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Hitler's Grotesque Economics

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Hitler’s grotesque economics Tooze describes Speer as a power Sinclair Davidson reviews hungry man who inflated his own abili- The Wages of Destruction: ties and expanded his bureaucratic em- pire. Ultimately Speer is portrayed as a The Making and Breaking self-serving bureaucrat and a spin-doctor. of the Nazi Economy It is difficult to know what to make of by Adam Tooze Tooze’s portrayal of Speer. Being a spin- (Allen Lane, 2007, 799 pages) doctor is not a crime against humanity. Speer may have been morally complicit in many of the crimes of Nazi Germany, n the acclaimed television series but Tooze’s new evidence is not enough Band of Brothers the Webster char- to doubt the judgement at Nuremberg— acter abuses a column of German I which chose to merely imprison, rather prisoners of war, ‘Say hello to Ford, and than execute, Speer. General fuckin’ Motors. You stupid fas- murder millions and millions of people. Ultimately Germany lost the war be- cist pigs. Look at you. You have horses. The Holocaust was not simply a case of cause they could not match the resources What were you thinking?’ In The Wages murdering a hated minority; it was the of the Americans, British, and Soviet of Destruction: The Making and Breaking starting point of a planned mass murder economies. Had the Allies done more to of the Nazi Economy, a recent and contro- on a far greater scale. destroy the German economy, the war versial book Adam Tooze, senior lecturer The war had caused substantial eco- could have ended earlier—more bomb- in economic history at Cambridge, sets nomic problems in Europe. The food ing of the Ruhr Valley and less bombing out what the Germans were thinking. supply was severely disrupted. It was of Berlin. Some high ranking German He has provided an exhaustive account only the mass murder of eastern Jews and officers, such as General Georg Thomas of the economics of the Third Reich. Ukrainians that allowed for sufficient also knew the balance of resources was In particular he sets out the eco- food supplies in 1942. Tooze explains unfavourable. nomic constraints facing the Germans in the trade-off associated with the need for Tooze has little time for the argu- the prosecution of the war. slave labour, the need to murder and the ment that the German war economy War history normally consists of food supply. It is a horrific story of in- was inefficient and German planning -in battlefield or political maneuvering— centives, economic constraints, perverted competent. As he indicates the Germans this history however concerns itself more worldviews and amoral pragmatism. fought the world to a standstill. So why with balance of payments, over-valued This ‘Hunger Plan’ is well worth a then did the war break out when it did? currencies and coal supplies. This is a book by itself. Tooze, however, is com- The usual argument is that Hitler mis- perspective that many general readers or prehensive. He touches on many other calculated. Tooze’s argument is that there the average arm-chair expert on WWII aspects of the war economy. The balance was nothing to gain by waiting—the will be likely to appreciate. of payments was a problem for Germany, outbreak of war was a calculated risk. The controversial aspect of the ultimately solved by non-market means. Tooze has made an important con- analysis is that the Nazi’s were not sim- As Gustav Schlotterer told German busi- tribution. Some aspects are likely to be ply madmen. They were highly rational nessmen in July 1940: controversial. Understanding the eco- and acted consistently given their warped nomic constraints facing the Germans world-view and the economic and politi- Our tendency is to use sleight of during the war, and the incentives the cal constraints they faced. hand, guile and possibly violence Nazi’s perceived provides a greater in- This makes their ’grand plan’ all the to get the European states to sell sight into those terrible events. more grotesque. It is well-known that Nazi their goods to Germany, but to It will be difficult for future histori- Germany invaded Russia in order to ex- leave their credits, when they ans to write about WWII without paying pand its own territory and to provide Ger- build up, in Berlin. serious attention to this well argued, well many with ‘living space.’ Tooze explains At least he was honest. Tooze has taken documented narrative. how the Nazi’s went to war in order to a disliking to Albert Speer, and spends a Some readers will find the argu- great deal of time and effort document- ments dense and bewildering but the ing how dishonest he was. In particular, Sinclair Davidson is a Senior Fellow book is well worth the time and effort. with the Institute of Public Affairs. Tooze expresses surprise that Speer was not executed after Nuremburg. R 42 IPA Review | November 2008 www.ipa.org.au.
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