UNITED NATIONs Distr. GENERAL SECURITY I S/3659 COUNCil 27 September 1956 ORIGINAL ~ ENGLISH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO Tfm SECURITY COUNCIL PUTISUANT TO THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTIONS OF 4 APRIL AND 4 JUNE 1956 ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION 12 September. 1956 I Th~ Security Council, in its resolution of 4 April 1956, noted with .grave concern that, despite the efforts of the Chief of staff, certain specific steps for the pur'pose of ensuring that the tensions alongthr.a Armistice Demarcation Lines should be reduced, had not been carried out. It requested the Secretary-General to undertake a ·survey of the various aspects of enforcement of. and compliance wi ththe four Gene.:ral Armistice Agreements in Palestine and the Council's resoluti.ons under reference in the decision. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for 'che adoption of any measureswhil" after discussion With the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considered wo' .d reduce eXisting tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points: (a) Withdrawal of their farces from. the Armistice Demarcation Lines; (b) Full freedom of movem~nt.for observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines and in the Demilitarized Zone and in the Defensive Areas; (c) Establishment of local ar.rangements for the prevention of incidents and prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements. My negotiations subsequent to this decision of the Security Council were the subject of a report totheOouncil on9 May 1956. The Council, \. in the light of this repor'b, on 4 June 1956 passed a second resolution in. which it noted that while progress had been made toward the adoption of the specific decisions set out in the resolution of 4 April, full 56-25276 S/3659 Englj.sh Fage 2 compliance with the General Armistice Agreements had not yet been effected, and that the measures called for in the previous resolution had been neither completely agreed u:pon nor fully put into effect. On the basis of this finding the Security Council declared that the parties to the Armistice Agreements should speedily carry out measures already agreed upon with the Sccretary~General and should co-operate with him and the ChiQf of Staff to put .into effect their further practical proposals. Specifically, the Council declared that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones, and in the Defensive Areas, as defined in the Armistice Agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions. The Council finally requested the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Cbuncil's resolution of 4 April 1956, and tb full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and. to report to the Security Council as appropriate. In the reports of 3 and 21 August 1956 I have drawn attention to incidents which have taken place along the Armistice Demarcation Lines. In view of later developments I consider it appropriate now to put 'before the Members of the Security Council a more complete evaluation of the developments Which have taken place after 4 June 1956, when the Council passed its latest resolution on the matter. The immediate reason for this new report is continued incidents along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and the temporary suspension of the discussions which have bee.n going on concerning such matters as various local a.rrangements. On both these subjects tbe Chief of staff has recently sUbmitted a report (Annex). II In my report to the Security Council of 9 May 1956 .I pointed out the complications which had arisen because of confusion conce.rning the extent to which compliance with the Armistice Agreements could be conditioned by reciprocit;t.·· I said in this context: -~-~-----.-.~,~------------~-------.....--- S/3659 English Page 3 "As a matter of course, each party considers its compliance with the stipulations of an Arm:Lstice Agreement as conditioned by compliance of the other party to the Agreement. Should. such, a stand be given the interpretation that anyone infringement of the provisions of the Agreement by one party justifies reactions by the other party which, in their turn, are breaches of the Armistice Agreement, without any limitation as to the field within which reciprocity is considered to prevail, j,t Would in fact mean that the armistice regime could be nullified by a single infringement by one of the parties. Although such an interpretation has never been given from responsible quarters, it appears to me that a lacl\: of clarity has prevailed. From no side has it been said that a breach of an Armistice Agreement, to whatever clause it may refer, gives the other party a free hand concerning the Agreement as a whole, but a tendency to regard the Agreements, including the cease-fire clauses, as entities rray explain a feeling that in fact, due to infringements of this or that clause, the obligations are no longer in a strict sense fully binding, and specifically that a breach of one of the clauses, other than the cease-fire clause, may justify action in contravention of that clause." . In view of this lack of clarity I considered it essential to lift the , cease-fire clauses out of the Armistice Agreements so as to give them an independent legal status as obligations; compliance with which was conditioned only by reciprocity in respect of °bhe implementation of the same obligations by the other parties to the Armistice Agreements. As a result of the negotiations last spring such an independent status was established for the cease-fire obligations to be~found in Article 11:2 of the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement, and in Article 111:2 of the Jordan-Israel, Lebanon-Israel, and Syria-Israel Armistice Agreements. Thus, no party could any longer justify a violation of the cease-fire by reference to an alleged non-compliance by other parties with other clauses of the General Armistice Agreements than the c/}ase-fire clause itself, and then only if and when such non-compliance were found to be a reason for the exertion of the right, of self-defence as recognized (and subject to the conditions) in Article 51 of the Charter. Any such measure must be immediate:LY reported to the Security Council and is subject to decision by the Council. In this connexion, circumstances make it necessary to emphasize again that acts of retaliation have repeatedl~r been condemned by the Security Council. The assuran,ces given to the United Nations of unconditional observance of the cease-fire clauses,. further, made the UnitedNations itself a party to the ---------------------,--,--.,--~~----~-~~- S/3659 English Page 4 cease-fire obligations. Its right to take steps for securing the implementation of these obligations was thereby again clearly established in line with the decision of the Security Council on 11 August 1949. The establishment of a general cease-fire of this legal nature served to alleviate the very tense situation prevailing in April of last spriDg. It helped to bring to a stop a rapidly developing deterioration of the situation along the Armistice Demarcation Lines. Thus, the new cease-fire arrangement, at the same time as it established an additional legal basis and removed any possibility of confusion, contributed to the creation of a state of affairs in wh~ ch prog:L'ess might be possible toward a discussion of those fundamental issues which so deeply.influence the whole situation in the Middle East, but which cannot be successfully essayed until after an improvement of the situation along the Demarcation Lines. In my report of 9 May 1956 I gave this evaluation of the pituation prevailing after the negotiations: "What. has been done may open the door to new fruitfuldeveloJ;:ments. The initiative is now in the hands of the Government party to the Armistice Agreements. It is my feeling that there is a general will to peace, and that this will should be fostered and encouraged, not by attempts to impose from outside solutions to problems of vital significance to everyone in the region, but by a co-operation which fR.dlitates for the Governments .concerned the taking unilaterally of steps .to increase confidence and to demonstrate their wish for peaceful conditions. "I believe that the present situation offers unique possibilities. If we had previ'ously experienced chain reactions leading to a continuous deterioration of the situation, wernay now have the possibility of starting a chain of reactions in the opposite direction." Recent discussions have uI.!derscored the significance of the re-establishment of a general and independent cease-fire obligation. It should, thus, be mentioned that added stress has recently been put on the argurnentthat the Arrnistice Agreements, apart from the cease-fire clauses, are "indivisible". This theory - especially when broadly interpreted - is destructive enough when applied to the Armistice Agreements in general. If permitted to apply to the cease-fire obligation as well, it would obViously lead to a complete collapse of order and security in the area. 8/3659 English Page 5 In other res~ects, too, I still believe the previous evaluation to have been essentially correct. ExperiencEs after the submission of my first report have confirmed the impression that the parties in the region all have a wish to es~ablish peaceful conditions. And my conviction stands firm that the quiet prevailing af~er the agreements on the cease-fire arrangements offered them unique possibilities to give such expressions to this will as might have started a chain of reactions in a positive direction. However, I must now register, with regret, that, so far, none of the parties concerned has used the opportunities thus offered and that, in consequence, the quiet established has not had the much needed support from developments toward a better general atmosphere which positive initiatives taken by the parties would have helped to bring about.