:e that there was no hope for a peaceful I JewIsh exIstence In the Soviet Unlon.~· It was at thIs tIme that the Soviet government began allowing emigration I of PolIsh Jews, and with the Poles as an example, the rest of the Soviet JeW$ queued up to emigrate. The first I contemporary wave of emIgratIon was on. I I I I --~.. I 12 I I Part: II: Eal I The first wave of eJalqratlon encolllpassed the period ftOIll 1968 through 1914, beginning after a total embargo I that followed the Six-Day War. In 1968, a totlll of only I 229 Jews were permitted to e",lgrate; in 1969, the number grew to 2,9?9.~ Peillklnq In 1973 with 34,733, the number of I emigrants reached, comparatively, mas,," proportlons.- There were several Soviet requirements for I participation Ln this first. WoJve: one hoJd to be invit.ed by I a relative then llvlnq in Israel; and one had to apply for oJn exit vlaa, which ent.oJlled obtalninq a referral letter I f:o_ an e_ployer. Aft.er these condltlons Were fllled, e_iqration waa only aa far away oJ" 'l"overnmental approval of I the oJppllcat1on. If the applicat10n were approved, then I oJll that WoJS left to do wa" to heoJd to vlenn", Or "ome other connection point, and tr"nsfer to " plane he"ded for 13 tstael. The official policy of the Soviet qoYern~ent allowed ..aiqu,tlon solely for the reunification of faailles, hence the prerequisite of an invitation. In actuality, the Soviet ~tiYI! at that tim" Ls SOMewhat difficult to discern. Old the Soviets allow the Je.... to e ...lqrlllte because of Jewish agltatlon1 Ot did the Soviets perMit their departure because foreign policy made It desirable? L,,',lfle P. Salltan develops the forDler theory, basically statlnq that the Je.... were allowed to leave because of the trOUble they ",",[l! causLnq. She proposes that the SavLer government realized that by allowing II few of the mote socially animated Jews to leave, social, economic, and political benefits could accrue. The government theorized, In this scenario, that tht!!y would let a few of the activists leave befoIt!! tht!!!r actions became an example to otheIll, thus ridding theIDSt!!lves of a destabilizing elelllent. 3 Salltan a150 points out that the first W<1lve Includ.-d IIlollny elderly and Influ. elligrants, and that they represented the least economically valuable segment for the Soviet Union.' An econollic benefit occurred, therefore, because costly pension funds could now be diverted to DOre useful economiC concerns. The second theory deals with forelqn polley. Ourlnq tht!! late sixties and early seventies, a desire for detente with the United States was a very Important Soviet priority. Their pursuit of SALT I Is evidence of this H Interest, and Lta e"use ma.y partly lie in the Soviet fear of Improved Slno-Amerlcan friendship. In this theory, known as the barometer thesLs, soviet neqotiators realized that Increased e~19ratlon was conducive to II relaxed International atmosphere. The barometer thesis also traces Soviet-American relations through the periods of Jewish e~iqratIQn, and seeks to draw II direct relatLonship between the two. The wara.,r Soviet-American relations, the higher the emigration totals,- Certainly the argument Ls fairly easy to substantiate with reference to emigration statisticS and U.S.-SovLet trade, and for the most part It Ieaalns apparently error-free. The theory Is not, however, entirely without fault. Saittan, ~ddresslng the barometer thesis directly, points out sevetal na_ In lts basic assullptions. She asserts th,U given the perspective of time, it is unlikely that emlqratlon would have endu~ed if It had been dl~ectly linked to u.s. rel~tlons. FOt example, ellliq~ation began seve~al ye~tS befote detente bec~me ~ slqnlflcant factot. Despite close sctutlny by the West, Jewish dissidents Wete constantly ~nd consistently h~tassed. Flnally, the Sovlet attitude towatd Jewl.h cultutal and tellqious l1fe ~e...ined hatsh, and qrew even more hostile as exposure to the West Increased.- Whatever its causes, the first wave ended in 1973. One hlsto~ian, writing during the period of the first wave, states that the Soviet qovernment had three methods of I I I discou,..qlnq ~..Iqratlon: -antl-ISlaeli and antl-ZLonlst propaganda, ha~sm..nt of those applying for ...I'Oratlon I visas, and repression In tile 'form of arre"ts and trlals.·~ I The propllqanda callie In two for=, anti-Semitic I and engineers." These measures had the l.medlate effect of I dropping emigration levels, but there was now an undercurrent of domestLc tens Lon which would Inevltably I find an outlet. I The Second w.. ..e I The second wave was the result of the internal tension I created by the ending of the first. It is doubtfui whether SovIet authoritIes believed that by atte~pting to release only certaIn promInent actlvlsts that they would lnsplre the rest of the Jew1sh population to do so. However, this 15 eKactly what h the Sovlet policy only ~e~ved to in~pi~e and enco~raqe other Jews to leave. OU~ing the years 1975 th~ough 1977, Sovier JewLsh e_igration ave~aged around 14,000 a yea~, & substantial numbe~, but stl11 a d~op fro_ the over 30,000 In 1972-13. However, by 1979, SovLet Jewish emigration had reached an all-time high of 51,320 emiqrant5.~ The second wave was little .o~e than an outgrowth of the first, although lt would co.e to dwarf its p~edecesso~ in magnitude. SovLet reaction to the threat of mass emlg~atlon in 1973 was to clamp down, usIng methods which have already been o~tlined. The Lntenslfled pressu~e on the Soviet Jews, ln their increasingly hostile environment, served only to make them want to leave. Even with the threat of joblessness and anti-Semitic ha~assment, soviet Jews lined ~p to emigrate. The n~mber of visa applicants g~ew steadl1y fro_ 1975 to 1979, and the Soviet gove~n.ent ulti.ately let the. leave. Fi~st and foremost, the Soviet government per_ltted the emiqration because a c~ackdown on the entire Jewish popUlation, eltho~gh not without p~ecedent, was decidedly not feasible. Second, the ~esult of the officially spon50~ed antI-Se_ltle p~opaganda was an Increase In ethnIc tensLons, and emLgration served in a small way to reduce that tension. One addItional reason was that with a significant po~tlon of the Jewish Jntell1gent~ja leaving, places in universities and other 1.po~tant job oppo~tunitles were opening up, and a process of national I 17 I I assimilation co~ld take ~Lac~ wlth these vacant positions going to natIonal ellt••. ~o I These openIngs Ln the educated elite, however, caused a great deal of governmental concern. Taking steps to ensure I that the SovLet Union was not hurt by the mass emlgratLon I of the Jews, the KremlIn began denying Jews entrance to unlversttLes Ln excess of the already strLngent quotas. In I 1968, one-thIrd of the Jewish populatIon was unLverslty-educated, compared wlth only four percent of the I total popUlation. But, from 191' to 19'9, not one Jew I was ad~ltted to the faculty of mathematLcs at Moscow State UnIversIty. From 1919 to 1980, only four Jews were a part I of the 400-S00 students annually enrolled.~~ The government was tryIn9 to Wean the country from the I extremely dense content of Jews In mental (um5t~venyll I labor posltIons.~2 DespIte thIs precautIon, SovIet authorItIes once agaIn felt the need to clamp down on the I Jewish exodus. EmIgration fell consIstently throughout IgeO, 50 that I by the end of that year only 21,~71 Jews were allowed to I e~Igrate.~2 This trend contInued through 1ge6, when only gl4 Jews e.lgrated.~4 Proponents of the barometer thesis I advance several arguments for thl5 second, and much mOre severe, restrIctIon. The UnIted States had conslstently denied the Host Favored NatIon trade status to the SovIet I Union since 1974. FurtherMOre, the mass emigration of 1'7' went al~at totally unnotIced by President Jimmy Carter.~· III 18 III III This ..y have angered the Soviet leadership Into 4 hardening of theIr positIon. TholQOs Haylor, Professor of III E:conomlcs and Business Administration at Duke Unlv<'!Islty, comments that between 197~ and 1982 the Whole fabrIc of III detente came unraveled bec,,"use of Lssues such- as Angola, III Afghanistan, Poland, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet natural-gas plpelLne to western III Europe, and last but not least, the at~ race.~· Opponents of the barometer thesis cIte this saM", material and ask why III it took until 1980 for such serious .atertal to have any III "ffl!ct.~· Looking at the Intern"l tension thesh, one finds other III explanatLons for the drasUc drop In emigration durIng the eighties. Salltan points out that the scale of the mass III eXOdus could not be ignoted in the eighties, because it was III a tillle fot declinIng econolllIc and populatIon growth in the Soviet Union. Havlnq teallzed that f....ily teunlflcatlon is I a never-ending process, the government had to act when 12.7 percent of the Jewish population had already emiqrated.~. I Salltan also theorIzes that the Soviet tegime felt the need I to assett control OVet is ptoblem which It probably assessed as out of hand.~· I The ThJrd "'ave I I The thIrd wave of Soviet Jewish elllIgtatlon began In 1987. During that yeiSt, there was is definIte thaw in I I " I I Sovlet-~erIC4n relatIons. In Dece~et of 1981, President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and Soviet leader MikhaIl I Gorbachev came together for a thIrd summit meeting. Also In oeceaber 1987, aore Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate I than durIng any other month since 1981.~o The e~odus had I begun. There were several reasons to belIeve that the thaw in I SovIet ealqratlon policy 45 of 1987 was a temporary meaSUre. The Internal tension thesis would assert that I Gorbachev was basically trying to get rid of a small I portIon of hIs population which was jobless (as a result of their visa applications) and lnherently worthless to the I Soviet economy. AppeasJng ~estetn nations clamoring for tree ealqtatlon further reco..ended the idea, sO he very wisely let the refusenIks emigrate. Once they were gone, I he could aiways tighten the contrOls and keep home the more valuable members of the Jewish community (the engineers and I sclentistsl.~~ This argument formed the basis for the theory that Oorbaehev considered the emigration of the Jews to be a temporary pheno.enon. Salltan adds that the restriction of emigration to one group could lead to greater demands to emigrate on the side of other ethnic minorities, a situation she Is sure Corbachev Wishes to avold.2~ With her arguments In ~Ind, one .ay conjecture that Cor bachev originally intended this second wave of Soviet JeW3 to be a temporary thing, and It Is because of so.ethlng a~ln to the baro~ter thesIs that he cannot now end the exodus. Observing the growing number of emigres, world opinion has grown too strong, and there are too many advantages occurring as a result of the emigration for Gorbachev to stop It now. Moreover, the emigration has become secondary to a domestic reform that has risen out of the emigration controversy. There are many indicators of a loosening in the overall Soviet domestic scene during the years 1987-1990. Many of these indicators deal specifiedly with Soviet Jewry. On 7 December 1987, the Soviet gove:rnment disbanded its offiCial "Anti-Zionist Commlttee."~~ As a sign of reduced ten"ion" on the lowest levels, ko"her food appeared in the official state stores late in i987.~· And the growing number of Jews permitted to emigrate "erves as an indicator of domestic policy as well. to. 1987, there we:re 8,1~5 total Jewl"h emigrant". In 1988, th'He were 18,961 emigrants, followed by 71,142 In 1989 and over 200,000 in 1990.~~ Not only did the number of emigrants keep growing, but the magnitude of domestic polley kept pace. In July 1988, a Soviet filmmaking team attended the Jerusalem Film Festival, and for the first time in history a Soviet government sanctioned films with predominantly Jewish themes. 2 • Later that same month, the first Israeli delegation to the Soviet Union in twenty years arrlved.~~ In November of 1988, the Soviets, for the first time since 1917, allowed Hebrew language classes to 2 be officially taught. • In February 1989, Jewish cultural 21 cente." were: legall:ted. The fl.st opened In Hoscow that same month, followed by Jewish cultural orqanizations in at least a dozen clti." at the end of 19a9.~· In OCtober 1990, the head of the antl-S"..ltic q:roup PalJtyat, In a court case ·without precedent In the USSR," was tried and convicted of sttu"lng up ethnic hlltred, and sentenced to a two-year telm in ,all,sa As one flnal example of what lIlust be conside::ed the greatest Iehabilitation of an ethnic qtOUP ever, there Ls the subject of direct plane fl1qhts to Israel. Since 1980, Israel has aSked for direct flights fro.. the Soviet Union to Is[ael to prevent the lo..s of Jewish elJtlqtants going to places besides I5.&81 (the so-called drop-out phenomenon). For years the Soviet govern~ent refused, saying that such flights would constitute ·coercion,·" and that the ~~igrants should hav~ the power of choice. On 29 Septe~er 1990, the Soviet Union agreed to direct fliqhts to Israel, s~rvinq only to exe~plify how far Soviet-IsraelI relations have come." Despite the re~rkable number of positive indicators occurring in the Soviet Union, there are still hints of .. darker force, re~inders of a ti~e not yet -passed. In late 1987, the KGB resorted to their time-honored tactic of force to Quiet a qroup of Jewish protestors." Even In 1990, anti-Semitism was a ma,or issue In the Soviet Union. Early In February, the KGB Issued an appeal for calm to counteract the rUmOrS and threats of pogroms aqainst the I I I Jews. H AgaIn In July. Pravda contained an ,utlcle on how .ntl-Se~it15. threatened to under.lne the political and I eeonoale tefor~ of the CDuntty.~· The fact that the article was even written shows how far Soviet society has I co~e; but Its content underscores how far It still has to ,.. I The examples of what 1", in effect, the rehabilitation I of Jewish culture, point out how h,Hd it wiLL be to "hut the now open door. Free emigration Is taking place, and it I is only a 519naL and a symbol of what may yet happen. The ,,It.-te necessary for such emlqratlon as Is occurring is I danqerQusly two·£"ceted: the door lIIust be open, and the I leaders of the Soviet state lIIust dealre to keep it open; however, there lIIust be a reaSOn that so aany Jews want to I l."ve. Be that all It l'lli!IY, one cannot help but 111010 the posItive cultuc"l ceforms of which the Jewish e_lqratlon I hall been a catalyst, and believe thi!lt the Jewish Exodus has I been a positive occurrence in the SOViet Union. I I I I I I I 2J I I p~(t Itt: Th~ SGYi~t Jewish Em19~ant I While the mere fact of Jewish ethnic identity indicate. I certain accepted characteristics, a closet look at I lllalgI.tlon p"tteCl;ll points to an even IDOre exclusive set of ._lqrant-speclfic traits. The l1Ioat important of these I Identifying components includes a general aqreement on point of orig-ln, .,....:$on for lu,vinq, ... nd final destlnatlon. I Through the COUrse of modern Soviet Jewish emigration. there has been a de~lnlte shift In emlgration compositlon, I especially with teqatd to these three categories. I I Until 1974, emigration from the Soviet Union was I basically driven by religious reasonll. Israel was I consldeted. the home of the Jewish people--thelr nation. The Zionist background of the SovIet ~ews wa~ one of the I st~ongest IltOtlvato~~ fo~ ellllgr.tlng. Natu~ally, then, the e.lg~... nt pool was made up of ~ews eOllllng fro.. tho.$e a~e's I where Zlonl~1lI was the strongest, namely the regions annexed I by the Soviets In World Wat It and the outlying, lea.$t n... tlonal1zed (Russlfledl areas such as Georgia and Central I A.sla.~ In these dIstrIcts, the ~ews had been able to resJst the natIonalization Which would have th~eatened I their Jewish cultural Identity, ... nd therefore had a stronq I " dll'l\rl! to ","lte wlth the state of Israel for truly Uonll1t rea50ns. Demographically, thl" pattern of the non-Sovietized Jew 15 d[.lUrie. Ninety-eight percent of the pre-19H emigrants went to Israel.~ The bulk of this number came from the Ie"" nationalized areas--thlrty five percent of all Jews going to Israel caMe from Geor91a.~ where less than 2.S percent of Sovlet Jews resided." The fact that these early emigrants went to Israel, coupled with their areaS of origination, certainly Indicates that they were going primarily to fulfill their dream of being a part of a Jewish nation, not -erely to escape the Soviet governaent Or harsh economic conditions. About their later counterparts, the same cannot be said. In 1974 a ma'or turning point w~s re~ched In the pattetn of Soviet Jewish emigration. In thill yeat the percentage of Soviet Jews who did not go to Isr~el 'umped ftom three percent to nineteen percent.- Thill figure continued to tlse, teachlnq fotty-nlne petCent In 1'376, and staylnq at ovet fifty percent fot the remainder of the lIecond wave,- ThIs rapid upswlnq of "dropouts· wall Indicative of s new type of emlqrant, one less concerned with the Jewish state than with Individual safety and welfare. " The yeal 1974 "'as l"deed the cru:< of the situation. During tht,. year, an e: Jllternatlve.~- OILIlIl On top of the increasingly unpleasant general social scene, the Jews were victilMl of a vicious anti-Semitic propaganda campaign. This tactic has been discussed In an earlier section, and without repeating details, one may say that for many Jews, it left them with an increased desire to leave the Soviet Union. With such conclusions In mind, the results of a survey of late seventies' emigrants may be examined wtthout surprise. ~When emigrants from this period were surveyed, they cited discrimination on the basis of nationaLIty, CUltural or political motivations, economic reasons, and family reunification as Chief factors motivating their decision to emigrate."~~ These reasons, taken togeth",r, Indicate the typical "new" emigrant of the second wave. As the catalysts for emigration changed, so did the origins of the ",migrant pool. OIith religious reasons much less weighted, nationalization had very little effect on the decision to emigrate. What it did affect, however, was the final destination of the emigrant. Seventy-two percent of all emigres from Russia and the Ukraine, very assimilated areas, went to the United States. On the other hand, oniy six percent of the Georgians and thirteen percent of the Central Asians went to the U.S.1~ With the 21 growing pefl:entaqe of elllLqrants qolng to the U.S., Lt ls obvious that there was a remarkable SUIge In the nu~e[ of ellllqr",nts £rolll the ..s"llllilated areas. The surge occucred in these densely packed areaS because the'll" were the Jews who felt ~"t the dragging 50clal dynallllcs, who felt ~"t the ",otl-5111111tlc propaganda call1paign, and who felt most the lure of new opportunities. They saw an avenue of escape lo the emigration of their more religIous cultural cousins, and they saw new possibilities In a route to AmerLca. When the thIrd wave of emigration began in 1987, the chief motivating factors for emigration remained fairly constant with what they were in 1979--£ea[ of dlscrllll1nation, fear of a worsenlnq econOIll¥. and a deslte fot farally teuniflcatlon. The rqjotity of Soviet Jewish emlgtants Wete still co_ing to the U.S., and the majotlty of those eralqtants otlglnated In the Uktalne and the RussIan Republic. Dlsctlralnatlon against the Jewish people 1n the late eighties had sevetal new twists. Fot ptob.1bly the flut tl." In hlstoty, the Jews Wete the vlctl~ of antl-Se.itla. because they Wete leaVing. WIth so Illuch concetn placed on the human tiqhts Issue of Jewish eralqratlon, the entire populatLon of the SovIet UnIon was well aware of exactly who was le/lvinq their countty. When emigration " restriction" for ol",.." eased In 1')117, 4 seed of [esentla"nt beqilln to grow In the Iaind" of nationalla-c" throughout the Soviet "rate. '(evqeny Vellkhov. director of the Kutch.tov InstItute of Atolalc Energy and melaber of the Central Co_lttel!, states poLqnantly, "Sut if you want to talll about emigration, why not put It In general terms--why always, or m ...l<;ratlon of the Jews, a probleJll known as "the brain drain." Because the Soviet "ysteJll provided frel! education and professional trainIng, a .l!~l!r of that system wa, expected to feel $o-e SOtt of obligation to it. Therefore, when a Jew chose to eml~rate, espeelally a well-edueated Jew, Lt appeared as If that Individual was rene~ln~ on a valid elalm to his manual and intelleetual resOurCeS. Emiqration from thIs standpoint was siphoninq some of the best minds out of the country, a problem, and the apparent denial of obLlqation was causinq the build up of huqe waves of resentment, another problem.~· To compound the Issue, thIs resentment simply encouraqed other JeW$ to leave the eountry. The very real issue of ~the brain draIn~ can be seen by lookinq at the occupations of Soviet Jews when they arrIve In Israel. Completely unskilled labor accounts for only twelve percent of Israeli immiqrants. £nqlneers and technicians make up thirty-eiqht percent of those I I " I \l/UIllqrants, ....hile twenty-one percent of the l_lqrant:; ace In academics. Eleven percent are In the medLc/ll field, and I the rest ace In market lng, admlnlstratlon, IIrt and sociaL I fields, lIervice positions, or otherwise skilled labor e ..plo~ents.~· With such II concentrated nu-tl'H of educolted I people flowIng out of the country, the Soviets are not imaqlninq -the brain drain- phenomenon. I In 1989, 10,000 Soviet Jews were /ll10w!!d to leave. Only 12,000 of that number went to lUllel.'· The ma:\orlty I of the rest came to the U.S.~~ Also In 1989, President I Bush announced that the United States would no lonqer consIder Soviet Jews as refuqees, and he set II ceiling for I total Sovlet I..Lqration at 50,000.'· Hade prl.arlly for economic reasons, this announcement still came as a shock I for thousands of Jews wanting to emIgrate to the U.S. I rather than Israel. Be that as it mtty, the net Impact of the new 1"""lgratlon [estrlctlon was to force the now I free-to-Ieave e~lgrant to go to Israel, as he was no longer free to co_ to the U.S. Israel's _55 I....igratlon was On. I Soviet Jews were still emigrating for better economic I conditions and because of antI-Semitism. Zionism was barely a consideration. However, it seems that by forcing I the Soviet Jews to go to [srael, the U.S. also triggered iI wave of Zionist feelings. These feelings were usually I _nlfested after a Soviet group arrived In Israel, but they appeilred to be genuIne. Groups of transplanted Russians could be seen singing songs of ~Zlonls~~ Ln [ellqlous 30 meetings, even though by their own admission they had no deep religiou5 feeling upon their departure from the Soviet Unlon.~9 After Bush closed the door on the SovIet JeW3, many of them stlll held out for ad_lsslon to the u.s. Over 30,000 applicants were on file at the u.S. embassy in Hoscow, with another 30,000 on an Inforeal waiting list (Peat, The Hew tork Timet, 3 September 1989, I, 1, 6). These determined would-be ~rlcans saw (srael as overcrowded, dangerous, and lacking In employment opportunities (more about Israel's probleas In the neKt part I, but they still wanted out of the Soviet union. That sentl~nt was shared by all Soviet Jewish emigrants. I J1 I I Part IV' Israeli Absorption of the Soviet Jews I Israel Is II :state founded on lIl I The"e exists Ln a Israel a basic lIlytholo"lY, Its origins I founded in a picture of the holocaust survivors being carried ashore on the shoulders of the Jewish priesthood I whUe an Illegal IlnlEllq1:atlon fleet lies beached on the coast of their anchnt hO_lllnd. This set of belleh I accords that all Jewish t ..iqrsnts wl11 be welcomed, that Isu.el I" the pl their liIst, best hope. From 1911 to 1990, almost four hundred thousand Soviet Jews av.. lled thelll5elves of this last, best hope, and still the state of Israel opened Its aras wid., encouraging and at tlJaes even l ..plorlng the world's Jews to return once /Igaln to the home that was agatn theirs. The growth of the ""tlo" of Isr"el, however, WillS not without Itll growl"'l palnll. HousJnq The ",ajor problelU with absorbing the Sovlet-Jewish lmmlgrants had almost always centered around three Issues--housing, employment, and the resettlement process. Housing was an obvious lssue, as the number of people that Israel can accommodate Is naturally limited by space. The government had been in the process of renting temporary housing and constructing permanent dwellings since the magnitude of the Sovlet-Jewlsh lnflux was first feit. The simple truth was that it could not keep up. Most Immigrants were settled somewhere other than their first choice because of space conslderations,~ and with the torrent of Immigrants In 1990, new arrivals were as oEten as not bedded down In tent towns, transIt camps, or in large refugee compounds consisting of tin, WOOd, and canvas huts. ~ Contrary to popular thought, the housing shortage did not force the Soviet Jews to settle In the occupied territories. Although housing was available there and such housing was an alterna.tlve, a survey published In June of 1990 found only three thousand seven hundred Soviet Jews living In the occupied territories, less than one percent of Soviet-Jewish Immlgrant~.· employment The second major Issue concerning the Soviet-Jewish Immigrants was unemployment or, more descriptively, unsuitable employment. As already stated, the average I JJ I I Soviet 1_lq[&n[ ....5 "xtr"....ly skilled, Jl Chal;Jlctl!rlselc whIch became a proble.. when thosl! skills werl! nO longer I needed In the Israeli work force. For I!xalllpll!, Ln 1"0 I Israel had three standing national symphony orchestras, • number consLdered large even by the most liberal of music I lovers. According to the Israeli Embassy, enough Soviet muslct,HIS had Landed by the end of 1990 to form an I additIonal five complete symphony oIche5t[as.~ Such an I Influx of talent would c,ntalnly bl! beneflclal for I5raeL In the long run, but dealing ",lto the Skilled workers as I they arrived presented an eve[-qrowlnq problellt. The proble. of employment was compounded not only by I thl! skill level of the SOViet-Jewish Illlllllqrants bllt abo by I their ag... d ....oguphles. For exalllple, In 1990 the largest port Lon of the hr\llligrants, 36 pereent, Wl!r'" ages 25 to 44, I the ag ... at whlch they ne...ded employment,- That statlstlc translates to 66,024 new jobs "eeded In the country of I Israel in a sl"gle year. Such jobs as street sweeping, long con:>1dered as "Arab work," were very much In demand by I Soviet Jews with few alternatives,~ I I The last _jor problela that Iuael had with the Soviet I Jews was in the process of resettlement, Early I Sovlet-Jewlsh hUlllgrants caused a need for a speciflc format for theLr llbllorptlon, and this need was Hlled by I the qua~i-governmental organizatIon known a~ the Jewi~h Agency, which worked hand in hand with its true govetnmental counterpatt, the "'b~orption Mlnl~try. These organization~ were re~pons1ble for acqu1ring temporary housing, the buIlding of permanent home~, the tecrultment and training of absorption staff, hiring language teacher~ and social workers, .,1"nn1ng "nd implementing training cour~e~, illnd dealIng with the acceptillnce of immigrillnt student~ to I~rilleii univet~itles.8 With the centralization of the ab~orption process, a ~pecific template for immigration from the Sovlet Union was laid. A Soviet-Jewish immigrillnt to I~rael began his journey wLth the plane flight to Israel, Which was until October 1990 a two-stillge affair. The first stage was typically on ill Hungarian, RomanIan, Or Polish charter flight, and the second on the national airline of Israel, El .1'.1.' After October 1990, direct flights to Israel from the Soviet union were allowed.~~ The air fare for all immigrants was p.aid for by the Israeli government. Upon arrival in Israel, the immigrants were allowed one phone call each to the Soviet Union at no cost. The Lmmigrants were given free taxi rides to their destinations. Those with nowhere to go were either lodged in hotels free of charge for two weeks, or taken to an Absorption center where they could stay until they found an apartment. Before they left the airport, they registered wIth the Absorption Ministry and obtained an Ldentl.fication card bearing their photograph. " When they registered, they were gIven an "absorptIon basket" containing a rights booklet, start-up money rangIng frON 3250 for an IndivIdual to $3000 for a family, depending on size, plus an additIonal $125 per person lor l~dlate needs. During the first year In Israel, a fa~Lly might be granted up to $15,000 In rent stlpends.~1 ~s of 1990, substantLal resentment over the start up money and the tent stipends had Increased among some IsraelLs. A factor In this resentment was that landlords were evicting older tenants to replace them with the subsidized Sovlet Jews.~2 Rumors circulating about Immigrants demandIng specific jobs or living places were also contributlng factors. There e~tsted In Israel a mlsunde~~tanding of -otlvatlon. The Is~aeli~ thought they we~e doing the Soviet Je~ a favo~ by taking the~ away f~o~ the Soviet Union, while the SOViet-Jewish immlg~ant felt as though he had fought hl~ way th~ough a vast bu~eauc~atlc entity to achieve his end, an end which included ~elnfo~clng the beleague~ed Jewi~h homeland.~~ Although this fo~mulae ..y have been -ore app~op~iate to the 1..lg~ants of the seventies and eighties, su~ely the sa~e type of gap In pe~ception continued th~ough 1990. Absorption Successes D~. Theodore F~ledgut, the senio~ lectu~e~ in RU~51an studies at the Heb~ew Unive~slty Ln Je~usale~, has IClentl£leCl 1913 dS a ttJrnlnq point for the absorption of Soviet_.,Jews in ISIael. ACCQrCllng to FlleClgut, by this time there • large, settle "The situation Is Impossible, but not hopeless.H~' There were ...and are ...advanta",es in the SOViet-Jewish migration for the Israeli government as well. The more " JeW'5 In [",r,sel, the II>OIe secure 1990, Israel was 60 percent Jewish, but the Jewish de..oqraphlc advanta'll! wLll end by the year 2020. U Every plane load of Soviet Jews pushes that date back II lIttle further. Also, one of ["' It 15 estlllllllted by the 15raeI1 government that Sovlet-Jewish Immiqt~tlon wlll account for one milllon i~lgrants In the yeats 1"1 to l"5. i This total increases Israel's population by 25 percent, and Is comparable to the United States absorbing the natton of France. The soviet Union will be hard pressed to allow sO many of Its highly trained and educated eltl~ens to depart, but the nat ton will profit lIlOte froll the freedolll their departure h.. ralds rhan ho... theIr presence within its boundarl..s. The emIgrants are searching for new lives, and If they r ..turn to Israel they will be well taken care of by those that calle before the•. And Israel? Israel cOlles that llIuch closer to gathering all of his children together. Although that wlll undoubtedly present proble~ rIght now, th.. state of Israel has met IDllny such problelftS In Its past and has somehow prevailed over them all. As Absorption Minister Ylt~hak Peret~ states, ·tn the short run. it's a great proble.. tn the long run, it's II grellt promise.·.. Append llC T.bles and Graph!! J9 Emigration from the U.S.S.R. since 1968 Table 1 Year Jews wno lett ThoS8lO VOM Jews woo left Those 10 the U.S_S.A. ,,,.. the U.S.S.R. ,,,.. 1968 229 231 1980 21471 7570 1969 2979 3033 1981 9447 1558 1970 1027 999 1982 2688 734 1971 13022 12819 1983 1314 387 1972 31681 31652 1984 896 340 1973 34733 33477 1985 1140 348 1974 20628 16816 1986 914 206 1975 13221 8531 1987 8155 2072 1976 14261 7279 1988 18961 2173 1977 16736 8348 1989 71142 12101 1978 28864 12192 1990 200279 183400 1979 51320 17614 Table 1. EmIgration from the USSR since 1968. CompIled fro~ Goodman, 22 and Israeli Embassy, telephone conversation. • The obvious discrepancies In the InItial data reflect the diffLculties Ln securlnq reliable data for tho5e early years. The fIgure" given are the most relIable for the IndivIdual cateqorles. I co n 0- I 0- 00 00 I 00 r- I OO '0 00 I V) 00 I 00"" M 00 I N ~ • 00 I I: ~ 0 • 00- .. .-~ co , 00 I e '0 01) 0- • • r- ! • .- 'g ~~ I 00 , , E r- o- , " I E r- o...... r- -0,• • F __ , o- '0 •.,••. -0 r- ~i' -.., o:l D •• ,.,.". V) i!.i - ... r- 00 D en !!! 0o'""• ...... DO - r-"" o_D•• • • < M '" r- -" ... ~i ." N • •••••• r- -Iji.. " .. r-- --. , CO ---••• r- ••• ••••• • 0- 1 '" '0 1 ---0 00 , '0 0 -,• • 0 0 -• 0 lI") N .... Soviet Emigration Flqure 2. Soviet £m~9r"tlon. Compiled frOIll OOOdlllall, 22; IlIlaell £mbalilly, telephone converllatlon; and Pelu, NU.S. Closed Door," 4,3,1. 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 • in 11-...... 1. ~W~TIn~~~Mn~~~81~D~~~~~~~ -• 'nom'I'·...," '" ,,,,,,, I"",,,sc.'.., ., II S To ':'...., S~ Labor 12'X.1 .... Marl<.,ong t2~1 ...... , Admon,strat've '4";" ,,- . Serv,ce 14";'1 Unsk,lIed Labor 112%1 -...::.,,' Soc'al & A",SlS 15%1 ~ Mi'dicel n ,...) Flqure J. Soviet I ..lqratlon by Profes.ion. Source: Israeli Embassy, ~Absorptlon,~ 4. SOVIET IMMIGRATION BY AGE 1990 C8'l101 1$·18 15~1 '_9:.14 6·9 17"1 lV·24 (7~1 25-44 138~1 65 .. 111 ...1 Flqure 4, SOViet I.mlqr.tion by Aqe. SOUrce: IsraelI Eabassy, -Absorption,· J. Motes Put OD!!; ~ LesteI Eck.an, Soylet Po)ISY TOWArds the Jewa And Israel. 1911-U14(tfew YOlk: Shenqold PUblishers, Inc .. 19H I 9. a Se10 Balon, Tbe By!!!!lan Jew Under the Tsars and the SoyleU(tfew 'tolk: The Macmillon Co., 191&) &4. a Eck....n, 9. 4 J.B. Schechtman, "The USSR, ZiOnism, and ISIael," Ih.=. Jews In Soviet Russia Sio.ce 1917, ed. Lionel Kochen(New 'tolk: OXfOld UnlveIslty Pless, 1910) 99. • Schechtman, 99. • EcklQ,n, 13. • Scbecbt....n, 112. •• Schecht...n, 117. •• Schecht....n, 111, .. Schechtalln, 118. .. Eck...n, SO . •• BeIOn 288 . ~. LeUlle SalitaD, "PolitIcs end tfAllonallty: the Soviet Jews,· Politics, Spsletv, ao.d tfetlpo.allty: Insldl! GplbAchev's RussIa, ed. Swelyn BIa1eI(BouldeI: Westview, 1979) 11&-7. Put Twg 1 Jerry Good.an, "The Jews in the Sovlet Unlon: S_l'l'ratlon and Its DUflcultles," Soviet Jewxv In the Q"slslye Desad". 1971-1910, ed. Robert Freedman(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 19841 22. ~ Cood~n, 22. • Sallt.lln, 180. • SeUtan, 180. " Robert Freed.,n, "Soviet Jewry and Soviet-American RelatIons: A Historical Analysis," Soviet Jewry In the DecIsive Decade. 1971-1980, ed. Robert Freedman(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1984) 41. .. S.,litan, 180. ~ Lewis, Philippa, "The 'Jewish QuestIon' In the Open, 1968-71," The Jews In Sgviet Runie Since 1917, ed. Lionel Kochan(Naw York: Oxford University Press, 1970) 346. • Freedll:liln, 42. " Goodman, 22. 1" Salltan, 182. 11 Goodllliln, 26. 12 Jero.e Gilison, .Sovlet-Jewlsh Emiqratlon, 1971-1080: An Overview," Soviet Jewry In the Decisive pecade. 1971-1'80, cd. Robert Freedman(Durham, North e&rollna: Duke University Press, 1984J 15. 12 Goodlllan, 22. •• Informatlon Department, Embassy of Iseilel. Telephone Convetsatlon: 17 September 1991. •• Tho..s Hayloe, ThC QOtbachCY stratCgy: 00e010g thc Clo,ed Soc1ctytLexlngton, Hass: Lexington Books, 1988) 130. u Hay10t, 130-1. :r.~ Salltan, 183. u Sallean, 184. ~o "8,011 Soviet Jews Left 1n i987, Host Sinee 1981," Lo.!! Ao.ge11J!!! Times 5 January 1988: I, 5, 1. ~:r. Salltan, 186 . •• Salltan, 186 . •• Andrew Rosenthal, "Soviet Anti-Zionist A~ency Hay GO," Hew Xgtk Times 8 oecembet 1987: A,16,4. 24 Ftancls Cllnes, "Soviet Jews Vlew Retutn of Kosher Food As a SI~n of Progeess," Atlanta Constltutlgn 24 Novelllber 19117: B,1,2. u Geta1d Peaty, "The Wlnds of Glasnost Catry Soviet Fll_ Hakers to Israel," Lg" Angelcs Time, 10 July 1988: C,26,1. Official Soviet vls1t 1n 20 Years," Los Angele, Time, 29 July 1988: 1,1,3. 24 "Jew1sh Group: SovIets Allow Hebtew Classes," AtlAnta Cgnst1tution 3 Hovelllber 1988: 10.,9,1. - -- .- tt Susan Cla~k, Gorbachcy's AgCnda: Changcs In SpylCt pome;tl' and Fprcign Pollcy(Boulder: WestView, 1989J 300. n Ell:abeth Shogrun, ·Ru~~lan Nationalist Gets 'I'wo Years for Antl-Se_ltls_,· I,p; bOoctt:! 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