Council Council

UNITED NATIONs Distr. GENERAL SECURITY I S/3659 COUNCil 27 September 1956 ORIGINAL ~ ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO Tfm SECURITY COUNCIL PUTISUANT TO THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS OF 4 APRIL AND 4 JUNE 1956 ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION

12 September. 1956

Th~ Security Council, in its resolution of 4 April 1956, noted with .grave concern that, despite the efforts of the Chief of staff, certain specific steps for the pur'pose of ensuring that the tensions alongthr.a Armistice Demarcation Lines should be reduced, had not been carried out. It requested the Secretary-General to undertake a ·survey of the various aspects of enforcement of. and compliance wi ththe four Gene.:ral Armistice Agreements in Palestine and the Council's resoluti.ons under reference in the decision. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for 'che adoption of any measureswhil" after discussion With the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considered wo' .d reduce eXisting tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points: (a) Withdrawal of their farces from. the Armistice Demarcation Lines; (b) Full freedom of movem~nt.for observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines and in the Demilitarized Zone and in the Defensive Areas; (c) Establishment of local ar.rangements for the prevention of incidents and prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements. My negotiations subsequent to this decision of the Security Council were the subject of a report totheOouncil on9 May 1956. The Council, \. in the light of this repor'b, on 4 June 1956 passed a second resolution in. which it noted that while progress had been made toward the adoption of the specific decisions set out in the resolution of 4 April, full

56-25276 S/3659 Englj.sh Fage 2 compliance with the General Armistice Agreements had not yet been effected, and that the measures called for in the previous resolution had been neither completely agreed u:pon nor fully put into effect. On the basis of this finding the Security Council declared that the parties to the Armistice Agreements should speedily carry out measures already agreed upon with the Sccretary~General and should co-operate with him and the ChiQf of Staff to put .into effect their further practical proposals. Specifically, the Council declared that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones, and in the Defensive Areas, as defined in the Armistice Agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions. The Council finally requested the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Cbuncil's resolution of 4 April 1956, and tb full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and. to report to the Security Council as appropriate. In the reports of 3 and 21 August 1956 I have drawn attention to incidents which have taken place along the Armistice Demarcation Lines. In view of later developments I consider it appropriate now to put 'before the Members of the Security Council a more complete evaluation of the developments Which have taken place after 4 June 1956, when the Council passed its latest resolution on the matter. The immediate reason for this new report is continued incidents along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and the temporary suspension of the discussions which have bee.n going on concerning such matters as various local a.rrangements. On both these subjects tbe Chief of staff has recently sUbmitted a report (Annex).

II In my report to the Security Council of 9 May 1956 .I pointed out the complications which had arisen because of confusion conce.rning the extent to which compliance with the Armistice Agreements could be conditioned by reciprocit;t.·· I said in this context: -~-~-----.-.~,~------~------.....---

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"As a matter of course, each party considers its compliance with the stipulations of an Arm:Lstice Agreement as conditioned by compliance of the other party to the Agreement. Should. such, a stand be given the interpretation that anyone infringement of the provisions of the Agreement by one party justifies reactions by the other party which, in their turn, are breaches of the Armistice Agreement, without any limitation as to the field within which reciprocity is considered to prevail, j,t Would in fact mean that the armistice regime could be nullified by a single infringement by one of the parties. Although such an interpretation has never been given from responsible quarters, it appears to me that a lacl\: of clarity has prevailed. From no side has it been said that a breach of an Armistice Agreement, to whatever clause it may refer, gives the other party a free hand concerning the Agreement as a whole, but a tendency to regard the Agreements, including the cease-fire clauses, as entities rray explain a feeling that in fact, due to infringements of this or that clause, the obligations are no longer in a strict sense fully binding, and specifically that a breach of one of the clauses, other than the cease-fire clause, may justify action in contravention of that clause." . In view of this lack of clarity I considered it essential to lift the , cease-fire clauses out of the Armistice Agreements so as to give them an independent legal status as obligations; compliance with which was conditioned only by reciprocity in respect of °bhe implementation of the same obligations by the other parties to the Armistice Agreements. As a result of the negotiations last spring such an independent status was established for the cease-fire obligations to be~found in Article 11:2 of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement, and in Article 111:2 of the Jordan-Israel, Lebanon-Israel, and Syria-Israel Armistice Agreements. Thus, no party could any longer justify a violation of the cease-fire by reference to an alleged non-compliance by other parties with other clauses of the General Armistice Agreements than the c/}ase-fire clause itself, and then only if and when such non-compliance were found to be a reason for the exertion of the right, of self-defence as recognized (and subject to the conditions) in Article 51 of the Charter. Any such measure must be immediate:LY reported to the Security Council and is subject to decision by the Council. In this connexion, circumstances make it necessary to emphasize again that acts of retaliation have repeatedl~r been condemned by the Security Council. The assuran,ces given to the United Nations of unconditional observance of the cease-fire clauses,. further, made the UnitedNations itself a party to the ------,--,--.,--~~----~-~~-

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cease-fire obligations. Its right to take steps for securing the implementation of these obligations was thereby again clearly established in line with the decision of the Security Council on 11 August 1949. The establishment of a general cease-fire of this legal nature served to alleviate the very tense situation prevailing in April of last spriDg. It helped to bring to a stop a rapidly developing deterioration of the situation along the Armistice Demarcation Lines. Thus, the new cease-fire arrangement, at the same time as it established an additional legal basis and removed any possibility of confusion, contributed to the creation of a state of affairs in wh~ ch prog:L'ess might be possible toward a discussion of those fundamental issues which so deeply.influence the whole situation in the Middle East, but which cannot be successfully essayed until after an improvement of the situation along the Demarcation Lines. In my report of 9 May 1956 I gave this evaluation of the pituation prevailing after the negotiations: "What. has been done may open the door to new fruitfuldeveloJ;:ments. The initiative is now in the hands of the Government party to the Armistice Agreements. It is my feeling that there is a general will to peace, and that this will should be fostered and encouraged, not by attempts to impose from outside solutions to problems of vital significance to everyone in the region, but by a co-operation which fR.dlitates for the Governments .concerned the taking unilaterally of steps .to increase confidence and to demonstrate their wish for peaceful conditions. "I believe that the present situation offers unique possibilities. If we had previ'ously experienced chain reactions leading to a continuous deterioration of the situation, wernay now have the possibility of starting a chain of reactions in the opposite direction." Recent discussions have uI.!derscored the significance of the re-establishment of a general and independent cease-fire obligation. It should, thus, be mentioned that added stress has recently been put on the argurnentthat the Arrnistice Agreements, apart from the cease-fire clauses, are "indivisible". This theory - especially when broadly interpreted - is destructive enough when applied to the Armistice Agreements in general. If permitted to apply to the cease-fire obligation as well, it would obViously lead to a complete collapse of order and security in the area. 8/3659 English Page 5

In other res~ects, too, I still believe the previous evaluation to have been essentially correct. ExperiencEs after the submission of my first report have confirmed the impression that the parties in the region all have a wish to es~ablish peaceful conditions. And my conviction stands firm that the quiet prevailing af~er the agreements on the cease-fire arrangements offered them unique possibilities to give such expressions to this will as might have started a chain of reactions in a positive direction. However, I must now register, with regret, that, so far, none of the parties concerned has used the opportunities thus offered and that, in consequence, the quiet established has not had the much needed support from developments toward a better general atmosphere which positive initiatives taken by the parties would have helped to bring about.

III " When in the report of 9 May I discussed unilateral, though related, moves serving to increase. confidence and leading to an improvement of the general conditions, I had in mind such steps of a general nature as abstention from repeated threats, and specifically,compliance from both sides with Articles VII and VIII of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement and the re-establishment of freedom of navigation for Israeli ships in the S~ez Car.al in accordance with , the resolution of the Security Council of 1 September 1951. Common to all countries was, of course th'e possibility to demonstrate their wish for better conditions in-the region by a strict adherence to the reconfirmed cease-fire obligations, covering also active measures against crossings of the Armistice Demarcation Lines and acts of violence in connexion therewith. ObViously, possibilities remain open for constructive steps on these various points, as well as in for example the fields of repatriation and resettlement of refugees or the utilization of Jordan waters where decisions by the Uni'ted Nations havl2 for long been neglected or even challenged. Hmvever, the urgenqr of the r.:atter i.s great. lacking such steps the serious deterioration of conditions. lih:ely to develop again might lead to the loss for an indefinite time of most of what was gained in the course of last spring in co-operation between the Governments and the United Nations. The responsibility rests on the Governments in the region. The United Nations can - as last spring - make a S/3659 English Fage 6

But the contr'iYltionby helping to stop a dangerous sequence of incidents. in efforts to turn United Nations cannot take over the role of the Governments the tide. any The Governments in the region have so far not only not taken in a positive initiatives which could help to start the necessary developments efforts to direction, but also, while in many cases they have made energetic forces, they have, support the cease-fire by appropriate instructions to their sufficiently firm to seen in retrospect, failed to carry through a discipline undermine the cease-fire. forestall incidents which, step by step, must necessarily United Nations, the Established as an independent obligation in relation to the of' the cease-fire remains, of course, fUlly valid as such, irrespective under the Charter incidents that may occur. As reflecting a general obligation in a general sense. it can never cea~e to bind a Member of the United Nations and binding on a As a formal obligation, accepted independently of the Charter cease to be binding on specific group of states in a specific situation, it can obligation by all a given state, only if there is a formal release from the actions of one of the parties concerned, including the United Nations, or if the that it de facto has other states concerned,or all of them, clearly indicate repudiated the obligation. challenged by However, if the cease-fire is permitted continuously to be and become a dead letter ~hich is not actual.events j it will lose its sanctity a legal obligation. respected by any of the parties ~lthough still existing as as indicating an This will happen even when these events cannot be interpreted for example intention of a Government to repudiate its cease-fire assurance" because the Government contends that it has acted "in self-defence". half of the Repeated incidents.,which have taken place in the latter a most dangerous way, summe:r', have brought us close to a point where facts, in Demarcation Line on undermine the law. The occurrences along the Egypt-Isrardl present several which the Chief of Staff reports in the Annex to this paper, by one party, typical cases. Acts of Violence, supposed to have been staged must be supposed to have been imrnediately followed by acts of violence which as part of a have been stated by persons on the other side "in self-defence", have taken policy of retaliation. Similar developments of equal seriousness S/3659 English Page 7 place between Jordan and Israel. To be properly understood, these incidents and especially the motives behind acts of so called retaliation - must, of course, be viewed in the light of the i.,hole previous development of the situati'On along the DemarcationLin~s, characterized by rejpeated waves of serious unrest l;l.gainst which the means at the disposal of the United Nations were not considered to provide sufficient safeguards. The present state of affairs" is deeply disturbing. Even to the extent that the acts of violence may have seemed to be limited to a pattern of what might be called II short term reciprocity", this may well be explained by temporary circumstances. There is a permanent risk that the incidents release a chain of events, such as that prevailing at the time of the cease-fire arrangement in the middle of April. Apart from legal considerations this fact,in itself fully justifies the stand of the Security Council on all acts of Violence including those which reflect a policy of retaliation.

IV Short of full and earnest co-operation from the Governments in the region, consistently reflecting a will to maintain peaceful conditions, it is impossible to bring the distUrbances along the Armistice Demarcation Lines to an end. However, much can be done for a reduction of risks and an easing of pressures by proper local arrangements and by Observers' activities in support of the cease-fire. It is, therefore, a source of great 'concern that s.uch arrangements have been put into effect only to a very limited extent, due to a lad: of .the necessary co-operation. The so-called, freedom of movement of Observers has even had to suffer from new restrictions and the conditions under which they have to operate hELVe deteriorated. I refer in this context for details to the report of the Chief' of' Staff circulated as an Annex to this -~ paper. Aq appears from the report of the Chief of Staff, ODe argument put forward by Israel againstacceptanc8 of his proposals and requests has been that each one of the Armistice Agreements, apart from the cease-fire clauses, is an indivisible whole. On this basis, what one party finds to be a lack of compliance by other parties to the Armistice Agreements, especially with their 8/3659 English Page 8

basic Article I, has been considered to give the party who finds it interests jeopardir,ed, freedom from its obligations under the Agreements (apart from the cease-fire obligation), including its obligations to the United Nations in

connexion with the Observers I opera,tions) as envisaged in the Agreements,. 8pecifically)it ~_s held by Israel that the lack of compliance by Egypt with the Security Council finding that the blocltadeof Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal is incompatible with the Armistice regime - which Israel considers to be a case of non-compliance with Article I of the Egypt-'Israel Agreement itself - gives Israel the right to consider Articles VII and VIII of the same Agreement as suspended, and, in consequence, i.e.' to refuse the United Nations Observers freedom of movement in the Demilitarized Zone at El AUja. Likewise, and on similar grounds, Israel refuses to assist in implementation of the Armistice Agreement stipulation which establishes the Mixed Armistice Commission's headquarters in El Auja - a stand which explains why recently the Commission has not been able to meet. Attention should in this context be given als.o to a new case o'f non-compliance with Article V of the Syria-Israel Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreements, it is true, are formally bilateral agreements, and the theory of "indivisibility" may well be considered as vaL for most bilateral treaties under international law. However, the fact that, with the consent of the parties, the Agreements have been endorsed by the Security Council -I ~efer specifically to the Council's decision of 11 August 1949 - and that they must be considered as establishing the equivalent of an international regime, submits the application of this theory to the Armistice Agreements to very serious limitations. Apy other view would, as appears from previous observations in this report, lead to obviously unreasonable consequences. In this connexion, \ it may be noted that the theory of "indivisibility" is not invariably applied to , ' contracts of a bilateral nature under national law, and it is for the courts, not for one of the parties acting unilaterally, to decide whether and in what way the clauses shall be treated as indivisible or separable. However, the theory to which I have just referred will not be properly understood, in its application to the Middle East, if considered merely as' an abstract principle of law. In essence, it reflects factors underlying the whole tragic situation in the region. 8/3659 English J?age 9

Article I of the various Armistice Agreements establishes) "with a view to promoting the return to permanent peace in Palestine") the following

ll prinl;:iples "to be fully observed by the parties during the Armistice ; "1. The injr.nction of' "l;he Security Council against resort to military force "in the settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties. "2. No aggressive action by the armed forces - land) sea) or air - of either Party shall be undertaken) planned) or,threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that the .use of the term 'planned' in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practised in military organizations. 113. The right of each Party to its security and freedcn:J. from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected. "4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine. 11 .. When the "indivisibility" of the Armistice Agreements is invoh:ed by Israel, this reflects the view that these principles are not observed by the other parties which) in Israel's view) in word and deed maintain - and for years have maintained - a threat against Israel and) therefore, must be considered as challenging the very Armistice. In this situation Israel considers itself obligated to comJP.ly with the articles of the General Armistice Agreements only to the extent that this can be done without prejudicing its' security in face of such threats. The view of the other parties is a similar one in the sense that it is held in many responsible quarters that Israel maintains a policy which constitutes a threat to its neighbours in violation of the basic principles of the Armistice. 'When deadlocks develop or such a basis on all such questions on which positive steps could have been tak~n) and when for the same reasons the efforts of the United Nations) through the Truce Observation Organization) to stabilize conditions do not meet with. the necessary co-operation, the fears to which I have just referred ~ilill become strengthened and entrenched. 8/3659 English Page 10

I have vrished to bring what has been reported here to the attention of the Security Council in order to emphasize my concern for the lack of positive initiatives, shown by all the Governments in the region) the unsatisfactory implementation of the cease-fire, the obstructions to improving the status and efficiency of the Observer organization'and new serious departures from compliance with the Armistice .Agreements. These matters may well be a source of great concern) but they can in no way excuse the United Nations from resolutely pursuing its efforts. However, the efforts of the: Cr.ited Rations) whatever the resources used) can never be of appropriate effectiveness without the co-operation of the sovereign Governments directly concerned. As already stated) I have found no reason to doubt the view formed in April that there is a.general will to peace in the region) nor that the state of affairs which we have had during part of this year, has been one Which has offered uniq,ue possibilities for improvements of the situation. However) later developments have indicated that the will to establish peaceful conditions bad not grown strong enough for any of those concerned to take the risks necessary for a use of existing opportunities. The possibilities are still there, and the United Nations must continue to impress on the Governments in the region their serious duty, to use them.

'. S/3659 English Annex Page 1 ANNEX

Jerusal<;:m,5 September 1956

REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION I have the honour to report on the current situation in the El AU,ja and GaZll areas andonnego~iations as to the following matters: .. Freedom.of movement of United Nations Military Observers in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone - Resunrption.of the meetings of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission - Marking of the Demarcation Line of the Gaza Strip: , Withdrawal of for·ces of both Parties 500 met:c'es from the same Demt::trcation Line \. .. .. t - Dismantling offortif:tcabions constructed in the Demilitarized Zone created by the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement - Establishing of United Nations observation posts on the Northern shore of Lake Tiberias 'l/y359 English Annex Page 2

SECTION I

DEVElLOIDiJENTS IN THE EJJ AUJA DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. The Israel Army continues to occupy the El AUja Demilitarized Zone. created by article VIrI (I) of the General Armistice Agreement. ~he Israeli settlement of the area which began with the est&blishment of Kibbutz Ktziot in September 1943, is ,also being expanded. Israel has further decided considerably to limit the freedom of movement and access of United Nations Military Observers in the D~militarized Zone. 2. On 5 July 1956 the Chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission was informed by the Senior Israeli Delegate that movement of United Nations Military Observers in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone would be restricted to Ghe use of the ro~d from Beersheba, through the Demiliterized Zone, to the Mixed ArmisticeComrnission Headquarters; and that no movement on other roads would be allovred in the Demilitarized Zone, and radio messages sent would be restricted to administrative reports. 3. The Chief of Staff protE:sted against this decision to the Minister for F'oreign Affairs, pointing out that "in its resolution of 4 June 1956, the Securi'ty Council has declared 'that full freedom of movement of United Nations Observers must be respected along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas, as defined in the Armistice Agreement,s, to enable them to fulfil their ftll1c"bions t n. The Chief of Staff requested the Israeli Government to reconsider its decision, as an action of this kind would constitute a further step in the process of non-compliance With the provisj.ons of article VIII relating to the Dernilitarized Zone and the duties of United Nations Military Observers in that Zone. 4. On 17 July 1956, the Chief of Staff received a reply from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Israel contending that in their conversations with the Secretary-General (in the month of April) it was .recognized that articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement wer,e not operative as long as Egypt did not implement article I in all four of its sections, and that in default of such implementation, Israel did not regard itself as bound by article VIII. Therefore, the presence of United Nations Observers in the Nitzana (El Auja) area was, in the view of the ISraeli Government, altogether superfluous. S/3659 English Annex Page 3 5. The letter also referred to the refusal of the Egyptian authorities to allmr United Nations Military Observers to investigate complaints of the infringement of article VIIr (3) in the area between the line El Quseima - Abu Aweiglla and the International Frontier, implying that the restrictions imposed by the two Parties were on a par. In fact, article VIII (1) gives the Chairman and Observers of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission a responsibility in regard to the Demilitarized Zone 'rhich they do not have in regard to the area on the other side of the International Frontier. 6. The vie"T was further expressed that "Israel cannot be re'garded as an 'extra territorial' area where United Nations Observers are not subject to the laws of the state. Outside of .the duties they are required to discharge under the Armistice Agreement, they should not claim any special rights". This presumaQly refers to paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution of 4 June 1956 (S/3605). 7. The matter was discussed during the talks between the Frime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel and the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff on 20 July 1956 • Finally, at a meeiiing with the Chief of Staff on3 September 1956, the Prime Minister of Israel maintained the viewpoints set forth above.. He indicated that since the Demilitar.ized Zone was now occupied. by Israeli military forces, it served no purpose to have United Nations Military Observers there. 8. In the view of the Chief of Staff, irrespective of the lack of compliance with articles VII and VIII of the General Armistice Agreement by both Egypt and Israel (see Annex V to the Secretary-GeneralIs report of 9 May 1956 (S/3596)), the maintenance of Observers in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone, with freedom of movement and to transmit messages to the Ohairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed' Armistice Commission and UNTSO by the speediest means, is essential in order to fulfil the duties imposed on UNTSO by paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Security Council resolution of 4 June 1956 (S/3605). The strategic importance of the roads radiating from El Auja is such that if one side or the other should contemplate aggression on a large scale against the territory of the other, primary or secondary line~ of operations would certainly be established through the Demilitarized, Zone. If either side entered the Demilitarized Zone 't'rith forces on an offensive scale, this "Tould be prima facie evidence of aggression. The presence of United Nations Military Observers, therefore, is a deterrent against aggression. and their withdrawal from the area would be a removal of this deterrent• S/3659 English Annex Page 4 pmETINGS OF THE EGYFTIAN-ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTIOE OOMMISSION

9. El AUja is not only the centre of the Demilitarized Zon~, as defined in paragraph 2 of article VIII. It is also, u.nder article X, paragraph 2,the Headquarters of the .Mixed Armistice Oommission. Because of her militaty occ1lpation of the Demilitarized Zone, Israel refuses access to El Auja to the Egyptian members of the Mixed Armistice Oo~~ission. Article X, paragraph 2, also stiptliates that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall hold its meetings at f\uch places and such times as it may deem necessa.ry for the effective conduct of its 'o'ork. The Egyptian Authorities have not a.ccepted the Israel refusal to allow the Mixed Armistice Oommission to hold meetings at its Headquarters. They have proposed that the Mixed Armistice Oommission should hold every other meeting at El Auja. Meetings of the Mixed Armistice Oommission - ordinary. or emergency - have not been resumed. Oomplaints by either Party are being investigated when an investigation is requested. The I'a,ct that the complaints are no longer considered in the Mixed Armistice Oommission greatly increases the responsibility of the UNTSO Chief of Staff a.nd his representative, the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice O,ommission, for observing the maintenance of the cease-fire by the two Parties. 10. At his meeting with the Ohief' of Staff on 3 September 1~,56, Mr. Ben-Gurion repeated hisref'usal to allow meetings of the Mixed Armistice Oommission at El Auja, stating that article VIII of the General Armistice Agreement and the provision in article X (2) relating to the Headquarters of the Mixed Armistice Commission, were in suspension'owing to Egypt's non-compliance with article I and the S)3curity Council refjolution of 1 September 1951 concerningipterference with the passage through the Suez Canal of shipping bound. fot, Isra.e1. No Egyptians could: now be allowed in the El AUja area for security reasons. He was willing, however, to have the Mixed Armistice Commission ~eet at other pla.ces. S/3659 English Annex Page 5 SECTION II

SITUATION ALONG THE DEMARCATION LINE BOUNDING THE GAZA STRIP 11. Following the cease-fire assurances by Egypt and Israel to the Secretary-General late in April as set forth .in Section III of his report of 9 May 1956, .conditions along the Demarcation Line surrounding the Gaza Strip W'ere stable for a period of nearly tw"o anC!. a half months. Commencing about the middle of July, however, they began to deteriorate and tension increased markedly. Neither side is adhering to'its undertaking to strictly observe article II, paragraph 2. of. the General Armistice Agreement. Attached as Appendix HAll are statistics and abbreviated accounts of the most serious incidents which were cOl1!plained of by the Parties. 12. The Observation Posts referred to in Section VI of the Secretary-General's report of 9 May 1956 (page 21) have been established and five to seven posts are manned daily. As \vill be seen from the account of the incidents in the Appendix, the presence of the$eObservers has not always deterred the Parties from opening fire across the Demarcation Line, nor from crossing the,Demarcation Line. Whenever such incidents have been observed, protests to the Party which has violated the Armistice Agreement have heen made but these protests have. not prevented further incidents occurring. 13. In the view of the Chief of Staff the failure to mark the Demarcation Line clear.ly, as provided in paragraph (c) on page 24 of the Secretary-General's report of 9 May 1956, and the failure .to accept the proposals tor the separation of the Parties' forces referred to in paragraph (a), page 23 of. the Secretary-General's report, and also paragraph 3(a) of the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956, are regrettable, as .they might have gone far toward preventing the occurrence of so many breaches of the cease-fire. 14. The adoption of these two measures. at the present time might give a concrete evidence of the Parties' desire to stabilize the situation along the Demarcation Line and help to prevent further incidents.

MARKING OF THE DEMARCATION LINE 15. On 19 June, the Chairman of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Corrnuission was infor.med by the Senior Israeli Delegate that Israel did not agree to United Nations Military Observers marking the Demarcation Line surrounding the Gaza 8/3659 English Annex Page 6

Strip by placing ba~rels 'in certain areas. The work had been arranged to commence on 20 June. The Chief of Staff drew the attention of the Ministry for For(~ign Affairs to the relevant passage in the SecretarywGeneralls report (page 24, paragraI!h (c)). However, the Israe1i Government maintained that they had not agreed to this particular proposal. 16. In subsequent conversations they suggested that it would be better if the barrels were placed wither by the Egyptians just on their mm side of 'the Demarcation Line, or.by the Israelis on their side. 17. This suggestion was referred to the Egyptian Government which saw no reason for changing the arrangement to .which they had agreed and which, as had been stated in the report to the Security Council, had been accepted by both Parties. No objection to this stat(;ment had been raised by Israel at the time. 18. On 28 'June, Mr. Ben-Gurion informed the Chief of Staff that the matter could be further considered. Inquiries were made from time to time, but no decision was given on the matter until Mr. Ben-Gurion .told the Chief of Staff at their meeting on 3 September that Israel would not agree to the marking of the Demarcation Line by the UNTSO. However, he was ready to have a line marked on 'che Israeli side at some distance from the Armistice Demarcation Line with United Nations Military Observers and Egyptian representatives present. The Egyptians, if they so desired, could also mark a line on their side. 19. This proposal has not yet been communicated to the .Egyptian Government.

WITHDRAHAL OF FORCES 500 MEWES FROM THE DEMARCATION LINE 20. The Chietof Staff proposed at his meeting with Mr. Ben-Gurion on :3 September 1956 that during daylight both sides should withdraw any defensive or observation posts from the zone 500 metres on each side of the Demarcation Line and. should refrain from sending patrols into this zone. 21. This is the same proposal as that. referred to in para~aph (a), page 23, of the Secretary-GeneralIs report. Mr. Ben-Gurion maintained the stand cited in that lJaragraph, 1. e., that Israel will refrain from sending patrols up to the Demarcation Line except when it is. necessary to do so to protect settlers working on their lands or to prevent people crossing f:t:om Egyptian-controlled territory. It will be see.n from the accounts ,of several of the incidents given in AppendiX

"A" that in practice this...., arrangement has not proven sUfficiently firm. Some 8/3659 English Annex Pa,ge 7 of the patrols which ~Tnited' Nations Military Observers have seen approaching the Demarcation Line were neither protecting settlers w'orldng in the fields, nor w'ere there any infiltrator,s to be prevented from crossing. S/3659 English Annex Page. 8 SECTION HI

QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE CREATED BY mm ISRAEL- SYHIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND TO LM\E TIBERIAS

22. In the Demilitarized Zone created by article V of the Israel-Syria Armistice Agreement, the question of per:1anent fortifications at the Israeli settlement of Hagovrim, in the central sector of the Zone, and at Susita, in the southern sector, has given rise to a controversy and the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission has been prevented from exercising his responsibility in the Demilitarized Zone. Annex 11, paragraph 3, to the General Armistice Agreement provided for the destruction or removal of permanent fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone after the signature of the Armistice. Annex II, p~ragraph 4, entitled the Chairman to order the destruction of such permanent fortifications which, in his view, ought not to remain in the Demilitarized Zone. The destruction of permanent fortifications, according to Annex 11,. was a part of the demilitarization of the Zone, Construction of permanent fortifications under the Armistice regime maybe considered as being, in some degree, a remilitarization of the Zone. (See Appendix "B" which deals vrith the legal aspect of this problem generally, and especially paragraph 5 in this particular connexion.) 23. The Chairman may, however, rule that certain ,vorks are permissible for the protection of civilian life referred to :i.n article V, 5(e) of the General Armistice Agreement and in Dr. Bunch~'s authoritative comment quoted in full in the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 18 May 1951. The Government of Israel has maintained that Israeli settlers may construct permanent fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone, as they do along the Armistice Lines. In the opinj.. on of the Chief of Staff, certain fortifications which the United Nations Observers have seen at Hagovrim and Susita go b~yond what .is required for the protection of civilian life. The Chief of Staff, accordingly, requested the dismantling of the fortifications in question. 'I'hereply received from the Israel Foreign Ministry argued that the Chief of Staff should permit these lvorks as necessary for the protection of 'Civilj.ans. Meamrhile, in spite of the Chief of Staff's request, Israel continued to extend the fOl'tifications in this area. 24. The Israel delegation has,onthe other hand, complained about the fac1i that certain Syrian fortifications in the north encroached upon the Demilitarized Zone. Investigation by United Nations Military Observers sho'lved that some minor o/.?o)' English Annex Page 9 ,Syrian works of fortification were encroaching upon the Demilitarized Zone. Syrian Authorities, when requested by the Chief of Staff to demolish these works, replied they were ready to do so when the Isra~lis demolished the permanent fortifications in and near Hagovrimand Susita. 25. At the meeting on.3 Sep'bember 1956, when the Chief of Staff asked for a definitive apswer of the Government of Icrael to his request for th.e dismantling and demolition th~ of apove-mentioned permanent fortifications in and near Hagovrim and Susita, l'Jr. Ben-Gurion said that, apart from the legal position concerning fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone abou~ which the Israel Foreign Minis:bry and the Chief of Staff disagreed (See Appendix B), Israel could not comply with the Chief of Staff's request. This he justified by the statement that Syria was violating article I by threatening Israel. Furthermore, the recent acquisition of'a ,considerable quantity of offensive armament by Syria placed the Israeli set'blements in the Demilitarized Zone in considerable danger. In his view it was unreasonable-to leave these settlements without the protection of fortifications. He inquired whe~her the Chief of Staff would be willing to give an unqualified assurance that the settlements were in no dapger of attack. 26. It is I the view of the Chief of Staff that, the extensive works consisting of both fire and shelter trenches, concrete bunkers and ,barbed wire entanglements, which are located at Hagovrimand nearby, constitute a type of fortification which might be described as a company strong point and which goes beyond that which is needed for, the protection of the ciVilian population.

OBSERVATION POSTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE DEMARCATION LINE NEAR LAKE TIBERIAS • 27. On pages 24 and 25 of the Secre'bary-General's report of 9 May 1956 (S/.3596), proposals for establ:i.shing Observation Posts on the eastern and north-eastern shores of Lake Tiberias are referred to. The proposals were accepted by Syria and pn Observation Post has been established on the Syrian side, near Bouteiha Farm. The report further refers to Israel's refusal to allow the establishment of an Observation Post on their side and states that "Israel would nevertheless be prepared E "er the lapse of a month, to consider a proposal by the Chief of Staff". The Chief of Staff made such a proposal in a letter to the Israel 8/3659 English Annex Page 10 Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 19 June 1956 •. On 28 June~ Mr. Ben-Gurion~ while maintaining his opposition to the use of a United Nations boat on lake Tiberias~ told the Chief of Staff that the proposal for an Observation Post on, the shore would be considered. 28. The question was taken up from time to time with the Israel Foreign Office~ but no answer was re,ceived until~ at his meeting wi'bh the Chief of Staff on 3 September 1956~ y~. Ben~Gurion stated that he saw no need for an Observation Post on the Israeli side. He said, however~ that if the need arose, the matter could be discussed again. 29. Practically no fishing is going on in the Lake at present, but when the fishing season begins, there may be a repetition of the incidents and troubles which the placing of United Nations Military Observers in fixed Observation Posts along the· Lake was intended to prevent. In the view of the Chief of Staff, it is necessary that both sides should agree to this system and that the Observation Post arrangements should now be settled, so that the System would be in working order and understood by both sides when the need for it arose. S/3659 English Annex Page 11 APPENDIX A

INCIDENTS IN AREA SURROUNDING THE GAM SmIP, AND IN AND NEAR THE EL AUJA DEMILITARIZED ZONE DuRING AUGUST 1956

The statistics of incidents complained of by Egypt and Israel occurring near the Gaza Strip and the El Auja Demilitarized Zone during August 1956 are as follows: Israel lodged forty complaints for the period 1-31 August: 1 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line by a military unit, 1 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line by a military unit and firirig.inside Israel, 3 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line a.nd mining, 2 alleging crossing of the Demarcat.ion Line by unarmed civilians, 2 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line and theft, 25 alleging firing across the Demarcation Line, and 6 alleging overflights. During this period, two Israelis were killed and twelve wounded. Thirty-nine out of the forty ~srael complaints have been investigated. Egypt lodged sixty-five complaints for the .same period: 2 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line by military units, 6 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line by military units and firing inside Egypt, 1 alleging crossing of the Demarcation Line by an armed civilian, 37 alleging firing across the Demarcation Line, 18 alleging overflights, and 1 alleging violation of territorial waters. During this period, twenty-two Egyptians were killed and five i'lounded.Sixty out of the sixty-five Egyptian complaints have been investigated. There follow brief statements regarding firing and mining incidents which took place in the area and "which have been substantiated in varying degrees with evidence other than statements from one side: 4· August; both sides complained of firing across the Demarcation Line in the MUSElRAT area. UNHO on Observation Post duty upheld the Egyptian complaint. )". 8/3659 English Annex Page 12

5 August; Egypt twice complained that the same Israeli position in the NUSEIRAT area that had been shooting across the Demarcation Line on4 August did so again. An U~~O witnessed the shootings. Egypt complained that an Israeli patrol from the. El Auja Demilitarized Zone crossed the international frontier into Egypt convered by fire from an Israeli position in the Demilitarized Zone. 6 August; Egypt made two complaints of an Israeli position in the BEIT.HANU~~EREZ area firing across the Demarcation Line. One bullet on the ground and two impacts on a building .inthe BElT HANUN area were shown as evidence of the alleged shooting. l~August; Israel complained that as a result of Egyptians firing across the Demarcation Line in BElT HANUN-EREZ ar~a, there was a shot through the windshield of one Israeli military vehicle. Fire was returned. An UNMO stated that while he was at BElT HANUN investigating Egyptian complaints of 6 August, Israelis fired one shot over his head. Egypt complained of this incident. 11 August; Israel twicE! complained of Egyptians firing across the Demarcation Line in the BElT HANUN-EREZ area. No physical eVidence found. Egypt put in counter complaint on second shooting. Twelve impacts found in the wall of U~mWA School and five in the ground near the Egyptian position at BEITHANUN were alleged to be from Israeli. firing. There were two more ,Egyptian complaints of shooting across the Demarcation Line in this area later in the day. Impacts 'i'Tere pointed out in the UNRWA School bUildings. Israelis claimed they had found a'i'rounded Arab in the EINHASHELOSHA ares, who stated he had been one of a patrol of five who had crossed the Demarcation Line from the Gaza Strip. 12 August; Israel twice complained of Egyptians firing across the Demarcation Line in BElT HANUN.. EREZ area, sh01'Ting mark on a tractor as evidence of one of the incidents. 13 August; Egypt twice complained of Israelis firing across the Demarcation Line in BElT HANUN-EREZ area; one instance vTas witnessed by an UNMO. 14 August; An Israeli truck was reported darnaged and its driver slightly wounded by a mine at SDE BOKER, which was confirmed on investigation. 15 August; Israel complained of snipers firing across the Demarcation Line near' NUSEIRAT and said fire '

16.August; Israel reported one civilian truck damaged and five of its twenty passengers wounded by a mine at SDE BOKER at OlOOZ,!/ which was con~irmed by UNMO investigation. Egypt reported Israeli night attacks in DEIR AL SALAH area and near RAFAH. Investigation showed that a group of from twelve to twenty armed persons had crossed the Demarcation Line from Israel into Egyptian-controlled territory where they exchanged fire with'" a small Egyptian post atMR 09530947. Shortly thereafter an Egyptian pa'trol ran into the group from Israel, still in EgjTJ?tian controlled territory. In the ensuing action the Egyptian sergeant and two other Egyptian soldiers were killed. The second incident of the night 16/17 August occurred on the mainGAZA-RAFAH road at MR 0834 0762. An Egyptian jeep carrying a doctor, four medical orderlies and a~river was ambushed by a group of from five to seven men. The jeep was set "on fire by a mine and its occupants were all killed by small arms fire at close range. Tracks were followed from the scene of the incident to the Demarcation Line, Gro:ssing it at MR 0852 0739. Egypt submitted a third complaint, that at about the' same time as the other Israeli attacks an Israeli patrol crossed the international frontier from the , EL AUJADemiliterized Zone, wounded one Egyptian.soldier and damaged one vehicle. UNMO saw a bullet-riddled jeep and two impacts of anti-tank rifle grenades. 18 August; Egypt complained that Israelis fired across the Demarcation Line in the DEIR At RALAH-NUSEIRAT area. Israel complained that Egyptians had fired across the Demarcation Line in the BElT HANUN ..EREZ area. While investigating the 17 August shooting in the BElT HANUN area, the UNMO had two rounds fired over his head. by Israelis. Egypt submitted a complaint. Both sides complained of an exchange of fire later in the day..

All times are given in terms of Greenwich Mean Time; viz. 0100Z. Add two hours to correct to local mean time, Le. OlOOGMT = 0300 LMT. Israel was on daylight saving time during August. S/3659 English Annex Page 14

19 August; Egypt complained that a civilian had been wounded in BElT HANUN by fire from EREZ area. An UNMO saw the wounded man. 23 August; there 1"as an exchang~ of fire in the BANI SUHEILA-NIRIM area between an Israeli patrol and Egyptian military posi tions • Accounts given by the two sides were conflicting as to the si.ze of forces and who opened fire. However, both. sides fired wi th automattc weapons andm.o:rtars. There were no casualties. 24 August; Egypt complained that Israelis in NUSElRATarea fired shots across the Demarcation Line intermittently from Q130Z to 0400z and at 0420Z fi.red three machine gun bursts also across the Demarcation Line •A clas.h between I~raeli and Egyptian patrols occurred in'the Vicinity of SH' NABHAN MR 0953 0929 at 0625Z. Although two lJNMOs, one in Israel and one in the Gaza Strip,were on OP duty within three kilometres they could not see actual scene of incident. However, both state that rifle and automatic fire was followed by mortaring. It was not possible by later questioning to determine which patrolsta~rtedthe fight. The UNMO in Egypt saw a mortar firing from Israel but stated that the Egyptians did not fire mortars • Th~,d was borne out by later examination of' the ground when thirty-four three-inch..mortar craters were found in Egyptian-controlled territory and none were shown to the investigating officer in Israel. At0705Z the UNMO in Israel saw three Israeli pers'onnel carriers approaching.' Fire slackened off between 0705Z and 0720Z. At about the time the reinforcements arrived (0730Z) heavy automatic and mortar firetroke out neal:' SH' NABHAN. 'During the clash three Israeli vehicles crossed the Demarcation Line, one penetrating 600 metres into WADIGAZA. It was reported that firing ceased at 08l5Z. Two wounded Egyptians and two wounded Israeli soldiers were seen by UNMOs and a third Israeli soldier was reported to be wounded. During the actioh theUNMO in Israel was deliberately fired upon from Egyptian-controlled territory, his car being hit five times. In the course of the investigation of this incident, the local Israeli Commander alleged that the Egyptians had been firing throughout the previous night. On their part the Egyptians filed two complaints with NINAC'alleging Israeli firing d~ring the same night. Observers reported mounted IsraeIipatrols of thirty-forty men within 200-300 metres of the Demarcation Line in this area on 15, 16, 22,25 August as well as those engaged on 23/24.August. An Observer who arrived at the observation post S/3659 English Annex Page 15 at 04.20Z on the 24th found an Israeli patrol (one officer; five soldiers) with four sub-machine guns and one medium machine gun. They appeared to be taking measu;rements and beari:n;3s of Egyptian .POSlMons; and left the ob.servation post at 0500Z. In addition to above at 06l5Z on 25 August .theUNMO at OP ONE reported that Israeli position on Hill 81 !Y.lR 1080 1070 fired approximately fifty rounds machine gun fire at approximately ME 1074 1054. At approximately 07l5Z it Ivas reported. to UNMO that a man ploughing a field in Egyptian-controlled territory in the vicinity of OP ONE with a tractor. had been shot at from Hill 81 and the tractor strucl~. UNMO inspected the tractor and found six bullet holes in it. Fire was not returned from Egyptian-controlled territory. 30. August; Israel complained that atl045Z in KETSIOT a command car was blown up by mine in the main road. Two Israelis were killed and four wounded. This was confirmed by United Nationsinvestigatibn. At ME 0955 0350 an Israeli command car hit three mines buried in the hard top on Rafah road. UNMO saw three wounded in ·the hospital. Bodies of two .killed were already buried. Egypt complained that at 2130Zan Israeli patrol crossed the Demarcation Line in DEIR AL BALAH area. A fire fight took· place betlveen the patrol and Egyptian troops. The patrol was sJpported by a mortar. The Egyptian soldiers were killed; 'two wounded. Three Egyptian soldiers interrogated at the scene of the incident stated they heardthree explosions and an exchange of fire on 2l30Z from a listening post atMR 09530946. vlhen fire stopped they'vTent to the listening post and found one Egyptian soldier· dead and a second who 'died within a few minutes. United Nations investigation revealed incoming and outgoing tracks of approximately' fifteen men followed. to the Demar:cation Line which crossed at MR 0961 09:57. UNMO saw tlVO bodies of Egyptian soldiers at listening post. No other casualties. Egypt also complained that at 2340z in SINAI an Israeli force estimated to be of company strength attacked an Egyptian observation post at mapsguare 094 023 killing six Egyptian soldiers. The Israelis then vlithdrew to the Demilitarized Zone taking with them one jeep with wireless; and other eguipment. The physical evidence seen by UNMO consisted of large bloodstains; empty cartridges with Israeli markings; jeep tracks and footprints across the Demarcation Line. The bodies were removed to Cairo and not seen by UNMO. S/3659 English Annex .Page 16·

Egypt also complained at2130Z in RAFAH area Israeli forces estimated to be of company strength attacked an Egyptian obServation post killing one Egyptian officer and four other ranks. AtMR 0844 0774 UNMO sa~ large bloodstains, impacts of bullets and hand grenades, empty cartridges with Israeli markings and incoming and outgoing tracks of approximately ten me~ across the DeIllarcation Line. A statement was taken frolIl one wounded in hospital and from the doctor.. Bodies were removed to Cairo and not seen by UNMO.

\. °1-'b'Sl English Annex Page 17

APPENDIX B

1. On 29 June 1956, the Chief of Staff requested the re'.,' ral and d~struction of , .' ,certain works in the Hagrovia and Susita areas of the Demilitarized Zone established by article V of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement, as being~n contravention of Annex 11,. paragraph 3, of the General Armistice Agreement. 2. In requesting such removal and destruction, the Chief of Staff actedu~der the responsibility vested in the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice COIT~ission by article V and Annex 11, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement. 3. Under a1:'ticle V and Annex 11, paragraph 4, of the General Armistice Agreement, the Chairman exercises supervisory powers under which he may aut,horize or prohibit certain activities in the Demilitarized Zone. By means of an interpretation .of arti.cle V and Annex II which may be given by the Mixed Armistice Commission under the terms of article VII, paragraph 8, the Mixed Armistice Commission alone may rescind the Chairman's decision. 4. The Chief of Staff did not raise' any objection to certain other \'lorks in the Hagovrim and Susita areas which he considered to be consistent with the provi,sions of the General Armistice Agreement and.with Dr. Bunche's explanatory note of 26 June 1949 which refers, ~ter ali~, to the protection of civilian life in. the Demilitarized Zone (Security C',I"ncil resolution, 18 May 1951, document No. S/2157). 5. It is relevant to note that the Mixed Armistice Commission examined at its fifth and si.xth meetings (29 August and 5 September 1949), a Syrian complaint alleging that,south of Ein Gev in the Demilitarized Zone, Israel had built houses which were enclos~d in a double-apron barbed wire fence ereeted in a tactical pattern with trenches dug within the wire fence. Such works represented new fortifications erected after the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The Mixed Armistice Commission d,ecided by a majority vote that the double-apron barbea wire fence and the trenches constituted a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. Israel complied with the Mixed Armistice Commission's decision. In this connexion, it should be noted that at the 34th Mixed Armistice Commission meeting held on 24 May 1950, both delegations agreed that quesJtions pertaining to the dElmilitarization of the Zone would henceforth be dealt with by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission. S/3659 English Annex page 18

6. In objecting to the removal and destruction of certain fortification works as requested by the Chief of Staff, the Israel Government pointed out that .the question of implementation of a specific article of the Armistice Agreement cannot be singled out from the question of the integral implp'::'lentation of the entire Agreement. Specifically the Israel Government referre;d to two recent complaints against Syria alleging violation of article I of the GElneral Armistice Agreement, and argued that in the light of the threatening pJ:'onouncements by Syrian authorities in violation of article I, it would be incumbent upon the Chairman to ensure normal civilian life in the Demilitarized Zone by authorizing the new fortifications. 7. The Israel Government also referred to an attempt made by the Syri.an delegation to the Armistice C~nf'erence of 1949 to insert in the Armistice Agreement a clause which would have prevented the civilian population in the Demilitarized Zone from engaging in any military activity or preparations and implied that the failure to adopt the Syrian proposal .showed that it was the intention of the Parties to allow the construction of fortifications of a military type by the civilian villagers. The Chief of Staff could not, however, agree with such a reading of the records of the Armistice Conference. In this regard, it i,s not felt that it .is necessary .to cite the relevant parts of the Armistic~ Conference records concerning the demilitarization of the Zone, in view of the pertinent provisions in the General Armistice Agreement, Dr. Bunche's authoritative comment and the precedents of the Mixed Armistice Commission (cf. paragraph 5 above).