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317 © the Author(S) 2019 Y. Sohn, T. J. Pempel (Eds.), Japan And INDEX1 A nationalism and identity politics, Abe, Shinzo 11–12, 147–148, 167–170, Abe Doctrine, 148, 150, 152, 183, 250–251, 262–268 157, 161 popularity, 152–154, 153n19, 161, Abe Effect, 6–7, 241 165, 166, 177, 186, 210 “Abenigma,” 152–153, 177 proactive pacificism, 12, 148, Abenomics, 148–150, 152–153, 181–183, 185, 186, 222, 271 158, 161, 177, 187, 210, 309 relations with China, 298–299 bait and switch tactics in campaigns, relations with South Korea, 149–152, 173 261, 262, 276 “beautiful nation” discourse, relationship with Trump, 151, 152, 165, 226, 309 213, 256, 256n38 constitutional revisionism, 148, 150, security agenda, 148–151, 154–158, 153, 156, 161, 166, 173, 180, 161, 166, 174, 177–179, 211, 251, 252 181–187, 252, 261 economic strategy, 299 South Korean view of, 312 first administration, 180 statement on World War II foreign policy, 5, 12, 26 anniversary, 166, 222, 271, 275 and Japan’s regional goals, 308 and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, maritime strategy, 251, 253–255 212–214, 230, 273, 297–299 meetings with Xi Jinping, 271 trilateral frameworks, 211, 269 1 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. © The Author(s) 2019 317 Y. Sohn, T. J. Pempel (eds.), Japan and Asia’s Contested Order, Asia Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0256-5 318 INDEX Abe, Shinzo (cont.) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), visit to South Korea, 280 23, 54, 114, 204–205, 211, 310 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, 262, 269, Asian Development Bank (ADB), 285, 296 52, 71, 228 See also Collective self-defense; cooperation with AIIB, 57, 71, “Proactive Contribution 214n29, 306 to Peace” Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, Afghanistan, 89, 99, 196n4, 206 55–56, 204–206 Ahn Jung-geun, 195, 270 Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank Air Defense Identification Zone (AIIB) (ADIZ), 168–170, 209 China’s promotion, 10, 57, 66, Air-Sea Battle, 244–246 71, 306 Akihito, Emperor, 159 cooperation with Asian Allison, Graham, Destined for War, 66 Development Bank, 57, 80, Al Qaeda, 91, 98 214n29, 306 American imperialism, 119, 124 creation, 57, 70, 228 Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy and infrastructure development, 71 (A2/AD), 100, 245 membership, 306 Anti-Americanism, 31, 87, 93 North Korea and, 113 Anti-Japanese sentiment and the regional order, 23, 42, 52, Chinese, 8, 77, 209, 221 53, 58, 59, 208, 209 compensation for anti-Japanese U.S. policy toward, 31, 298 movements, 296 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), North Korean, 124 206, 227 South Korean, 262, 267, 284 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEC, see Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC), 52, 58, Cooperation Forum 204–205, 215, 234, 286 Apology diplomacy, 159, 203, 2017 summit, 58, 233 266–268, 309 Asia Women’s Fund, 160 Aquino, Benigno, 31 Aso, Taro, 34, 180, 181, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, 285, 289 34, 180, 181 Association of Southeast Asian Article 9, see Japanese constitution Nations (ASEAN) Asahi shimbun, 187 Japan and, 182, 186, 187 Asan Forum, 180 and Japan-China-ROK relations, ASEAN, see Association of Southeast 279, 280 Asian Nations joined by Myanmar, 112 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and the Regional Comprehensive Plus, 23, 54, 211 Economic Partnership, ASEAN Plus Six, 293 215, 294 ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 23, 52, role in the regional order, 19–21 195, 206, 287, 288, 293, 294 and South China Sea disputes, 297 INDEX 319 Australia Bull, Hedley, 20 and the comfort women dossier, 159 Bush, George W., 90, 97, 98, 154, hosting of U.S. Marines at Darwin, 205, 206 207, 246 Byungjin, 125, 125n81, 128, 135, 136 membership in regional organizations, 195, 204, 206 relations with Japan, 180, 181, 206, C 211, 235, 253 Cabinet Decision on Development of TPP and, 195, 213, 299 Seamless Security Legislation trade agreements, 196, 297–298 (Japan), 151, 183–185 trade with Japan, 218 Cambodia, 46, 155, 297 Campaign to Suppress Counter-­ Revolutionaries (China), 86, 88 B Campbell, Kurt, 97 Baker, James, 154, 204 Carr, E. H., 51 Balance of effect, 9, 31–34, 308 Central Foreign Affairs Work Balance of power, 21, 67, 77, 215, 242 Conference (Beijing, 2014), 68 See also Hegemony Century of Humiliation, 65, 76 Bandung Conference, 125 Chan, Steve, 33, 45 Ban Ki-moon, 285 Charter 08 democracy movement, 99 Beijing Olympics, 99 Chen Guangcheng, 87, 101 Belgrade embassy bombing, 86, 89, Cheng Yonghua, 254n32 98, 103 Cheonan incident, 130, 134 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chiang Kai-shek, 87, 96, 100 10, 23–24, 66 Chiang Mai Initiative, 206 See also One Belt, One Road Chi Haotian, 92 initiative China, 304 Berger, Thomas, 149 “charm offensive,” 5, 69, 203, 270 Betts, Richard, 67 currency manipulation, 41, 209 Biden, Joe, 269 domestic issues, 74, 76, 102, Bilateralism 299, 304 favored by Trump administration, 58 economic gains, 76, 77, 208–210 trade agreements, 13, 50, 56, 233 economic relations with Japan, See also U.S.-Japan alliance 26–29, 76–78, 201–202, Bin Laden, Osama, 98 217–218, 290–292 Bipolarity, 39, 40, 42, 43 economic relations with United Blair, Dennis, 97 States, 46, 202, 203 Bloomberg News, 101 entry in global economic system, Bo Xilai scandal, 101 17, 40, 90 Brunei, 239 foreign investment, 224–226 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 99 foreign policy, 72–76, 80, 81 Bukh, Alexander, 251n28, 252n28 free trade agreements, 292–295 320 INDEX China (cont.) China Opportunity paradigm, geoeconomic strategy, 70–73 90, 95, 99 gross domestic product, 224–227 China Threat paradigm, 90 irredentism, 244 Chinese Americans, 104 islands contested with Japan, See also Wen Ho Lee 170–171, 172n18, 174, 222, Chinese Communist Party, 307 226, 241, 250, 294 19th National Congress, 299 military expenditures, 77, 209, Chin, Gregory, 56 224–226 Choi Kyong-lim, 297 military modernization, 46, 304, 306 Choi Seok-Young, 295 national identity, 26, 76 CIA naval capabilities, 243, 245–247 Belgrade embassy bombing, 90, 93 and North Korea’s nuclear program, preoccupation with Cuba, 96 203, 207 and the Soviet invasion of perception of North Korea, Afghanistan, 89 129n109, 130, 136 surveillance against China, perception of other Asian 87, 95, 103 countries, 218 Climate change, 41, 174, 307 perceptions of, 214–215, 218 Clinton, Bill, 90, 91, 93, 205 power vs. influence, 75 Clinton, Hillary, 100, 230 regional infrastructure efforts, 17, Closed vs. open regionalism, 33 23, 29, 70–71, 208, 306 Cold War relations with North Korea, 13, bipolarity of, 40, 42 113, 116, 131–135 and the security-focused order, relations with Southeast Asia, 51–52, 54 227, 313 and the U.S.-Japan alliance, 179 relations with South Korea, 13, 27, Collective self-defense (CSD), 41, 78, 29, 270–272, 283 150, 174, 179, 184, 207, relations with Taiwan, 46, 209, 292 211, 309 role in regional order, 33, 66–77, Comfort women 81, 116, 227, 233, 236, as history issue, 166–167 304–309 and Japan–South Korea relations, Tianxia worldview, 70, 70n20 152, 262, 264, 266–268, vision of regional security, 72–73, 81 284–285 World War II anniversary parade, Obama on, 269 222, 312 statue, 262, 275–276 See also East China Sea; Espionage; Trump meeting with, 152 Japan-China relations; South 2015 agreement, 167, 275–276, 280 China Sea; U.S.-China See also Kono Statement relations; Xi Jinping Committee for Security Cooperation China Daily, 234 in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), China Hands, 97, 104 54, 115 INDEX 321 “Common destiny” narrative, 24 E Competing hubs system, 28 Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization Comprehensive and Progressive (EVSL), 205 Agreement for Trans-Pacific Easley, Leif-Eric, 248n21 Partnership, 233 East Asia Community (EAC), 195–196 Comprehensive security, 48 East Asian peace, 43, 45–46 Conference on Interaction and East Asia Summit (EAS), 23, 52, 53, Confidence Building 58, 195, 206, 211, 285 Measures in Asia East China Sea (Shanghai, 2014), 71 contested islands, 170, 171n14, Conflict avoidance mechanisms, 174, 175, 208, 211, 212, 312, 314 241n4, 249, 283 Confucianism, 75, 76, 81, 126, and Japan-China relations, 133, 134 222–227, 241 Constructivism, 7, 26, 226, Japan Coast Guard (JCG), 281, 286 249, 249n23 Cooperative security order, 43 marine resources, 243n6 Cox Report, 94, 95 North Korean attack on South Crimea, 43 Korean island, 100 Cui Tiankai, 291 September 2010 incident, 226, 250, 294 Economic Cooperation Framework D Agreement (ECFA) Dangoon, 117, 122 (China-­Taiwan), 292 Davies, John Paton, 95 Economic interdependence, 23, Davos, see World Economic Forum 49–50, 52, 58, 67, 79, 194, 208 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in Europe, 283 153, 195, 196, 229 and Japan-China relations, 76–78 Democratic People’s Republic of and regional integration, Korea (DPRK), see North Korea 283–285, 293 Deng Xiaoping, 40, 88, and security tensions, 312 99, 312 See also Free trade agreements Destler, I. M., 222 Economic Partnership Agreements Developmental state, 20, 32, 34 (EPAs), 197 Development Research Center See also Free trade agreements; (China), 289 Regional Comprehensive Diaoyu islands, see East China Sea Economic Partnership Diplomatic Blue Book (Japan), 210 Economics and security, 51–52 Dobell, Graeme, 246 economic security, 26, 27, 31, 48 Dokdo (Takeshima), 172n16, 208, separation of, 53 209, 264, 266, 272, 285n11 spillover, 24, 25, 30, 31 Domestic–foreign policy connection, theoretical approaches, 7–8 32–33, 35 See also Economic-security- Duterte, Rodrigo, 31 identity nexus 322 INDEX Economic-security-identity nexus China and, 13, 227, 234, 290 balance of effect, 9, 31–34, 308 China–South Korea, 270, 294 China and, 68 Japan-China-ROK, 279–281, 283, downward spiral, 304 284, 290–295, 299 Japan and, 6–9 KORUS, 299 and Japan-ROK relations, 266–267 political-strategic considerations, 7 models and practices, 17–18, 21–27 regional, 53, 215 parallel realities, 9, 27–31 United States and, 261 and the regional order, 6–9, 112n8, See also Regional Comprehensive 135, 305–308 Economic Partnership; South Korea, 261–276 Trans-Pacific Partnership See also Economics and security Friedberg, Aaron, 67, 304 Economist, 165, 267 Fukuda, Yasuo, 181, 287, 288 Emmerson, Donald K., 28 Fukushima, 287 Energy resources, 242 English, Bill, 232 English School, 20 G Espionage Gaddafi, Muammar, 91 Chinese efforts to influence Gaiatsu, 256 U.S.
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