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The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers The Scholar Texas National Security Review: Volume 3, Issue 2 (Spring 2020) Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153 DESPERATE MEASURES: THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC ISOLATION ON WARRING POWERS Erik Sand 12 Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers Scholars and strategists have long debated whether cutting off an opponent’s trade is an effective strategy in war. In this debate, success or failure has usually been judged based on whether the state subjected to economic isolation surrenders without being defeated on the battlefield. This approach, however, has missed a more important way in which economic isolation affects its target: strategy. Economic isolation constrains a state’s strategic choices and leaves its leaders to choose from the remaining options, which are almost always riskier. As analyses of German decision-making in World Wars I and II demonstrate, these riskier strategies often involve escalating the conflict at hand. ow does a state’s access to the inter- region at the start of a conflict.2 On the other hand, national economy affect its strategy not all potential U.S. adversaries are so well con- to prevail in war? This question bears nected to the international economy. North Ko- on some of the most important inter- rea, for example, maintains a national ideology of nationalH challenges facing the United States today. self-sufficiency and does its best to isolate itself Economic sanctions have become a frequent tool from the world, to avoid being vulnerable to such in American foreign policy — witness the current maneuverings. If the United States found itself at campaigns of “maximum pressure” against Iran, war with either of these countries, what would a North Korea, and Venezuela as well as increased strategy of economic isolation accomplish? Would economic sanctions against Russia and the return it lead to victory? of the embargo against Cuba.1 The United States The traditional scholarly answer is “no”: Industri- would almost certainly expand such measures as al economies are sufficiently robust and economic part of its strategy were one of these disputes to isolation is sufficiently difficult such that states fac- escalate into open conflict. More importantly, per- ing economic isolation can easily adapt, except in haps, a strategy of economic isolation is already be- extraordinary circumstances.3 This article challeng- ing explicitly discussed as an option in the event of es that claim. While economic isolation alone may a war between the United States and China. China not lead directly to defeat, it places important con- is highly integrated into the international economy, straints on a power’s strategic decision-making by and some U.S. strategists argue that blocking the limiting the options that are available. Economically Strait of Malacca to disrupt China’s supply of oil isolated powers tend to pursue riskier strategies, would be a good alternative to the “AirSea Battle” often launching attacks that expand the conflict at concept, whose advocates call for strikes against hand. These broader conflicts then frequently end sensors and long-range weapons located in main- in defeat. Moreover, this effect holds regardless of a land China to reduce threats to U.S. forces in the state’s prewar level of economic integration. 1 Adam Taylor, “What Coronavirus? With Indictment of Venezeula’s Maduro and Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Doubles down on ‘Maximum Pressure,’” Washington Post, March 27, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/maduro-indictment-maximum-pressure-coronavi- rus-trump-venezuela/2020/03/26/82809364-6f86-11ea-a156-0048b62cdb51_story.html; Kenneth Rapoza, “Russia’s Latest Sanctions a Year in the Making but Surprise Everyone,” Forbes, Aug. 2, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/08/02/russias-latest-sanctions-a-year-in-the- making-but-surprises-everyone/; and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Readies New Sanctions on Cuba; Immigration Policies Likely to Remain Same in 2020,” Miami Herald, Dec. 30, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article238826998.html. 2 T. X. Hammes, “Strategy for an Unthinkable Conflict,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2012, https://thediplomat.com/2012/07/military-strate- gy-for-an-unthinkable-conflict/. 3 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1963); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014). 13 The Scholar In the first section of this article, I begin by review- close blockade of the Chinese economy to achieve ing the debate surrounding the potential U.S. strate- American goals coercively. gies in the event of a conflict with China, before dis- A significant portion of the debate concerning cussing the principal existing arguments about how the economic isolation approach has focused on prewar economic integration affects wars and the the feasibility of a blockade strategy. China does effects of economic isolation during war. In section appear to be vulnerable to isolation: In 2018, Chi- two, I develop a theory of how economic isolation na imported 69.8 percent of its oil consumption, a leads to risky decision-making, identifying two ways number that is expected to rise to 80 percent by in which economic isolation impacts a country’s de- 2030.6 While China is roughly self-sufficient when cision-makers as well as two types of obviously risky it comes to grain production, food imports by value strategies. I briefly discuss case selection before ex- increased significantly between 2005 and 2015 and ploring two critical examples of economic isolation are a key source of animal fodder.7 Douglas Peifer in sections three and four: Germany in World Wars I and Sean Mirski have both argued that a blockade and II. I conclude the article with a discussion of the would be feasible and less escalatory than an Air- relevance of these two cases today and the implica- Sea Battle campaign,8 with Mirski providing a de- tions of my analysis. tailed plan for how such a blockade might occur. However, other scholars, such as Gabriel Collins and William Murray, and Evan Montgomery, have War and Economic Isolation countered that a strategy of economic escalation would not only be unlikely to succeed but could For more than a decade, policymakers, scholars, provide the illusion of taking a less escalatory ap- and pundits have debated how the United States proach while drawing the United States deeper should respond to the rise of China. A key compo- into a conflict.9 Discussion in media outlets has nent of this debate has been what strategy the Unit- mirrored this scholarly divide, focusing on wheth- ed States should adopt if it finds itself in a conflict er it would be possible to isolate China economi- with China, given China’s growing investment in cally, and how best to execute such a campaign.10 anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. There are Both sets of thinkers are largely in agreement as three basic opinions: Most aggressive are the advo- to how isolation would affect China if successfully cates of the AirSea Battle concept, which propos- implemented. Should violent conflict occur, they es striking deep into China to roll back the A2/AD see economic isolation as a means either to co- envelope and allow American forces to approach.4 erce Chinese surrender or to reduce China’s mili- A second group argues that A2/AD systems will tary capabilities, the traditional consequences by enhance the defensive abilities of American allies which policymakers and scholars have judged the in the region, thus potentially allowing the United effectiveness of economic isolation. None, howev- States to achieve its objectives with minimal direct er, have assessed how a campaign of economic iso- military commitment.5 The final group contends lation might affect Chinese strategy. that the United States should adopt a strategy Moreover, economic isolation is among the most of economic isolation through either a distant or common tools in the U.S. coercive toolbox today. 4 Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept/publication/1. 5 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249; and Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 78–119, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294. 6 “China Commercial Guide,” International Trade Administration, accessed Jan. 14, 2020, https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-Oil-and-Gas. 7 “How Is China Feeding Its Population of 1.4 Billion?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Team, accessed Jan. 14, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-food-security/. 8 Douglas C. Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept,” Orbis 55, no. 1 (January 2011): 114–31, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.009; and Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 385–421, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.743885. 9 Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (2008): 79–95, https://digital- commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/10; and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no.
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