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A Review of Fuzzing Tools and Methods 1 Introduction
A Review of Fuzzing Tools and Methods James Fell, [email protected] Originally published in PenTest Magazine on 10th March 2017 1 Introduction Identifying vulnerabilities in software has long been an important research problem in the field of information security. Over the last decade, improvements have been made to programming languages, compilers and software engineering methods aimed at reducing the number of vulnerabilities in software [26]. In addition, exploit mitigation features such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [65] and Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) [66] have been added to operating systems aimed at making it more difficult to exploit the vulnerabilities that do exist. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that all software applications of any significant size and complexity are still likely to contain undetected vulnerabilities and it is also frequently possible for skilled attackers to bypass any defences that are implemented at the operating system level [6, 7, 12, 66]. There are many classes of vulnerabilities that occur in software [64]. Ultimately they are all caused by mistakes that are made by programmers. Some of the most common vulnerabilities in binaries are stack based and heap based buffer overflows, integer overflows, format string bugs, off-by-one vulnerabilities, double free and use-after-free bugs [5]. These can all lead to an attacker hijacking the path of execution and causing his own arbitrary code to be executed by the victim. In the case of software running with elevated privileges this can lead to the complete compromise of the host system on which it is running. -
Microsoft Patches Were Evaluated up to and Including CVE-2020-1587
Honeywell Commercial Security 2700 Blankenbaker Pkwy, Suite 150 Louisville, KY 40299 Phone: 1-502-297-5700 Phone: 1-800-323-4576 Fax: 1-502-666-7021 https://www.security.honeywell.com The purpose of this document is to identify the patches that have been delivered by Microsoft® which have been tested against Pro-Watch. All the below listed patches have been tested against the current shipping version of Pro-Watch with no adverse effects being observed. Microsoft Patches were evaluated up to and including CVE-2020-1587. Patches not listed below are not applicable to a Pro-Watch system. 2020 – Microsoft® Patches Tested with Pro-Watch CVE-2020-1587 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1584 Windows dnsrslvr.dll Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1579 Windows Function Discovery SSDP Provider Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1578 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability CVE-2020-1577 DirectWrite Information Disclosure Vulnerability CVE-2020-1570 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability CVE-2020-1569 Microsoft Edge Memory Corruption Vulnerability CVE-2020-1568 Microsoft Edge PDF Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1567 MSHTML Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1566 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1565 Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1564 Jet Database Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1562 Microsoft Graphics Components Remote Code Execution Vulnerability -
Software Vulnerabilities Principles, Exploitability, Detection and Mitigation
Software vulnerabilities principles, exploitability, detection and mitigation Laurent Mounier and Marie-Laure Potet Verimag/Université Grenoble Alpes GDR Sécurité – Cyber in Saclay (Winter School in CyberSecurity) February 2021 Software vulnerabilities . are everywhere . and keep going . 2 / 35 Outline Software vulnerabilities (what & why ?) Programming languages (security) issues Exploiting a sofwtare vulnerability Software vulnerabilities mitigation Conclusion Example 1: password authentication Is this code “secure” ? boolean verify (char[] input, char[] passwd , byte len) { // No more than triesLeft attempts if (triesLeft < 0) return false ; // no authentication // Main comparison for (short i=0; i <= len; i++) if (input[i] != passwd[i]) { triesLeft-- ; return false ; // no authentication } // Comparison is successful triesLeft = maxTries ; return true ; // authentication is successful } functional property: verify(input; passwd; len) , input[0::len] = passwd[0::len] What do we want to protect ? Against what ? I confidentiality of passwd, information leakage ? I control-flow integrity of the code I no unexpected runtime behaviour, etc. 3 / 35 Example 2: make ‘python -c ’print "A"*5000’‘ run make with a long argument crash (in recent Ubuntu versions) Why do we need to bother about crashes (wrt. security) ? crash = consequence of an unexpected run-time error not trapped/foreseen by the programmer, nor by the compiler/interpreter ) some part of the execution: I may take place outside the program scope/semantics I but can be controled/exploited by an attacker (∼ “weird machine”) out of scope execution runtime error crash normal execution possibly exploitable ... security breach ! ,! may break all security properties ... from simple denial-of-service to arbitrary code execution Rk: may also happen silently (without any crash !) 4 / 35 Back to the context: computer system security what does security mean ? I a set of general security properties: CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (+ Non Repudiation + Anonymity + . -
Intrinsic Propensity for Vulnerability in Computers? Arbitrary Code Execution in the Universal Turing Machine
Intrinsic Propensity for Vulnerability in Computers? Arbitrary Code Execution in the Universal Turing Machine Pontus Johnson KTH Royal Institute of Technology Stockholm, Sweden [email protected] Abstract and Weyuker in [4], “Turing’s construction of a universal computer in 1936 provided reason to believe that, at least in The universal Turing machine is generally considered to be principle, an all-purpose computer would be possible, and the simplest, most abstract model of a computer. This paper was thus an anticipation of the modern digital computer.” Or, reports on the discovery of an accidental arbitrary code execu- in the words of Stephen Wolfram [16], ‘what launched the tion vulnerability in Marvin Minsky’s 1967 implementation whole computer revolution is the remarkable fact that uni- of the universal Turing machine. By submitting crafted data, versal systems with fixed underlying rules can be built that the machine may be coerced into executing user-provided can in effect perform any possible computation.” Not only code. The article presents the discovered vulnerability in de- the universality, but also the simplicity of the universal Tur- tail and discusses its potential implications. To the best of our ing machine has attracted interest. In 1956, Claude Shannon knowledge, an arbitrary code execution vulnerability has not explored some minimal forms of the universal Turing ma- previously been reported for such a simple system. chine [13], and posed the challenge to find even smaller such machines. That exploration has continued to this day [16]. 1 Introduction A common strategy for understanding a problem is to re- duce it to its minimal form. -
Security Threat Intelligence Report
Security Threat Intelligence Report December 2020 In this issue COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers and supply chain targeted RansomEXX ransomware targeting Linux systems Botnet targets Linux servers, Linux IoT devices NSA top 25 vulnerabilities exploited by Chinese APT groups VMware zero-day vulnerability exploited in the wild Security Threat Intelligence Report About this report Message from Mark Hughes Fusing a range of public and proprietary information feeds, Cyber criminals are opportunists, and including DXC’s global network with COVID-19 vaccines shipping in of security operations centers and cyber intelligence services, multiple countries, attackers are targeting this report delivers an overview manufacturers and their supply chains in an of major incidents, insights into effort to monetize ransomware attacks at key trends and strategic threat awareness. the worst possible time and steal intellectual property and patient data. This month’s report also documents This report is a part of DXC Labs | Security, which provides insights the expanding attacks against Linux, Windows, and internet of and thought leadership to the things (IoT) devices. Also, the SolarWinds hack is top of mind for security industry. everyone. This is a rapidly evolving situation, and we will share Intelligence cutoff date: more details next month. For the most up to date information, November 30, 2020 refer to CISA guidance. Mark Hughes Senior Vice President Offerings & Strategic Partners DXC Technology Table of Threat Updates contents RansomEXX ransomware targeting -
Check Point Threat Intelligence Bulletin
November 2-8, 2020 YOUR CHECK POINT THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES Check Point Research has alerted against a wave of ransomware attacks targeting Israeli companies and corporations, using known ransomware families such as REvil and Ryuk, as well as a new family called ‘Pay2Key’. The ransomware is capable of rapid lateral movement within the company network. Check Point SandBlast Agent provides protection against these threats (Ransomware.Win32.Pay2Key; Ransomware.Win32.REvil) Luxottica, the world's largest eyewear company, has admitted it has been breached. The giant’s appointment scheduling application has been hacked, leading to the exposure of protected health information (PHI) for patients of eye care practices such as LensCrafters, Target Optical and EyeMed. Japanese game developer Capcom has suffered a breach leading to the shutdown of some its systems, possibly by the Ragnar Locker ransomware. Attackers claim that 1TB of sensitive data has been stolen. Check Point SandBlast Agent provides protection against this threat (Ransomware.Win32.Ragnar) The Italian liquor company Campari Group has been hit by the Ragnar Locker ransomware, leading to the theft of 2TB of unencrypted files. The attackers are demanding a $15 million ransom to retrieve the files. Check Point Research has uncovered an attack operation targeting the Sangoma and Asterisk VoIP phone systems at nearly 1,200 organizations. The attackers, most likely located in Gaza and the West Bank, target SIP servers to execute telecom fraud, sell phone number and gain access to the organizations’ VoIP servers. Check Point IPS provides protection against this threat (SIPVicious Security Scanner; Sangoma FreePBX Authentication Bypass (CVE- 2019-19006); Command Injection Over HTTP) North Korean surveillance campaign targeting the aerospace and defense sectors in Australia, Israel, Russia and India is spreading a new spyware called Torisma via fake job offers sent through social media. -
Conti Ransomware: Evasive by Nature and How It Works
BRAINTRACE THREAT ADVISORY REPORT APRIL 15, 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................................................... 2 VULNERABILITIES PATCHED IN NETTLE'S SIGNATURE VERIFICATION ........................................................ 2 APPLE MAIL ZERO-CLICK VULNERABILITY ...................................................................................................... 2 FAKE NETFLIX APP CALLED FLIXONLINE LURING ANDROID USERS THROUGH WHATSAPP MESSAGES 3 CHARMING KITTEN APT GROUP TARGETING MEDICAL RESEARCHERS ...................................................... 4 GIGASET ANDROID UPDATE SERVER HACKED TO INSTALL MALWARE ON USERS' DEVICES .................. 5 'MORE_EGGS' MALWARE TARGETS PROFESSIONALS WITH LINKEDIN JOB OFFERS ................................ 6 SONICWALL EMAIL SECURITY VULNERABLE TO MALICIOUS HTTP REQUESTS .......................................... 7 CONTI RANSOMWARE: EVASIVE BY NATURE AND HOW IT WORKS. ......................................................... 8 REVIL RANSOMWARE NOW CHANGES PASSWORD TO AUTO-LOGIN IN SAFE MODE .............................. 9 NEW VULNERABILITY TARGETS POPULAR WINDOWS TIME SYNCH SOFTWARE ...................................... 9 RISING TIDE IN FIRMWARE CYBERATTACKS ................................................................................................. 10 UNPATCHED VULNERABILITY FOUND IN CISCO ROUTER MANAGEMENT INTERFACE ............................. 11 CRING RANSOMWARE -
Professional Mobile Espionage Attacks: Pegasus and Beyond
#RSAC SESSION ID: MBS-R11 Professional Mobile Espionage Attacks: Pegasus and Beyond Andrew Blaich Max Bazaliy Staff Security Researcher Staff Security Researcher Lookout Lookout @ablaich @mbazaliy Video #RSAC What just happened? 3 #RSAC What just happened? “Lawful Intercept” 4 #RSAC The Target: Ahmed Mansoor 5 #RSAC Collaboration 6 #RSAC Citizen Lab: Pegasus Attribution C2 Infrastructure sms.webadv.co <-> mail1.nsogroup.com, nsoqa.com Linked to other targeted attacks in Mexico, Kenya Code identifiers Internal variables and function names Sophistication of software HackingTeam leak: marketing literature 7 #RSAC Pegasus Overview #RSAC What is Pegasus? Pegasus is espionage software Relies on jailbreaking a device to install itself The jailbreak is achieved via an exploit chain named Trident Pegasus can listen to all audio, video, text, and data communications coming into or leaving a phone 9 #RSAC Historical analysis Pegasus featured a non-public persistent remote jailbreak No/Minimal user interaction required 2011 public jailbreak “jailbreakme 3” is most similar December 2016 Luca Tedesco released a “jailbreakme” using Trident and Pangu. 10 #RSAC How does Pegasus operate on iOS? Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 WebKit XNU Surveillance Spear-phish RCE exploitation + persistence Single use Safari UAF Kernel info leak + Re-jailbreak on CVE-2016-4657 CVE-2016-4655 reboot + Kernel UAF + Init. app hooks CVE-2016-4656 + Sync with C&C server = Jailbreak 11 #RSAC Exploit Chain - Trident CVE-2016-4657: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to arbitrary -
The Security Architecture of the Chromium Browser
The Security Architecture of the Chromium Browser Adam Barth∗ Collin Jackson∗ UC Berkeley Stanford University Charles Reis∗ Google Chrome Team University of Washington Google Inc. ABSTRACT There have been a number of research proposals for mod- Most current web browsers employ a monolithic architec- ular browser architectures [8, 27, 5, 7] that contain multiple ture that combines \the user" and \the web" into a single protection domains. Like Chromium's architecture, these protection domain. An attacker who exploits an arbitrary proposals aim to provide security against an attacker who code execution vulnerability in such a browser can steal sen- can exploit an unpatched vulnerability. Unlike Chromium's sitive files or install malware. In this paper, we present the architecture, these proposals trade off compatibility with ex- security architecture of Chromium, the open-source browser isting web sites to provide architectural isolation between upon which Google Chrome is built. Chromium has two web sites or even individual pages. The browser's secu- modules in separate protection domains: a browser kernel, rity policy, known as the \same-origin policy," is complex which interacts with the operating system, and a rendering and can make such fine-grained isolation difficult to achieve engine, which runs with restricted privileges in a sandbox. without disrupting existing sites. Users, however, demand This architecture helps mitigate high-severity attacks with- compatibility because a web browser is only as useful as the out sacrificing compatibility with existing web sites. We sites that it can render. To be successful, a modular browser define a threat model for browser exploits and evaluate how architecture must support the entire web platform in addi- the architecture would have mitigated past vulnerabilities. -
Merlin Programmer for Kids Is a Simple Program to Help Kids, Ages 5
Merlin Programmer for Kids is a simple program to help kids, ages 5 - 8 (ages prior to their moving on to more advanced languages such as Scratch), learn about the concept of sequential programming by allowing them to make Merlin or any of the other Microsoft Agent characters perform actions, move, speak, listen for and make sounds in a predetermined manner. They will learn about do loops, conditional program continuation based on time, key strokes, spoken words, and more! I wrote it in 2003 for my twins, Tommy and Betsy, ages 7 then (now 16!), and although they enjoyed it most for making the characters speak naughty words and make silly sounds, they learned more. I am sure your kids will have fun with it! It is a totally FREE program. This help file is intended for you, the parents. You must explain how this program works to your child, in a manner appropriate for his/her age. Obviously, the ability to understand and work with some features in this program will depend on your child’s age. Soon enough he/she will amaze you! In order to help you, several example scripts are included. Please read the sections on Menu and Programming. They are very short, but informative. Merlin Programmer for Kids home: SciSoft Company My home page: Yale University Ear Lab Installation New! After you download <Merlin Programmer for Kids v.5.5.8.msi> into a folder, double click on it and the Merlin program will be installed. A shortcut will be placed on the desktop , and when you first double click on it additional required components will be installed and then the program will start. -
Hotfuzz: Discovering Algorithmic Denial-Of-Service Vulnerabilities Through Guided Micro-Fuzzing
HotFuzz: Discovering Algorithmic Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities Through Guided Micro-Fuzzing William Blairy, Andrea Mambretti∗, Sajjad Arshadz, Michael Weissbacher∗, William Robertson∗, Engin Kirda∗, and Manuel Egeley yBoston University ∗zNortheastern University yfwdblair, [email protected], ∗fmbr, mw, wkr, [email protected], [email protected] Abstract—Fifteen billion devices run Java and many of them are being released to unauthorized principals (confidentiality vio- connected to the Internet. As this ecosystem continues to grow, lations). The third traditional security property, availability, is it remains an important task to discover any unknown security not exempt from this issue. However, denial-of-service (DoS) threats these devices face. Fuzz testing repeatedly runs software as a vulnerability class tends to be viewed as simplistic, noisy, on random inputs in order to trigger unexpected program and easy (in principle) to defend against. behaviors, such as crashes or timeouts, and has historically re- vealed serious security vulnerabilities. Contemporary fuzz testing This view, however, is simplistic, as availability vulnerabilities techniques focus on identifying memory corruption vulnerabilities and exploits against them can take sophisticated forms. Algo- that allow adversaries to achieve either remote code execution or rithmic Complexity (AC) vulnerabilities are one such form, information disclosure. Meanwhile, Algorithmic Complexity (AC) where a small adversarial input induces worst-case1 behavior vulnerabilities, which are a common attack vector for denial-of- in the processing of that input, resulting in a denial of service. service attacks, remain an understudied threat. While in the textbook example against a hash table an adver- In this paper, we present HotFuzz, a framework for automatically sary inserts values with colliding keys to degrade the complex- discovering AC vulnerabilities in Java libraries. -
Softether VPN Server NDIS 5.X Windows Local Bridge Driver Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
2019/07/09: SE201901: SoftEther VPN Server NDIS 5.x Windows Local Bridge Driver Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Published: 2019/07/09 Related: CVE-2019-11868 SoftEther VPN Security Advisory articles are published for high impact vulnerabilities (an arbitrary code execution or equivalent). Summary A vulnerability in the NDIS 5.x based Local Bridge module for SoftEther VPN 4.29 Build 9680 or older could allow the local Windows-logged-on attacker (who is already logged on to the same computer which run VPN servers) to realize a Windows local authenticated privilege escalation attacks or could result in BSODs. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must log on to the local Windows system which is the same computer which running the SoftEther VPN Server. An attacker could then run a specially crafted program that could exploit the vulnerability. This vulnerability affects only when the server computer is running the Local Bridge function or the SecureNAT function on Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 8.0 (not Windows 8.1). Same Windows Server family of these Windows versions could also be affected. Any systems with Windows 8.1 or Windows 10 (includes Windows Server 2012 R2, 2016, 2019), or Linux, FreeBSD, macOS or Solaris are not to be affected. This vulnerability affects only when: 1. A VPN system administrator shares a single Windows computer between the VPN server feature and local or remote login terminals for unprivileged users. (e.g. Terminal Service for the organization) or 2. A VPN system administrator allows attackers to execute any untrusted arbitrary programs in the local VPN server computer.