Mario Monti's Technocratic Government

Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government

Daniela Giannetti

The technocratic government of Mario Monti lasted 401 days. It took office on 16 November 2011 and was terminated on 21 December 2012, although it is staying on as a “caretaker” until the general elections of 24–25 February 2013. The Monti government was the sixty-first government in the history of the Italian Republic and one of the few non-partisan governments since the institutional transition that was initiated in 1993. After the collapse in November 2011 of Silvio Berlusconi’s government, which had been paralyzed by internal conflicts and was unable to guarantee the adoption of the policy measures sought by the Euro- pean Union (EU), the president of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano, appointed Monti, a former EU commissioner and president of Boc- coni University, to head a new government.1 Composed entirely of non-partisan ministers, the new government was charged with implementing urgent reforms needed to navigate Italy out of a debt crisis that had endangered the whole Eurozone. In November 2011, Italy was close to a full-scale financial emergency after yields on 10-year bonds soared over 7.6 percent—levels that forced Ireland, Portugal, and Greece to seek an international bailout. The government formation process in early November raised a number of questions regarding the very nature of democratic representation in a parliamentary system. Do technocratic governments represent a breaking point in the democratic channel of delegation? Or, alternatively,

Italian Politics: Technocrats in Office 28 (2013): 133–152 © Berghahn Books doi:10.3167/ip.2013.280108 134 Daniela Giannetti

taking to an extreme the intuition of the late Peter Mair, is there any real difference between partisan and non-partisan governments in “hard times,” as they are both compelled to implement the same austerity policy measures dictated by supra-national institutions and markets?2 Finally, is a technocratic government like the Monti administration an indicator of the increasing influence of the head of state on government formation and dissolution in the Italian parliamentary system? Another theme frequently debated by political commentators was the capacity of the Monti government to implement effectively its policy agenda. While it was apparent that Monti could rely on unprecedented parliamentary support at the time of his investiture, many analysts felt that the lack of political cover left the government open to being undermined in Parliament. The Monti government was supported by a “strange majority” that included the three principal political groups in Parliament: the center-right People of Freedom (PdL), the center-left Democratic Party (PD), and the Union of the Center (UdC). However, given the non-partisan composition of the government, the ideological heterogeneity of the supporting coalition members, and the lack of party cohesion, the government appeared to work as a minority government. Eventually, on 6 December 2012, the PdL abstained from a confidence vote on a government decree in the Senate, signaling its intention to terminate the government and forcing Monti to resign four months before the natural end of the 16th Legislature. Monti’s resignation, following parliamentary approval of the 2013 budget law, set the stage for a turbulent election season in which the outgoing prime minister (who has become the prime ministerial candidate for a centrist coalition) and his government’s legacy will play a large role. In the first section that follows, there will be a brief account of the formation of the Monti government and the changes in government composition during 2012. The next section will describe the implementation of the government’s policy agenda. The third section will deal with parliamentary support for the government, and in the following section there will be an overview of government satisfaction among the Italian public. The next section will discuss the termination of the Monti government, and some final analysis will conclude the chapter.

The Formation of the Monti Cabinet: A Technocratic or Presidential Government?

After Monti had been appointed as head of an emergency government, the headline that appeared in the Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 135 on 14 December 2011—“The Presidential Government”—summarizes best the ongoing debate about the peculiarities of Monti’s Cabinet. This was the third non-partisan government in the history of Italy’s “Second Republic.” Its predecessors were Ciampi I (the 11th Legisla- ture, 1993–1994) and Dini I (the 12th Legislature, 1995–1996). These governments, commonly referred to as technocratic governments, have the following features in common: they are inter-electoral governments that do not reflect the outcome of the popular vote in previous elections and are responsible to the elected Parliament; they are appointed by the head of state for a limited time horizon and with a restricted mandate to implement a number of measures in order to respond to some kind of emergency; they are partially or entirely composed of ministers who have been selected on the basis of their technical expertise. According to some commentators, the most important respect in which the Monti government differed from its predecessors has to do with the pro-active role played by the head of state in the process of government formation. In a press release on 9 November 2011, Presi- dent Napolitano ratified Berlusconi’s resignation announcement in an unequivocal way, even though the prime minister, despite having lost his majority in the Chamber of Deputies, still retained control of the Senate. On the same day, Napolitano appointed Monti as a Senator-for- Life just a week before asking him to form a new government. Such moves were seen by many political experts as a step toward a de facto semi-presidential republic.3 Other differences between Monti’s government and the previous technocratic governments relate to their timing within the life cycle of the legislature, their policy agenda, and their composition. Lamberto Dini was appointed prime minister shortly after the beginning of the 12th Legislature, following the fall of the first Berlusconi government, in the expectation of new elections, which were eventually held 18 months later.4 Monti was asked to form a government when the 16th Legislature was for the most part over. However, he refused to set a definite time horizon for his administration and declared that he was willing to work until the natural end of this legislative term. Speaking after his appointment, Monti promised to act “with urgency” to ensure budgetary consolidation and to work jointly with Parliament in order to “rescue Italy” from financial disaster and return the country to its former status as “an element of strength, not of weakness, in Europe.” President Napolitano echoed these words by declaring that his nomination of Monti as prime minister of a non- partisan government should not be seen as overturning the results of the elections in 2008: the financial situation was too critical to wait for elections to be held. Italy needed a government that “could unite 136 Daniela Giannetti the diverse political forces in an extraordinary effort warranted by the current financial and economic emergency.”5 The composition of Monti’s government was similar to Dini’s in that both Cabinets were composed entirely of non-partisan ministers (in Ciampi’s 11th Legislature, the percentage of non-partisan ministers was about 40 percent). The Monti government was composed of 16 ministers and 2 vice-ministers, one of Economic Development and one of Welfare. In addition, there were 28 undersecretaries. Monti initially sought to include individuals from the major parties in his Cabinet in an effort to share the political costs of his government’s program. But while the major parties were prepared to back his government, none was willing to join it. The new Cabinet consisted entirely of technical experts rather than politicians: eight ministers were academics, eight were semi-public or public managers, and two ministers were private sector managers.6 However, the appointment of undersecretaries reveals that beneath the surface of a purely technocratic government there was a com- promise between partisan and non-partisan considerations.7 After a bargaining process that lasted two weeks, mainstream parties agreed on an allocation of junior ministers, according to which, leaving aside the five junior ministers and two vice-ministers (18 percent) selected by Monti, a third went to the PdL, another third was given to the PD, and 10 percent was allocated to centrist parliamentary party groups.8 This allocation of portfolios, as shown in table 1, is consistent with an empirical generalization known as Gamson’s law, according to which portfolio pay-offs are roughly proportional to party size. An examination of the allocation of junior ministers (not reported) shows that for each minister, the junior ministers most often belonged to different parties. The allocation of junior ministers in this manner reveals that parties played a significant monitoring role, notwithstanding their refusal to share ministerial posts. The composition of the government remained quite stable. On 30 April 2012, Monti appointed three “super technicians” to implement the spending review in order to improve the efficiency of his government’s activity. First, Enrico Bondi, an administrator with considerable experi- ence in restructuring Italian companies with financial problems (e.g., Parmalat), was put in charge of identifying cuts of 4.2 billion euros in public expenditure. Second, the former socialist prime minister, Giuliano Amato, was asked to draft reform proposals for the public funding of political parties and trade unions that would implement the goals of Arti- cle 49 of the Italian Constitution. Third, Francesco Giavazzi, a respected economist and a professor at Bocconi University, was tasked with for- mulating proposals for reducing public subsidies to private enterprises. Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 137

Table 1 Junior Ministers Appointed on 28 November 2011 by Party Affiliation

Party Size Party Size No. of % of Propor- (number of (percentage Under- Under- tionality Party seats) of seats) secretaries secretaries Index

Monti — — 5 17.9 — PdL 212 33.7 9 32.1 0.95 PD 206 32.7 9 32.1 0.98 UdC 38 6.0 2 7.1 1.18 FLI 25 3.9 — — — ApI 5 0.8 1 3.7 4.60 Independents — — 2 7.1 — Others 144 22.9 — — —

Total 630 100 28 100 —

Note: The number of parliamentary seats for each group was calculated on December 2011. The proportionality index is the ratio between the percentage of junior secretaries on the total and the percentage of seats that each party contributes to the winning coalition. It takes a value of one when the two per- centages are identical, lower than one when a party is under-represented, and greater than one when a party is over-represented in terms of junior secretaries.

The appointment of these three super technicians was viewed by many observers as an attempt to overcome the increasing difficulties experienced by the Monti government in implementing its structural reform agenda. Italian political parties were proving slow to embrace internal reform, and there was also resistance to change from bureau- cratic lobbies, which constituted another key obstacle to progress. Additional changes in the Monti government’s composition were made during the following summer of 2012. On 7 July, Monti, who had held the economy and finance portfolio since the previous November, assigned this portfolio to Vittorio Grilli, a former treasury director- general and senior technocrat. This choice was received positively by parties supporting the Monti government because of Grilli’s expertise and commitment to the European policy agenda. It is also important to note that in 2012 two undersecretaries resigned after public allegations of misconduct.9 To sum up, the establishment of the Monti government was prompted by an unprecedented financial and economic crisis. The president of the Republic, Napolitano, played a major role, not only in the process of government formation, but also in backing the government during 138 Daniela Giannetti its tenure in office as a guarantor of Monti’s pledges to Italy’s European partners. The formation of the Monti government fueled a debate about the increasing influence of a Parliament-selected president, as is the case in Italy, on government formation and dissolution. Such a debate dates back to the early 1990s, when President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro refused to call new elections after the fall of the first Berlusconi government (May 1994–January 1995) and appointed Dini as prime minister. Here it is enough to note that some analysts have contended that the activism of the head of state is introducing substantial changes to the operation of parliamentary government in Italy. In contrast, other observers see the actions of the president as entirely consistent with his institutional prerogatives.10

The Monti Government’s Policy Agenda and Its Implementation

In a speech delivered to the Senate asking for an investiture vote, Prime Minister Monti presented his government as “a government of national commitment,” saying that its policy agenda would be based on three pil- lars: “fiscal rigor, growth, and fairness.” He identified two primary goals for his government, entailing different strategies and time frames: “on the one hand, a series of measures to confront the emergency, ensure the sustainability of public finances, and restore confidence in the capacity of our country to react and sustain durable and balanced growth; on the other, a project to modernize economic and social structures with con- crete measures so as to extend opportunities for companies, the youth, women, and all citizens in a context of social and regional cohesion.” In order to ensure the consolidation of public finances and restore Italian credibility in the eyes of foreign investors, the prime minister promised to implement fully the budget measures approved by the previous government, supplementing them with measures outlined in a letter that was sent to the European authorities. Further corrective actions were connected with reform of the pension system, which, despite “being among the most sustainable in Europe,” was “characterized by wide disparities in treatment between different generations and categories of workers.” Monti also announced his intention “to re-examine the weight of taxes on property assets,” saying that “the exemption of principal residences from property taxes is a peculiarity, not to say an anomaly, in our tax system compared with international standards.” According to the Italian Court of Auditors, tax evasion accounts for 18 percent of the national GDP, and fighting it was another priority indicated by Monti.11 Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 139

The prime minister committed his government “to contain the cost of operations of elective bodies” and “to reduce the overlap of decision-making levels” by aggregating smaller administrative units and reorganizing the responsibilities of the provinces. He also advocated constitutional change aiming at the “complete elimination” of provinces. Finally, Monti declared his support for a constitutional proposal under discussion in Parliament “to introduce binding commitments on balanced budgets of public administrations similar to the commitments taken with the Eurogroup.” Monti recognized that such “ambitious targets for a balanced budget, for a fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio” would not be attainable without “making the economy grow again.” In order to promote economic growth, the prime minister outlined a reform of the labor market that was intended to reduce the strong protec- tions given to those with permanent jobs. The reform aimed at creating a “system of job protection” that would make welfare fairer and would also facilitate “productivity growth.” In this context, the prime minister advocated a reform of social benefits and a system of tax reductions that would encourage companies to invest in job creation. Monti declared his goal of removing “the structural obstacles to growth” by overcoming resistance and eliminating corporative privileges. For this purpose, he also proposed to simplify administrative procedures and to reform the rules governing the regulated professions by abolishing minimum fees and facilitating access to professions. The common denominator of the reforms outlined above should be seen as the objective of protecting the weakest members of society, that is, women and the youth. In what follows, we will focus on the main achievements of the Monti government, leaving to future research a more rigorous analysis of the implementation of government pledges.12 The Monti government’s activity may be roughly divided into three phases: the first phrase, lasting from December 2011 to late March 2012, was characterized by an exten- sive process of domestic reform; the second phase, referring to events that occurred between April and the early summer, was dominated by a number of European initiatives; and the final phase, extending from the summer to December 2012, was characterized by increasing political problems and the premature collapse of the Monti Cabinet. In the first phase of its term in office, the Monti government focused on the financial emergency in order to consolidate public finances. A few days after securing his investiture vote, the new prime minister announced his “Save Italy” decree (Legislative Decree No. 201/2011), a package of fiscal adjustments worth 30 billion euros over three years. The most important measures included in the package were (1) the introduction of the property tax on first houses (the IMU), which had been abolished by the previous government, and (2) pension reform, 140 Daniela Giannetti

including later retirement for workers. These measures were followed by the “Grow Italy” decree (Legislative Decree No. 1/2012), a wide range of provisions intended to address the economic competitiveness of Italian enterprises. Envisaged as a counterweight to the austerity measures approved in December, this decree was expected to lead to a substantial increase in GDP, a growth in employment and private expenditure, and, most importantly, an increase in foreign investments. The third legislative package aimed at streamlining Italian bureaucracy by abolishing hundreds of laws and simplifying rules that regulate companies and new businesses. These measures were included in a decree called “Simplify Italy” (Legislative Decree No. 5/2012). These three legislative packages addressed the most urgent meas ures as requested by the EU in order to placate markets and shore up investor confidence in Italian debt. In terms of implementing the government’s agenda, there is no doubt that through the legislative packages outlined above—in particular, the “Save Italy” decree—the executive was able to overcome the financial emergency, thereby re- establishing Italy’s economic appeal and international reputation at the same time. Moreover, the government was able to pass a constitutional obligation to ensure a balanced budget (Constitutional Law No. 1/2012), to come into effect in 2013, in anticipation that other EU member states will adopt a similar measure in the near future. Other policy areas where government action proved effective may be summarized as follows. First, tax evasion was tackled with a variety of measures, such as banning cash payments above 1,000 euros and the introduction of a tool, known as redditometro, to compare declared revenues and lifestyle. Second, pension reforms modified the Italian system to become fully contributions-based, raised the retirement age to 66 years, and curtailed the practice of early retirement. Third, the reduction of public expenses for defense was achieved by adjusting the structure and organization of the Ministry of Defense. Fourth, there was a reprogramming of EU co-financed funds targeted at Italy’s southern regions through the drafting of a Social Cohesion Action Plan, a policy agreed upon with the European Commission (EC). Lastly, a revamping of the public administration was implemented through a range of practi- cal policies, such as digitalizing documentation and forms, centralizing the purchase of goods and services, and changing the rules for payment delays by the public administration to private firms.13 The implementation of other landmark policies within the Monti government’s reform agenda faced more obstacles. The prime minister was not able to pass liberalizing policies and the reform of the labor market without incorporating significant changes by the main parties that supported his government—the leftist PD and the right-wing Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 141

PdL. Reforming a rigid two-tier labor market, divided between highly protected workers with lifetime jobs and newcomers on short-term contracts with no security, had been a key demand of the EC and the European Central Bank (ECB). Designed by the minister of labor and social policies, Elsa Fornero, Law No. 92/2012 was intended to facilitate entry into the labor market of young people on apprenticeships, to increase taxes in order to discourage short-term contracts, and to give room to employers to lay off workers for economic reasons by amending Article 18 of the workers’ statute. But the reform that emerged from Parliament was watered down under pressure from trade unions—in particular, the left-wing Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL)—and from the PD.14 In a similar way, some of the liberalizing measures included in the “Grow Italy” decree were softened to overcome the opposition of professional guilds and workers of those sectors affected by the measures represented in Parliament by the PdL party.15 According to many commentators, the second phase of the Monti government started in the spring of 2012 and was characterized by a series of diplomatic initiatives to involve European partners in a growth plan for the whole EU. These initiatives culminated in the adoption by the ECB of an “anti-spread” mechanism to use EU rescue funds to buy government bonds on the secondary market and thus stem any widening in yield spreads that makes it harder for indebted countries to service their debts. For Monti, this intense period of financial negotiations and planning, along with the enactment of a number of austerity policies, culminated in the implementation of a landmark policy goal highlighted in several declarations. The key objective was to narrow interest rate spreads between Italian 10-year bonds and the German benchmark. By the end of 2012, the spread between German and Italian rates had fallen to 287 points, exactly half the level it was at when Monti took over from Berlusconi in November 2011. The third phase of the Monti government commenced after the summer and was the most problematic for the prime minister. As we shall see in the following sections, tensions among the parties that supported the Monti government made it more difficult to implement the policy measures outlined in the government’s agenda. Anti-corruption measures were only partially implemented, as the government was able to give the green light to only one out of three legislative decrees implementing the anti-corruption measures for Italian public administration in Law No. 190/2012. The “Clean Lists” decree (Legislative Decree No. 235/2012), approved by the Parliament in November 2012, bans anyone sentenced to two or more years in prison from running for political office or accepting government posts. Other related measures, 142 Daniela Giannetti

such as transparency in public administration budgets and banning politicians from top administrative positions, were not implemented, especially due to opposition from the PdL. Two of the main goals of the Monti agenda, that is, reviving economic growth and cutting the expenditure of local and regional government, were much less successfully pursued during this technical government’s brief term in office. The austerity measures adopted by the government had wide recessive effects and were not effective in reducing Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio during 2012. In addition, the Italian economy is forecast by the EC to shrink by a further 0.5 percent in 2013. The level of direct taxation on ordinary Italians increased to 46 percent, and there was also a hike in the VAT rate on consumer spending and the reinstatement of a tax on residential property (the IMU).16 The overall unemployment rate jumped to 11.1 percent (still below the Eurozone average), but for young people it reached 36.5 percent—a figure that was well above the EU average. The two “Economic Development” decrees (Legislative Decree No. 83/2012 and No. 179/2012) sponsored by the minister of economic development, Corrado Passera, are intended to boost economic growth. Although they have been approved by Parliament, they require further implementing measures in order to become effective. The first of these decrees is designed to promote growth in the economy, particu- larly through tax incentives for construction companies, infrastructure projects, and energy efficiency measures. The second concerns the development of a digital agenda to improve digital services for citizens and to support start-up enterprises. However, the government was not able to bring about approval of the promised new law about economic competition and liberalizations or the law affecting small and medium- sized enterprises.17 The attempt to reduce taxes in the 2013 budget bill, known as the financial stability bill, also failed, as did a more compre- hensive reform of the fiscal system.18 Regarding the high costs of Italy’s system of sub-national gover- nance, the Monti government was able to introduce some measures to cut expenses in local government but failed to introduce the long- awaited reform of regional government. Decree Law No. 174/2012, converted into law on 7 December 2012, introduced cuts to regional government budgets, aimed at curbing corruption and excessive spending, and increased the powers of Italy’s Court of Auditors to inspect regions’ finances. The abolition of provinces, promised by Monti in his investiture speech, appeared an easy task to accomplish after the “Save Italy” decree had changed provinces into non-elected bodies, with the goal of transferring their functions to municipalities during 2012. However, in the following months a mobilization of provincial-elected Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 143 officials, backed by some national parliamentarians, especially from the PdL, blocked the reform. Monti was compelled to pursue a simple reorganization of provinces, and the decree initiating a more incisive reform (Legislative Decree No. 188/2012) was not converted into law.19 Far from being the “constructive ending” of the legislature sought by President Napolitano,20 the last phase of the technocratic government led by Monti saw the re-emergence of eager partisan interests in Parliament. Parties were able to block measures, such as the decree law on fiscal policy (approved by the Chamber of Deputies but rejected by the Senate) and the reform of local governments. Both of these reforms were judged by the government as very important meas ures, not only due to their impact on Italy’s financial status, but also for their ability to help restore citizens’ trust in political institutions. Before tendering his resignation to the head of state, Monti was still able to pass the 2013 budget bill, which had been transformed into an omnibus bill with substantial concessions to political parties.21 Finally, one of the last measures approved by the Monti government was a decree that saved Ilva, the second largest steel plant in Europe (located in Taranto, in southern Italy), from being closed. Local mag- istrates had ordered the arrest of the company’s owners and sought to close the plant due to rising cancer rates in the area. This decision would have dramatically affected employment and wealth. Monti’s decree reopened Ilva, with the promise to create a safer and environ- mentally cleaner industrial production process in the near future. To summarize, the Monti government was only partially able to implement its original reform agenda due to its short time in office and the increasing difficulties it faced in negotiating support from political parties. It is to this topic that we will now turn in the next section.

Parliamentary Support for the Monti Government

The investiture vote for the Monti government passed with the highest level of parliamentary support ever given to an Italian government in the lower house (556 in favor, 61 against, 0 abstentions).22 In this section, we will focus on the roll call data relating to confidence votes requested by the Monti government in the Chamber of Deputies in order to examine trends in parliamentary support for the technical government. Between December 2011 and December 2012, the government requested 35 confidence votes on bills in the Chamber of Deputies. The confidence vote that occurred on 4 July 2012 was actually a vote asking legislators to reject a motion of no confidence presented by the Northern League (LN) and Italy of Values (IdV) against Minister of Welfare Fornero, who was 144 Daniela Giannetti

at the center of controversy after having recently signed off on a sweep- ing labor market reform package.23 The Chamber of Deputies rejected this motion (435 against, 88 in favor, 18 abstentions).24 A comparison with previous governments shows that the frequency of confidence votes in the Chamber of Deputies increased during the Monti administration. The Berlusconi IV government (2008–2011) requested 27 confidence votes over three and a half years, and the Prodi II government (2006–2008) requested 14 votes of confidence during its two years in office. The confidence vote was used by previous Italian governments as a means of strengthening voting unity among disparate government coalition members characterized by a low cohesion. There are various reasons why the increased use of the confidence vote during 2012, despite the fact that the Monti government had a high level of cross-party support in the legislature, is not surprising. These factors include the low cohesiveness of Italian legislative parties, the distribu- tive nature of most bills, and the high level of pressure under which the government operated during its 13 months in office. An examination of confidence votes requested by the Monti government in the Chamber of Deputies, shown in figure 1, reveals a continuous decline in absolute legislative support during the 13 months examined. The top line shows that the level of support of those legislators present remained largely constant at about 85 percent. In contrast, the bottom line shows that fewer MPs were present in Parliament during confidence votes, suggesting that legislators in some parties decided neither to support nor to oppose the Monti government. Figure 1 shows that this group of legislators grew from about 12 percent to about 40 percent. The two linear trend lines indicate a steady and continuous fall in support for the Monti government, as a proportion of all MPs, over the time period examined. The PdL party members especially seem to have boycotted the government through abstentions.25 The highest level of legislative support attained in 2012 was in the confidence vote of 23 February that was concerned with converting into law a Council of Ministers decree on economic and fiscal matters, for which 447 legislators (71 percent) voted “yes” with the Monti government. Figure 1 shows that the lowest level of support was registered in the two confidence votes that converted into law some “Economic Growth” decrees enacted on 6 and 12 December 2012, with 281 (45 percent) and 295 (47 percent) votes in favor respectively. Berlusconi’s PdL grouping abstained in both of these December roll calls, and support for the Monti government fell below the majority threshold of 316 votes. Figure 1 also shows that in the last two confidence votes, on 18 and 21 December, parliamentary support for the government increased again, as the PdL voted in favor of the 2013 budget bill. Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 145

FIGURE 1 Parliamentary Support for the Monti Government, Chamber of Deputies, November 2011–December 2012

% vote in favor of those present % vote in favor of the total

Note: The two straight lines show the linear trends of aggregate parliamentary support for the government. For the top time series, the trend in support is largely constant with a small decline. For the bottom time series, there is evi- dence, with much variation, of a general decline in legislative support over the 13 months examined. Source: Chamber of Deputies, 2011–2012

These roll call data reveal growing tensions among political parties, especially the PdL, due to intra- and inter-party conflicts. As elections scheduled for February 2013 approached, Italian parties felt increasingly compelled to signal more clearly their policy stances to the electorate. For this and other reasons, the PdL eventually withdrew its support for the Monti government’s reform agenda, thereby precipitat- ing an early government termination on 21 December. It is appropriate at this stage to make some remarks about the state of public opinion during the Monti government’s time in office.

Public Support for the Monti Government

A considerable amount of survey research was conducted in late 2011 and throughout 2012 regarding Italian citizens’ support for the Monti government reform agenda. Such interest in government satisfaction among the public was not surprising since the Monti government had 146 Daniela Giannetti not achieved office through a popular election and because it pursued stringent austerity measures. The survey data discussed in this section refer to domestic public opinion.26 Survey estimates of popular evaluations of the general performance of the Monti government during its first year in office show that only a small minority expressed a “very positive” evaluation. In fact, the overall pattern evident in figure 2 is one of convergence between the “quite positive,” “quite negative,” and “very negative” trends, leading to an equal division of the Italian electorate by late 2012. A third of the public were reasonably satisfied, another third were somewhat dissatisfied, and the most of the remainder were quite negative or had no opinion. In short, overall public sentiment was generally pessimistic by a ratio

Figure 2 Trend in Government Satisfaction during the Monti Government, December 2011–November 2012 (percent)

Note: The survey question was “how do you evaluate the overall work of the government right now?” Response options were (1) “very positively,” (2) “quite positively,” (3) “quite negatively,” (4) “very negatively,” and (5) “do not know” (an option not given to respondents). “Do not know” responses are not shown as they are typically less than 5 percent. Sample size: equal to 800 respondents; method: computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI); sampling error: 3.5 percent. Source: Government satisfaction ratings are based on estimates from the following surveys: MMP 237/11 to MMP 290/12. Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 147 of two to one. From the Monti government’s perspective, the most alarming trend must have been the steady increase in “very negative” sentiment during the 11-month period examined, in which pessimism trebled from 10 percent to 33 percent. The survey data presented in figure 3 show that the trends in government satisfaction and trust in Monti as a prime minister followed similar paths. There was net satisfaction with government and trust in Monti until late March 2012. After this point, Italian public opinion adopted a negative position regarding perceived government performance and trust in the prime minister. After July 2012, a disjunction between

Figure 3 Comparison of Trend in Government Satisfaction and Trust in Monti as Prime Minister (percent)

Positive evaluation of Monti Government Trust in Monti as a prime minister

Note: The government satisfaction question was “how do you evaluate the overall work of the government right now?” Response options were (1) “very positively,” (2) “quite positively,” (3) “quite negatively,” (4) “very negatively,” and (5) “do not know” (an option not given to respondents). Positive evaluations refer to the sum of responses (1) and (2), and negative sentiments reflect the sum of responses (3) and (4). The question on trust in Mario Monti as prime minister was “I will now call out the names of some institutions in our country. Please tell me the degree of trust with respect to each of them as I read them.” Response options were (1) “a great deal of trust,” (2) “a lot of trust,” (3) “little trust,” (4) “very little trust,” and (5) “do not know.” Item #12 (from a list of 16 institutions) referring to “the head of government, Mario Monti” was read in a random order to each respondent. “Trust” refers to the sum of responses (1) and (2). Source: Government satisfaction ratings are based on estimates from the following surveys: MMP 252/12 to MMP 284/12. 148 Daniela Giannetti

government satisfaction and trust in the prime minister emerged: an increasing trust in Monti as head of government was not associated with a growth in satisfaction with his government. These data reveal the appreciation of the public for non-policy factors such as the personal competence and undisputed prestige of the prime minister. According to these survey results, a year after his appointment as head of government, Monti was still supported by 46 percent of the Italian public. After the announcement that Monti would participate in the Ital- ian general elections of 2013, the polling data may also provide some indication of his impact on the party choice of voters.27 Pre-electoral surveys released in early January 2013 show that the centrist political parties that endorse Monti as a prospective prime minister have a much lower level of support among the electorate. The center-left, led by the PD, is leading the polls, while the center-right, dominated by the PdL, appears to be gaining ground. The other major electoral force is Beppe Grillo’s anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S), which appears to be attracting a significant percentage of the popular vote. At the start of the election campaign in January 2013, it is difficult to predict the impact of Monti and his policy agenda on the outcome of the February 2013 elections. In particular, it is an open question as to whether the party lists endorsing Monti’s candidacy for prime minister will incorporate the sober professor’s policies and reflect his personal opinions.

Moving beyond Technocracy: The Monti Government Termination

The ending of the Monti government stemmed from a decision made by one of the main political players to withdraw its support and call for elections (slightly) earlier than expected.28 As the end of the 16th Legislature approached, Italian political parties felt it necessary to position themselves toward the electorate. The three major parties that had supported the Monti government prepared for the electoral campaign differently. The center-left parties had planned well in advance to hold primary elections in November 2012 in order to select the prime ministerial candidate on the basis of a joint platform. The center parties, who had been some of the stronger supporters of the Monti government, championed its policy agenda as their future electoral program. The PdL was in a stalemate. The PdL’s secretary, Ange- lino Alfano, stated that the party planned to hold primary elections, and Berlusconi, as the PdL’s leader, announced plans to campaign in the 2013 general elections on a platform that targeted an electorate Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 149 dissatisfied with austerity policies and weary of repeated tax increases and simultaneous spending cuts. This alienated segment of the public appeared increasingly to be attracted by the populist appeals of anti- euro and anti-establishment movements. In early December 2012, Berlusconi announced his intention to enter the political race for the sixth time. Alfano’s plan to schedule primary elections within the PdL was quickly abandoned. On 6 and 12 December, the PdL withdrew its support for the government by abstaining during a confidence vote, first in the Senate and then in the Chamber. The decision to abstain was ambiguous, as the party did not want to be accused of directly terminating the government. Monti, however, declared that his government would have not stayed in office without the support of a majority, and on 21 December he resigned as prime minister, keeping a promise to step down after the budget law drawn up by his government had been approved. On that date, the Chamber approved the 2013 budget (309 in favor, 55 against, 5 abstentions), and Napolitano signed the decree of Parliament dissolution immediately afterward. The next general elections were scheduled to take place on 24–25 February 2013, and the first meeting of the new Parliament (the 17th Legislature) was scheduled for 15 March. Monti’s decision to enter the political race came after many days of uncertainty. The PD and the PdL, both of which had supported Monti’s technocratic government in Parliament, made it clear that they would not be happy if he ran against them. Massimo D’Alema, a former center-left prime minister, said in an interview that it would be “morally questionable” for Monti to run against the PD, which had backed all of his reforms.29 Berlusconi echoed the criticism, stating that Monti risked losing the credibility he had won over the past year and becoming a “little political figure.” Eventually, on 28 December 2012, Monti, whose Senator-for- Life status means that he does not have to stand for a seat, publicly announced his candidacy for prime minister in the next government, having been endorsed by a coalition of centrist political forces. The coalition will run in the Senate as a unique component (provisionally, Monti’s Agenda for Italy) and in the Chamber as a coalition of several components, including a list endorsed by Monti himself. In his end- of-year message to the Italian people, President Napolitano pointed out that he respected Monti’s decision, although, according to many observers, the president would have preferred an election in which Monti was not directly involved. The electoral schedule will also force Napolitano, still in office for two months before the end of his mandate, to appoint the formateur of the new government. In short, the manner in which the Monti 150 Daniela Giannetti government ended was strongly affected by the pre-electoral strategies of the parties that supported his Cabinet. The president of the Repub- lic, who had asked Italian party leaders to avoid a “precipitous end of the legislature,” could do little more than take note of the decisions of the various political actors involved.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has provided an overview of the main features of the Monti government, leaving to future research a deeper analysis of the different phases of its term of office. The Monti government headed Italy for 13 months during one of the most difficult periods in the history of the Italian Republic and among Western democracies more generally. Its technocratic composition raises important questions about the workings of the Italian parliamentary system. Assessing the performance of the Monti government is a complex task that calls for more detailed study in order to give greater deliberation to the short time horizon and the parliamentary context within which this administration operated. Moreover, the passage of time will facilitate the for- mulation of more considered evaluations of the medium- to long-term effects of many of the policy measures adopted in late 2011 and 2012. There is currently widespread agreement that the Monti government, through the introduction of decisive structural reforms, did indeed restore Italy’s credibility on the international stage. At the same time, increased fiscal pressure on Italian citizens and businesses, com- bined with a severe recession and record unemployment, offer Monti’s political adversaries many reasons to fight against his austere reform agenda in the election campaign of February 2013. Monti’s decision to enter the political race—in his own words, to “climb” into politics— was a controversial one, and for many politicians and commentators it was unexpected. His candidacy as the leader of a coalition of centrist forces will affect the next electoral competition, making it a three-way contest among Monti’s centrists, the left-wing coalition led by Pier Luigi Bersani’s PD, and the right-wing coalition led by Berlusconi’s PdL. Another political force will be the anti-establishment M5S led by Grillo, who will run without allies. The restructuring of the political space along a dimension that is pro-/ anti-Europe is another likely effect of the most recent developments in Italian politics. After a meeting with centrist politicians, Monti declared that the traditional left-right split has “historic and symbolic value” for the country, but that “it does not highlight the real alliance that Italy needs—one that focuses on Europe and reforms.” A strong pro-Europe Mario Monti’s Technocratic Government 151 stance, such as the one advocated by Monti, seems to counteract the rising anti-European sentiment of groups like Grillo’s M5S and the LN. More research, using analyses of party manifestos in combination with expert and mass survey data, is required in order to assess how Monti’s entry into the election will affect party competition in Italy in 2013.

Daniela Giannetti is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. Her research interests include coalition theory and, more generally, rational choice theory of social institutions and political behavior.

Notes

1. In the summer of 2011, in the middle of a dramatic crisis of the European stock markets and an increasing spread between Italian and German bonds, the ECB sent a letter to Berlusconi, urging structural reforms. This “secret” letter summarized requests made by the European institutions to the Italian government. See E. Jones, “The Berlusconi Government and the Sovereign Debt Crisis,” in Italian Politics: From Berlusconi to Monti, ed. A. Bosco and D. McDonnell (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 172–190; and C. Fusaro, “The Formation of the Monti Government and the Role of the President of the Republic,” in Bosco and McDonnell, Ital- ian Politics, 78–97. 2. P. Mair, “Bini Smaghi vs. the Parties: Representative Government and Institutional Constraints,” EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2011/22. 3. See, for example, P. Martelli, “Governo tecnico: Un passo verso il pres- idenzialismo?” Il Mulino, no. 2 (2012): 226–232, and M. Olivetti, “Gover- nare con l’aiuto del presidente,” Il Mulino, no. 2 (2012): 233–241. 4. The Dini government lasted 486 days. 5. From a speech by Napolitano reported in Il Sole 24 Ore, 14 November 2011. 6. For a more detailed analysis, see M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli, “Tech- nocratic and Expert Ministers in Italy: A Diachronic Analysis,” paper presented at the 22nd Congress of the International Political Science Asso- ciation, Madrid, 8–12 July 2012. 7. D. Martirano, “Sottosegretari verso la stretta,” Corriere della Sera, 25 Novem- ber 2011. 8. Monti obtained the investiture vote for his government before appointing the junior ministers. 9. The two undersecretaries were Carlo Malinconico, who left on 12 January 2012, and Andrea Zoppini, who left on 14 May 2012. 10. For an overview, see N. Lupo and G. Piccirilli, “Le recenti evoluzioni della forma di governo italiana: Una conferma della sua natura parlamentare,” 152 Daniela Giannetti

Democrazia e Diritto, no. 1–2 (2012): 85–110, and F. Marone, “Prime rifles- sioni sul governo tecnico nella democrazia maggioritaria italiana,” http:// www.gruppodipisa.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/MaroneDEF.pdf. 11. “Corte dei Conti: L’evasione fiscale in Italia è al 18% del PIL, al secondo posto dopo la Grecia,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 June 2012. 12. For interesting work in this direction, see F. Marangoni, “Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into Its Term of Office,”Bulletin of Italian Poli- tics 4, no. 1 (2012): 135–149, and F. Marangoni, “The Legislative Activity of Technocrats: An Updating of Indicators at the (Early) End of the Monti Government,” Bulletin of Italian Politics 4, no. 2 (2012): 295–303. 13. Italy’s Budgetary Consolidation and Reforms: A Year of Government by Mario Monti, a report of the president of the Council of Ministers, 16 Novem- ber 2012. 14. See the chapter by Stefano Sacchi in this volume. 15. See the chapter by Liborio Mattina in this volume. 16. D. Di Vico, “Patrimoniale, nuova tentazione vecchie vittime,” Corriere della Sera, 14 December 2012. 17. A. Candidi, “Le pagelle del Sole: Promossi e bocciati del governo Monti,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 22 December 2012. 18. M. Mobili, “Rimandato il sogno di un fisco più semplice,” Il Sole 24 Ore, 23 December 2012. 19. See the chapter by Sergio Rizzo and Gian Antonio Stella in this volume. 20. Speech delivered by President Napolitano at a ceremony conferring the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic on 25 November 2012. 21. For example, an amendment to the 2013 budget bill defers until 2014 the transfer of the provinces’ functions to municipalities. 22. In the Senate, the largest parliamentary support was obtained by the Dini government. 23. The problem of the so-called esodati, whereby voluntary early retirees found themselves deprived of their income due to the rise of the retirement age, was at the center of controversy for months. 24. Sixty-eight MPs were not present, and 20 were away, conducting legislative business. 25. See also the analysis conducted by Andrea Pedrazzani and Luca Pinto in this volume. 26. Data were kindly provided by the Institute for the Study of Public Opin- ion (ISPO), directed by Renato Mannheimer. See ISPO Survey/3G Deal & Research SRL at http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it. For evaluations of the Monti government in the international context, see Francesco Stolfi’s chapter in this volume. 27. See the ISPO survey published in Corriere della Sera on 6 January 2013. 28. Such reasons for government termination are codified as discretionary in the literature. See W. C. Müller and K. Strøm, eds., Coalition Governments in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 29. R. Zuccolini, “Il premier contro chi lo sostiene? Sarebbe moralmente dis- cutibile,” Corriere della Sera, 14 December 2012.