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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2008 Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte Lewis Alexander Bell

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COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

URBAN POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF PLANNERS IN THE DECISION TO

BUILD LIGHT RAIL IN CHARLOTTE

By

LEWIS ALEXANDER BELL

A Thesis submitted to the Department of Urban and Regional Planning in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Planning

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2008

The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Lewis Alexander Bell defended on October 27, 2008.

Gregory L. Thompson Professor Directing Thesis

Jeffrey Brown Committee Member

Richard Feiock Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

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For my father, Ronald A. Bell, Jr.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the course of this research project, several individuals provided guidance and assistance that were invaluable to the completion of the work. Greg Thompson was instrumental in developing the concept of utilizing multiple political models to analyze transportation politics in Charlotte. He guided the project from the conceptual phases through the study of the literature to the historical research and ultimate conclusions. Jeff Brown also critiqued the paper throughout its development. Dan Gallagher of the Charlotte Department of Transportation provided information about potential interview subjects and provided copies of several important documents. Finally, John Muth and Lynn Purnell were both crucial contributors to the historical research undertaken for this paper. They were always available for follow-up questions by phone, e-mail, or additional meetings and were never short of valuable information. John Muth also provided copies of numerous printed materials from CATS’ archives. I thank you all for your support in this project.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures vii List of Abbreviations viii Abstract ix

INTRODUCTION 1

1. EXPLANATORY MODELS OF METROPOLITAN DECISION- MAKING 4

1.1 The Elitist Model 5 1.2 The Pluralist Model 6 1.3 The Class-Dialectical Model 6 1.4 The Growth Machine 8 1.5 Regime Theory 9 1.6 Consensus Building 11

2. METHODOLGY 13

2.1 Theoretical Expectations 14 2.2 Sources 22

3. CENTERS, CORRIDORS, AND WEDGES 28

3.1 A New Direction 28 3.2 Early Rapid Transit Planning 31 3.3 The Regional Sourcebooks of 1992 and 1994 33 3.4 The Committee of 100 36

4. THE TRANSIT SALES TAX REFERENDUM AND THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION 46

4.1 The Committee of 10 47 4.2 The Mecklenburg Delegation 52 4.3 The 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan 56 4.4 The Metropolitan Transit Commission 68

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5. EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING MODELS AND PLANNING POLITICS IN CHARLOTTE 77

5.1 The Elitist Model 77 5.2 The Pluralist Model 81 5.3 The Class-Dialectical Model 83 5.4 The Growth Machine 86 5.5 Regime Theory 89 5.6 Consensus Building 92

CONCLUSION 95

APPENDIX A – HUMAN SUBJECTS FORMS 102 APPENDIX B – COMMITTEE OF 100 AND COMMITTEE OF 10 ROSTERS 116

REFERENCES 122

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 126

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Map of Charlotte Metropolitan Region 3

Figure 2. Mecklenburg County Spheres of Influence 41

Figure 3. Annexation History of Charlotte 42

Figure 4. Illustrations of Various Metropolitan Transportation Strategies from 1992 “Concepts of Growth” Sourcebook 43

Figure 5. Illustration of the Centers and Corridors Strategy and Descriptions of Its Elements from 1998 “Centers and Corridors” Sourcebook 44

Figure 6. The Committee of 100's Proposed Metropolitan Roadway Plan 45

Figure 7. Comparison of Residential Densities from 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan 72

Figure 8. Regional Rapid Transit Network from 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan 73

Figure 9. Regional Road Plan: Programmed Projects and 1998 Road Bond Projects 74

Figure 10. Front of Advertising Brochure for the 1998 Transit Sales Tax and Road Bond Initiatives 75

Figure 11. Schematic Diagram of Structure of Transit Decision- Making in Charlotte-Mecklenburg 76

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BAC – Bay Area Council BART – Bay Area Rapid Transit BRT – Bus Rapid Transit CATS – Charlotte Area Transit System CBD – Central Business District (also referred to as “Uptown” in Charlotte) CDOT – Charlotte Department of Transportation CMPC- Charlotte Mecklenburg Planning Organization CTAG – Citizens Transit Advisory Group DMU – Diesel Multiple Unit EIS – Environmental Impact Statement FTA – Federal Transit Administration HSC – Human Subjects Committee HOV – High Occupancy Vehicle ISTEA – Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act LRT – Light Rail Transit MIS – Major Investment Study MPO – Metropolitan Planning Organization MSA – Metropolitan Statistical Area MTC – Metropolitan Transit Commission MUMPO – Mecklenburg-Union Metropolitan Planning Organization NCBOT – North Carolina Board of Transportation NCDOT – North Carolina Department of Transportation NS – Norfolk Southern PBQD – Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade, and Douglas, Inc. SCDOT – South Carolina Department of Transportation SOI – Spheres of Influence T-PAC – Transit Planning Advisory Committee TSAC – Transit Services Advisory Committee UNCC – University of North Carolina Charlotte USDOT – United States Department of Transportation

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ABSTRACT

This paper applies six theoretical models of metropolitan decision-making to analyze the history of rapid transit planning in Charlotte, North Carolina. The political models employed include: the elitist model, the pluralist model, the class-dialectical model, the growth machine model, regime theory, and consensus building. The hypothesis under consideration is that none of these models fully explains Charlotte’s decision to build rapid transit, but each one provides unique insights that, when combined, provide a rich understanding of the region’s transportation and planning politics. To begin, I develop a set of expectations for how each model would explain Charlotte’s decision-making. Next, utilizing information from technical documents, newspaper articles, and interviews with planners in the region, I describe the history of transportation and land use planning in Charlotte from the early 1980’s to the late 1990’s. Then I compare the historical events observed with the expectations outlined for each model to evaluate the power of the respective models to explain Charlotte’s decision-making process. The comparison of observed events to theoretical expectations reveals that each of the models presents unique insights into the region’s political process, but none adequately tells the full story, which unfolds over the course of nearly 20 years. Throughout the course of that history, different modes of decision-making seem to come and go, demonstrating the dynamism of metropolitan politics. However, there appear to be relatively consistent parallel streams of political momentum: one which seeks to corral elite interests in support of rapid transit, and a second that focuses on public involvement and neighborhood interests. The successful marriage of these streams by planners in Charlotte was a significant factor in the region’s decision to build rapid transit. Finally, Charlotte’s history demonstrates that transit planning does not need to operate in direct opposition to highway interests, and the coordination of transportation and land use planning can be achieved without significant state intervention.

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INTRODUCTION

On 24 November 2007, a new era in transportation began for Charlotte, North Carolina. This is the date that a new rapid transit improvement, the LYNX Blue Line light rail, first became a relevant travel option for the general public. The city’s investment in rapid transit signaled a departure from transportation policies centered around the automobile and highway building that had typified most urban growth in the United States (especially the Southeast) for the greater part of the twentieth century. This change in philosophy was made to position the region to continue to enjoy growth and investment well into this century. The decision to rethink the region’s growth and transportation strategies evolved over the course of about two decades and was influenced by a number of individual and collective actors. This paper utilizes newspaper articles, planning documents and other public records, and interviews with some of the planners involved with the region’s transformation over that time to retrace the history of transportation and land use planning in the Charlotte metropolitan area and provide insight into the political interactions that led to the region’s endorsement of rapid transit. It examines the roles of planners, politicians, and business leaders in defining (or redefining) the goals and policies of a city and a region in the American metropolitan complex. Broken into five chapters, the manuscript begins by reviewing several explanatory models of metropolitan governance in Chapter 1, outlining the basic theoretical premises of each one. Chapter 2 then defines the paper's hypothesis and discusses how the political models will be applied to test it. The objective is to identify what historical details would need to be observed in Charlotte in order to endorse each model. Chapter 2 also outlines the sources used to understand the history of Charlotte's transportation planning. Together these initial chapters provide a theoretical underpinning to inform and support the analyses presented in the subsequent chapters. Next, two general planning periods are discussed in detail: the era leading to the 1994 “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook that laid the groundwork for future transportation and land use decisions in Charlotte (Chapter 3); and the period immediately following, which led to the development of the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan in 1998 and the imposition of a half-

1 cent transit sales tax (Chapter 4). Finally, Chapter 5 compares these events that led to the construction of the Blue Line (and planned system expansions) with the tenets of each of the models described in the opening chapters to evaluate each model's ability to explain Charlotte's decision-making. It describes the particular insights provided by each theory, how they relate to specific events in Charlotte, and how the various models contradict, support, overlap, and refine each other. Ostensibly, this approach would identify a superior model, reveal the respective inadequacies of the various models, and/or demonstrate a fluidity and complexity in America's urban political scene that requires the application of multiple explanatory mechanisms to achieve a comprehensive understanding of metropolitan decision-making. Indeed, the hypothetical undercurrent of the paper is that the different layers of analysis provided by each of the respective models permits a more robust understanding of urban politics than can be achieved by applying any single model. Ultimately, the paper aims to highlight the dynamic interactions that move significant transportation investments forward in the contemporary American metropolis and to illuminate planners’ positions and roles in these interactions.

Overview of the Charlotte Area Charlotte is located in the center of Mecklenburg County in North Carolina’s western piedmont just north of the South Carolina border (see figure 1). The estimated population of Mecklenburg County in 2003 was 753,049 people. Apart from the City of Charlotte, which had 584,658 residents in 2003, there are six other municipalities in the county: Huntersville, Davidson, and Cornelius in the north; Mint Hill and Matthews in the East; and Pineville in the South. These municipalities are generally referred to as “the Towns” in many documents and throughout this paper. The Office of Management and Budget also includes Anson, Cabarrus, Gaston, and Union Counties in North Carolina, as well as York County, SC in its definition of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The total population for the MSA in 2003 was 1,439,085 people. With the bulk of the population and proposed transit improvements concentrated in Mecklenburg County, this paper focuses on developments and actors in the county and its municipalities. Where relevant, attention is also given to outlying areas in the MSA as well as to parts of Iredell County, directly north of Mecklenburg but not included in the OMB definition of the MSA. (US Census, n.d.; Office of Management and Budget, 2005)

2 Charlotte Metropolitan Region

Source: Mecklenburg County and Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, http://gischamber.co.mecklenburg.nc.us/website/chamber, 2008 Figure 1 – Map of Charlotte Metropolitan Region

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CHAPTER 1: EXPLANATORY MODELS OF METROPOLITAN DECISION-MAKING

The often contentious nature of transportation investments makes them perennially ripe for critical investigation. A voluminous body of literature exists to provide guidance in constructing an analytical framework within which to examine the key factors that impact local decision-making. Typically, analyses include discussions of the principal actors who conceive, negotiate, and construct major projects, as well as those who oppose them. Consideration is also frequently given to the motives driving the actions of these personages. Inquiries in this vein are generally grounded in a particular theoretical context to develop, support, or revise a model of political activity. Sometimes multiple constructs are described and compared to demonstrate the superior explanatory power of one with respect to another. J. Allen Whitt (1982) was the first to perform this kind of comparative analysis in a transportation setting. In this chapter, six theories are outlined. These are briefly introduced below, and each is discussed in its own section as the chapter progresses. The first three sections of this chapter are devoted to the three models of urban decision- making employed by Whitt in his account of transportation politics in California during the late 1960’s and the 1970’s: the elitist model, the pluralist model, and the class-dialectical model. Each has arisen from varied intellectual foundations that are too numerous to discuss in full detail, but they largely hinge on concepts of class conflict. Whitt extracts the principal themes that typify a category, and those distilled descriptions are applied in this analysis. The fourth and fifth sections address two other theories that have been applied in subsequent analyses of transportation politics. First is the growth machine perspective, which postulates urban growth and speculative land development as the driving forces in American metropolitan decision-making; the principal scholars reviewed are Harvey Molotch (1976; 1993) and Sy Adler (1987). Secondly, regime theory, as applied to transportation politics by James Dunn (1998), echoes elements of Whitt’s class-dialectical model with its interest in social institutions, but also focuses on political ideologies and their impact on transport policy.

4 The final section covers consensus building as defined by Judith Innes (2004). The consensus building approach can be likened to a perfect pluralism, a proactive endeavor to bring all stakeholders to the table for any important political action. However, it generally requires a highly controlled decision-making environment and lacks the dynamism of the pluralist model, which anticipates numerous and diverse interest groups and dramatically shifting political allegiances among them. Also, the consensus building model is the only construct utilized in this paper that has not been used to describe the mechanics of transportation politics. Indeed, it is largely a normative theory suggesting how decision-making should transpire to more evenly distribute benefits. It should be noted that each of the theories outlined herein has its own merits, and none should be viewed merely as an augmentation of another, in spite of the consonance some may exhibit in various movements. Each will be assessed against all the others in Chapter 5. Hence, although the growth machine theory may jibe nicely with certain aspects of Whitt’s elitist model, it is not built on that model, and may emerge as a stronger or weaker explanatory theory in a side by side comparison. However, in keeping with the spirit of the paper, every opportunity will be taken to demonstrate the more complete comprehension that can be achieved by applying multiple models, including those that support and magnify one another, as well as those that seem to contradict each other.

1.1 The Elitist Model The elitist model employed by Whitt presumes that a relatively unified and stable elite class dominates the political process, and decision-making outcomes consistently favor this class above all others. Members of the elite class have similar social, political, and economic backgrounds. They encounter one another in business and in exclusive society. Typically, they hold positions on boards of major corporations (e.g. - banks, oil companies) and/or prominent social institutions (e.g. – chambers of commerce, universities), or they hold political office. Consensus within the class is imperative, and although conflicts of interest may arise, the risk of fraying crucial economic, social, and/or political relations precludes significant upheaval among elites. That is, they are knit together as a socioeconomic class in which individual interests yield to the greater good of the group. It is important to remember that the elitist model does not discount the presence and

5 activity of other interests when examining a political issue. Rather, the model would hold that these interests are often overlooked and do not have the resources to draw attention to their position(s), especially on the same scale that the elites would be able to achieve. The elites establish the class position on a political issue from the outset – indeed, commonly they instigate the discussion – and dictate the terms of debate through mass media. The combination of well- funded campaigns and the fact that there is very little money available to publicize the counter- perspective (the wealthy and propertied are the elite) usually results in public support for the elite position.

1.2 The Pluralist Model The second perspective that Whitt considers is the pluralist model, which holds that numerous interest groups with divergent goals would be actively involved in the decision- making process, and as such, outcomes will not tend to favor any one group in particular. Under the pluralist paradigm, the wealthy, propertied elite class would simply be one among many groups vying for political influence by attempting to organize and mobilize voluntary associations for action. Since the individuals that comprise the assorted groups themselves have varied interests, collective allegiances are short-lived, and the political cauldron is constantly boiling. Pluralists tend to see this model of political activity as an evolution of the elitist model. They might concede that the latter describes very well an oligarchic society in which wealth and power accrue to a handful of people. However, they would view contemporary American society, with its multitudes of immigrants and an exceptionally culturally diverse population, as unwieldy under such a scheme. In the political arena, popularity becomes paramount, and resources are deployed in varied efforts to appeal to myriad discursive groups organized around the common interests and goals of their respective members. Any consistency in political outcomes stems from the effectiveness of individual leaders in successfully marshaling the resources and energies of these groups to sway public opinion.

1.3 The Class-Dialectical Model Whitt’s third (and preferred) model, the class-dialectical model, understands social institutions to be biased in favor of the dominant class. However, it also recognizes that these

6 institutions are governed by numerous constraints, both explicit and implied, that curtail elite dominance. Additionally, inter- and intraclass conflicts arise that affect decision-making. Hence, while elite class interests would typically prevail, their power is constrained by structural limitations and the interests of other groups. While sharing certain points in common with both the pluralist and elitist models, the class-dialectical perspective requires an alteration in the scope of analysis from political actions and actors to power structures and social institutions. Accordingly, Whitt frames his final analysis of California’s transportation politics in light of the imprint of capitalist assumptions on fundamental conceptions of the origins and purposes of transportation. Specifically, in the United States, transportation is understood to be an invaluable component of the process of capital accumulation. As such, decisions regarding the provision of transportation infrastructure should be analyzed in terms of how they address the needs of the dominant class according to economic logic. Being grounded in histories, the class-dialectical model is more difficult to apply in the analysis of a single outcome - or even only a handful of outcomes - than the elitist and pluralist models. Institutional change tends to be gradual, and as such, power relations remain relatively stable. Changes that are observed need to be considered in their historical contexts in order to assess how the dominant class responds to class conflict and structural limitations over time. Without such considerations, consistent outcomes observed during a relatively brief time span may suggest that elitist politics are at work. Conversely, inconsistent outcomes would lend support to the pluralist model when in fact more complex politics are at play. Hence, the class- dialectical model offers several relevant insights into the logic of the entire political apparatus that cannot be observed with the more narrow mechanical foci of the pluralist and elitist models. Scholars subsequent to Whitt have applied different models to explain transportation decision-making. As noted above, these models share certain themes in common with the theories described by Whitt and with each other, but each has emerged from different intellectual origins, allowing them to introduce other dimensions to the analysis. The growth machine model is considered in the next section, followed by regime theory, and a brief overview of consensus building.

7 1.4 The Growth Machine In the vein of the elitist model, Harvey Molotch (1976) postulates that the driving force of elite consensus is the desire to attract growth to the elites’ jurisdiction. Molotch’s argument is rooted in the fact that land is the most significant commodity for establishing wealth and power in the American political system. As such, numerous individual and collective actors take an intense interest in land and decisions affecting its investment potential. This leads them to take an active role in local politics, where most land-use decisions are made. What emerges is an intense competition for scarce developmental resources whereby “government becomes the arena in which land-use interest groups compete for public money and attempt to mold those decisions which will determine the land-use outcomes” (Molotch, 1976, p. 312). Molotch goes on to argue that this process dominates local politics, although it is largely overlooked as more prominent “symbolic” issues take the fore in public debate. These symbolic issues are the headline issues of public morality and social reform, which are mobilized by prospective and incumbent elected officials in order to secure or maintain a position of authority that allows them to affect the “real” politics of distribution – that is, “who, in material terms, gets what, where, and how” (p. 313, emphasis in original). Molotch acknowledges that some politicians are genuinely dedicated to symbolic issues, “but the money and other supports which make them viable as politicians is usually nonsymbolic money” (p. 318), making them directly responsive to issues of resource distribution and diminishing the likelihood of achieving a truly representative government or making progress on symbolic social issues. Contributing to the momentum of the growth machine is the fact that US cities rely on local revenues to provide many basic urban services. The generation of new revenue sources thus takes precedence in the local political scene, and growth and development are understood to be the best opportunities to infuse funds into the public coffers. Aside from the need to enhance revenue flows to maintain and/or improve services, social problems such as homelessness or unemployment are also believed to be vulnerable to the power of growth. In short, growth is seen as intrinsically good, a universal salve to cure all urban woes. (Molotch, 1993) Sy Adler (1987) applies the growth machine framework when considering the politics of transportation. Adler suggests that competition to attract growth, both between and within metropolitan areas, gives rise to place-based coalitions of political and industrial interests who promote parochial agendas. Alliances among coalitions can be achieved when a project permits

8 certain groups to pursue their interests jointly. The place-based coalition takes an interest in transport supply decisions because of the location advantages that might be afforded. The critical concern is to enhance the capacity of a certain area to welcome workers and consumers, creating an economic growth advantage for that area and necessarily disadvantaging other areas. Facility location questions typically fuel debate more than modal considerations. Coalitions of central city interests will tend to promote radial systems that link peripheral neighborhoods to the CBD. Suburban interests would prefer a transportation network that facilitates local economic growth independent of a major center.

1.5 Regime Theory James Dunn’s (1998) use of regime theory hinges on the concept of “modal growth coalitions.” These coalitions consist of business and land interests, political leaders, and workers who benefit from the promotion of a given mode of transport. They forge a “modal benefits regime,” a set of public policies and legislation to allocate benefits to the various members of the coalition. When a growth coalition establishes a benefits regime that gains uncontested favor in the political arena, the resulting condition is referred to as a “policy monopoly.” Competing coalitions may attempt to subvert the policy monopoly by recasting it in a negative light (presumably, the policy monopoly has been established as a result of its broad political appeal). Dunn identifies two basic contending coalitions that have come to dominate transportation politics: the highway promotions regime and the anti-auto vanguard. The former is supported by the popularity and profitability of automotive transport and unified by its adept political maneuvering during most of the 20th century, specifically the establishment of the highway trust fund and its reliance on state and federal cooperation. The latter represents, in Dunn's eyes, a haughty minority composed of self-aggrandizing individuals, gloomy prophets who propose centralized planning and expanded mass transportation, and who decry the evils of the automobile, failing to recognize its numerous benefits and mass appeal. They persistently undermine the highway benefits policy monopoly. While Dunn is certainly not fond of the vanguard’s agenda, renouncing it as politically unpalatable and essentially impractical in the face of widespread personal mobility, he concedes they have achieved some successes in the political and social arenas. He also acknowledges a need to rein in the highway promotions regime, mostly through federal standards dictated to car manufacturers.

9 However, Dunn also recognizes a potent advantage in the vanguard’s approach. He characterizes them as an “advocacy coalition” that organizes people around ideas rather than interests. Being more concerned with the conceptual rather than the material, this group of diverse actors patiently waits for opportunities to infiltrate and manipulate institutions in order to achieve their policy goals over time. Planners are often, though not always, identified with this coalition - those who would impose “smart growth” strategies, increase funding for transit, or promote measures to make drivers bear the full social costs of automotive transport. Like Whitt’s class-dialectical theory, Dunn looks at the institutional underpinnings of the highway regime's policy monopoly, especially the highway trust fund and intergovernmental cooperation in planning and funding roadway investments. Built on longstanding American political traditions (e.g. - federalism; publicly subsidized capital improvements with privately funded operations) these two pillars of the highway regime effectively uphold the automobile as the country's official mode of transport and legitimize the establishment and perpetuation of federal and state highway bureaucracies and pro-highway policies. Also in the same vein as the class-dialectical model, Dunn holds that these structural advantages preserve the automobile's dominance in American transportation policy rather than the unification of an elite class or other cohesive coalition of highway interests. That is, while the highway coalition's various constituents may quarrel over numerous issues, its political foundations are not shaken because of the sturdiness of these institutions. In order to disrupt the highway coalition's dominance, the anti-auto vanguard seeks to delegitimize its institutional support or stake a claim to a share of the proceeds from the gas tax. They justify such claims by pointing to any number of negative externalities associated with widespread automobile usage: traffic congestion, poor air quality, subsidized parking, military expenditures to pursue the nation’s oil interests overseas, and the list goes on. Additionally, they lobby the legislature (state or federal, depending on the issue at hand) to advance their agenda. In so doing, they pay special attention to prominent political issues of the day and look for problems to which to attach their solutions. They also attempt to build institutional momentum by portraying their program as inevitable – “these measures would have to be taken at some point, why not start now?” Dunn's application of regime theory to transportation politics bridges gaps between the elitist, class-dialectical, and growth machine theories. Wealth and property form the basis of

10 political power in the United States. As such, there is an elite class of wealthy land owners that engage the local political arena to impact land use decisions to preserve and augment the status of the class. Their prominence in the political sphere produces institutional biases that tend to favor the elites. However, there are limitations to elite dominance, and class conflicts emerge on various levels. While elitist theory emphasizes consensus within the socioeconomic class, urban elites’ spatial relationships take on an equal significance in the growth machine model. So the geography of elite interests will have a substantial influence on decisions regarding the location of transportation facilities. Moreover, Adler’s place-based coalition may well exist as a modal benefits coalition, depending on the discursive ties of its various members or the ideological bent of its leadership.

1.6 Consensus Building Perhaps unique among the theories outlined herein, which generally anticipate conflicts of interest among social and economic classes, is the consensus building approach. Although it has been employed in a variety of real-world contexts, the consensus building model serves less as an explanatory instrument than a suggested mode for improved decision-making. Far from overlooking prospective conflicts, this approach seeks to air the interests of all relevant stakeholders and to analyze all possible alternatives before selecting a course of action. A “pure” application of the consensus building method requires attention to several fairly rigorous requirements (see Chapter 2), and the process can take a long time. In some instances the duration of consensus building deliberations is sufficient to preclude full implementation of the process since elected leaders have relatively brief time spans within which to forge a legacy before the next election cycle. Given these constraints, it seems highly unlikely that an organization or jurisdiction that did not specifically pursue a consensus building process, possibly including the aid of a qualified facilitator, would develop and implement one that meets the prescribed conditions. The theoretical underpinnings of the consensus building model are somewhat complex and not necessarily germane to the analysis undertaken in this paper. The broad strokes outlined here and in Chapter 2 come from an article by Judith Innes (2004) that responds to criticisms of the consensus building paradigm and attempts to clarify the basic elements of the process. It is included because certain collaborative processes that might be overlooked by the other models

11 described herein may emerge and receive their due attention by applying this lens to the analysis of Charlotte’s urban transportation politics.

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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 described six models of metropolitan decision-making. These models serve as different modes of analysis for understanding how Charlotte came to the decision to embark upon an ambitious rapid transit investment program. While the paper focuses on the transportation planning history of a specific metropolitan region, it does so primarily to investigate the power of each model to explain that region's political processes. The descriptions in Chapter 1 reveal that although each model has a distinct analytical focus, they all provide insight into the politics of transportation. This paper applies these insights to organize a history of the decision-making process in Charlotte that permits evaluation of the degree to which the models explain the region’s decision to construct rapid transit. Class considerations, interest group activities, institutional structures, geographic relationships, ideologies, and comprehensive attempts at regional collaboration all influence decision-making outcomes and impact the planning and policy trajectories of an urban area. There is not a single theoretical construct that considers all of these elements equally. By employing multiple models that tend to emphasize one of the above factors, a comprehensive understanding of metropolitan decision-making can be achieved. To demonstrate this, Chapters 3 and 4 recount the history of transportation planning in Charlotte, and Chapter 5 compares the events of that narrative to the tenets of each of the six political models. If it is true that the application of multiple models yields a more complete understanding of urban decision-making, there will be various elements of Charlotte's regional transportation decision-making that can be explained by each of the models. If one model seems to explain most of the events that took place in Charlotte, but the others provide additional supportive insights, there remains value in deploying multiple models. However, if the history conforms primarily to one theory and seems to mostly contradict the others, there would be no basis for using a variety of theories in the analysis of urban politics. The first half of this chapter defines the structure and mechanics of the decision-making process that would be expected in a metropolitan area if a given theory accurately described the area's politics. As in the previous chapter, each theory is considered individually. Synopses of

13 other historical analyses guided by each model are provided as examples of how they explain metropolitan decision-making. Then expectations are outlined for how Charlotte's story should unfold according to each model. The descriptions provided herein are revisited in Chapter 5, which considers each theory in light of the historical events detailed in the intervening chapters. The second half of the chapter describes what information was obtained to reconstruct the history of transportation planning in Charlotte leading up to the decision to invest in rapid transit. Information is provided on the printed materials and interviewed subjects that contributed to the historical account found in this paper. A description of how interviews were scheduled and conducted is also included.

2.1 Theoretical Expectations This section provides further insight into each of the political models described in Chapter 1 and establishes criteria for each model that will be used to evaluate how well it explains events in Charlotte.

2.1.1 The Elitist Model As noted in Chapter 1, the elitist model proffers a cohesive elite class that tends to direct all actors on the political stage. As such, resolutions disproportionately favor the elites above other interested parties. Whitt’s criteria for espousing an elitist model of urban politics are as follows:

…[T]he study of an important political issue should reveal (1) a high degree of elite involvement, (2)general convergence of interest among elites, (3) elite unity and dominance on the issue, (4) stability of political allegiances, and (5) outcomes that tend to favor elites. (p. 31)

Whitt cites the involvement of business elites in the construction of rapid transit in the San Francisco Bay Area as an example of elite politics at work. There, several major downtown business leaders coalesced to form the not-for-profit Bay Area Council (BAC) that was heavily involved in the early planning stages of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) System and instrumental in financing the campaign to issue bonds backed by local property taxes that

14 ultimately made construction of the rapid transit network feasible. Of preeminent concern for the BAC and their elite allies was bolstering land values in central San Francisco, where they had substantial land interests, even if they did not necessarily expect to stem the tide of suburban growth and continued decentralization of capital. Indeed, while BART supporters emphasized relief from traffic congestion and development concentrated around rapid transit stations, Whitt argues that there are several reasons to believe that the system was never intended to compete with the automobile and decentralization. In the first case, inasmuch as BART boasts a number of suburban stations, proponents of the system clearly did not oppose decentralized growth per se, but rather sought to focus it in particular areas. Whitt suggests that these stations ultimately had the effect of making suburban living and auto-ownership easier for many of the region’s residents. As such, members of the elite class whose interests were closely tied to the automobile or to suburban development had little incentive to oppose the system. Furthermore, campaign advertising touted mobility and environmental benefits that the average citizen would not likely oppose, so there was minimal community opposition, and that which was aroused could not hope to muster sufficient funding to compete with elite interests. In this example, the critical elements align to suggest that an elitist model of urban politics is sufficient to identify a locus of power that shaped local and regional resolutions. If the elitist model explained events in Charlotte, a similar pattern would be observed. Central city business interests would be intimately involved in the planning process from the early stages, possibly even initiating discussions on rapid transit in the region's future. In Charlotte, NationsBank and First Union Bank (now Bank of America and Wachovia, respectively) were two major employers with substantial land holdings in the CBD (also referred to as “Uptown” in Charlotte). Whether leading the initiative or merely supporting it, the business elites would work in concert with other members of their class, including political and institutional leaders. The class consensus would result in streamlined campaigns (i.e. - consistent messages with minimal opposition) and political outcomes that would be generally agreeable to all members of the class. As in the San Francisco example, Charlotte's rapid transit system might be seen as bolstering rents in the Uptown vicinity without crippling the pace of decentralized, auto-oriented developments on the fringe, thereby minimizing suburban opposition. Campaigns touting

15 benefits like congestion relief and improved air quality would help to build popular support, while elite consensus on the issue would minimize the funds available for opposing interests to run a counter-campaign.

2.1.2 The Pluralist Model The pluralist model portrays urban elites simply as one of many groups with varied interests attempting to engage the political process and impact policy outcomes. Indeed, the elites as defined under the elitist model might not exist as a group at all according to the pluralist paradigm if those individuals’ interests and preferences differed sufficiently to dissolve their bonds. Fluid allegiances are a critical component of the pluralist perspective. Whitt’s criteria for endorsing this model are as follows:

…[T]he study of an important political issue should reveal (1) the active involvement of numerous interest groups, (2) divergent goals and interests among the groups, (3) a vigorous, competitive relationship among the groups, (4) interests and alliances that shift over time, and (5) political outcomes that consistently favor no particular group over any other. (p. 31)

Several aspects of the transportation measures examined by Whitt support the pluralist paradigm as well. Most notably, two similar California state ballot measures - Proposition 18 of 1970 and Proposition 5 of 1974 - both aimed to divert money from the State's highway trust fund to pay for mass transit improvements. While the former was vehemently opposed by highway lobby elites, the latter received a great deal of support from downtown business elites similar to those that supported BART. Such discrepancy among elites and shifting support for similar measures epitomize the variability that pluralists suggest characterize American politics. Another example of pluralist politics at work may be visible in Zachary Schrag’s (2006) account of the planning and building of Metro in Washington, D.C. A decades-long saga, Metro met with support and opposition from different political associations, neighborhood organizations, and special interest groups at different times during its inception and implementation. Moreover, some groups changed their position at different stages, demonstrating the fluidity of interests and allegiances that the pluralist model emphasizes.

16 Certain routing and station location decisions, as well as the lack of a dedicated funding mechanism for the system are the results of an inability to establish a consensus among all the various groups that organized for action in response to Metro. If Charlotte's decision to build rapid transit resulted from pluralist processes, the participation of numerous and varied interest groups would be immediately evident. Certain groups may have formed temporary alliances at various stages of the development of the region's transit vision, and individual participants may have worked with different, possibly competing, organizations at different times. If political outcomes tended to favor certain interests, this would be attributable to effective individual leadership, perhaps by a popular political figure, in mustering sufficient support from various groups to push the transit planning process forward.

2.1.3 The Class-Dialectical Model Shifting from the emphasis placed on political actors’ social, economic, and political relationships (either static as in the elitist model or unstable as in the pluralist), the class- dialectical theory focuses on institutional biases and historical power relations. The criteria for subscribing to this model reflect the more complex modes of investigation:

…(1) biases of social institutions that favor outcomes beneficial to dominant classes; (2) evidence of latent class conflict (divergent interests) or observable class conflict over the issue, perhaps including intraclass conflicts among the dominant class, but accompanied by attempts to achieve class unity and cohesion; (3) political alliances and stability of power relations that are historically contingent, reflecting the need to respond to inter- and intraclass conflicts and structural crisis; and (4) outcomes that usually favor dominant class interests, but may also reflect the power of opposing classes and the limitations imposed by structural conditions. (Whitt, p. 31-32)

Considering the example of BART, in spite of years of elite class consensus regarding the desirability of an auto-dominated metropolis, the resulting flight from central cities challenged the accumulation capacity of downtown locations. The business leaders (especially the BAC) took a proactive stance to reinvigorate that capacity by constructing a radial mass transit

17 network. The tension between the momentum of decentralization as a reflection of socialized notions of private transport and the desire among segments of the elite class to bolster rents in central locations relates to the second criterion listed above. The temporal aspect of the same scenario pertains to the third. In a similar scenario, voters in Los Angeles opted not to tax themselves extra to pay for a BART-like system some years after, demonstrating that elite class consensus bodes well for victory but cannot ensure it, as the final criterion suggests. The first criterion is more or less axiomatic. That the social institutions of a capitalist society would generally favor the holders of capital is not surprising. To uphold the class dialectical model as an explanation of decision-making in Charlotte, historical events would have to reveal attempts to develop elite class consensus in the face of some level of intraclass conflict. Decision-making outcomes would typically favor elites but would be structurally constrained and sometimes responsive to other interests. Following the example of BART above, threats to the accumulation capacity of properties in the CBD imposed by sprawling suburban development may have led Charlotte's urban elites to consider rapid transit as a way of securing their financial futures. However, without political and financial support from the suburbs, no transit projects would be constructed. Power relationships within and among the City of Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, and the Towns would remain relatively stable but could evolve over time in response to different levels of class conflict or if existing power structures became unable to meet the demands of the elite class.

2.1.4 The Growth Machine Molotch and Adler postulate that land ownership is the fundamental source of power in American politics. As such, place-based growth coalitions take an active interest in decisions affecting land use patterns and development potential, including transportation facility choices. Politicians operate on two levels, deploying a symbolic politics of social rectitude and negotiating the real politics of distributing material resources. Sincerity in the former is understood to be less critical than pressures on the latter. That is, a civic leader who touts the social benefits of mass transit will have little chance of enhancing its presence in an area without demonstrating material benefits to the key land owners. Applying the growth machine model, one would expect Charlotte’s decision to invest in rapid transit to be couched in the rhetoric of a transit-benefits regime. Political leaders would

18 garner support for the plan by touting mass social benefits, which they might actually expect, but which would likely be less tangible than the benefits that would ultimately accrue to the land-use interest groups who are behind the plan. These would include public and private entities. On the public side, focusing development within the municipal boundary would boost tax revenues and reduce the costs of expanding infrastructure in the future. Private land-holding interests in the areas targeted for development would benefit from increased accessibility to their properties and an associated augmentation of rents in the area. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the growth machine also brings spatial relationships to the fore, which can create some tension within the model itself. Municipalities would naturally seek localized growth for the reasons noted above, but private land holders may be more interested in speculative fringe development, depending on the nature of the region. For example, Adler cites the defeat of numerous mass transit proposals in the Los Angeles area, attributing them to the presence and alliance of numerous growth coalitions who preferred sprawling autonomous development to more focused schemes centered on the core municipality. Applying a parallel logic to the Charlotte region, including the several outlying jurisdictions, one would expect to find a number of place-based growth coalitions serving highly localized interests. Facility location decisions would need to serve the most influential of these coalitions in order to foster alliances. Groups that do not see their interests being served by a radial transit network focused on Charlotte’s central core would oppose the transit plan, while those keen to promote joint development would support it. The growth coalitions would differ from Dunn's anti-auto vanguard in that they would be organized around interests in real property rather than the idea of reducing reliance on the automobile. As such, the same areas would probably support a similarly designed highway plan if it offered the same material benefits. A preference for transit could emerge if the coalition became convinced that auto-centric development ultimately would stifle profits and that transit could support a more lucrative development scenario. They also differ slightly from the urban elites described by Whitt in that they demonstrate a concern for the practical realities of highly localized political contexts. Whitt’s analyses predominantly follow metropolitan trends, but the growth machine permits examination of intraregional conflicts.

19 2.1.5 Regime Theory Dunn portrays transportation decision-making as dominated by two powerful modal growth coalitions: the reigning highway benefits regime and the perpetually subversive anti-auto vanguard. Given Charlotte’s decision to invest in light rail and Dunn’s perception of the car as a vastly superior and naturally preferred mode of transport, one would have to assume that the vanguard (or some other transit promotions coalition) is active in the Queen City. Otherwise, the combined advantages of automotive transport and the political fortitude of the highway promotions regime would have produced a highway-based vision for the area. If the decision to build rapid transit in Charlotte resulted from the activities of such a group – perhaps meddlesome planners hoping to craft an urban utopia in a rapidly growing region – their strategy would correspond to the primary elements that Dunn identifies for the movement more broadly: raising public awareness of auto-related social costs, actively lobbying legislative bodies to attach solutions to problems, and presenting their program as ultimately inevitable. To be effective, the vanguard would need members – or at least sympathetic allies – in prominent public positions. The roles, associations, and ideologies of the region's most influential politicians, bureaucrats, and citizen organizations merit attention to investigate the presence and activity of the anti-auto vanguard in Charlotte. It might also be true that transportation planning in Charlotte resembles the kind of “auto, plus” strategy that Dunn offers in response to the vanguard’s “unrealistic” goals. Indeed, Thompson (2007) suggests that Portland, Oregon’s transition from a typical sprawling American metro to the transit-friendly planning Mecca it has become falls in line more with the “auto, plus” paradigm than the vanguard’s anti-auto rhetoric. Thompson points out that power brokers in Portland recognized the broad appeal of the automobile and transferred funds from rejected freeway projects to local roads as well as transit improvements, but these investments were to be tailored to support local planning objectives. Applied loosely, the “auto, plus” model would postulate a similar synthesis of interests in creating a complete transportation network that does not deny the benefit of personal mobility but effectively addresses some of the more conspicuous problems associated with a car-dependent populous. It should be reiterated, however, that Dunn puts more faith in improving the automobile itself than in most strategies that would propose to offer alternatives to it.

20 2.1.6 Consensus Building The consensus building model provides a platform to develop political solutions that address the concerns of all the relevant stakeholders. Judith Innes (2004), a scholar at the fore of consensus building theory, in a response to critics of some of the tenets of consensus building, outlines several conditions that should be met when entering deliberations. These include:

1. Inclusion of a full range of stakeholders; 2. A task that is meaningful to the participants and that has promise of having a timely impact; 3. Participants who set their own ground rules for behavior, agenda setting, making decisions and many other topics; 4. A process that begins with mutual understanding of interests and avoids positional bargaining; 5. A dialog where all are heard and respected and equally able to participate; 6. A self-organizing process unconstrained by conveners in its time or content and which permits the status quo and all assumptions to be questioned; 7. Information that is accessible and fully shared among participants; 8. An understanding that ‘consensus’ is only reached when all interests have been explored and every effort has been made to satisfy these concerns. (p. 7)

The extent to which consensus building theory applies in Charlotte will depend on the level of stakeholder participation in transportation planning decisions. If decision makers in Charlotte proactively sought input from a full range of interests that would be impacted by rapid transit with the intent of responding to those interests and achieving broad consensus on the region's urban transportation future, their actions would embody the underlying principles of consensus building. Records of planning discussions and developments would be relatively easy to access for the general public. Perhaps there would be arenas in which stakeholders were self- organized and unconstrained in the time and content of their discussion. It is often helpful, though not always necessary, to employ a trained facilitator to ensure that all conditions stipulated above are met. As noted in Chapter 1, consensus building is very

21 much a proactive process, meaning that these criteria would not all generally be observed in the study of most major metropolitan issues. However, inasmuch as certain decisions are reached through collaboration and inclusive processes, the model provides a way to account for those.

2.2 Sources The history of Charlotte's transportation planning presented in the next two chapters was constructed from a variety of different sources. Much of the history can be derived from published sources such as planning documents and newspaper articles. However, additional and more specific and insightful information was obtained by interviewing individuals involved in the development of the region's rapid transit and supportive land use strategy from its inception through its implementation. A description of the sources used and the subjects interviewed is offered below.

2.2.1 Print Sources A large portion of the history of transit planning in Charlotte is chronicled in technical planning documents. This paper relies heavily on the information and recommendations presented in these documents since the 1980s. Some of these focused solely on transportation, but the most influential addressed both transportation and land use issues. The Charlotte Transit Corridors Study was completed in June 1989 by the Charlotte Department of Transportation (CDOT). The consulting firm Barton-Aschman and Associates, Inc. was retained to work with CDOT on the study, which was intended to examine the feasibility and need for “capital-intensive transit improvements” (p. 12) in several corridors and to identify low cost actions to meet contemporary transit needs. The Transit Corridors Study also discussed several important previous documents that were not available, including the 1977 Long Range Transit Plan and the 1988 Independence Boulevard HOV Lane Plan. These documents are discussed in Chapter 3. In 1993, CDOT published the 1995-2015 Charlotte Transportation Plan. As part of that plan, the consulting firm Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade, and Douglas, Inc. created the Charlotte Fixed Guideway Study. The study examined the feasibility of rapid transit in up to eight corridors and the effectiveness of light rail versus bus rapid transit (BRT) improvements. The report is discussed in Chapter 3 as one of the critical transportation planning documents that

22 brought rapid transit to the fore of the region's planning discussions and identified the South Corridor as the region's best option for initiating rapid transit planning. In 1992, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission (CMPC) and Michael Gallis and Associates produced a document that they called a “Regional Sourcebook for the Long-Term Growth of Charlotte-Mecklenburg.” The sourcebook was colorful and glossy with illustrations of future land development patterns, maps of Charlotte and other areas, and bullet-point text. The theme of the document was that significant growth was coming to the region, and the region needed to decide how it would handle that growth. Transportation issues took the fore, and the document largely explains how Charlotte's transportation strategies would impact its future urban form. It is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, and is referred to throughout this paper as the “Concepts of Growth” sourcebook. Another sourcebook entitled “Centers and Corridors: A User Guide to the Long Term Growth of Charlotte-Mecklenburg” was produced in 1998. It lays out the conceptual transportation and land use vision for the region. The sourcebook is used to describe the “centers and corridors” concept that emerged in the early 1990s. The concept simply promotes focused growth in established urban centers and along principle transportation corridors. It was seen as an efficient means of accommodating Charlotte-Mecklenburg's rapid growth. The 1998 sourcebook echoes the principles articulated in an earlier version published in 1994, although it is more detailed. The 1994 sourcebook was not available, but the 1998 version embodies its spirit and is used to discuss the strategy and its importance in the regions transportation planning, including the Committee of 100 report and the 2025 Integrated Transit and Land Use Plan. It is commonly referred to in this paper as the “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook. In 1993, Charlotte Mayor Richard Vinroot appointed a “Committee of 100” to study the region's transportation options and develop a consensus on a vision for the region's future. The Committee of 100's Final Report in late 1994 describes the composition of the committee and outlines its recommendations in five areas: land use, roads, environmental and transportation technology, transit service alternatives, and intergovernmental roles and finance. The report informs a significant portion of the history presented in Chapter 3. Two years following the Committee of 100's report, Charlotte's new Mayor Pat McCrory appointed a Committee of 10 to refine the recommendations in the report and develop a short term program for transportation improvements in the City of Charlotte. The Committee of 10

23 was also charged with identifying potential funding sources for implementing their program. A published document of the Committee of 10's five-year program was not available. However, John Muth delivered an undated program that outlines the issues they addressed and their recommendations. These were the recommendations that were presented to the City, County, and Towns in early 1997 before the region's representatives in Raleigh pursued enabling legislation for a dedicated funding source for transit. Contemporary with the Committee of 10's work, a statewide panel called the Transit 2001 Commission analyzed the need to invest in public transportation systems to accommodate growth throughout North Carolina. The commission was appointed in September 1995 by Governor Jim Hunt, a Democrat from Greensboro, NC. Their final report was delivered to Governor Hunt and the North Carolina General Assembly in February 1997 and addressed rural and human services transportation, urban and regional transit, intercity passenger rail service, and land use and development issues. The commission's final report is discussed briefly in Chapter 4 as its recommendations to increase State funding for transit helped Charlotte planners prepare a financial strategy for building rapid transit projects in the Charlotte region. The 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan was created as a public information document prior to the vote in November of 1998 on a referendum to impose a half-cent sales tax in Mecklenburg County for transit funding. The CMPC and CDOT led the multi-agency effort to create the 2025 Plan. The plan laid out the changes that would be needed in the City and County's land use and transportation policies to effectively implement rapid transit. The document gave more specific recommendations than any of the previous plans that addressed transportation and land use and was pivotal in convincing the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners to put the sales tax referendum on the ballot. While the 2025 Plan was being created, Charlotte City Council member Mike Jackson wrote a report that he called “Fiduciary Alternatives for Charlotte's Transportation System” or FACTS. The FACTS report criticized the proposed sales tax's focus on transit, especially rail transit, and argued that it should be reconfigured to include all kinds of transportation projects. Jackson wanted a plan that focused on highway building and bus transit. The FACTS report refuted claims by rail proponents about the cost-effectiveness of rail transit and suggested that costs would be higher than projected and ridership lower. Dr. Robert Cervero of the University of California-Berkeley, who contributed to the 2025 Plan, responded to the FACTS report in a

24 letter to Jackson and Charlotte City Council, addressing the issues and statistics Jackson raised to argue against rapid transit. The 2025 Plan, the FACTS report, and Cervero's response are covered in detail in Chapter 4. In addition to technical documents, newspaper articles contemporary with the major movements in the development of the region’s rapid transit commitment are referenced. The articles provide some insight into public opinion and the positions of politicians during the development of a regional transportation and land use philosophy. These insights are applied not only in retracing the planning history in Chapters 3 and 4, but also for evaluating the explanatory power of the various political models in Chapter 5. Finally, other printed records like interagency memoranda and public meeting minutes can explain certain events not detailed in planning documents. One such source is the minutes from a special joint meeting of the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), Charlotte City Council, and Mecklenburg County Commissioners in May of 2007. The meeting was held to explain the history of the MTC, how its structure was determined, how it had changed since 1999, and how it might change in the future. The discussions included a number of public leaders who were involved in establishing the MTC and pursuing enabling legislation from the North Carolina General Assembly to levy a half-cent sales tax in Mecklenburg County. Their accounts provide information about State politics and regional priorities that cannot be gleaned from other sources.

2.2.2 Interviews To supplement the information provided by print sources, several individuals who were involved with the development of the region’s transit and land use philosophy and specific planning efforts were interviewed. The interview process was approved by the Florida State University Human Subjects Committee (HSC). Potential interviewees' names and positions were provided to the HSC, as was a list of questions and a behavioral consent form. The consent form outlined the study for those people being interviewed and explained that their participation was voluntary and that their contributions would not remain confidential since the credibility of the information they provided is a function of who they are and their work in Charlotte's transportation planning over the years. The information they would provide was related to public documents and activities, so they would incur no significant risks by participating but could

25 refuse to answer questions for any reason. Potential subjects were contacted via e-mail to request their participation and schedule meetings. The approved consent form was attached to the initial e-mail for subjects' review. All meetings took place in Charlotte during the month of July 2008, but in most cases additional correspondence took place during the ensuing months for follow-up questioning. Before discussions began, each subject signed a hard copy of the behavioral consent form. Although the roster of potential subjects submitted to the HSC included planners and politicians, the only participants in the end were four planners (the participants are described later in this section). Interview questions were designed to initiate discussion on various aspects of rapid transit planning in Charlotte; they were informed by the history presented in the published sources. The questions only dealt with broad topics of discussion, and responses often led to more detailed lines of inquiry and in some cases to additional unforeseen topics. The approved behavioral consent form, forms signed by participants, and the approved survey instrument can be found in Appendix A. As noted above, the subjects interviewed in this study were all planners. Each was involved at different levels and in different aspects of planning in Charlotte leading up to the decision to build rapid transit. Therefore, the history presented in the next two chapters is primarily told from the perspective of the planning profession. However, since part of the paper's purpose is to highlight planners' roles and interactions in metropolitan decision-making, the narrative presented is appropriate and useful, even though it is not comprehensive. Some brief biographical information about each of the individuals interviewed is presented below. Martin Cramton served as the Director of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission from 1979-2003. He received a bachelor’s degree in planning from Michigan State University in 1965 and a master’s in political science from Portland State University (Oregon) in 1976. Before coming to Charlotte, Cramton served as Planning Director for Washington County and subsequently Multnomah County in the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area between 1973 and 1979. He stated that he played a leading role in creating the Portland Metropolitan Urban Growth Boundary and in drafting both counties’ comprehensive plans to meet planning and regulatory standards established by the State of Oregon. He also was involved with the initial stages of the Portland region’s light rail/land use strategy. (M.R. Cramton, personal communication, September 17, 2008)

26 Lynn Purnell served as the Transportation Planning Manager for the Charlotte Department of Transportation from 1986 - 1999. He earned a bachelor’s in civil engineering from North Carolina State University and later received a master’s in civil engineering from Purdue University. He stated that his work as a public transit manager in Monroe, Louisiana and Roanoke, Virginia gave him a good understanding of fixed-route bus system planning and operations before coming to Charlotte. During his time with the City, he was involved with the development of the 2005 Long Range Transportation Plan and worked with consultants on a number of transit corridor studies. (L. Purnell, personal communication, September 17, 2008) John Muth currently serves as the Deputy Director for Development for the Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS). He earned a bachelor's degree and master's degree in civil engineering from the University of West Virginia. Muth led work on the transit portion of the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan in 1998 (J.M. Muth, personal communication, September 29, 2008). In addition to responding to interview questions, Muth also provided Power Point presentations on the region's light rail planning that he has delivered to conferences such as the American Society of Civil Engineers and to visiting delegations from other cities including Atlanta and Tampa. He also provided brochures and advertisements from different stages of the region's transportation planning as well as access to archives of memoranda and newspaper articles. Laura Harmon is the Assistant Director of Strategic Planning Services for the Charlotte- Mecklenburg Planning Commission. She came to the CMPC in 1990 and has been involved in business corridor revitalization, district plans, and land use planning for the LYNX Blue Line. Harmon earned a bachelor's degree in civil engineering fro Duke University in 1982 and a master's degree in city planning from the Georgia Institute of Technology in 1987. (Harmon, personal communication, October 21, 2008) Even with the insight provided by each individual interviewed and the printed materials reviewed, the history that follows in the next two chapters is not definitive. Some interactions and affiliations at the local level and especially at the State and Federal levels are difficult to describe in detail. Occasionally, informed speculation is required in narrating the events that took place. Some of the speculative details receive further attention in Chapter 5 as each political model will apply unique logic in inferring how certain outcomes were achieved.

27

CHAPTER 3: CENTERS, CORRIDORS, AND WEDGES

Chapters 3 and 4 present a historical narrative of the events of Charlotte's decision to build light rail. Chapter 5 then considers the events of this narrative and compares them to the expectations outlined in Chapter 2 to assess the applicability of the various theoretical models in Charlotte. This chapter focuses on the emergence of rapid transit in the region's transportation and land use planning initiatives; the identification of transit corridors and the development of a focused growth strategy; and the promotion of a supportive transportation and land use philosophy for the region. The first section briefly outlines changes in the overall planning program for the Charlotte metro. The second section describes early rapid transit planning efforts that examined various modal and corridor alternatives for expanding transit service in the region. The penultimate section discusses two “regional sourcebooks” that provided the region's overarching planning philosophy, reviewing several growth scenarios and laying out a preferred alternative consisting of concentrated development supported by enhanced transit service. The final section considers the Committee of 100, an advisory panel of appointed business, political, and neighborhood representatives who refined the principles defined in the sourcebooks and spearheaded the campaign to promote rapid transit and supportive development patterns.

3.1 A New Direction Perhaps the most important factor impacting transit and land use planning in the Charlotte region was the recruitment and appointment of Martin Cramton as Director of the Charlotte- Mecklenburg Planning Commission (CMPC) in 1979. The CMPC is the land use planning body for the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. It consists of an appointed board of commissioners and the staff who support them. Cramton’s role as Director made him the highest-ranking staff member. While planning documents and final decisions would officially be made by the commissioners, the activities of the CMPC described in this paper invariably refer to those being carried out by the staff. In addition to their land use planning responsibilities, the CMPC also coordinates strategies and initiatives with the Mecklenburg-Union Metropolitan

28 Planning Organization (MUMPO), which oversees transportation planning in Mecklenburg County and the urbanized portions of Union County. (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Department, n.d.; Mecklenburg-Union Metropolitan Planning Organization, n.d.) Cramton came to the CMPC from the Portland, Oregon region where he had served as the Planning Director for first Washington County and later Multnomah County. He was involved with the establishment of Portland's urban growth boundary and the region's light rail initiative. He brought to Charlotte an emphasis on regional planning and coordinated transit and land use planning. (Cramton, personal communication, September 17, 2008) At the time of Cramton's appointment, the CMPC was “dominated by real estate interests” (Cramon, personal communication, July 14, 2008). The local Realtor's Association, Home Builders Association, and similar groups representing real estate, contractor, and developer interests heavily lobbied local political bodies to affect planning decisions. The CMPC commissioners had significant editorial authority over staff recommendations, so that outcomes of the planning process also tended to favor the real estate and development communities. (Cramton, personal communication, October 7, 2008) In the late 1970's, neighborhoods were beginning to formally organize to counteract the lobbying efforts of the real estate and development interests. Their activities led to changes in the composition of the Charlotte City Council. The new Council was responsive to these neighborhood interests, which expressed concerns over several planning, land use, and regulatory issues (Cramton, personal communication, October 7, 2008). It is not entirely clear what these issues were specifically, but it is evident that the neighborhoods wanted a more inclusive planning process, one in which public participation played a greater role than it had up until that time. Pressure from neighborhood interests prompted the new City Council to look for a new planning director, and they ultimately recruited Cramton for the job. When Cramton was hired, he reorganized the CMPC to devote more staff resources to public involvement initiatives. His staff developed a list of neighborhood organizations and their officers to improve public awareness of involvement efforts and expedite coalition building. Cramton launched an “Urban Symposium” in 1980 to meet with citizens and neighborhood leaders to identify the region's principal planning issues and set the CMPC's planning agenda. From that process, Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioner adopted a multi-year planning program that was rooted in citizen participation. (Cramton,

29 personal communication, July 14, 2008; see also Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission [CMPC], 2003) Charlotte City Council also wanted to develop a clear agenda for the CMPC and articulate the public role in redeveloping Uptown Charlotte, its surrounding communities, and the city's principal business corridors. Charlotte's urban core was not heavily populated, but some residential growth had begun during the 1970's in the Fourth Ward, the northern quadrant of the Uptown area. Meanwhile, business corridors were run down. Along South Boulevard, the road that runs roughly parallel to the LYNX Blue Line today, industrial zoning was in place for a market that did not exist. The corridor was characterized by vacant and/or deteriorating industrial and commercial uses. Cramton sought to spur urban revitalization through public investment. Fourth Ward residential growth followed collaborative public-private efforts focusing on infrastructure investments and mortgage programs. In 1986, Charlotte City Council created a $5 million corridor reinvestment fund to revitalize business corridors, including South Boulevard. (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008; see also CMPC, 2003) These programs led to reinvestment in both the urban core neighborhoods as well as the corridors. After the Fourth Ward programs, the Third Ward (western quadrant) saw commercial, institutional, and residential investment in the 1980s, followed by major residential investments in the First Ward (eastern quadrant) in the 90’s. Just south of Uptown in the South End neighborhood, abandoned mills, warehouses, and industrial sites were being redeveloped into condos, apartments, and arts centers. This area is served by South Boulevard and development continues along the LYNX Blue Line. (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008; see also CMPC, 2003) Finally, Cramton sought a way to foster a regional scope for planning in Charlotte in which numerous jurisdictions could cooperate to manage growth in the metro area. In the early 1980s, Cramton and his staff organized political leaders from Charlotte and the surrounding municipalities to draft “Spheres of Influence” (SOI) agreements (Figure 2). These documents established boundaries for annexation for each of Mecklenburg's municipalities, thereby eliminating a prospective source of conflict among the various cities and towns as the area continued to grow. The SOI agreements also hemmed in the City of Charlotte and restricted its ability to absorb an expanding tax base on the urban periphery. Being restrained in its ability to capture fringe growth, Charlotte was forced to consider mechanisms for attracting growth within

30 its boundaries. (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008; Harmon, personal communication, July 22, 2008)

3.2 Early Rapid Transit Planning While Cramton was reshaping the nature of land use planning in the Charlotte- Mecklenburg area, the region's transportation planners began to discuss the role of transit and the most appropriate corridors to serve with rapid transit at some point in the future. Before the creation of CATS in 1999 (see Chapter 4), Charlotte Transit - a small division of CDOT - operated the city's bus system. Charlotte City Council had adopted a goal to recover 40% of the system's operating expenses through passenger fares. Although the system grew modestly during the 1980s and 90s, expansions were difficult because of the impact they would have on the farebox recovery ratio. Some express routes enabled white-collar workers to commute from the suburbs to jobs in Uptown, but the overwhelming majority of transit riders were transit- dependent citizens who did not own cars. (Purnell, personal communication, September 17, 2008) The 1977 Long Range Transit Plan, completed by Wilbur Smith and Associates for CDOT, supported expanded bus operations and the creation of dedicated bus lanes in four corridors: Independence Boulevard, Little Sugar Creek (or the SouthPark area), Charlotte- Douglas Airport, and North Tryon Street to the University of North Carolina Charlotte (UNCC). These corridors were selected because they had both immediate needs for expanded bus operations and the greatest potential for long term transit investments. The study did not address engineering concerns or environmental impacts, and it was never fully implemented. However, the busway for the Independence corridor was partially developed. In 1988, the Independence Boulevard HOV Lane Plan provided design specifications and environmental analyses for the conversion of Independence to an expressway with a reversible median lane that could be used as a dedicated busway or opened to bus and carpool traffic.* (Charlotte Department of Transportation [CDOT], 1989). In 1989 the consulting firm Barton-Aschman and Associates delivered the Transit Corridors Study as part of CDOT's 2005 Charlotte Transportation Plan. The study examined

* The conversion of Independence from an urban arterial roadway to a limited access highway is an ongoing NCDOT project, presumably to enhance regional mobility. An HOV lane has been part of the plan from the early project planning stages.

31 three alternative scenarios for enhancing the region's transit network: (1.) an expanded bus system; (2.) a busway/HOV system in five corridors with supportive local bus service; and (3.) a light rail transit (LRT) system in eight corridors with local bus service. Although the study found the LRT system would generate the highest ridership of the three alternatives, it would also be the most costly to construct. Therefore, the study recommended that the city explore a combination of rail and bus improvements to augment the transit network. While the report claimed that regional population and employment densities could not support fixed guideway transit improvements, it identified existing rail rights-of-way in LRT corridors as invaluable community resources. It also called for developing plans and policies for focused growth in high-density corridors to support any eventual rapid transit investment and touted LRT as an economic development catalyst. (CDOT, 1989) In 1993 a team of consultants led by Parsons Brinkerhoff Quade and Douglas, Inc. (PBQD) completed the Charlotte Fixed Guideway Study for CDOT, which found both BRT and LRT to be viable transit technologies for major regional transit investments. The study considered the eight corridors identified in the Transit Corridors Study, and proposed a 26-mile LRT starter system consisting of the Airport, Pineville (South Boulevard), and Matthews (Independence Boulevard) corridors. The latter two corridors were prioritized because densities and socioeconomic demographic data suggested they would attract the highest ridership. Even so, the study recommended changes in land use regulations to foster development better suited for transit service. PBQD also advised the City of Charlotte to acquire land to protect transit rights-of-way in the corridors. (CDOT, 1993; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008). Thus, for about a decade and a half, Charlotte mulled over the most appropriate way to expand transit service in the city and the region while protecting rapid transit rights-of-way for potential future projects. The Spheres of Influence agreements also paved the way for developing a regional strategy for managing growth and connecting the region's principal urban centers. The strategy of building rapid transit and focusing growth in major centers and corridors was conceived during these early stages, but its acceptance as the region's official planning policy depended first on the effective illustration and discussion of alternative growth scenarios, and secondly, on consensus among the area's business and political leaders. The former requirement was addressed by a series of “regional sourcebooks,” while the latter was achieved

32 by the Committee of 100.

3.3 The Regional Sourcebooks of 1992 and 1994 From 1970 to 1990, the population of the City of Charlotte grew from 241,420 residents to 395,934 residents, while the population of Mecklenburg County grew from 354,656 residents to 511,433 residents (US Census, 1993). During this time, the City annexed substantial portions of the County’s unincorporated areas (see Figure 3). Similar population growth rates were projected for the next twenty years, but opportunities for lateral growth were quickly diminishing. In 1992, Cramton requested money from Charlotte City Council to perform a study that would help Mecklenburg County develop a vision for how it would manage its projected growth. The CMPC hired UNCC professor Michael Gallis as a consultant to assist in this endeavor (Cramton, personal communication, July, 14 2008; see also Bradbury, 1994). The document they assembled was not a lengthy, detailed plan but rather a glossy brochure, only a few pages long with illustrations, pictures, and bullet-point text. The opening spread outlined the history of Charlotte's urban form since World War II and pondered the possibilities for how it would change further over the coming decades (CMPC, 1992). The subsequent pages of the “Concepts of Growth” sourcebook proffered a variety of growth scenarios facing Charlotte and gave examples of cities that were representative of each of the scenarios. Houston was named as a city that had pursued a growth strategy focused on road building; Atlanta built highways and rails; Toronto relied more on transit. Figure 4 shows the illustrations of each region’s transportation strategy. The appropriateness and potential impacts of the various strategies for Charlotte were discussed and the general patterns of growth that could be expected were mapped. Houston and Atlanta provided examples of areas of sporadic, unplanned growth that could not be adequately served in spite of their enormous highway networks. Toronto provided a more efficient and sustainable model that relied on dense growth served by transit. For Charlotte, the challenge would be to develop a coordinated regional planning strategy that would not require unrealistic highway expansions to avoid gridlock that could cripple the region's economic competitiveness. The overall purpose of the “Concepts of Growth” sourcebook was to initiate a conversation regarding the desirability of each of the growth scenarios for the Charlotte region

33 and to frame in the minds of the area's leaders, as well as the general public, what actions would need to be taken to confront the challenges that continued growth would pose. In response to the issues raised by the “Concepts of Growth” sourcebook, Charlotte Mayor Richard Vinroot, Charlotte City Council, and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners sought to develop a consensus land use and transportation vision for the region. In late 1993, they appointed a citizens committee to study metropolitan transportation and transit issues. The resulting Committee of 100 is discussed in detail in the final section of this chapter. Working with Gallis and the CMPC, they carried forward the sourcebook concept and delivered a second, “Centers and Corridors,” in the summer of 1994.* (Charlotte City Council, 1994; Transportation/Transit Committee of 100 [Committee of 100], 1994a). “Centers and Corridors” took the next step beyond describing possible growth scenarios and developed a framework for the region's long term planning policies. Picking up where its predecessor had left off, it outlined the prospective issues facing the region and stressed primarily a number of economic concerns. Public services, infrastructure, and accessibility were among the critical points emphasized as factors in maintaining Charlotte's competitive edge in the global marketplace. Framing metropolitan regions as the foundation of the global economy, Charlotte's ability to compete for jobs and residents would depend on its strength as a region. Thus, the document called for a coordinated growth strategy that would efficiently utilize existing infrastructure and curb continued sprawl. (CMPC, 1998) Additionally, “Centers and Corridors” questioned the sustainability of contemporary development patterns. The authors warned that continued sprawling development would result in increased public spending to subsidize urban services and businesses, increased traffic congestion and a concomitant need for alternative modes of transportation, and increased environmental quality concerns. The recommended strategy was to concentrate new development in the region's

* There are conflicting histories regarding the “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook. Planners, including Cramton, tend to identify it as a product of the CMPC and the planning process; they talk about it as a predecessor to the work of the Committee of 100. However, documents from the Committee of 100 and Charlotte City Council clearly state that the committee was formed prior to the sourcebook's completion, and that Council adopted the committee's “Centers and Corridors” land use vision in July 1994. It is likely that the committee's Land Use and Quality of Life subcommittee worked closely with Cramton and the CMPC to develop the vision, or that the CMPC developed the vision but the committee were responsible for delivering it to Council. The discussion of the 1994 “Centers and Corridors” document presented in this chapter is based on a later version from 1998 that presented the same principles but was more detailed – according to Muth (personal communication, September 25, 2008), the 1994 version was like a “place-mat” while the 1998 version was a booklet.

34 identifiable centers and along major transportation corridors. This approach would maximize the productivity of existing infrastructure and transportation facilities and reduce the demand for extensive new facilities, thus saving the local governments heavy expenses. Moreover, focusing growth in these areas would stem the flow of residents to outlying greenfield areas and retain important tax revenues for Charlotte as well as Mecklenburg's other towns. Figure 5 shows the illustration of the overall Centers and Corridors concept from the 1998 version of the sourcebook. Centers were defined as the existing areas of concentrated institutional, commercial, and/or transportation activity. Their sizes and ages varied, and several were located within the Charlotte city limits (e.g. - SouthPark, University City, and Center City Charlotte). Each of Mecklenburg's other towns were identified as centers, and some centers were located in adjacent counties (e.g. - Gastonia, Concord, and Monroe). Corridors referred to linear areas of commercial development and parallel transportation facilities. Five radial corridors that converge in Uptown Charlotte were identified. Each corridor contains an Interstate highway (or similar facility), a major arterial roadway, and a rail line. The presence of these high capacity parallel facilities made the corridors ideal areas to absorb growth without dramatically impairing regional automotive accessibility and improving overall transit accessibility. The presence of rail lines meant that rapid transit improvements could be constructed along the corridors, thereby enhancing accessibility and broadening the scope of development that would be appropriate for the corridors. With much of the growth and development activity focused in urban centers and along the five corridors, the neighborhoods between the corridors (the “quadrants” or “wedges”) would remain areas characterized by low density residential and supportive retail development. Wedges were described as prime areas to build schools, parks, and other neighborhood amenities with a high level of local accessibility. The major success of the two regional sourcebooks was that they conceptually linked development patterns and land use planning with transportation planning. Appealing to the real economic interests of the City of Charlotte, “Centers and Corridors” offered a growth management solution to forthcoming civic and regional challenges. The strategy was also based on experiences from other major metropolitan regions, good and bad. However, no particular area was held up as a model to emulate. In an article in the Charlotte Observer that discussed

35 the centers and corridors strategy, Committee of 100 Chairman Bill Simms was quoted as saying that although Toronto provided a good example of a successful transit strategy, their land use regulations would not be palatable in Charlotte, nor would pictures of the region's high-rise development help to sell the strategy to the public in Mecklenburg County. On the other hand, Los Angeles demonstrated that a roads-only strategy could be disastrous (Bradbury, 1994). The chief benefit of the centers and corridors strategy was that, if implemented, the transportation infrastructure needed to support the region's growth was largely in place. Still, transit was touted as a crucial component to serve the higher density developments that would be seen in the centers and along the corridors. In this way, the sourcebook responded to the calls in earlier transit studies noted above to increase the intensity of activities in areas that could be served by rapid transit. “Centers and Corridors” was adopted by Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners as a guiding policy document for the CMPC in July of 1994 (Charlotte City Council, 1994). However, the Committee of 100 still needed to flesh out what this conceptual framework would mean for establishing policies and actions to guide growth in Mecklenburg County and throughout the metropolitan region.

3.4 The Committee of 100 The Transportation/Transit Committee of 100 was formed in September of 1993 to develop a regional consensus about Charlotte-Mecklenburg's urban future. The committee was established and funded by the Charlotte City Council and Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners with some additional funding provided by the State of North Carolina (Committee of 100, 1994a). The decision to appoint a broad based citizens committee to tackle transportation and land use issues was made not only to address the regional scope of the issues but also because of the success of a previous committee of 100 in getting the Charlotte Coliseum built. The process appeared to be an effective way to unite people across the region to address issues that could have major political and economic ramifications (Purnell, personal communication, July 14, 2008). This section discusses the committee's purpose, composition, structure, recommendations, and results. The City Council and County Commission charged the Committee of 100 with establishing the overarching planning framework for transportation and land use, recommending a funding strategy to support the vision, and developing an organizational structure to manage

36 the implementation of transportation improvements. They had as their starting point the “Concepts of Growth” sourcebook from 1992 (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Bradbury, 1994). No authority was granted to the committee to adopt policies or impact institutions. They were an advisory body to develop concepts for transportation and land use planning in the region that they presented to City Council, the County Commission, and other political bodies in the region. (Purnell, personal communication, September 17, 2008) The Committee of 100 was comprised of individuals from Cabarrus, Gaston, Iredell, Mecklenburg, and Union Counties, NC and York County, SC who represented a cross-section of interests (Committee of 100, 1994b). Potential committee members were nominated by Charlotte City Council members, Mecklenburg County Commissioners, and the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. City and County staff - including planners – put together a preliminary list of nominees that represented most areas of the community. The nominees were then reviewed by Charlotte Mayor Richard Vinroot and Mecklenburg County Commission Chair Parks Helms for final appointment (Purnell, personal communication, July 14, 2008). Ultimately, the committee was comprised of business leaders, neighborhood and community service organization representatives, bureaucrats, city and town representatives, developers, transit users, and others. Appendix B displays the complete Committee of 100 roster by association and by subcommittee assignment. The committee was split into five subcommittees: Environmental and Transportation Technology; Land Use and Quality of Life; Roads; Transit Service Alternatives; and Intergovernmental Roles and Finance. Each of the subcommittees reported periodically to the steering committee led by Chairman Bill Sims, President of the Reinsurace Division of Transamerica Life Companies. Cramton and the CMPC coordinated with the subcommittees and held workshops in towns and cities throughout the region to ensure they were involved in the process and up to date with the committee's progress. (Bradbury, 1994; Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008) Each of the five subcommittees delivered recommendations to develop and support a 20- year regional transportation and transit plan. The overall plan called for the acceleration of State road projects and high capacity transit planning in the first ten years (1996-2005). The second ten years (2006-2015) would see the implementation of rapid transit, while the bus system would be dramatically expanded over the course of the 20-year span. The total cost was estimated at

37 $1.7 billion. (Charlotte City Council, 1994) The environmental and transportation technology subcommittee emphasized the need for alternative fuels and increased bicycle and pedestrian connections. They also encouraged development that would be oriented to bike and pedestrian uses, although they did not stipulate regulations, incentives, or other mechanisms that would bring about such developments. Additionally, they recommended converting all public sector vehicle fleets to natural gas or electric energy, building HOV lanes, and exploring congestion pricing to reduce congestion and improve air quality. They requested that $3 million be dedicated annually to implementing environmental projects. (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) The land use and quality of life subcommittee reaffirmed the region's commitment to the centers and corridors growth concept. They also sought to create a regional network of existing planning agencies rather than trying to establish an overarching planning authority to manage regional land use decisions. A staff member would need to be added to each local agency to focus on regional coordination. The land use subcommittee also felt that it would be important to educate the public about the close relationship of transportation and land use planning. They suggested a long term community information program. Finally, they recommended $5 million per year be spent on rapid transit planning and to protect transit rights of way. (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) The roads subcommittee asked for $450 million to accelerate NCDOT and SCDOT road projects and to build out the Metropolitan Roadway Plan, a network of regional highways linking Charlotte with the outlying “ring cities” and the rings cities to each other (Figure 6). The projects emphasized included: the Outer Loop (I-485), Independence Boulevard, and expansions of I-85 and I-77. The roads subcommittee also recommended that MUMPO team with the area's other MPOs and local jurisdictions to group several relatively low-cost roadway projects when pursuing state and federal funds rather than prioritizing a single, very expensive project. (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) To address the region's high capacity transit needs, an additional $450 million would be needed plus $10 million each year to expand the Charlotte Transit bus system, according to the transit service alternatives subcommittee. The transit subcommittee also wanted to expand carpool and vanpool options and enhance express bus service. They identified LRT as the preferred modal alternative for the region's long term future, acknowledging a need for

38 development and growth management policies to support the creation of a light rail system. Finally, they suggested a metropolitan transit organization be formed, starting with Charlotte and Mecklenburg County with options for neighboring jurisdictions to join or contract for transit services.(Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) Perhaps the most critical aspect of the Committee of 100's charge was the need to identify a funding source and organizational structure to implement and manage its regional transportation plan. The intergovernmental roles and finance subcommittee recommended that the region push for enabling legislation in the North Carolina General Assembly for up to a one percent regional sales tax that would be dedicated to the realization of the committee's vision that would be levied on a county-by-county basis. The tax would need voter approval in each county. A special task force would be needed to address funding options in South Carolina. (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) From an organizational standpoint, the subcommittee sought to create a single MPO that covered the entire Charlotte MSA (Mecklenburg, Gaston, Union, Cabarrus, York, Rowan, and Lincoln Counties) plus Iredell County. This would entail a merging of the four MPOs in the region, incorporate new areas that were not part of any MPO, and require approval from the governors of both North Carolina and South Carolina. They also echoed the transit alternatives subcommittee in calling for a metropolitan transit organization. Finally, they identified candidate roadway projects to be funded during the first ten years of the plan's implementation. (Committee of 100, 1994a; see also Charlotte City Council, 1994) In November of 1994, the Committee of 100 took their final report with these recommendations to the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners and the Charlotte City Council. The County Commissioners approved the plan and endorsed the effort to seek enabling legislation for the one cent sales tax from the General Assembly, while the City Council voted to support the transportation proposals but leave the question of financing open. However, these meetings took place as these offices were changing hands, and both bodies had predominantly Republican members by the end of the year who did not favor the sales tax concept, especially as a means for funding roads since the gasoline tax was already in place for that purpose. Another criticism of the Committee of 100's report was that it was too broad in its scope – its recommendations were regional, long-range, and too general. The Board of County Commissioners voted to overturn the previous decision to endorse the plan, and at that time it

39 appeared to many to be a dead issue. (Lyttle, 1994; Purnell, personal commnication, July 14, 2008) Although it lacked the political support to move forward, the Committee of 100's metropolitan transportation plan was based on the concepts laid down in the “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook, a strategy that remained conceptually sound from a public sector planning perspective. Furthermore, both the transportation plan and the centers and corridors vision emerged from regional participatory processes that lent them broad-based support. Finally, both had the input and support of the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce. The next chapter examines how Charlotte's new mayor, Pat McCrory, resurrected the committee's plan and built political momentum for a sales tax dedicated to transit as well as a new transit agency with the capacity to provide regional service and build rapid transit.

40

Figure 2 - Mecklenburg County Spheres of Influence

41

Figure 3 - Annexation History of Charlotte

42

Figure 4 – Illustrations of Various Metropolitan Transportation Strategies from 1992 “Concepts of Growth” Sourcebook

43

Figure 5 – Illustration of the Centers and Corridors Strategy and Descriptions of Its Elements from 1998 “Centers and Corridors” Sourcebook

44

Figure 6 -The Committee of 100’s Proposed Metropolitan Roadway Plan

45

CHAPTER 4: THE TRANSIT SALES TAX REFERENDUM AND THE METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION

In November 1995, Pat McCrory was elected Mayor of the City of Charlotte. McCrory graduated from Catawba College in Salisbury, NC in 1978, and although he received a bachelor’s degree in political science and education as well as a North Carolina Teaching Certificate, he went on to work for Duke Energy Corporation in various management positions and as an economic development consultant. He emerged on Charlotte’s political scene in 1989 when he successfully ran for City Council as an at-large representative. He retained that position over the next two election cycles (in 1991 and 1993) and served as Mayor Pro Tem in 1993 before running for Mayor in 1995. He continued his employment with Duke Energy while holding these offices. (City of Charlotte, n.d.) For most of the 1995 calendar year, the Committee of 100’s final report sat collecting dust with the issue of additional taxation for transportation improvements seeming to present an insurmountable obstacle. As a member of City Council during the Committee of 100's work, McCrory would have been well aware of their plan and the political objections to its adoption and implementation. Information about how he voted on the plan as a council member was not available for this study, but anecdotal evidence suggests he favored it generally. While both Purnell (personal communication, September 17, 2008) and Muth (personal communication, September 25, 2008) do not recall transportation issues being a major part of McCrory's mayoral campaign, Muth says a story that the Mayor has recounted more than once indicates that they were on his mind at the time. According to Muth (personal communication, September 25, 2008), McCrory' story unfolds as follows: Shortly after his election in 1995, the young mayor arranged a meeting with Bill Lee, the president of Duke Energy. McCrory asked for Lee's advice about what he could do as mayor with the Committee of 100 report. Lee stressed the importance of implementing transit improvements in the near future. He likened the situation to doctor's visits and preventative medicine - failure to address now the possibility of clogged arteries at some point in the future

46 would lead to costly and painful procedures to remedy a life-threatening condition. Lee warned McCrory that it would be difficult to sell transit to the public and local politicians but convinced him that it was absolutely necessary for the future health of the region. With this advice, McCrory - a Republican - bucked the conventional party stance toward taxation and championed the cause of transit in the region. He appointed a Committee of 10 to revisit the Committee of 100 report, refine its recommendations, and come up with a financing strategy that the region would endorse. The Committee of 10 would focus primarily on short- term projects that could be implemented in a five-year period in the City of Charlotte. (Purnell, personal communication, September 17, 2008) The first section of this chapter recounts the history of the new committee and its findings. The second section examines how the Committee of 10’s work allowed the Charlotte- Mecklenburg delegation in Raleigh to persuade the General Assembly to create the enabling legislation for Mecklenburg County to impose a one-half cent sales tax - subject to voter approval – that would be dedicated to funding transit improvements. The third section reviews the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan that gave the centers and corridors land use vision some teeth and bolstered public support to pass the transit sales tax in 1998. The final section describes the unique governance structure of the newly formed regional transit agency that emerged after the 1998 ballot.

4.1 The Committee of 10 McCrory appointed the Committee of 10 in March of 1996. He justified the creation of the new transportation committee by echoing the sentiments that Lee had stressed to him earlier. He was quoted in the Charlotte Observer immediately following the Committee's appointment as saying, “I feel, knowing the importance of transportation, if we don't move now in the '90s we will be paying a much higher price in economic vitality, quality of life, and environmentally” (Whitacre, 1996a). Lee and McCrory's support for transit reflected the opinions of the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce generally who felt that rapid growth in the region and the time already invested in the Committee of 100 report warranted action to maintain the city's competitive edge in attracting development and investment. The region's political leaders shared these concerns but wanted a clearer picture of what would be done with any potential new funding source. (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008)

47 The principal objective for the Committee of 10 was to review the Committee of 100 report and deliver a more focused five-year plan, identifying specific transportation projects that could be built in Charlotte with a dedicated funding source. Their plan needed to have a multimodal emphasis and identify improvements for streets, transit, and bicycle and pedestrian traffic. They were also charged with exploring potential funding sources besides the one-percent sales tax proposed by the Committee of 100. They needed to overcome the opposition to the Committee of 100's report, which sprang largely from it's broad, regional approach. A more specific, project-oriented effort might allay concerns about additional taxation. (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) The composition of the Committee of 10 resembled that of the Committee of 100, consisting primarily of business and political figures, including First Union Bank CEO Mac Everett and NationsBank CFO Jim Hance. Johnsie Beck, Chair of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Workforce Development Board, chaired the committee, which also included Committee of 100 Chairman Bill Simms. Several other members, including Peter Pappas and Frank Emory of the North Carolina Board of Transportation (NCBOT)* and Gastonia Mayor Jick Garland had also served on the Committee of 100. The Committee of 10’s full roster is presented in Appendix B. The Committee of 10's members were appointed because of their experience in transportation planning and because they were all well respected and well known by the Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg Delegation in the NC General Assembly (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008). Their interactions with both of these political bodies are discussed in greater detail in the next section. The remainder of this section deals with the committee's time line and the recommendations they delivered to Charlotte City Council. McCrory gave the Committee 90 days to review the Committee of 100's final report, starting in the spring of 1996. They were to recommend a course of action by August of the same year and consider possible funding sources (Whitacre, 1996b). This would give the Mecklenburg Delegation (the region's representatives in Raleigh) ample time to prepare for the State legislative session in early 1997. Purnell (personal communication, September 26, 2008) suggests that McCrory may have been thinking about the need for State action to obtain a

* NCBOT is the policy-making body for NCDOT, appointed by the Governor. Appointees generally represent a cross-section of interests, including environmental, highway, and transit groups (Purnell, personal communication, October 9, 2008)

48 dedicated local funding source when he established the time line. He says there was a “concerted effort” to work a funding proposal through the General Assembly in 1997 (see Section 4.2). There was a feeling among the region's leaders (especially the Chamber) that there was an opportunity to maintain the momentum of the Committee of 100's work in gaining local and state support for significant transportation improvements. After reviewing the Committee of 100 report, the Committee of 10 worked with city staff (CMPC, CDOT, and others) to create the roads and transit capital investment program described later in this section. What level of interaction the Committee of 10 had with City and County elected officials during this time is not clear, but they would have needed to gauge the political palatability of their proposed program, so it is likely that meetings between these bodies took place on a somewhat regular basis. A memo from Committee of 10 Chair Johnsie Beck (1997) suggests that the committee did not present their final plan to Charlotte City Council until January 7, 1997. A relatively brief program, it identified the primary objective of each component, the needs that were being met, and the projects and funds required to address those needs. The program was disseminated in an 11x17-inch brochure (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008). A copy of the final brochure was not available; the information that follows comes from an undated outline of the Committee of 10's recommendations that John Muth recovered from CATS' archives. The plan had three principal components: roads and streets; transit and transitways; and state and federal funding. The objective for the roads and streets section was to keep road projects on pace to meet the needs defined in MUMPO's long range transportation plan for 2015 and to minimize congestion growth. Investment would be needed to respond to the region's growing traffic congestion problem and increase mobility to protect its economic vitality. A $66 million municipal road bond from 1996 was expected to cover the majority of Charlotte's street construction needs until the year 2000. An additional $9.5 million would be required for two improvements (Arequipa Road and Krefeld Road) needed in 2001, although marks on the copy of the outline suggest these may have been eliminated from the final program. State road projects would also be critical, but funds were lacking - $370 million would be needed for freeway projects plus $64 million for non-freeway improvements. None of that money was expected to come from local funds. (Committee of 10, n.d.-a)

49 The transit and transitways section was much more expansive than the roads section, identifying a number of specific projects and needs to meet the objective of doubling transit ridership by 2010. This was a goal established in the MUMPO 2015 plan along with increasing service levels to spur such ridership growth. The five-year program would address the need to create greater mobility options for the region's citizens, reduce household transportation costs as well as the regional number of single-occupant vehicle trips, reduce emissions, and foster more efficient development patterns that would keep the costs of services and infrastructure down. (Committee of 10, n.d.-a) The program called for extending service hours for transit and introducing service to new locations, increasing the number of crosstown bus routes, improving operations planning to match appropriately sized buses to routes based on ridership, and enhancing customer service with new low-floor buses and/or improved fare collection technologies. These improvements would require $11 million in capital spending, a quarter of which would come from the City, and $11.4 million in operating expenses fully funded by the City over the five-year period. Ostensibly, the capital costs would only be for the purchase of additional or replacement buses. It was also suggested that Charlotte pursue partnerships for regional commuter bus service to Gastonia, Monroe, Concord/Kannapolis, and Mooresville. The Rock Hill CommuteRide to Rock Hill, SC was named as an example of partnering with another municipality to expand express bus service, but the details of that partnership were not presented. (Committee of 10, n.d.-a) The Committee also listed a transitway demonstration project along the Independence Boulevard corridor that would start as an exclusive busway, with an eye toward possible conversion to light rail in the same right-of-way at a later date. The demonstration project would also include additional buses and operating expenses not included in the $11 and $11.4 million figures noted above. Finally, the transit and transitways program called for money to purchase rail corridors as they became available (presumably from discontinued freight operations) for future transitway projects and estimated that $15 million would be needed over the next five years. (Committee of 10, n.d.-a) In addition to the Independence Boulevard busway, the Committee of 10 appears to have discussed developing rapid transit in the South Corridor parallel to I-77 and South Boulevard (Purnell, 1997). Both the South and Independence Corridors had been identified as the best candidates for initial rapid transit projects at least as early as the 1993 Fixed Guideway Study.

50 The South Corridor was experiencing the highest levels of traffic congestion in the region, and some existing rail right-of-way had already been acquired for rapid transit purposes. There was also the possibility that the line would extend all the way down to Fort Mill, South Carolina, meaning that both the North Carolina and South Carolina delegations in the U.S House and Senate could work for federal earmarks to fund the project. Further developments in obtaining funding for the South Corridor project are discussed below in Section 4.3.3 (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008). The final component of the Committee of 10's five-year plan aimed to increase the amount of state and federal funding the region would receive for both highway and transit improvements. The program did not identify a specific amount to pursue at that time, but stated a goal to “jumpstart development of a transitway system” (p. 4). They recognized an opportunity to pursue federal earmarks for that purpose with the re-authorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) scheduled to take place during the 1997 congressional session. Furthermore, a statewide panel called the Transit 2001 Commission was preparing to address the General Assembly to recommend an expanded role for public transportation in the State and support local option revenue sources, such as a county-wide sales tax (committee of 10, n.d.-a). The Transit 2001 Commission (1997) suggested increased funding for transit from the State General Fund, the State Highway Fund (not the same as the State Highway Trust Fund, which was explicitly “off-limits,” p. 183), and new transportation-related taxes. The time was right at both the State and Federal levels to pursue financial assistance. The Committee of 10 had also identified a number of possible local funding options to support its five year transportation plan that would not require State approval. The first option was to draw from the balance of the City's transportation fund, but the $10 million available would not be sufficient to cover most of the improvements. An auto-privilege tax of $30 per vehicle per year was already in place in Charlotte. Most of those revenues ($25) went to the transportation fund, while the remaining $5 went to the City's General Fund. Transferring the remaining $5 per vehicle to the transportation fund would yield $1.4 million annually. (Committee of 10, n.d.-b; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) Another option was to draw from an existing one percent sales tax in the city. Half of those revenues were already diverted to transportation and the other half wen to the General Fund. However, transferring the other half to transportation would only yield about $7 million

51 per year (Committee of 10, n.d.-b). Purnell (personal communication, September 26, 2008) explained that this sales tax was not applied for all transactions and was only in place in the City of Charlotte and not all of Mecklenburg County. Hence its yield was relatively low, although it was the highest of the locally available funding alternatives considered. Two alternatives recommended by the Transit 2001 Commission could also be adopted without State approval or referendum. A city council or county commission vote would be sufficient. A vehicle registration surcharge of $5 per vehicle would bring in $1.4 million annually if imposed by the City or $1.7 million if imposed by the County. A tax of 10 percent on rental vehicle gross receipts would raise about $4.3 million each year. (Committee of 10, n.d.-b) Clearly none of the immediately available local funding sources would be sufficient to meet the region's transportation goals. As noted above, McCrory probably established the Committee of 10's schedule with an understanding that the region would have to work with the General Assembly to develop enabling legislation for a more substantial local funding source. The challenge would be to develop consensus among local politicians in the region and among the region's representatives in the General Assembly to draft and promote an acceptable proposal for the 1997 legislative session. The next section describes the interactions of the Committee of 10, the Mecklenburg Delegation, and the local political bodies in creating legislation that allowed Mecklenburg County to hold a referendum for a one-half cent sales tax dedicated to transit.

4.2 The Mecklenburg Delegation The Mecklenburg Delegation simply refers to the elected representatives in the State House and Senate from Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, and the Towns (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008). Any enabling legislation for a local option funding source would have to originate with these officials. The Committee of 10 presented their five-year program to Charlotte City Council in January of 1997 (Beck, 1997) and met with the County Commission and the Towns, presumably around the same time (Metropolitan Transit Commission [MTC], 2007). The committee of 10's program was not officially adopted by any of the local political bodies, and as the next section will describe in greater detail that there was not unanimous local support for their proposals. However, a group of local politicians (led by Mayor McCrory) from various jurisdictions who favored the Committee of 10's program initiated discussions with

52 members of the Mecklenburg Delegation to make them aware of local support for a potential local option funding source (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008; see also MTC, 2007). Before the Mecklenburg Delegation could sponsor any legislation in the General Assembly for local transportation funding, the details of the proposal needed to be clearly defined. The Committee of 10's work had identified several projects that could be implemented with a new funding source, but their work on funding options demonstrated a clear need for one that would bring in substantial new revenues and require State approval. The natural starting place was to revisit the Committee of 100's proposal for a countywide one-cent sales tax for general transportation improvements, meaning transit and road projects. The most immediate difficulty with the sales tax proposal was the fact that, if it succeeded, it would be imposed across Mecklenburg County and potentially in other counties. As such, it would necessarily entail some sort of institutional change, specifically on the transit side. Charlotte Transit was only a small division of CDOT that primarily served the city of Charlotte. The new tax revenues would be collected from all parts of the county, and transit service improvements and rapid transit projects would have to equitably enhance transit service levels in areas beyond the city limits. A new, larger transit agency would be needed to oversee transit expansion throughout the county and possibly the region. The region's leaders needed to figure out how decisions would be made on capital and operating budgets, rapid transit facility location and priority, the expansion of the bus fleet, and a host of other issues. (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce favored a regional transit authority. The Chamber believed that an authority would remove transit decision-making from the political process and so allow rapid transit planning and expanded bus operations to proceed more efficiently. Local politicians, however, opposed an authority for the same reason. Removing transit decision- making from the political process would undermine the region's land use goals and the centers and corridors vision that stressed integrated transit and land use planning. The Chamber countered this argument by pointing out that elected officials made up the boards of the region's MPO's, so they would still have the capacity to affect transportation issues. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008)

53 The Chamber had several additional concerns. Based on their arguments and the eventual structure of transit decision-making in Charlotte (see Section 4.4), the apparent arrangement circulating among the elected officials involved creating a new City department with a policy- making and budgetary board that consisted of representatives from all jurisdictions in the county. The Chamber felt that such an arrangement would fail for two reasons. First, executive authority in the new agency would remain with the City or with a City employee, presenting possible equity concerns. Secondly, and more to the point, the Chamber believed that the City would not be able to attract a transit executive with the knowledge and experience needed to carry out the types of major expansions and capital projects that were being discussed. Charlotte Transit had a relatively small administrative staff, and none were seen as appropriate candidates for the job. The salary demanded by qualified candidates would exceed that of Charlotte's City Manager, and the Chamber balked at the idea of the City Manger agreeing to pay another City employee such a wage. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) Ultimately, the elected officials resisted the pressure from the Chamber to establish a regional transit authority. Ostensibly, they felt that the need to coordinate transportation and land-use planning was too important and that the potential pay-scale problem could be overcome. The mayors of each Mecklenburg municipality, including McCrory for Charlotte, and the Chair of the County Commission drafted and signed an interlocal agreement called the Metropolitan Coalition Governance Agreement. The contract established a regional decision-making process in which only paying members could vote, but other representatives were invited to be non- voting participants. To retain the Chamber's support, the agreement called for a re-evaluation of the decision-making process after a certain number of years. This agreement laid the foundation for the Metropolitan Transit Commission, which is discussed in further detail below in Section 4.4. (MTC, 2007) Having defined the general structure of future transit decision-making, the next step for the region's leaders was to build support in Raleigh for a local option transportation funding source. Charlotte's lobbyist in the state legislature, Boyd Cauble, rallied local politicians, the Committee of 10, and several interest groups to build momentum for the sales tax proposal. They were first encouraged to call or write the members of the Mecklenburg Delegation and request their support for the proposal. (This was probably already happening while local leaders

54 were debating the institutional issues outlined above and even during the development of the Committee of 10's five-year program.) Later in the process, Cauble provided a list of state representatives from other areas who were friendly to transit or the region and prodded these same groups to follow a similar strategy for securing their votes. Some of the interest groups involved included the League of Women Voters, the hospitality industry (who felt that current transit service was inadequate), and several environmental groups, although many others likely also took an interest in the issue. (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) Meanwhile, the Mecklenburg Delegation teamed up with representatives from the Raleigh-Durham area who were also seeking a dedicated local option funding source for transit improvements in the Research Triangle. Their partnership was to serve two purposes: first, to support each other's efforts to win approval for local transit funding; second, each wanted additional local tax monies to spend on road improvements (MTC, 2007). The Triangle strategy involved a fee for car rentals that, if approved by the General Assembly, would only require a vote by the applicable county governments to be implemented. Charlotte's sales tax proposal would be much more lucrative, but the enabling legislation would only allow a county to put the tax issue on the ballot as a referendum. The final decision would be left to the voters. As such, it was considered to be a riskier strategy, but Cauble united the Mecklenburg Delegation around the need for something that could generate enough revenue to significantly impact Charlotte-Mecklenburg's transportation system. (Purnell, personal communication, July 14, 2008) Initially, the Charlotte proposal called for a one-cent sales tax for roads and transit. However, its not clear how far the Mecklenburg Delegation carried that proposal. The State was not willing to authorize a local funding source for road building, saying that the need for roads was a statewide problem to be addressed by the State through the gas tax and the State Highway Trust Fund. They did acknowledge a unique need for transit in the Charlotte and Triangle regions that could be addressed at the local level. The ultimate Mecklenburg proposal then shifted to a half-cent sales tax dedicated solely to transit funding. (MTC, 2007; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) The Mecklenburg Delegation had one additional concern to address. The General Assembly worried that other jurisdictions would institute a similar sales tax even though it might not be justified. They needed to draft the legislation in such a way that it singled out the

55 Charlotte metropolitan region without being explicitly inequitable. Purnell (personal communication, July 14, 2008) recalls that the enabling legislation contained population and location criteria (e.g. - adjoining another state) that no other area in North Carolina would meet, especially given that the tax was to be dedicated solely to transit improvements. However, these criteria do limit the ability of several of the Charlotte region's counties to impose the sales tax. Currently, only Mecklenburg County qualifies. As such, some jurisdictions have had to look for other local funding sources similar to those reviewed by the Committee of 10. (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) The Mecklenburg Delegation's sales tax proposal was approved by the General Assembly in 1997. The approval only allowed the County to place the taxation measure on the ballot as a referendum, so local voters would have the final say. The next section discusses the events that took place to convince the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners to take the transit sales tax referendum to the voters in 1998, focusing on the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan and opposition to its proposals.

4.3 The 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan The composition of the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners had not changed since the 1994 election (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008). The same body that had repealed approval of the Committee of 100 plan now had to be persuaded to put the transit sales tax issue on the ballot. Some of their initial concerns may have been allayed by the Committee of 10's program and the Metropolitan Coalition Governance Agreement, which clarified both how the new tax revenues would be spent and who would be making critical policy and budget decisions. However, uncertainty lingered over whether or not the region's citizens would change their travel behaviors and embrace mass transit. To help make the case for transit, the City of Charlotte funded a six-month study of land use and transit alternatives in those corridors defined in the centers and corridors vision that had originally been adopted in 1994. The 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan was authored by the CMPC and CDOT with input from other City/County departments as well as from consultants, including Dr. Robert Cervero of the University of California-Berkeley and Dr. Reid Ewing of Florida International University (City of Charlotte, various departments [City], 1998). The 2025 Plan was never adopted as a policy document but was intended primarily to educate

56 the County's elected officials and voters before the decision to place the sales tax referendum on the 1998 ballot. (Harmon, personal communication, July 22, 2008). Its most critical themes involved focusing employment and multifamily housing in station areas to support rapid transit. It outlined possible changes to land use and transportation planning policies to create more transit-friendly developments in Charlotte. It also showed that these changes would not drastically alter prevailing development trends, especially in existing single-family neighborhoods, making the proposals more palatable to the residents of existing low-density areas.

4.3.1 Public Involvement To ensure that there was sufficient public involvement in the creation of 2025 Plan, the Transit Planning Advisory Committee (T-PAC) was created. A total of 21 citizens were appointed to the committee by the Charlotte City Council, Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners, Mecklenburg County School Board, and the towns of Matthews, Mint Hill, Pineville, Cornelius, Huntersville, and Davidson. Johnsie Beck, Chair of the Committee of 10, served as Co-Chair of T-PAC along with Jim Palermo. The committee was charged with identifying opportunities for public involvement, determining whether the 2025 Plan provided sufficient basis for citizens to vote on a half-cent sales tax for transit funding, and making a recommendation to the County Commission to place the referendum on the 1998 ballot or not. The T-PAC attended all public meetings and met at various times with City staff and consultants to discuss technical aspects of the emerging plan and review citizen comments. (City, 1998) In the months leading up to the study, advertisements were placed in the Charlotte Observer and other local newspapers, on radio broadcasts, and on Charlotte Transit buses announcing public meetings and corridor group meetings to establish the best transit option for each corridor (City, 1998; “Volunteers,” 1998). Although there was little time to perform a detailed analysis of the transit and land use preferences for each corridor, the 2025 plan needed to include citizens in the process as well as officials from the surrounding municipalities to garner county-wide support for the tax (“High stakes,” 1998). The public involvement and education process included televised public meetings that allowed citizens to call in questions and comments; 15 corridor group meetings (three in each of the five corridors) that helped the consultants establish preferred transit technologies, station and alignment locations, and potential

57 (re)development sites; presentations to civic and neighborhood groups; bill inserts from City and County services; and extensive media coverage (City, 1998). The public meetings were held throughout the spring of 1998. Specially trained facilitators were hired to conduct the corridor meetings. At each meeting, different aspects of the emerging plan were presented by City staff and consultants and discussed among the citizen participants. Some of the meetings did not begin with presentations but proceeded more as workshops broken out into various groups to consider different aspects of transit and land use planning in each corridor. At least one meeting in each corridor focused on land use strategies and the population densities needed to support rapid transit. The meetings allowed neighborhoods in the corridors to provide feedback on the plan as it was taking shape. Their input was reviewed by staff and the T-PAC, and it altered rapid transit alignment and station location decisions, roadway network plans, and even the timing and location of public meetings to increase the level of public involvement in the process. The meetings brought about substantial revisions to the initial plans presented by consultants. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; see also City, 1998) As an example, the original vision in the Independence Corridor was to provide a connection at Conference Drive between the HOV/busway lanes in the median of Independence Boulevard and the existing rail corridor parallel to Monroe Road. Citizens felt that Conference Drive was already overburdened and suggested that the connection be made at Krefeld Road. The change was made for the final plan. (City, 1998) With substantial public involvement, the final 2025 Plan examined for each of the five corridors existing land uses, rapid transit alignment options, transit technology preferences, and redevelopment opportunities. The 2025 Plan's treatment of each of these topics is discussed below.

4.3.2 Land Use and Transit Recommendations The 2025 Plan opened by reiterating the need to maintain the economic vitality of Charlotte's Center City and reaffirmed the centers and corridors strategy as the best way to accommodate growth and protect the region's quality of life. Trends of decentralizing employment and population were identified as potential threats to the region's economic competitiveness in the long run. Major mixed-use centers like SouthPark and Ballantyne were

58 located in the wedges and were already undermining the centers and corridors concept. New zoning practices would be needed to provide incentives to bring dense employment to the corridors and limit such development in the wedges. The plan advocated revisions to district plans and development policies to introduce more transit friendly zoning categories, including Mixed Use Development Districts and Transit Districts that emphasized increasing employment and residential densities in station areas. It recommended average residential densities of 12 dwelling units per acre within a half-mile radius of transit stations. Illustrations of different density tiers were provided to show that this did not entail ultra-dense, high rise urban development as some supposed (Figure 7). The plan listed various regulatory changes, possible public sector initiatives, and financing options and incentives to improve development patterns and drive redevelopment in the corridors. (City, 1998) The plan also examined land use and development trends for each of the corridors. For example, in the North Corridor development pressures were rising as Huntersville, Cornelius, and Davidson were all experiencing significant population growth but were still only sparsely developed. Each of the northern Towns had established conservation goals, and rapid transit was seen as a tool to focus growth around stations and thereby protect greenfield areas. The northern Towns would each need to adopt master plans and zoning ordinances that would drive investment to the station areas. The transportation component of the plan considered both rapid transit alignment alternatives and transit technologies (i.e. - rail versus bus) for each corridor. Rail technologies considered included LRT and Diesel Multiple Units (DMU's). LRT was deemed most appropriate for serving relatively dense areas where stations would be spaced closer together. LRT also has the advantage of being able to operate in mixed traffic. DMU's could achieve higher maximum speed than LRT but did not accelerate as quickly. Hence, they would be more appropriate for commuter rail service reaching out to lower density areas where stations were farther apart. DMU's would also require exclusive rights-of-way, which could be shared with freight rail operations in most cases. In addition to these rail technologies, BRT was also considered for each corridor. (City, 1998) Each transit technology was evaluated based on six criteria: jobs within a half mile of transit stations (at system build-out in 2025); households within a half mile of transit stations at

59 build-out; capital costs per mile; projected daily ridership; long-term need for congestion relief; and long-term land use opportunity. There was no weighting of these criteria. The first two criteria were evaluated under two development scenarios: the Trend or “business-as-usual” land use pattern and the Plan or centers and corridors pattern. In outlining these criteria and the development scenarios, the 2025 Plan's authors explicitly pointed out that a pure quantitative analysis would not be sufficient since rapid transit would be a “long-term, multi-generational investment” (p. 5) and such an approach might not give due attention to issues such as the region's long-term economic vitality. (City, 1998) The final 2025 Plan recommended BRT be implemented in the Independence, Airport, and University Corridors, mostly due to costs since the rail and BRT alternatives performed roughly the same on the other criteria, with some exceptions. The BRT alignment in the Airport Corridor would serve more jobs. In the University Corridor, BRT was expected to attract more riders than rail and provide better opportunities for station-area (re)development. The Independence Corridor was closest to some level of implementation in that the State's conversion of Independence Boulevard to a limited-access highway involved creating HOV lanes in the median. Some of that capacity had already been constructed and extensions were already programmed. There was an opportunity to convert these lanes to busways. This was the opportunity that the Committee of 10's transitway demonstration project was based on. The decision to make the lane conversions had not been finalized at the time the 2025 Plan was published. (City, 1998) Rail technologies were recommended in the South and North Corridors in the form of LRT and DMU respectively. The viability of rail transit in these corridors would depend on the implementation of land use policies to concentrate growth in station areas. BRT was also recommended in the North Corridor in addition to DMU. The buses would operate along the shoulders of I-77, which would have to be widened and strengthened for this purpose. Both transit technologies were recommended because rail was seen as a long-term proposition that was highly contingent on successfully focusing development in future station areas. BRT was seen as a way to improve transit service in the short-term and attract the kinds of development in those areas that would be needed to support eventual rail service. (City, 1998) In the South Corridor, two rail alignments had been considered. Both involved operating in an abandoned freight rail right-of-way from Uptown to Tyvola Road. South of Tyvola the

60 alternatives differed. The alignment that was selected utilized an existing Norfolk Southern (NS) right-of-way and constructing new track to shift NS operations to the west and providing space for two LRT tracks. The freight and LRT tracks would run parallel to each other all the way to Pineville. The second alternative involved shifting LRT operations to the South Boulevard right- of-way to avoid shared freight and LRT activities. This would open up some large tracts in the south to development, but there were some potential wetlands impacts that might affect its feasibility. BRT on I-77 was also considered, but this would remove transit service from most of the corridor's existing activities and would present fewer development opportunities than rail. (City, 1998) Throughout the region rapid transit lines would need to be supplemented with enhanced bus connections between the corridors and to centers not located within a corridor (e.g. - South Park and Ballantyne). All rapid transit lines would meet in Center City and utilize existing rights-of-way where possible. Figure 8 shows the regional rapid transit network defined by the 2025 Plan. (City, 1998) Additionally, although the 2025 Plan identified preferred rapid transit alignments and technologies for each corridor, these would have to be studied again as part of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for any project that would apply for federal funding assistance, which they all presumably would. At the time the 2025 Plan was created, the EIS process for the South Corridor was already underway. (City, 1998)

4.3.3 The South Corridor and the Funding Contexts for the Transit Sales Tax Following the presentation of the Committee of 10's program and while the Mecklenburg Delegation were working on the enabling legislation for the transit sales tax, the Charlotte City Council hired the McMillan Group to lobby Congress for $50 million in federal earmarks in the reauthorization of ISTEA for a rapid transit project in the South Corridor (Purnell, 1997). The estimated capital cost for the light rail line proposed in the 2025 Plan was $227 million (City, 1998). Senator Lauch Faircloth, a Republican from Sampson County, NC and Representatives Sue Myrcick and Mel Watt agreed to sponsor the project in Washington. The Republican Myrick represented District 9, covering portions of Mecklenburg, Union, and Gaston Counties, while Watt, a Democrat, represented District 12, which runs from Greensboro and Winston-Salem in

61 the north to the north and west portions of Charlotte in the south. At the time the McMillan Group was hired, discussions were still ongoing with members of the South Carolina Delegation (Purnell, 2008). Ultimately, the bi-state appeal of a potential South Corridor project paid off as Representative John Spratt a Democrat from York, SC and Democratic Senator Fritz Hollings of Charleston, SC provided the most vocal support for the project and worked harder to secure the earmark than any of the North Carolina Delegation (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008; United States Congress, n.d.). The federal earmark would only provide a portion of the money needed for the South Corridor. State and local contributions would also be needed. A major success of the 2025 Plan was that it demonstrated the benefit of the transit sales tax in a greater funding context. In response to the Transit 2001 Commission's report the NC General Assembly adopted the Transit 2001 Plan. Part of that plan called for the State to fund 25 percent of the capital cost of local rapid transit systems, but at the time the 2025 Plan was published, that funding had not been appropriated. (City, 1998) The transit sales tax would allow Mecklenburg County to provide another 25 percent of the capital expenses for rapid transit projects, leaving the remaining 50 percent to be funded with federal monies, a portion of which would ostensibly come from the 1997 earmark. With the competition for federal funds continually increasing among metropolitan regions, these potential State and local contributions would bolster the region's chances of receiving federal assistance. Failure to institute the tax would cripple transit planning and the Centers and Corridors growth vision and diminish confidence in the region among the private sector. (City, 1998)

4.3.4 Roads In addition to transit and land use recommendations, the 2025 plan contained a brief discussion of road building. It emphasized the point that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg region would continue to build and widen roads where appropriate while simultaneously expanding transit, bike, and pedestrian alternatives. Road building decisions in the region would continue to be made by the State and the respective MPO's, and the 2025 Plan did not go into any detail on how those decisions would be made. It did, however, identify a significant funding shortfall for road projects, especially on the state system. Charlotte City Council approved an $88 million bond referendum for the 1998 ballot that would fund eleven projects on the state road system.

62 The bond would be backed by property taxes in the city (Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008). The bond issue was voted on separately from the proposed transit sales tax. Figure 9 shows the roadway projects the bond would fund and other projects programmed for Mecklenburg County. (City, 1998)

4.3.5 Opposition and Rebuttal The 2025 Plan met with opposition before it was completed, even while public meetings were still ongoing. Mike Jackson, a member of Charlotte City Council, took issue with the developing interest in rapid transit in the region. Jackson authored a report that he called “Fiduciary Alternatives for Charlotte's Transportation System” or “FACTS,” in which he castigated transit proponents for overstating the social costs imposed by the automobile, exaggerating the benefits of transit and projected ridership figures, and consistently underestimating the costs to construct rapid transit improvements. Jackson even offered his own plan for improving transportation in the Charlotte region. Jackson had the support of fellow council member Don Reid in his efforts. Jackson's (1998) FACTS report consisted of three sections. The first two were responses to documents that had been delivered to the Charlotte City Council supporting mass transit, especially light rail. The first of these was a paper entitled, “The Transportation Future of Charlotte-Mecklenburg” authored or endorsed by numerous contributers from the Sierra Club, Citizens for Efficient Mass Transit, UNCC, the Charlotte Urban Forum, and the Charlotte Environmental Protection Commission. That paper had claimed a number of advantages of LRT: its operating costs are lower than buses and it attracts more riders; it attracts high-end development to the corridor; it promotes pedestrian activity and a sense of community; it produces less pollution and noise than buses. The main objective of the group was to bring rail transit to the northern Towns and argue against busways. In responding to these claims, Jackson referred to various rail projects across the country, citing budget overruns, lower than expected ridership, and growing congestion or declining transit commute shares in areas that invested in rail transit. One of the regions he focused on was Portland, Oregon. Jackson claimed that Portland's MAX line had attracted almost no new development, and that Portland had turned to a property tax abatement strategy to try to bring development to the rail line. He also noted that the percent of work trips in Portland bound for

63 the CBD increased from 11% in 1980 to 16% in 1990, but transit use declined even in census tracts near the MAX line. He then compared Portland to Seattle, stating that automobile commuting was growing faster in Portland; transit trips were declining in Portland whereas they were growing in Seattle; and downtown development (densification) in Seattle had outpaced Portland's. The point of all of this was that Seattle had not built any rail transit but allegedly had outperformed Portland on a number of indicators. The second section of the FACTS report responds to a letter from David Walters, a professor at UNCC, that stated that only 60% of the money spent on federal and state highways in the U.S. comes from highway user fees like the gas tax. Walters attached an article by the World Resource Institute from 1992 to support his claim. The assertion was based on costs related to police, highway patrol, and fire services as well as free parking. (Jackson, 1998) Jackson dismissed the article, stating that it had been discredited as anti-highway propaganda. He said that the figures came from selectively deployed or even fabricated statistics, which were then deceptively manipulated to make a case against the automobile. He lambasted the $85 billion figure offered as the cost of free parking saying, “Obviously, [it]... was not researched, cannot be supported, and is based on faulty economic reasoning” (sec. 2, p. 1). He went on to insist that highway users actually pay more than the full costs of highway construction. He pointed to a U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) table of highway statistics from 1995. The table listed total highway user revenues at almost $95.7 billion versus just $92.5 billion in highway expenditures. From this table, Jackson concluded that highway user revenues were actually being diverted to pay for non-highway related expenses. His conclusion was erroneous; he misunderstood the information that was being presented in the table as will be described later in this section. Finally, in the last section of the FACTS report Jackson provided his own transportation plan, which he felt would spend sales tax revenues more responsibly. Jackson's plan argued first against the centers and corridors strategy, saying that it had overlooked the heart of the region – Uptown Charlotte. He felt there should be more emphasis on increasing residential densities within a three-mile radius of Uptown. He recommended committing $5-10 million of public money annually to add 12,000-15,000 new homes to the area. He gave no time horizon for that goal.

64 Further, Jackson felt that the sales tax legislation should be amended so that the money could be applied to any transportation project, not just transit projects. He may not have been aware of the State's intransigence on this issue when the legislation was being drafted. His plan prioritized highway projects – widening the Interstates and finishing the conversion of Independence Boulevard. Whatever funds were not spent on highways could be used for bus transit. He felt that HOV lanes and busways would be the most efficient solution to the region's transportation problems. To sum up his overall plan he wrote, “In Charlotte the addition of 4 HOV/busway lanes, 6-8 highway lanes into center city and the additional housing would achieve the goal of providing 120,000 people working in the CBD with the access they have today” (sec. 3, p. 3). This, he claimed, would make his plan by far more effective than the 2025 Plan that was being developed. Jackson disseminated his FACTS report to Charlotte City Council, the County Commissioners, and the elected bodies of the Towns (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008). Unfortunately for Jackson, the transit camp (i.e. - those preparing the 2025 Plan) had one of the nation's most prolific scholars on transit and its land use impacts, Robert Cervero, working with them to develop an effective integrated transit and land use plan. On May 30, 1998, Cervero wrote a letter to Jackson in which he reviewed his report and critiqued many of its claims. Presumably, copies of the letter were sent to the same individuals who received the FACTS report; certainly multiple copies are extant at the time if this writing. Cervero's (1998) response started by commending Jackson for taking the time to examine mass transit issues closely and raise important points on the subject. He acknowledged that in the world of transportation politics, data are frequently “thrown around loosely, often without supporting documentation” (p. 1). For this reason, Cervero noted, the best sources of information were census publications and peer-reviewed journals. Cervero then went on to systematically demonstrate the inaccuracy of many of the statistics and trends that Jackson had alluded to in his FACTS report. For example, he referred to a study by Portland State University that found multifamily housing development in Portland was occurring most rapidly around MAX eastside stations, so Jackson's claim that virtually no development had occurred along the line was false. Furthermore, the property tax abatement measure had been passed by the State of Oregon, not the City of Portland as Jackson had reported, to promote affordable housing in that state. This was a response to rising housing costs

65 resulting from the state's urban growth boundaries and had nothing to do with the light rail line. He pointed out that transit carried 33% of downtown work trips in Portland in 1990. Regarding the comparisons of Portland and Seattle, Cervero was familiar with these claims that originated from Wendell Cox, a vociferous transit critic. Cervero simply stated that he believed the numbers were false and pointed out that they had not been based on any kind of peer review. In reference to the World Resource Institute article about highway users not bearing the full cost of automotive transport, which Jackson had refuted, Cervero listed four other credible studies from both environmental advocacy groups and conservative economists that had found similar results. He conceded that the $85 billion price tag for free parking might be high, but not grossly exaggerated. He said that virtually all suburban workers and shoppers park for free. Estimating a going commercial rate for parking of $5 per day, 85 million American workers parking for free 200 days out of the year would yield an overall parking subsidy of $85 billion. This calculation was somewhat crude, but sufficient to demonstrate that Jackson's assessment of the figure was inappropriate. Furthermore, Jackson's use of the USDOT highway statistics table misrepresented the facts. In calculating user revenues, that table included general fund transfers, which are direct subsidies. Cervero then referred to a 1996 report by the Federal Highway Administration that said general fund transfers were consistently growing as a share of highway receipts across the country. Cervero had little to say on Jackson's proposed transportation plan. Perhaps his claim that it did not focus enough on central Charlotte did not need to be rebutted since the entire plan was centered on maximizing accessibility to the core as well as to satellite centers. The desire to build thousands of new homes in the Uptown vicinity and promote expanded freeways to serve suburban areas failed to consider the desirability of this concept for the Towns and Mecklenburg County. The centers and corridors strategy had been developed out of regional processes and by this time all the Mecklenburg jurisdictions generally supported it. Finally, his proposal was put together without any analysis of the impacts it would have on Charlotte's communities and its transportation network. It simply made a few general recommendations. In July of 1998, City staff and consultants who worked on the 2025 Plan presented the final plan to all the elected officials of the City of Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, and all of the Towns, as well as the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. The region's political leaders debated the merits of the plan and asked questions of staff. Cervero was on hand to field

66 questions and debate the claims of Jackson and Reid in their opposition to the plan. Ultimately, the decision to send the sales tax referendum to the voters in November would be left to the Board of County Commissioners. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008)

4.3.6 The Transit Sales Tax Passes With extensive public involvement, clearly stated policy recommendations, a thorough delineation of transit and roadway plans, and a description of the vital importance of the transit sales tax to the regional growth vision, the 2025 Plan convinced the Mecklenburg County Commissioners to place the sales tax referendum on the ballot. Unquestionably, Cervero's expertise in response to opposition also bolstered support for the plan and secured votes from some who were undecided. Indeed, the tenor of the County Commission regarding transit and the sales tax had changed markedly from the days of the Committee of 100's final report. Tom Bush, Chair of the County Commission, was one of those who voted to rescind approval of that report. By the time the 2025 Plan was underway, Bush made his support for the plan contingent on the inclusion of LRT in the South Corridor. Commissioners Joel Carter, George Higgins, and Bill James also reversed their stances between 1994 and 1998. Some did not necessarily endorse the tax but said that they were willing to let the people vote on it. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; Purnell, personal communication, September 26, 2008) With the sales tax issue going to the voters in November, the 2025 Plan also served as an educational and promotional tool to build public support for the tax (Harmon, personal communication, July 22, 2008). Although it was created in only six months, it addressed the principal issues in sufficient detail to bolster voter confidence in the region's transit ambitions. Additional support for the sales tax campaign was provided by the Chamber of Commerce, who funded most of the advertising, including a fold-out, place mat style brochure that jointly advocated the transit sales tax and the road bond referendums side-by-side (Figure 10). Voters responded positively to what was pitched as a balanced approach to transportation planning. They approved the transit sales tax 58% to 42% in November of 1998 (Muth, 2004). The road bond passed by an even higher margin (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008). With the new dedicated funding source in hand, the next step was to finalize the governance structure for a new transit agency that could expand service throughout the county and successfully plan and construct a new rapid transit line.

67 4.4 The Metropolitan Transit Commission The Metropolitan Coalition Governance Agreement, negotiated before the passage of the transit sales tax enabling legislation in the General Assembly in 1997, laid the groundwork for the structure of a new transit institution in Charlotte-Mecklenburg that would be a department of the City of Charlotte but governed by a board of local elected officials from each jurisdiction in Mecklenburg County. The 2025 Plan had built on the foundation of that agreement and provided a clearer description of the embryonic Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) that would be created if the transit sales tax were approved. The primary role of the MTC would be to manage coordinated transit operations throughout Mecklenburg County and ensure that the interests of the Towns were represented. The MTC also needed to ensure that public involvement was part of the decision-making process. The system had to be flexible to allow jurisdictions outside of Mecklenburg County to join. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the governance structure needed to “retain for the elected bodies the responsibility of approving long range transit plans and capital and operating programs that support these plans” (City, 1998, p. 57). As sketched in the 2025 Plan, the MTC would have the responsibility of preparing long range transit plans for Mecklenburg County as well as transit operating programs and five-year capital programs. These programs would include public participation components that the MTC would be responsible for conducting. The board would not own assets or receive federal monies, leaving those responsibilities for the County and its municipalities. Based on the eventual institutional structure, it is evident that the MTC was never intended to be the transit operator, but simply a policy-making and budgeting board. Operations would be managed by the new transit department of the City of Charlotte, which was not established until 2000 (actual operations would be carried out by a contracted transit company due to federal and state laws affecting public entities and unionized labor). The same City department would also be responsible for rapid transit planning and construction. The City of Charlotte would provide technical and managerial support to the MTC with a Town representative and the County Manager contributing to the appointment and evaluation of the staff director. The MTC’s transit planning staff would work with committees from the County, NCDOT transit division, the CMPC, and contracted private transit operators in developing programs for regional transit. Service investments in the Towns (including new routes, extended bus service hours or improved frequency, rapid transit stations, etc) would have

68 to roughly reflect the sales tax revenue shares from each jurisdiction unless one expressed a desire for less service. Approval of the long range transit plan and operating and capital programs would be needed from the Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners. Other governing bodies could request review and revisions to those plans within an established review and approval period. (City, 1998) With the sales tax in place in 1999, the Transit Governance Interlocal Agreement established the MTC as the budgetary and policy-making body for transit in Mecklenburg County. Each of Mecklenburg's eight jurisdictions, including the County, were given one equal vote on the MTC, while surrounding jurisdictions and the state DOTs of North Carolina and South Carolina were granted ex-officio status. The MTC chair would alternate annually between the Mayor of Charlotte and the Chair of the Board of County Commissioners. (Muth, 2004) As noted above in Section 4.2, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce had favored a regional transit authority, but local officials were concerned that such an authority would remove transit decisions from the sphere of local and regional land use planning, which had become the defining theme of the region's planning philosophy. As they had done in the Metropolitan Coalition Governance Agreement, local politicians included in the Transit Governance Interlocal Agreement a resolution to review the governance structure of the MTC in 2004. The Chamber's concern that the City would not be able to attract a qualified transit executive to supervise rapid transit planning still remained a potential problem. However, after formally establishing the MTC as the regional decision-making body, the City hired Ron Tober as Public Transit Director in 1999. Tober was an experienced transit executive who had experience with rail projects and the federal funding process. He had previously worked with Metro Transit in Seattle and also had transit experience in Cleveland and Boston (Charlotte Trolley, 2008). When hired, Tober became the highest paid public employee in the State of North Carolina (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008). In 2000, Charlotte Transit was dissolved as a division of CDOT, and the Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) was created as the regional transit operator. However, in keeping with the description of the MTC offered in the 2025 Plan, CATS remained a City department. As such, the City owns all transit assets and liabilities. For example, the MTC can prepare a capital budget that includes purchasing new buses, but when purchased those buses will be the property of the City of Charlotte. The City is also responsible to service any debts that are part of the

69 MTC's financing strategy, but those expenses would be accounted for in the MTC budget.* For this reason, the MTC budget as well as all transit contracts must be approved by Charlotte City Council. The County had budgetary oversight when the MTC was formed, but later opted out of that responsibility. (MTC, 2007) The MTC also reports to two citizen advisory groups: the Citizens Transit Advisory Group (CTAG) and the Transit Services Advisory Committee (TSAC). The former was established by the Transit Governance Interlocal Agreement at the same time as the MTC. Members of CTAG are appointed by the County Commissioners, City Council, the Towns, and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Elected officials may not serve. CTAG reviews the MTC’s long range transit plans and the capital and operating programs. For long range plans, they are briefed by CATS and given time to review plans with staff. Then they may issue endorsements, express concerns, and/or provide recommendations to the MTC. For capital and operating budgets, CATS staff present proposed budgets to the MTC, who refer those proposals to CTAG. The citizen committee then replies with recommendations. CTAG recommendations or concerns are not always unanimous among the group. They are intended to provide the MTC with insight into the concerns of citizens when making budgetary and transit policy decisions. The MTC can choose to ignore CTAG comments, but this may be politically risky as the group ultimately represents the board's constituents. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; see also Charlotte Area Transit System [CATS], n.d.) TSAC was established after the MTC to make focused recommendations on day-to-day transit operations and short term operations plans. Appointments are made by the same bodies who decide the composition of CTAG, with the exception that the Board of Education is excluded. TSAC members are usually regular transit users. They consider such issues as decisions to cut bus routes, extend new routes, change operating hours, the location of benches and shelters, and the like. The overall organization of transit governance, including citizen advisory groups is presented schematically in Figure 11. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008; see also CATS, n.d.) The structure of the MTC provided Charlotte with a mechanism for coordinating transit and land use planning. Such coordination is generally elusive in American metropolitan areas, as

* In theory, the MTC could decide not to program monies to service the City's transit-related debt with the approval of the City Council.

70 local jurisdictions cling to autonomy in land use decisions while regional and state entities control transportation decisions. Significantly, Charlotte’s integrated approach was achieved in the absence of any State umbrella legislation that provides or requires comprehensive growth management controls. At the time the 2025 Plan was being developed, Charlotte had already received funding from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to study transit alternatives in the South Corridor, and with the hiring of Tober in 1999 the South Corridor Major Investment Study (MIS) began. The study was completed in 2000 and officially confirmed LRT as the preferred transit mode. The project moved into FTA’s preliminary engineering phase in November of 2000 as the City began the MIS process for each of the remaining four corridors. (Muth, 2004) Preliminary engineering for the South Corridor was completed in 2002 and a draft EIS was issued. The City submitted a full funding grant agreement application to FTA in August 2004, which was approved in December of the same year (Muth, 2004). The region’s first rapid transit line would extend south from Uptown Charlotte to the Pineville area. In late 2007, the LYNX Blue Line opened for service. The opening day ceremonies not only marked the completion of years of construction but the culmination of decades of planning and the first glimpse at the future of urban transportation in the Queen City.

71

Figure 7 – Comparison of Residential Densities from 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan

72

Figure 8 – Regional Rapid Transit Network from 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan

73

Figure 9 – Regional Road Plan: Programmed Projects and 1998 Road Bond Projects

74

Figure 10 – Front of Advertising Brochure for the 1998 Transit Sales Tax and Road Bond Initiatives

75

Figure 11 – Schematic Diagram of Structure of Transit Decision-Making in Charlotte-Mecklenburg

76

CHAPTER 5: EVALUATION OF DECISION-MAKING MODELS AND PLANNING POLITICS IN CHARLOTTE

This chapter evaluates the ability of each of the six political models described in the first two chapters to explain the historical events presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Like in the opening chapters, each model is considered individually. Each section below restates the theoretical expectations for each model as described in Chapter 2 before applying the model to analyze the events that took place in Charlotte. Even with the general facts of the region's transportation planning history in place, there remains some room for speculation as to how and why certain events occurred. As such, some license is taken to present slightly different narratives based on the analytical lenses provided by the different models. This provides a second test of the models' explanatory power. The plausibility of each model's rendition of speculative events and relationships – when compared to those observed – testifies to the strength of the model as a tool for understanding the region's decision-making.

5.1 The Elitist Model The basic assumption of the elitist model is that a unified and relatively stable elite class dominates political activities and achieves decision-making outcomes that favor the class as a whole. Although some intraclass conflict may occur, it tends to be resolved before an issue enters the public political realm, and elite consensus generally ensures that the interests of the class are protected. Chapter 2 states that, according to the elitist paradigm, business interests in central Charlotte would have worked closely with their political and institutional counterparts in developing the region's rapid transit plan. They would need class consensus beyond the City of Charlotte, and as such the plan would not infringe on suburban interests that tend to rely on the convenience of automotive accessibility. The elites would have funded advertising campaigns for the rapid transit plan and its accouterments (e.g. - the transit sales tax) that touted sweeping regional benefits, like reducing congestion and vehicle emissions. The unity of the elite class would minimize funding available to opposing campaigns.

77 In Charlotte, there is no evidence to suggest that the conception of a regional rapid transit system originated with any members of the elite class, but elites played a critical role in the ultimate decision to build rapid transit. Discussion of rapid transit in planning documents extends as far back as the 1977 Long Range Transit Plan that envisioned four dedicated busways. However, that plan and subsequent efforts throughout the 1980's did not envision rapid transit coming to fruition in the near future – they continually stressed the need to preserve rights of way and increase densities in future transit corridors. It was not until the early 1990's with the formation of the Committee of 100 and the adoption of the centers and corridors vision that regional leaders and planners began to think of rapid transit as a serious possibility and something they would pursue in only a matter of years. This was also the time when business interests became more overtly involved in transportation planning. Hence, it appears that elite involvement elevated rapid transit from a loosely defined concept to address the region's long term transportation concerns to a clear priority for Mecklenburg County's short term capital projects planning. The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce was intimately involved in the Committee of 100's selection process and its proceedings. Indeed, the composition of the Committee of 100 included a number of representatives from major businesses and institutions, many of which are located in or near Uptown Charlotte (Appendix B). There were also a number of prominent political figures and appointed bureaucrats on the committee, like former Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt (listed under “individual expert” in Appendix B) and several members of the NCBOT. The subsequent Committee of 10 had a similar composition. Committee of 10 Chair Johnsie Beck was a building materials executive, which may partly explain her interest in the region’s transportation planning. She was promoted to president of Sakrete of North America in 2006. Sakrete is a subsidiary of the Charlotte-based building products firm, Bonsal American Inc. Clearly, Beck could be considered a member of the elite class, along with other Committee of 10 members like Mac Everett and Jim Hance. (Charlotte Business Journal, 2006) Beyond the appointment of elites to serve on prominent advisory bodies like the Committee of 100 and the Committee of 10, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce played a major role in funding the advertising and public information campaigns in support of the transit sales tax and the road bond referendums in 1998. Clearly, there was a high level of elite involvement in several of the major movements that led to the region's decision to build rapid transit.

78 An additional concern, however, is the extent to which the elites exhibited unity as a class on the issue of rapid transit. Unity of class interests is not as critical as unity of class behavior. That is, the elite interests in central Charlotte surely would support a rapid transit system focused on the CBD, while those in the fringe areas might well have preferred continued highway- building and lateral expansion of activities. These groups of business elites have divergent interests, but their behavior throughout the rapid transit planning process was supportive, or at least not competitive. This fact is all the more intriguing when one considers that there was talk in the early 90's about building an Outer-Outer Loop (the Outer Loop, I-485, was already programmed and is currently near completion). The road would have spread population and employment further afield. Cramton opposed the idea and used the Committee of 100 process to bring the centers and corridors strategy to the fore (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008). While the centers and corridors vision focused primarily on Charlotte, it acknowledged the importance of outlying centers, which would help to soften suburban opposition. Cramton (personal communication, July 14, 2008) believes that the inclusion of business and political elites from the peripheral centers in the Committee of 100 process helped them to see that the Outer-Outer Loop would actually be detrimental to their interests in the long- run as it would promote leapfrog development and diminish their ability to attract jobs and residents. From the elitist perspective, Cramton seems to have proactively cultivated regional elite consensus on the centers and corridors vision, including the rapid transit component. While business elites demonstrated the kind of class unity that the elitist model predicts, the region's political leaders were much more divided. The Committee of 100 report was received favorably when it was first delivered to Charlotte City Council and the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners in late 1994, but newly-elected members of the latter body succeeded in repealing their predecessors' endorsement. Later, when the question of whether or not to put the transit sales tax referendum on the 1998 ballot was before the County Commissioners, two members of Charlotte City Council, Mike Jackson and Don Reid, adamantly opposed rapid transit. Jackson even went so far as to offer his own transportation plan that focused on highways and bus lanes. Ultimately, the sales tax referendum went to the voters in 1998, and as noted above, the Chamber financed the campaign to support it. Thus, sales tax proponents had substantial resources to bring their message to the public and build political momentum for the cause of

79 rapid transit. Opponents, on the other hand, would struggle to raise funds to disseminate a contradictory message. While the amount of money spent on each side of the sales tax argument in 1998 was not available for this study, an effort in 2007 (shortly before the LYNX Blue Line began operations) to repeal the transit sales tax may reveal the difference in financial support for each position. During that campaign, those who favored the tax – including the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce - spent around $600,000 on newspaper, radio, and television advertisements, while opponents – including Reid and Jackson - only mustered about $25,000. The attempt at repeal failed by a margin of 70% to 30%. (Charlotte Business Journal, 2007) Finally, the elitist model expects decision-making outcomes to consistently favor the elite class. In the case of Charlotte, the final outcome did favor the general elite position. There is some evidence described above that the elites developed a consensus on their position during the early, conceptual stages of rapid transit planning, in spite of some political opposition. Indeed, the transit initiative overcame political setbacks in 1994 and 1998 and survived a subsequent attack in 2007 to solidify the role of rapid transit in the region’s transportation planning. However, at least one outcome did not favor business elites. The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce pushed strongly to establish a regional transit authority, but on this issue political opposition was too strong. The politicians involved clearly supported the rapid transit idea, but wanted to ensure that land use and transit planning decisions would be made by elected officials. The resulting structure of the MTC and CATS is complex but fosters a strong sense of regional interest in the transit system and its growth. Overall, the elitist model partly explains the events that led to rapid transit in Charlotte, but on certain issues it seems to be inadequate. There seems to have been consensus more among business elites than among political elites, and there were times when these two groups had clearly not developed consensus on an issue before it became an important topic of public debate. Most notably, perhaps, the elitist model does not adequately explain the events that took place in the North Carolina General Assembly leading to the transit sales tax.. There is evidence, by virtue of the composition of the Committee of 10, that elites had some opportunity to build political momentum for the Mecklenburg Delegation's transit sales tax proposal, but their activities alone do not explain its success in Raleigh. It was in this arena that interest groups played a more active role in the region's transportation politics.

80 5.2 The Pluralist Model In contrast to the elitist model, the pluralist model holds that interest group activities will dominate the political process. Central city elites may be one among numerous groups who organize around varied interests and forge temporary alliances in response to certain issues. Although influential individuals can effectively organize these groups and achieve consistent outcomes on an issue, the variable nature of interest group politics generally ensures that outcomes will not tend to favor any one group. If the pluralist model explained decision-making in Charlotte, transportation planning would involve a number of interest groups, from neighborhood associations to business communities to environmental organizations and the like. These groups might play different roles at different stages of the planning process. Some may have been more involved at the State level than the local level and vice versa. Others might have taken an interest in land use policies without having a real preference among transportation alternatives. Group and individual allegiances may have shifted over the years, and planning or political decisions would reflect this fluidity. Consistent decision-making outcomes would be attributable to a high-profile leader, such as Mayor McCrory, who championed a cause and mustered support for it. Not surprisingly, in Charlotte various interest groups were active in the development and approval of the region's rapid transit vision. When Cramton was first hired as director of the CMPC, groups representing real estate and home building interests had been highly influential in the planning process, but organized neighborhood associations had begun to push for more inclusive planning processes that provided the public with better information and empowered neighborhoods to impact the planning agenda. These neighborhood organizations actively sought to introduce competition for political resources and alter the City and County's development patterns and policies. Their demands for a voice in planning decisions led to the recruitment of Cramton by the Charlotte City Council in 1979 to be the new Planning Director. In the pluralist paradigm, the business community is but one among many interest groups competing to affect policy. Certainly, as has already been discussed, the business community was a critical contributor to rapid transit planning in Charlotte, but they were not the only contributor. The Committee of 100 included representatives from neighborhood and service organizations as well as transit users in its deliberations. A significant portion of the 2025 Plan was developed out of public meetings and workshops. Certainly, various interest groups had the

81 opportunity to engage the planning process in these settings. Moreover, although the Committee of 10 seems to have been composed primarily of elites, their efforts to build political momentum in Raleigh for the transit sales tax proposal were complemented by a number of other groups, including environmental groups, the hospitality industry, and the League of Women Voters. Later, Mike Jackson's FACTS report responded to documents supporting transit for the Charlotte region that had come from a variety of groups, including the Sierra Club, UNCC, and the Charlotte Urban Forum. Clearly interest groups engaged the political process and had an impact on the region's decision to build rapid transit. However, aside from the early conflict between development interests and neighborhood organizations, there is little evidence of intense competition among interest groups or shifting values and allegiances within or among them. Although collective allegiances may have remained relatively stable, individual positions changed somewhat. Mecklenburg County Commission Chair Tom Bush originally opposed the Committee of 100 recommendations, but later threw his support behind transit when the 1998 sales tax referendum was being debated. He even decided to withhold his support for the 2025 Plan unless it included rail in the South Corridor. Fellow commissioners Carter, Higgins, and James also reversed their stance between 1994 and 1998, if not quite as fervently as Bush. Decision-making outcomes should not tend to favor any one group under the pluralist model. Any consistency in outcomes would be the result of effective individual leadership. As noted in the previous section, business elites generally achieved their goals in bringing rapid transit to the region, excepting that they were overruled by local politicians in their push for a regional transit authority. However, the reasons for the general trend may have to do with several effective leaders who supported transit and the sales tax. First, Cramton demonstrated the ability to forge alliances among competing interests (from neighborhood organizations to development groups) in support of integrated transit and land use planning. Additionally, Mayor McCrory galvanized community support for transit by virtue of being a highly-visible public leader and speaking out on the issue throughout his tenure as Mayor. While the decision to build rapid transit can be seen as a victory for central city elite interests, it was supported by a variety of groups who did not have the same goals in mind. Finally, Boyd Cauble played a major role in organizing the effort to lobby representatives in the North Carolina General Assembly to build support for the enabling legislation for the transit sales tax. That effort relied on more than elite

82 participation, achieving an outcome that ostensibly favored a broad array of interests. The leadership of Cramton, McCrory and Cauble in mustering support for transit can reconcile generally consistent outcomes with the expectations of the pluralist model. The pluralist model provides a different explanation of some of the events that led to Charlotte's decision to pursue rapid transit than the elitist model. Both the pluralist and elitist models have elements that seem to be true. While the region's elites were certainly involved in the planning of the transit system and the process to build political support for it, they were accompanied by planners, neighborhood organizations, environmental groups, and other interest groups who had different priorities. While competing interest groups may not have driven the process entirely, they forced major changes in how planning took place in Charlotte during the 1980's. Those changes led to a different planning paradigm that emphasized regional coordination and the efficient use of existing infrastructure. Certainly interest groups played an important role in shaping Charlotte's planning philosophy. However, although general consistency in decision-making outcomes may be explained by effective leadership, the story of rapid transit in Charlotte does not seem to have the elements of continual upheaval and fluid allegiances that the pluralist model anticipates. The positions of some political leaders did change, but there is little evidence that interest group positions altered during the process. The pluralist model perhaps provides the best lens for examining interest group activities, which were significant, but it does not appear to tell the whole story of the region’s transportation politics.

5.3 The Class-Dialectical Model The class-dialectical model synthesizes elements of the elitist and pluralist models, but also shifts the emphasis of the analysis from individual and collective actors to social institutions and power structures. Understanding transportation to be a vital component of the capital accumulation process, proponents of the class-dialectical model examine decisions affecting transportation systems in terms of how they respond to the needs of the capitalist or elite class. Internal class conflicts can have a profound impact on the positions the elites take on different issues at different times, and competing groups representing working- and middle-class interests can affect decision-making outcomes. Social institutions tend to be biased in favor of the dominant class but must also be responsive to the positions taken by competing groups. Political

83 outcomes generally favor elites, but will often reflect structural limitations and the power of opposing interests. Power structures may shift over time to better provide for the interests of the elite class. In analyzing transportation politics in Charlotte, the class-dialectical model would examine institutional structures and power relations. The compositions, structures, and functions of different institutional bodies like the Committee of 100, the Committee of 10, and the MTC tell a story of shifting power relations to meet elite class demands. Intraclass conflict would impact regional transportation decision-making. Although most political outcomes would favor elites, some would cater to opposing needs, responding to and in some cases creating new structural limitations in the region's institutions. As in most American cities in the 20th century, Charlotte's transportation institutions tended to focus on road building and facilitating automotive transport by default. MUMPO’s work seems to have primarily concentrated on regional road plans and major highway projects like the I-485 beltway (the current MUMPO website disseminates information on road projects almost exclusively, though there are links to sites that provide information on other modes). Meanwhile, Charlotte Transit was limited to operations within the city limits and was required to recover 40% of operating costs through passenger fares. With the formation of the Committee of 100 and later the Committee of 10, the political leaders of Charlotte – with consent from the Mecklenburg County Commissioners – wrested regional transportation decision-making from the MPO, at least to a degree. The goal of the first committee was to develop consensus on a regional transit plan; the second committee was created to foster support for transit by focusing on projects that could be built in Charlotte in a short time span. The composition of the Committee of 100 provided input from each of the Towns as well as the surrounding counties and their municipalities. However, the bulk of the committee came from Charlotte. The Committee of 10 had some regional representation but also consisted mostly of Charlotteans. While the Committee of 100 and Committee of 10 had no power to dictate transportation decisions, they began conversations about pursuing major transit investments for the region. They helped build the political support to push the transit sales tax proposal through the General Assembly and with the Mecklenburg County voters, while their emphasis on a regional vision had a significant impact on the structure of the MTC. Local leaders feared that a regional transit

84 authority would remove transportation decisions from the land use planning process. Thus, they established the MTC that is made up of representatives from Mecklenburg County, the City of Charlotte, and each of the Towns, each having one equal vote. The MTC structure demonstrates a shift in power relations in the region. With transit decision-making previously limited to the City of Charlotte and service provided only within the city limits, the advent of the transit sales tax required a new decision-making structure that equitably considered the interests of each jurisdiction. The transit sales tax also helps to diminish tension between the MTC and MUMPO, since it minimizes competition for local transportation funds. When the MTC and CATS coordinate long range transit plans with MUMPO's long range planning for general transportation, the allocation of local resources for either road or transit projects is generally not an issue. The sales tax was established for the specific purpose of funding transit, leaving regional transit decisions to the MTC. Even though the MTC must coordinate with MUMPO to apply for and receive federal monies, the transit board's long range plans are incorporated into the MUMPO Long Range Transportation Plan essentially without question. (Muth, personal communication, September 25, 2008) Clearly, the structure of transportation decision-making in Charlotte has changed in significant ways. First, there is a body dedicated solely to making transit decisions with a substantial funding source dedicated to supporting their plans. This has elevated the prominence of public transportation in the region so that it receives a similar level of public attention as road projects. Secondly, power relations have changed as well. While Charlotte remains the principal center of the region, its one vote on the MTC is equal to each of the votes from the County and each of the Towns. The City still retains budgetary oversight of the MTC, but clearly it was important to include the Towns in the decision-making process in order to bolster support for the transit plan. The Towns might have been content to allow growth to continue without a focused, coordinated growth strategy like the centers and corridors vision. The state of Charlotte's urban neighborhoods and business corridors in the 1970's and 80's suggests that urban decline may have eroded the accumulation capacity of central city properties. As such, Charlotte had good cause to pursue a new growth strategy and rapid transit focused on the Uptown area to revitalize the urban core. However, without the support of the Towns and the rest of Mecklenburg County,

85 their plans would not be politically feasible. Power structures in the region had to shift from dominant groups in Charlotte to include the other Mecklenburg jurisdictions. They all have equal votes on the MTC. Power relations also shifted slightly in the sense that real estate and development interests had successfully infiltrated and influenced planning decisions in the region before Cramton came to the CMPC in 1979. Organized efforts by several neighborhoods forced City leaders to develop more inclusive planning processes that incorporated public participation. The class- dialectical model contends that decision-making outcomes will tend to favor the capitalist class but, being structurally constrained, would sometimes respond to the demands of other groups. In this case, the real estate and development groups represented the capitalist class interests, but they were overcome by the need for political leaders to respond to their voting constituents. The class-dialectical model seems to provide a deeper understanding of many of the events that led to Charlotte's decision to invest in rapid transit than either the pluralist or elitists models. Its key points take into account some interest group activities but also acknowledge the power of the elite capitalist class. Its emphasis on institutional structures and power relations reveals a possible shift in regional power structures to respond to the changing needs of the dominant class. As has been noted in previous sections, intraclass conflict among the elites occasionally presented some difficulties, but as the class-dialectical model anticipates, efforts to develop consensus within the class were typically sufficient to ensure outcomes that favor elites.

5.4 The Growth Machine The growth machine model focuses on the activities of place-based growth coalitions in engaging the political process to affect land development decisions, including transportation facility questions. Politicians can focus on symbolic issues in their campaigns to garner public support, but often the real politics of resource distribution are more responsive to the demands of major land holders who provide financial support to the politicians. Symbolic politics were certainly part of the campaign to build rapid transit in Charlotte. However, the growth machine model calls for exploration of the land-use interests who supported the plan. Facility location decisions would likely be the product of recognizing the need to organize the most critical local growth coalitions around the rapid transit concept. Private entities would take an interest in the impact of the transit plan on the accumulation

86 capacity of their land holdings, while public bodies would be concerned with attracting dense growth that would boost tax revenues and minimize the need to make heavy investments in new infrastructure. Some of the symbolic issues that surrounded the development of the Charlotte region's rapid transit plan included air quality concerns and relief from traffic congestion. The latter probably received the greatest attention from the press (see Frazier, 1994; Whitacre, 1996a; Whitacre and Meadows, 1998). However, local media also considered issues such as curbing suburban sprawl, reversing central city decline, and redeveloping business corridors (Whitacre, 1998; Whitacre and Meadows, 1998). Another point of emphasis, stressed especially by McCrory, was the notion that transit was a preventative solution, a strategy to be pursued not for the current generation but for future generations (MTC, 2007). His stance echoed the advice given to him by Duke Energy president Bill Lee shortly after he took office in 1995. The most important symbolic issue, however, was the concern for the Charlotte region's long-term economic competitiveness. The sourcebooks of 1992 and 1994 began their discussions with a focus on this topic, and it permeated transit planning discourse from that point forward. It might be said that this was the “real” issue at hand, but who had material interests in the rapid transit system? The plan would have to garner support from the region's most critical place-based growth coalitions. The most powerful of these coalitions was the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, which represented the wealthy land interests in Uptown Charlotte. Their support for a radial rapid transit network focused on the CBD would not be difficult to attain as it would directly enhance the accumulation capacity (i.e. - rents) of their properties. The growth coalitions for the Towns, Mecklenburg County, and commercial/industrial centers in Charlotte not served by rapid transit (e.g. - SouthPark and Ballantyne) might not be as interested in the rapid transit plan. Early in Cramton's tenure in Charlotte, he worked with each of the Mecklenburg municipalities to draft the Sphere of Influence agreements. With growth occurring and expected to continue in much of unincorporated Mecklenburg County or in the Towns, the SOI agreements established boundaries for annexation that effectively eliminated conflict and competition among neighboring jurisdictions in capturing growth. By limiting the capacity for territorial expansion, the SOI agreements forced each jurisdiction to consider its future development patterns and the most efficient way to expand the local tax base. The most logical strategy was to concentrate

87 growth in the areas that were best suited (from an infrastructure standpoint) to accommodate it, and this is exactly what the centers and corridors vision called for. Rapid transit was seen as a tool to support the centers and corridors land use strategy. The Towns realized that road building tended to prompt low-density development that would bleed into other jurisdictions. The best way for them to maximize their growth potential was to coordinate with the region's principal city and support rapid transit. (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008) The corridors defined in the “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook catered to the need to serve each of the Towns. The northern Towns – Huntersville, Cornelius, and Davidson – would be served by the North Corridor. Matthews and Mint Hill would be served by the Southeast or Independence Corridor (although Mint Hill would not be served directly by rapid transit), while Pineville would be served by the South Corridor. In addition, the West Corridor would serve Charlotte-Douglas International Airport, bringing support from growth interests surrounding the airport. The Northeast Corridor would serve UNCC, thereby eliciting the support of one of the region's largest and most influential institutions. There are significant land interests surrounding the UNCC campus as well, an area referred to as University City, including a large research park, a major hospital, and burgeoning residential and retail developments (University City Parnters, n.d.). The Northeast Corridor could also be extended into Cabarrus County to serve the Concord/Kannapolis area, which is home to Lowe's Motor Speedway, a major NASCAR venue, and the Concord Mills Mall, North Carolina's foremost destination for shopping and tourism (Cabarrus County Convention and Visitors Bureau, n.d.). These two attractions bring millions of visitors to the region each year and rapid transit would greatly enhance their overall accessibility. The centers and corridors vision, the concept at the core of Charlotte’s rapid transit planning, was developed from regional processes that included most if not all of the region’s most influential growth coalitions. However, it also had been designed with the apparent intent of bringing them together to foster regional consensus on a broad land use and transit strategy. Given Cramton’s proactive stance in reforming the region’s planning practices, it is likely that he understood the importance of creating a vision that these various coalitions would support. That is, although the centers and corridors vision officially came out of regional participation in the Committee of 100 process, it seems that it really emerged from Cramton and the CMPC and was subsequently adopted by that body. The growth machine model permits the most thorough exploration of the parochial

88 concerns of growth coalitions within the metropolitan region. The class-dialectical analysis showed how institutional structures and power relations had shifted to make transit a high-profile metropolitan concern rather than an afterthought of the City of Charlotte. In that discussion, a new power structure that considered the interests of each of the Towns was understood to be critical to the success of the transit sales tax. The growth machine model provides additional insights into the varied interests represented throughout the metropolitan region by showing how the proposed transit system serves, in material terms, the economic development interests of the critical centers. However, the rapid transit concept still does not seem to have emerged from any or all of these supportive place-based growth coalitions. The centers and corridors concept and the regional planning perspective that Cramton advocated seem to have come from his concept of responsible planning and development for the region. His experiences from Portland would undoubtedly have provided him with valuable insight into how to achieve regional consensus on planning issues, but his impetus may have come more from ideological roots rather than material concerns. The regime theory mode of analysis permits a deeper understanding of the role that ideologies can play in major political decisions.

5.5 Regime Theory Perhaps more than any of the other political models discussed in this paper, regime theory permits an examination of how planners can influence the decision-making process. It also provides a more fruitful method for exploring the role of ideologies in the politics of transportation. According to Dunn, two modal growth coalitions tend to dominate proceedings: the highway benefits regime and the anti-auto vanguard. The vanguard would infiltrate the decision-making process, looking for problems to which to attach their solutions and seeking to portray their program as inevitable in the long run. As noted in Chapter 2, the decision to construct rapid transit in Charlotte suggests the presence of the anti-auto vanguard in the region and their effective engagement of local and regional politics. Transit promotions groups in the region would be expected to stress the eventual need for substantial transit investments. However, as will be demonstrated, it does not appear that the activities of the transit benefits regime were prompted by anti-auto ideals. It is also possible that Charlotte adopted a strategy that resembles Dunn's “auto-plus” concept that

89 addresses some of the most notable problems associated with the automobile. Pursuing transit and road improvements could augment the benefits of the automobile while providing an alternative to it. As Dunn anticipates, much of the rhetoric surrounding rapid transit planning in Charlotte emphasized the inevitable need for transit investments at some point in the region’s future. The costs of materials and rights-of-way would only get more expensive over time, so it behooved local leaders to pursue rapid transit sooner rather than later. At the same time, McCrory (among others) continued to stress that rapid transit was not a response to existing conditions but preparation for future conditions. The investment was being made to protect the region’s long term economic viability for the sake of future generations. Waiting for a problem to emerge would lead to exorbitantly expensive solutions. The rhetoric deployed to support rapid transit in Charlotte seems to indicate the presence of an active anti-auto vanguard. The vanguard used planning documents like the “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook and the 2025 Plan to disseminate these rhetorical appeals and build public and political interest in transit. It is not clear that the region's most prominent political or business leaders had an ideological interest in transit. It is more likely that their support for transit developed out of the various material or class concerns described throughout this chapter. However, advocacy coalitions like the anti-auto vanguard seek to organize people around ideas rather than interests. It is possible that some who had no material interests at stake (both among leaders and the public) flocked to the concept of transit as a preventative solution to an inevitable problem. For those who generally favored transit because of material or class concerns, the rhetoric of the vanguard could only bolster their support. Cramton may have been the leader of the Charlotte vanguard, even though he really saw rapid transit as a means of supporting a land use strategy rather than an end of itself (Cramton, personal communication, July 14, 2008). Certainly, he opposed major highway investments like the proposed Outer-Outer Loop and developed the centers and corridors vision as a more efficient alternative that would enhance the region's economic competitiveness. The consistency in planning documents to warn of impending mobility and accessibility declines and the threat of congestion to the region's economic health suggests that Cramton was the guiding hand that kept the region focused on rapid transit. Cramton had come from Portland and witnessed that region divert state and federal

90 highway money to transit and local road projects. In that case, the transit benefits regime had infiltrated the political process to erode parts of the foundation of the highway benefits regime. They took money from the highway coalition and used it to pay for transit and local roads. However, this coup was as much about empowering local planners to tailor transportation investments to support local land use and development plans as it was about modal preferences (Thompson, 2007). Cramton was the Planning Director for Washington and Multnomah Counties, Oregon while these events transpired in Portland. His experience left him well- equipped to lead a transit benefits regime in Charlotte against the prevailing highway regime and probably instilled in him a commitment to impact land use planning and incorporate transit as a tool to support more sustainable and economically viable development patterns. Charlotte's transit benefits regime took a different approach than Portland had decades earlier, and while much of their rhetoric might have conformed to Dunn's expectations, it is not clear that the “vanguard” was necessarily “anti-auto.” Initially, the sales tax proposed by the Committee of 100 – and later considered by the Mecklenburg Delegation – was a one-cent sales tax devoted to transit and road building. When the State of North Carolina refused to endorse local option taxes for roads, the proposal changed to a half-cent sales tax dedicated solely to transit. Even then, the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce campaigned for the 1998 transit sales tax in tandem with a major road bond package. The transit benefits regime in Charlotte did not seek to undermine the highway benefits regime directly but sought to establish for itself some level of structural autonomy to provide the transit coalition with a set of advantages similar to what the highway regime had long enjoyed. In this way, transportation decision-making in Charlotte resembles Dunn's “auto-plus” model. Like Portland, Charlotte's plan involves rapid transit as well as road building, but the real thrust of the planning effort emphasizes increasing the intensity of urban development, in part to make the most efficient use of existing infrastructure. As has been noted throughout this paper, this was the critical point that led to the establishment of the MTC rather than a regional transit authority. Increasing urban densities would make transit viable in the region's centers and business corridors, but would not have a dramatic impact on the convenience of the automobile in the wedges and in suburban locations. Furthermore, providing alternatives to the car would benefit the region's air quality, create a more equitable transportation system, and attract reinvestment in urban neighborhoods, thereby tackling several of the major drawbacks of the

91 automobile. Regime theory provides intriguing insights into the workings of a transit benefits regime in Charlotte and the power that planners can wield in organizing people around ideas. Certainly, the rhetorical appeals of transit advocates to consider the region's long term vitality would have influenced the opinions of decision-makers and their constituents. Furthermore, the ability of the transit regime to establish the transit sales tax and the MTC provides the fiscal and institutional foundations to support continual transit investments in the region. However, it remains likely that the major contributors to the transit campaign (i.e. - the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce) and its proponents in the political arena would have been more concerned with the material benefits of rapid transit as compared to a highway plan than the idealistic issues raised by the vanguard. In working to develop regional consensus on a transportation and land use vision, Cramton appears to have organized supporters around material interests as much if not more than ideals. As such, a transit advocacy coalition cannot be proffered as the driving force behind Charlotte's decision to invest in rapid transit. It stands to reason that there was such a coalition, that they were active and influential, but that other important actors, collective and individual, supported rapid transit because of anticipated material benefits, to maintain class cohesion, and/or to promote the agenda of some interest group.

5.6 Consensus Building The consensus building approach focuses on inclusive, collaborative processes in metropolitan decision-making. While the particular conditions specified in consensus building theory (see Chapter 2) will not likely all be observed in Charlotte, the impacts of public involvement and collaborative planning efforts can best be explored using this model. A comprehensive set of stakeholders would need to be intimately involved with transportation planning in Charlotte to uphold consensus building as a model for the region’s decision-making. The planning process would need to be highly transparent and records of decisions easy to obtain. A number of significant planning efforts in Charlotte included high levels of public involvement or attempted to bring a full range of stakeholders into the decision-making process. Neighborhood pressures in the early 1980's led Cramton and the CMPC to increase public

92 participation in the planning process. The “Urban Symposium” that the CMPC held in 1980 brought an array of interests to the table to develop the CMPC's planning agenda and to define the region's most important planning issues. The program that emerged from the symposium focused on public participation in planning and reinvigorating Charlotte's urban neighborhoods and chief business corridors. As these concepts played out through the 80's and in the early 90's, rapid transit and the centers and corridors vision formed the foundation of the region's planning philosophy. The Committee of 100 also appeared to be an attempt at developing consensus on a regional growth and transportation strategy that included representatives from across the region and from a variety of interests. Committee members represented various types of groups from businesses large and small to neighborhood organizations, service organizations, politicians, the development community, and transit users. It is not clear that all interests were considered equally; it is possible that the Committee of 100's proceedings were dominated by representatives of elite interests. However, Cramton (personal communication, July 14, 2008) asserts that the involvement of suburban and central city interests engendered widespread support for the centers and corridors vision and later the transit sales tax throughout Mecklenburg County. Public participation was critical in the development of the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan in 1998. To ensure that public voices were heard, all corridor meetings were conducted by trained facilitators, and comments were reviewed and addressed by T-PAC. City staff worked with T-PAC to incorporate suggestions and criticisms aired in the public meetings into the transit and land use recommendations articulated for each corridor. Furthermore, the content of meetings was made available on the City/County website, an information hotline, and through the media. The high level of public involvement solidified support for the 2025 Plan among the Mecklenburg County Commissioners and may have played an important part in building public support for the transit sales tax. Finally, the MTC relies on collaboration among various City and County departments. CATS funds positions with the CMPC to work on land use planning in coordination with transit planning. Additionally, CDOT has substantial input in the rapid transit planning process that includes determining the need for grade-separated street crossings, opportunities to improve the street network for transit-oriented development in station areas, and reviewing bicycle and

93 pedestrian accessibility of stations (Muth, personal communication, July 2, 2008). This does not necessarily point to a consensus building process, but the fact that CATS needs the blessings of various departments to finalize decisions and proceed with rapid transit planning ensures that a variety of interests are considered in that process. Moreover, the MTC also requires the cooperation of the various political leaders of each jurisdiction represented on the board. Each paying jurisdiction has one equal vote and non- paying members can contribute to discussions even though they cannot vote on issues. The MTC members voice parochial interests but ultimately have to develop consensus on transit planning and budgetary issues in the region. The structure of the MTC suggests that decision- makers in Charlotte-Mecklenburg have proactively sought to develop a way to ensure that each jurisdiction's interest are known and given full consideration in the decision-making process. While there are examples of collaborative and inclusive processes in the development of Charlotte's rapid transit plan, the consensus building model does not effectively explain the whole story of the region's commitment to transit. Indeed, even the best examples of collaboration do not conform to all of the consensus building criteria set forth by Innes that were enumerated in Chapter 2. For example, there are no instances in which the planning process in Charlotte appears to have been self-organized by participants and unconstrained in time or content. Furthermore, it would be difficult to assert that a full range of stakeholders was included in any of the major movements of the region's planning history. An audit of the public involvement processes and the cross-section of the community and the interests represented might be the subject of a different paper. However, the fact that there are some shortcomings points more to the strict, prescriptive nature of the consensus building model than to a failure by planners and decision-makers in Charlotte to include a variety of interests in forging the region's planning vision. As this section has shown, there were a number of inclusive processes that would not receive attention or at least be treated differently by other decision-making models.

94

CONCLUSION

This paper has considered six models of metropolitan decision-making and compared the tenets of those models with the events that led to Charlotte's decision to build rapid transit. The hypothesis defined in Chapter 2 stated that no single one of these models would be sufficient to explain how that decision was ultimately achieved. Each model tends to focus on particular attributes of the political dynamic, all of which play an important part in the decision-making process. Chapters 3 and 4 detailed the history of Charlotte's planning politics, and Chapter 5 described how the different political models each explain some of those events and processes but fail to adequately explain others. The application of all of the models, however, provides a rich understanding of transportation politics in Charlotte, including the roles that planners played. The material presented in this paper also suggests that decision-making is a dynamic process in which numerous individual and collective actors with discursive interests and affiliations assume roles of varying importance at different stages of the process. Decisions are made not at one time by one group of people, but rather throughout the course of a number of years by many different people. The strengths and weaknesses of each model to describe the events that took place in Charlotte at different times indicate that the decision-making process is continually evolving. This concluding section briefly presents the history of transit planning in Charlotte again, describing each stage according to the political model(s) that seems to have been the dominant mode of decision-making in the region at the time. When Cramton arrived in Charlotte as the new director of the CMPC, the nature of the region’s planning process and the critical participants in the process were in flux. Real estate and development interests had been heavily influential in setting the region’s planning agenda, but an increasing number of neighborhood organizations introduced competition for political resources to reform the process. Their activities altered the composition of the Charlotte City Council who recruited Cramton and directed the CMPC to develop a more inclusive planning program. The activities of the neighborhood interest groups and their effectiveness in shifting the focus of the planning process from development interests to incorporate public participation suggest that the earliest movements toward the development of a rapid transit system in Charlotte (although this

95 was certainly not the issue in those debates) stemmed from pluralist processes. Furthermore, Cramton’s initiatives to expand public involvement, including his Urban Symposium, attempted to include a broad range of interests in developing a new planning agenda for the 1980’s. To some extent, as Chapter 5 described, there was an element of consensus building in that process. As such, the roots of rapid transit planning in Charlotte come from the activities of diverse interests and the proactive enrollment of stakeholder participation. However, there seems to have been a clear need to foster elite consensus on a number of issues, and the growth machine model explains much about how that need was addressed. Before rapid transit entered the political arena as a realistic issue for debate, Cramton began work to develop cohesion among the Mecklenburg municipalities. The Sphere of Influence agreements eliminated a potential source of conflict among the jurisdictions as the region continued to grow by establishing boundaries for municipal annexation. With these boundaries in place, local growth coalitions understood where their opportunities to court growth and investment would lie. The centers and corridors growth vision served most of the county’s municipalities and proffered a scenario in which they could maximize local growth and maintain a high standard of living. The centers and corridors vision became a reified planning framework for the region with the Committee of 100 in 1994. When considering the Committee of 100 and its importance to transit planning in Charlotte, a number of different political theories (some that seem to contradict each other) can be applied to analyze different aspects of the group and its work. The committee included members from a broad cross-section of interests and from throughout the region, an apparent proactive endeavor to develop full regional consensus on transportation and land use issues. The consensus building model shows how the Committee of 100 provided an opportunity for a full range of stakeholders to shape the region’s future. However, many of the Committee of 100 members might also be classified as members of the elite class. From the vantage point of the elitist model, the committee provided an opportunity to forge elite consensus on transportation and land use issues without bringing those issues into the political arena. The chairs of each of the five subcommittees seem to be elites and members of either the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce or major institutions (e.g. Tony Zeiss of the Transit Alternatives subcommittee was affiliated with Central Piedmont Community College, although it is unclear in exactly what capacity).

96 Although the consensus building and elitist models might present contradictory interpretations of the Committee of 100, it may be that both are partially true. The committee certainly provided a venue in which to develop elite consensus, and the process may have been guided by elites who chaired the subcommittees. However, other interests were represented, and even if the committee’s proceedings did not entirely conform to the conditions of the consensus building model, participants may have been satisfied that their concerns were heard and felt that they had some ownership of the committee’s outcomes. The geographical composition of the Committee of 100 again suggests an awareness of growth machine politics and the importance of place based growth coalitions. It would be important to develop a transportation network that catered to the material interests of most if not all of these coalitions. While the Transit Alternatives subcommittee did not outline a specific rapid transit plan for the region at that time, the committee had embraced the centers and corridors vision that did serve most major centers in the region and illustrated the potential benefits of a coordinated growth strategy. The Committee of 100’s endorsement of the centers and corridors vision opens up yet another facet of the committee’s work for discussion. The “Centers and Corridors” sourcebook appears to have truly been a product of the CMPC that was promoted by the Committee of 100. The rhetorical and material appeals of that document suggest that a transit benefits regime (ostensibly led by Cramton) was at work to influence decision-making. “Centers and Corridors” seems to have been exactly the kind of solution-looking-for-a-problem that Dunn anticipates in his description of the anti-auto vanguard. The final report of the Committee of 100 was initially approved and later rejected by the Mecklenburg Board of County Commissioners. The turnaround came with the election of new commissioners to that body. In spite of the committee’s apparent intent to forge elite consensus on transportation and land use issues, the new leaders opposed the recommendations of the final report. This outcome (indeed the dramatic inconsistency of two political outcomes – first supporting, then opposing) gives some credence to the pluralist model. It appears that elites may indeed have been a powerful group in Charlotte at that time, but alternative interests prevailed in defeating their plan. In this contracted narrative, it appears that a number of important political processes were at play with the Committee of 100. Each theory may offer a satisfactorily complete rendition of

97 the history and purpose of that committee, but when all are considered together (even those that contradict each other) the Committee of 100 process appears to be much more dynamic and influential than when only a single model is applied. In contrast to the Committee of 100, the Committee of 10 of 1996 appears to have been a predominantly elitist endeavor. The committee was composed mostly, if not entirely of members of the elite class. They did not have a significant public involvement component in developing their five-year program, nor does there appear to have been a transit benefits regime influencing the committee’s work. The committee’s task was to focus on short term improvements for the City of Charlotte, so the same growth machine principles that applied in the Committee of 100 do not seem relevant to the Committee of 10. Generally, the Committee of 10 appears to have successfully fulfilled its charge and demonstrated local support for transit and a local option funding source. However, there was no real outcome – a decision was not made in direct response to their program. As such, it seems to have been an elitist process, but without an outcome it is hard to tell if the elitist model fully describes the nature of decision-making in Charlotte at that time. When the Committee of 10’s work shifted to engaging the Mecklenburg Delegation to draft enabling legislation for the transit sales tax in the North Carolina General Assembly in 1997, other political processes emerged. The elites on the Committee of 10 played an important role in enlisting the support of the Mecklenburg Delegation and other state representatives, but it does not appear that an elitist model can account for the success of the sales tax proposal in the state legislature. A number of additional interest groups were also involved in building statewide support for the sales tax. The success of the proposal was a result of their activities and the effective efforts of Boyd Cauble in organizing their support and lobbying politicians. This pattern of events conforms more closely to the pluralist model than the elitist model. Additionally, the pursuit of funding for transit never seemed to attack highway interests. The sales tax proposal in its earliest stages included a roads component. The transit benefits regime in Charlotte (in this case operating at the state level) would not appear to have been akin to the anti-auto vanguard described by Dunn. In fact, even though transportation planning in Charlotte has come to include substantial investments in transit, it has consistently paired transit and road investments. The transit benefits regime looked to establish an institutional structure and a funding source that would permit essentially autonomous decision-making without having

98 to directly compete with the highway coalition for political and material resources. Before the transit sales tax was adopted in Mecklenburg County in 1998, the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan was created to give elected officials and the public an idea of how the tax would impact transit and land use in the county, specifically in each of the five corridors. The 2025 Plan was created with a great deal of public involvement, and information about the process and records of decisions were publicly available in a variety of forms (see Section 5.6). Trained facilitators conducted public meetings and the T-PAC was formed to ensure that public comments were incorporated into the final plan. These attributes of the process resemble the consensus building model. The 2025 Plan also contained warnings about the detrimental effects of not implementing the transit sales tax. Those warnings generally focused on the long term economic competitiveness of the region, and so appealed to the concerns of elites and local growth coalitions. The rhetoric of the 2025 Plan closely resembles that of the anti-auto vanguard by stressing inevitable problems resulting from an auto-centric growth strategy. Like the Committee of 100 process, several models seem appropriate to describe certain elements of the 2025 Plan. Although the 2025 Plan and the transit sales tax faced some opposition in the Charlotte City Council, they enjoyed the support of the majority of Charlotte's leaders and the elite class. The Charlotte Chamber of Commerce provided the financial backing for the sales tax campaign, and other than Jackson's FACTS report that was effectively defused by Cervero before the 2025 Plan was finished, there is no evidence of a significant counter-campaign. Although the 2025 Plan was drafted out of a consensus building process and included the involvement of a transit benefits regime, the support of the elite class was ultimately critical to the success of the transit sales tax. The final development considered by this paper is the establishment of the MTC in 1999. Each Mecklenburg jurisdiction is represented on the MTC, and two citizen advisory committees – CTAG and TSAC – contribute to the decisions made by the board. The structure of transit decision-making attempts to include a variety of interest and equally consider the concerns of each municipality as well as the County. Like the Committee of 100, it is possible that MTC decisions are really dictated by elite interests, but the structure calls to mind elements of the consensus building model.

99 The establishment of the MTC signals an institutional shift that may be based on the demands of local growth coalitions in the Towns. The MTC provides a decision-making process devoted solely to transit. Although long range transit plans must still be coordinated with MUMPO, there is minimal competition for resources among transit and highway interests, thanks to the transit sales tax. With each jurisdiction having equal votes on the MTC, the center of power in the Charlotte region may also have shifted. Central city business elites needed the support of the Towns to pass the transit sales tax, and the Towns now each have an equal say in transit decisions as the City of Charlotte, even though they are much smaller in population. The shift in power relations would ostensibly be a response to the changing demands of the capitalist class and the need to revitalize the accumulation capacity of central city properties while protecting the growth interests of suburban centers. The class dialectical model best describes the changes in institutional structures and power relations that took place in the region during the development of the rapid transit plan. The abbreviated retelling of Charlotte's rapid transit planning history presented above reveals the value of applying a variety of theoretical constructs in this analysis. At different times over the course of Charlotte's history different models of metropolitan decision-making appear to describe the region's political processes. In several instances multiple models are applicable, providing a deep, stratified understanding of the concerns of decision-makers at those times. Interestingly, the story of rapid transit in Charlotte includes several episodes that incorporate elements of the consensus building model (more than initially expected), but the success of transit also depended heavily on contributions from the elite class. A substantial amount of public involvement and neighborhood organization activities in the 1980's and 90's cast the plan as at least partially the product of public meetings and workshops. However, the continual promotion of transit by the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce and the sustained efforts by political leaders like McCrory suggest that the elite class had developed some level of consensus on the issue before it became a topic of public debate. The fact that both the consensus building and elitist models (or variations on the elitist theme like the growth machine model) can be observed throughout Charlotte's transit planning history demonstrates the dynamism and complexity of decision-making, especially as it takes place over the course of an extended period of time.

100 Finally, in evaluating the roles of planners in the metropolitan decision-making process, the Charlotte story shows that there are numerous important considerations that planners should be aware of when engaging the political arena. The ideals commonly associated with the planning profession or perhaps with a transit benefits regime have a symbolic or rhetorical appeal and can influence decision-making, especially when they appear as solutions to seemingly unavoidable problems. However, it may be more important for planners to consider how their agendas materially impact significant groups and individuals, such as the region's elites or a collection of local growth coalitions. Developing consensus among elites and/or uniting various growth coalitions around a planning vision can be critical to the success of a plan. However, interest group activities and public participation processes are also necessary to foster public support. Perhaps the greatest success of Charlotte's rapid transit story is that is not possible to define it as an elitist endeavor or a grassroots movement. There are elements of both top-down and bottom-up political processes at work, and often times planners provided the bridge between the two, incorporating public input and facilitating elite consensus. An additional insight that can be gleaned from this analysis is that the Charlotte story provides a template for developing an integrated approach to transit and land use planning even without a full complement of state growth management legislation. A thorough dissection of Charlotte’s model for coordinating these two spheres of planning is not appropriate for this paper, but the concept prompts a new line of inquiry that warrants further investigation.

101 APPENDIX A – HUMAN SUBJECTS FORMS

102 Office of the Vice President For Research Human Subjects Committee Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2742 (850) 644-8673 · FAX (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 3/21/2008

To: Lewis Bell

Address: 472 W Jefferson St, Tallahassee, FL 32301 Dept.: URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING

From: Thomas L. Jacobson, Chair

Re: Use of Human Subjects in Research Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

The application that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Secretary, the Chair, and two members of the Human Subjects Committee. Your project is determined to be Expedited per 45 CFR § 46.110(7) and has been approved by an expedited review process.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals, which may be required.

If you submitted a proposed consent form with your application, the approved stamped consent form is attached to this approval notice. Only the stamped version of the consent form may be used in recruiting research subjects.

If the project has not been completed by 3/19/2009 you must request a renewal of approval for continuation of the project. As a courtesy, a renewal notice will be sent to you prior to your expiration date; however, it is your responsibility as the Principal Investigator to timely request renewal of your approval from the Committee.

You are advised that any change in protocol for this project must be

103 reviewed and approved by the Committee prior to implementation of the proposed change in the protocol. A protocol change/amendment form is required to be submitted for approval by the Committee. In addition, federal regulations require that the Principal Investigator promptly report, in writing any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the Chair of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Human Research Protection. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Gregory Thompson, Advisor HSC No. 2008.1130

104

FSU Behavioral Consent Form Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

You are invited to be in a research study of the politics of rapid transit in Charlotte, NC. You were selected as a possible participant because of your professional experience in transportation planning in Charlotte. We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by Alex Bell, a graduate student in the department of Urban and Regional Planning at Florida State University.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to examine various models of urban politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the events that led to the decision to build rapid transit in Charlotte. It also looks closely at the actions and influences of planners in the region to better understand the importance of the planning profession in shaping urban areas and developing large-scale public projects.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, I simply ask that you choose a time that is convenient for you to sit down and speak with me about the history of transportation planning in Charlotte and to especially give me some background on the critical planning documents that preceded construction of the area’s first light rail line. I would like to record the conversation on audio tape. I will be in the Charlotte area for about 12 weeks during the summer of 2008 (May through July), so I hope this will allow sufficient time to arrange a meeting.

Risks and benefits of being in the Study:

The study intends to ask you about your professional experiences in relation to transportation or transit-supportive land-use planning in Charlotte. As most of this information pertains to public events and documents, you should not encounter any substantial risks by participating in this study. If questions regarding a sensitive matter are posed that you do not wish to answer, you may certainly refuse response.

There are no direct benefits from participating in this study.

Compensation:

Participation in this study is on a purely volunteer basis, and you will receive no compensation for the time you contribute to it.

FSU Human Subjects Approved on 3/20/2008. Void after 3/19/2009. HSC#: 2008.1130 105

Confidentiality:

Audio recordings and transcripts of conversations will be available only to the author of the report or his advisor. However, this is not a confidential survey. The prospective published report will include your name and your assessments and/or descriptions of significant events in Charlotte’s transportation or related planning and/or politics as this sort of primary source is invaluable to a paper of this kind.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is Alex Bell. You may ask any question you have now. If you have a question later, you are encouraged to contact him at 472 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301, 813-956-1167, or [email protected]. You may also contact Gregory Thompson of the FSU Department of Urban and Regional Planning at 850-644- 8514 or [email protected].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2742, or 850-644- 8633, or by email at [email protected].

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

______Signature Date

______Signature of Investigator Date

FSU Human Subjects Approved on 3/20/2008. Void after 3/19/2009. HSC#: 2008.1130 106 FSU Behavioral Consent Form Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

You are invited to be in a research study of the politics of rapid transit in Charlotte, NC. You were selected as a possible participant because of your professional experience in transportation plruming in Charlotte. We ask that you read this form ru1d ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by Alex Bell, a graduate student in the department of Urban ru1d Regional Planning at Florida State University.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to examine various models of mban politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the events that led to the decision to build rapid trru1sit in Charlotte. It also looks closely at the actions and influences of planners in the region to better understand the impmtance of the planning profession in shaping urbru1 areas and developing large-scale public projects.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, I simply ask that you choose a time that is convenient for you to sit down and speak with me about the history of transportation plruming in Charlotte and to especially give me some background on the critical plruming documents that preceded construction of the area's first light rail line. I would like to record the conversation on audio tape. I will be in the Charlotte area for about 12 weeks during the surnmer of2008 (May through July), so I hope this will allow sufficient time to arrange a meeting.

Risks and benefits of being in the Study:

The study intends to ask you about your professional experiences in relation to transportation or transit-supportive land-use planning in Charlotte. As most of this information pe1tains to public events and documents, you should not encounter any substantial risks by participating in this study. If questions regarding a sensitive matter are posed that you do not wish to answer, you may certainly refuse response.

There are no direct benefits from participating in tllis study.

Compensation:

Participation in this study is on a purely volunteer basis, and you will receive no compensation for the time you contribute to it.

107 Confidentiality:

Audio recordings and transcripts of conversations will be available only to the author of the report or his advisor. However, this is not a confidential survey. The prospective published report will include your name and your assessments and/or descriptions of significant events in Charlotte's transportation or related planning and/or politics as thjs sort of primary source is invaluable to a paper of thls kind.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to pruticipate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting tills study is Alex Bell. You may ask any question you have now. If you have a question later, you are encouraged to contact him at 472 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301, 813-956-1167, or [email protected]. You may also contact Gregory Thompson of the FSU Deprutment ofUrban and Regional Planning at 850-644- 8514 or [email protected].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone other than the reseru·cher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Reseru·ch Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2742, or 850-644- 8633, or by email [email protected].

You will be given a copy of tllis information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

Date

7/?. {co' Date

108 FSU Behavioral Consent Form Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

You are invited to be in a research study of the politics of rapid transit in Charlotte, NC. You were selected as a possible participant because of your professional experience in transportation plruming in Charlotte. We ask that you read this form ru1d ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by Alex Bell, a graduate student in the department of Urban ru1d Regional Planning at Florida State University.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to examine various models of mban politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the events that led to the decision to build rapid trru1sit in Charlotte. It also looks closely at the actions and influences of planners in the region to better understand the impmtance of the planning profession in shaping urbru1 areas and developing large-scale public projects.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, I simply ask that you choose a time that is convenient for you to sit down and speak with me about the history of transportation plruming in Charlotte and to especially give me some background on the critical plruming documents that preceded construction of the area's first light rail line. I would like to record the conversation on audio tape. I will be in the Charlotte area for about 12 weeks during the surnmer of2008 (May through July), so I hope this will allow sufficient time to arrange a meeting.

Risks and benefits of being in the Study:

The study intends to ask you about your professional experiences in relation to transportation or transit-supportive land-use planning in Charlotte. As most of this information pe1tains to public events and documents, you should not encounter any substantial risks by participating in this study. If questions regarding a sensitive matter are posed that you do not wish to answer, you may certainly refuse response.

There are no direct benefits from participating in tllis study.

Compensation:

Participation in this study is on a purely volunteer basis, and you will receive no compensation for the time you contribute to it.

109 Confidentiality:

Audio recordings and transcripts of conversations will be available only to the author of the report or his advisor. However, this is not a confidential survey. The prospective published report will include your name and your assessments and/or descriptions of significant events in Charlotte's transportation or related pla1ming and/or politics as this sort of primary source is invaluable to a paper of this kind.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Patticipation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to parti.cipate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is Alex Bell. You may ask any question you have now. If you have a question later, you are encouraged to contact him at 4 72 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301, 813-956-1167, or [email protected]. You may also contact Gregory Thompson of the FSU Department of Urban and Regional Planning at 850-644- 8514 or [email protected].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2742, or 850-644- 8633, or by email [email protected].

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

ｾ＠ ＷＭｬｶＭ｣Ｚ［ｾ＠ Signature Date (...

7-t'-1 - o?S ｓ ｾ ･ｳｴｩｧ｡ｴｯｲ＠ Date

110 FSU Behavioral Consent Form Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

You are invited to be in a research study of the politics of rapid transit in Charlotte, NC. You were selected as a possible participant because of your professional experience in transportation plruming in Charlotte. We ask that you read this form ru1d ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by Alex Bell, a graduate student in the department of Urban ru1d Regional Planning at Florida State University.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to examine various models of mban politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the events that led to the decision to build rapid trru1sit in Charlotte. It also looks closely at the actions and influences of planners in the region to better understand the impmtance of the planning profession in shaping urbru1 areas and developing large-scale public projects.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, I simply ask that you choose a time that is convenient for you to sit down and speak with me about the history of transportation plruming in Charlotte and to especially give me some background on the critical plruming documents that preceded construction of the area's first light rail line. I would like to record the conversation on audio tape. I will be in the Charlotte area for about 12 weeks during the surnmer of2008 (May through July), so I hope this will allow sufficient time to arrange a meeting.

Risks and benefits of being in the Study:

The study intends to ask you about your professional experiences in relation to transportation or transit-supportive land-use planning in Charlotte. As most of this information pe1tains to public events and documents, you should not encounter any substantial risks by participating in this study. If questions regarding a sensitive matter are posed that you do not wish to answer, you may certainly refuse response.

There are no direct benefits from participating in tllis study.

Compensation:

Participation in this study is on a purely volunteer basis, and you will receive no compensation for the time you contribute to it.

111 Confidentiality:

Audio recordings and transcripts of conversations will be available only to the author of the report or his advisor. However, this is not a confidential survey. The prospective published report will include your name and your assessments and/or descriptions of significant events in Charlotte's transportation or related planning and/or politics as this sort of primary somce is invaluable to a paper of this kind.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to pruticipate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is Alex Bell. You may ask any question you have now. If you have a question later, you ru·e encouraged to contact him at 472 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301 , 813-956-1167, or [email protected]. You may also contact Gregory Thompson of the FSU Deprutment of Urban ru1d Regional Plarming at 850-644- 8514 or [email protected].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2742, or 850-644- 8633, or by email [email protected].

You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

ｓ ｾ ｶ･ｳｴｩｧ｡ｴｯｲ＠ Date

112 FSU Behavioral Consent Form Urban Politics and the Role of Planners in the Decision to Build Light Rail in Charlotte

You are invited to be in a research study of the politics of rapid transit in Charlotte, NC. You were selected as a possible participant because of your professional experience in transportation plruming in Charlotte. We ask that you read this form ru1d ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

This study is being conducted by Alex Bell, a graduate student in the department of Urban ru1d Regional Planning at Florida State University.

Background Information:

The purpose of this study is to examine various models of mban politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of each model in explaining the events that led to the decision to build rapid trru1sit in Charlotte. It also looks closely at the actions and influences of planners in the region to better understand the impmtance of the planning profession in shaping urbru1 areas and developing large-scale public projects.

Procedures:

If you agree to be in this study, I simply ask that you choose a time that is convenient for you to sit down and speak with me about the history of transportation plruming in Charlotte and to especially give me some background on the critical plruming documents that preceded construction of the area's first light rail line. I would like to record the conversation on audio tape. I will be in the Charlotte area for about 12 weeks during the surnmer of2008 (May through July), so I hope this will allow sufficient time to arrange a meeting.

Risks and benefits of being in the Study:

The study intends to ask you about your professional experiences in relation to transportation or transit-supportive land-use planning in Charlotte. As most of this information pe1tains to public events and documents, you should not encounter any substantial risks by participating in this study. If questions regarding a sensitive matter are posed that you do not wish to answer, you may certainly refuse response.

There are no direct benefits from participating in tllis study.

Compensation:

Participation in this study is on a purely volunteer basis, and you will receive no compensation for the time you contribute to it.

113 Confidentiality:

Audio recordings and transcripts of conversations will be available only to the author of the report or his advisor. However, this is not a confidential survey. The prospective published repot1 will include your name and your assessments and/or descriptions of significant events in Charlotte's transportation or related plruming and/or politics as this sort of primary source is invaluable to a paper of this kind.

Voluntary Nature of the Study:

Participation in this study is voluntru-y. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the University. If you decide to pruiicipate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without affecting those relationships.

Contacts and Questions:

The researcher conducting this study is Alex Bell. You may ask any question you have now. If you have a question later, you are encouraged to contact him at 4 72 W. Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32301, 813-956-1167, or [email protected]. You may also contact Gregory Thompson of the FSU Department ofUrban and Regional Plmming at 850-644- 8514 or [email protected].

If you have any questions or concerns regarding tllis study and would like to talk to someone other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the FSU IRB at 2010 Levy Street, Research Building B, Suite 276, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2742, or 850-644- 8633, or by email [email protected].

You will be given a copy oftllis information to keep for your records.

Statement of Consent:

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study.

ﾷＮｾ ｯＮ＠ I--4\C...,Cl. .:ib,_., ｾ＠ o?..l2-2-/os Signature :6ate 1

114 Lewis A. Bell Department of Urban and Regional Planning Interview Questions for Masters Thesis

This is a list of questions that I will pose to professionals interviewed for my thesis. These questions address the basic concerns of the paper. Responses from participants may warrant further, more detailed questions. Depending on how the conversation progresses, I may opt to omit some questions or to modify the order in which they are asked.

1. Please tell me a little bit about your job, your day to day responsibilities, and your involvement in transit (or related land use) planning in the region.

2. What can you tell me about the people and processes involved in developing the “centers, corridors, and wedges” concept that has been the foundation for transportation and land use planning in the region for the last decade or so?

3. There seems to be a theme in the planning documents of looking toward future problems and developing solutions today. Can you identify any individuals (e.g. - business or political leaders) or organizations that have pushed for long term planning in the region?

4. Who was thought of as the primary audience for documents like the Centers, Corridors, and Wedges Sourcebook and the 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use plan? (i.e. - were they intended to speak to political leaders, to educate the general public?)

5. Before and/or at the time the decision to invest in rapid transit was made, what was the regional view of the existing transit agency, its planning and management, and the role of transit in day to day life?

6. Was there a different transportation vision before, perhaps a highway-based vision?

7. CATS has a rather unique organization structure as a department of the City of Charlotte that serves multiple jurisdictions in the region. Why was this structure preferred rather than the usual track of establishing a regional authority through the state legislature?

115

APPENDIX B – COMMITTEE OF 100 AND COMMITTEE OF 10 ROSTERS

116 TRANSPORTATION/TRANSIT STRATEGIC PROCESS "COMMITTEE OF 100" MEMBER DESCRIPTION

CATEGORY MAJOR EMPLOYERS GEORGE LINVILLE KOGER CENTERS PHIL MANZ PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL JAMES DIXON UNCC PETER BROWNING NATIONAL GYPSUM ED MOZER ARROWOOD ASSOCIATION TONY ZEISS CPCC ED TUBEL RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION TONY PRESSLEY SOUTH BLVD. BUSINESSES JOE MARTIN NATIONSBANK JOE TRONCO FIRST UNION TOM KALIN HOTEL/MOTEL ASSOCIATION CARLA DUPUY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY CATEGORY SMALLER EMPLOYERS WILLIAM E. SIMMS TRANSAMERICA LIFE BILL MOORE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL CHARLES RABON PETREE STOCKTON HAYNES LEA ROBINSON,BRADSHAW, & HINSON CATEGORY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS CHARLES LA.MM LIONS SERVICES CHESTER HELMS PROGRAMS FOR ACCESSIBLE LIVING MYRA CLARK ENERGY COMMITTED TO OFFENDERS MARY JACKSON UNITED WAY PAULETTE GRIFFIN GOODWILL INDUSTRIE.S CATEGORY CIVIC & SOCIAL GROUPS BETTY SEIZINGER LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS CYNDEE PATTERSON ｓｾｃｅｓｓ＠ BY 6 BOARD ZACHARY ZAPACK HOSPITAL AUTHORITY CATEGORY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS JUDY MOONEY JOHNSTON YMCA ETHEL MCINTYRE DILLEHAY COURTS CHRISTIE TAYLOR EARTH COALITION MARY COLVIN UNIVERSITY AREA SAM SMITH, JR COULWOOD NEIGHBORHOOD DANA SMITH BENT OAKS APARTMENTS BURT GREEN HABITAT FOR HUMANITY VUTHIE NILES ASIAN COMMUNITY BETTY CHAFIN RASH FOURTH WARD THOMAS HORTON PLATO PRICE NEIGHBORHOOD RICKEY HALL REID PARK NEIGHBORHOOD ZAIRA GOODMAN HISPANIC COMMUNITY LEROY "POP" MILLER NORTHWEST CHARLOTTE DOUG MEYER-CUNO STEELE CREEK NEIGHBORHOOD COURTNEY SHARP BELMONT COMMUNITY FAY JONES FAIRVIEW HOMES

117 TRANSPORTATION/TRANSIT STRATEGIC PROCESS "COMMITTEE OF 100" MEMBER DESCRIPTION

CATEGORY CITIES/TOWNS GEORGE JAGGERS GASTON URBAN AREA MPO CHAIRMAN TROY POLLARD FORMER MINT HILL MAYOR & MPO CHAIR JOE LANFORD FORMER ROCK HILL MANAGER KENNETH L. PROPST CONCORD NOMINEE, FIRST CAROLINA PROPERTY LEE MYERS MPO VICE CHAIRMAN 1 MATTHEWS MAYOR RUSSELL KNOX MPO CHAIRMAN, DAVIDSON MAYOR CATEGORY BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION FRANK EMORY NC BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION PETER PAPPAS NC BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION BAYLES MACK SC HIGHWAY COMMISSION CARROLL EDWARDS NC BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION ANN GAITHER NC BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION CATEGORY INDIVIDUAL EXPERT RAY GOODING COMMUNICATIONS ED WEISINGER PRESIDENT, BETTER TRANSPORTATION FOR NC SCOTT PERPER TRANSIT FINANCING HARVEY BURGESS COMMUNICATIONS JESSE HITE TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING BARNEY LAWSON SYSTEM ENGINEERING MARK CRAMER REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY AL WHEELER PRIVATE TANSPORTATION OPERATORS SEDDON GOODE 1 JR STATE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMMING HARVEY GANTT LAND USE PLANNING BEA QUIRK COMMUNICATIONS,CONVENTION/VISITORS BUREAU RON MORGAN LAND USE PLANNING LECIL HENDERSON . PRESIDENT I CHARLOTTE ｔｾｏｌｌｅｙ＠ I INC. RALPH MCMILLAN BOND FINANCING CATEGORY LAND DEVELOPMENT FRANK MARTIN RESIDENTIAL/COMMERCIAL JOHN HARRIS COMMERCIAL OTIS CROWDER INDUSTRIAL CATHERINE BROWNING RESIDENTIAL PHIL DEE BUSINESS LOCATION DICK STOEVER COMMERCIAL ALLEN TATE RESIDENTIAL CATEGORY APPOINTED BOARDS CLAYTON LOFLIN ED MCMAHAN MPO /UNION COUNTY REPRESENTATIVE ERVIN WOODS 2015 TRANSPORTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE I.B. SHIVE TRANSIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE VICE-CHAIRMAN BILL MCGEE CAROLINAS URBAN COALITION, MONROE UPTOWN TRANSPORTATION COUNCIL CHAIRMAN PEGGY UPCHURCH CAROLINAS TRANSPORTATION COMPACT WADE ALLEY I JR TRANSIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN STANFORD BROOKSHIRE AIRPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

118 TRANSPORTATION/TRANSIT STRATEGIC PROCESS "COMMITTEE OF 10011 MEMBER DESCRIPTION KATHRYN TYLER CHARLOTTE CHAMBER BEN ROOK LIGHT RAIL TASK FORCE DAVID BELTON CHARLOTTE CHAMBER REX GRIBBLE, JR CHARLOTTE CHAMBER . ROYCE ROBINSON MASS TRANSIT PARTNERSHIP,GASTONIA GEORGE PRETTY, II CHARLOTTE CHAMBER KENNETH PAYNE CABARRUS COUNTY COMMISSION,VICE-CHAIRMAN MARK ERWIN CHARLOTTE CHAMBER, TRANS. COMM. CHAIRMAN FRED KLEIN UPTOWN TRANSPORTATION COUNCIL KIP KISER LIGHT RAIL TASK FORCE IKE HEARD I JR CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG PLANNING COMMISSION JAMES GARLAND CAROLINAS URBAN COALITION, GASTONIA LYNN WHEELER MASS TRANSIT PARTNERSHIP CHAIRMAN KENNETH GEATHERS MASS TRANSIT PARTNERSHIP, KANNAPOLIS BACHMAN BROWN CAROLINAS URBAN COALITION, KANNAPOLIS TOM O'BRIEN CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG PLANNING COMMISSION CHAIRMAN CATEGORY TRANSIT USERS CAROL FISHER KELLY WATERS STEVEN SOBOTA JUDITH BROOKMAN ANNIE DUNN BEVERLY HOWARD FREIDA CALDWELL PATRICIA TWITTY TAMMY JOHNSON CATEGORY TRUCKING INDUSTRY ERNEST COX PRESIDENT, MOSS TRUCKING

119 THE COMMITTEE OF 100 William E. Simms, Chairman

ENVIRONMENTAL& LAND Use AND TRANSIT SERVICE INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSPORTATION QUALITY OF LIFE ROADS ALTERNATIVES ROLES & FINANCE SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE

Wade Alley, Jr., Betty Chafin Rash, Mark Erwin, Tony Zeiss, Chainnan Harvey Gantt, Chair Chairman Chairman Chairman

Doug Booth Kenneth Geathers Kenneth P.ayne Stan Brookshire Bachman Brown judi Brookman Kenneth Propst CabamlS County Frelda Caldwell CabamtS Co1mty Harvey Burgess CabamtS County Otis Crowder Myra Clark Ann Gaither Carla DuPuy Jick Garland Ernest COx Arthur Warren Catawba C<>unty Frank Emory Gaston County james Dixon Gaston County Chester Helms Annie Dunn Michael Price Lecll Henderson Richard Nantz Bert Green Sara Halre Gaston County Beverly Howard Iredell Qnmty Skip Gribble Iredell County Fay jones Tammy Johnson Ray Gooding Tom Kalin Mary Colvin Haynes Lea David Belton Carol Fisher Charles Lamm Mark Cramer George Unville Phil Dee Tom Mangum Frank Martin Paulette Griffin Betty Seizinger Robert Ett John McLaughlin Joe Martin Rickey Hall, Sr. Courtney Sharpe Seddon Goode, ]L Leroy "Pop* Miller Ralph McMillan john Harris Dana Smith Ledl Henderson Eric Mozer Judy Mooney Isaac Heard, Jr. Sam Smith, Jr. Thomas Horton Peter Pappas Lee Myers Parks Helms Christie Taylor Mary jackson Cyndee Patterson Ella Scarbomugh ｊ･Ｎｾｳ･＠ Hite Mecklenburg County Bill McGee Troy Pollard Steve Sobota Kip Kiser Ethel Mcintyre Ed Welstger Dick Stoever Fred Kleln Ed McMahan Mecklenburg County Kelly Waters Russell Knox Doug Meyer-Cuno A1 Wheeler Phil Manz Ron Morgan Carroll Edwards Lynn Wheeler Vuthy Niles Henry Nicholson, Jr. Clayton Lotlin Ervin Woods Scott Perper Thomas O'Brien Union County Mecklenburg County George Pretty, II Tony Pressley Chet Rabon Bea Quirk Bayles MaCk Ben Rook Allen Tate Peggy Upchurch JoeTronco Patrida Twitty York County Kathryn Tyler Mecklenburg County Lynn Wheeler Zachary Zapack I.B. Shive Mecklenburg County Union County Lynn Keziah Joe Lanford Union County York County Henry Woods

, , ...... Ｌ ｾ＠ r ......

120 TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE OF 10

Johnsie Beck, Chair Chair, Workforce Development Board Sara Spencer, Vice Chair Chair, Council’s Transportation Committee Frank Emory, Jr. Member, N.C. Board of Transportation Mac Everett Chair/CEO, First Union of N.C. Jick Garland Mayor, City of Gastonia Jim Hance Vice-Chair/CFO, NationsBank Peter Pappas Member, N.C. Board of Transportation Charlie Shelton General Partner, The Shelton Company Bill Simms Chairman, “Committee of 100” Lynn Wheeler Vice Chair, Council’s Transportation Committee & Charlotte Representative to the Metropolitan Planning Organization

121 REFERENCES

1. Adler, Sy. (1987). Why BART but no LART? The political economy of rail rapid transit planning in the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas, 1945-57. Planning Perspectives 2: 149-174.

2. Bradbury, T. (1994, January 22). Mission Impossible?. The Charlotte Observer, pp 12A.

3. Cabarrus County Convention and Visitors Bureau. (n.d.). Visit Cabarrus – Concord/Kannapolis, North Carolina. Retrieved October 13, 2008, from http://www.visitcabarrus.com/

4. Charlotte Area Transit System. (n.d.). MTC Home. Retrieved September 10, 2008, from http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/CATS/MTC/home.htm#mtc

5. Charlotte Business Journal. (2006, May 26). Beck foresees concrete results for Sakrete brand. Retrieved October 16, 2008, from http://charlotte.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2006/05/29/focus5.html?jst=cn_cn_lk

6. Charlotte Business Journal. (2007, December 28). Don Reid. Retrieved October 16, 2008, from http://charlotte.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2007/12/31/focus6.html

7. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Deparment. (n.d.). About US. Retrieved October 3, 2008, from http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Planning/About+Us/Home.htm

8. Charlotte Trolley. (2008, January 9). Ronald J. Tober Joins Charlotte Trolley, Inc. as Executive Director. Retrieved October 9, 2008, from http://www.charlottetrolley.org/news.php

9. City of Charlotte. (n.d.). Mayor Home. Retrieved September 4, 2008, from http://www.charmeck.org/Departments/Mayor/Home.htm

10. Dunn, James A., Jr. (1998). Driving Forces: The Automobile, Its Enemies, and the Politics of Mobility. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

11. Frazier, Eric. (1994, August 14). Plan's supporters face rocky road to build mass transit in region. The Charlotte Observer, pp 1A.

12. High stakes planning. (1998, January 9). The Charlotte Observer. Editorial.

13. Innes, Judith. (2004). Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. Planning Theory 3: 5-20.

14. Lyttle, Steve. (1994, December 2). Plan for Road Improvements Hits a Snag. The Charlotte Observer, pp 7U.

122

15. Mecklenburg-Union Metropolitan Planning Organization. (n.d.). MUMPO– About Us. Retrieved October 3, 2008, from http://www.mumpo.org/About_Us.htm

16. Molotch, Harvey. (1976). The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place. The American Journal of Sociology 82: 309-332.

17. Molotch, Harvey. (1993). The Political Economy of Growth Machines. Journal of Urban Affairs 15: 29-53.

18. Schrag, Zachary M. (2006). The Great Society Subway: A History of the Washington Metro. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

19. Thompson, Gregory L. (2007). Taming the Neighborhood Revolution: Planners, Power Brokers, and the Birth of Neotraditionalism in Portland, Oregon. Journal of Planning History. 6/3 (August): 214-247.

20. Transportation/Transit Committee of 100. (1994b). Growth, Gridlock, and Opportunity. The Charlotte Observer, pp 1Z-4Z (special advertising section).

21. United States Congress. (n.d.). Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-Present. Retrieved October 8, 2008, from http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp

22. University City Partners. (n.d.). Home: University City Partners. Retrieved October 13, 2008, from http://www.universitycitypartners.org/

23. US Census. (1993). Population and Housing Unit Counts. 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Washington, D.C.

24. Volunteers to help plan mass transit. (1998, January 9). The Charlotte Observer.

25. Whitacre, Dianne. (1996a, March 29). Area Transit Needs To Get Closer Look. The Charlotte Observer, pp 3C.

26. Whitacre, Dianne. (1996b, May 2). Traffic Committee Appointed. The Charlotte Observer, pp 3C.

27. Whitacre, Dianne. (1998, April 17). Renewal, airport service key to transit study goals. The Charlotte Observer, pp. 1C.

28. Whitacre, Dianne and Bob Meadows. (1998, April 21). Meetings help put “public” in transit. The Charlotte Observer, pp. 1C.

29. Whitt, J. Allen. (1982). Urban Elites and Mass Transportation: The Dialectics of Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Technical Sources 30. Beck, Johnsie. (1997, January 3). Memorandum: Presentation of 5-year Transportation Plan to Charlotte City Council. Unpublished.

31. Cervero, Robert. (1998). Comments on FACTS Sheet. Charlotte, NC: Author.

32. Charlotte Chamber of Commerce and Mecklenburg County. (n.d). Mecklenburg County GIS. Retrieved May 5, 2008, from http://gischamber.co.mecklenburg.nc.us/website/chamber, 2008

33. Charlotte City Council.(1994, November 29). Approved Committee of 100 recommendations. Unpublished.

34. Charlotte Department of Transportation. (1989). Transit Corridors Study. 2005 Charlotte Transportation Plan. Charlotte, NC: Author.

35. Charlotte Department of Transportation. (1993). 1995-2015 Charlotte Transportation Plan. Charlotte, NC: Author.

36. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission. (1992). Regional Sourcebook for the Long-Term Growth of Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Charlotte, NC: Author.

37. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission. (1998). Centers and Corridors Sourcebook: A User Guide to the Long Term Growth of Charlotte-Mecklenburg. Charlotte, NC: Author.

38. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission. (2003, Fall). Martin Cramton retires as Planning Director. Highlights, 1-3.

39. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission. (n.d.) Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission Index of Maps. Retrieved October 3, 2008, from http://www.athomecharlotte.com/cmeckplmaps/index.htm

40. City of Charlotte, various departments. (1998). 2025 Integrated Transit/Land Use Plan. Charlotte, NC: Author.

41. Committee of 10. (n.d.-a). Untitled white paper (Five Year Program). Unpublished.

42. Committee of 10. (n.d.-b). Untitled white paper (Funding Options). Unpublished.

43. Jackson, Mike. (1998). Fiduciary Alternatives for Charlotte's Transportation System. Charlotte, NC: Author.

44. Metropolitan Transit Commission. (2007, May 23). Special Joint Meeting. Minute Book 125, pages 1-14.

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45. Muth, John. (2004, September 8). Regional Transit Planning: The Charlotte Story. Power Point presented at Nashville Public Transit Forum, Nashville, TN.

46. Office of Management and Budget. 2005. Update of Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses (OMB Bulletin No. 06-01). Washington, DC: Author.

47. Purnell, Lynn. (1997, February 25). Memorandum: Request for Federal Funds for South Corridor Transitway. Unpublished.

48. Transit 2001 Commission. (1997). Technical Report. Raleigh, NC: Author.

49. Transportation/Transit Committee of 100. (1994a, Fall). Final Report. Charlotte, NC: Author.

50. US Census. (n.d.) State and County QuickFacts. Retrieved May 5, 2008, from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html

List of Interviewees: (Name, Title. Place of interview. Date of main interview)*

1. Cramton, Martin R., Director - Charlotte-Mecklenburg Planning Commission (retired). 400 E Trade St, Charlotte, NC. July 14, 2008.

2. Harmon, Laura A., Assistant Director of Strategic Planning Services – Charlotte- Mecklenburg Planning Commission. 600 E Fourth St, Charlotte, NC. July 22, 2008.

3. Muth, John M., Deputy Director of Development – Charlotte Area Transit System. 400 E Trade St, Charlotte, NC. July 2, 2008.

4. Purnell, Lynn., Senior Supervising Planner – Parsons Brinkerhoff. 400 E Trade St, Charlotte, NC. July 14, 2008.

*in each case, follow up questions were asked by email, telephone, or brief additional meetings.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Alex Bell was born in Statesville, North Carolina in 1983. He attended the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida from 2001-2006 and earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in art history. In 2007, he moved to Tallahassee, Florida to study urban and regional planning at Florida State University. He was the Florida Department of Transportation’s Public Transit Fellow for 2007-2008. As part of the fellowship, he worked at StarMetro (the City of Tallahassee’s public transit agency) in transit planning and spent the summer of 2008 as an intern for the Charlotte Area Transit System, assisting with project planning for the Blue Line Extension, a continuation of the light rail line built in Charlotte’s South Corridor to the northeastern sector of the city.

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