THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
John Wyclif’s Christology in Light of De Incarnatione Verbi, Chapter 7
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Faculty of the Center for Medieval and Byzantine Studies,
School of Arts and Sciences
Of The Catholic University of America
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Luke Nathan DeWeese
Washington, D.C.
2020 John Wyclif’s Christology in Light of De Incarnatione Verbi, Chapter 7
Luke Nathan DeWeese, Ph.D.
Director: Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D.
This dissertation begins the work of a full critical edition and translation of Wyclif’s treatise, De incarnatione Verbi (DIV). Chapters 1–4 include full codicological surveys of all eight surviving manuscripts that contain the text; justify the proposed stemma codicum in light of surviving textual variants; argue that the version contained in manuscript M is a reportatio; and explain the need for a new edition to replace Edward Harris’s edition of 1886. Chapters 5–8 contain critical editions and translations of the prologue and seventh chapter of both the reportatio and final version of the treatise. Chapter 9 discusses the treatise’s authenticity, title, genre, and date.
Chapter 10 begins the themes-based portion of this dissertation. It contains the most comprehensive account of Wyclif’s Christology yet to appear in print, and advances the state of the question through translations of much hitherto unstudied material. Chapter 11 is a commentary on the material contained in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 12 considers Wyclif’s use of his sources. Chapter 13 concludes with the intention of giving the reader a sense of a coherent whole.
Unfortunately, two, persistent, and important questions regarding Wyclif’s Christology cannot be resolved at the present time. The first is Wyclif’s stance on the primacy of Christ; the second, his stance on the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood. Only at the end of his life did Wyclif explicitly deny the primacy of Christ in his De antichristo; he denied the other explicitly in his
De Trinitate, around the time he wrote DIV. Both doctrines, however, in some form are required by DIV 7. It is not at present clear whether Wyclif’s stance on these doctrines remained consistent throughout the course of his career. Future scholarship must address the question as more of Wyclif’s texts are edited and translated.
Finally, because a proper critical edition and translation of part of the treatise now appears in print, Wyclif’s thought can be more accurately studied by philosophers, theologians, and intellectual historians. This dissertation by Luke Nathan DeWeese fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Medieval and Byzantine Studies approved by Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., as Director, and by Mark Clark, Ph.D., and Megan Murton, Ph.D., as Readers.
————————————————————— Timothy B. Noone, Ph.D., Director
————————————————————— Mark Clark, Ph.D., Reader
————————————————————— Megan Murton, Ph.D., Reader
ii
OPTIMAE MATRI
iii
O loving wisdom of our God! When all was sin and shame, A second Adam to the fight And to the rescue came.
O wisest love! that flesh and blood Which did in Adam fail, Should strive afresh against their foe, Should strive and should prevail.
…
O generous love! that he who smote In Man for man the foe, The double agony in Man For man should undergo.
…
Praise to the Holiest in the height, And in the depth be praise, In all his words most wonderful, Most sure in all his ways.
(John Henry Newman)
iv Table of Contents
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………..vi
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1
Part 1: The Manuscript Portion
Ch. 1: Codicological Surveys of All Pertinent Manuscripts………………………………6
Man. A: Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1387……………………….6
Man. B: Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4307……………………...15
Man. C: Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 4504……………………...24
Man. G: Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 337/565………………………..31
Man. M: London, British Library, Royal 7 B.111……………………………….39
Man. O: Oxford, Oriel College 15……………………………………………….45
Man. P: Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria 311……………………………………..54
Man. Q: Prague, Metropolitan Chapter Library, D.35 (600)…………………….60
Other Known but Non-Extant Copies of the Treatise……………………………67
Ch. 2: The Stemma………………………………………………………………………70
Ch. 3: The Curious Case of Manuscript M……………………………………………..133
Ch. 4: The Need for a New Edition…………………………………………………….144
Ch. 5: The Critical Edition of the Shorter Text………………………………………...152
Ch. 6: The Translation of the Shorter Text……………………………………………..172
Ch. 7: The Critical Edition of the Longer Text…………………………………………189
Ch. 8: The Translation of the Longer Text……………………………………………..230
Ch. 9: Authenticity, Title, Genre, and Date…………………………………………….258
v
Part 2: The Themes-based Portion
Ch. 10: Wyclif’s Christology in General……………………………………………….266
The High- and Late-Medieval Origins………………………………………….266
Wyclif’s Christology: Introduction……………………………………………..269
Wyclif on the Necessity of Creation and the Incarnation………………………272
Wyclif on the Atonement……………………………………………………….282
Wyclif on the Fruit of the Atonement…………………………………………..285
Wyclif’s Use of Geometric and Cosmographic Analogies in Christology……..297
Wyclif on Christ as Scripture…………………………………………………...308
Ch. 11: A Commentary on DIV, Prologue and Chapter 7……………………………...328
Ch. 12: Some Notes on Wyclif’s Use of His Sources…………………………………..364
Ch. 13: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..374
Appendix: Other Latin Texts and English Translations………………………………………..376
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………390
vi Acknowledgements
A twentieth-century medievalist once remarked, “A researcher is only worth the books he is led to, the friends who support him, and the scholars kind enough to advise, correct, and occasionally translate.”1 To this I must reply: A graduate student in medieval studies is only worth the books and manuscripts he is led to; the friends, family, and clergy who support, house, and feed him; the faculty wise enough to teach, advise, and correct him; the confidants harrowing enough to warn and terrify him; proofreaders detailed enough to fault him; and the mentors fatherly enough to lead him in the way he must go. In that light, despite so many people who have assisted me over the course of the past ten years, justice requires thanking the following by name for their kindnesses to me:
Mary Margaret Dandeneau and Jonda Pieratt of Port Dover, Ontario, who believed in me during my darkest moments; and Dr. J. Patrick Hornbeck II of Fordham University, who first encouraged me to study Wyclif’s thought in depth and has always replied promptly to my emails;
All those who offered me memorable hospitality during my travels abroad, including the
Rev. Jason Catania of St. Barnabas, Omaha; Dr. Martin Dekarli of the Institut für Mittelalter- forschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Vienna; Jonathan DeWeese, then of Boston; David Hunter, Brette Ritchie, Andrew Hunter, and Shannon Fewster of Toronto;
Dr. Evan and Elizabeth King, then of Clare College, Cambridge; Filip Koutny of Prague;
Michael Masefield of New York; the Rev. Dr. John Ridegeway-Wood of York; Peter Russell,
1 Marc Drogin, Anathema!: Medieval Scribes and the History of Book Curses (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld and Schram, 1983), xvii. vii then of Coulsdon, England; Timothy Thomas of Milan; and the Rev. Dr. George Westhaver,
Principal of Pusey House, Oxford;
All those who solemnly warned me of the dangers of not finishing, including Dr. Stephen
Blackwood, President of Ralston College; Dr. Michael Dauphinais of Ave Maria University; Dr.
Jennifer Paxton of the Catholic University of America; and James Atkins Pritchard, Dean of
Ralston College;
All others who mentored me in notable ways, including the Rev. Dr. Joseph P. Finn †, once of London, Ontario; the Rev. Dr. Walter Hannam of St. Bartholomew’s, Regent Park,
Toronto; the Rev. Dr. Stephen E. Lahey of the University of Nebraska, Lincoln; the Very Rev.
Dr. J. Nixon McMillan of St. Paul’s, Albany; Raymond Michaels of Lansing, Michigan; and the
Rev. Dr. Bernard J. O’Connor †, once of Ave Maria College.
I must also thank Dr. Ian Christopher Levy of Providence College, Dr. Luigi Campi of
Università degli Studi di Milano, Dr. Heather Phillips, and Dr. Mark Thakkar of the University of St. Andrews for their replies to my emails; Dr. Richard Cross of the University of Notre Dame for thoughtfully reading over chapters eight and ten and offering suggestions for improvement, and for giving me a copy of his unfinished article on Wyclif’s Christology; Dr. Olga Izzo, once of Ave Maria College, for her assistance with Old Czech marginalia; Dr. Martin Klein of
Universität Würzburg, for his assistance with German; Julian Vestry, then of the University of
Wellington, for proofing much of chapter one; Catherine Cousino of Gananoque, Ontario, and
Devra Torres of Hyattsville, Maryland, my proofreaders; Karen Stephanites of Mullen Library, for her assistance with interlibrary loans; Lola Lastrapes of the Center for Medieval and
Byzantine Studies, the Catholic University of America, for her never failing support and interest in my work; Dr. Trevor Lipscombe of the Catholic University of America’s Press for permission
viii to reproduce the diagram of Grosseteste’s circular model of redemption; the trustees of the
Lorraine Elisabeth Cella Memorial Scholarship Fund for funding part of my research abroad; Dr.
Kevin White of the Catholic University of America for his suggestion to reread the final canto of the Divine Comedy; and Dr. Lilla Kopár, Director of the Center for Medieval and Byzantine
Studies, the Catholic University of America, for her expertise at finding funding in an era of constant budget cuts.
Penultimately, I must thank in a special way my advisor, mentor, and philosophic father,
Dr. Timothy B. Noone of the Catholic University of America, without whose tolerance of my eccentricities I would never have developed my full potential.
Finally, more thanks than I can muster are due to Dr. Mary Grace Finn, mother, maiden, mediatrix, mystic, and MD, whose love, understanding, and financial assistance made me both to live and to live well.
ix Introduction
Now that scholarship has mostly freed Wyclif from Protestant hagiography and Catholic heresiology, scholars can go about the more important work of reconstructing the architecture of his thought-world. That world is not easy to visit, because the terrain is so very alien to those who have never been there. In fact, visits are usually impossible; one must emigrate. To get a sense of the difficulties involved, consider the following quotations from two twentieth-century scholars who failed to understand the Doctor evangelicus: (1) In 1920, Theodore Otto Wedel observed in his work on medieval astrology, “There is evidence in…[Wyclif’s] writings that he was well acquainted with the current astrological textbooks; in his earlier works he seems even to have subscribed to astrological theory. There is extant a short treatise of his on comets in which Aristotle, Averroes, Haly, and other Arabian masters are freely cited.”1 In a footnote,
Wedel continues, “The treatise itself, which is a characteristic scholastic disputation, is unintelligible to me.”2 (2) In 1945, Vivian Hubert Howard Green almost exclaimed in exhaustion after wrangling at length through the minutia of Wyclif’s Eucharistic doctrine, as follows:
Wyclif’s “final view [of the Eucharist] is not very clear and hardly capable of a true scientific analysis.”3
Since 1945, however, real progress has been made toward situating Wyclif’s thought in the broad narrative of late-medieval philosophy and theology. The greatest impediment to that scholarly motion is lack of reliable critical editions of Wyclif’s texts. The Wyclif Society more
1 Theodore Otto Wedel, The Mediaeval Attitude toward Astrology Particularly in England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), reprinted as Astrology in the Middle Ages (Mineola, New York: Dover, 2005), 128. 2 Ibid., footnote 2. 3 V. H. H. Green, Bishop Reginald Pecock: A Study in Ecclesiastical History and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 93, footnote 4. 1 2 than a century ago started the work of publishing critical editions of Wyclif’s corpus, but did not complete that project. Despite their heroic efforts, approximately one third of Wyclif’s corpus has remained unpublished, including his treatise, De ideis, which is critical for grasping his thought as a whole. Unfortunately, not only are the works that were never printed in need of editing, the Wyclif Society’s editions must often be re-edited in light of additional manuscript evidence discovered since its labors ceased. Finally, because Latin literacy continues to wane among English-speaking academics, Wyclif’s Latin should also be translated into English.
To help remedy this unfortunate situation, this dissertation has begun the work of a critical edition and translation of Wyclif’s treatise, De incarnatione Verbi. The first nine chapters present the fruit of the manuscript research requisite for a proper critical edition and translation of the entire treatise, and a critical edition and translation of the treatise’s prologue and seventh chapter. Chapter 1 gives full codicological surveys of all eight surviving manuscripts that contain the text. Chapter 2 justifies the proposed stemma codicum in light of surviving textual variants.
Chapter 3 argues that the version of the text contained in manuscript M is a reportatio, and thus contains the earliest surviving version. Chapter 4 reveals the defects in Edward Harris’s 1886 edition and explains the need for a new edition. Chapter 5 contains the critical edition of the prologue and seventh chapter of the reportatio. Chapter 6 contains an English translation of the material found in chapter 5. Chapter 7 contains the critical edition of the treatise’s prologue and seventh chapter. Chapter 8 contains an English translation of the material found in chapter 7.
Chapter 9 discusses the treatise’s authenticity, title, genre, and date.
This kind of manuscript work requires real diligence. Not all scholars who begin, bring their labors to completion. Allen D. Breck, for instance, attempted a critical edition of Wyclif’s
De tempore, but did not finish the work. He did, however, note the difficulties that beset any 3 potential text editor:
The recreation, the reassembling of the text on time, as it left the hands of John Wyclyf, is a difficult task…We should bear in mind that…surviving copies of copies often differ widely one from another, and that the production of something resembling the original is tantamount to assembling an ancient mammal from an incomplete collection of bones—only worse. We have no manuscript of the first, or, in all probability, of the second generation, although…[some of the manuscripts] are certainly early recensions. Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties (haste in copying, scribes whose Czech or German was better than the Latin of a man who thought in English, the wanderings, disappearances and misattributions of manuscripts), it is possible, indeed necessary, to produce a clear (even if not definitive) rendering of Wyclyf's contribution to the subject of time.4
Breck’s comparison of text editing to the discovery of a prehistoric skeleton is altogether apt. As with all analogies, however, when pushed too far, it fails. Unlike reassembling the bones of a mammal long dead, text editing usually requires collecting evidence from more than one location and disregarding all that makes for an incoherent finished product. As regards the surviving manuscript evidence of DIV, the situation is not as dire as De tempore, for the reportatio of manuscript M gives us the rough draft that Wyclif probably worked from to prepare the text for publication. Manuscript G likewise contains additional material Wyclif probably added to the text during his forced retirement to Lutterworth. Therefore, the evidence allows us to pay close attention to how the work matured over the course of the author’s lifetime, whereas fossils only give us a glimpse of the animal at the time of death.
Breck’s analogy also fails, because, if properly assembled, the recreated literary artifact can be made to speak again. In that spirit, the translations in this dissertation are intended to convey to the reader something of what it must have been like to attend Wyclif’s lectures at fourteenth-century Oxford. The English idiom that best suits Wyclif’s texts is consequently that
4 Allen D. Breck, “John Wyclyf on Time,” in Cosmology, History, and Theology, ed. Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck (New York: Plenum Press, 1977), 214–215. 4 of a stereotypical Oxfordbridge academic. Wyclif scholars from the Anglosphere, including
Breck, all agree that Wyclif’s native Middle English Yorkshire dialect is presupposed by his
Latin. When that syntax is reflected in English translation, what emerges almost on its own is the
English style found in chapters 6 and 8 of this dissertation. Some may take issue with this judgment, but no one can do the work of a translator without identifying the kind of idiom in the target language suitable for a particular text. That which naturally emerged in the process of translation simply conforms the closest to the Latin text.
Chapter 10 begins the themes-based portion of this dissertation. It contains the most comprehensive account of Wyclif’s Christology yet to appear in print. It builds upon all the known scholarship on Wyclif’s Christology in both English and German and advances the state of the question through translations of much hitherto unstudied material. Chapter 11 is a commentary on the material contained in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 12 considers Wyclif’s use of his sources. Chapter 13 concludes with the intention of giving the reader a sense of a coherent whole.
Chapter 10 will appeal to non-specialists the most. Of special interest is Wyclif’s use of geometric analogies to understand the Incarnation. At one key juncture his doctrine is clearly
Pythagorean in inspiration. Of interest as well, is how Wyclif fell into Christological heresy.
Although the Council of Constance never condemned any part of Wyclif’s Christology, he did succumb to Monophysitism in De incarnatione 10. In that lecture, he also committed himself to the very strange view that, per impossibile, should the hypostatic union be dissolved, he would still render the worship of latria to Christ’s then non-divine human nature. Later theologians justly criticized such errors in Wyclif’s thought. If one can ignore both of those mistakes,
5 however, Wyclif’s Christology offers much that the orthodox can benefit from. Some of the material quoted in chapter 10, for instance, can profitably be quoted in sermons in our own time.
Unfortunately, two persistent and important questions regarding Wyclif’s Christology cannot at present be resolved. The first is Wyclif’s stance on the primacy of Christ; the second, his stance on the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood. Only at the end of his life did Wyclif explicitly deny the primacy of Christ in his De antichristo; he denied the other explicitly in his De
Trinitate, around the time he wrote De incarnatione. Both doctrines, however, in some form are required by DIV 7. It is not at present clear how and why Wyclif’s stance on these doctrines changed throughout the course of his career. Future scholarship must address the question as more of Wyclif’s texts are edited and translated.
Finally, Wyclif’s use of number symbolism to construct the treatise should be noted. 7 and 12 have played an essential role in Christian mysticism since the Apostolic era. Wyclif probably had such number symbolism in mind when he divided his subject matter into the lectures that are now DIV’s thirteen chapters. Unsurprisingly, chapter 7 is the crowning glory of the treatise and sits enthroned in the midst of twelve other chapters. Likewise, this dissertation has thirteen chapters and chapter 7, the critical edition of the Latin text, is its most important part. Chapter 1: Codicology
The eight manuscripts that preserve a copy of DIV are of varying quality. Four are of
English origin and four are Bohemian, viz.:
I. A: Vienna, ÖNB 1387
This manuscript contains the best continental copy of De incarnatione Verbi on fol. 75r–
104v. Thomson dates it to c. 1410.1
Provenance: The known history of this manuscript goes back to sixteenth-century
Lymburg (modern-day Nymbruk, Czech Republic), a city about thirty-six miles northeast of
Prague. Sometime after 1553 Kaspar von Niedbruck, an ardent Protestant and bibliophile, took the book and at least four others containing Wyclif’s writings back to Vienna, probably with the intention of returning it to its owners once it had been copied. The initial Ly of Lymburg, still visible at the very top of the recto of the second front endpaper, bears witness to its original home. Unfortunately, von Niedbruck died unexpectedly on September 26, 1557. Because he had left no will, all his property was forfeit to the emperor, including the books he had borrowed.2
The codex appears in the 1576 catalogue of the Imperial Library and is numbered 384 in the
Library’s catalogue of 1794.3 By 1864 it had received the shelf mark it still bears.4 At the bottom
1 Williell R. Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf: An Annotated Catalog (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 38. 2 Anne Hudson, “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia,” in Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), XVI, 30–34. 3 Hermann Menhardt, Das älteste Handschriftenverzeichnis der Wiener Hofbibliothek von Hugo Blotius 1576, Denkschriften 76 (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 1957), 6 7 of fol. 1r the words “Ex Augustissimâ Bibliothecâ Cæsareâ Vindobonensi” are written in a beautiful eighteenth-century cursive.
Covers and Spine: The codex measures 265 x 382 x 68 mm. The current covers are made of cream-colored leather and are noticeably sullied by grime. Embossed in gold on the front cover are the letters “E . A . B . C. V .” Below, the imperial crest is embossed in the cover’s middle. Further below is embossed “17 . G . L . B . V. S . B . 53.” The current binding no doubt dates from 1753 and has almost completely separated from the codex at both front and back. It is still partially attached by the twine used to sew the quires together and by fragments of the paper that forms the pastedowns and the first front and last endpapers. A red rectangle at the top of the spine reads,
WICLEFI OPUSCULA VARIA:
A red rectangle at the bottom of the spine reads,
COD.MS.THEOL. N. DCCCLXXIII. OL. 314.
The back cover displays only the imperial crest embossed in gold, as on the front cover.
Inside Covers: Pastedowns cover the insides of both the front and the back covers. These are made of the same kind of paper as the first front and back endpapers. In the upper left-hand corner of the front pastedown a nineteenth-century label has the shelf mark 1387. Below in red crayon is written “VII. J.35.” Further below in pencil appears “D. V. I. p. 1448.” The back
111. Michael Denis, Codices manuscripti theologici bibliothecae palatinae Vindobonensis latini aliarumque occidentis linguarum, vol. 1, part 2 (Vienna, 1794), col. 1448–1453. 4 Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales in bibliotheca palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1864), 231–232. For the modern-day catalogue entry, see http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AC13990605, accessed August 31, 2018. 8
pastedown is blank except for the residue of what appears to be a strip of glue approximately 20 mm wide along the top.
Endpapers: The manuscript has three endpapers, two in front and one in back. The first front endpaper is made of paper and is blank on both sides, except for the shelf mark 1387 written in pencil in the upper left-hand corner of its recto. Its watermark depicts sunbeams emanating from a triangle. The second front endpaper is made of parchment and is clearly much older. Besides the “Ly” mentioned in the section on provenance above, in the upper third of its recto ten lines of notes have been written, probably in the first quarter of the fifteenth century in a textualis media in fading brown ink. A piece of paper similar to that of the first endpaper has been glued over the beginning of lines six through ten of these notes. In the middle of the recto appears the following, probably in an eighteenth-century hand, in fading ink:
Vo 314
TRACTATVS de ἐυχαρίςια Item de dotacione Ecclesiæ
A tear in this second endpaper near the spine was once repaired with stitches. To the right of this tear someone has written “Doctor Martin Luter” in very faded ink. Because the text looks to be post-sixteenth century, and because of the squiggles in the same hand, I deem this a probatio pennae and not an indication of provenance.5 In the bottom corner of its recto appear two old shelf marks in Roman numerals. The first, DCCCXXIII has been written in ink and crossed out in pencil. Above it in pencil is written DCCCLXXIV. On the back of the second front endpaper
5 Gotthard Lechler noticed this writing as well but refused to make a judgment as to whether or not Luther had owned this volume. See his prolegomena to Trialogus by John Wyclif, ed. Gotthard Lechler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 21. 9 one finds a small rectangular piece of white paper glued in the upper left-hand corner.
Immediately thereunder are the words:
Si facis ad motum. iungas cum corpore verbum dictum de pane. que sunt epractica tolas
The back endpaper is made of paper and entirely blank. It has suffered some foxing. It has the same watermark as the first front endpaper.
First folio: A floral motif made with green, lavender, and red inks springs from the initial
S of the text into the left margin. A tear near the bottom right-hand corner has never been repaired. At the bottom one finds the text mentioned in the section on provenance above.
Quires: Quire 1: fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–24. Quire 3: fol. 25–34. Quire 4: fol. 35–46.
Quire 5: fol. 47–58. Quire 6: fol. 59–66. Quire 7: fol. 67–74. Quire 8: fol. 75–84. Quire 9: fol.
85–94. Quire 10: fol. 95–104. Quire 11: fol. 105–114. Quire 12: fol. 115–125. Quire 13: fol.
126–137. Quire 14: fol. 138–149. Quire 15: fol. 150–162. Quire 16: fol. 163–174. Quire 17: fol.
175–184. Quire 18: fol. 185–193. Quire 19: fol. 194–204. Quire 20: fol. 205–215. Narrow strips of parchment are visible along the spine between quires 1 and 2, quires 3 and 4, quires 11 and 12, and quires 19 and 20.
Stitching: Because the binding is deteriorating, it is clear that the quires are stitched together at five points along the spine with very coarse twine. The bands average 60 to 65 mm apart.
Folios: In addition to the three endpapers, the codex includes 215 folios. The width of each folio is not what was originally intended, for prickings are often visible on the edges of many folios. These prickings can be as far as 9 mm from the edge of the page. The parchment is not of the best quality, despite the beauty of its writing. The browning on the edges of each page 10
as well as abundant marginalia indicate an oft-studied book. Each folio typically measures 260 x
375 mm.
Parchment inserts are stitched between fol. 35 and 36, fol. 44 and 45, and fol. 151 and
152. The first and third of these contain writing; the second does not. Another insert containing writing was found between fol. 19 and 20 but is not stitched into the binding. Warble fly holes appear on fol. 5, 17, 23, 34, 37, 42, 43, 45, 50, 51, 54, 60, 69, 113, 128, 129, 131, 144, 165, 176,
206, 207, and 212–214. The bottoms of fol. 17, 20, 44, 153, 154, 157, and 158 have been cut away. A tear on fol. 18 has been repaired with eight stitches. Repairs have been made to fol. 41,
50, 56, 63, 125, 128, 147, 155, 188, 207, and 211–212. Tears on the bottom of fol. 54, 71, 90, 91,
124, and 153 have not been repaired. The corners are missing on fol. 15, 22, 23, 26, 40, 50, 51,
54, 69–72, 106, and 119. Parts of the bottom of fol. 55 and 57 have been ripped out. Some parchment has been removed from the outer edge of fol. 95.
Columns, margins, and lines: The folios are double-columned. Each column generally measures 80 x 270 mm. The upper margin of each page typically measures 30 mm, the inner margin 25 mm, the inter-columnar margin 12 mm, the outer margin 55 mm, and the lower margin 75 mm. An average column contains 63 lines.
Foliation: The folios have been foliated correctly in Arabic numerals in the upper right- hand corner of each recto, probably by an eighteenth-century hand.
Last folio: Fol. 215 is noticeably darker and dirtier than most other folios in the codex.
All but the first fifteen lines of the first column of its recto have been left blank. It has been reinforced on its verso with a large piece of the same kind of paper as the back endpaper. The bottom of its verso has been smeared with mud or some other dark brown substance. At its 11 bottom near the spine appears the Arabic numeral 4336, no doubt a previous shelf mark.
Contents: This codex includes twenty-four works, all but one by Wyclif, viz.:
Quires 1–4
(1) De eucharistia (fol. 1r–43r) Incipit: Sentencia tractatus de Eukaristia in compendio sic habetur Explicit: adiuuvando deum confiteri in jhesu christo finaliter observare
(2) De eucharistia tractatus parvus (fol. 43r–46r) Incipit: Sepe confessus sum et adhuc confiteor quod idem corpus christi Explicit: dehonorant corpus Christi quantum in ipsis est
The rest of fol. 46r and 46v contains commentary written in a different hand.
Quires 5–7
(3) De Trinitate (fol. 47r–74v) Incipit: [S]uperest inuestigare de distinctione et conueniencia personarum Explicit: simpliciter per comunem essenciam communicationem essentie
Quires 8–10
(4) De incarnatione (fol. 75r–104v) Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter Explicit: gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini nostri Jhesu Christi Amen
Quire 11
(5) Epistolae octo (fol. 105r–107r)
(5a) Papae Urbano VI Incipit: Gaudeo plane detegere cuicumque fidem quam teneo Explicit: quidem non potest cum ista sit patens condicio antichristi
(5b) Archiepiscopo Cantuariensi Incipit: Venerabilis in christo pater et domine vester sacerdos Explicit: et fieret in materia fidei exponens legislator
(5c) Episcopo Lincolniensis Incipit: Humilis seruus christi deuotus obedienciarius Explicit: catholica sub sigillo et testimonio confirmetur
12
(5d) Ad simplices sacerdotes Incipit: Videtur meritorium in bonos colligere sacerdotes Explicit: taliter operando
(5e) De amore Incipit: Quidam fidelis [in] domino querit Explicit: vincula ad sui gloriam in hoc statu miserie dirrumpamus
(5f) De octo quaestionibus Incipit: Amice preclare ex scripturis vestris concipio quod Explicit: multum damnum ecclesie insensibiliter introducunt
(5g) De illo qui in Spiritum Sanctum peccat Incipit: Nemo peccat in spiritum sanctum ad sensum ewangelii nisi Explicit: ut prescitos ecclesiam cuiusmodi sunt prelati
(5h) Littera parva ad quemdam socium Incipit: Amice karissime vobis in nomine dei Explicit: quod nobis concedat dominus ihesus christus
(6) Scripta minora (fol. 107r–114v)
(6a) De mendaciis fratrum Incipit: Pseudofratres replicant quod non licet sacerdotibus Explicit: omni Sancta in fine
(6b) Descriptio fratris id est monachi mendicantis Incipit: Pseudofrater degens in seculo est diabolus Explicit: ecclesia ex summa cautela sathane machinatus
(6c) De officio regis Incipit: Rex debet ex vi officii sui defendere legem dei Explicit: quo fideliter seruierit deo suo
(6d) De quattuor imprecationibus Incipit: Quod clerus regni anglie secundum Explicit: patet huius racionabilitas ex fide scripture
(6e) De solutione Satanae Incipit: Quantum ad objectum fratrum quod non sane intelligitur Explicit: ortodoxe fidei lucem veram
(6f) De purgatorio 13 Incipit: Unde quidam musitant de regimine animarum Explicit: mandatorum capitulo octauo siue vltimo
(6g) De clavibus ecclesiae Incipit: Quodcumque ligauerit uel soluerit super terram Explicit: quia tunc indubie foret papa imprecabilis
(6h) De tribus partibus ecclesiae Incipit: Cum sim conditor cuiuslibet creature et iudicabo homines Explicit: damnato vel hereticacio quam prelati sciunt infligere
(6i) De sententia incarcerandi fideles propter excommunicationem Incipit: Cum prelati contencionum non Episcopi animarum Explicit: voluntatem et prudenciam legios suos acutius puniendi
(6j) De condempnatione 19 quaestionum Incipit: Cum secundum apostolum ad hebreos 11 Fides sit Explicit: sobrie iuste et pie in ewangelica paupertate Amen
(6k) De vaticinatione Incipit: Cum secundum sanctos spectat ad officium doctoris Explicit: suffragium perturbacio ecclesie est seducta. Amen.
Quire 12
(7) De dotatione ecclesiae (fol. 115r–123r) Incipit: Utrum clerus debuit dotacionem quom modo occupat Explicit: in isto maximo periculo pro dei adiutorio postulando
(8) Speculum saecularium dominorum (fol. 123r–125v) Incipit: Cum veritas fidei eo plus rutilat quo plus plane cognoscitur et Explicit: Hoc mouet fideles ad contra has sectas concorditer invehendum
Quire 13
(9) De paupertate Christi (fol. 126r–134r) Incipit: Christus deus noster caput vniuersalis ecclesie fuit pro tempore Explicit: quod dominus vndique compendiosius dabit pacem Amen
(10) Ad parliamentum regis (fol. 134r–135v) Incipit: Protestor publice ut sepe alias quod propono et volo esse ex Explicit: de amissione temporalium stare pro ewangelica paupertate
Fol. 136r–137v are blank.
14
Quire 14
(11) Super Matt. 23 sive De vae octuplici (fol. 138r–144v) Incipit: Cum sapientia dei patris sit nuclius veritatis in foliis verborum Explicit: in gratitudine erit pena in istis perfidis sine fine
(12) Super Matth. 24 sive De antichristo (fol. 145r–149r) Incipit: Quia ewangelium istud est multis absconditum et deus ostendit Explicit: et esse occasio ut fides hec ewangelii sit melius intellecta
Fol. 149v is blank.
Quire 15
(13) Dialogus sive Speculum ecclesiae militantis (fol. 150r–162v) Incipit: Cum ydemptas [sic] sit mater fastidii et pulchra alternacio delectat Explicit: Et veritates eorum uel falsitates facilius cognoscantur
Quires 16–20
(14) Trialogus sive Summa summae (fol. 163r–215r) Incipit: Cum locucio ad personam \multis/ plus complacet quam locucio Explicit: de quo ewangelium facians quemlibet sensum beatorum
As regards (6h), in 1928 S. Harrison Thomson argued that it was spurious, despite its similarities to Wyclif’s Dialogus.6 It was therefore not included in Thomson’s Catalog.
Script and ink: The scribe who copied De incarnatione Verbi wrote in a well-formed cursiva media. He uses single-compartment A. F and straight S extend below the baseline. B, H, and L always have loops, but D is sometimes loopless. His dark brown ink makes for very easy reading. The text is rubricated. The first letter of many sentences, the titles of the work and its chapters, and some underlining appear in vermillion. The hands of the other treatises in the codex are similar but often not as beautiful.
6 For an introduction and a critical edition of this treatise, see S. Harrison Thomson, “Some Latin Works Erroneously Ascribed to Wyclif,” Speculum 3, no. 3 (July 1928): 387–391. 15
Marginalia: Abundant marginalia in this volume testify to eager and thoughtful readership of its texts. As regards DIV in particular, the marginalia appear in two but similar hands in the outer margins but not between the columns. The first glossator wrote with a darker colored ink. His marginalia are often rubricated. The other wrote more abundantly in a fading brown ink. Sometimes this second glossator wrote upside down in the lower margin. Aside from a manicula on fol. 57v and marginalia in vermillion in the second half of the codex, the marginalia are more or less in the same kinds of hands throughout the entire volume. Current scholarship attributes some of these marginalia to Peter Payne (d. c. 1455).7
II. B: Vienna ÖNB 4307
Folios of this manuscript are the most elaborately decorated of all those studied here. The ornamentation of its decorated capitals, the exuberant script of its colophons, and its litterae caelestes testify to the skill of scribes who took pride in their work and were not afraid of being associated with Wyclifite ideas. This copy of De incarnatione Verbi was probably made by Peter of Čáslav, who labored in Klatovy, Bohemia. DIV is found on fol. 115r–157v. A colophon at the end of the treatise dates it to 1433.
Provenance: The earliest known location of this manuscript is the Carolinum in Prague.
As with manuscript A, Kaspar von Niedbruck brought it to Vienna with the intention of returning it after it had been copied. Upon his untimely death on September 26, 1557 it was surrendered to
7 S. H. Thomson, “A Note on Peter Payne and Wyclif,” Medievalia et Humanistica 16 (1964): 60–63. For more on Payne, see F. Šmahel, “Payne, Peter [Peter Engliss],” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43:208–213. A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1441–1443. 16 the emperor and has been in Vienna ever since.8 It appears in the library catalogues of 1576 and
1794, and by 1869 had received the shelf mark it still bears.9
Covers and Spine: The covers and spine of this manuscript are made of the same kind of grimy, cream-colored leather as manuscript A. The manuscript measures 154 x 232 x 65 mm. At the top of the front cover “E . A . B . C . V.” are embossed in gold. Below, in the middle of the cover, the imperial crest is also embossed in gold. This crest is smaller than the crest on the covers of manuscript A. At the bottom of the front cover, “17 . G . L . B . V. S .B . 55” are also embossed in gold. The current binding no doubt dates to 1755. In a red rectangle at the top of the spine appear the words:
TRACTATUS DE ANIMA WICLEF. OPUSC.
Shortly below this red rectangle someone has written the Arabic numeral “43” in pencil. In another red rectangle at the bottom of the spine are the words:
COD. MS. THEOL. N. DCCCCXI.
Unfortunately, at first glance the grime on the spine makes the initial C in this label appear as a
G. The back cover is blank except for the same imperial crest in the middle as on the front cover.
Inside Covers: The pastedowns are of paper that has suffered some foxing and bear no watermark. A nineteenth-century label bearing the shelf mark 4307 has been glued in the upper
8 Anne Hudson, “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia,” XVI, 32–33. 9 Menhardt, Das älteste Handschriftenverzeichnis der Wiener Hofbibliothek von Hugo Blotius 1576, 113. Denis, Codices manuscripti theologici bibliothecae palatinae Vindobonensis latini, vol. 1, part 2, col. 1510–1513. Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales, vol. 3, 236. For the modern-day catalogue entry, see http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AC13960129, accessed September 5, 2018. 17 left-hand corner of the front pastedown. Below this in red crayon appears “IX.J.7.” Below this in pencil appears “D. V. i. p. 1510.” The back pastedown is blank.
Endpapers: There are four front endpapers. The first three are of eighteenth-century paper and coeval with the current binding. The fourth has been preserved from an earlier binding in the fifteenth century and is noticeably darker than the first three. All four have suffered some foxing.
Between the second and third endpapers the binding has become mostly detached from the codex proper. In the upper left-hand corner of the first front endpaper’s recto is written the shelf mark
“. 4307” in pencil and in Arabic numerals. Although the weave of the eighteenth-century paper is visible, a watermark appears only on the third endpaper. This watermark is difficult to describe but measures 22 x 68 mm. In the upper corner of the recto of the third front endpaper a twentieth-century hand has written Roman numeral I in pencil. This same hand has written “Iv” in the lower corner of this endpaper’s verso. This foliation continues on the recto and verso of the next endpaper. A fifteenth-century table of contents appears at the top center of the fourth front endpaper’s recto in dark black ink. When its abbreviations are expanded, it reads:
Tractatus de anima magistri Sarp Item tractatus de compositione hominis Item Tractatus de vniuersalibus Item Tractatus de incarnacione Item tractatus de ente in generali magistri Johannis ewangelici doctoris Item tractatus de ente praedicamentali Item tractatus de tempore
No. 36.
Very fine lines of black ink extend from the S of hominis to the O of Johannis and from the final
E of tempore to the bottom of the M of magistri Johannis. To the left of Item Tractatus de incarnacione near the spine appears the Arabic numeral 57. Below Item tractatus de tempore and above No. 36. an eighteenth-century hand has written “Theolog. Lat. MS. N. 248” in fading 18 black ink. This hand has also written “No. 248” near the upper right-hand corner of the recto of this endpaper. To the right and slightly lower appears the twentieth-century foliation of the
Roman numeral II in pencil. Towards the bottom in the center another eighteenth-century hand has written, “12 .DCCCCXI.” Below appears “ol 248.” The back of the fourth front endpaper is blank except for the twentieth-century foliation “IIv” in pencil in the lower left-hand corner.
There are five back endpapers. The first comes from an older binding. The last four are of the same kind of paper as the first three front endpapers. The same watermark appears on the last three back endpapers as on the third front endpaper. All have suffered some foxing; all but the first are blank. Between the second and the third the codex is becoming detached from the binding. The recto of the first back endpaper has twentieth-century foliation “I+” in pencil in its upper right-hand corner. In the lower left-hand corner of its verso the same hand has written
“I+v” in pencil. To the right an eighteenth-century hand has written “M|3900” in the center of the verso and in black ink.
First folio: Fol. 1r is representative of the other folios in the codex. When expanded, the running title in vermillion at the top reads, “Incipit tractatus de anima magistri Sarp liber primus.” Inks of at least seven colors have been used to illustrate its initial capital U.
Quires: Quire 1: fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–25. Quire 3: fol. 26–37. Quire 4: fol. 38–49.
Quire 5: fol. 50–59. Quire 6: fol. 60–71. Quire 7: fol. 72–86. Quire 8: fol. 87–97. Quire 9: fol.
98–110. Quire 10: fol. 111–121. Quire 11: fol. 122–132. Quire 12: fol. 133–144. Quire 13: fol.
145–156. Quire 14: fol. 157–169. Quire 15: fol. 170–181. Quire 16: fol. 182–192. Quire 17: fol.
193–205. Quire 18: fol. 206–217. Quire 19: fol. 218–228. Quire 20: fol. 229–239. Quire 21: fol.
240–251. Quire 22: fol. 252–265. Quire 23: fol. 266–277. Quire 24: fol. 278–288. Quire 25: fol.
19 289–300. Narrow strips of parchment stitched into the spine are often visible between one quire and the next and in the middle of a quire.
Stitching: Because the binding is deteriorating, it is clear that the quires are stitched together at four places along the spine. The second and third bands are on average 10 mm wide.
The bands are 42, 65, and 45 mm apart from top to bottom.
Folios: Besides the endpapers the codex has 300 paper folios. The cream-colored paper is becoming brown along the edges and sometimes slightly jagged. An average folio measures 145 x 222 mm. Fol. 184v, 200r, 203v, 208r, 243r are blank except for the outline of the writing- frame. Fol. 243v–300v are entirely blank. I can see no watermark on any of the folios. On the folios that contain writing the vertical paper weave is visible. On fol. 243–300 the horizontal weave is also visible. The distance between the horizontal lines is usually 38 mm. The blank folios are remarkably well preserved.
Columns, margins, and lines: The folios are single-columned and the writing-frame typically measures 104 x 170 mm. Typically, the upper margin measures 20 mm, the inner margin 15 mm, the outer margin 25 mm, and the lower margin 31 mm. Because the writing becomes considerably more cramped at some places in the codex, a given folio can have anywhere between 36 and 55 lines.
Foliation: A seventeenth-century hand has numbered fol. 1–243 in Arabic numerals with a fine black ink in the upper right-hand corner of each recto. The twentieth-century hand mentioned above in the section on the endpapers has continued this foliation on fol. 244–300.
The same twentieth-century hand has also foliated the lower left-hand corner of each verso in pencil throughout the entire codex. The foliation is correct.
20 Contents:
(1) De anima by John Sharpe (fol. 1r–38r) Incipit: Utrum anima intellectiua est quodammodo omnia Quod non arguitur Explicit: non oportet huiusmodi abstractionem procedere
(2) De composicione hominis by Wyclif (fol. 38v–62r) Incipit: Tria mouent me tractare materiam de compositione hominis Explicit: et idem patet 4o et ultimo eodem octaui et alibi satis sepe
(3) De vniuersalibus by Wyclif (62v–114v) Incipit: In purgando errores circa universalia sunt tria introductoria prenotanda Explicit: ad quarum noticiam sentencia ista ipsam apparenciam egressurus
(4) De incarnacione by Wyclif (fol. 115r–157v) Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter incarnacionis Explicit: ad laudem gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini nostri ihesu christi Amen
(5) De ente in communi by Wyclif (fol. 158r–167v) Incipit: In primis ergo supponitur ens esse Hoc enim nec potest probari nec Explicit: non sunt res cum non sunt per se in genere ut patet post
(6) De ente primo in communi by Wyclif (167v–177r) Incipit: Extenso ente secundum eius maximam amplicationem possibilem Explicit: ex bonitate et misericordia dei sumitur indirecte occasio peccandi
(7) Purgans errors circa veritates in communi by Wyclif (177v–184r) Incipit: [C]Onsequentes est purgare errores circa instancias quibus decepti putant Explicit: que non conuenit si quis logicis ergo propter talia signa oportet
Fol. 184v is blank.
(8) Purgans errores circa universalia in communi by Wyclif (185r–190v) Incipit: [O]Biciendum contra dicta de vniuersalibus Quidam nimis pueriliter Explicit: et saltem si deus vellet uel non superflueret
(9) De ente in praedicamentali by Wyclif (190v–242v) Incipit: [S]Vpposito ex superius declaratis et declarandis in posterum Explicit: patet ergo quod si partes temporis sunt aput deum tunc vere sunt
Fol. 200r, 203v, 208r are blank.
21 John Sharpe (d. p. 1403), the author of (1), was an ardent anti-Wyclifite. At least four of his philosophical works are still extant.10 As regards (3) and (8), in this codex the explicits are noticeably different from those recorded by Thomson.11
Script and ink: Ivan Mueller thought that two scribes produced all the contents of this manuscript and assigns fol. 1r–114v and 205r–242v to the first hand and 115r–204v to the second.12 He no doubt was led to this judgment because the hand of 114v is noticeably less cramped than the hand of 115r. If one compares fol. 115r to fol. 1r, however, one sees that the hand is the same for each folio. The scribe merely wrote with larger letters as he grew fatigued.
If this identification is correct, the scribe of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi was Peter of
Čáslav, identified in the colophons discussed below. A different scribe is probably responsible for 205r–242v. In any event, the scribe who copied DIV writes in a very legible cursiva media with a clear and dark black ink. He uses single-compartment A. F and straight S extend below the baseline. B, D, H, and L always have loops. I is often dotted.
Decorated capitals adorn the beginning of the treatises on fol. 1r, 38v, 62v, 115r, 158r, and 167v. Harris records that Sigmund Herzberg-Fränkel describes this ornamentation thus:
“Litterae initiales prologi et primi capituli variis coloribus sed pessimi gustus depictae.”13 This
10 For more on John Sharpe, see Charles H. Lohr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Johannes de Kanthi–Myngodus,” Traditio 27 (1971), 279–280. See also Richard Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnout: Brepols, 1997), 315–316. A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 1680. For his De anima, see Leonard A. Kennedy, “The De anima of John Sharpe,” Franciscan Studies 29 (1969): 249–270. 11 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 20 and 21. 12 Ivan J. Mueller, introduction to Tractatus de universalibus, by John Wyclif, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), lxii. 13 Edward Harris, preface to Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione, by John Wyclif, ed. Edward Harris (London, 1886), xii. For more on Herzberg-Fränkel (1857–1913), see “Herzberg-Fränkel, Sigmund,” in Österreichisches biographisches Lexicon 1815–1950, vol. 2 (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1959), 296, available online http://www.biographien.ac.at/oebl_2/296.pdf, accessed September 4, 2018. 22 aesthetic judgment constitutes a grave insult to the scribe responsible for some truly impressive decoration. He used at least two shades of blue, three shades of green, three shades of red, and three shades of violet. The largest of them all is the initial I on fol. 62v. A blossoming vine sprouts from the initial and meanders to the bottom margin of the folio. No illustrations are found after 205r, but the second scribe does use litterae caelestes in the first line of some folios, although these are sometimes found earlier in the codex as well.
Marginalia: Marginalia in both vermillion and black appear throughout the codex until
201r. Thereafter, the margins are blank except for foliation. The marginalia rarely amount to a gloss as they do in manuscript A. The marginalia in black were written first and sometimes offer corrections to the text. Black maniculae appear on fol. 7r, 8r, 9r, 16r, 72r, 102v, 176v, and 177r.
The rubricator responsible for the marginalia in vermillion has sometimes underlined black marginalia, as on fol. 6v, 8v, 13v, and 38r. He also added running titles in the upper margin; brief phrases or numbers useful for understanding the progression of the text in the inner and outer margins; paraphs to the text; capitals at the beginning of some chapters; and colophons and explicits at the end of some chapters. A red manicula appears on fol. 66r. As Anne Hudson has noted, one means of enabling readers to access Wyclif’s works was for scribes to add letters along the margins of a text, and to direct readers to the pertinent letter in an index found elsewhere.14 The rubricator has done precisely this throughout this entire copy of De incarnatione Verbi, but not in the rest of the manuscript.
Colophons: Colophons appear on fol. 38r, 62r, 114v, and 157v. The first is entirely in vermillion and in the same hand as the rubricator. Fol. 38r:
14 Anne Hudson, “Accessus ad auctorem: The Case of John Wyclif,” Viator 30 (1999): 328–338. 23 Explicit tractatus Magistri Sarp Bud bohu chwala In te domine confido
“Bud bohu chwala” is old Czech for “Laus Deo” or “Praise be to God.” Fol. 62r:
In te domine confido
Explicit Tractatus de composicione Hominis Magistri Johannis Wykleph professoris sacre Theologie Per Petrum de Czaslawia Anno domini Moccccoxxxiio immediate ante Circumcisionem domini nostri ihesu christi Et finitus est Glatowie Saluum fac seruum tuum domine
The last line of this colophon appears entirely in vermillion and in the same hand as the rubricator. The rest of the text is of beautiful, whimsical, late-medieval penwork with rubrication. Here the scribe has left us his name, Peter of Čáslav. Unfortunately, as Ivan Mueller has pointed out, nothing is known of this Peter, except for what is said in the colophons of this manuscript.15 Peter finished this copy of De compositione hominis on Wednesday, December 31,
1432.16 Glatowia is the Latin name for modern-day Klatovy, a city in the southeast of the Czech
Republic. Fol. 114v:
Finui sabbato proximo ante purificationem Explicit tractatus eximii Magistri Johannis Wy- kleph. De vniuersalibus per Petrum de Czaslawia Finitus Glatowie Sub Anno domini Moccccoxxxo iiio Et eodem anno fuit Synodus generalis Concilii cum dominis Bohemis Basilie
Similar to the last colophon, here the first line is entirely in vermillion and in the same hand as the rubricator’s. His textualis formata is a testament to the beauty, creativity, and skill of late- medieval penwork. Peter of Čáslav finished this copy of De universalibus on Saturday, January
15 Mueller, introduction to Tractatus de universalibus, lxiv. 16 For the liturgical calendar in the year 1432, see H. Grotefend, Taschenbuch der Zeitrechnung des deutschen Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Hannover and Leipzig, 1898), 146–147. In that year, Easter fell on April 20. See also http://kirchenkalender.com/, accessed September 4, 2018. 24 31, 1433.17 He mentions the Council of Basel because on January 1 of that year “fifteen Hussite delegates with a suite of 300 came to Basel” to present their demands to the Council for the reform of the Church.18 Fol. 157v:
Explicit tractatus de Incarnacione M. J. Wy. Anno domini 1433 Scriptori pro pena dentur gaudia sempiterna. Fur huius carte ledatur demonis ar- te Et cetera
Unfortunately, there was little space left on the folio for a colophon as glorious as the last.
Modern-day readers may find the bookcurse at the end to be of interest.19
III. C: Vienna ÖNB 4504
The outward appearance of this manuscript is the least visually attractive of all those studied here, in part because of the fifteenth-century binding it still bears. De incarnatione Verbi is found on fol. 37r–110v. Thomson dates it to the first half of the fifteenth century.20
Provenance: Like manuscript B, manuscript C was one of the books from the Charles
University in Prague surrendered to the emperor upon the death of Kaspar von Niedbruck on
September 26, 1557.21 It too has remained in Vienna ever since, and appears in the library catalogues of 1576 and 1794. By 1869 it had received the shelf mark it still bears.22
17 Grotefend, Taschenbuch der Zeitrechnung, 130–131. In 1433, Easter fell on April 12. 18 J. Gill, “Basel, Council of,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 2:134. 19 For more on medieval book curses, see Marc Drogin, Anathema!: Medieval Scribes and the History of Book Curses (Montclair, NJ: Allanheld and Schram, 1983). 20 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 38. 21 Anne Hudson, “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia,” XVI, 32–33. 22 Menhardt, Das älteste Handschriftenverzeichnis der Wiener Hofbibliothek von Hugo Blotius 1576, 64. Denis, Codices manuscripti theologici bibliothecae palatinae Vindobonensis latini, vol. 1, part 2, col. 1462–1464. 25 Covers and Spine: The fifteenth-century binding of this book has not weathered the storms of the centuries unscathed. The front cover creaks when it closes. The book measures 150 x 227 x 43 mm. The covers and spine are made of wood that was once covered in leather. Some of this leather remains, giving the front cover a marbled look. Three bands are visible along the spine. The average distance between them is 45 mm. At least two layers of paper have been glued to the spine over the years. Much of this paper has chipped away, but what remains reveals parts of old shelf marks. I counted at least twenty wormholes on the spine. The cover once had two clasps. Two sets of two tacks are near the left-hand edge of the back cover. The distance between the middle of each of the tacks nearest the edge is 94 mm. Nothing remains of the clasps on the front cover. The places where they once were have noticeably worn away. When the book is closed, “T.128.” is visible on the lower edge of the codex proper.
Inside Covers: The front inside cover bears two layers of paper. The upper layer has begun to chip away. At the top near the left-hand corner the shelf mark “4504” appears in Arabic numerals and in fading pencil. Below, a fifteenth-century hand has written a table of contents in black ink:
Wik: de Symonia de Incarnacione de composicione hominis Sermo similiter probet autem seipsum homo
Below, an eighteenth-century hand has written “IX.J.28.” in red crayon. Further below, the same hand responsible for the table of contents has written “Nȏ 8.” in the same black ink. Beneath this, an eighteenth-century hand has written “D. V. i. p. 1462.” in pencil. Towards the bottom and left
Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales, vol. 3, 290–291. For the modern-day catalogue entry, see http://data.onb.ac.at/rec/AC13961609, accessed September 6, 2018. 26 a nineteenth-century label gives the shelf mark 4504 in Arabic numerals. At the very bottom and in the center the Arabic numeral 18 has been written in fading brown ink.
The inside back cover is mostly bare. The boundaries of the writing-frame appear as on all the folios that contain text. It too bears two layers of paper. The upper layer is gradually wasting away. Towards the bottom in the center the old shelf mark “N4028” has been surrounded by a rectangle in fading brown ink.
Endpapers: The front endpaper consists of two pieces of paper probably glued together.
The first is noticeably grimier than the second. Along the top of the recto a fifteenth-century hand has written, “hic de composicione hominis non est examinatus” in brown ink. Below, along the right-hand edge appears the Roman numeral “I” in pencil. Further below, “Wiclef de
Simonia.” appears in a beautiful seventeenth-century cursive and in black ink. Further below to the left, “2504” appears in pencil, in Arabic numerals, and probably in a twentieth-century hand.
Further below, the seventeenth-century hand has written “No 8.” At the bottom in the center two hands have written in pencil:
DCCCCXXXII 208. N.DCCCCXXXII ol 296
The back of the front endpaper is remarkably well preserved. It is blank except for “Ausgebessert
1914.” written in pencil in the center towards the top. The vertical and horizontal weave of the paper is visible, as is a circular watermark. Inside the circle appears the outline of what looks like a three-pronged cactus. This new paper attaches to the first recto by a folded strip of adhesive.
The original front endpaper is part of the first quire, which extends to fol. 13. There is no back endpaper.
27 First folio: Fol. 1r has the same look as the other folios that contain text except that in its upper margin an eighteenth-century hand has written:
Theolog. Lat.MS. No. 296 N. 296.
The first four lines of text were indented so that an illustrator or rubricator could add an initial capital S, but this has not been filled in. At least a dozen wormholes have damaged the first folio.
One of these pierces through the next five folios. On fol. 1v three pieces of transparent tape reinforce the parts of the folio where the worms have done their worst. A different kind of tape reinforces the edges of the page, but a manicula and the boundaries of the writing-frame extending to the edges of the page are still visible. This tape attaches to the upper left-hand corner of fol. 2r.
Quires: Quire 1: fol. 1–13. Quire 2: fol. 14–25. Quire 3: fol. 26–36. Quire 4: fol. 37–47.
Quire 5: fol. 48–58. Quire 6: fol. 59–71. Quire 7: fol. 72–85. Quire 8: fol. 86–97. Quire 9: fol.
98–110. Quire 10: fol. 110–114. Quire 11: fol. 115–120. Quire 12: fol. 121–134. Quire 13: fol.
135–144. Quire 14: fol. 145–155. Paper strips stitched into the binding are often visible in the middle of the quires.
Stitching: Given the age of the binding, the fact that the codex proper remains mostly connected to the covers and spine is remarkable. This is due in part to the repairs made to the volume in 1914. Nevertheless, the codex has begun to detach from the back cover. Three bands are visible and average 8 mm wide and 45 mm apart.
Folios: Besides the front endpaper the codex has 155 cream-colored paper folios. They typically measure 145 x 220 mm. Fol. 1, 49, and 155 have been repaired with tape along the edges. Fol. 36v and 114v–120v are blank. The vertical weave of the paper is visible. Except on 28 the last folio, I can see no watermarks other than the one already mentioned. Bookworms have had their way with some folios, as was said. Light foxing is common throughout. The edges of the paper have begun to brown and some are slightly jagged. The bottoms of fol. 25–32 have suffered a little water damage. The bottom corners of fol. 24 and 71 have been lost. The loss of part of the marginalia in the upper margin of fol. 37r indicates that the folios were trimmed at some point after the writing was finished.
Columns, margins, and lines: The folios are single-columned. The boundary lines of the writing-frame are often visible and extend to the edge of the folios. The writing-frame itself usually measures about 105 x 173 mm. On average, the upper margin measures 17 mm, the inner margin 17 mm, the outer margin 26 mm, and the bottom margin 31 mm. Each page contains approximately 37 lines.
Foliation: Foliation appears in the upper right-hand corner of each recto in a seventeenth- century hand from fol. 1–153. Because fol. 153v–155r contain no text, fol. 154 and 155 were not foliated. The 1s of fol. 11r, 101r, 111r, 121r, and 151r are doted. The foliation is correct.
Last folio: Because there is no back endpaper, the last folio touches the inside of the back cover. On both its recto and verso the boundaries of the writing frame are clearly visible, as is the weave of the paper, both horizontal and vertical. A watermark is visible, but this has been partially covered on both sides of the paper by strips of tape that that reinforce fol. 154 and 155, and fol. 155 and the back cover along the spine. The verso is dirtier than the recto. In the middle of the verso someone has written “/930” and just above the lower boundary of the writing-frame
“146,” both in pencil.
Contents: The manuscript contains four works that are surely by Wyclif himself and one that may be spurious. 29 Quires 1–3
(1) De symonia (fol. 1r–36r) Incipit: [S]Entencia tractatus de Symonia capciatur sic habetur Capitulum Explicit: quod ipse moueat qui super totam ecclesiam semper regnat Amen
Fol. 36v is blank.
Quires 4–9
(2) De benedicta incarnacione (fol. 37r–110v) Incipit: PRelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter Explicit: laudem gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini nostri ihesu christi
Quire 10
(3) Sermo probet autem seipsum homo (fol. 110v–113v) Incipit: Quomodo christianus ad ministrandum disponi debet et digne Explicit: oppositum a quo nos custodiat qui sine fine viuit et regnat
(4) Epistola pape Urbano missa (fol. 114r) Incipit: Gaudeo plane detegere cuicumque fidem quam teneo et specialiter Explicit: faciat quod non potest cum ista sit patens condicio antichristo
Quire 11
Fol. 114v–120v are blank.
Quires 12–14
(5) De compositione hominis (fol. 121r–153r) Incipit: [T]Ria mouent me tractare materiam de compositione hominis Explicit: idem patet 4o ultimo eiusdem octaui et et alibi satis sepe
The incipit of this copy of (1) is different than that noted by Thomson. Thomson regards (3) as perhaps not genuine.23
Script and ink: The same scribe produced all the works of this manuscript. He writes in a very legible cursiva media and uses single-compartment A. F and straight S extend below the baseline. B, D, H, K, and L always have loops. The ink is sometimes black, sometimes brown,
23 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 63, 307. 30 but usually not fading. The same scribe has reinforced some of the capitals on fol. 105v–106r and 110v–114r in vermillion. He has also played the rubricator for two words of text on fol.
107v, and the capital Q and the reinforcing of the colophon on fol. 110v.
Marginalia: On the whole, very little marginalia appear in this codex. Maniculae are common in the first half. Sometimes the scribe adds corrections in the margin, as on fol. 4r,
144v, and 145r. In other cases a later reader in a smaller script adds corrections in the margins, as on fol. 18v, 27r, 29v, 30r, and 61v. There are no marginal notes or glosses. Except for De symonia and De compositione hominis, the titles of works appear in later hands in the margins.
Colophons: Colophons appear on fol. 36r, 110v, 114r, and 153r. The first reads: Explicit tractatus de Symonia in the same hand and script as the main text. The colophon on fol. 110v is the most elaborate of them all. When expanded, it reads:
Explicit tractatus de benedicta incarnacione Reuerendi magistri Joha- nis Wicleph Amen dicant omnia Si finis bonus est tunc totum laudabile est
The first three lines are in a thick textualis formata that is somewhat difficult to read. The last line is written in the same script as the text proper. The scribe has underlined the last line of the treatise and all four lines of the colophon and has reinforced the text of the first three lines in vermillion. Because the copy of the letter to Pope Urban VI contained in this manuscript has more text than that noted by Thomson, I quote the remainder of the text as a colophon here:24
“Seruus ihesu christi et ecclesie sue Johannes Romano Pontifici Vrbano Sexto” (fol. 114r). When expanded, the last colophon (fol. 153r) reads:
24 Ibid., 259, 261, footnote 7. 31 Deo gracias Amen Explicit tractatus de composicione Hominis Reverendi Magistri Johannis Bikleff
Quod quisque sibi serit presentis tempore vite Hoc sibi messis erit dum dicitur Ite Venite
The script is the same for the text proper. The first three lines are underlined. If the scribe had simply added an additional stroke to the B of Bikleff, Wyclif’s name would not have been misspelled.
IV. G: Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 337/565
Manuscript G is the most accurate insular copy of the treatise. It also contains text found in no other copy of DIV. Edward Harris did not know of it when he published his edition in
1886, and thus the identification of the additional text found only in G is essential for a proper critical edition.25 DIV appears on folios 128r–178r. Thomson dates this copy to “the last quarter of the fourteenth century”;26 that is, it may have been produced within Wyclif’s lifetime.
Provenance: Anne Hudson has observed of this manuscript that “an erased inscription on the verso of flyleaf ii contains the names of Henry Bryt, fellow of Queen's in 1403–4 and appearing in the college Long Rolls in several later years, John Mychel, probably the master connected with Exeter College in 1403, and John Gosele, otherwise unknown but presumably also an Oxford man.”27 In another place she speculates that G is “probably a scholar’s own
25 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, x. Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38. 26 S. Harrison Thomson, “A Gonville and Caius Wyclif Manuscript,” Speculum 8, no. 2 (April 1933), 197. See also Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 38. 27 Anne Hudson, “The Debate on Bible Translation, Oxford 1401,” The English Historical Review 90, no. 354 (January 1975), 13. 32 copy.”28 The possibility that G originated in Oxford is also strengthened by the initial elongated I on fol. 1r.29 Four other manuscripts that either contain Wyclif’s works or are in some other way related to him also have a similar initial elongated I at the beginning of an important text. Current scholarship hypothesizes that these manuscripts were probably copied at Oxford.30 Because manuscript G does not appear in the University catalogue of 1600 but does appear in the catalogue of 1697, Gonville and Caius probably acquired it at some point in the seventeenth century.31
Covers and Spine: The manuscript measures 198 x 261 x 68 mm. According to the library’s most recent catalogue, in 1907 the binding was covered with white leather but was
28 Anne Hudson, “Compilations for Preaching and Lollard Literature: II. Lollard Literature,” in The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, ed. Nigel Morgan and Rodney M. Thomson, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 335. 29 A black and white photograph of the upper portion of fol. 1r, including its initial I, may be seen in P. R. Robinson, Catalogue of Dated and Datable Manuscripts c. 737–1600 in Cambridge Libraries, vol. 2 (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1988), plate 165. 30 The initial elongated I appears at the beginning of Wyclif’s De tempore and De universalibus in Cambridge, Trinity College B.16.2, fol. 23v and 46r. For black and white photographs of these folios and more on the connection of this manuscript to manuscript G, see Anne Hudson, “Trial and Error: Wyclif’s Works in Cambridge, Trinity College MS B.16.2,” in New Science out of Old Books: Studies in Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in Honour of A. I. Doyle, ed. R. Beadle and A. J. Piper (Aldershopt: Scolar Press, 1995), 68–70, 79– 80, and plates 10 and 11. The initial elongated I also appears in Nicholas Hereford’s Ascension Day sermon of 1382 in Oxford, Bodleian Library e Mus. 86, fol. 36v, and Oxford, Bodleian Library, Bodley 240, p. 848. For more on these manuscripts, see Falconer Madan, H. H. E. Craster, and N. Denholm-Young, A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, vol. 2, part 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937), 710–711, #3629; and Falconer Madan and H. H. E. Craster, A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, vol. 2, part 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), 384–385, #2469. For black and white photographs of the elongated initial I in these manuscripts, see Wyclif & His Followers: An Exhibition to Mark the 600th Anniversary of the Death of John Wyclif: December 1984 to April 1985 (Oxford: Bodleian Library), plates 19 and 32. Finally, the initial elongated I may also been seen at the beginning of Holcot’s commentary on the Sentences in Oxford, Oriel College 15, fol. 120r. For more on this manuscript, see the section below on manuscript O. 31 Thomas James, Ecloga Oxonio-Cantabrigiensis, tributa in libros duos; quorum prior continet catalogum confusum librorum manuscriptorum in illustrissimis bibliothecis, duarum florentissimarum Academiarum, Oxoniae et Cantabrigiae [...] (London, 1600). Edward Bernard, Catalogi librorum manuscriptorum Angliae et Hiberniae in unum collecti cum indice alphabetico (Oxford, 1697), 111, #827.14. James’s Ecloga Oxonio-Cantabrigiensis is available online through http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home. Bernard’s Catalogi is also available online at https://archive.org/details/CatalogiLibrorumManuscriptorumAngliae1/page/n579, accessed September 30, 2018. 33 missing the two clasps it originally had.32 The library keeps on hand an annotated copy of this catalogue, which is contained in a series of black binders and available only on site. According to it, the manuscript was rebound by J. P Gray and Sons in 1914. The red leather is in excellent condition. Both covers lack ornamentation and labels. The average distance between each of the five bands along the spine is 40 mm. Above the second band from the top is the shelf mark 565 in red ink; below the band is the shelf mark 337 in black ink. These Arabic numerals are printed on small white rectangular labels that are glued to the spine.
Inside Covers: The front pastedown is made of paper from the 1914 rebinding. The vertical weave of this paper is visible. There is no watermark. A label with the College’s crest has been glued to the middle of the front pastedown. Beneath the crest the label reads, “Coll. de
Gonvile et Caius”; further below on the label are the handwritten shelf marks “565.” in red ink and “337.” in black ink. The back pastedown is completely blank and made of the same kind of paper.
Endpapers: There are seven front endpapers. The first four are of the same kind of paper as the pastedowns and were added in 1914. A faint outline of the label on the front pastedown now appears on the first endpaper’s recto. The leather of the front cover has also darkened the outer edges of its recto. The second, third, and fourth front endpapers are entirely blank. They have begun to brown along the edges. The next three front endpapers are of late-medieval parchment. These are mostly devoid of text. In the upper right-hand corner of the fifth recto appears the Arabic numeral 288 in pencil. Beneath this and to the right a different hand had written the same numeral, which has been struck through. Immediately below appears the shelf
32 Montague Rhodes James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 380. 34 mark “337 (565)” in pencil and in the first hand. In the middle of this recto lines of brown ink crisscross. Near the top of the sixth recto one finds what remains of the erasure discussed in the section on provenance above. Above this erasure and near the corner there appears in pencil the
Arabic numeral 289. Below the erasure appears the shelf mark “337(565).” In the upper right- hand corner of the recto of the seventh front endpaper the same hand has written “299” and then
“337(565” below. Numerous wormholes mar the last two front endpapers.
There are six back endpapers. The first two are of parchment; the last four of paper. A warble fly hole is visible near the top of the first back endpaper along the spine. The shelf mark
“337(565)” has been written in pencil in the upper right-hand corners of the rectos of the first and second back endpapers. On the second endpaper’s verso appears “Collated 25/3/41” in pencil. These back endpapers have also been marred by bookworms. The last four back endpapers are of the same kind of paper as the back pastedown and completely blank. The leather along the edges of the inside back cover has left its mark along the edges of the verso of the last back endpaper.
The twentieth-century rebinding is in remarkable condition. There are no signs of the codex proper becoming detached from the covers or spine in front or back.
First folio: The first folio has much the same appearance as the other folios in the volume except the long initial I appears in vermillion along the inner margin of the folio next to seventeen lines of text.33 The importance of this motif has already been discussed in the section on provenance above. In the upper margin a very fine, fifteenth-century hand has written the title
“de vniuersalibus.” To the left, the Arabic numeral 157 appears in light brown ink. To the right
33 For a black and white photograph of the upper portion of fol. 1r, see Robinson, Catalogue of Dated and Datable Manuscripts c. 737–1600 in Cambridge Libraries, plate 165. 35 of the title appears the shelf mark 565 in pencil. Immediately below, 337 appears in the same hand.
Quires: The twentieth-century rebinding makes distinguishing the quires difficult, as do the multiple attempts to foliate the codex correctly. For more on the foliation, read below.
Despite these difficulties, the quires can be identified by recourse to the library catalogue of 1907 and to the Arabic numerals written in pencil in the lower right-hand corner of the first recto of
34 each quire other than the first. Quire 1: fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–24. Quire 3: fol. 25–36.
Quire 4: fol. 37–48. Quire 5: fol. 49–51. Quire 6: fol. 52–59. Quire 7: fol. 60–67. Quire 8: fol.
68–79. Quire 9: fol. 80–91. Quire 10: fol. 92–103. Quire 11: fol. 104–115. Quire 12: fol. 116–
127. Quire 13: fol. 128–139. Quire 14: fol. 140–151. Quire 15: fol. 152–163. Quire 16: fol. 164–
175. Quire 17: fol. 176–180. Quire 18: fol. 181–182. Quire 19: fol. 183–194. Quire 20: fol. 195–
206. Quire 21: fol. 207–218. Quire 22: fol. 219–230. Quire 23: fol. 231–242. Quire 24: fol. 243–
254. Quire 25: fol. 255–266. Quire 26: fol. 267–277. Quire 27: fol. 278–287. Strips of paper stitched into the binding are visible between fol. 50 and 51; 175 and 176; fol. 181 and 182; and fol. 218 and 219.
Stitching: Because the current binding is in remarkable condition nothing can be said of the stitching except the number of bands and the distance between them, as mentioned in the section on the spine above.
Folios: As is discussed in the section dedicated to foliation below, in addition to its endpapers the manuscript has 288 parchment folios. These typically measure 185 x 245 mm. The following imperfections testify to the very mediocre quality of its parchment: Warble fly holes appear on fol. 18, 28, 35, 111, 133, 152, 157–161, 167, 172, 201, 223, 228, 243, 274, 283. Before
34 James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College, 380. 36 the text was written noticeable portions of the parchment were trimmed away from fol. 64, 65,
70, 73, 155–157, 174, 182, 186, 242–244, 265, 274, 284, and 285. Fol. 12, 23, 37, 40, 43, 134,
141, 155, 158, 162, 172, 233, 245, 248, 275, 278, and 282 have been repaired at some point in the past. The text was written around a quadrilateral hole on fol. 9. In other respects, the codex has suffered the ravages of time. The bottom corner of fol. 171 has been lost through use. Fol.
176, 177, 179, and 280 are notable for their foxing. The loss of part of the marginalia at the top of fol. 265r indicates that the codex was trimmed sometime after the marginalia were written.
Finally, fol. 36–162 have suffered water damage along the spine at the bottom.
Columns, margins, and lines: All the folios are single-columned except for fol. 267r–
277r, which are double-columned. Because of the diversity of the hands, the width of the writing-frame can be anywhere between 125 and 140 mm; its height falls between 180 and 200 mm. The width of the columns on fol. 267r–277r averages 65 mm. The upper margin falls between 15 and 25 mm. The inner margin is usually 20 mm, the outer margin 33 mm, and the lower margin 40 mm. This copy of De incarnatione Verbi usually has 43 lines per page.
Foliation: Two hands have foliated parts of this volume in Arabic numerals, in pencil, and in the upper right-hand corner of the rectos. The following are foliated twice: fol. 25, 37, 49,
52, 68, 80, 104, 116, 128, 140, 152, 156, 163, 164, 176, 181, 183, and 278. Unfortunately, the first hand only foliated some of the folios and made certain mistakes. Fol. 195 was originally foliated 194, which has since been corrected. The second hand has likewise corrected the foliation on fol. 207, 219, 231, 243, 255, and 267. This second hand, however, initially overlooked the folio between fol. 275 and 276. This folio is now marked 275A. Consequently, contrary to what initially seems to be the case, the codex has 288 folios in addition to the endpapers. 37 Last folio: The last folio is not noticeably different than the rest.
Contents: This manuscript contains only works by Wyclif:
Quires 1–4
(1) De universalibus (fol. 1r–47r) Incipit: In purgando errores circa uniuersalia sunt tria introductoria premittenda. Explicit: intencionis ad quarum noticiam sentencia ista aperit aggressurus Amen.
(2) Prologus to De universalibus (fol. 47r–48v) Incipit: capitulum primum premittit primo trimembrem distinccionem de Explicit: cum aliis dubijs poterit finem istius tractatus
(3) Prologus to De tempore (fol. 48v) Incipit: Capitulum primum supponendo tempus esse declarat quod omne Explicit: metaphysicam de quiditate temporis
Quire 5: Fol. 49r–51v are blank.
Quires 6–7
(4) De compositione hominis (fol. 52r–66r) Incipit: Tria mouent me ad tractandum materiam de composicione hominis ex suis Explicit: octaui et alibi satis sepe. Confirmatur tripliciter primo ex hoc quod
Fol. 66v–67v are blank.
Quires 8–12
(5) De dominio divino (fol. 68r–127v) Incipit: Cum quilibet christianus et specialiter theologus mori debeat uirtuosus Explicit: quis ministrat sine debito secundum legem humanam donare dicitur
Quires 13–17
(6a) De incarnatione (fol. 128r–177v) Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter incarnacionis Explicit: et gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini ihesu christi: Amen. Amen.
(6b) Two addenda to De incarnatione (fol. 177v–178r) (1) Hoc deficit 8vo capitulo: Eo ipso quo…suppositum substanciale (2) Hoc deficit 10mo capitulo…: Quomodo queso…create substancie
Fol. 178v–180v are blank. 38
Quires 18–26
(7) De mandatis divinis (fol. 181r–277r) Incipit: Sentenciam humani dominii sicut duorum priorum decrevi in tres tractatus Explicit: ideo infidelitas facit quod lege ista contempta discitur aliena
Fol. 277v is blank.
Quire 27
(8) De statu innocencie (fol. 278r–287v) Incipit: Ut supradicta magis appareant oportet parumper disgredi videndo Explicit: hominis lapsi videtur diffusius tractandum de dominio clericorum
The incipit to (2) is noted differently by Thomson.35 A third addendum to DIV is surrounded by a vermillion rectangle and appears in the lower margin of fol. 163r: “Nam subiectum potest secundum diversos…non sit deitas sit creatura purissima.”36
Script and ink: The scribe of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi writes in a legible anglicana cursiva media. Double-compartment A is slightly higher than the other short letters.
V-shaped R connects to the next letter at the baseline. B, H, and L always have loops. F and straight S sometime extend below the baseline. Most of the text appears in a faded brown ink, while the initial capitals, paraphs, a little underlining, and rectangles around most marginalia appear in vermillion. The only decoration is the initial P at the beginning of the text. The same scribe and rubricator may also have written De universalibus (fol. 1r–47r). The initial I of De universalibus (fol. 1r) surely looks to be by the same rubricator as the initial P of De incarnatione Verbi (fol. 128r). The hand of DIV is not as clear or as beautiful as that of De dominio divino on fol. 68r–127v. That scribe writes in a dark black ink. Initial capitals and
35 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 20. 36 For more on the three addenda, see Thomson, “A Gonville and Caius Wyclif Manuscript,” 200–201; and Anne Hudson, “Introduction: Wyclif’s Works and their Dissemination,” in Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), I, 9, especially footnote 34. 39 paraphs appear in both vermillion and dark blue. The underlining is exclusively in vermillion.
Unfortunately, water damage especially detracts from the beauty of this part of the manuscript.
Some dark blue initial capitals also appear on fol. 181r–182r.
Marginalia: The titles of De universalibus (fol. 1r), De compositione hominis (fol. 52r),
De dominio (fol. 68r), and De incarnatione Verbi (fol. 128r) were added in the upper margins after these treatises were written. The same eighteenth-century hand wrote all but the first title.
Marginalia appear throughout the volume, but only rarely do they amount to a gloss. Usually, one finds only corrections and authorities cited in the texts. Throughout much of the volume the marginalia are surrounded by vermillion rectangles. In the outer margin of fol. 283v someone has drawn the face of a drowsy and bored monk.
One final note: “Nowhere in the manuscript does the name of Wyclif or any scribe or place of writing appear.”37
V. M: London, BL Royal 7 B.III
As will be made clear in chapter 4, this manuscript contains the earliest version of De incarnatione Verbi in the form of a reportatio, that is, a compilation of the lecture notes of at least two of Wyclif’s students. As is explained in chapter 9, because this first draft of DIV must have been produced shortly after Wyclif delivered the lectures that would in time be published as
DIV, it can be dated to the 1369–1370 academic year. This version of DIV is found on fol. 66r–
74v.
37 Ibid., 197. 40 Provenance: As the marginalia on fol. 1r indicate, the book once belonged to Henry
FitzAlan, Earl of Arundel. Although we cannot trace its provenance back further, before 1536 it may have belonged to a monastery. After Arundel’s death in 1580, his library passed to his daughter’s widower, John, Lord Lumley. After Lumley’s death in 1609, the collection passed to
Henry Frederick, prince of Wales (d. 1612), and has remained in the royal library ever since.38
Covers and Spine: The book has been rebound at least twice. In 1886, Edward Harris noted that the binding in his day was about a century old.39 A conservation label in the back endpapers and a stamp on the inside back cover indicate that the current binding dates to 1972.
The book appears handsome and is in excellent condition. It measures 246 x 305 x 40 mm. The front and back covers are identical. They are made of light brown leather and tan cloth. The shield and the royal coat of arms surrounded by the garter and the royal crown have been embossed in gold in the center of each cover. The spine shows five bands. Between the first two from the top the spine says:
TRACTS AGAINST WYCLIFFE
Between the second and third bands appears “BRIT. MUS.” Between the third and fourth bands:
ROYAL MS. 7 B. III
Affixed to the top of the spine on a white label is the Arabic numeral 8. Affixed to the bottom of the spine on a white label is the lowercase letter c.
38 George F. Warner and Julius P. Gilson, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King’s Collections (London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1921), 1:168–169. For more of the provenance of this manuscript, see Sears Jayne and Francis R. Johnson, introduction to The Lumley Library: The Catalogue of 1609 (London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1956), 1–26. For the book’s entry in the catalogue, see p. 119, #935. 39 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, xiii. 41 Inside Covers: The inside covers are mostly blank. The pastedowns are made of cream- colored paper. No weave or watermarks are visible on this paper. The leather of the cover has begun to brown the edges of the pastedowns. In the lower left-hand corner of the front inside cover someone has written “8.c” in pencil. In the lower left-hand corner of the back inside cover the binder has stamped, “B.M. 1972,” marking the year of the rebinding.
Endpapers: There are four mostly blank front endpapers made of the same kind of paper as the pastedowns. The leather of the cover has begun to brown their edges. The book’s shelf mark is stamped at the top of the first front endpaper’s recto:
ROYAL MS. 7 B. III
A piece of parchment from the old binding has been pasted to the middle of the fourth front endpaper’s recto. On it a seventeenth-century hand has written a list of the manuscript’s contents:
Wodford contra wicliff Wiclef de incarnatione Verbi Wiclef confessio de corpore christi Thomæ winterton absolutio contra wiclef.
On the parchment but to the right of this script a later hand has written,
Found on a Blank leaf at the beginning AG. L
Below this is the red stamp of the British Museum. There are five back endpapers. The first predates the new binding and is pasted to a strip of paper that is bound to the spine. The horizontal and vertical weave of the first back endpaper is visible, but it has no watermark. A twentieth-century hand has written on its recto in pencil: 42 1* 85 folios 86
The rest of the back endpapers are made of the same kind of paper as the pastedowns. They are entirely blank, except that on the verso of the second a conservation label records that the new binding was officially examined on February 18, 1972. They too are browning along their edges.
First folio: Fol. 1r resembles the other folios in the volume except that in the upper margin someone has written, “Marke on the board. XIII A.” In the upper right-hand corner first appears the Arabic numeral 239 in fading ink, an old foliation. Below this in black ink it says, “7
13.III. p 121.” Further below this in pencil appears the new foliation 1 in pencil. The bottom margin bears the red stamp of the British Museum. To the right a seventeenth-century hand has written, “Arundel Lumley.,” as discussed in the section on provenance above.
Quires: The twentieth-century binding makes it very easy to distinguish each quire. Each has been sewed to a strip of paper, which in turn has been stitched into the spine. There are seven sewing stations, which average 44 mm apart. Quire 1: fol. 1–14. Quire 2: fol. 15–30. Quire 3: fol.
31–46. Quire 4: fol. 47–62. Quire 5: fol. 63–73. Quire 6: fol. 74–85.
Folios: There are eighty-five folios, some of paper and some of parchment. They measure approximately 26 x 290 mm. The outermost and innermost folios of each quire are for the most part made of parchment; the rest are made of paper. The only exceptions to this general pattern are in the fifth and six quires. The innermost folios of quire 5 (fol. 67–68) are made of paper.
These, however, are surrounded by fol. 66, which is made of parchment, and a strip of parchment between fol. 68 and 69. The first folio of quire six (fol. 74) is made of parchment, but its corresponding folio, which would appear after fol. 85, has been cut away, leaving only a strip of parchment. Between fol. 74 and 75 a strip of paper connects to fol. 85. 43 The paper folios have weathered the centuries fairly well besides some browning along the edges and some grime. The vertical weave of the paper is visible. I can detect no watermarks.
The parchment folios are in similar condition. Before fol. 23 was written on, a warble fly hole had been repaired in it and about one fifth of it had been trimmed away. Fol. 31v is blank.
Columns, margins, and lines: The folios are single-columned. The writing frame typically measures 165 x 260 mm, but the hasty scribes often exceed its bounds. The writing, for example, on fol. 14r goes all the way to the lower edge. The upper margin generally measures 10 mm, the inner margin 15 mm, and the outer margin 25 mm. The lower margin can be anywhere from 0 to
25 mm. Because of the diversity of the hands and the cramped writing, the number of lines per folio often differs.
Foliation: Two foliations appear in the upper right-hand corner of each recto. A seventeenth-century hand did the first when more quires were in the codex than at present.
Quires 1–4 are marked 239–299, two folios marked 242 by mistake. Quires 5 and 6 are strange.
The old foliation on fol. 63 and 64 is very faint, but both were probably once marked 300 by mistake. Fol. 65 is marked 301, but then fol. 66–74 (i.e., the folios that contain DIV) are marked
123–131. The old foliation then continues 302–312 for fol. 75–85. De incarnatione Verbi, it should be noted, does not fall along the quire divisions. The second foliation is correct and in pencil. Both the earlier foliation and the incomplete treatise at the manuscript’s end indicate that the codex must have originally contained more material.
Last folio: Fol. 85 resembles the others except that it bears some light foxing and more grime. It seems to have suffered some water damage at the bottom.
44 Contents:
(1) De sacerdotio novi testamenti (fol. 1r–4v) Author: William Woodford (d. c. 1400) Incipit: [U]trum quilibet laicus iustus sit sacerdos noue legis. Quod non quia Explicit: corpori virili ideo primam vnionem apparet non secundam
(2) 72 Questiones de Eucharistia (fol. 4v–65v) Author: William Woodford Incipit: [R]acione solempnitatis iam instantis de corpore christi ad rogatum Explicit: sit honor et gloria per infinita secula seculorum amen. Deo gracias.
(3) De incarnatione (fol. 66r–74v) Author: John Wyclif (d. 1384) Incipit: [P]relibato tractatu de anima restat tractare de benedicta incarnatione et Explicit: mori tamen alteri est innaturale [?] ad laudem domini nostri ihesu christi
(4) Confessio Wyclyf de corpore christi (fol. 75r–76v) Author: Wyclif Incipit: [S]epe confessus sum et adhuc confiteor quod idem corpus christi in Explicit: inhabiles alicubi graduari sed credo quod finaliter veritas vincet eos
(5) Questiones [26] eiusdem…dampnate per archiepiscopum Cantuarie (fol. 77r) Date: May 21, 1382 Incipit: Substancia panis et vini manet in sacramento altaris post consecrationem Explicit: non est ib veraciter in sua propria persona corporali. Heresis
(6) Absolucio Thome Wynterton contra Wyclif (fol. 77v–85r) Author: Thomas Winterton (d. c. 1400) Incipit: Sicut testante apostolo ad Romano 10 capitulo ore confessione ad salutem Explicit: et referendo deo omnium largitori graciarum accionem
(7) De pauperie Saluatoris (fol. 85v) Author: Geoffrey Hardeby (d. c. 1385) Incipit: [V]enerabili in christo patri fratri N. generali priori ordinis fratrum Explicit: ordo canonicorum regularum fuerit institutus40
Note: (7) contains only the first folio of the treatise. Because of the water damage at the bottom of the folio, I cannot make out the final words of the explicit. Those given are found at the end of the prologue.
40 For more on the contents of this manuscript, see Warner and Gilson, Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King’s Collections, 1:168–169. 45 Script and ink: The scribe of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi writes in an anglicana media. Double-compartment A is slightly higher than the other short letters. V-shaped R extends below the baseline. B, D, H, and L always have loops. F and straight S extend below the baseline. The text is highly abbreviated in dark brown ink.
Marginalia: The marginalia in this volume are limited to corrections, quire marks, and marks that indicate the beginning of a chapter.
VI. O: Oxford, Oriel College 15
O is the most beautiful insular copy of De incarnatione Verbi. Unfortunately, its beauty rivals its inaccuracy. Because O was the only complete English copy of the treatise Harris knew, he was often deceived by its errors. Although some date O to 1389 on the basis of an erased colophon on fol. 210r, this interpretation is far from certain. 1389, however, is the terminus a quo for dating this copy of DIV, because it must have been made after the work to which the colophon refers. Because Thomson dates it to the second half of the fourteenth century, 1400 is the terminus ad quem.41 DIV is found on fol. 225r–243r.
Provenance: A note has been taped to the verso of the fourth front endpaper of this volume that reads:
MS. XV
This volume was purchased by the College in 1454, as appears by the following entry in the Treasurer’s accounts, p. 50.
“1454
41 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38. 46 “18 die Aprilis sol. M. T. Wyche pro libro “empto a Johanne More continente “Armacanum, Hokot & Wyclyff super “sentencias ______xlii s.”
The above mentioned John More is elsewhere in the same accounts called Stationarius.
(Above information given me by Mr. C. L. Shadwell - J. Cook Wilson. [before 1885])
Thomas Wyche, therefore, acting on behalf of Oriel, bought the book from John More, on April
18, 1454, when it entered library’s collection. As was discussed earlier in the section on manuscript G, the initial elongated I on fol. 120r may indicate that this manuscript was produced at Oxford.
Covers and Spine: This large, stately, and beautiful book measures 315 x 457 x 74 mm. It was probably rebound at great expense in the eighteenth century. The leather is tan in color and has weathered the centuries with little wear. The covers are decorated with elaborate but tasteful tooling in a floral motif. The leather is intact except for the lower corner of the back cover where the wooden board has just begun to pierce through. The spine has eight bands that average 37 mm apart. Between the bands a list of the book’s contents has been embossed in gold and reads:
RICARDI RADULPHI. ARMACHANI OP. IN P. LOMB.SENTENT.
ROBERTI HOLCOTH QUAEST IN SENTENT. LIB.
QUAEST. DUODECIM MAG. NICHOLAI ASTON
TRACTAT. DE COMMUNICATIONE IDIOMATUM
JOANNIS WYCLIFFE TRACT. 47 DE INCARNAT. VERBI.
SWINESHEAD QUAEST. SUP. SENTENT.
ORIEL MS. XV.
A crack between the back cover and spine has begun to form on both top and bottom.
Inside Covers: Marbled paper has been pasted over the inside covers. A label that was probably salvaged from the late-medieval binding has been affixed over this paper on the front inside cover. Although it is faded, chipped, and consequently difficult to read, it once contained a partial table of contents for the book. Towards the bottom of the inside front cover another salvaged label reads “A13,” probably an old shelf mark. The back inside cover bears nothing but the marbled paper. The adhesive tape connecting the inside covers to the first and last end papers is in very good condition. The book’s stitching can therefore not be seen.
Endpapers: There are four front endpapers. The first is marbled on its recto. The vertical and horizontal weave of the paper is visible on its mostly blank verso. Some foxing has occurred at the top of its verso. A photograph has been pasted in the middle of the verso directing readers’ attention to the erasure on fol. 210r. The other front endpapers are foliated in pencil in the upper right-hand corner of each recto in lowercase Roman numerals (ii, iii, iv). The second front endpaper is a thin sheet of cork that has been salvaged from the late-medieval binding.
Astonishingly, it remains intact despite the army of bookworms that have devoured much of it.
Tears on its outer edge indicate where the clasps of the old binding once were. Each was approximately 40 mm wide. The distance between them was 178 mm. The second front endpaper is completely devoid of text except for its foliation and the letter C at the center of its recto. The third and fourth front endpapers are made of very rough late-medieval parchment and bear a few 48 wormholes. They are blank except for their foliation and the Roman numeral XV written in pencil on the verso of the third and the recto of the fourth. Attached to the verso of the fourth front endpaper is the note discussed in the section on provenance above.
The twentieth-century foliation continues in the upper right-hand corner of the rectos of the three back endpapers. Except for the foliation, the back endpapers are devoid of text. The first is made of rough, late-medieval parchment and bears some wormholes, as do the third and fourth front endpapers. The second back endpaper is a thin sheet of cork and bears many wormholes, as does the second front endpaper. The third back endpaper is blank on its recto and marbled on its verso; it thereby resembles the first front endpaper.
First folio: Fol. 1r is similar to the rest except that the initial F of FitzRalph’s Sentences commentary is elaborately decorated in vermillion, black, and dark blue inks. Sprouting from this F is a floral motif that surrounds the text in three margins. In the upper margin a sixteenth- century hand has written “Armachanus super Sentencias” in faded brown ink. The same hand which has foliated the recto in the upper right-hand corner in pencil has also written the Roman numeral XV in the outer margin. I counted five wormholes towards the bottom of the folio.
Quire marks appear at the bottom of the recto, as described below.
Quires: A single scribe has probably copied all the works contained in this manuscript.
He has manifested his attention to detail by leaving marks at the bottom of the rectos of the first six folios of each quire where a given folio falls in the manuscript. He wrote a letter in the middle of the lower margin to indicate the quire (A for the first quire, B for the second, etc.) and an Arabic numeral in the lower right-hand corner to indicate the order that particular folio has in its quire. Thus, in the bottom margin of fol. 1r he has written A in the middle and 1 in the right- hand corner; on fol. 2r he was written A in the middle and 2 in the right-hand corner. This 49 system continues for the next four rectos. There are no quire markings on fol. 7–12, but in the bottom margin of fol. 13r he has written B in the middle and 1 in the right-hand corner; on fol.
14r, he has written B in the middle and 2 in the lower right-hand corner, etc. This numbering system continues through quire 10, which is marked K. Because the system begins again with A1 on fol. 120r, it can be inferred that the scribe initially intended the manuscript to have only ten quires and to contain only FitzRalph’s Sentences commentary. The final quire is marked O, because there are 24 quires, because the system restarts after fol. 119, and because no distinction is made between I and J. Catchwords also appear at the bottom of the verso before a new quire begins. Thus, in the margin below col. b on fol. 24v, the scribe has written “illam dileccionem absque,” the first words on the next recto.
Quire 1: fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–24. Quire 3: fol. 25–36. Quire 4: fol. 37–48. Quire 5: fol. 49–60. Quire 6: fol. 61–72. Quire 7: fol. 73–84. Quire 8: fol. 85–96. Quire 9: fol. 97–108.
Quire 10: fol. 109–119. Quire 11: fol. 120–131. Quire 12: fol. 132–143. Quire 13: fol. 144–155.
Quire 14: fol. 156–167. Quire 15: fol. 168–179. Quire 16: fol. 180–191. Quire 17: fol. 192–203.
Quire 18: fol. 204–215. Quire 19: fol. 216–227. Quire 20: fol. 228–239. Quire 21: fol. 240–251.
Quire 22: fol. 252–263. Quire 23: fol. 264–275. Quire 24: fol. 276–287. A strip connected to the last back endpaper is stitched between quires 23 and 24 (i.e., between fol. 275 and 276).
Folios: The manuscript contains 287 parchment folios. The parchment is of high quality and must have been costly, for most of the folios are milky white and scraped both thin and clean. They generally measure 298 x 425 mm. Fol. 113r–119v are blank. Fol. 6, 31, 135, and 192 contain small warble fly holes. Fol. 31 and 155 have been repaired. A long tear along the spine mars fol. 286.
50 Columns, margins, and lines: The folios are double-columned. Each column typically measures 86 x 306 mm. On average, the upper margin measures 37 mm, the inner margin 30 mm, the inner-columnar margin 17 mm, the outer margin 75 mm, and the bottom margin 78 mm.
Each column of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi has 72 lines.
Foliation: A sixteenth- or seventeenth-century hand foliated fol. 2–112 in the upper right- hand corner of the rectos in brown ink. This hand originally foliated fol. 79 as 78, but fol. 80 is correctly foliated in the original hand. The original hand erred by foliating fol. 111 as 112, and fol. 112 as 113. A twentieth-century hand has corrected these two mistakes and foliated the remaining folios in pencil. Given that the first foliator stopped at fol. 112 and the rest of that quire is blank, it is likely that the book was originally intended to end at fol. 119. The quire marks, as discussed above, confirm this interpretation. Unfortunately, at least one other less accurate hand attempted to foliate some of the folios. This hand foliated fol. 1–6 in pencil, corrected the mistake on fol. 79, but thereafter erred greatly by skipping the blank folios and foliating fol. 120 as 114. This erroneous foliation is not continuous but appears regularly throughout the rest of the codex. The folios that contain De incarnatione Verbi (fol. 225–243) have all been misfoliated, sometimes twice, despite also bearing the correct foliation.
Last folio: Fol. 278v resembles the other folios in the manuscript except for the wormholes it bears. It was clearly not intended to be the last page of the manuscript because the catchwords “abaraham noluit hoc et in hoc” appear at the bottom of col. b.
Contents: The manuscript contains at least three Sentences commentaries and one series of disputed questions. The other three works are probably Sentences commentaries as well.
51 Quires 1–10
(1) Super sentencias (fol. 1r–112v) Author: Richard FitzRalph (d. 1360) Incipit: Fluminis impetus letificat civitatem dei ps. 45 postquam primus Explicit: agente naturali et condensatur per compressionem scilicet et incurvatur
Fol. 113r–119v are blank.
Quires 11–24
(2a) Super sentencias (fol. 120r–204r) Author: Robert Holcot (d. 1349) Incipit: IErusalem euuangelistam dabo ysaia 41 scola denota theologice Explicit: eum non amare qui est benedictus in secula sempiterna. Amen.
(2b) Sermo finalis (fol. 204r–205r) by Holcot
(2c) Ttituli quaestionum (fol. 205r–205v) by Holcot
(2d) Prologus operis (fol. 206r–207r) by Holcot
(3) Sex articuli de diuersis materiis (fol 207r–210r) Author: Holcot Incipit: Primus articulus fuit quod obiectum fidei et opinionis Explicit: vnam talem esse veram iste est deus demonstrato ydolo
(4) Questiones xii disputate (fol. 210v–222r) Author: Nicholas de Aston (fl. 1362) Incipit: UTrum veritatem creata[m] poterit veritas creata ypostatice sustentare Explicit: ad sentencias est vera et patet sic et cetera
(5) Tractatus de communicatione ydiomatum (fol. 222v–224v) Author: Nicholas Oresme (d. 1382) Incipit: Svppono primo cum doctoribus sanctis quod in christo sit due nature Explicit: pro eo quod proprie signat et eum denominat
(6) De incarnacione Verbi (fol. 225r–243r) Author: John Wyclif (d. 1384) Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est proper incarnacionis Explicit: laudem gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini nostri ihesu christi Amen.
(7) Super sentencias (fol. 243r–287v) Author: Roger Swineshead (d. c. 1365)
52 Incipit: Utrum aliquis in casu ex precepto possit obligari ad aliquid quod est Explicit: abrahe ut ymmolaret filium suum et ipse abraham noluit hoc et in hoc42
Script and ink: The scribe writes in a legible anglicana cursiva media. Double- compartment A is slightly higher than the other short letters. V-shaped R connects to the next letter at the baseline. B, D, H, and L always have loops. F and straight S extend below the baseline. The ink for most of the text is clear but not incaustum. The paraphs alternate between vermillion and dark blue inks. The capital initial letters of the treatises and chapters are exquisitely decorated in vermillion and dark blue with floral ornamentation that decadently sprouts into the margins. Only an exceedingly skilled scribe could have produced such excellent penwork.
Marginalia: The manuscript has marginalia on virtually every folio. These typically identify the authorities cited in the text or offer aids to the reader for following the arguments.
Only rarely do the marginalia amount to a gloss, but exceptions are to be found on fol. 5r, 5v,
127r, 163r, and 174r. Diagrams illustrating principles of optics and astronomy have been drawn in the margins of fol. 164r and 165v, and in col. b on fol. 170v. Maniculae are common and can be found with some frequency between fol. 144r and 155v. Many marginalia have been erased throughout the codex. For notable examples, see fol. 25v, 55r, 174r, 213r, 215v, 243r, and 266v.
Finally, spilled ink mars the upper margins of fol. 48–50, 52–55, and 211–212.
Two final notes: Certain marginalia in this manuscript refer to Wyclif by name. Harris notes, “there are…in the margin of…[this] MS. two special notes…connecting the text with
Wyclif. One is a marginal note on fol. 225d [i.e., 233v]…‘Nota exposicionem in de materia et
42 For more on the contents of this manuscript, see H. O. Coxe, “Catalogus codicum mss. collegii Orielensis,” in Catalogus codicum mss. qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur (Oxford, 1852), 5– 6, #15. 53 forma capo secundo secundum Wyclif,’ which is the only appearance of the author’s name in full in the Oriel codex; and the other, also a marginal note, fol. 234a [i.e., 242r],…‘sententia
Johîs.’”43 Minio-Paluello notes further that immediately after the end of DIV on fol. 243r there once appeared the following subscription: “Explicit tractatus magistri Iohannis Wiclefi de incarnacione verbi.” These words, however, are now visible only under ultraviolet light.44
Another important erasure may shed light on the history of this codex. “At the end of
Holcot’s work, fol. 210rb, the following subscription was erased but can be read in ultraviolet light: ‘Scriptus fuerat iste liber de industria fratris Nicholai Fawkes monachi Glastonie anno
Domini millesimo trecentesimo octogesimo nono quo tempore plures questiones de opere
Holkoth graue fuerat inuenire.’”45 Scholars differ in their interpretation of this sentence. Anne
Hudson judges that the “iste liber” spoken of is in fact Oriel 15. At one point, she concluded that
Nicholas Fawkes OSB of Glastonbury Abbey must also have produced O’s copy of DI.46 Later in her career she was open to the possibility that perhaps this copy of DIV was merely made for
Fawkes by someone else.47 Minio-Paluello interprets the evidence differently: “This
[subscription] does not necessarily mean that our manuscript was written for Nicholas Fawkes or that it dates from 1389. ‘Iste liber’ may only refer to Holcot’s work, and the scribe of Oriel 15 may have wanted to record the fact that this text, included by him in the collection of
Quaestiones, was copied from an edition made by Fawkes at a time when some of Holcot’s
43 Ibid., vii–viii. 44 Minio-Paluello, “Two Erasures in Ms. Oriel College 15,” Bodleian Library Record 4 (1953), 207. 45 Ibid., 206. 46 Anne Hudson, “Cross-Referencing in Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff, ed. Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 213–214. 47 Anne Hudson, “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia,” Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), XVI, 5. 54 Quaestiones were difficult to obtain.”48 J. A. Robson, however, gives the most stimulating interpretation of the evidence. Having assumed that Fawkes himself is ultimately responsible for both the contents of Oriel 15 and the erasures, he speculates:
Although it is possible that Faux [sic] merely wished to avoid guilt by association, the double erasure surely indicates that he owned the complete codex and, very probably, that he was responsible for the copying of the Wyclif text [i.e., De incarnatione]. The next occasion, therefore, on which we meet Nicholas Faux is a piquant one. For on 19 February 1396/97, as a doctor of divinity, he represented the Chancellor of the university before Archbishop Arundel at the Canterbury Convocation, on the very occasion on which a delegation from Oxford was delating the university authorities for countenancing the propagation of Wycliffite works and doctrines. Perhaps it was after this that Faux made the erasure which so embarrassingly identified him as the owner of the Oriel manuscript.49
Because of the ambiguity of the subscription’s wording, I judge that the exact relation of Fawkes to O’s copy of DIV cannot at present be determined. In any event, 1389 is the earliest that this copy of Holcot’s works could have been made. Because the beginning of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi does not coincide with the beginning of a new quire, and because it is found after Holcot’s works, it too could not have been made before 1389.
VII. P: Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, Aldini 311
Because the leaves of this manuscript were misordered when it was rebound, DIV is contained on folios 91v, 93r–97v, 62r–71v, and 108r–130r. Although the manuscript appears in
48 Minio-Paluello, “Two Erasures in Ms. Oriel College 15,” 206. See also Jeremy Catto, “Some English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 354. 49 J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools: The Relation of the ‘Summa de ente’ to Scholastic Debates at Oxford in the Later Fourteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 242. 55 the University’s catalogue of 1894, its contents only came to the attention of Wyclif scholars in
1931.50 Thomson dates this copy of DIV to the second half of the fourteenth century.51
Provenance: In the upper-right hand corner of the recto of the second front endpaper there appears in faded brown ink, “Don Hieronymus de Bulgarinis Sacrista Valentie,” no doubt a previous owner of this volume. Unfortunately, in her treatment of this manuscript Anne Hudson asserted that it contains no mark of previous ownership.52 Besides this mark and its entry in the library’s nineteenth-century catalogue, there seems to be no other indication as to when this volume entered the library’s collection.
Cover: As the University catalogue states, this volume was rebound in the nineteenth century.53 The gently used, brownish-red leather cover measures 226 x 324 x 39 mm. The spine has four raised bands. A label taped to the bottom of the spine identifies the shelf mark.
Inside Covers: The pastedowns are of cream-colored paper. The weave of this paper is visible. The same label indicating the shelf mark appears in the upper left-hand corner of the front pastedown as on the spine. A tear has begun between the front pastedown and the bottom of the spine. A strip of the front pastedown has been bound between fol. 12 and 13. In the upper right-hand corner of the back pastedown the nineteenth-century binder’s label reads, “Ferrari
Giuseppe: Restauro Libri Antichi: Modena.”
Endpapers: The first front endpaper is of same kind of paper as the pastedowns and was added to the book by the nineteenth-century binder. A strip of it has been bound between the first
50 L. de Marchi and G. Bertolani, Inventario dei manoscritti della r. biblioteca universitaria di Pavia, vol. 1 (Milan, 1894), 170–171. I. H. Stein, “Two Notes on Wyclif,” Speculum 6, no. 3 (July 1931): 465–468. 51 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38. 52 Anne Hudson, “Books and their Survival: The Case of English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in Medieval Manuscripts, Their Makers and Users (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 230. 53 Marchi and Bertolani, Inventario dei manoscritti, 170. 56 and second quires together with a strip of the front pastedown. The second front endpaper has been preserved from the late-medieval binding. A label bearing the shelf mark identical to those found on the spine and front pastedown appears on the right-hand edge of the recto. Its parchment is noticeably thicker than the other folios that contain text and bears at least six bookworm holes and a little foxing. One of these holes goes through seven folios. Creases and two holes near the spine in the lower half of this endpaper indicate that it was used for some other purpose before being bound with this particular codex. The words written in the upper right-hand corner of its recto are mentioned in the section on provenance above. Its lower outer corner has been repaired together with the lower corners of the next two folios.
The first back endpaper was preserved from an earlier binding, as was the second front endpaper. It bears the foliation 131 but otherwise has no manmade marks. I counted twenty-three worm holes in it, one of which continues through eleven folios. The second back endpaper is made of paper like the pastedowns and was added to the book with the nineteenth-century rebinding. A strip of it was bound between the last two quires. No strip of the back pastedown is visible between quires, however.
First folio: Fol. 1r is not noticeably different than the other folios that contain the beginning of a treatise. Seven lines of text sit to the right of the initial L, which is illustrated with blue and vermillion tendrils that extend into three margins. The right-hand margin contains three marginalia. The library’s stamp is in the lower margin. Three wormholes mar the page.
Quires: Quire 1: Fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–24. Quire 3: fol. 25–36. Quire 4: fol. 37–48.
Quire 5: fol. 49–60. Quire 6: fol. 61–72. Quire 7: fol. 73–84. Quire 8: fol. 85–96. Quire 9: fol.
97–108. Quire 10: fol. 109–120. Quire 11: fol. 121–130.
57 Stitching: The thread used to stitch each quire together is usually visible in the middle of each quire. The binder used four stitches per quire. The top and bottom stitches average 23 or 24 mm each. The two stitches in the middle average 105 mm each.
Folios: The 130 parchment folios measure approximately 218 x 312 mm. Warble fly holes appear on fol. 16, 27, 34, 38, 60, 74, 79, 94, 101, 103, 104, 106, 110, 113–115, 120, and
126. Tears appear on fol. 4, 44, and 83. There is a white blotch on folio 77v over which the writing continues.
Columns, margins, and lines: Two columns appear on each folio, measuring approximately 65 x 245 mm. Typically, the upper margin is 23 mm, the inner margin 30 mm, the margin between the columns is 15 mm, the outer margin 43 mm, and the lower margin 45 mm.
On some folios the light pencil marking the boundaries of the writing-frame is still visible. The columns usually have sixty lines of text.
Foliation: The foliation of this volume has suffered from the absent-mindedness of a librarian. In 1931, I. H. Stein described the erroneous foliation thus: “Fol. 12 is not numbered (in pencil) in the codex, consequently nos. 12–73 are inaccurate. After fol. 73 follows no. 75 and after fol. 91 there is no numeration.”54 In other words, the first librarian to foliate the codex numbered what he thought were fol. 1–91, but failed to number fol. 12 and skipped from numeral 73 to numeral 75 by mistake. By a happy coincidence, by omitting numeral 74 he correctly numbered fol. 75–91. Sometime after Stein’s work, another librarian numbered folio
12, corrected the foliation of fol. 13–73, and foliated the rest of the codex through the first back endpaper. Thus, fol. 13–74 bear two folio numbers, the lesser one crossed out. Folio 129 was originally numbered as 130, which has been corrected.
54 Stein, “Two Notes on Wyclif,” 466. 58 Last folio: Fol. 130 bears at least sixteen wormholes. Its lower, outer corner has worn away. The text of DIV extends halfway down the second column. Under the colophon discussed below appears the university’s stamp, as on fol. 1r. The verso is void of all manmade marks except grime. It bears some light foxing.
Contents: This manuscript contains only works by Wyclif:
(1) De Universalibus (fol. 1r–35v) Incipit: Libellus de vniuersalibus iij capitula cuius primum capitulum premittit Explicit: ad quarum noticiam lumina [?] ista aperit aggressurus. Amen etc.
(2) De Materia & Forma (fol. 35v–37v, 98r–107v, 48r) Incipit: Cum materia et forma sint vniuersalia mundi principia restat de eis primo Explicit: ens dicit prius vel ex e [sic] conuerso aliquam essenciam preter deum
(3) De Ydeis (fol. 42r–47v, 72r–76r.) Incipit: Tractando de ydeis primo oportet querere si sint supponendo quid nominis Explicit: omnis creatura et solum creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo etc.
(4) De Tempore (fol. 48r–49v, 51r–v, 50r–v, 52r–v, 59r–v, 58r–v, 60r–61v, 38r–42r) Incipit: In isto supponendo tempus esse declarat quod omnis duracio sit Explicit: quod peccat in spiritum subtrahendo ab eo oracionis suffragium
(5) De Compositione Hominis (fol. 76v–88v, 90r–v, 89r–v, 92r–v, 91r) Incipit: Tria mouent me ad tractandum materiam de composicione hominis Explicit: et idem patet composito et ultimo eiusdem octaui et alibi satis plane
(6) De Benedicta Incarnatione (fol. 91v, 93r–97v, 62r–71v, 108r–130r)55 Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter incarnacionis Explicit: gloriam et honorem eiusdem domini nostri ihesu cristi Amen. et cetera
Anne Hudson notes how the quires were misordered when the codex was rebound:
The disordering in the Pavia manuscript…is the result of errors in the binding. The correct quiring appears to be: 1–312, 412 but inner 5 bifolia are now in quire 9, 512 but second and third bifolia should be reversed (to 49, 51, 50, 52), 612 but inner 5 bifolia are now in quire 4, 712, 812 but central two bifolia should be
55 The folio numbers are listed in ibid. 59 reversed (to 90, 89, 92, 91), 912 but inner 5 bifolia are now in quire 6, 1012, 1112 lacks 11–12 cut away and probably blank.56
Script and ink: It seems that the same scribe copied out all the treatises contained in this volume. His devotion has resulted in some rather beautiful penwork and a very legible anglicana cursiva media script. The initial letter of each treatise and chapter appear in dark blue ink, adorned with whimsical red tendrils that extend well into the margins. The text is punctuated by alternating red and blue paraphs. The scribe’s ignorance, however, has resulted in frequent textual errors. Double-compartment A is slightly higher than the other short letters. V-shaped R often extends below the baseline. B, H, and L always have loops. D is sometimes loopless. F and straight S extend below the baseline. The ink of most of the text is brown in color.
Marginalia: Stein notes:
There are numerous marginalia by two different writers, one of whom uses red, the other black ink. Both belong to the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th century. The notes in black are rare and draw attention merely to the context of the text. Only on one occasion does the writer express an opinion (‘nota, non videtur Wicleff,’ fol. 123[r]), where the question of transubstantiation is discussed. On the other hand the scribe who used red ink, though often indicating the contents of the text, often also expresses his opinion of the author’s doctrine, and is clearly an orthodox and well informed Catholic. Thus we have: Fol. 1[r], “Iste hereticus tenet quod esse creatum est sua essencia.” Fol. 3[v], “Pulchra sententia de laude incarnationis.” Fol. 6[r], “Conclusio fantastica istius.” Fol. 7[r], “Opinio Viclef quod omne universale est singulare licet non formaliter.” Fol. 13[r], “Ridiculus es cumputas istas raciones cogere contra sencientes.” Fol. 16v, “De similitudine quam ponit iste hereticus in numero creato et increato.” Fol. 17[r], “Nota istam contradiccionem.”57
Colophons: At the end of De incarnatione Verbi (fol. 130r), the scribe has given us the title of the treatise:
56 Anne Hudson, “Appendix II: Supplement to Manuscript Listings,” Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 2. Note that the pagination in this volume is not continuous. This appendix is found at the end of the volume. 57 Ibid., 466–467. 60 Finitus est tractatus de in carnatione Verbi.
¶Laudo te sancta maria et sancte Johannes ewangelista
Two final notes: (1) As I. H. Stein notes, “It is perhaps also worthy of note that five of these tractates are to be found in nearly the same order in two other codices, namely MSS 773 and 1555 of Prague University Library, in which only the De Benedicta Incarnacione is lacking.”58 (2) The scribe’s penchant for both ornamentation and textual error makes his work comparable to the texts of Wyclif contained in Cambridge, Trinity College MS B.16.2.59
VIII. Q: Prague, MK D. 35 (600)
Because of the difficulty Western scholars have faced in accessing manuscripts in Eastern
Europe, this manuscript has been little studied. Édouard Jeauneau mentions it in an academic article from 1979, but his interest was not in Wyclif.60 A more recent book mentions the manuscript and De incarnatione Verbi but says very little else pertinent to this dissertation.61
Thomson dates this copy of DIV to c. 1410,62 but in fact it was produced in 1400 by a scribe named Nicholas. De incarnatione Verbi appears on fol. 1r–77v.
58 Ibid., 467. 59 Anne Hudson, “Trial and Error: Wyclif’s Works in Cambridge, Trinity College MS B.16.2,” in New Science out of Old Books: Studies in Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in Honour of A. I . Doyle, ed. Richard Beadle and A. J. Piper (Aldershot: Scolar, 1995), 68; Anne Hudson, “Books and their Survival,” 227. 60 Édouard Jeauneau, “Plato apud Bohemos,” Mediaeval Studies 41 (1979), 199. Reprinted in Édouard Jeauneau, “Tendenda vela:” Excursions littéraires et digressions philosophiques à travers le moyen âge (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 387. 61 František Šmahel, Die Präger Universität im Mittelalter: The Charles University in the Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 498–500. 62 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38. 61 Provenance: The archivists on site tell me that the medieval manuscript collection of the
Archdiocese of Prague was transferred to its current location in the south wing of the Archive of
Prague Castle within the Castle precincts (Archiv Pražského hradu, Jižní křídlo Nového paláce na Pražského hradu) immediately to the south of St. Vitus Cathedral at the insistence of the communist government in the 1950s. Unfortunately, records do not survive for most of the collection that would shed light on provenance.
Covers and Spine: The covers and spine are made of a single piece of sturdy, worn, slightly grimy, cream-colored parchment. This parchment is nonetheless fully intact and was previously used for some other purpose. The covers and spine of the codex measure 142 x 210 x
31 mm.
On the front cover appear in faded brown ink the words “de incarnacione christi auctoritates.” Below this writing there was once glued a square piece of rough parchment. It measures 54 x 51 mm. Unfortunately, this label became detached from the manuscript during the course of its examination on August 28, 2018. On this piece of parchment appear the words “de incarnatione Christi” in a bold, late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century gothic script. The part of the front cover that was previously covered by this label reveals only the slightest hint of text: the letters “libr.” The rest of the text is more visible: “orum Aristotelis” Below and to the left of where this label was once glued appears the Arabic numeral 35 in pencil as a shelf mark.
The spine is the most beautiful part of the book, because thereto has been attached a piece of curiously wrought, dark-brown leather, measuring 25 x 206 mm. Some of the thread used to stitch the quires together attaches the leather strip to the codex in three places. Above and below the middle grouping of stitches appear five small holes arranged as Greek crosses. A strip of metal reinforcing the spine can be seen through these holes. Around these crosses two circles 62 have been drawn into the leather. In addition to this tooling, four lines have been drawn into the leather that extend lengthwise all the way from top to bottom. The distance between each line measures about 5 mm. Above and below the circled crosses appears some intricate threadwork.
Above and below this threadwork appear two circular metal buttons measuring 12 mm in diameter, bearing nineteen circles in the shape of a blossom. Like the crosses, two circles have been drawn into the leather around these buttons. Below the bottom button and slightly above the bottom stitches a piece of very rough parchment has been glued onto the spine marked with a large D, the shelf mark of this volume. A similar but smaller piece of leather has been glued above the upper button as well. Although some ink still remains on it, I cannot make out what it once said. One of the archivists has assured me that this kind of ornamentation on the spine is common in the collection.
As regards the back cover, a few, small, dark-red blotches may have been caused by ink or blood. A crease along the length of the back cover 4 mm from the outer edge indicates previous use.
Inside covers: A summary of the codex’s contents appears on the inside front cover in two early fifteenth-century hands. Among other things it reads,
De in Carnatione Christi Auctoritates librorum Aristotelis Senece Platonis Commentarii Empedoclis Boetii
Glued to the inside front cover is an eighteenth-century shelf mark that reads, “Bibliothek des allezeit getreuen Metrop. Domcapitels in Prag: D 35.” No text appears on the inside of the back cover.
63 Endpapers: The front endpaper has been recycled from an earlier manuscript and is covered in text written in at least two hands. It is on average 4 mm wider than the front cover.
The text is double-columned and appears upside down compared to the rest of the manuscript.
On the second side of this endpaper, originally the folio’s recto, rubrication has been added to the text. The archive’s catalogue of 1911 identifies the text of the front endpaper as a fourteenth- century canon law text.63 There is no back endpaper.
First folio: Fol. 1r is unique first and foremost for the rubricated P that begins the treatise.
Two tendrils have grown from the top and bottom of this initial capital and have sprouted foliage in the left-hand margin. The counter of the P contains ornamentation that reminds me of an elongated lily pad from which tubular sponges are sprouting. The archivists on site tell me that this manner of decoration is unusual in the collection.
The first three lines of the treatise appear in a dark-brown textualis media. The distance between each of these lines is about 7 mm. A rubricator has added red dashes or dots to indicate word division and slashed through the first three minims of what was ministerium, rightly correcting this word to misterium. In the upper margin of fol. 1r in a faint brown ink appear the marginalia, “De incarnacione christi Item Auctoritates philosophorum ff.” Immediately thereafter in ink of the same color as the textualis media appears the Arabic numeral 41, as noted in the archive catalogue.64
Quires: Quire 1: fol. 1–12. Quire 2: fol. 13–24. Quire 3: fol. 25–36. Quire 4: fol. 37–48.
Quire 5: fol. 49–60. Quire 6: fol. 61–72. Quire 7: fol. 73–84. Quire 8: fol. 85–96. Quire 9: fol.
63 Ad. Patera and Ant Podlaha, eds., Soupis Rukopisů knihovny metropolitní kapitoly pražské [List of Manuscripts of the Library of the Prague Metropolitan Chapter], vol. 1, A–E (Praha [Prague]: Česká akademie císaře Františka Josefa [Czech Academy of Emperor Franz Josef], 1910), 342. 64 Ibid. 64 97–108. Quire 10: fol. 109–118. Between the first and second quire there appears a strip of parchment connected to the front endpaper. Similarly, folded pieces of recycled parchment have been stitched into the book in the middle of each quire.
Stitching: The stitching is just barely visible between the quires and has been briefly discussed above along with the spine. The quires are stitched together in eight places.
Folios: The folios are made of remarkably well-preserved paper. The weave of this paper is clearly visible and goes solely lengthwise from top to bottom. Each folio measures approximately 147 x 213 mm.
Columns, margins, and lines: The text of De incarnatione Verbi (fol. 1–77) is single- columned. The writing-frame measures approximately 99 x 157 mm. The upper margin of each folio averages 20 mm, the outer margin 30 mm, the inner margin 19 mm, and the lower margin
38 mm. The writing-frame is outlined in very fine brown ink that runs through the margins to the edge of each folio. Each folio typically contains 32 lines of text. Fol. 78r–84v contain no text, but the same fine brown ink marks the boundaries of what would be the writing-frame. Fol. 85r–
118v are double-columned. The columns are generally 55 mm in width and 168 mm in length.
The border of the writing-frame is identified once again by a very fine brown ink. The lines of this border extend beyond the margins to the edge of the page.
Foliation: The foliation is correct throughout. It has been stamped in black ink in the upper right-hand corner of each recto, probably in the nineteenth century.
Last folio: The last folio is not different from the rest except that top of its verso is particularly grimy.
Contents: The manuscript contains quite a medley of literature:
65 Quires 1–7
(1) De incarnatione Christi (fol. 1r–77v) Author: John Wyclif (d. 1384) Incipit: Prelibato tractatu de anima, qui introductorius est propter incarnacionis Explicit: Jesu Christi qui est benedictus in secula seculorum Amen Am.
Fol. 78r–84v are blank.
Quires 8–10
(2) Auctoritates Aristotelis, Senecae, Platonis Boëtii (fol. 85r–112v) Incipit: Omnes homines natura scire desiderant Explicit: addere et augere reliquum…Est finis huius, laus omnipotenti
(3) Collocutio iuvenis cum moniali (fol. 112v) Incipit: Me tibi teque michi etas et decor equant
(4) Miscellanea Lat. (112v–114v)
Fol. 115r–117v are blank.
(5) Miscellanea Lat. medicinalia (fol. 118r–118v).65
Script and ink: Except for the first three lines of the treatise, the scribe of this copy of De incarnatione Verbi writes in a simple, legible, and beautiful cursiva media. He uses single- compartment A. F and straight S extend below the baseline. B, D, H, and L always have loops.
The brown ink is mostly fading. Rubrication and some underlining appear in vermillion. The hand of 85r–112v is similar to that which copied De incarnatione Verbi but sloppier. Each section of DIV is introduced with a bold textualis media, and the text is rubricated. The remaining texts was written by three or four different hands in a standard, late-medieval cursiva media bookhand. These texts are not rubricated. The hand of 118r–v borders on currens.
65 The incipits and explicits given here are those found in the entry of the library’s catalogue for this manuscript (see ibid.). Unfortunately, because of my inexperience, I failed to note the incipits and explicits of items 3, 4, and 5, which do not appear in the library catalogue. For more on the contents of this manuscript, see ibid. 66 Marginalia: Besides the marginalia in the upper margin of fol. 1r, very few marginalia appear in this copy of DIV. Sometimes the scribe himself added marginalia to identify Wyclif’s sources (e.g. fol. 41r) or maniculae, as on fol. 5r and 14v. Sometimes another hand has added corrections to the text (e.g., fol. 36r, 38v) in the same color of ink. When the rubricator was displeased with such marginalia, he was prone to strike it through, as on fol. 6v and 41r. A small manicula in a later hand and fine black ink appears in the margin of fol. 9v.
Colophons: At the end of some of the chapters of this copy of DIV, the scribe has left colophons that tell us his name and the day he finished a given chapter. The colophons are as follows:
At the end of chapter 6: “Feria quarta post Iudica me deus,” (fol. 35r, ln. 33)— that is, Wednesday in the fifth week of Lent.
At the end of chapter 7: “Sequitur feria secunda post Iubilate et cetera” (fol. 41v, ln. 6)—that is, Monday in the third week after the Easter octave.
At the end of chapter 8: “Scriptum sabbato ante dominicam Cantate hora quinta tertiarum” (fol. 48, ln. 6)—that is, Saturday in the same week after the hour of terce.
At the end of chapter 9: “Scriptum est hoc Sabbato ante dominicam Vocem iocunditatis anno cccco,” (fol. 54r, ln. 2–3)—that is, the Saturday in the fourth week after the Easter octave, in the year 1400. (Unfortunately, the scribe omitted the M in his numeral.)
At the end of chapter 10: “Feria secunda sexta post Ascensionis et cetera” (fol. 62r, ln. 16)—that is, Friday, the second day of Ascensiontide.
At the end of chapter 11: “Scriptum feria tertia in die sancti Nicomedis martyris gloriosi ante festum Pentecostes” (fol. 67v, ln. 28–29)—that is, the feast of St. Nicomede, which that year was also the Tuesday before Pentecost.
At the end of chapter 12: “Scriptum in vigilia sancte et individue trinitatis per Nicolaum” (fol. 72b, ln. 21)—that is, the Saturday before Trinity Sunday, and the scribe’s name is Nicholas.
67 Given that Nicholas has told us that he copied the text in the year 1400 and that June 1 (i.e., the feast of St. Nicomede) was the Tuesday before Pentecost, these dates can be easily converted:66
Nicholas finished
Chapter 7 on Monday, May 10, 1400 Chapter 8 on Saturday, May 15, 1400 at about 11 a.m Chapter 9 on Saturday, May 22, 1400 Chapter 10 on Friday, May 28, 1400 Chapter 11 on Tuesday, June 1, 1400 Chapter 12 on Saturday, June 12, 1400.
IX. Other Known but Non-Extant Copies of De incarnatione Verbi
Thus far, scholarship has identified two other copies of De incarnatione Verbi that unfortunately are not known to be extant. The first belonged to Syon Abbey, Iselworth,
Middlesex. Part of the pertinent entry from Syon’s early sixteenth-century library catalogue, which is now Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ms 141, reads as follows:
Bracebridge N 28 semet ipsum
…o Tractatus prolixus & subtilis de incarnacione verbi. fo. 142. ¶ p Tractatus prolixus & subtilis de trinitate. fo. 188.67
Because no surviving copy of DIV is forty-six folios long, no surviving copy can be the one mentioned here. Despite the loss of this manuscript, however, something is known about its donor, John Bracebridge. He was probably “the headmaster of Boston School from 1390, and of
Lincoln School from 1406 to 1420.”68 If this identification is correct, he descended from “a
66 For the liturgical calendar in the year 1400, see Grotefend, Taschenbuch der Zeitrechnung,142–143. In the year 1400, Easter fell on April 18. See also http://kirchenkalender.com/, accessed September 4, 2018. 67 Vincent Gillespie, ed., Syon Abbey (London: British Library, 2001), 275. See also Mary Bateson, ed., Catalogue of the Library of Syon Monastery Isleworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898), 124. 68 Marios Costambeys, “Bracebridge [Brasbrigg], John,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7:141. 68 dynasty of York merchants,” probably studied at Oxford, and used his family wealth to amass a collection of more than one hundred volumes that he bequeathed to Syon.69 These included works on “theology,…secular history, canon law, philosophy, medicine, and grammar.”70
The second non-extant copy of De incarnatione Verbi was bequeathed to Corpus Christi
College, Cambridge by Thomas Markaunt upon his death in 1439.71 The pertinent entry in the catalogue of the Markaunt collection reads as follows:
43 a Alyngton super predicanienta, b De uniuersalibus, c De tempore, d De materia et forma, e De anima, f De ydeis, g De incarna[fol. 7r]tione uerbi, h Uniuersalia secundum Burleygh, i De absoluta necessitate futurorum cuius secundum folium incipit genus omne quod est et pe. fo. incipit racioni qa deserit.72
Although this entry does not mention Wyclif by name, the next entry does.73 Anne Hudson, for her part, deems all of these works to be Wyclif’s except those ascribed to Allington and Burley.74
It is probable that this volume was no longer in the collection by c. 1535.75 It should be noted that if these are Wyclif’s works and De anima is identified with De compositione hominis, all the
69 Virginia R. Bainbridge, “Syon Abbey: Women and Learning c. 1415–1600,” in Syon Abbey and its Books: Reading, Writing and Religion, c. 1400–1700, ed. E. A. Jones and Alexandra Walsham (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press), 100–101. 70 Costambeys, “Bracebridge [Brasbrigg], John.” See also A. B. Emden, “Bracebrigge, John,” in A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 239–240. For more on Wyclif’s works in Syon’s library, see Vincent Gillespie, “The Mole in the Vineyard: Wyclif at Syon in the Fifteenth Century,” in Text and Controversy from Wyclif to Bale: Essays in Honour of Anne Hudson, ed. Helen Barr and Ann M. Hutchison (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), 131–162. The volume that contained De incarnatione is discussed on page 153. 71 Catherine Hall, “Markaunt, Thomas,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36:680–681. See also A. B. Emden, “Markaunt, Thomas” in A Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 390–391. For more on Markaunt’s bequest, see C. R. Cheney, “A Register of Mss Borrowed from a College Library, 1440–1517: Corpus Christi College, Cambridge Ms 232,” Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society 9, no. 2 (1987): 103– 129. 72 Peter D. Clarke and Roger Lovatt, The University and College Libraries of Cambridge (London: British Library, 2002), 200. 73 Ibid. 74 Anne Hudson, “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia,” in Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), XVI.10. 75 Ibid., 11. 69 works found in Pavia Aldini 311 also appeared in this volume. Given that Pavia Aldini 311was rebound in the nineteenth century, the possibility cannot be ruled out that its contents ultimately derive from Markaunt’s bequest.
Chapter 2: The Stemma
I. The Primary Split in the Stemma: GOP vs. ABCQ
As should be clear from chapter 1, paleographical evidence indicates that the surviving witnesses of De incarnatione Verbi are evenly divided between English copies (GMOP) and continental copies (ABCQ). Textual evidence confirms that the primary split in the stemma likewise falls along the same divide. Because manuscript M is sui generis, the discussion of its relation to the stemma is postponed to chapter 3. The more than sixty errors below reveal how the continental manuscripts agree in error against the English branch of the stemma. (The number before each quotation refers to its line number in the critical edition of the longer text, as found in chapter 7.)
26 Obicit multipliciter ac dissolvit
et ABCQ
57 Capitulum tredecimum confirmat aliorum sententias
dicta aliorum ABCQ
80 Primo ex hoc quod omnem motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto. Universitas creata est mota. Ergo oportet illam inniti alicui fixo immoto. Sicut ergo mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terrae qui non commovebitur
om. per hom. ABCQ
93 Ut quod, Nihil simul est et non est; quod, Multa entia possunt esse, et cetera
om. ABCQ
115 Minor patet ex hoc quod essentia increata est suppositum mobile
om. ABCQ
119 Habet naturam sibi unitam secundum quam moveri sufficit
om. ABCQ 70 71 125 Bonificans et vivificans omnia ultra hoc quod sufficeret vel poterit alia creatura
hoc A, sed exp.; hoc BCQ
141 Quamlibet creaturam aliam post vel ante
om. ABCQ
148 Ista passio rectificat omnem operationem naturae quae humano generi est subiecta
reaedificat ABCQ
155 Patet quod ultra possibilitatem motus caeli spiritualem bonificat creaturam
specialem ABCQ
157 Sed spiritus pretiosissimus Filii Hominis et Dei Filii naturalis
species pretiosissima ABQ; species pretiosissimae C
158 Dei Filii naturalis qui est tanto melior angelis effectus
quae ABQ
159 Qui est tanto melior angelis effectus
tantae ACQ
160 Ut dicit Apostolus (ad Hebraeos 1 capitulo [vs. 4]). Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli (ad Colossenses 1 capitulo), quando dicit quod Deus
om. per hom. ABCQ
175 Ut primum mobile circulatur, vel ut est posibile quod aliquid moveatur
circulariter ABCQ
190 Ac demum motu locali multiplici, scilicet super terram
om. ABCQ
205 Consequentia non valet, quia cum apud Deum omnia quae fuerunt sunt praesentia
om. ABCQ
207 Certum est quod auctor huius scripturae satis cognovit quomodo
eius ABCQ
224 Sed ut hoc cognosceret servus quod noverat Abraham
non erat ABCQ
72 260 Iesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto salvans, secundo eos qui non crediderunt perdidit
eis ABCQ
283 In Deo ideo dicere quodlibet tempus audacter licet, quod in eo nullum proprie dici licet
om. ABCQ
286 Deus praeteritorum non reminiscitur, cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt
semet ABCQ
287 Cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt
intuitu ABCQ
288 Et exemplificat satis notabiliter (34 Moralium capitulo 5 tripliciter)
add. et 9 ABCQ
292 Nec adhuc ventura quasi quae non apparent desunt
om. ABCQ
297 Paterentur theologi magnas angustias in expositionibus scripturarum
expositione ABCQ
300 Et sic de multis dictis
om. ABCQ
315 Dare ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis secundum successivam denominationem
om. ABCQ
325 Ut illud Iohannis 10, Sermonem quem audistis
om. ABCQ
340 Non servat sermones suos, id est, sententias vel veritates quas praecipit observari
om. ABCQ
347 Licet personaliter distinguatur, subiungit
distinguantur ABCQ
355 Et sic intelligendus est sensus Apostoli (ad Philippenses 2)
Apostolus ABCQ
374 Quod commune esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit
om. ABCQ 73 377 Nihil quod est naturale et essentiale supposito est rapina, sed Christum esse aequalem Deo est naturale et per se inest Verbo. Ergo hoc non est rapina, sed faciendo se esse naturam visibilem exinanivit misercorditer semetipsum
om. per hom. ABCQ
380 Exinanivit misercorditer semetipsum. Semetipsum dicit propter identitatem
om. ABCQ
381 Quae est Filius Hominis et Dei Filius. Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se ad extra
om. per hom. ABCQ
382 Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se ad extra
om. ABCQ
384 Ad quem sensum, ut exponit Augustinus (12 Confessionum)
2 ABCQ
387 Potius possit intelligi quam quod res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic “exinanita”
add. sit ABCQ
388 Res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic “exinanita”
sit ABCQ
402 Quia perinde negaretur hoc
per idem ABCQ
403 Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus, et cetera, cum in prima
om. ABCQ
408 Et cetera, est constructio non synecdochica
conclusio ABCQ
466 Formo sic exclusivam ut apparentia sophistica sit minus evidens
evidentia ABCQ
476 Nam nulla persona movetur propter habitum vel accidens essentialiter separatum
separatis ABCQ
485 Non ergo sequitur si ista humanitas movebatur a non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum
post non ABQ; per consequens C
74 520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur
om. ABCQ
523 Quartum genus habitus est quod habitum nec exinde mutat substantiam cui advenit, nec mutatur, ut anulus in digito
om. ABCQ
533 Quartus vero nec mutat necessario nec mutatur
non ABCQ
535 Sed praeter haec quattuor quae in se sunt substantiae sumitur habitus apud philosophos
non ABCQ
536 Sumitur habitus apud philosophos formaliter ad duos sensus aequivocos
om. ABCQ
537 Primo pro qualitate praedicamentali de prima specie qualitatis
passionali ABCQ
540 Habitus autem spiritualis ex habitu primo modo dicto materialiter generatur
om. ABCQ
541 Sicut habitus corporalis efficitur ex secundo
om. ABCQ
571 Secundo in hoc quod non facit naturam cui advenit esse quid vel aliud
om. ABCQ
576 Dicuntur per se egredi de propriis principiis subiectorum
om. ABCQ
578 Tamen non inseparabiliter consequitur ad Verbum
om. ABCQ
598 Cum sit eiusdem rationis cum aliis, est idem personaliter Verbo Dei
et ABCQ
606 Et patet mira subtilitas in verbis Apostoli, quando dicit
om. ABCQ
75 642 Quia tunc evidenter sequeretur Christi mobilitas
sequitur ABCQ
644 Ligatus est super struem
ad ABCQ
655 Et idem docet Augustinus in Enchiridion 40
4 ABCQ
667 Ad unitatem suae hypostasis seu personae
hypostaticae ABCQ
674a Propter veram convenientiam in natura specifica
om. ABCQ
674b Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi nostri
om. ABC
676 Sequitur quod fuit homo pro sancto triduo
illo ABCQ
A few words are in order here about these data. The anomalies of 158, 159, and 674b are treated later in this chapter. More importantly, readers should note that the manuscript that carried De incarnatione Verbi to the continent lacked about ninety words from chapter 7 alone. As shall become clear later, about a quarter of these missing words appear solely in manuscript G, a fact of which Edward Harris was unaware when he published his edition of DIV in 1886. Although the missing words from the continental tradition often do not alter the meaning of the text, sometimes they do. As regards these more important omissions, in 80, 160, and 377 a scribe failed due to homoeoteleuton. The loss of 380 is also understandable, as scribes are naturally inclined to regard a repeated word as a dittographic error. The loss of 520 and 523, however, which except for a single word are found only in G, poses a greater challenge to the text editor, for they contain substantive content necessary for establishing Wyclif’s intended sense. It seems 76 unlikely to me that they are glosses added to the text by a later scribe and only slightly more likely that a scribe overlooked these words by chance. Instead, these additions to the text were probably made by Wyclif himself after the text first travelled to Bohemia. This hypothesis is strengthened by the fact that Wyclif probably also added text to De veritate scripture and revised other parts of his corpus, including De scientia Dei, after they had entered circulation.1
Conversely, in more than forty instances GOP agree in error against ABCQ:
21 Dat sensum doctorum in scripturis et in symbolo
dictorum GOP
27 Quartum capitulum iuxtaponit sententias modernorum doctorum
sententiam GOP
32 Christus sit univoce homo cum aliis hominibus, et respondendo obiectibus
om. GOP
37 Explanat sensum scripturae multis ambiguum, quomodo Sapientia summe mobilis
ambiguae GOP
47a Et hoc roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis
om. GOP
47b Et hoc roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis
sanctorum GOP
51 Recitando decem ludicra quae concedentes
ludicria GOP
66 Non esse concedendum quod Christus est mobilis
sit GOP
1 Anne Hudson, “Cross-Referencing in Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999), 205. Luigi Campi, “Introduction” to John Wyclif, De scientia Dei, ed. Luigi Campi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xx. 77 72 Omnis persona divina, est simpliciter immobilis
sit GOP
86 Oportet stare in suis limitibus secundum ordinationem principalis ordinantis
principaliter GOP
98 Tertio patet idem ex hoc quod illa prima pura natura est in fine perfectionis possibilis
om. GOP
111 Necesse est quidquid quod poterit esse, esse mobile
fuerit GOP
123 De Sapientia aeterna suo tempore incarnata
om. GOP
136a Qua Deo serviret et placito homini, instauratur
om. GOP
136b Qua Deo serviret et placito homini, instauratur
placato GOP
143 A quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem
om. GOP
189 Augmentatione et alteratione, ac demum motu locali multiplici
et GOP
265 Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei consilio incarnata
semper in GOP
275 Sed satis est quod ipsum sit aliquando
illud GOP
289 Unde (9 Moralium 25) expresserat istud diffusius exponens illud Iob 10
illud GOP
347 Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur
om. GOP
361a Cum quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est Deus, quia
quod GOP 78 361b Cum quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est Deus, quia
om. GOP
362a Quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo, quia est homo formaliter humanitate
quod GOP
362b Quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo, quia est homo formaliter humanitate
hoc est GP; om. per hom. O
388 Res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic “exinanita”
ut GOP
403 Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus, et cetera
om. GOP
404 Cum in prima sit aequivocatio et in secunda sit conceptio personarum
om. GOP
434 Tunc OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE.
om. GOP
458 Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologos ad metam aliquam
theologum GOP
511 Exponendo illud Apostoli (ad Philippenses 2), Habitu inventus est ut homo
om. GOP
531a Primus habitus mutat substantiam cui advenit et non mutatur
subiectum GOP
531b Primus habitus mutat substantiam cui advenit et non mutatur
om. GOP
536 Sumitur habitus apud philosophos formaliter ad duos sensus aequivocos
suos GOP
537 Primo pro qualitate praedicamentali de prima specie qualitatis
praeternaturali GOP
573a Non potest esse sine supposito Verbi Dei cui inseparabiliter sed contingenter adhaeret
om. GOP 79 573b Non potest esse sine supposito Verbi Dei cui inseparabiliter sed contingenter adhaeret
adhaereat GOP
577 Cum non potest abesse postquam infuit, tamen non inseparabiliter consequitur
cum GOP
585 Nam sicut relationes, habituationes, et respectus consimiles
habitiones GOP
591 Convenit autem cum ceteris formis substantialibus specialiter in hiis tribus
om. GOP
616 Humanitas Christi non solum sit ut vestimentum Verbo vel ignis ferro
vermis GOP
645 Igitur cum Isaac noster ex partibus nostris quantitativis componitur
om. GOP
651 Consequenter moveri ad motum progressivum partium
per totum GOP
674 Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi.
nostri GO; Christi nostri P
It should be noted that in fifteen of these cases ABCQ preserve a word that fell out of the English branch of the stemma.
Penultimately, sometimes the required meaning of the text provides insufficient grounds for judging between variants. In many of these instances, I have made my selection on the hypothesis that Wyclif wrote and spoke in Latin while at least some of the time thinking in his native Yorkshire dialect of Middle English. This hypothesis is generally taken for granted by
Wyclif scholars from the Anglosphere and was held by Leonard Boyle and Allen Breck.2 As
Anne Hudson has noted, “My own conviction is that, even though the probability that Wyclif
2 Allen D. Breck, “John Wyclyf on Time,” in Cosmology, History, and Theology, ed. Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck (New York: Plenum Press, 1977), 215. Heather Phillips, who worked on Wyclif personally with Boyle, assured me in a personal email of February 23, 2018 that Boyle also held this opinion. 80 himself at various points taught in English must be strong, that teaching is preserved only in
Latin.”3 Others, however, including Luigi Campi, are persuaded that Wyclif was so fluent in
Latin that Middle English syntax is never presupposed by any of his surviving texts. In any case, proper text editing requires that a selection be made between variants even in those cases when the text would have the same meaning regardless of which variants are chosen. The following is a list of such variants that bear witness to the primary split in the stemma:
17 Dividitur autem iste tractatus in tredecim capitula
inv. GOP
36 Septimum capitulum declarando mobilitatem Christi explanat sensum scripturae
inv. ABCQ
40 Capitulum octavum obicit tripliciter contra identitatem specificam Christi
inv. ABCQ
101 Si enim posset moveri, hoc foret potissime obiective
inv. GOP
112a Non est possibile aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata
inv. GOP
112b Non est possibile aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata
istud ABCQ
207 Auctor huius scripturae satis cognovit quomodo Christus maneat in aeternum
quoniam ABCQ
251 Inanis, inquiunt, est suggesta oratio, cum omnia praedicta nec sunt nec possunt esse
inv. ABCQ
253 Sed constat quod unumquodque illorum, cum sit nobis praeteritum
istorum GOP
3 Cf. Anne Hudson, “Introduction: Wyclif’s Works and their Dissemination,” Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), I, 14. 81 267 In quocumque tempore fuerunt, vere sciverunt Christum esse
inv. ABCQ
270 Quamvis non tunc fuisset ita quod Christus est incarnatus
inv. ABCQ
304 Unde ad istum sensum loquitur sapiens Ecclesiastici 47
illum GOP
311 Hii dicunt quod cum tot sunt genera motus quot et entis
inv. GOP
322 Auctor scripturae intenderit omnes istos sensus
illos ABCQ
365 Unam tamen habet absolute necessario et aliam accepit ex tempore
inv. ABCQ
415 Quod nullo modo poterit moveri, licet sit suppositum mobile
inv. GOP
416 Patet ista logica in exemplo
illa ABCQ
446 Omnis quaestio indubie attestatur super ignorantiam vel peccatum
inv. ABCQ
456 Et ista est sententia Augustini (2 De doctrina Christiana 31)
illa ABCQ
486 Si ista humanitas movebatur a non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum
illa GOP
496 Sed quia Verbum est ex integro illa humanitas
ex integro est ABCQ
530 Sumitur autem sufficientia istorum quattuor penes hoc
illorum ABCQ
538 Sive sit habitus corporis (ut sanitas)
inv. ABCQ 82 547 Et patet quod istae sex maneries habitus sunt satis aequivocae
illae ABCQ
558a Nec quod sit coaeva Verbo vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens ad subiectum
ut GOP
558b Nec quod sit coaeva Verbo vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens ad subiectum
consequitur GOP
624 Sed causatur ex istis, cum stat illa esse aeterna
illis ABCQ
630 Ad tertiam patet quod non oportet esse in toto correspondentiam figurati cuiuslibet
in toto esse ABCQ
In conclusion, the regional differences among the hands, the loss of fifteen words from the insular manuscripts and ninety words from the continental manuscripts, and numerous significant errors on both sides of the stemma establish that the primary split in the manuscript tradition is between GOP and ABCQ.
II. Manuscript G
Here it is argued that GOP are not codices descripti of each other, but OP do descend from a common exemplar. As was noted earlier, G contains words that are missing from the rest of the manuscript tradition, some of which shed important light on Wyclif’s intended meaning:
190 Ac demum motu locali multiplici, scilicet super terram
om. ABCOPQ
380 Exinanivit misercorditer semetipsum. Semetipsum dicit propter identitatem
om. ABCPQ; sed ipsum O
83 520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur.
om. ABCOPQ
523 Quartum genus habitus est quod habitum nec exinde mutat substantiam cui advenit, nec mutatur, ut anulus in digito.
om. ABCOPQ
Thus, my research has confirmed S. Harrison Thomson’s remark that “the number of…[G’s] unique readings is considerable, and in general…[G is] superior to any other single text [of DIV] that we have.”4 Because Edward Harris was not aware of G’s copy of De incarnatione Verbi when he published his own edition in 1886, these additional words help to justify the need for a new critical edition of the treatise, as shall be discussed in chapter 4. On the other hand, G commits at least twenty errors independently of all other witnesses:
8 Cum diligentia, quia nulla materia est intellectui difficilior
intellectu G
46 Suadet duodecim evidentiis quod humanitas assumpta sit Christus
quid G
102 Cum non capit suam speculationem aut praxim a rebus extra
vel G
162 Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia, quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt
om. G
204 Huic dicitur quod quidquid fuerit de conveniente, consequentia non valet
hic G
224 Sed ut cognosceret servus quod noverat Abraham
moverat G
4 S. Harrison Thomson, “A Gonville and Caius Wyclif Manuscript,” Speculum 8, no. 2 (April 1933), 200. 84 260 Iesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto salvans, secundo eos qui non crediderunt perdidit
sanans G
347a Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur
add. licet G mg.
347b Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur
om. G
357 Sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens
seipsum G
361 Quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est Deus
id G
362 Quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo
id G
387 Exinanitio potius possit intelligi quam quod res
proprius G
399 Non est repugnantia inter ista, Pater est maior Christo
illa G
411 Non enim habemus nomina quae sine figura Deum signent.
signarent G
520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis
humanitatis G
552 Humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem
tegens G
616 Cum humanitas Christi non solum sit ut vestimentum Verbo
om. G
636 Forma risus (
nostri figurans Dominum Iesum Christum G
666 Ipsum corpus vere, et per se, et essentialiter informantem
om. G 85 Thus, there can be no doubt that G is neither an exemplar nor a codex descriptus of any other surviving copy of DIV.
III. The Exemplar of OP
Unlike manuscript G, OP do descend from a common exemplar, which is no longer extant. This exemplar contained a single word that is missing from all manuscripts other than
OP:
471 Sed Augustinus et alii sancti doctores non curarunt de istis apparentiis sophistarum.
om. ABCGQ
At least seventeen significant errors found only in OP also bear witness to this lost exemplar:
71 Et per consequens omnis persona divina, est simpliciter immobilis
om. OP
72 Est simpliciter immobilis, et per consequens nulla est mobilis. Si ergo
immobilis OP
96 Cui innixae praedictae veritates immobilitatem suscipiunt.
add. et OP
102 Cum non capit suam speculationem aut praxim a rebus extra.
om. OP
150 Cum omnis servitus post et ante facta humano generi
omnia OP
270 Quamvis non tunc fuisset ita quod Christus est incarnatus
iterum OP
287 Cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt.
intuitum OP
86 302 Immensa Dei aeternitas coassistit omni tempori praeterito vel futuro
tempore OP
332 Sed forte non sine mysterio ibi dixit pluraliter
om. OP
387 Exinanitio potius possit intelligi quam
prius OP
411 Non enim habemus nomina quae sine figura Deum signent.
Dei OP
413 Redeundo ergo ad propositum conceditur
igitur OP
466 Apparentia sophistica sit minus evidens, Tantum res mobilis
inv. OP
526 Cum denominant substantiam habituari vel habere
subiecta OP
552 Quasi vestis detegens deitatem, et religiosi
divinitatem OP
627 Si Deus temporaliter generatur quod ante non fuit, cum satis est
autem OP
In one instance OP’s exemplar retained a single word that would otherwise appear only in G. In the quotation below, the italicized words are found only in G, whereas the single underlined word appears in G and was also found in OP’s exemplar:
520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur.
Below is P’s version of this text:
520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur.
Instead of proicitur, O has proficitur. Although O and P do not share the same reading, they do 87 share an error, for each has lost the text contained only in G except for a single word. This loss of text must have taken place in their exemplar. Whereas P has retained proicitur even though it makes no sense without the context of the lost text, O has misread proicitur for proficitur.
Although more data bearing witness to my proposed stemma are desirable, this evidence justifies the hypothesis that OP descend from a single exemplar independently of G.
Nevertheless, a few instances can be cited that may in time call for a more complex stemma. In four instances GO act in harmony against the rest of the tradition, including P:
26 Obicit multipliciter ac dissolvit
et ABCPQ
292 Nec adhuc ventura quasi quae non apparent desunt
om. ABCPQ
374 Quod commune esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit
om. ABCPQ
640 Et sic de aliis quae huic loco non pertinet applicare
pertinent ABCPQ
In five other instances GP act in harmony against O:
160 Ut dicit Apostolus (ad Hebraeos 1 capitulo [vs. 4]). Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli (ad Colossenses 1 capitulo), quando dicit quod Deus
om. per hom. ABCOQ
224 Sed ut hoc cognosceret servus quod noverat Abraham
om. GP
362 Quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo, quia est homo formaliter humanitate
hoc GP
526 Cum denominant substantiam habituari vel habere
habituri GP
88 611 Ideo respectu sententiae Apostoli, qui fuit prudentissimus praedicator
isti GP
As shall be made clear below, however, sloppy scribes produced both O and P. Nothing prevents at least some of these errors from being made independently by multiple scribes.
IV. Manuscript O
Abundant evidence indicates that O is not a codex descriptus of P or vice versa, for each commits errors independently of the other. O contains a single word that is not found in any of the other manuscripts. This word, because it clarifies Wyclif’s intended meaning, has been included in the critical edition:
117 Consequentia patet, quia ipsa est res mobilis, eo quod est persona Verbi quae moveri poterit et nedum hoc, sed habet naturam sibi unitam secundum quam moveri sufficit.
om. ABCGPQ
Unfortunately, O is a most sloppy scribe. In addition to the error of “proficitur” for “proicitur” mentioned above, O errs independently of all other witnesses more than one hundred times, as follows:
10 Cum reverentia, quia nulla materia theologica est affectui pretiosior
om. O
12 Sub uno comprehendit involucro totius creationis et recreationis venerabile sacramentum
om. O
17 Dividitur autem iste tractatus in tredecim capitula
om. O
25 Tertium capitulum ostendit quod Christus fuit homo in Triduo
Christo O
89 29 Quintum capitulum supponendo quod Verbum non dimisit
om. O
30 Humanitatem pro triduo probat quod nec potuit dimittere naturam
om. O
33 Et respondendo obiectibus declarat quod Christus est secundum multorum doctorum
obiectionibus O
44 Dissolvit tres obiectus eorum per ordinem
in O
57 Confirmat aliorum sententias quod tunc nec foret unus homo
quae O
67 Sed nullus deus est mobilis. Ergo nec Christus
om. O
69 Aliqua res est immobilis, sed nulla si non Deus. Ergo Deus est immobilis. Et cum unus Deus sit omnis deus
om. per hom. O
74 Sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile
eius O
91 Secundo patet idem ex hoc quod veritates multae aeternae
hos quia O
92 Tam affirmationes quam negationes, sunt omnino immobiles
sunt O
101 Si enim posset moveri, hoc foret potissime obiective
autem O
104 Et multo minus localiter, augmentative, vel alterative
locatur O
138 Sed quod verissime, de vi sermonis, secundum seriem verborum
om. O
90 141 Quamlibet creaturm aliam post vel ante. Nam quaelibet creatura citra hominem
om. O
143 a quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem
redundantia O
153 Dolus et peccatum demonum mitigatur, laetum angelorum consortium augmentatur
lectum O
167 Ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus, concedendum est
Iohannis O
170 Sed plus effectualiter movebatur quam alia creatura
effectum aliter O
171 Quoad velocitatem, quoad compendiositatem, et quoad generalitatem
quae ad O
177 Causa tardationis post discipulorum intuitum non est faciliter fingenda
om. O
187 Quarum utraque tam multipliciter movebatur
multiplicitatem O
190 Super terram, aquam, et aerem, pulsione, tractione,
om. O
242 Cum enim ipsi eadem fide salvati sunt nobiscum
om. O
245a Tempore incarnari. “Constat,” inquit Ieronimus
add. quod O
245b Tempus non praeiudicasse sacramento uniti hominis ac Dei.
praedicasse O
248 Quibus rogat Deum per incarnationem, nativitatem, circumcisionem, baptismum
Dominum pro O
257 Quod non audeamus disputationi cuiuscumque philosophantis ostendere
audiamus O 91 260 Ex illo dicto Iudae, Iesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto
Christus O
265a Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei consilio incarnata
om. O
265b Dei consilio incarnata — et materialis essentia semper praesto:
om. O 266 Praesto: sic ergo sancti patres in quocumque tempore fuerunt
sibi O
268 Fuisse, et fore, et propositiones formatae ab eis fuissent verae
add. per O
280 Fides credita a qua fide absit falsitas sive fictitia, et cetera
om. O
281 Unde Gregorius (23 Moralium capitulo 15) exponens illud Iob 33
idem O
282 Semel loquetur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetet
ad ipsum O
284 Proprie dici licet.” Unde notat causam eius
unum vocat O
286 Deus praeteritorum non reminiscitur, cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt
praeterito O
287 Ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt
om. O
292 Nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc ventura quasi quae non apparent desunt
ad hunc O
293 Quia is qui semper esse habet, cuncta sibi praesentia conspicit
quae O
298 Ut (psalmo 21) tempore David dicit dicta Sapientia
tempori O
92 305 Christus purgavit peccata ipsius
pugnavit O
308 Sunt autem multi alii sensus huic litterae adaptati: Ut hii dicunt
damnati O
311 Cum tot sunt genera motus quot et entis, et Deus ad omnem punctum mundi
entes O 313 Est in illa manerie motus relationis summe mobilis
metus O
315 Secundum successivam denominationem subiecti in materia motus
denotationem O
329 Non, inquit, miremur; non paveamus. Non est minor Patre
paciemus O
331 Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat
me non diligit O
339 Facta constructione recta, non sit antithesis
fit O
340 Non servat sermones suos, id est, sententias vel veritates
om. O
341 Sententias vel veritates quas praecipit observari
praecepit O
347 Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur, subiungit
Pater O
355 Sensus Apostoli (ad Philippenses 2) quod Christus, Cum in forma Dei esset
om. O
359 Notandum quod sicut forma Dei est deitas, sic forma hominis
divinitas O
362 Quia
divinitate O
93 363 Illud quo est homo, quia est homo formaliter humanitate
om. per hom. O
365 Unam tamen habet absolute necessario et aliam
necessitate O
366 Et aliam accepit ex tempore. Et istam altissimam metaphysicam
accipit O 367 Vellem nostros theologos, etsi non in Metaphysica Aristotelis
om. O
372 Honorem Patri debitum, ut fecit Satanas, cum naturaliter
facit O
374 Quod commune esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit
coinest O
380 Exinanivit misercorditer semetipsum. Semetipsum dicit propter identitatem
sed ipsum O
388a Res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic “exinanita”
essentialiter O
388b Res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic “exinanita”
fit O
400 Pater est maior Christo, et idem, Pater non est maior Christo. Nec debent tales
om. per hom. O
410 Quando scilicet humana passio Deo tribuitur (ab anthropos “homo,” et pathos “passio”)
attribuitur O
426 Et patet quod non sequitur Deus est mobilis
mobile O
434 Secundum essentiam non-formalem, tunc OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE. Quod si
om. O
438 Cum incidit in redargutionem quae est meta vilissima respondentis
om. O
94 443 Prima quaestio quam scriptura meminit est a Diabolo
invenit O
444 Est a Diabolo introducta. Cur, inquit serpens
introducatur O
458 frivolam puerilem. Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologos
nunc O 477 Movetur propter habitum vel accidens essentialiter separatum.) Sed humanitas Christi
om. O
479 Ergo propter eius lacerationem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei
est O
482 Etsi vestimenta eius taliter patiantur
totaliter O
497 Illa humanitas tam secundum corpus quam animam
add. secundum O
501 Firmiter itaque est tenendum quod Verbum Dei
inv. O
506 Non conservative sed essentialiter a deitate quae Christus est
divinitate O
518 Dicitur habitus huiusmodi; habitus quidem, quia denominat
om. per hom. O
525 Ut anulus in digito. Omnia autem haec
omnis O
527 Dicuntur in praedicatione secundum essentiam esse habitus
est O
531 Cui advenit et non mutatur. Secundus mutat et mutatur. Tertius mutatur et non mutat
om. per hom. O
533 Quartus vero nec mutat necessario nec mutatur
necessitato O
95 535 Substantiae sumitur habitus apud philosophos
sumuntur O
538a De prima specie qualitatis, sive sit habitus corporis
supersit O
538b Habitus corporis (ut sanitas), sive habitus animae
vel O 546 Divitiae enim denominant homines divites, possessionatos, vel habentes formaliter
possessionantes O
550 Cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans vel faciens ipsum
mutas O
555 Dicit Augustinus in dialogo Ad Felicianum quod humanitas est accidens Verbo
humanitatis O
560 Contingenter ex tempore, nobis ineffabiliter — inest Verbo
inefficabiliter (sic!) O
564 Quae Deum faceret hominem et hominem Deum
facere O
571 Non facit naturam cui advenit esse quid vel aliud quam absolute necessario semper erat
aliquid O
581 Convenit secundo cum accidentibus absolutis per se in genere
actibus O
588 Cum deitas solum denominatione respectiva denominatur
divinitas O
589 Ex eius adiacentia summe mirabili. Convenit autem cum ceteris
miraculi O
593 Quia priusquam Verbum fuit pure deitas, nunc est homo
divinitas O
602 Suscipit saltem in praedicatione secundum essentiam praedicta
add. et O
96 612 Et Augustini sui discipuli qui fuit scripturae sacrae subtilissimus explanator
fuerit O
628 Cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generationis quod non effectualiter fuit ante
add. est O
645 Igitur cum Isaac noster ex partibus nostris quantitativis componitur
om. O 660 Ipse verus Deus in se existens fieret verus homo
foret O
667 Assumpsisse, ex tempore in virginali thalamo
add. et
669 Assumpta natura ipsum Dei Verbum pro omnium operanda salute
omni O
674 Propter veram convenientiam in natura specifica
propriam O
Given O’s proclivity to error, it is a pity that it was Edward Harris’s favorite manuscript. As shall be made clear in chapter 4, Harris’s undue reliance upon O contributes to the need for a new edition of De incarnatione Verbi. It should be noted that in 69, 400, 518, and 531 O errs due to homoeoteleuton. In 380 his error is also understandable, as scribes tend to delete what they take to be dittography. The preponderance of the evidence, however, indicates that O must have been particularly sloppy, even by the standards of his own day. The loss of 434 is especially lamentable, as that sentence is arguably the most important in all of DIV 7.
V. Manuscript P
As in O, a single word is found in P that is lacking in all the other manuscripts that contain De incarnatione Verbi. Because it adds clarity to the text, it has been retained in the 97 critical edition:
311 Hii dicunt quod cum tot sunt genera motus quot et entis, et Deus ad omnem punctum mundi continue acquirit dominia, est in illa manerie motus relationis summe mobilis.
om. ABCGOP
Like O, P commits more than one hundred errors independently of all other witnesses:
5 Praelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est propter incarnationis mysterium
om. P
14 Sicut in nulla materia quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius aut periculosius
et P
48 Testimoniis et exemplis. Capitulum undecimum solvit instantias
om. P
49 Capitulum undecimum solvit instantias quibus moderniores doctores videntur fulcire
om. P
54 Declarat quod si assumeret multas humanitates, foret multi homines
assumens P
55 Foret multi homines, sicut dictat sententia sancti Thomae
dicta P
71 Sequitur quod omnis deus, et per consequens omnis persona divina
om. P
74a Sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile
om. P
74b Sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile
sit P
85 Sic omne motum, cum sit ordinatum sic moveri ab alio, oportet stare in suis limitibus
motu P
86 Secundum ordinationem principaliter ordinantis. Quia cum moveri
ordinatam P
98 92 Tam affirmationes quam negationes, sunt omnino immobiles
omne P
98 Illa prima pura natura est in fine perfectionis possibilis, quia aliter non esset
possibiliter P
100 Sed si moveri posset, posset perfici. Ergo moveri non poterit
om. P
102 Sed aeternaliter ordinat omnia, cum non capit suam speculationem
inv. P
108 Posset perfici et imperfici, quod non competit summe bono
summo P
114 Omnis essentia increata est mobile. Ergo conclusio
immobilis P
116 Est suppositum mobile. Ergo illa est mobile
ista P
118 Eo quod est persona Verbi quae moveri poterit, et nedum hoc
potest P
121 Quod dictum (ut mihi videtur) potest catholice intelligi et vere
om. P
124 Cum attrita sit secundum humanitatem assumptam propter scelera nostra
assumpta P
135 Cum quaelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad perfectionem primariam
quilibet P
141 Quamlibet creaturam aliam post vel ante. Nam quaelibet creatura citra hominem
et P
143a A quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia
redimantur P
143b A quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia
hinc P 99 145 Per passionem et per consequens per motionem huius Sapientiae, facta plena
humanae P
161 Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli (ad Colossenses 1 capitulo)
istum P 167a Ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus, concedendum est
Solnus P
167b Ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus, concedendum est quod ipsa sit summe mobilis
om. P
172 Quoad velocitatem, quia pro instanti suae generationis plena carismatum
om. P
182 Ad maius temperamentum quam motus perpetuus primi mobilis suffecisset
quod P
198 Multum cognatum motui. Sic ergo verissime
igitur P
199 De virtute sermonis dicitur Sapientia Dei Patris omnibus aliis creaturis mobilior
de P
220 Peteret uxorem filio suo Isaac, hoc eum iuramento obstrinxit ut fideliter
enim P
238 Declarat Ieronimus de prophetia patriarchae Isaac sentientis Christum odore prophetico
sentientes P
245 Tempus non praeiudicasse sacramento uniti hominis ac Dei
unici P
251 A periculis liberari. Inanis, inquiunt, est suggesta oratio
inquit P
251 Est suggesta oratio, cum omnia praedicta nec sunt
inv. P
253a Sed constat quod unumquodque illorum, cum sit nobis praeteritum
om. P
100 253b Sit nobis praeteritum et futurum suo tempore patribus veteris testamenti
sui P
257 Quod non audeamus disputationi cuiuscumque philosophantis ostendere
disputationem P 264 Natus ex Maria virgine, sed quia illa persona quae tempore suo est Christus
quod P
268 Et propositiones formatae ab eis fuissent verae (Christus est
fuisset P
274 Correspondenter propositio potest esse nunc vera cum hoc quod
om. P
282 Semel loquetur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetet
tertio P
287 Cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia
semetipso P
294 Et idem dicit Anselmus (Monologion 19)
om. P
300 Quae pueriliter essent sine ratione posita sub ita disparatis temporibus
ista P
305 Christus purgavit peccata ipsius. Et patet quod facta
eius P
308 Sunt autem multi alii sensus huic litterae adaptati
om. P
311a Hii dicunt quod cum tot sunt genera motus
om. P
311b Cum tot sunt genera motus quot et entis, et Deus ad omnem
quod P
330a Vel impar sibi. Non enim mentitus est
om. P
101 330b Non enim mentitus est. Qui non diligit me
om. P
332 Non est hic sibi contrarius, sed forte
om. P 340 Nam qui non diligit Christum, non servat sermones suos, id est, sententias
sermones suos non servat P
346a Et tertio ut doceat quod ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri
secundo P
346b Et tertio ut doceat quod ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri
iste P
350 Sermo vocalis non sit Verbi ex se modo quo
add. et P
360 Utraque enim est forma substantialis, cum quaelibet
om. P
361 Cum quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est Deus
idem P
362a Sicut quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo
om. P
362b Sicut quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo
idem P
383 Quae in mundi principio, prius origine quam formam habeat
formaret P
393 Secundum rationem divinitatis vel secundum rationem humanitatis, sicut exigit praedicatum
om. per hom. P
396 Non est repugnantia, Pater est maior Christo, et idem, Pater est
om. P
404 Et cetera, cum in prima sit aequivocatio et in secunda
persona P 102 407 Deus est mobilis, natus, passus, et cetera, est constructio non synecdochica
cum P
409 Figura quae anthropospathos dicitur, quando scilicet humana passio Deo tribuitur
om. P
410 Ab anthropos “homo,” et pathos “passio”
peratos P
411 Non enim habemus nomina quae sine figura Deum signent. Redeundo
signant P
413 Propositum conceditur quod aliqua res
quia P
415 Licet sit suppositum mobile (ut puta, Christus passus
immobile P
419
cum P
432 Potest dici aequivocando quod nihil non est mobile, quia natura divina est mobile
mobile P
436 Cum sapiat contradictionem, interimere disputationes theologicas
interime P
437 Interimere disputationes theologicas, cum incidit in redargutionem
vel P
474 “Genuit,” inquit, “et non genuit Maria Filium Dei”
om. P
486 A non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum, tunc et Verbum
add. est P
489 Non hunc occidit sed arietem quem vidit post tergum haerentem
videt P
498 Animam, et actiones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum
et P 103 501 Vel patitur. Firmiter itaque est tenendum quod Verbum Dei
om. P
512 Primo pro sapientia quae est veritas quam addiscimus, quae manens non-mota
veritatis P
515 Secundo pro alimentis habitis mutantibus corpus quod nutriunt
in mutantibus P
518 Huiusmodi; habitus quidem, quia denominat subiectum habere
qui P
528 Quae est motu dicto formaliter acquisita, ut patet
ducto P
531 Cui advenit et non mutatur. Secundus mutat et mutatur. Tertius mutatur et non mutat
om. per hom. P
540 Habitus autem spiritualis ex habitu primo modo dicto materialiter generatur
aut P
550 Cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans vel faciens ipsum aliam personam
om. P
555 Dicit Augustinus in dialogo Ad Felicianum quod humanitas est accidens Verbo
consequenter P
558 Nec quod sit coaeva Verbo, vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens ad subiectum
om. P
560 Contingenter ex tempore, nobis ineffabiliter — inest Verbo non mutando
minime P
562 Identificata vel hypostatice copulata, cum secundum Augustinum
copulatam P
567 Cum formis per se in genere accidentis, primo in hoc quod
om. P
578 Inseparabiliter consequitur ad Verbum, sicut passio ad subiectum
om. P 104 580 Poterit a subiecto. Convenit secundo cum accidentibus absolutis
add. sibi P
581 Convenit secundo cum accidentibus absolutis per se in genere
absoluta P
593 Advenit esse aliud quam praefuit, quia priusquam Verbum
praevenit P
600 Licet Verbum commune sit natura divina quae non potest esse
Dei P
602 Homo Iesus suscipit saltem in predicatione secundum essentiam
suscepit P
619 Ad secundam negatur consequentia, quia motio, passio
negetur P
624a Sed causatur ex istis, cum stat illa esse aeterna
hiis P
624b Sed causatur ex istis, cum stat illa esse aeterna
ista P
632 Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem qui de facto
significationem P
636 Fuit forma risus (
Dominum Iesum Christum P
649 Nec credo philosophum dicere Deum esse hominem, nisi consequenter
om. P
655 Et idem docet Augustinus in Enchiridion 40 et decretalis In Clementis
decretalia P
656 De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica: Confitemur, inquit, Filium Dei
confitetur P
661 Humanum videlicet corpus passibile, et animam intellectivam seu rationalem
intellectivas P 105 665 Ad unitatem suae hypostasis seu personae; et quod
om. P
667 Non solum affigi cruci et in ea mori voluit, sed etiam emisso iam spiritu, perforari lancea sustinuit latus suum. Ecce primo univocatio
om. P
674 In natura specifica. Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi
et P
676 Sequitur quod fuit homo pro sancto triduo
secundo P
Doubtless, P is as sloppy as O. One should note, however, that in 108 P may have intended to correct the rest of the tradition in a perfectly understandable way, in 114 P’s reading seems reasonable when read out of context, and in 245 and 432 P’s errors make for interesting and completely coherent alternative readings. In 393 and 531 the scribe erred due to homoeoteleuton and in 100 he mistook a repeated word for dittography.
Although more evidence may be discovered in time, the errors referred to here suffice to show that GOP descend from a hyparchetype independently of ABCQ, that OP probably descend from a common exemplar independently of G, and that none of the English manuscripts is a codex descriptus of another. It should be noted that the worst scribes to copy De incarnatione
Verbi were English. We now turn to their Bohemian counterparts, who were on average more careful.
VI. The Bohemian Branch of the Stemma (ABCQ)
It has already been established that manuscripts ABCQ descend from a different hyparchetype than do manuscripts GOP. Constructing the continental branch of the stemma is 106 more difficult than constructing the English branch, because the Bohemian manuscripts all suffer from contamination. There can be no doubt that the Bohemain scribes went to great lengths to improve the texts they had received in light of English copies. Anne Hudson, for her part, has called on text editors to carefully record all the known variants that survive in the continental tradition in order to shed light on the differences between the various English copies used by the continental scribes.5 The evidence presented in this section strives to do precisely that. Minor but important textual variants suggest that if the readings indicative of contamination are ignored, AB descend from one archetype and CQ from another. In two instances, only AB preserve the correct reading:
13 Et cum timore quia sicut in nulla materia quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius aut periculosius oberratur
aberratur CGOPQ
300 Et sic de multis dictis
scripturae CGOPQ
13 is important for text editing, as it is a classic case of a lectio difficilior. In other instances AB preserve a word that would otherwise have fallen out of the tradition altogether:
69 Minor sic arguitur: Aliqua res est immobilis
om. CGOPQ
373 Cum naturaliter et communiter inest sibi cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto esse Deum
om. CGOPQ
554 Hoc notantes quod accidit Deo humanitas sed inseparabiliter
om. CGOP; om. Q et spat. vac. undecim litteras comprehendens
Despite such positive contributions to the text, in a number of instances AB agree in error:
5 Anne Hudson, “From Oxford to Prague: The Writings of John Wyclif and his English Followers in Bohemia,” Slavonic and East European Review 75 (1997), 651–656. 107 73 Si ergo Deus sit mobilis et omne aliud a Deo sit mobile
inv. AB
104 Ergo non movetur a suis effectibus obiective
moveri AB
108 Et sic varie posset perfici et imperfici, quod non competit summe bono
potest AB
112 Non est possible aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata
om. AB
125 Omnia ultra hoc quod sufficeret vel poterit alia creatura
om. AB
184 Principia enim secundum Aristotelem sunt minima quantitate
prima AB; primi Q
189 Movebatur quidem generatione et morte, augmentatione et alteratione
quadem AB
270 Quamvis non tunc fuisset ita quod Christus est incarnatus
om. AB
282 Semel loquetur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetet
ipsum AB
301 Pueriliter essent sine ratione posita sub ita disparatis temporibus
positae AB
302 Nisi ad imprimendum in nobis quod immensa Dei aeternitas
om. AB
303 Coassistit omni tempori praeterito vel futuro. Unde ad
et AB
331 Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat.
sermonem meum AB
383 Quae in mundi principio, prius origine quam formam habeat
originem AB 108 418 Et tamen ipsa
talis AB
541 Primo modo dicto materialiter generatur, sicut habitus corporalis
sive AB
636 Ipse quidem fuit forma risus (
Domini nostri AB
666 Ipsum corpus vere, et per se, et essentialiter informantem
om. AB
CQ for their part also agree in error in a number of instances:
12 Sub uno comprehendit involucro totius creationis et recreationis
involuto CPQ
21 Dat sensum doctorum in scripturis et in symbolo
om. CQ
112 Non est possible aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata
sicut CQ
113 Essentia creata vel essentia increata. Omnis essentia creata
inv. CQ
230 Et respondet, cum per femur genus notatur
vocatur CQ
275 Quod nunc non sit suum primarie signatum
primarium CQ
291 “Deo,” inquit, “nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc ventura quasi
transfacta CQ
305 Et patet quod facta instantia non impugnat sensum datum ad istam scripturam
potest CQ
308 Sunt autem multi alii sensus huic litterae adaptati
hoc CQ
109 457 Ubi docet in disputationibus cavere rixandi libidinem
rep. CQ
505 Essentia, substantia, vel natura separata non conservative sed essentialiter a deitate
conservantem CQ
615 Quantum ad primam trium confirmationum patet quod similitudo non est sufficiens
om. C et spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens; con Q et spat. vac. quattuor litteras comprehendens
632 Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem
dicens C; om. Q et spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens
Thus, AB probably descend from one exemplar; CQ, from another.
As regards contamination, a passage in DIV 7 proves beyond doubt that the Bohemian manuscripts suffer from contamination:
561 Non mutando naturam cui advenit, sed formata mirabiliter, quia Verbo Dei identificata vel hypostatice copulata
add. unita A mg; unita C; add. unita Q lin.
Here, A has the alternative reading of unita in the margin to the left of the text. Likewise, Q has unita immediately above formata interlinearly. B agrees with the English manuscripts and has only formata. C alone of the tradition has only unita. Other instances point to contamination in the Bohemian manuscripts:
14 Quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius
promeret BGQ
In 14, it is to be lamented that G originally wrote promeretur but then blotched out the -ur suffix.
In the following, of the Bohemian manuscripts only C has the proper reading without correction:
221 Hoc eum iuramento obstrinxit ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret
videbatur ABQ, sed corr. A
Here, A has rightly corrected videbatur to iubebatur, while BQ remain in error. Similarly, in the 110 following case, of the Bohemian manuscripts only B has the proper reading without correction:
370 Non ex propria reputatione vel arbitrio proprio sine veritate substrata vendicavit se esse aequalem Patri
subtracta ACP, sed corr. C; abstracta Q
In this instance, ACP orignally had one error and Q another. C, however, corrected his version so that it now agrees with GO in England and B on the continent.
As will be discussed below, none of the Bohemian manuscripts are codices descripti of each other, and each evinces some independent evidence of contamination.
VII. Manuscript A
Scribe A is by far the most fastidious of all those studied here, for his zeal has not only resulted in the most accurate text of all the continental manuscripts, but has also resulted in some alterations to the text that are as thoughtful as they are erroneous. Some of the evidence of contamination in A has already been given. The evidence unique to A is as follows. In these instances, A alone of the Bohemian manuscripts agrees with the correct reading of the English manuscripts:
96 Naturam immobilem cui innixae praedictae veritates
cum BCQ
257 In nostra lege celamus quod non audeamus disputationi
colamus ABCQ, sed A corr.
343 Subiungit, Et sermonem quem audistis (supple non seruat) per quam copulationem docemur methaphysicam
supplendum BCQ
355 Et sic intelligendus est sensus Apostoli (ad Philippenses 2)
om. BCQ 111 441 Ex peccato Luciferi introductum,
praetermissis BCQ
463 Ad sensum aequivocum satis catholice concedi poterunt
potuerunt BCQ
In 343, it should be noted that A has written non over an erasure.
Without doubt, A was a most careful scribe. In the following instances he corrected some of his notable mistakes:
114 Omnis essentia increata est mobile
creata A, sed corr. lin.
125 Ultra hoc quod sufficeret vel poterit alia creatura
hoc A, sed exp.
130 cum mediante illo influitur perfectio mundo supposito
add. Domini A, sed cancel.
290 Exponens illud Iob 10, Numquid
Iohannis A, sed corr. mg.
596 Idem essentialiter vel personaliter cum subiecto formae
personali A, sed corr.
Despite such precision, however, A commits a number of errors unique in the tradition:
84 Secundum centrum fluctuans huc aut illuc, sic omne motum, cum sit ordinatum
sicut A
135 Per Christi passionem ad perfectionem primariam, qua Deo serviret
pristinam A
138 Verissime, de vi sermonis, secundum seriem verborum
add. aut A
139 Primum mobile sit Sapientia increata
sicut A
112 156 Nec mirum quia motor intrinsecus huius motus fuit non intelligentia
cuius A
188 Multipliciter movebatur, quod sit ceteris plus mobilis
sic A
256 Non quod quidquam scrupulosum in nostra lege celamus
scrupulosis A
261 Et Apostolus (1 ad Corinthios 10), Neque tentemus Christum
om. A
267 Vere sciverunt Christum esse, fuisse, et fore
inv. A
288 Et exemplificat satis notabiliter (34 Moralium capitulo 5)
24 A
289 Capitulo 5 tripliciter). Unde (9 Moralium 25)
om. A
353 Tamen prior sensus est subtilior et mihi carior
inde A
375 Esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit, Ego et Pater
om. A
522 Prohicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur
membrorum A
572 Quid vel aliud quam absolute necessario semper erat
erit A
621 Sunt personae Verbi ratione formae assumptae principaliter tribuenda
assumptae ratione formae A
628 Cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generationis quod non effectualiter fuit ante.
add. quando A
Doubtless, in 267 the scribe thought he was improving the text. Not only was this scribe the best 113 of them all, one of his readers tried to improve upon his work. In the following cases this diligent scholar, whose marginalia often amount to glosses on De incarnatione Verbi, added the following to A’s version of the text:
104 Ergo non movetur a suis effectibus obiective, et multo minus
add. potest A mg. alt. man.
139 Secundum seriem verborum primum mobile sit Sapientia
add. debetur A mg. alt. man.
432 Aequivocando quod nihil non est mobile, quia natura
om. A, sed add. mg. alt. man.
In 104, it should be noted that AB preserve the error of moveri instead of movetur. Thus, this glossator has made a perfectly reasonable addition to the text as he had it.
In sum, although A’s commitment to precision sometimes predisposed him to err through excessive caution, A is still the most accurate scribe of all those studied here. Admittedly, a transcription of A corrected in light of G would suffice for a reliable text of DIV.
VIII. Manuscript B
Some of B’s errors have already been mentioned. These ground B in the continental tradition or shed light on B’s reliance upon English manuscripts. Sometimes such reliance does correct the errors of the Bohemian tradition. B alone among the continental manuscripts has both formata and substrata without any correction or erroneous alternative. In one case, a single word found only in B has been retained in the edition, because it is useful for clarifying Wyclif’s intended sense:
114 403 Ego et Pater unum sumus; et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus
om. ACGOPQ
In two cases, B is preserved from continental error by relying upon the English tradition:
34 Christus est secundum multorum doctorum testimonia creatura
testimonium ACQ
158 Filii Hominis et Dei Filii naturalis qui est tanto melior angelis effectus
tantae ACQ
In other instances, B’s reliance upon the English branch of the stemma has resulted in error:
47 Et hoc roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis
om. BGOP
290 Expresserat istud diffusius exponens illud Iob
illud BGOP
361 Quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est Deus
quod BGOP
362 Quaelibet persona hominis est illud quo est homo
quod BGOP
591 Convenit autem cum ceteris formis substantialibus specialiter in his tribus
om. BGOP
B has also committed a number of unique errors that prove it is not a codex descriptus of any other surviving manuscript. These often indicate a particularly sloppy scribe. The following phrase is missing in its entirety in B’s copy of De incarnatione Verbi:
653 Consequenter moveri ad motum progressivum partium, cum impossibile sit aliquid non moveri quod tamen subiective habeat in se motum. Unde Ieronimus
om. B
In other instances B preserves the text but does not preserve the word order found in all other witnesses to the text:
115 19 Primum declarando ex testimoniis sanctorum quod humanitas sit Christus et per consequens creatura.
quod humanitas sit Christus ex testimoniis sanctorum B
102 Cum non capit suam speculationem aut praxim a rebus extra
inv. B
205 Fuerit de conveniente, consequentia non valet, quia cum apud Deum
non valet consequentia B
272 Cum hoc quod hic non sit suum primarie signatum
non sit hic B
275 Quod nunc non sit suum primarie signatum
inv. B
357 Non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo
inv. B
390 Et hinc vere dicit Veritas (Iohannis 14)
inv. B
457 In disputationibus cavere rixandi libidinem et ostentationem frivolam
inv. B
458 Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologs ad metam aliquam
inv. B
516 Omne quidem substantiale nobis adiacens
inv. B
519 Quod sibi accidentaliter adiacet. Tertium genus
inv. B
528 Dicitur materialiter esse res quae est motu
inv. B
591 Convenit autem cum ceteris formis substantialibus specialiter in hiis tribus
inv. B
116 595 Est idem hypostatice cum supposito cui advenit
inv. B
The following are less noteworthy errors unique to B:
12 Cum sub uno comprehendit involucro totius
add. et B
21 Dat sensum doctorum in scripturis et in symbolo quae videntur huic opposita
om. B
66 Secundo principaliter arguitur non esse concedendum quod Christus
om. B
67 Nam si Christus sit mobilis, tunc Deus est mobilis
est B
73 Si ergo Deus sit mobilis et omne aliud a Deo sit mobile
om. B
74 Sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile
om. B
79 Necesse est aliquam rem esse omnino immobilem
om. B
85a Cum sit ordinatum sic moveri ab alio, oportet
om. B
85b Cum sit ordinatum sic moveri ab alio, oportet
illo B
104 Et multo minus localiter, augmentative, vel alterative
augmentatem B
105 Localiter, augmentative, vel alterative. Aliter enim
alteritatem B
106 Esset in eo passiva potentia ante actum mixta cum potentia
ea B
117 107 Cum aliud sit posse movere et aliud posse moveri. Et sic
om. per hom. B
108 Et sic varie posset perfici et imperfici
om. B
110 Supposito ergo quod sit aliqua res et aliquid omnino immobile
aliud B
111 Dicendum est quod necesse est quidquid quod poterit esse, esse mobile
om. B
117a Consequentia patet, quia ipsa est res mobilis
illa B
117b Ipsa est res mobilis, eo quod est persona Verbi quae moveri poterit
ea B
125 Bonificans et vivificans omnia ultra hoc quod sufficeret
om. B
133 Cuius motu primo omnium totus mundus ante et post perficitur
omnis motus totius B
138 Verissime, de vi sermonis, secundum seriem verborum primum mobile
significationem B
171 Quoad velocitatem, quoad compendiositatem, et quoad generalitatem
add. et B
172 Quoad velocitatem, quia pro instanti suae generationis plena carismatum
incarnationis B
174 Post verisimiliter in sua ascensione movebatur
visibiliter B, sed corr. lin.
182 Totum mundum post et ante ad maius temperamentum quam motus perpetuus
magis B
190 Ac demum motu locali multiplici, scilicet super terram
om. B 118 197 Et constat ex 3 Physicorum quod passio vel est motus vel accidens
patet B
227 Pone manum sub femore meo et iura per Deum caeli
iuras B
243 Ipsi crediderunt incarnationem Domini sicut et nos
om. B
245 “Constat,” inquit Ieronimus, “tempus non praeiudicasse sacramento
om. B
249 Baptismum, ieiunium, passionem, mortem, resurrectionem, et ascensionem
add. et B
256 Non quod quidquam scrupulosum in nostra lege celamus
scrupulos B
259 Et illum modum loquendi docet Ieronimus ex illo dicto Iudae
dicit B
271 Nam ut saepe dixi, sicut propositio potest esse hic vera
add. quod B
296 Nisi omne tempus praeteritum vel futurum fuerit Deo praesens
futurorum B
300 Quae pueriliter essent sine ratione posita sub ita disparatis temporibus
simpliciter B
304 Ecclesiastici 47, Christus purgavit peccata ipsius. Et patet quod
illius B
359 Sicut forma Dei est deitas, sic forma hominis est humanitas
sicut B
382 Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se ad extra esse naturam corpoream
om. B
391 Pater maior me est, quia cum Christus sit tam aequivoce divinitas et humanitas
om. B 119 396 Non est repugnantia, Pater est maior Christo, et idem
me B
440 Principaliter propter apparentiam arguentis et redargutionem patulam respondentis
responsionem B
441 Ex peccato Luciferi introductum,
om. B
452 Veritas degenda. Omne autem quod amplius est
omnis B
454 Poena peccati introducta est. Et ista est sententia
om. B
459 Argutiae sophistarum theologos ad metam aliquam, sed
aliam B
475 Sed ulterius arguitur quod Verbum Dei non sit simpliciter mobile
Verbi B
489 Non hunc occidit sed arietem quem vidit post tergum haerentem cornibus
tergentem B, sed corr. tergem ln.
515 Secundo pro alimentis habitis mutantibus corpus quod nutriunt
nutrientibus B
516 Omne quidem substantiale nobis adiacens
add. vel B
522a Prohicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur
om. B
522b Prohicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur
adaptata B
525 Haec quattuor, cum denominant substantiam
om. B
529 Acquisita, ut patet 3 Physicorum
et B 120 530 Sumitur autem sufficientia istorum quattuor
sufficientiam B
533 Quartus vero nec mutat necessario nec mutatur.
om. B
539 Ut virtus intellectualis aut moralis
vel B
544 Et talis habitus causatur ab habitu tertio et quarto modis
pro B
550 Non mutans vel faciens ipsum aliam personam
ipsam B
553 Religiosi qui Christum induunt, habent habitus corporis
habitum B
564 Talis fuit unio incarnationis quae Deum faceret hominem
unionis B
566 Et patet quod dicta humanitas est forma
et B
584 Tertio convenit cum accidentibus respectivis
conveniunt B
597 Essentialiter vel personaliter cum subiecto formae et composito ex eisdem
vel B
627 Si Deus temporaliter generatur quod ante non fuit
aliquando B
646 Componitur quae tam varie movebantur
tamen B
649 Nec credo philosophum dicere Deum esse hominem
om. B
663 Fieret verus homo, (humanum videlicet corpus passibile
scilicet B 121 676 Sequitur quod fuit homo pro sancto triduo
om. B
This evidence should suffice to substantiate the hypothesis that manuscript B suffers from some contamination, is not a codex descriptus of any other surviving witness, and is very prone to error.
IX. Manuscript C
Manuscript C sometimes also proves the wild card. C’s readings of unita, promeretur, iubebatur, and substrata have already been discussed. In the following instances, C alone of the continental manuscripts agrees with the English tradition and has the correct reading:
126 Habuit nimirum motionem fontalem quae principiat quasi vita omnem motionem mundi
qua ABQ
158 Filii Hominis et Dei Filii naturalis qui est tanto melior angelis effectus
quae ABQ
184 Principia enim secundum Aristotelem sunt minima quantitate
prima AB; primi Q
513 Quae manens non-mota movet animam quam informat
movens ABQ
597 Personaliter cum subiecto formae et composito ex eisdem
vel B; vel C, sed corr. ln.
In certain cases, it looks as though C could not determine which variants in the manuscript tradition he wished to perpetuate:
265 Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei consilio incarnata
semper C, et spat. vac.; semper in Dei GOP
122 397 Pater est simpliciter aequalis Christo.
simpliciter est AB; est simpliciter est C
As regards 397, however, perhaps C is merely prone to adding est to the text, as he did in at least one other instance:
432 Potest dici aequivocando quod nihil non est mobile
add. est C
In other cases, C makes notable errors distinct from the errors of the other Bohemian manuscripts:
143 A quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia
om. CGOP
145 Cum ergo per passionem et per consequens per motionem huius Sapientiae, facta plena satisfactione sit natura humana gloriosius restituta
satisfactio ABQ; satisfactionem C
156 Nec mirum quia motor intrinsecus huius motus fuit non intelligentia
species pretiosissima ABQ; species pretiosissimae C
486 Ista humanitas movebatur a non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum
post non ABQ; per consequens C
540 Aut moralis). (Habitus autem spiritualis ex habitu primo modo dicto materialiter
aut habitus spiritualis et ille ABQ; aut habitus specialis et ille C
632 Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem
dicens C; om. Q et spat. vac.
Other errors unique to C also help to prove that C is not a codex descriptus of any other manuscript studied here:
7 De benedicta incarnatione operosius aggredi cum diligentia, reverentia, et timore
inv. C
123 17 Dividitur autem iste tractatus in tredecim capitula
ille C
34 Christus est secundum multorum doctorum testimonia creatura
om. C
38 Quomodo Sapientia summe mobilis sit habitu inventa ut homo
om. C
42 Positionem de humanitate, et narrando tres radices causantes
ut C
58 Quod tunc nec foret unus homo nec multi homines
unus nec foret C
64 Capitulum septimum
om. C
68 Sed nullus deus est mobilis. Ergo nec Christus.
om. C
80 Quod patet tripliciter, primo ex hoc quod omne motum oportet
immo C
83 Fixo immoto. Sicut ergo mixta terrestria innituntur
sic C
84 Qui non commovebitur secundum centrum fluctuans huc aut illuc
om. C
94 Multa entia possunt esse
essentia C
100 Sed si moveri posset, posset perfici
inv. CO
110a Supposito ergo quod sit aliqua res et aliquid omnino immobile
quot C
110b Supposito ergo quod sit aliqua res et aliquid omnino immobile
om. C 124 111 Necesse est quidquid quod poterit esse, esse mobile
om. C
117 Consequentia patet, quia ipsa est res mobilis
quod C
119 Habet naturam sibi unitam secundum quam moveri sufficit
unicam C
129 Aristoteles (8 Physicorum) imaginatur motum primi mobilis esse quasi vitam viventibus
vita C
148 Patet quod ista passio rectificat omnem operationem naturae
om. C
155 Patet quod ultra possibilitatem motus caeli spiritualem bonificat creaturam
vivificat C
187 Utraque tam multipliciter movebatur, quod sit ceteris plus mobilis
om. C
191a Terram, aquam, et aerem, pulsione, tractione
pulsionem C
191b Pulsione, tractione, vectione, et vertigine ut actu illo imperfecto
om. C
199 Dicitur Sapientia Dei Patris omnibus aliis creaturis mobilior
om. C
201 Quod Christus non est ante incarnationem, et per consequens
add. a C
339 Potest dici quod facta constructione recta
om. C
374 Quod commune esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit
Patre C
377 Nihil quod est naturale et essentiale supposito est rapina
essentiale C 125 382 Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se ad extra esse naturam corpoream
rep. C
400 Pater non est maior Christo.
auctor C
413 Conceditur quod aliqua res
quae C
416 Patet ista logica in exemplo: Nam natura divina est
add. illo C
419 Et cetera. Essentia materiae primae est suppositum ignis
essentiae C
479 Ergo propter eius lacerationem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei.
om. C
517 Quod mutat et mutatur adiacendo subiecto
vel C
601 Cum sit individuum humanae naturae, homo Iesus suscipit
modum C
612 Et Augustini sui discipuli qui fuit scripturae sacrae subtilissimus explanator
om. C
620 Et similia positiva, cum sint praedicta personalia
sunt C
645 Igitur cum Isaac noster ex partibus nostris quantitativis componitur
quam C
663 Fieret verus homo, (humanum videlicet corpus passibile
humani C
This evidence should suffice to show that C, like all the Bohemian manuscripts, suffers from contamination and is not a codex descriptus of any other manuscript. C, despite the apparent sloppiness of his hand, is less prone to error than B. 126 X. Manuscript Q
After A, Q is the most accurate continental manuscript. The most important evidence indicating contamination has already been noted. Other readings, however, also reveal Q’s affinity with GOP:
121 Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia
motibus Q, sed corr. mg. alt. man.
135 Cum quaelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad perfectionem primariam
om. Q, sed add. mg. alt. man.
144 A quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia
om. Q, sed add. ln. alt. man.
293 Quia is qui semper esse habet, cuncta sibi
hiis OQ
366 Absolute necessario et aliam accepit ex tempore. Et istam
excepit Q, sed corr. mg. alt. man.
397 Pater est simpliciter aequalis Christo
inv. ABC
415 Quod nullo modo poterit moveri, licet sit suppositum
inv. GOPQ
554 Hoc notantes quod accidit Deo humanitas sed inseparabiliter
om. CGOP; om. Q et spat. vac. undecim litteras comprehendens
575 Analogice conveniunt generi accidentis. Assimilatur autem passionibus
assimilantur BOQ
645 Ex partibus nostris quantitativis componitur quae tam varie movebantur
qui Q, sed corr. mg. alt. man.
674 Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi nostri
om. ABC 127 Certain errors nonetheless indicate that Q is not a codex descriptus of any other manuscript:
70 Ergo Deus est immobilis. Et cum unus Deus sit omnis deus
om. Q
73 Si ergo Deus sit mobilis et omne aliud a Deo sit mobile, sequitur quod
esse Q
80 Primo ex hoc quod omne motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto. Universitas
in motu Q
104 Ergo non movetur a suis effectibus obiective, et multo
affectibus Q
146 Per motionem huius Sapientiae, facta plena satisfactione
Sapientia Q
153 Dolus et peccatum demonum mitigatur, laetum angelorum consortium augmentatur
inv. Q
163 Proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt
om. Q
184 Principia enim secundum Aristotelem sunt minima quantitate
primi Q
186 Quoad generalitatem, patet cum Christus sit creatura corporea
quasi Q
221 Hoc eum iuramento obstrinxit ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret.
abstinxit Q
265 Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei consilio incarnata
creatura Q
271 Nam ut saepe dixi, sicut propositio potest esse hic vera cum hoc quod hic non sit suum
inv. Q
285 Unde notat causam eius (32 Moralium capitulo 5), diecns
12 Q
128 296 Ideo ut saepe dixi, nisi omne tempus praeteritum vel futurum fuerit Deo praesens
add. ut Q
322 Primum tamen principalius ut sit introitus ad alios consequentes
add. omnes Q
330 Patre vel impar sibi. Non enim mentitus est.
inv. Q
340 Non servat sermones suos, id est, sententias vel veritates quas praecipit observari
idem Q
352 1 Contra Maximinum capitulo 10), tamen prior sensus est subtilior et mihi carior
cum Q
365 Habet absolute necessario et aliam accepit ex tempore
add. Q lin.
368 Saltem in verbis Apostoli compendiose addiscere. Ex quo patet
inv. Q
401 Nec debent tales praedicationes abici de virtute sermonis
dicunt Q
437 Interimere disputationes theologicas, cum incidit in redargutionem
non Q
458 Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologos ad metam aliquam
dicunt Q, sed corr.
464 Ut dando exclusivam huius universalis, Omnis res est mobilis
immobilis Q
502 Deus ipse pendebat dolens et passus in cruce
om. Q
518 Dicitur habitus huiusmodi; habitus quidem, quia
huius Q
129 520 Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur.
om. Q et spat. vac. decem litteras comprehendens
525 Omnia autem haec quattuor, cum denominant substantiam
hoc Q
535 Sed praeter haec quattuor quae in se sunt substantiae
hoc Q
550 Habitus tertii modi, cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans
acti Q
586 Non exinde movent naturam cui inhaerenter adveniunt
om. Q
593 Quia priusquam Verbum fuit pure deitas, nunc est homo
inv. Q
609 Copiosius quoad philosophicam considerationem
propheticam Q
632a Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem
om. Q et spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens
632b Deum Patrem qui de facto duxit et obtulit super montem
quae Q
652 Cum impossibile sit aliquid non moveri quod tamen subiective
ac Q
674 Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi nostri
Domini nostri Iesu Christi Q
676 Sit et mortuus, sequitur quod fuit homo pro sancto triduo.
add. Sequitur feria secunda post Iubilate, et cetera. Q
It should be noted that in 265 Q’s error makes for a plausible alternative reading.
Secondly, the second hand that made the corrections in 121, 135, 144, 366, and 645 is 130 responsible also for some marginalia in this copy of De incarnatione Verbi. This scribe, however, is not responsible for the interlinear reading of unita discussed earlier. The fact that he was so eager for a reliable text that he improved Q in light of another manuscript testifies to the zeal of Wyclif’s Bohemian readership.
XI. Conclusion
Sufficient textual data has been presented in this chapter to substantiate the following assertions regarding the surviving manuscripts that contain De incarnatione Verbi: (1) The primary split in the stemma is between the English manuscripts (GOP) and their Bohemian counterparts (ABCQ). (2) G is unique because it contains material found nowhere else in the tradition. Wyclif probably added this new material to the text after the treatise entered circulation. (3) OP descend from a common exemplar independently of G. (4) All the Bohemian manuscripts suffer from contamination. (5) Despite the undeniable evidence for contamination,
AB probably descend from one common exemplar; CQ from another. (6) None of the surviving manuscripts is a codex descriptus of another. In short, the evidence supports a stemma codicum along the following lines: 131
Ω1 . . . Ω2 c. 1372
β
δ ε α
γ
O P G A B C Q 1390s xiv/2 xiv/2 c. 1410 1433 xv/1 1400
Adding the date of each manuscript, as identified in chapter 1, sheds light on the evidence. It is not at all surprising that G was written as early as it was, nor that B may have been the last manuscript to be written, for it is the worst of the Bohemian manuscripts. What is surprising, however, is that OP are about as old as G and yet are more prone to error than all the rest. More importantly, the relative accuracy of AQ helps to illustrate how fervent Wyclif’s Bohemian followers were for their master’s doctrine. Without their zeal, the text of De incarnatione Verbi would be much more difficult to reconstruct.
This research confirms a conclusion about DIV’s dissemination noted by Anne Hudson:
Four copies [of De incarnatione Verbi are] of English origin, four of Bohemian; one of the English copies is heavily abbreviated [i.e., manuscript M], so that its evidence is unhelpful. The Wyclif Society edition of Edward Harris unfortunately provides a conflated text, using two of the English copies (including the abridged one) and three of the Bohemian; a full understanding of the situation will not be possible until the work is reedited using all the manuscripts. But it is clear even 132 from Harris’s edition that there are some major oddities in the transmission: at least four passages, two of them of considerable length [none of which are in chapter 7], are missing from some copies. For the most part it is the English copies that lack them, the Bohemian which provide them; but this is not always the case…The English scribes sometimes show awareness of the anomaly…Do the discrepancies go back to Wyclif, to his assistants who continued the revision of his works, or to scribal error? The witnessing of the two forms of text do, however, emphasise that more than one copy of the text travelled to Bohemia.6
This chapter confirms Hudson’s observation made in the last sentence just quoted and provides data that can be used to distinguish between the original version of DIV that was brought to the continent and later versions that Wyclif’s sympathizers used to improve their copies.
Unfortunately, given the paucity of surviving evidence, we cannot know how many additional
English copies the Bohemian scribes had access to, but we now have some insight into how they tried to correct the text they had received.
6 Anne Hudson, “Introduction: Wyclif’s Works and their Dissemination,” I, 8–9.
Chapter 3: The Curious Case of Manuscript M
Of all the manuscripts studied here, M is by far the oddest. It contains a shorter version of
De incarnatione Verbi, approximately forty percent the length of the complete text preserved in the other manuscripts. In his “Preface” to the 1886-edition of DIV, Harris describes M thus:
The writing varies very much in the volume; some parts being much clearer and more careful than others. The worst is the De Incarnatione, which is written very hurriedly, with excessive contractions. The lines are generally crooked and very close together… The relation of the MS. to the text of our tract is curious. Very much is omitted, and the joining words and clauses of sentences are commonly altered, while on the other hand long passages are given verbatim from a good text. I was at first inclined to hope that we had here the notes of a pupil who had heard the De Incarnatione as lectures, but I now take this copy to be a summary made from a MS. for the use of the writer. The parts copied contain the main course of the argument, the omissions being chiefly of illustrations and authorities cited. A listener would be less choice in his selection and less full in the pieces given. Moreover, the best judgements I can obtain say that the writing is not of Wyclif’s time, but of the fifteenth century.1
Although Harris’s judgments about the sloppiness and partial nature of M are sound, his claim that the script must be of the fifteenth century is simply false. M. Michèle Mulchahey, Greti
Dinkova-Bruun, and Timothy Noone have all considered the hand of M and all are agreed that there is no reason why M cannot have been written within Wyclif’s lifetime (i.e., before 1384).
After considering how the two versions of the text differ and textual evidence indicating that M is at least as primitive as G, the possibility that at least two of Wyclif’s students produced M by combining their lecture notes into a single document, or a reportatio, shall be considered.
First, how exactly do the two texts differ? Sometimes the same text for the most part appears in both. In other cases, passages in the shorter version are enriched by additional material in the longer version. In other cases still, the longer version contains material that
1 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnactione, xiv. For Anne Hudson’s description of the situation, see Anne Hudson, “Books and their Survival: The Case of English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in Medieval Manuscripts, Their Makers and Users (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 233, footnote 52. 133 134 corresponds to nothing in the shorter text. A passage by passage comparison of the two versions of DIV appears below. The numbers in parentheses refer to the line numbers of the shorter and longer texts respectively as contained in chapters 5 and 7 of this dissertation. The numbers to the right of the parentheses are the total number of lines in a passage:
Shorter text Longer Text
Obj. 1 (32–39): 8 Obj. 1 (66–78): 13
1 Reply to Obj. 1 (40–47): 7 1 Reply to Obj. 1 (79–90): 11
2 Reply to Obj. 1 (48–56): 5 2 Reply to Obj. 1 (91–97): 7
3 Reply to Obj. 1 (57–66): 10 3 Reply to Obj. 1 (98–109): 12
1 Respondeo (67–80): 14 1 Respondeo (110–165): 56
1 Respondeo a (79–80): 2 1 Respondeo a (166–180): 15
1 Respondeo b (181–185): 5
1 Respondeo c (186–200): 15
Obj. 2 (81–83): 3 Obj. 2 (201–204): 4
1 Reply to Obj. 2: …incarnandum 1 Reply to Obj. 2: …incarnandum (83–98): 16 (204–237): 34
2 Reply to Obj. 2: …est aeterna 2 Reply to Obj. 2: …praesto (99–114): 16 (238–266): 29
3 Reply to Obj. 2: …
4 Reply to Obj. 2: …Monologion 19 4 Reply to Obj. 2: …Monologion 19 (125–137): 13 (276–295): 20
5 Reply to Obj. 2: …instantiam factam 5 Reply to Obj. 2: …est Sapientia (138–145): 8 (296–307): 10
135 6 Reply to Obj. 2: …litteralior 6 Reply to Obj. 2: …consequentes (145–156): 12 (308–323): 16
7 Reply to Obj. 2: …me, Patris 7 Reply to Obj. 2: …me, Patris (157–177): 21 (324–349): 26
8 Reply to Obj. 2: …Deum signent (349–412): 64
2 Respondeo: …EST MOBILE 2 Respondeo: …EST MOBILE (178–195): 18 (413–435): 23
Rearranged text Rearranged text (196–215): 20 (436–474): 39
3 Objections: …passa fuit 3 Objections: …fuit passa (216–230): 15 (475–493): 19
1 On habitus 1 On habitus (231–252): 22 (494–548): 55
2 On habitus 2 On habitus (253–259): 5 (549–565): 17
On forms (566–614): 49
Reply to Obj. 1 Reply to Obj. 1 (260–263): 4 (615–618): 4
Reply to Obj. 2 Reply to Obj. 2 (263–273): 10 (619–629): 11
Reply to Obj. 3 Reply to Obj. 3 (274–276): 3 (630–672): 43
Conclusion (673–677): 5
Total: 242 Total: 613
More can be said about the two versions of the text, however, if we go beyond mere length. Sufficient textual evidence exists to show that M is more closely related to the English
136 rather than the Bohemian branch of the stemma. First, M is clearly written in an English hand.
Second, M has some of the text found only in the English part of the stemma. The underlined text below is not found in manuscripts ABCQ:
80 GOP Primo ex hoc quod omnem motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto. Universitas creata est mota. Ergo, oportet illam inniti alicui fixo immoto, sicut ergo mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terrae qui non commovebitur [Ps. 92:1]. 41 M Primo ex hoc quod omnem motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto. Universitas creata est mota. Ergo, oportet quod mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terrae qui non commovebitur [Ps. 92:1].
135 GP Cum quaelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad perfectionem primariam…instauratur…Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli Ad Colossenses 1 capitulo, quando dicit quod Deus proposuit 75 M Cum quaelibet creatura per Christi passionem ad suam perfectionem primariam instauratur. Colossenses 1 capitulo: Deus proposuit
Other examples connect M to GOP:
248 GOP Contra orationes ecclesiae quibus rogat Deum per incarnationem 103 M Contra orationes ecclesiae rogantis Deum per incarnationem
rogat] orat ABCQ
281 GOP Unde Gregorius (23 Moralium capitulo 15) exponens 126 M Unde Gregorius (23 Moralium 15) exponens
15] 3 ABCQ
297 GOP Paterentur theologi magnas angustias in expositionibus scripturarum 139 M Paterentur theologi magnas angustias in expositionibus scripturarum
expositionibus] expositione ABCQ
325 GOP Illud Iohannis 10, Sermonem quem audistis 157 M Illud Iohannis 10, Sermonem quem audistis
10 om. ABCQ
486 GOP Illa humanitas movebatur a non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum 225 M Illa humanitas movebatur a non-esse ad esse
a non] post non ABQ; per consequens C
513 CGOP Addiscimus quae manens non-mota movet animam 239 M Addiscimus quae manens non-mota movet animam
manens] movens ABQ
137 536 GOP Sumitur habitus…pro qualitate praeternaturali de prima specie qualitatis 247 M Sumitur habitus pro qualitate praeternaturali de prima specie qualitatis
praeternaturali] passionali ABCQ
Both paleographical and textual evidence undoubtedly confirms that M belongs to the English branch of the stemma. The question still remains, however, of M’s relation to G, O, and P taken severally. Sufficient evidence exists to show that M is not a codex descriptus of G, O, or P:
162 OP Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt 77 M Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt
instaurare om. G
432 GMO Potest dici, aequivocando, quod nihil non est mobile 192 M Potest dici, aequivocando, quod nihil non est mobile
nihil] mobile P
435 G OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE 194 M OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE
quod…mobile om. per hom. O; est2 om. P
512 GO Primo pro sapientia quae est veritas quam addiscimus, quae manens non-mota 238 M Primo pro sapientia quae veritas est quam addiscimus, quae manens non-mota
veritas quam] veritatis quem P
520 OP Formantur a subiectis habituatis…quam quando membris aptata induitur 244 M Formantur a subiectis habituatis, quando membra induitur
habituatis] humanitatis G
552 OP Humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem 255 M Humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem
detegens] tegens G
627 G Ideo non oportet, si Deus temporaliter generatur quod ante non fuit 271 M Ideo non oportet, si Deus temporaliter generatur quod ante non fuit
ante] autem OP
628 GP Cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generationis quod non effectualiter fuit ante 272 M Cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generationis quod non effectualiter fuit ante
non add. est O
138 Finally, in one important instance M agrees with G, where all the rest err:
287 G Ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt 131 M Ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt
intuitui] intuitu ABCQ; intuitum OP
In sum, despite the seeming imprecision of the hand that wrote it, M is a surprisingly accurate text. Even though it is only about forty percent the length of the longer text, it contains some of the fragments that are lacking in the continental manuscripts. Some surprising evidence also connects M to G, the most complete, albeit not the most accurate, copy of De incarnatione
Verbi that has come down to us. M cannot be a codex descriptus of G, however, because in
162/77 above M has instaurare, which G omits; in 520/244 M contains the correct reading
(habituatis), where G errs (with humanitatis); and in 552/255 M agrees with all the other manuscripts, whereas G records an error. Thus, at minimum M is a very early English copy of
DIV and mostly trustworthy for what it contains.
The evidence presented thus far does not suffice to establish the exact relationship between the shorter and the longer texts. M could contain Wyclif’s rough draft that he later expanded for publication. Or, as Harris thought, it could contain an abbreviated version of the text made from a copy of the longer text that is no longer extant. Or it could be a reportatio, i.e., a document produced by at least two of Wyclif’s students who heard his lecture and then combined their class notes into a single and quasi-official account of what their teacher said in the lecture hall.2 Some additional evidence does suggest that this third possibility is in fact the case.
2 For more on the structure and history of reportatio as a genre of scholastic texts, see Jean-Pierre Muller, “Les reportations des deux premiers livres du Commentaire sur Les sentences de Jean Quidort de Paris O.P.,” Angelicum 33 (1956), 361–414; and Jean-Pierre Muller, introduction to Commentaire sur Les sentences by Jean de Paris (Quidort), Livre 1, ed. Jean-Pierre Muller (Rome: Herder, 1961), xxii–xxviii.
139 First, the shorter text suffers from a noticeable homoeoteleuton. The passage in question from manuscript M is as follows:
Colossenses 1 capitulo: Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt, ut exponit Gregorius (31 Moralium 38), ascendendo ergo de limbo ad caelum velocissime.3
In the longer text, the same material appears as follows:
Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli (ad Colossenses 1 capitulo), quando dicit quod Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt, ut exponit Gregorius (31 Moralium capitulo 38). Sic ergo intelligendo per Sapientiam personaliter Verbum Dei ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus, concedendum est quod ipsa sit summe mobilis. Immo plus attendendo ad litteram concedi potest quod dicta Sapientia nedum fuit plus mobilis, sed plus effectualiter movebatur quam alia creatura quoad velocitatem, quoad compendiositatem, et quoad generalitatem: [1] Quoad velocitatem, quia pro instanti suae generationis plena carismatum, post verisimiliter in sua ascensione movebatur recte tam velociter ut primum mobile circulatur, vel ut est posibile quod aliquid moveatur, quia causa tardationis post discipulorum intuitum non est faciliter fingenda. Christus ergo ex se ascendendo a limbo ad caelum ultimum pertransiit velocissime longissimum spatium transmeabile.4
Although the omission of the words between the two ergos could be due to a hasty scribe making an abbreviated copy of De incarnatione Verbi, the missing text could just as easily have been omitted by all the students who were recording Wyclif’s lecture.
The second piece of evidence more compellingly points to a reportatio. The pertinent portion of the longer text is divided below into three parts and reads as follows:
[A] Multum proficeret modum disputandi sophisticum, principaliter propter apparentiam arguentis et redargutionem patulam respondentis ex peccato Luciferi introductum,
[B] Et ista est sententia Augustini (2 De doctrina Christiana 31), ubi docet in disputationibus cavere rixandi libidinem et ostentationem frivolam puerilem. Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologos ad metam aliquam, sed detegit eorum versutiam harundineam qua prius pompaverant et hoc ex propriis eorum principiis. Unde frequenter ut colores “sapientiae” sophisticae minus
3 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation, ln. 76–80. 4 See Chapter 7 of this dissertation, ln. 161–180.
140 appareant, obvio eis negando negativas quae ad sensum aequivocum satis catholice concedi poterunt.
[C] Ut dando exclusivam huius universalis, Omnis res est mobilis, formo sic exclusivam ut apparentia sophistica sit minus evidens, Tantum res mobilis est res, quod est falsum pro rebus aeternis. Concedi tamen posset quod, Nihil aliud quam mobile est res, accipiendo mobile essentialiter substantive; et tamen, Aliud quam mobile est res, posito quod mobile praedicetur formaliter adiective. Sed Augustinus et alii sancti doctores non curarunt de istis apparentiis sophistarum. Unde in dialogo Ad Felicianum, “Genuit,” inquit, “et non genuit Maria Filium Dei.”5
As described in chapter 11 of this dissertation, shortly before this quotation Wyclif comes to a very counter-intuitive conclusion that seems to contradict what he had reasoned to earlier, namely that everything, including God, is a mobile. In all probability, a sincere student then asked a reasonable question, “What then is non-mobile?” Wyclif then assumes that the student would only interrupt the flow of the lecture to flaunt his powers of sophistry. In section A,
Wyclif begins by comparing such a question to the first question recorded in Scripture, which was posed by the Devil in Genesis 3:1 (“Yea, hath God said, ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?”), but then tries to meet the objector halfway by acknowledging that questions arising from the humble and earnest desire for the truth are in fact permissible in theological discourse.
Section B begins with a reference to Augustine’s De doctrina Christiana and includes more of
Wyclif’s protestations against sophistry. In section C, Wyclif illustrates the coherence of his point with various logical examples and concludes with a quotation from the pseudo-Augustinian treatise, Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis. There should be no doubt that A, B, and C appear in their correct order in the longer text. This material in the shorter text, however, appears in a different order:
[C]
5 Ibid., ln. 439–474.
141 formaliter adiective. Unde Augustinus in dialogo Ad Felicianum, “Genuit,” inquit, “et non genuit Maria Filium Dei.”
[A] Introductum est enim in scholis theologicis contrariae quaestiones ex
[B] per Augustinum 2 De doctrina Christiana 31.6
A close reading of this passage in the shorter text should leave no room for doubt that the scribe of manuscript M made an important mistake. First, the contrariae quaestiones in part A refer to the question posed shortly before part C. Secondly, in De doctrina Christiana 2.31 Augustine does not speak directly to anything said in section A. But how to account for the discrepancy? In all probability, when Wyclif’s students assembled their lecture notes to produce the reportatio, here they put their notes in the wrong order, leaving their reader at a loss as to what Wyclif actually said.
If this argument is sound, certain important conclusions follow: (1) As discussed in chapter 9 of this dissertation, De incarnatione Verbi started as a series of lectures Wyclif gave on the Sentences in order to complete his doctorate in 1372. Reading aloud parts of the treatise also reveals some aspects of Wyclif’s oral delivery in the lecture hall. (2) One can reasonably conclude that the version of DIV contained in manuscript M must have been written in the hand of one of Wyclif’s students. (3) A close comparison of the two versions of DIV also sheds light on how Wyclif prepared his lectures for publication. Thereby, we catch a glimpse of the process of academic writing and revision used by one faculty member at fourteenth-century Oxford. (4)
More importantly for text editing, if the shorter version of DIV is primitive, it can be invoked to
6 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation, ln. 196–215.
142 judge between variants in the wider manuscript tradition that would otherwise not be so easily decided. In the following cases, recourse to M determined which variant was worthy of the text and which should be relegated to the apparatus:
248 GOP Contra orationes ecclesiae quibus rogat Deum per incarnationem 103 M Contra orationes ecclesiae rogantis Deum per incarnationem
rogat] orat ABCQ
293 ABCQ Quae non apparent desunt 135 M Quae non apparent desunt
apparent] appareant GOP
297 GOP Paterentur theologi magnas angustias in expositionibus scripturarum 139 M Paterentur theologi magnas angustias in expositionibus scripturarum
expositionibus] expositione ABCQ
(5) Finally, I have had recourse to M to judge between the various titles of the treatise found in the manuscript tradition. MOP give De incarnatione Verbi as the title, whereas AB have De incarnatione, C has De benedicta incarnatione, and GQ have De incarnatione Christi (in G the title appears in an eighteenth-century hand). Because M is probably primitive and agrees with O and P, fairly early copies, I have opted for De incarnatione Verbi.
Proper scholarship, however, requires acknowledging any pertinent evidence that does not conform to a proposed theory. Should more evidence be found similar to the cases below, it may in the long run require at least a partial revision of the hypothesis proposed in this chapter:
347 ABCQ Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur 175 M Ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur
Deo om. GOP
434 ABCQ Non-formalem, tunc OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE. 194 M Non-formalem, OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE.
Tunc om. G
479 ABCGOPQ Propter eius lacerationem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei 220 M Propter eius actionem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei
143
525 ABCGQ Omnia…haec quattuor…denominant substantiam habituari 245 M Omnia haec quattuor denominant subiecta habituari
substantiam] subiecta MOP
As regards 479/220 above, Harris was right to note the discrepancy between M and all the other manuscripts in this case.7 Although it would seem that M’s reading is better suited to the context, because all the other manuscripts have the same alternative reading, that alternative reading appears in the critical edition of the longer text.
Because Anne Hudson bemoans that M was used to produce Harris’s edition of DIV, a critical edition and English translation of the portion of M studied here appear separately in
8 chapters 5 and 6.
7 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnatcione 7, ed. Harris, 117, footnote 3. 8 Anne Hudson, Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), I.8–9.
Chapter 4: The Need for a New Edition
Essential to this dissertation is the need to justify the beginnings of a new critical edition of De incarnatione Verbi. Why should Edward Harris’s edition of 1886 not be trusted and translated just as it is? Although I am grateful to Harris for his labors, after a thorough study of all the known manuscripts that contain DIV, including those unknown to him, there can be no doubt that a fresh edition is called for. Before presenting reasons that justify such a demanding and time-consuming project, however, I would like to explain how my engagement with Harris’s edition has improved my work.
Given the limitations Harris labored under, his efforts deserve to be respected and acknowledged. He did not know of manuscripts GPQ and had to rely on Rudolph Beer’s transcription of the Viennese manuscripts (ABC),1 but he still managed to produce a text that is sometimes reliable for scholarship. His editorial judgments regarding paragraph divisions and punctuation often gave me occasion to think through my own choices afresh. More importantly, a comparison of my work with his compelled me to confess my own fallibility. Promeretur (not pervenietur), perfectio (not perfecto), devotionem (not denotationem), citra (not circa), philosophicam (not physicam), and some inferior variants noted in the apparatus only appear in my edition because they first appeared in his. In other respects, my work has confirmed that two of his emendations to the text are simply correct. In Harris’s edition the first such emendation is as follows:
1 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, xvi. 144 145 Non quod propter devocionem finguntur falsa; sed quod verissime de vi sermonis secundum seriem verborum primum mobile sit sapiencia increata; et quod eius motus vel passio perficit *[hominem] plus quam motus caeli quamlibet creaturam [aliam] post vel ante.2
Although the addition of hominem should be rejected because it is unnecessary, aliam appears not only in O, as Harris notes in his apparatus, but also in GP;3 he was therefore correct to include it in his edition. The second emendation is not clearly noted as such:
Sed faciendo se esse naturam visibilem exinanivit misericorditer semetipsum: semetipsum dicit propter ydemptitatem persone que est filius hominis et dei filius.4
Harris correctly notes in a footnote that the second semetipsum is omitted in ABC and appears as
“sȝ ipsum” (i.e., sed ipsum) in O.5 This passage, however, does not appear in M, and thus the second semetipsum nowhere clearly appears in any of the five manuscripts to which Harris had access. The discovery of the second semetipsum in G (and only in G),6 proves his editorial judgment to be correct. In short, Harris was a trailblazer and some of his editorial judgments were sound; my edition would not be nearly as good as it is had I not compared my work with his. One gets the sense that every serious piece of medieval philosophy deserves at least two dedicated text editors working independently of one another to produce the best text possible for study. And I am confident that the edition of DIV 7 published here comes as close to that goal as possible.
Despite Harris’s admirable efforts, however, his edition should be superseded for a number of reasons: (1) He had never seen manuscripts ABC in person, and the fact that he relied on Rudolph Beer’s transcription of these manuscripts is amply attested to by errors in his
2 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione, ed. Harris, 107, underlining added. 3 Ibid., footnote 15; Gonville and Caius 337/565, fol. 150v, ln. 20; and Pavia BU 311, fol. 110r, ln. 22. 4 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, 114, underlining added. 5 Ibid., footnote 13. 6 Gonville and Caius 337/565, fol. 152r, ln. 19.
146 apparatus. (2) He did not know of manuscripts GPQ. (1) and (2) taken together are particularly unfortunate, as the scribe of A is by far the most careful and the text of G the most complete. (3)
Consequently, Harris’s edition lacks certain words (often found only in G) that are sometimes necessary for determining Wyclif’s intended sense. More than forty such words have been restored to chapter 7 alone. (4) Harris’s critical apparatus is horribly inadequate on its own terms, because it frequently misrepresents the manuscripts to which he had access and fails to include important variants that shed light on the stemma. (5) When faced with variants in the manuscript tradition, he often selected inferior readings for the text. Harris’s preference for O, the only complete English manuscript he knew, sometimes accounts for this fact. (6) A few words in his edition need to be deleted or rearranged, either because they do not reflect the manuscript tradition at all or are errors. (7) Finally, some of Harris’s emendations to the text are simply not called for (e.g., hominem mentioned earlier) or are now no longer necessary due to the additional text discovered in G.
An examination of the apparatus of the longer text as found in chapter 7 of this dissertation will reveal that more than ninety of Harris’s readings have been rejected. Although all the differences are not equally important, certain noteworthy instances of improvement should be brought to the reader’s attention here. As regards Harris’s apparatus, on page 121 of his edition, for example, he wrongly attributes efficiens to C in footnote 3, vîtus fîo to O in footnote 4, sint to ABC in footnote 5, assumptae ratione formae to BC in footnote 6, and ymo locus to C in footnote 8. If we keep in mind that page 121 has only ten footnotes, one begins to realize how sloppy Harris must have been with his work. On the other hand, the inclusion of the following variants would have especially improved his apparatus:
147 unitam] unicam C at 107, line 6
qua] quae CO at 107, line 15
rectificat] reaedificat ABC at 108, line 7
noverat] non erat ABC at 110, line 8
intuitu] intuitui M; intuitum O at112, line 1
quo] quod BO at114, lines 3 and 4
substrata] subtracta AC, sed corr. C at 114, line 12
parcium] per totum O at 122, line 9
As discussed in chapter 3, “intuitui M” is actually the correct reading and especially important for determining M’s relation to the other manuscripts.
As regards the text proper, the following correction should strike the informed reader as important. At the end of De incarnatione Verbi’s first paragraph, Harris’s text reads as follows:
Et cum timore, quia, sicut in nulla materia quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius aut periculosius aberratur.7
Harris notes in a footnote that manuscripts ABC have oberratur instead. Unfortunately, here
Harris made two errors. First, oberratur is to be preferred, because it is a classic case of a lectio difficilior. Secondly, only AB have the correct oberratur; manuscript C has the erroneous aberratur. Thus, in respect of both text and apparatus Harris’s edition is here simply incorrect.
Some of Harris’s errors stem at least in part from his preference for O, the only complete
English manuscript he knew. In some respects, these errors are understandable, because without comparison to GP, the authentic readings of the English branch of the stemma cannot always be distinguished from O’s errors. In two cases, because of his preference for O, Harris made Wyclif
7 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione, prologus, ed. Harris, 1, ln. 13, underlining added.
148 misquote the Bible: Regrettably, when Wyclif quotes Job 33:14 in Harris’s edition, it reads,
Semel loquetur Deus, et secundo ad ipsum non repetet.8
Whereas Harris is correct to note in a footnote that AB lack ad, he was wrong to attribute the omission of ad to C without noting that C has idipsum, the correct reading found in any standard edition of the Vulgate. More importantly, the only manuscript that reads ad ipsum is O. In another instance, when Wyclif quotes John 14:24, Harris has it thus:
Qui me non diligit, sermones meos non servat.9
The only manuscript that has this word order is O; all the other manuscripts agree with standard printings of the Vulgate and have non diligit me. In sum, my edition is better than Harris’s, because it distinguishes the correct readings of the earlier English tradition from O’s errors and rejects the latter.
In other instances, Harris has Wyclif misquote both the Bible and Aristotle. Although
Wyclif actually wrote, “Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia” (quoting Wisdom 7:24),10
Harris made him say,
Omnibus mobilibus est mobilior sapiencia,11 which is found in no standard edition of the Vulgate and in none of the manuscripts that contain
DIV. On another occasion, Wyclif quotes Genesis 3:1, “‘Cur,’ inquit serpens, ‘praecepit vobis
Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi?’,”12 but Harris’s edition has instead
Cur, inquit serpens, precipit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de omni ligno paradisi?13
8 Ibid., 7, p. 111, ln. 27–28, underlining added. 9 Ibid., 7, p. 113, ln. 8–9, underlining added. 10 See Chapter 7, ln. 119 of this dissertation. 11 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, 107, ln 8–9, underlining added. 12 See Chapter 7, ln. 444–446 of this dissertation.
149 As regards Aristotle, Harris’s edition reads,
Prima enim secundum Aristotelem sunt quantitate minima.14
With prima, Harris errs by following AB against the correct and predominant tradition of principia; with quantitate minima he departs completely from all the manuscripts, which read minima quantitate. Although Harris notes in his introduction that he did not record in his apparatus instances of variant word order he deemed unimportant,15 he still erred by printing something found in none of the manuscripts, with the overall effect of misquoting the
Philosopher. In short, the improvements made to the text of De incarnatione Verbi in this dissertation ensure that Wyclif is no longer misquoting the two most important authorities for fourteenth-century academic theology.
The greatest textual improvement over Harris’s work that this dissertation offers, however, is the restoration of certain words to the text that are usually found only in G. The discovery of these words renders one of Harris’s emendations unnecessary. Here is the passage in question with the additional words from G in bold:
Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur.16
In order to make sense of this passage as he knew it, Harris emended it as follows:
3m. genus est quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis †perfeccius quam quando membris aptata induunutr.†17
Perfeccius and induuntur, it should be noted, appear in none of the manuscripts Harris knew.
13 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, 116, ln 15–16, underlining added. 14 Ibid., 7, p. 109, ln. 6–7, underlining added. 15 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, xvi, xvii. 16 See Chapter 7, ln. 518–521 of this dissertation. 17 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, 118, ln 19–21.
150 Penultimately, while chapter 11 of this dissertation was being written, an important omission was discovered in Harris’s edition of DIV 9. At one critical point in the text, Harris’s text reads as follows:
Ex istis patet, cum nulla assumpcio ypostatica sit eterna, quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam, quia nec alia persona, nec alia natura est Christi humanitas; licet sit creator, quia persona Verbi, que secundum deitatem non secundum ipsam creat omnia.18
The text, as transcribed from manuscript G and checked in light of ABCOPQ, should read as follows, however:
Ex istis patet cum nulla assumptio hypostatica sit aeterna, quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam: Omne quidem assumere est efficere identitatem unius ad aliud, sed omne efficere est solummodo temporale. Ergo cum assumptum non potest temporaliter praefuisse, patet quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam, quia nec alia persona nec alia natura est Christi humanitas quam creatura, licet sit Creator, quia persona Verbi quae secundum deitatem, non secundum ipsam creat omnia.19
The underlined text appears in all the manuscripts, including O, Harris’s favorite. Consequently, the longer omission must be due to homeoteleutic error. As discussed in chapter 11, this portion of DIV 9 is especially critical to Wyclif’s argument, for here he explicitly denies what one could otherwise reasonably understand him to be saying in DIV 7.
We have yet to consider Harris’s greatest mistake, however. In at least one instance he added a critical word to the text that has no basis in the manuscript tradition at all. Here is the passage, as it appears in Harris’s edition:
18 Ibid., 9, p. 147, ln. 14–18. 19 Ioannis Wyclif, De incarnatione Verbi 9. This Latin text was transcribed from Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 337/565 (manuscript G), fol. 158v, ln. 6–11, and checked in light of Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek 1387 (manuscript A), fol. 93v, col. b, ln. 56–fol. 94r, col. a, ln. 3; Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4307 (manuscript B), fol., 122v, ln. 13–18; Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4504 (manuscript C), fol. 82r, ln. 28–35; Oxford, Oriel College, 15 (manuscript O), fol. 236 (228r), col. b, ln. 37–43; Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria 311 (manuscript P), fol. 116r, col. b, ln. 1–11; and Prague, Metropolitan Chapter Library, D.35 (600) (manuscript Q), fol. 49v, ln. 17–22.
151 Ideo dicunt sancti quod humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem; et religiosi, qui Christum induunt, habent habitus corporis; hoc notantes, quod accidit Deo humanitas, sed non inseparabiliter.20
Although Harris notes in his apparatus that non is omitted in ABC, the word actually appears in none of the manuscripts, including O. It should be admitted that the addition of non to this passage is a grave error, for it can only pervert Wyclif’s intended sense. Unfortunately, this radical misrepresentation of Wyclif’s text is similar to another Mark Thakkar has found in the
Wyclif Society’s 1893 edition of Tractatus de logica. The printed text reads:
Alia regula est ista: ab universali ad suam singularem affirmativam cum debito modo, ubi singulares significant res corruptibiles, valet consequentia.21
Mark Thakkar’s research, however, has brought to light what the text ought to be:
Alia regula est ista: ab universali ad suam singularem affirmativam sine debito medio, ubi singulares significant res corruptibiles, non valet consequentia.22
In sum, my work has confirmed some of Anne Hudson’s concerns regarding the deficiencies of the old Wyclif Society editions. Since the time that the Wyclif Society was disbanded,
more manuscripts of many of the texts edited in the Wyclif Society have come to light; these may offer conflicting or more complete evidence. More worryingly, it [has] also…[become] clear that neither the text, nor the variants cited from those manuscripts known to the editors, were always an accurate record of their witness. In some cases, this is probably the result of the editors’ reliance on amanuenses, whose work they were either unable or unwilling to check; in others it seems likely that the alteration was deliberately though silently made, to fit in with the editor’s understanding of the passage to which reference was intended.23
20 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, p. 119, ln. 14–18, underlining added. 21 Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de logica, vol. 3, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London, 1893), p. 44, ln. 28– 30, underlining added. 22 Thakkar’s revised text can be found in Martin Dekarli, “Before and After Wyclif: Sources and Textual Influences,” Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 56, fasc. 2 (2016), 122, footnote 2. In a private email of April 24, 2019, Thakkar tells me that he does not think that Dziewicki altered the text intentionally. 23 Anne Hudson, “Cross-Referencing in Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999), 194.
Chapter 5: The Critical Edition of the Shorter Text
The version of De incarnatione Verbi contained in manuscript M is arguably a reportatio.
Its relation to the longer text has already been discussed in chapter 3. Because current scholarship calls for the separate editing of each version of DIV, this chapter contains a critical edition of the part of the treatise studied in this dissertation.1 A few remarks, however, are in order regarding the editorial principles used for both the shorter and the longer versions of DIV.
First, all spellings have been classicized.2 Although some will no doubt object to this editorial norm, as time goes by, fewer and fewer scholars will command the Latin necessary to engage texts like this without the means of a translation. Those scholars with some Latin will probably be accustomed to classical Latin; thus the use of classical orthography will minimize the difficulties to be faced as they begin reading Wyclif’s Latin. Beyond this general principle, when there was any doubt as to how a word should be spelled, recourse was had to the entries and principles of the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. I have likewise tried to use the minimal punctuation necessary for communicating the sense of a passage. Italics have been reserved for quotations of both Aristotle and the Bible, the titles of important works, the parts of a syllogism, and single terms that would appear in scare quotes in contemporary academic
English. The program used for formatting the text was Classical Text Editor 10.10.
To maximize the usefulness of the edition, the works Wyclif refers to are referenced in the apparatus, and, whenever space permits, the pertinent passages are quoted in full. Because
1 Anne Hudson, Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), I, 8–9. 2 For more on the use of classical spellings in the critical editing of scholastic texts, see R. James Long, “Scholastic Texts and Orthography: A Response to Roland Hissette,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 41 (1991): 149–151. 152 153 the different ways in which Wyclif has received the Aristotelian inheritance may be of interest to the reader, the Philosopher is quoted both in the original Greek and in a medieval Latin translation if such is available. Four necessary emendations to the text are noted as such in the apparatus. Three should require no explanation; praedicamentali is discussed in chapter 7.
The abbreviations in the critical apparatus of each edition differ only slightly from the abbreviations used in the critical edition of Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics commentary, to wit:
add. addidit vel addiderunt alt. man. altera manu cancel. cancelavit cod. codex codd. codices corr. correxit del. delevit dub. dubitavit exp. expungit inv. invertit vel invertunt lin. super vel sub linea mg. in margine om. omittit vel omittunt per hom. per homeoteleuton rep. repetit rest. restitit spat. vac. spatium vacuum3
Finally, scholarship has cast doubt on whether the prologues found at the beginning of some of Wyclif’s works are authentic, including the prologue to DIV. Anthony Kenny is of the opinion that a scribe must have appended the prologue to Wyclif’s De universalibus because its summaries of each chapter seem to misrepresent the treatise’s overarching argument. Vilém
Herold shares Kenny’s skepticism, and Anne Hudson has been led by them to doubt the
3 Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis: Libri I–V, Opera philosophica, vol. 3, ed. R. Andrews, et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997), liv. 154 authenticity of all the prologues.4 Although I can speak to no part of Wyclif’s corpus other than
DIV, given that the shorter version of the text is probably older than the longer and includes a prologue, it would seem that at least in this case the prologue is authentic. Its summaries of each chapter do not seem to misrepresent the work in whole or in part.
4 Anne Hudson, “Accessus ad auctorem: The Case of John Wyclif,” Viator 30 (1999), 326, especially footnote 16. 155 [British Library, Royal 7 B III, fol. 66r]
Wyclif: De Incarnatione Verbi
Praelibato tractatu de anima, restat tractare de 5 benedicta incarnatione et dividitur in tredecim capitula: [1]
Primum declarat quod Christus est sua humanitas, et per consequens creatura. [2] Secundum quod haec sententia discrepat ab heresi Arriana. [3] Tertium quod Christus fuit homo in triduo. [4] Quartum ponit sententiam 10 modernorum ut veritas plus lucescat. [5] Quintum, supponendo quod Verbum non dimisit humanitatem in triduo, probat quod nec potest dimittere naturam quam assumpsit. [6] Sextum quod Christus sit univoce homo cum aliis hominibus, et quod sit creatura. [7] Septimum 15 ostendit quod Sapientia summe mobilis potest habitu inventa ut homo. [8] Octavum obicit contra identitatem specificam Christi cum aliis. [9] Nonum epilogat
Undecimum solvit instantias quibus moderni videntur fulcire suam sententiam, recitando decem ludicra quae concedentes possibilitatem dimissionis annuunt
16 summe mobilis] Cf. Sap. 7:24 | habitu … 17 homo] Phil. 2:7 156 consequenter. [12] Duodecimum recitat opiniones varias 25 de assumptione creaturae, et declarat quod si assumeret multas humanitates, foret multi homines, ut dicit Thomas.
[13] Tredecimum concordat modernorum
30
[Fol. 70r, ln. 19]
Capitulum Septimum
Nunc videndum est an Christus sit mobilis.
Ergo omnis persona divina est simpliciter immobilis, et sic 40
27 ut … Thomas] Cf. “Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens quod humana natura in omnibus suis suppositis a Verbo assumeretur. [1] Primo quidem, quia tolleretur multitudo suppositorum humanae naturae, quae est ei connaturalis. Cum enim in natura assumpta non sit considerare aliud suppositum praeter personam assumentem, ut supra dictum est; si non esset natura humana nisi assumpta, sequeretur quod non esset nisi unum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est persona assumens. [2] Secundo, quia hoc derogaret dignitati Filii Dei incarnati, prout est primogenitus in multis fratribus [Rom. 8:29] secundum humanam naturam, sicut est primogenitus omnis creaturae [Col. 1:15] secundum divinam. Essent enim tunc omnes homines aequalis dignitatis. [3] Tertio, quia conveniens fuit quod, sicut unum suppositum divinum est incarnatum, ita unam solam naturam humanam assumeret: ut ex utraque parte unitas inveniatur.” Thomas Aquinas, Tertia pars Summae theologiae q. 4, a. 5 co., Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII p. m. edita 11 (Romae: Sancta Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 1903), 85, col. a–b. 157 Christus non est passus, nec mortuus, nec cum hominibus conversatus.
Restat quod necesse est aliquam rem esse immobilem. Quod patet tripliciter: [1] Primo ex hoc quod omne motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto. Universitas 45 creata est mota. Ergo oportet quod mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terrae qui non commovebitur, et sic de aliis ordinatis simpliciter. Cum moveri sit imperfectionis et posse movere perfectionis simpliciter, patet quod prius est prima perfectio quam imperfectio exemplata. 50
[2] Secundo sic:
Multae sunt veritates aeternae immobiles. (Ut quod, Nihil simul est et non est; et Multa entia possunt esse.) 55 Sed omnem rem rationis oportet fundari in aliqua essentia absoluta. Ergo oportet dare essentiam immobilem cui innitantur. 60 [3] Tertio sic: Illa prima natura est in fine perfectionis possibilis, quia aliter non esset summe perfecta. Sed si moveri posset, perfici posset. Ergo moveri non poterit. Si enim moveri posset, hoc foret obiective, sed aeternaliter ordinat omnia, cum non capit suam speculationem
47 orbi … commovebitur] Ps. 92:1 158 activa mixta, cum aliud sit posse movere et
Supposito ergo quod aliqua res sit immobilis, hoc intelligendum est secundum naturam eius immobilem. Est tamen mobilis secundum aliam naturam sibi unitam.
Sapientia 7: Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia, quod intelligitur de Sapientia incarnata. Sicut enim motus 75 primi mobilis est quasi vita viventibus (8 Physicorum) quia influit perfectionem mundo, sic illa Sapientia incarnata est primum mobile efficacia et dignitate, cuius motu totus mundus perficitur, cum quaelibet creatura per
Christi passionem ad suam perfectionem primariam 80 instauratur. Colossenses 1 capitulo: Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra
74 Omnibus … sapientia] Sap. 7:24 76 quasi … Physicorum] Cf. «Τοῦτ᾽ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν;» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Aristotelis Physica 8.1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1966), 250b14–15. “Hoc inmortale et sine quiete inest his que sunt, ut vita quedam natura subsistentibus omnibus?” Aristoteles, Physcia: Translatio Vetus, ed. Fernand Bossier et Jozef Brams, vol. 7, fasc. 1.2, in Aristoteles Latinus (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 277. Vide etiam: Jacqueline Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974), p. 156, n. 199. 81 Deus … 83 sunt] Eph. 1:9–10 159 sunt, ut exponit Gregorius (31 Moralium 38), ascendendo ergo de limbo ad caelum velocissime.
Sed contra: Christus non est ante incarnationem. Ergo 85 scriba illius scripturae non intendebat ad litteram
83 Gregorius … 38] Cf. “Mediator uenit ut redempto humano genere illa angelica damna sarciret, et mensuram caelestis patriae locupletius fortasse cumularet…[Vnde] de Patre dicitur: Proposuit in eo, in dispensatione plenitudinis temporum, instaurare omnia Christo, quae in caelis, et quae in terra sunt in ipso [Eph. 1:9–10]. In ipso quippe restaurantur ea quae in terra sunt, dum peccatores ad iustitiam conuertuntur. In ipso restaurantur ea quae in caelis sunt, dum illuc humiliati homines redeunt unde apostatae angeli superbiendo ceciderunt.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob 31.49.99, ed. Marcus Adriaen, CCSL143B (Turnholt: Brepols, 1985), 1618. 90 maneat … aeternum] Heb. 7:24 | Iesus … 91 saecula] Heb. 13:8 92 De assumptione] Cf. “Vnde Dominus ad Iudaeos: Antequam Abraham, inquit, fieret, ego sum [Io. 8:58]. Quibus itaque uerbis ostendit se, qui loquebatur, in eo semper fuisse mysterio unitatis…Nam Abraham antequam fieret humanitatis est brevitas; Ego sum autem aeternitas naturae declaratur. In qua nimirum aeternitate, iam se fuisse, qui loquebatur, per sacramentum suae incarnationis insinuat.” Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Ieronimus Stridonensis), De assumptione sanctae Mariae virginis 10.61, ed. Albertus Ripberger, CCCM 56C (Turnholti: Brepols, 1985), 137. 94 Abraham2 … 97 est] Io. 8:56
89 scripturae scripsi. naturae cod. 160 gavisus est (Iohannis 8). Et Augustinus (Homilia 43) notat quomodo Abraham misit servum suum ut peteret uxorem filio suo Isaac quem iuramento astrinxit. Pone manum tuam sub femore meo et iura per Deum caeli, quo signatur 100 de genere Abrahae venturum in carne Deum caeli et
Messiam de suo semine incarnandum.
Patet ergo quod ipsi
97 Augustinus … 43] Cf. “Pater Abraham quando misit seruum suum, ut peteret uxorem filio suo Isaac, hoc eum sacramento obstrinxit, ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret, et sciret etiam ipse quid faceret. Magna enim res agebatur, quando Abrahae semini coniugium quaerebatur. Sed ut hoc cognosceret seruus quod nouerat Abraham, quia nepotes non carnaliter desiderabat, nec de genere suo aliquid carnale sapiebat; ait seruo suo quem mittebat: Pone manum sub femore meo, et iura per Deum coeli. Quid uult Deus caeli ad femur Abrahae? Iam intelligitis sacramentum: per femur, genus. Ergo quae fuit illa iuratio, nisi quia significabatur de genere Abrahae uenturum in carne Deum coeli?” Augustinus Hipponensis, In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus 124, Tractatus 43.16, ed. D. Radbodus Willems, CCSL 36 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1954), 380. 99 Pone … 100 caeli] Cf. Gen. 24:3, 4, 9 105 Constat … 106 Dei] Cf. “Vnde constat tempus non praeiudicasse sacramentum uniti hominis ac Dei, ita ut iam esset in illo per unitatem personae ab initio saeculi, qui necdum erat natus de Maria uirgine, quod multis scripturarum declaratur indiciis.” Paschasius Radbertus, De assumptione 10.61, p. 136–137. 107 orationes … 110 liberari] Cf. Processionale ad usum insignis ac praeclarae ecclesiae Sarum, ed. W. G. Henderson (Leeds: M’corquodale & Co., 1882), 109. Manuale et processionale ad usum insignis ecclesiae Eboracensis, ed. W. G. Henderson, The Publications of the Surtees Society 63 (Leeds: McCorquodale, 1875), 169. 161 praedicta nec sunt nec possunt esse. Constat quod unumcumque illorum, cum sit nobis praeteritum et futurum suo tempore patribus veteris testamenti, quod vere est pro suo tempore et per consequens causa misericordiam impetrandi. Et istum modum loquendi 115 habet Apostolus (<1> Corinthios 10), “Neque tentemus
Christum sicut quidam eorum tentaverunt, non quod iam esset Iesus Christus natus ex Maria” Virgine, sed quia illa persona, quae tempore suo est Christus, est aeterna.
Sic ergo sancti patres
(Christus est, fuit, vel erit incarnatus), quam
Sicut enim propositio potest esse hic vera cum hoc quod 125 hic non sit suum primarium significatum (sed satis est quod ipsum sit
(sed satis est quod id sit
Et sic intelligendi doctores quod eadem est fides 130 patrum novi et veteris testamenti. Unde Gregorius (23
Moralium 15) exponens illud Iob, Semel loquetur Deus et
116 Neque … 117 tentaverunt] 1 Cor. 10:9 | Neque … 118 Maria] Cf. “Neque tentemus Christum, sicut quidam eorum tentauerunt. Non quod iam esset Iesus aut Christus natus ex Maria, sed quia in illo unico filio Dei iam unitas personae commendatur, quae occulta erat in mysterio.” Paschasius Radbertus, De assumptione 10.62, p. 137. 132 Semel … 133 repetet] Iob 33:14 162 secundo non repetet: “In Deo,” inquit, “dicere quodlibet
“Deo,” inquit, “nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc 140 ventura quae non apparent desunt, quia is qui semper esse habet cuncta sibi [fol. 70v] praesentia conspicit.” Et idem dicit Anselmus (Monologion 19).
Et nisi omne tempus praeteritum vel futurum fuerit
Deo praesens, paterentur theologi magnas angustias in 145 expositionibus scripturarum, ut (Psalmo 21) tempore
133 In … 135 licet] Cf. “Semel loquitur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetit, hoc intellegi subtilius potest, quod Pater unigenitum consubstantialem sibi Filium genuit. Loqui enim Dei est Verbum genuisse. Semel autem loqui est Verbum aliud praeter unigenitum non habere. Vnde et apte subditur: Et secundo idipsum non repetit, quia uidelicet hoc ipsum Verbum, id est Filium, nonnisi unicum genuit. Quod autem non ait, locutus est, sed loquitur, non uidelicet tempus praeteritum, sed futurum ponens, liquet omnibus quia Deo tempus nec praeteritum congruit, nec futurum. Tanto ergo in eo quodlibet tempus ponitur libere, quanto nullum uere…Inde itaque in eo dici proprie nullum licet. Verbum namque Pater sine tempore genuit.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob 23.19.35, p. 1170–1171. 135 Deus … 138 assistunt] Cf. “Quomodo ergo Deus praeteritorum reminiscitur, cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt eius nutui semper praesentia assistunt?” Ibid., 32.5.7, p. 1632. 139 Numquid … tui] Iob 10:5 140 Deo … 142 conspicit] Cf. “Eique nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc uentura, quasi quae non appareant desunt, quia is qui semper esse habet, cuncta sibi praesentia conspicit.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob 9.47.72, ed. Marcus Adriaen, CCSL 143 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1979), 507. 143 Monologion 19] Anselmus Cantuariensis, Monologion 19–24, vol. 1 in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia, ed. Francis Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), 33–44. 163 David dicit dicta Sapientia, Foderunt manus meas et pedes meos; quod dicitur quia immensa Dei aeternitas coassistit omni tempori praeterito vel futuro. Et ad dictum sensum loquitur sapiens Ecclesiastici 47, Christus purgavit 150 peccata ipsius, et sic intelligere instantiam factam. [1] Alii autem dicunt quod, extensive loquendo de motu, Sapientia increata movetur obiective a cognitis terminantibus eius actum. [2] Et hii dicunt
Et sic Augustinus de virtute sermonis salvat illud
Iohannis 10, Sermonem quem audistis non est meus, sed 165
147 Foderunt … 148 meos] Ps. 21:17 150 Christus … 151 ipsius] Ecclesiasticus 47:13 154 sint … 155 entis] Cf. «Ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἴδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Physica 3.1, ed. Ross, 201a8–9. “Quare motus et mutationis sunt species tot quot et entis.” Aristoteles, Physcia, ed. Bossier et Brams, 98. Vide etiam Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 148, n. 97. 165 Sermonem … 166 Patris] Io. 14:24
151 instantiam factam scripsi. instantia facta cod. 164 eius qui misit me Patris, quod dicit esse verum de virtute sermonis (Homilia 76). Non, inquit, paveamus. Non est minor Patre vel impar sibi. Non enim mentitus est. Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat. Non est 170 sibi contrarius, sed forte non sine mysterio ibi dixit pluraliter, hic singulariter, volens hic intelligere sermonem ipsum qui, cum sit Sermo vel Verbum Dei Patris et non sermo sui ipsius, verum dixit ad litteram. 175 Sermonem quem audistis, non est meus. Quod si grammaticus ex accusativo casu offenditur, potest dici quod facta constructione recta, non sit antithesis. (Nam qui non diligit Christum, non servat sermones, id est, sententias vel veritates quas praecipit observari.) Et ut 180 manifestet quid ex hoc sequitur, subiungit, Et sermonem quem audistis non servat. Et ut doceat quod ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur, subiungit, Non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris.
Redeundo ergo ad propositum conceditur quod aliqua 185 res
167 Homilia 76] Cf. “Et sermo quem audistis non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris, non miremur, non paueamus: non est minor Patre, sed non est nisi a Patre. Non est impar ipso, sed non est a seipso. Neque enim mentitus est dicendo: Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non seruat. Ecce suos dixit esse sermones; numquid sibi ipse est contrarius, ubi rursus dixit: Et sermo quem audistis non est meus? Et fortasse propter aliquam distinctionem, ubi suos dixit, dixit pluraliter, hoc est sermones; ubi autem sermonem, hoc est Verbum, non suum dixit esse, sed Patris, seipsum intellegi uoluit.” Augustinus Hipponensis, In Iohannis Evangelium, Tractatus 76.5, p. 519. 168 minor Patre] cf. Io. 14:28 169 Qui … 170 servat] Io. 14:24 176 Sermonem … meus] Io. 14:24 184 Non … Patris] Io. 14:24
182 non add. est meus, sed del. 183 Patri add. mg. 165 immobilis, sed sit suppositum mobile, quia Christus passus
Petrus, non potest taliter transmutari. Unde in omnibus et similibus oportet diligenter attendere ad praedicationem secundum essentiam et formalem. Et patet quod non sequitur 195 Deus est mobilis. Et omne aliud a Deo est mobile. Ergo omnis res est mobilis. quia aliqua res non est mobilis. Et si quaeritur, Quid non est mobile?, potest dici, aequivocando, quod nihil non est 200 mobile, quia natura divina est mobile. Et sic, intelligendo praedicationem secundum essentiam non-formalem,
OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE.
189 ipsa … 190 genita] Cf. Natura divina “non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius qui gignitur, et Spritus Sanctus qui procedit.” Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum 804, ed. Heinrich Denzinger et Peter Hünermann, 43a ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 268. 166 res, posito quod mobile praedicetur formaliter adiective. 210
Unde Augustinus in dialogo Ad Felicianum, “Genuit,” inquit, “et non genuit Maria Filium Dei.”
Introductum est enim in scholis theologicis contrariae quaestiones ex
(Genesis 3) Omnis enim quaestio attestatur ignorantiam vel peccatum. Non tamen est negandum quin quaestiones theologicae possunt tractari meritorie, cum Veritas quaesivit a peccatoribus multas quaestiones. Oportet tamen quod attendatur gloria Dei, quod superbia destruatur 220 et veritas detegatur. Quod amplius est in disputatione a
Malo est. Unde quaestio sicut et iuramentum occasione vel
211 Genuit … 212 Dei] Cf. “Genuit ergo Maria et non genuit Filium Dei: genuit, quando ex ipsa secundum carnem natus est Christus; non genuit quando de Patre sine initio exstitit Filius: genuit, quando ex hac Verbum caro processit, ut habitaret in nobis (cf. Io. 1:14); non genuit quando in principio erat Deus Verbum, quod originem praestitit universis. Nolite ergo partu virginis determinare originem Dei Verbi: nolite de virgine genitum corpus coaeternum dicere deitati; quia Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus (I Tim. 2:5) prima nativitate coaeternus est Patri, secunda particeps temporis nostri; in illa auctor temporis, in ista particeps est aetatis.” Vigilius Tapsensis (Pseudo-Augustinus Hipponensis), Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis 12, PL 42, 1167. 214 Cur … 215 paradisi] Gen. 3:1 221 a … 222 est] Mt. 5:37 222 iuramentum] Cf. Gen. 21:22–34 167 poena
Sed contra: [1] Arguitur quod Verbum Dei non sit 225 simpliciter mobile ratione assumpti homnis. (Nam nulla persona movetur propter habitum vel accidens essentialiter separatum.) Sed humanitas Christi est habitus Verbo Dei accidentaliter copulatus. Ergo propter eius actionem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei. Exemplum: 230
Homo non laceratur vel comburitur, etsi vestimenta eius taliter patiantur. [2] Simpliciter conceditur humanitas per tempus notabile non fuisse, quando tamen non conceditur
Verbum Dei conformiter non fuisse. Non ergo sequitur, si illa humanitas movebatur a non-esse ad esse, quod sic 235
Verbum. [3] Et (Genesis 22) Abraham non immolavit
Isaac sed arietem. Cum ergo passio Christi figurata allegorice per Isaac, videtur quod non persona Christi sed eius humanitas passa fuit.
Hic dicitur quod non esset concedendum Verbum pati 240 propter passionem humanitatis, nisi Verbum esset personaliter illa humanitas tam secundum corpus quam
223 Augustinum … 224 31] Cf. “Sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in litteris sanctis sunt, penetranda et dissoluenda, plurimum ualet; tantum ibi cauenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi aduersarium. Sunt enim multa, quae appellantur sophismata, falsae conclusiones rationum et plerumque ita ueras imitantes, ut non solum tardos, sed ingeniosos etiam minus diligenter attentos decipiant.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De doctrina Christiana 2.31.48, ed. Joseph Martin, CCSL 32 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1962), 65–66. 236 Abraham … 237 arietem] Gen. 22:13 168 secundum animam, et actiones et passiones sunt primo suppositorum. Sed pro nomine habitus notandum quod sumitur quadrupliciter, per Augustinum 83 quaestionum, 245 quaestione 73 super illo Philippenses 2, Habitu inventus
243 actiones … 244 suppositorum] Cf. «Αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (Aristotle’s Metaphysics) 1.1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1975), 1:981a16–17. “Actus autem et omnes generationes circa singulare sunt.” Aristoteles, Metaphysica [...] Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin- Diem, vol. 25, fasc. 3.2 in Aristoteles Latinus (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 12. Vide etiam: Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 115, n. 5. Cf. “Actiones sunt suppositorum et individuorum.” Aquinas, Tertia pars Summae theologiae q. 7, art. 13, resp, Opera omnia 11, p. 125, col. a. “Actiones singularium sunt secundum Philosophum.” Thomas Aquinas, De unione Verbi incarnati art. 1, arg. 16, ed. Walter Senner, Barbara Bartocci, et Klaus Obenauer, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 21 (Leuven: Peters, 2015), 90. 245 Augustinum … 246 73] Cf. “Multis modis habitum dicimus: [1] uel habitum animi, sicuti est cuiuscumque disciplinae perceptio usu roborata atque firmata; uel habitum corporis, secundum quem dicimus alium alio esse suculentiorem et ualidiorem, quae magis proprie habitudo dici solet; uel habitum eorum quae membris nostris accommodantur extrinsecus, secundum quem dicimus uestitum, calciatum, armatum, et si quod eiusmodi est. In quibus omnibus generibus, siquidem nomen hoc ductum est ab illo uerbo quod est habere, manifestum est in ea re dici habitum, quae accidit alicui, ita ut eam possit etiam non habere…Verumtamen hoc interest, quod quaedam eorum quae accidunt nobis ut habitum faciant non mutantur a nobis, sed ipsa nos mutant in se, ipsa integra et inconcussa manentia, sicuti sapientia cum accidit homini non ipsa mutatur, sed hominem mutat, quem de stulto sapientem facit. [2] Quaedam uero sic accidunt, ut et mutent et mutentur: sicuti cibus et ipse amittens speciem suam in corpus nostrum uertitur, et nos refecti cibo ab exilitate atque languore in robur atque ualentiam commutamur. [3] Tertium genus est, cum ipsa quae accidunt mutantur ut habitum faciant, et quodammodo formantur ab eis quibus habitum faciunt, sicuti est uestis; nam cum proiecta uel reposita est, non habet eam formam quam sumit cum induitur atque inducitur membris. Ergo induta accipit formam quam non habebat exuta, cum ipsa membra et cum induuntur et cum exuuntur in suo statu maneant. [4] Potest esse etiam quartum genus, cum ea quae accidunt ad faciendum habitum nec ea mutant quibus accidunt, nec ab eis ipsa mutantur, sicuti anulus digito, si non nimis subtiliter attendatur. Verumtamen hoc genus aut nullum est, si diligenter discutias, aut omnino rarissimum.” Augusitnus Hipponensis, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus 73.1, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CCSL 44A (Turnholti: Brepols, 1975), 209–210. 246 Habitu … 247 homo] Phil. 2:7 169 est ut homo. [1] Primo pro sapientia quae veritas est quam addiscimus quae manens non-mota movet animam quam informat. [2] Secundo pro alimentis habitis mutantibus corpus quod nutriunt, quae digestione facta adiacendo 250 subiecto dicuntur habitus, quia denominant subiectum habere quod sibi accidenter adiacet. [3] Tertio quando habituata formantur a subiectis habituatis, quando membrum induitur. [4] Quarto genus habitus ut anulus.
Omnia haec quattuor denominant subiecta habituari in 255 praedicacione secundum essentiam. Sed praeter istos modos [5] sumitur habitus pro qualitate praedicamentali de prima specie qualitatis, sive sit corporis habitus (ut sanitas), sive animae (ut virtus intellectualis, vel moralis, aut spiritualis). [6] Alio modo sumitur habitus pro forma 260 respectiva de decimo genere quod est habere vel habitio.
Dicitur ergo humanitas assumpta a Verbo habitus tertio modo, cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans personam quae praefuit. Ideo dicunt sancti quod humanitas
248 manens … movet] Cf. «Ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ.» Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.7, ed. W. D. Ross, 2:1072a25. “Est aliquid quod non motum mouet.” Aristoteles, Metaphysica [...] Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, 256. 262 humanitas … 264 praefuit] Cf. “Iste autem habitus non est ex primo genere, non enim manens in se natura hominis naturam dei commutauit; neque ex secundo, non enim et mutauit homo deum et mutatus ab illo est; neque ex quarto, non enim sic adsumtus est homo, ut neque ipse mutaret deum nec ab illo mutaretur; sed potius ex tertio: sic enim assumptus est, ut commutaretur in melius, et ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius atque coniunctius quam uestis ab homine cum induitur.” Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus 73.2, p. 211.
253 subiectis add. formantur, sed del. 254 membrum scripsi. membra cod. 257 praedicamentali scripsi. praeternaturali cod. 170 est quasi vestis detegens deitatem, et religiosi qui 265
Christum induunt habent habitus corporis. Ideo
Augustinus in dialogo Ad Felicianum dicit quod humanitas est accidens non inhaerens ut accidentia novem generum, sed contingenter ex tempore inest Verbo.
[1] Quantum ergo ad primam confirmationem vel 270 exemplum, patet quod similitudo non est sufficiens, cum humanitas Christi non solum sit ut vestimentum, sed vera
Christi
266 Christum induunt] cf. Gal. 3:27 267 Augustinus … Felicianum] Cf. “Non separo, ne Dei Patris unam secundum carnem, et alteram secundum majestatem introducere videar prolem: quia idem Dei Filius et sine initio processit ex Patre, et secundum tempus nasci est dignatus ex virgine. Impassibilis in suo, passus in nostro, dum incomprehensibilem majestatem velut quodam indumento carnis vestire est dignatus ex utero.” Vigilius Tapsensis, Contra Felicianum 9, PL 42, 1164. 171 correspondentiam figurati ad figuram. Aliter enim sequitur
Christi mobilitas.
Chapter 6: The Translation of the Shorter Text
Most serious scholarship in medieval studies now relies upon sound translations. As knowledge of foreign languages, especially Latin, continues to wane among English-speaking medievalists, reliable translations become all the more necessary if little-studied texts are to be received and thought through by the wider academic community. Contrary to what one might initially suppose, however, translations can also benefit scholars with excellent Latin. Especially when encountering a new author, Latin readers can have trouble understanding why a text editor judged a particular variant to be authentic and another to be an error. Appending an English translation to a critical edition is thus sometimes the most efficient way of explaining why a given variant has been deemed authentic. This translation, therefore, is intended not only to make the text accessible to those who do not know Latin, but also to justify to Latin readers editorial judgments that may otherwise be unclear.
A few remarks are in order here regarding the principles of translation presupposed by both chapters 6 and 8 of this dissertation. Controversies continue to rage over what constitutes a good translation. Contrary to what one might imagine, such controversy had already begun in earnest before 1950.1 Although some may argue that a translation according to the principles of dynamic equivalence would help unearth Wyclif’s thought for a contemporary audience, in my translation I have endeavored instead to follow the principles of formal equivalence whenever possible. It should be noted that the Wyclif scholars who have proofread my translation are pleased with the results. Heather Phillips, for instance, who wrote her doctoral dissertation on
1 For a relatively early defense of what is now called the dynamic equivalence approach to translation, see Ronald Knox’s pamphlet, On Englishing the Bible (London: Burns and Oates, 1949). 172 173 Wyclif’s Eucharistic doctrine with considerable input from Leonard Boyle, has assured me in an email of February 24, 2018 that my style of translation is particularly valuable because it usually preserves intact the Middle English syntax presupposed by Wyclif’s Latin.
More specifically, I have sought to make Wyclif speak to us again. He spent most of his life studying and teaching at Oxford. Consequently, I knew I had alighted upon the right idiom when I heard the text reading like a stereotypical Oxbridge lecture. I had frequent recourse to the
Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources, and when no definition quite fit the context,
Lewis and Short often provided just the right expression. Because Wyclif was opposed to whatever he perceived as an innovation in church life, only older translations of the Bible can capture the flavor of his texts. Thus, for Wyclif’s quotations of the psalms, I had recourse to the psalter in the 1662 Book of Common Prayer; for his quotations from the rest of the Bible, I quote the Authorized Version of 1611 except when it fails to capture the sense of the Vulgate. When the AV and the Vulgate diverge, I have had recourse to the Douay Rheims version of 1582 as revised by Bishop Challoner in 1749–1752. To aid readers’ comprehension, I have divided the text into its constituent parts and added explanatory material in square brackets. It should be stressed that this material is an editorial addition to the text in imitation of the marginalia found in Harris’s edition.
In the footnotes, I have usually translated in full the passages Wyclif refers to or quotes.
The Latin texts of these passages are in the apparatus of the critical editions. For translations of quotations from Aristotle, I have used standard translations from the original Greek, because it is fascinating to compare the text of Aristotle as Wyclif had received and manipulated it with what scholars take to be a faithful translation of the original. Finally, it should be stressed that the 174 apparatus of a critical edition is not a suitable place to direct readers to secondary literature. I have instead referred to pertinent scholarly works in chapters 11 and 12 of this dissertation.
175 Here begins British Library, Royal 7 B III, folio 66r.
Wyclif: On the Incarnation of the Word
Having first touched upon a treatise on the soul, it remains to treat of the blessed
Incarnation. [This treatise] is divided into thirteen chapters: (1) The first declares that Christ is his manhood and consequently a creature. (2) The second, that this doctrine differs from the
Arian heresy. (3) The third, that Christ was a man during the triduum. (4) The fourth states the opinion of the moderns that the truth may shine forth all the more. (5) The fifth, by establishing that the Word did not lose its manhood during the triduum, proves that it cannot lose the nature it assumed. (6) The sixth, that Christ is univocally man with other men, and that he is a creature.
(7) The seventh shows that the supremely mobile Wisdom (cf. Ws 7:24) can be in habit found as a man (Phil 2:7 DRV). (8) The eighth objects to the specific identity of Christ with others. (9)
The ninth makes a summary [of our position] on [Christ’s] manhood by telling the three roots [of modern error] and resolves three objections. (10) The tenth shows by twelve proofs that the assumed manhood is Christ. (11) The eleventh resolves the contradictions on which the moderns seem to base their opinion by citing ten trifles, granting which, they consequently assent to the possibility of the loss [of Christ’s manhood]. (12) The twelfth cites conflicting opinions regarding the assumption of the creature, and declares that if he were to assume many manhoods,
176 he would be many men, as [St.] Thomas says.2 (13) The thirteenth harmonizes [the opinions] of the moderns with [those of] the ancients.
Here begins folio 70r, line 19.
Chapter Seven
[Objection 1: No divine person, including Christ, can be mobile.]
Now let us see whether Christ is mobile. It seems that he is not, because then God would be mobile. But no god is mobile. Therefore, the conclusion [follows of necessity]. The minor premise is clear that something is naturally immobile. But there is nothing, if there is no God.
Therefore, God is immobile. But the one God is every god. Therefore, every god is immobile.
Therefore, every divine person is immobile without qualification, and so Christ did not suffer, die, or dwell with men.
[Response to objection 1, part 1: Three arguments proving that the first principle must be immobile.]
2 Cf. “I answer that it was not fitting that human nature in all its supposites be assumed by the Word: (1) First, because the multitude of supposites of human nature, which is natural to it, would be taken away, for [in that case] in the assumed nature one would not consider any supposite other than the person assuming, as was said above. If there were no human nature other than that assumed, it would follow that there would be only one supposite of human nature, which is the person assuming. (2) Secondly, this would detract from the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, precisely as the firstborn among many brethren (Rom. 8:29) according to his human nature, as he is ‘the firstborn of every creature’ (Col. 1:15) according to his divine [nature]. For then all men would be of equal dignity. (3) Thirdly, it was fitting that, as one divine supposite is incarnate, so also that he would assume only one human nature, that unity may be found on each side.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 3.4.5, body. 177 It follows that something is necessarily immobile. This is clear in three ways: (1) First from this, that everything that is moved must rest upon something fixed and unmoved. The created universe has moved. Therefore, the mixed things of earth must rest upon the round world that cannot be moved (Ps. 93:1), and so for other ordered things without qualification. [But] because being moved is [a sign] of imperfection and the ability to move [other things is a sign] of perfection without qualification, [this] primary perfection is clearly prior to the imperfection modeled upon it.
(2) Second:
There are many eternal and immobile truths. (For example, “Nothing can simultaneously be and not be”; and, “Many entities can be.”) But every being of reason must be established in some absolute essence. Therefore, one must grant that there is an immobile essence on which they rest.
(3) Third, that primary nature is at the end of [all] possible perfection, for otherwise it would not be supremely perfect. But if it could be moved, it could be improved. Therefore, it cannot be moved. For if it could be moved, it would be [moved] in the order of cognition, but it eternally orders all things, because it does not receive its theoretical or practical knowledge from things external to it. Therefore, it is not moved in the order of cognition by its effects, and much less [does it move] in respect of place, increase, or change. For otherwise in it passive potency would be mixed with active [potency], for the ability to move [other things] differs from the ability to be moved.
[Response to Objection 1, Part 2: Although the first principle is per se immobile, it is also mobile in virtue of Christ’s assumed manhood. It can therefore be the ultimate supposite and mover of mobile things.]
178 Having established, therefore, that there is something immobile, [we assert further that] this thing must be understood according to its immobile nature. Nevertheless, it is mobile according to another nature united to it. [As it says in] Wisdom 7:24, Wisdom is more moving than any motion, which we understand of the incarnate Wisdom. For as the motion of the prime mover is as it were the life of living things (Physics 8)3 because it causes its perfection to flow into the world, so that incarnate Wisdom is the prime mover in efficacy and dignity because by its motion the whole world is perfected, for every creature by Christ’s passion is being restored to its original perfection. [As it says in] Colossians 1, God purposed to restore in Christ all things, which are in heaven and in earth (Eph 1:9–10), as Gregory the Great explains (Moralia
31.38),4 by ascending therefore from limbo to heaven with the greatest velocity.5
[Objection 2: There was no Christ before the Incarnation.]
But on the contrary: There is no Christ before the Incarnation. Therefore, the author of that verse [i.e., Wisdom 7:24] did not intend the mobility of the incarnate Wisdom in the literal sense.
3 Cf. “Is [motion] in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally constituted things?” Aristotle, Physics 8.1 (250a14–15), trans. R. P Hardie and R. K. Gaye, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 354. 4 Cf. “The Mediator came that by the redemption of the human race he might make amends for the loss of the angels and perhaps make the measure of the heavenly country to overflow more richly…[Hence,] of the Father it is said, he purposed in himself that in the dispensation of the fullness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth even in him (Eph 1:9–10). In him indeed things on earth are being restored, while sinners are converted to righteousness. In him things in heaven are being restored, while humbled men return to that place whence the apostate angels fell by pride.” Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 31.49.99. 5 In the longer text, an entire paragraph intervenes between the reference to the Moralia and the words translated here as “by ascending therefore from limbo to heaven with the greatest velocity.” For more on this omission, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 179 [Reply to Objection 2: The created order, past and present, presupposes the fact of the Incarnation. Christ is consequently present to all times.]
We say that [this] consequence is not valid, because, insofar as all the past is present with
God, the Author of this verse well knew how Christ continueth ever (Heb. 7:24). Jesus Christ, today, tomorrow, the same forever (Heb. 13:8), which Jerome makes clear in his epistle “On the
Assumption” to Paula and Eustochius.6 The patriarch Abraham knew of Christ’s Incarnation
(i.e., that Christ is incarnate at his proper time). Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day (i.e., the time of the Incarnation and not only the day of eternity). He saw [it] and was glad (Jn 8:56).
And Augustine in Homily 43 notes how Abraham sent his servant to find a wife for his son
Isaac. [This servant] he bound with an oath. Put thy hand under my thigh and swear by the God of heaven (cf. Gn 24:3, 4, 9). By this, [Scripture] signifies that the God of heaven would come from the lineage of Abraham and that the Messiah would be incarnate of his seed.7
Evidently, therefore, they who were saved by the same faith as we believed in the Lord’s
Incarnation and that God is incarnate at his own time. “Time,” says Jerome, “certainly presents no obstacle to the mystery of man and God uniting.”8 And [our response] is clear to the frivolous
6 Cf. “Hence, the Lord [said] to the Jews, Before Abraham was, I am (Jn 8:58). And so with these words he showed that he, who was speaking, was always in the very mystery of unity [i.e., the Trinity]…For Before Abraham was is the shortness of human existence, but I am declares the eternity of the [divine] nature. Doubtless, he who was speaking, makes clear that he was then in eternity through the mystery of his Incarnation.” Paschasius Radbertus [Pseudo-Jerome], On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin 10.61. 7 Cf. “When father Abraham sent his servant to seek a wife for his son Isaac, he bound [the servant] by this oath to fulfill faithfully what he was bidden, and that he might also know what he was doing. For a great thing was taking place, when a spouse was sought for the seed of Abraham. But that the servant might recognize what Abraham knew, that he did not long for descendants according to the flesh and that he did not have anything carnal in mind regarding his posterity, he said to the slave he was sending, Put thy hand under my thigh and swear by the God of heaven (cf. Gn 24:9). What does the God of heaven have to do with Abraham’s thigh? Now you understand the oath. By ‘thigh’ [he means] ‘posterity.’ Therefore, what was that oath except that it meant that the God of heaven was to come in the flesh from Abraham’s descendants?” Augustine of Hippo, 124 Sermons on the Gospel of John, Sermon 43.16. 8 Cf. “For catching a whiff afar off of this field of the womb, the patriarch Isaac said, See, the smell of my son is as the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed (Gn 27:27). Although those who think too little imagine 180 objections to the prayers of the church beseeching God by [the Lord’s] holy Incarnation, nativity, circumcision, baptism, fasting, passion, death, and resurrection to be delivered from peril, for all the aforesaid [events of the Lord’s life] neither are nor can be.9 Certainly, although each of them is past to us and temporally future to the fathers of the old covenant, [each] truly does exist at its proper time and consequently is a cause of [the faithful past and present] obtaining mercy. And the Apostle speaks this way in I Corinthians 10:9, “neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted [him], not because Jesus Christ was already born of [St.] Mary”10 the Virgin, but because that person, who at his proper time is Christ, is eternal.
Therefore, regardless of when the holy fathers lived, they truly knew that Christ was, had been, and would be. And the propositions thus formed [by them] were true ([e.g.,] “Christ is, was,” or “shall be incarnate”), although it was not then true that Christ is incarnate. For as a proposition can be true here despite the fact that its primary denotation does not refer to here
(because it suffices that it be true somewhere), so a proposition can be true now despite the fact that its [primary] denotation does not refer to now (because it suffices that it be true at some time).
And the doctors [of the church] are to be understood in this way, [when they teach] that the faith of the fathers of the old and new covenants is the same. Hence, Gregory the Great in that the saints of the old covenant understood the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation less [than we do], [those saints] were saved by the same grace [as we]. Hence, time certainly presents no obstacle to the mystery of God and man uniting so that he, who had not yet been born of the Virgin Mary, was already in [time] from the beginning of the world through the unity of his person. Many Scriptural proofs declare this fact.” Paschasius Radbertus, On the Assumption 9.60–10.61. 9 That is, the events of the Lord’s life invoked in the Litany, strictly speaking, are neither now nor can at present be, because they are unrepeatable events of the past. 10 Cf. “The Apostle Jude wishes to explain this fact quite openly. Jesus, he says, having saved the people out of the land of Egypt, did afterwards destroy them that believed not (Jude 1:5 DRV). And Paul [says] in another place, Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted [him], not because Jesus or Christ was already born of Mary, but because in that single Son of God the unity of his person was already declared which had been hidden in a mystery.” Paschasius Radbertus, On the Assumption 10.61. 181 Moralia 23.19 explains Job 33:14: God shall speak once, and shall not repeat not the selfsame thing the second time [DRV]. “Speaking presumptuously,” he says, “one may predicate any
[time] of God, because properly speaking none may be predicated of him.”11 In Moralia 32.9, he gives the reason [for this]: “God does not remember the past because the past in itself is always present to his sight.”12 And he also gives a notable example of this point in Moralia 9.25 on Job
10:5, Are thy days as the days of man? “The past,” he says, “has not passed for God, nor are the things yet to come, which do not [yet] appear, lacking [to him], for he who always has being sees all things as present to him.”13 And Anselm says the same in Monologion 19.14
And unless all time, past or future, were present to God, theologians would suffer great difficulties in the expositions of Scripture, as in the time of David Wisdom says the words, They have pierced my hands and my feet (Ps. 22:16). This is said because God’s vast eternity coexists with every time, past or future. And the wise man of Ecclesiasticus 47:11 speaks in this sense,
Christ took away his sins, and so one should understand [any other] given instance [of the
Scriptures].15
11 Cf. “God speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time. [Job 33:14] This can be understood rather ingeniously, [namely] that the Father begot the only begotten Son as consubstantial with himself. For God’s speaking is his having begotten the Word. But to speak once is to have no Word other than the Only Begotten. Hence, it aptly adds, ‘and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time,’ i.e., he begot only this Word, i.e., the Son. But because he does not say ‘has spoken,’ but ‘speaketh’…it is clear to all that neither the past tense nor the future befits God. Therefore, any tense is predicated of him loosely, but none truly…Hence, no [tense] can be properly said of him, for the Father begot the Word without time.” Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 23.19.35. 12 Cf. “How, therefore, does God remember the past, when the past in itself is always present to his will?” Ibid., 32.5.7. 13 Cf. “And to him the past is not past, nor are the things that are yet to come lacking, as though they did not appear, because he who always has being sees all things as present to himself.” Ibid., 9.47.72. 14 In Monologion 19, Anselm addresses the ways in which “nothing” can be said to be before and after God. He does not, however, there address how all times are simultaneously present to God. Perhaps Wyclif has in mind Monologion 20–22 and 24 instead, where Anselm explains how God can be said to be present to all times and to none, but there Anselm emphasizes only God’s presence to the finite order, not that order’s presence to God’s eternity. Thus, Wyclif’s citation of Monologion 19 to support his point here is slightly sloppy. 15 In the Bibles we are used to, Ecclesiasticus 47:11 (or vs. 13 in the Vulgate tradition) reads “the Lord” and not “Christ.” 182
[Objection 2 being refuted, other interpretations of Wisdom 7:24 are considered.]
(1) While speaking of motion broadly, however, some [senses of Scripture] say that the uncreated Wisdom moves in the order of cognition by the thoughts that delimit its act. (2) Other
[senses of Scripture] say that because “there are as many kinds of motion as there are [kinds] of being”16 and [because] God continuously acquires dominions at every point of the world, that in that manner of relative motion [the divine Wisdom] is supremely mobile. (3) A third [degree of interpretation] says that in every motion an order of priority is given according to the successive denomination of the subject in the matter of motion, and every such thing according to its intelligible being is ordered and delineated eternally in the uncreated Wisdom, and for these reasons [the divine Wisdom] is figuratively called supremely mobile. But the first exposition is more true and more literal.
[Other Scriptural passages touching upon the Incarnation are interpreted in the same way.]
And thus Augustine saves the literal sense of John 10, The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me (Jn 14:24), which he says is literally true in Homily 76.
Let us not be afraid, he says. [Christ] is not less than the Father (cf. Jn 14:28) or unequal to himself. Surely, he has not lied. He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words (Jn 14:24 DRV). Nor does he contradict himself, but perhaps not without mystery there he uses the plural [and] here the singular, wishing [us] here to understand the word itself which, because he is the Speech or Word of God the
16 Cf. “Hence there are as many types of motion or change as there are meanings of the word is.” Aristotle, Physics 3.1 (201a8–9), trans. Hardie and Gaye, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. McKeon, 354. 183 Father and not the speech of himself, has spoken the literal truth.17
The word which ye hear is not mine (Jn 14:24). But if a grammarian is offended by the accusative case, it can be said that the correct construction was used, not its opposite. (For he who does not love Christ does not keep his words, i.e., the sayings or truths he commands to be observed.) And to manifest what follows from this, he adds, “And the word which ye hear he keepeth not.”18 And to teach that this Word is the same essentially as the Father, although personally different, he adds, is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me (Jn 14:24).
[The author returns to his main point: God is not mobile, but he is a mobile supposite.]
Therefore, to return to the matter at hand, we grant that there is something which, because it is the divine nature, is altogether immobile. It is, however, a mobile supposite, because Christ has suffered, for example. The divine nature is the Word begotten both eternally and temporally, and yet the divine nature is not begotten.19 Peter eats, dies, or changes in some other way, and yet the specific nature that Peter is cannot change in such a way. Hence, in all similar cases one must
17 Cf. “And the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me. Let us not wonder or be afraid. He is not less than the Father, but he only exists from the Father; he is not unequal to himself, but he is not from himself. Neither has he lied by saying, He that loveth me not keepeth not my words. Behold, he said that the words are his own. On the other hand, he has not contradicted himself, has he, when he said And the word which ye hear is not mine? And perhaps [he said this] because of some distinction. When he spoke his own [words], he used the plural, i.e., ‘words’; but where he said ‘word,’ i.e., the Word, he did not speak his own [word], but he wanted himself to be understood [as the Word] of the Father.” Augustine of Hippo, Tractate on the Gospel of John 76.5. 18 Here the shorter text is not entirely intelligible without recourse to the longer text. Wyclif is concerned with what appears to be a grammatical error in the Vulgate version of John 14:24: Et sermonem quem audistis non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris” (And the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me), where grammatically we would expect to find “sermo” and not “sermonem.” To rectify this apparent error, in the longer text Wyclif proposes that readers supply the additional words “non servat” from earlier in verse 24. If we do so and change the punctuation accordingly, Wyclif’s revised text would read, “He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words. And the word which ye hear he keepeth not. It is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me.” 19 Wyclif probably has part of the Fourth Lateran Council’s condemnation of Joachim of Fiore in mind here. Cf. The divine nature “does not beget, is not begotten, and does not proceed, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds.” D. 804. 184 diligently attend to essential predication and formal predication. Clearly, [the following syllogism] does not follow:
God is mobile. And everything other than God is mobile. Therefore, everything is mobile. because something is non-mobile. And if the question is posed, “What is non-mobile?”, we can say by equivocation that nothing is non-mobile, because the divine nature is a mobile. And thus, by understanding essential, but not formal, predication, EVERYTHING THAT IS, IS A MOBILE.
But on the contrary: There seems to be a contradiction. Someone may say that by granting the limiting statement of this universal “Everything is mobile,” I form the argument thus: “Only a mobile thing is a thing,” which is false for things eternal. I could, nevertheless, grant that “Nothing other than a mobile is a thing,” by taking “mobile” essentially as a substantive; and yet, “Something other than a mobile is a thing,” granted that “mobile” be predicated formally as an adjective. Hence, Augustine in his dialogue To Felician says, “Mary
[both] did and did not beget the Son of God.”20
[Sophists at Oxford are chastised for their conceited displays of pseudo-science.]
20 Cf. “Therefore, Mary [both] did and did not beget the Son of God. She did beget [him], when Christ was born of her according to the flesh; she did not beget [him], when the Son existed of the Father without beginning. She did beget [him], when the Word [made] flesh proceeded from her that he might dwell among us (cf. Jn 1:14); she did not beget [him], when in the beginning God was the Word (Jn 1:1) that granted a beginning to all things. Do not limit the beginning of God the Word by the Virgin Birth; do not say that the body begotten of the Virgin is coeternal with the Godhead, for the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tm 2:5), by his first birth is coeternal with the Father, and by a second [birth] is partaker of our own time. By the prior [he is] the author of time; by the latter, a sharer of the human realm.” Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine of Hippo), Dialogue to Felician the Arian on the unity of the Trinity 12. 185 Disingenuous questions were surely introduced in theological schools by a sin of Lucifer.
Why, he asked, hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? (Gn
3:1 DRV) Indeed, every question bears witness [either] to ignorance or to sin. Nevertheless, it must not be denied that theological questions can be discussed meritoriously, for Truth [himself] asked many questions of sinners (cf. Jn. 14:6). Nevertheless, one must mind the glory of God, that pride be laid waste and the truth laid bare. All else in [theological] disputation is of the Devil
(cf. Mt 5:37). Hence, questions, like oaths (cf. Gn 21:22–34), were introduced [into the world by at least] the occasion, [if not also] the penalty, of sin, as Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine
2.31.21
[Objection 3: Whereas Christ’s manhood suffered on the Cross, God did not.]
But on the contrary: (1) Some argue that the Word of God is not mobile without qualification by reason of its assumed manhood. (For no person moves because of a habit or an essentially separate accident.) But Christ’s manhood is a habit joined accidentally to the Word of
God. Therefore, the passion of the Word of God does not follow from [Christ’s] action or passion. For example, a man is not torn or burnt, even if his clothes undergo such action. (2) We grant without qualification that [Christ’s] manhood did not exist for a notable time. We do not,
21 Cf. “But especially important is the discipline of disputation, which must be entered into and worked out for all kinds of questions that present themselves in the study of the Scriptures. One must nevertheless be on one’s guard against the urge to quarrel and against a certain childish display in order to deceive one’s opponents. For there are many false conclusions of arguments called ‘fallacies’ that very often so imitate true [arguments] that they deceive not only the dull-witted, but also brilliant people who are not paying full attention.” Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Doctrine 2.31.48. In the longer text the content of this paragraph and the one immediately preceding are in reverse order. The reference to On Christian Doctrine introduces material that is lacking here. For more on this textual disarrangement, see Chapter 3.
186 however, correspondingly grant that at the same time the Word of God did not exist. Therefore, it does not follow that if that manhood was moved from non-being to being, the Word was too.
(3) And in Genesis 22:13, Abraham did not sacrifice Isaac but a ram. Therefore, because Christ’s passion was prefigured allegorically by Isaac, it seems that the person of Christ did not suffer, but [only] his manhood.
Here we say that one should not grant that the Word suffers because of the suffering of its manhood, unless the Word personally were that manhood as regards both body and soul, and
[unless the incarnate Word’s] actions and passions pertain in the first place to [these] supposites
[i.e., to Christ’s body and soul]. But we must note that the word “habit” is taken in four ways, as
Augustine says in the Eighty-three Questions, question 73 on Philippians 2:7, being…in habit found as a man (DRV). (1) [“Habit” is understood] first as the wisdom that is the truth we learn, which, “remaining unmoved, moves”22 the soul it informs. (2) Secondly, [“habit” is understood] as the nutrients that, once eaten, change the body they nourish. Once digestion occurs by association with the subject, these are called “habits,” because they specify that a subject “has” what associates with it accidentally. (3) Thirdly, [a “habit” occurs] when habituated things are formed by habituated subjects, as when a part of the body is clothed. (4) Fourthly, there is the kind of habit like a ring.23 All four of these specify that subjects are habituated by essential
22 “There is something which moves without being moved.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7 (1072a25), trans. W. D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 879. 23 Cf. “We use the word ‘habit’ in many ways: (1) either ‘mental habit,’ e.g., the comprehension of any discipline solidified by use, or ‘bodily habit,’ as when we say that one person is stronger or more vigorous than another. (Usually, [‘habit’ in this sense] is more properly called a ‘disposition.’) [In this sense,] ‘habit’ [is also taken for] those things that are outwardly put on the body, e.g., clothing, shoes, weapons, and anything of that kind. In these instances, since the noun derives from the verb ‘to have,’ clearly ‘habit’ is predicated of that which happens to someone, such that he or she can also not have it…This, nevertheless, is important that certain of those things that happen to us such that they produce a ‘habit’ [in us] are not changed by us, but in themselves change us, while their permanency remains whole and unshaken, as when wisdom comes to a man and does not change [thereby], but [rather] changes the fool to make him wise. (2) Certain things, however, so happen that they change and are changed, e.g., food, which loses its appearance and is turned into our body, and we refreshed by the food go from 187 predication. But besides these ways (5) “habit” is understood as the preternatural quality of the first species of quality, be it a “habit of the body” (e.g., health), or a “[habit of] the soul” (e.g., intellectual, moral, or spiritual virtue). (6) In another way, “habit” is understood as the respective form of the tenth genus, which is “to have” or “the act of having.”
Therefore, we say that the manhood assumed by the Word [is] a habit in the third way, because it comes to a being in act, not changing the person it was before.24 For this reason, the saints say that [Christ’s] manhood is as it were a garment covering the Godhead, and vowed religious who have put on Christ (cf. Gal. 3:27) have a bodily habit. For this reason, Augustine in his dialogue To Felician says that [Christ’s] manhood is an accident, not inhering like the accidents of the nine genera, but contingently belonging to the Word in time.25
(1) Therefore, as regards the first objection26 or example, the comparison clearly does not suffice, because Christ’s manhood is not only like a garment, but is Christ’s true quiddity
weakness and sluggishness to strength and vigor. (3) The third kind is when those things that happen [to the body] change while producing a habit, and in a certain sense are given shape by those things in which they produce the habit, e.g., clothing. For when it is cast or taken off, [clothing] does not have that shape which it takes when it is worn and covers the body. Therefore, put on, it takes on a shape it does not have when it is taken off, while the parts of the body, both when clothed and when bare, remain in their own state. (4) There can also be a fourth kind [of ‘habit’], when those things that happen to produce a habit neither change those things to which they come nor are changed by them, e.g., a ring on a finger, if one does not particularly pay attention [to it]. This kind, nevertheless, is either non-existent, if you scrutinize it closely, or extremely rare.” Augustine of Hippo, Eighty-three Different Questions 73.1. 24 Cf. “This habit is not of the first kind, for human nature does not change the divine nature while remaining unchanged. Nor is it of the second kind, for man has not changed God while being changed by him. Nor [is] it of the fourth [kind], for man was not so assumed that he neither changed God nor was changed by him. It is rather of the third kind, for [man] was assumed that he might be changed for the better, and was ineffably shaped by [God] more excellently and more intimately than [any] clothing worn by man.” Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions 73.2. 25 Cf. “I do not separate [the two natures] lest I seem to introduce one offspring according to the flesh and another according to the [divine] majesty. For the same Son of God has both proceeded from the Father without beginning and deigned to be born of the Virgin in time. Impassible in his own [nature], he suffered in ours, since he deigned to clothe his incomprehensible majesty, as it were, with the garment of [our] flesh from the [Virgin’s] womb.” Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine), Dialogue to Felician 9. 26 The word translated here as “objection” literally means “corroboration.” Wyclif means to say, “as regards the corroboration of my response to the first objection…” 188 personally and not an addition.27 (2) As regards the second, I deny the consequence, because motion, passion, and [other] similar positive [features], although they are personal predicates, are to be granted to the person of the Word principally by reason of the assumed form [of man].
They [are] not, however, thus negations, which are not predicates. For this reason, I say that the beginning [of the Incarnation] is clearly not “being” and “previously not having been,” but it is caused in virtue of these [principles] because it can be eternal, and the one making a merely instantaneous beginning cannot make the said negation. For this reason, [the objection] is not necessary if God is begotten in time as that which he was not before, because it suffices that he be that thing by force of generation that in effect he was not before. (3) As regards the third, clearly the correspondence of signified to signifier is not necessary in every respect. Otherwise, the mobility of Christ follows.
27 The words rendered here as “and not an addition” are the best that can be done with the scholastic gibberish of “tamen non et.” Chapter 7: The Critical Edition of the Longer Text
Because the editing principles used to produce both the shorter and longer texts are the same, only a little additional information is necessary here to supplement what was said at the beginning of chapter 5. Only two emendations to the longer text have been deemed necessary:
537 Primo pro qualitate praedicamentali de prima specie qualitatis, sive sit habitus corporis
scripsi. passionali ABCQ; praeternaturali GHOP
592 Primo quod facit suppositum cui advenit esse aliud quam praefuit, quia priusquam Verbum fuit pure deitas, nunc est homo.
scripsi. postquam codd.
The second of these should require very little justification, for the medieval abbreviations for priusquam and postquam are very similar and the context absolutely requires the alteration. The first is the more difficult case. On my own, I would have judged praeternaturali to be correct, as
Harris did. Thankfully, Dr. Noone pointed out the need to emend the text and saved me from vain speculation regarding Wyclif’s doctrine of prelapsarian man.
189
190 De incarnatione Verbi
Prologus
Praelibato tractatu de anima qui introductorius est 5 propter incarnationis mysterium cognoscendum, restat tractatum de benedicta incarnatione operosius aggredi cum diligentia, reverentia, et timore: [1] Cum diligentia, quia nulla materia est intellectui difficilior, et per consequens oportet mentem dare operam plus attentam. [2] Cum 10 reverentia, quia nulla materia theologica est affectui pretiosior, cum sub uno comprehendit involucro totius creationis et recreationis venerabile sacramentum. [3] Et cum timore, quia sicut in nulla materia quis compendiosius promeretur, sic nullibi facilius aut 15 periculosius oberratur.
Dividitur autem iste tractatus in tredecim capitula quorum:
[1] Primum, declarando ex testimoniis sanctorum quod humanitas sit Christus et per consequens creatura, 20
1 De … Verbi] De incarnatione A mg. alt. man.; Tractatus de incarnatione magistri Iohannis Wyclif B; De benedicta incarnatione Iohannis Wiklif C mg. alt. man.; De incarnatione Christi G mg. alt. man.; om. P; De incarnatione Christi Q mg. 3 Prologus om. CGOPQ 5 est om. P 7 aggredi cum inv. C 9 intellectui] intellectu G 11 nulla om. O 12 comprehendit add. et B | involucro] involuto CPQ 13 creationis om. O 15 promeretur] promeret BGQ | sic] et P 16 oberratur] aberratur CGHOPQ 17 iste] ille C | iste tractatus inv. GHOP | in om. O 19 ex … 20 Christus] quod humanitas sit Christus ex testimoniis sanctorum B 191 dat sensum doctorum in scripturis et in symbolo quae videntur huic opposita.
[2] Secundum capitulum declarat quomodo ista sententia discrepat ab heresi Arriana.
[3] Tertium capitulum ostendit quod Christus fuit 25 homo in triduo, et obicit multipliciter ac dissolvit.
[4] Quartum capitulum iuxtaponit sententias modernorum doctorum ut veritas plus lucescat.
[5] Quintum capitulum, supponendo quod Verbum non dimisit humanitatem pro triduo, probat quod nec 30 potuit dimittere naturam quam assumpsit.
[6] Sextum capitulum ostendit quod Christus sit univoce homo cum aliis hominibus, et respondendo obiectibus, declarat quod Christus est secundum multorum doctorum testimonia creatura. 35
[7] Septimum capitulum, declarando mobilitatem
Christi, explanat sensum scripturae multis ambiguum, quomodo Sapientia summe mobilis sit habitu inventa ut homo.
[8] Capitulum octavum obicit tripliciter contra 40 identitatem specificam Christi cum aliis et dissolvit.
38 Sapientia … mobilis] Cf. Sap. 7:24 | habitu … 39 homo] Phil. 2:7
21 doctorum] dictorum GHOP | et om. B | in2 om. CQ 25 Christus] Christo O 26 ac] et ABCHPQ 27 sententias] sententiam GOP 29 capitulum om. O 30 probat om. O 33 hominibus om. GOP 34 obiectibus] obiectionibus O 35 doctorum om. C | testimonia] testimonium ACQ 36 mobilitatem … 37 Christi inv. ABCHQ 37 ambiguum] ambiguae GOP 38 mobilis om. C 40 Capitulum octavum inv. ABCQ 192 [9] Capitulum nonum epilogat positionem de humanitate, et narrando tres radices causantes modernorum discrepantias, dissolvit tres obiectus eorum per ordinem. 45
[10] Capitulum decimum suadet duodecim evidentiis quod humanitas assumpta sit Christus, et hoc roborat doctorum testimoniis et exemplis.
[11] Capitulum undecimum solvit instantias quibus moderniores doctores videntur fulcire suam sententiam, 50 recitando decem ludicra quae concedentes, possibilitatem dimissionis annuunt consequenter.
[12] Capitulum duodecimum, recitando opiniones varias de assumptione creaturae, declarat quod si assumeret multas humanitates, foret multi homines, sicut 55 dictat sententia sancti Thomae.
56 sententia … Thomae] “Respondeo dicendum quod non fuit conveniens quod humana natura in omnibus suis suppositis a Verbo assumeretur. [1] Primo quidem, quia tolleretur multitudo suppositorum humanae naturae, quae est ei connaturalis. Cum enim in natura assumpta non sit considerare aliud suppositum praeter personam assumentem, ut supra dictum est; si non esset natura humana nisi assumpta, sequeretur quod non esset nisi unum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est persona assumens. [2] Secundo, quia hoc derogaret dignitati Filii Dei incarnati, prout est primogenitus in multis fratribus [Rom. 8:29] secundum humanam naturam, sicut est primogenitus omnis creaturae [Col. 1:15] secundum divinam. Essent enim tunc omnes homines aequalis dignitatis. [3] Tertio, quia conveniens fuit quod, sicut unum suppositum divinum est incarnatum, ita unam solam naturam humanam assumeret: ut ex utraque parte unitas inveniatur.” Thomas Aquinas, Tertia pars Summae theologiae a quaestione 1 ad quaestionem 59, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis
43 et] ut C 45 per] in O 47 quod] quid G | hoc om. BGOP 48 doctorum] sanctorum GOP 49 Capitulum om. P | solvit om. P 51 ludicra] ludicria GOP 55 assumeret] assumens P | foret] forent C, sed corr. 56 dictat] dicta P 193 [13] Capitulum tredecimum confirmat aliorum sententias quod tunc nec foret unus homo nec multi homines, sed et unicus atque multi. Et sic concordat modernorum sententias cum antiquis. 60
…
Capitulum Septimum
65
Secundo principaliter arguitur non esse concedendum quod Christus est mobilis. (Nam si Christus sit mobilis, tunc Deus est mobilis.) Sed nullus deus est mobilis. Ergo nec Christus. Minor sic arguitur: Aliqua res est immobilis, sed nulla si non Deus. Ergo Deus est immobilis. Et cum 70 unus Deus sit omnis deus, sequitur quod omnis deus, et per consequens omnis persona divina, est simpliciter immobilis, et per consequens nulla est mobilis. Si ergo
Deus sit mobilis et omne aliud a Deo sit mobile, sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile. Ex quo 75 sequitur quod Christus non sit passus, mortuus, aut cum
XIII p. m. edita 11 (Romae: Sancta Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 1903), 4.5 co., p. 85, col. a–b.
57 aliorum … 58 sententias] dicta aliorum ABCQ 58 quod] quae O nec1 … unus] unus nec foret C 60 antiquis add. Explicit prologus A 64 Capitulum Septimum om. C 66 arguitur om. B 67 est] sit GHOP sit] est B 68 deus om. C | est mobilis2 om. O 69 arguitur om. CGOPQ 70 sed … immobilis om. per hom. O | Et om. Q 71 deus2 om. P 72 omnis om. OP | est] sit GHOP 73 mobilis] immobilis OP 74 Deus sit inv. AB | omne] esse Q | sit2 om. B 75 ens] eius O | sit om. P | sic om. B; sit P 194 hominibus conversatus, cum tunc esset desinibilis et annihilabilis.
Hic dicitur quod necesse est aliquam rem esse omnino immobilem, quod patet tripliciter: [1] Primo ex 80 hoc quod omne motum oportet inniti alicui fixo immoto.
Universitas creata est mota. Ergo oportet illam inniti alicui fixo immoto. Sicut ergo mixta terrestria innituntur orbi terrae qui non commovebitur secundum centrum fluctuans huc aut illuc, sic omne motum, cum sit ordinatum sic 85 moveri ab alio, oportet stare in suis limitibus secundum ordinationem principalis ordinantis. Quia cum moveri sit imperfectionis et posse movere perfectionis simpliciter, patet quod prius est pura perfectio quam imperfectio exemplata. 90
[2] Secundo patet idem ex hoc quod veritates multae aeternae, tam affirmationes quam negationes, sunt omnino immobiles. (Ut quod, Nihil simul est et non est; quod,
Multa entia possunt esse, et cetera.) Cum ergo omnem rem rationis oportet fundari in absoluta essentia, sequitur quod 95 oportet dare essentiam vel naturam immobilem cui innixae praedictae veritates immobilitatem suscipiunt.
83 orbi … 84 commovebitur] Ps. 92:1
77 desinibilis] destruibilis GP; destructibilis HO 80 omnino om. B Primo] immo C 82 Universitas … 83 immoto om. per hom. ABCQ 83 Sicut] sic C 84 secundum om. C 85 sic1] sicut A | sic2 om. B 86 moveri] motu P | alio] illo B 87 principalis] principaliter GHOP ordinantis] ordinatam P 91 hoc] hos O | quod] quia O 92 omnino] sunt O; omne P 94 entia] essentia C | et cetera om. ABCQ 96 cui] cum BCQ | innixae add. et OP 195 [3] Tertio patet idem ex hoc quod illa prima pura natura est in fine perfectionis possibilis, quia aliter non esset summe perfecta. Sed si moveri posset, posset perfici. 100
Ergo moveri non poterit. Si enim posset moveri, hoc foret potissime obiective. Sed aeternaliter ordinat omnia, cum non capit suam speculationem aut praxim a rebus extra.
Ergo non movetur a suis effectibus obiective, et multo minus localiter, augmentative, vel alterative. Aliter enim 105 esset in eo passiva potentia ante actum mixta cum potentia activa, cum aliud sit posse movere et aliud posse moveri.
Et sic varie posset perfici et imperfici, quod non competit summe bono.
Supposito ergo quod sit aliqua res et aliquid omnino 110 immobile, consequenter dicendum est quod necesse est quidquid quod poterit esse, esse mobile. Patet sic: Non est possibile aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata. Omnis essentia creata est mobilis. Omnis essentia increata est mobile. Ergo conclusio. Minor patet 115 ex hoc quod essentia increata est suppositum mobile. Ergo
98 pura om. GHOP 99 possibilis] possibiliter P 100 moveri posset inv. CHO | posset2 om. P 101 enim] autem HO | posset moveri] moveri poterit GOP; moveri posset H 102 ordinat omnia inv. P 103 suam speculationem inv. B | aut] vel G; om. OP 104 non add. potest A mg. alt. man. | movetur] moveri AB | effectibus] affectibus Q 105 localiter] locatur O | augmentative] augmentatem B | alterative] alteritatem B 106 eo] ea B 107 movere … posse2 om. per hom. B 108 sic om. B posset] potest AB 109 summe] summo P 110 quod] quot C | sit om. C aliquid] aliud B 111 necesse est om. B 112 poterit esse] fuerit GOP esse2 om. C 113 aliquid esse inv. GOP | illud] istud ABCQ | sit] sicut CQ 114 essentia1 om. AB | essentia increata inv. CQ 115 increata] creata, sed corr. A lin. | mobile] immobilis P 116 mobile om. ABCQ 196 illa est mobile. Consequentia patet, quia ipsa est res mobilis, eo quod est persona Verbi quae moveri poterit, et nedum hoc, sed habet naturam sibi unitam secundum quam moveri sufficit. Et sic intelligo illud Sapientiae 7, 120
Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia, quod dictum
(ut mihi videtur) potest catholice intelligi et vere ad litteram de Sapientia aeterna suo tempore incarnata quae, cum attrita sit secundum humanitatem assumptam propter scelera nostra, bonificans et vivificans omnia ultra hoc 125 quod sufficeret vel poterit alia creatura, habuit nimirum motionem fontalem quae principiat quasi vita omnem motionem mundi sensibilis et cuiuslibet suae partis. Sicut ergo Aristoteles (8 Physicorum) imaginatur motum primi mobilis esse quasi vitam viventibus, cum mediante illo 130 influitur perfectio mundo supposito, sic verissime sine fictitia illa Sapientia est primum mobile efficacia et
121 Omnibus … Sapientia] Sap. 7:24 124 attrita … 125 nostra] Is. 53:5 129 8 Physicorum] Cf. «Τοῦτ᾽ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι πᾶσιν;» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Τὰ φυσικά (Aristotelis Physica) 8.1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeum Clarendonianum, 1966), 250b14–15. “Hoc inmortale et sine quiete inest his que sunt, ut vita quedam natura subsistentibus omnibus?” Aristoteles, Physcia: Translatio Vetus, ed. Fernand Bossier et Jozef Brams, vol. 7, fasc. 1.2, in Aristoteles Latinus (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 277. Vide etiam: Jacqueline Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval étude historique et édition critique (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974), p. 156, #199.
117 illa] ista P | quia] quod C | ipsa] illa B 118 mobilis om. ABCGPQ eo] ea B | poterit] potest P 119 sibi om. ABCQ | unitam] unicam C 120 illud om. O 121 mobilibus] motibus, sed corr. Q mg. alt. man. mobilior est inv. H 122 ut om. P 123 aeterna om. GOP 124 assumptam] assumpta P 125 ultra hoc om. B 126 vel] hoc A, sed exp.; hoc BCQ | poterit om. AB 127 quae] qua ABHQ 130 vitam] vita C 131 perfectio add. Domini A, sed cancel. 197 dignitate secundum assumptum hominem, mediante cuius motu primo omnium totus mundus ante et post perficitur, cum quaelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad 135 perfectionem primariam, qua Deo serviret et placito homini, instauratur. Non quod propter devotionem finguntur falsa, sed quod verissime, de vi sermonis, secundum seriem verborum primum mobile sit Sapientia increata, et quod eius motus vel passio perficit plus quam 140 motus caeli quamlibet creaturam aliam post vel ante. Nam quaelibet creatura citra hominem debet ex institutione primaria servire homini, et sic peccato primi hominis (a quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia) quodammodo peioratur. Cum ergo per 145 passionem et per consequens per motionem huius
Sapientiae, facta plena satisfactione, sit natura humana gloriosius restituta, patet quod ista passio rectificat omnem operationem naturae quae humano generi est subiecta. Et cum omnis servitus post et ante facta humano generi, non 150 interveniente ista redemptione, foret quodammodo cassata, patet quod compendiosius motu caeli vivificat praeterita et
134 omnium] omnis motus B | totus] totius B 135 quaelibet] quilibet P Christi om. Q, sed add. mg. alt. man. 136 primariam] pristinam A | et om. GHOP | et placito] placato et H | placito] placato GOP 138 vi om. O | sermonis add. aut A 139 secundum seriem] significationem B verborum add. debetur A mg. alt. man. | sit] sicut A 140 perficit add. hominem H 141 aliam om. ABCQ | vel] et P | Nam om. O 144 hodie om. CGOP; om. Q, sed add. ln. alt. man. | redundanter] redundantia O; redimantur P | haberet] hinc P 146 huius] humanae P 147 Sapientiae] Sapientia Q | satisfactione] satisfactio ABQ; satisfactionem C 148 quod om. C | rectificat] reaedificat ABCQ 150 omnis] omnia OP 198 futura. Et cum exinde dolus et peccatum demonum mitigatur, laetum angelorum consortium augmentatur, patet quod ultra possibilitatem motus caeli spiritualem 155 bonificat creaturam. Nec mirum quia motor intrinsecus huius motus fuit non intelligentia
Hebraeos 1 capitulo). Et illum credo esse sensum Apostoli
(ad Colossenses 1 capitulo), quando dicit quod Deus proposuit instaurare in Christo omnia quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt, ut exponit Gregorius (31 Moralium capitulo 38). 165
Sic ergo, intelligendo per Sapientiam personaliter
Verbum Dei ut docent Augustinus et Ieronimus, concedendum est quod ipsa sit summe mobilis. Immo,
159 tanto … 161 capitulo] Heb. 1:4 163 proposuit … 164 sunt] Eph. 1:9‒- 10 164 31 Moralium] Cf. “Mediator uenit ut redempto humano genere illa angelica damna sarciret, et mensuram caelestis patriae locupletius fortasse cumularet…[Vnde] de Patre dicitur: Proposuit in eo, in dispensatione plenitudinis temporum, instaurare omnia Christo, quae in caelis, et quae in terra sunt in ipso [Eph. 1:9–10]. In ipso quippe restaurantur ea quae in terra sunt, dum peccatores ad iustitiam conuertuntur. In ipso restaurantur ea quae in caelis sunt, dum illuc humiliati homines redeunt unde apostatae angeli superbiendo ceciderunt.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob 31.49.99, ed. Marcus Adriaen, CCSL143B (Turnholti: Brepols, 1985), 1618.
154 laetum] lectum OH | angelorum consortium inv. Q 155 spiritualem] specialem ABCQ 156 bonificat] vivificat C 157 huius] cuius A 158 spiritus pretiosissimus] species pretiosissima ABQ; species pretiosissimae C 159 qui] quae ABQ | tanto] tantae ACQ 161 Et … 162 capitulo om. per hom. ABCHOQ | illum] istum P 163 instaurare om. G 164 quae om. Q 167 Ieronimus] Iohannis O; Solnus P 168 est om. P 199 plus attendendo ad litteram, concedi potest quod dicta
Sapientia nedum fuit plus mobilis, sed plus effectualiter 170 movebatur quam alia creatura quoad velocitatem, quoad compendiositatem, et quoad generalitatem: [1] Quoad velocitatem, quia pro instanti suae generationis plena carismatum, post verisimiliter in sua ascensione movebatur recte tam velociter ut primum mobile 175 circulatur, vel ut est possibile quod aliquid moveatur, quia causa tardationis post discipulorum intuitum non est faciliter fingenda. Christus ergo, ex se ascendendo a limbo ad caelum ultimum, pertransiit velocissime longissimum spatium transmeabile. 180
[2] Quoad compendiositatem, patet quod eius brevis passio reduxit totum mundum post et ante ad maius temperamentum quam motus perpetuus primi mobilis suffecisset. (Principia enim secundum Aristotelem sunt minima quantitate.) 185
177 post … intuitum] Cf. Lc. 24:51; Act. 1:9–10 184 Principia … 185 quantitate] Cf. «Σχεδὸν γὰρ αὕτη πασῶν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐναντιώσεων τοῖς ἀποφηναμένοις τι περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως καὶ γέγονε καὶ γένοιτ᾽ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένοις γίνεται πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον. οἷον εἴ τις ἐλάχιστον εἶναι τι φαίη μέγεθος· οὗτος γὰρ τοὐλάχιστον εἰσαγαγὼν τὰ μέγιστα κινεῖ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. τούτου δ᾽αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες.» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Περὶ ὀυρανοῦ (Aristotelis de caelo: libri quattuor) A5, ed. D. J. Allan (Oxonii: Typographeum Clarendonianum, 1936), 271b6–13. Vide etiam Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 161, #20.
170 effectualiter] effectum aliter O 171 velocitatem add. et B | quoad2] quae ad O 173 suae om. P | generationis] incarnationis B 174 verisimiliter] visibiliter B, sed corr. lin. 176 circulatur] circulariter ABCHQ 177 post om. O 182 maius] magis B 183 quam] quod P 184 Principia] prima ABH; primi Q 185 minima quantitate inv. H 200 [3] Quoad generalitatem, patet cum Christus sit creatura corporea et creatura incorporea quarum utraque tam multipliciter movebatur, quod sit ceteris plus mobilis.
Movebatur quidem generatione et morte, augmentatione et alteratione, ac demum motu locali multiplici, scilicet super 190 terram, aquam, et aerem, pulsione, tractione, vectione, et vertigine ut actu illo imperfecto reduceret suos ad quietem perpetuam. Unde sicut naturalis philosophus commendat motum tamquam signum efficax nedum ad philosophandum, sed ad intentum naturae perficiendum, 195 sic nimirum commendat theologus voluntariam passionem. Et constat ex 3 Physicorum quod passio vel est motus vel accidens multum cognatum motui. Sic ergo verissime, de virtute sermonis dicitur Sapientia Dei Patris omnibus aliis creaturis mobilior. 200
191 pulsione … 192 vertigine] Cf. «Τέτταρα γὰρ εἴδη τῆς ὑπ᾽ἄλλου φορᾶς, ἕλξις, ὦσις, ὄχησις, δίνησις.» Aristoteles, Physica 7.2, ed. Ross, 243a16–17. “Qui enim sunt ab altero motus quatuor sunt: pulsio tractio vectio vertigo.” Aristoteles, Physcia: Translatio Vetus, ed. Bossier et Brams, 261. 197 3 Physicorum] Cf. «Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμφω κινήσεις, εἰ μὲν ἕτεραι, ἐν τίνι; ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ κινουμένῳ, ἢ ἡ μὲν ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἡ δὲ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταύτην ποίησιν καλεῖν, ὁμώνυμος ἂν εἴη).» Aristoteles, Physica 3.3, ed. Ross, 202a25–28. “Quoniam igitur utraque sunt motus, si quidem alteri, in aliquo sunt; aut enim utrique in patienti et moto sunt, aut actio quidem in agenti, passio autem in patiente est; si autem oportet et hunc actionem vocare, equivoce utique sit.” Aristoteles, Physcia: Translatio Vetus, ed. Bossier et Brams, 105–106. Vide etiam: Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 148, #101. 199 Sapientia … 200 mobilior] Cf. Sap. 7:24
186 cum] quasi Q 188 tam om. CH | multipliciter] multiplicitatem O sit] sic A 189 quidem] quadam AB 190 ac] et GHOP | multiplici om. B | scilicet om. ABCHOPQ 191 et aerem om. O | pulsione] pulsionem C | et2 om. C 197 constat] patet B 198 ergo] igitur P 199 dicitur] de P | Patris om. C 201 Sed obicitur contra hunc sensum per hoc quod
Christus non est ante incarnationem, et per consequens scriba huius scripturae non intendebat ad litteram mobilitatem Sapientiae incarnatae. Huic dicitur quod, quidquid fuerit de conveniente, consequentia non valet, 205 quia cum apud Deum omnia quae fuerunt sunt praesentia, certum est quod auctor huius scripturae satis cognovit quomodo Christus maneat in aeternum. Iuxta illam vocem vasis electionis suae (ad Hebraeos 13), Iesus Christus hodie et cras, ipse et in saecula. Et illud egregie declarat 210
Ieronimus in epistola, De assumptione beatae Virginis ad
Paulam et Eustochium. Christi quidem incarnationem (hoc est, quod Christus suo tempore incarnatur) cognovit patriarcha Abraham iuxta testimonium Veritatis (Iohannis
8), Abraham pater vester exultavit ut videret diem meum 215
(id est, tempus incarnationis et non solum diem
208 maneat … aeternum] Heb. 7:24 209 vasis … suae] Cf. Act. 9:15 ad … 210 saecula] Cf. Heb. 13:8 211 De assumptione] Cf. “Vnde Dominus ad Iudaeos: Antequam Abraham, inquit, fieret, ego sum [Io. 8:58]. Quibus itaque uerbis ostendit se, qui loquebatur, in eo semper fuisse mysterio unitatis…Nam Abraham antequam fieret humanitatis est brevitas; Ego sum autem aeternitas naturae declaratur. In qua nimirum aeternitate, iam se fuisse, qui loquebatur, per sacramentum suae incarnationis insinuat.” Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Ieronimus Stridonensis), De assumptione sanctae Mariae virginis 10.61, ed. Albertus Ripberger, CCCM 56C (Turnholt: Brepols, 1985), 137. 215 Abraham … 217 est] Io. 8:56
202 Christus add. a C 204 Huic] hic G; hinc H 205 consequentia … valet] non valet consequentia B 206 quia om. ABCQ 207 huius] eius ABCQ 208 quomodo] quoniam ABCQ 202 aeternitatis); vidit et gavisus est. Cui Augustinus (Homilia
43) adicit argumentum,
Quando, inquit, Abraham (Genesis 24) misit 220 servum suum ut peteret uxorem filio suo Isaac, hoc eum iuramento obstrinxit ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret. Magna enim res agebatur quando Abrahae semini coniugium quaerebatur. Sed ut hoc cognosceret servus 225 quod noverat Abraham, quod nepotes non carnaliter affectabat nec de suo genere carnale aliquid sapiebat, ait servo quem mittebat, Pone manum sub femore meo et iura per Deum caeli. Quid, inquit, sibi vult Deus caeli ad 230 femur Abrahae? Et respondet: Cum per femur genus notatur, illa iuratione signabatur de genere Abrahae venturum in carne Deum caeli. Stulti, inquit, reprehendunt prophetiam Abraham tamquam pure puerile gesserit in hoc 235 dicto, sed cum credidit benedictionem sui seminis, Messiam credidit de suo semine incarnandum.
Et idem secundo declarat Ieronimus de prophetia patriarchae Isaac sentientis Christum odore prophetico
(Genesis 27), quando dixit, Ecce odor filii mei, sicut odor 240
217 Homilia … 218 43] Cf. “Pater Abraham quando misit seruum suum, ut peteret uxorem filio suo Isaac, hoc eum sacramento obstrinxit, ut fideliter quod iubebatur impleret, et sciret etiam ipse quid faceret. Magna enim res agebatur, quando Abrahae semini coniugium quaerebatur. Sed ut hoc cognosceret seruus quod nouerat Abraham, quia nepotes non carnaliter desiderabat, nec de genere suo aliquid carnale sapiebat; ait seruo suo quem mittebat: Pone manum sub femore meo, et iura per Deum coeli [Gen. 24:3, 4, 9]. Quid uult Deus caeli ad femur Abrahae? Iam intelligitis sacramentum: per femur, genus. Ergo quae fuit illa iuratio, nisi quia significabatur de genere Abrahae uenturum in carne Deum coeli?” Augustinus Hipponensis, In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus 124, Tractatus 43.16, ed. D. Radbodus Willems, CCSL 36 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1954), 380. 227 Pone … 229 caeli1] Cf. Gen. 24:3, 4, 9 240 Ecce … 241 Dominus] Gen. 27:27
221 eum] enim P | obstrinxit] abstrinxit Q 222 iubebatur] videbatur ABQ, sed corr. A 224 hoc om. GP 225 noverat] non erat ABCQ; moverat G 228 iura] iuras B 231 notatur] vocatur CQ 239 sentientis] sentientes P 203 agri pleni quem benedixit Dominus, et ita de singulis patriarchis. Cum enim ipsi eadem fide salvati sunt nobiscum, patet quod ipsi crediderunt incarnationem
Domini sicut et nos, et per consequens Dominum suo tempore incarnari. “Constat,” inquit Ieronimus, “tempus 245 non praeiudicasse sacramento uniti hominis ac Dei.”
Et patet ad obiectus garrulos sophistarum quibus invehunt contra orationes ecclesiae quibus rogat Deum per incarnationem, nativitatem, circumcisionem, baptismum, ieiunium, passionem, mortem, resurrectionem, et 250 ascensionem a periculis liberari. Inanis, inquiunt, est suggesta oratio, cum omnia praedicta nec sunt nec possunt esse. Sed constat quod unumquodque illorum, cum sit nobis praeteritum et futurum suo tempore patribus veteris testamenti, quod vere est pro suo tempore et per 255
245 Ieronimus] Cf. “De isto namque uentris agro patriarcha Isaac longe odorans aiebat dicens: Ecce odor filii mei sicut odor agri pleni, quem benedixit Dominus [Gen. 27:27], quamuis putent parum intellegentes, quod priores sancti minus de Christo intellexerint mysterium incarnationis, cum et ipsi eadem saluati sint gratia. Vnde constat tempus non praeiudicasse sacramentum uniti hominis ac Dei, ita ut iam esset in illo per unitatem personae ab initio saeculi, qui necdum erat natus de Maria uirgine, quod multis scripturarum declaratur indiciis.” Paschasius Radbertus, De assumptione 9.60–10.61, pp. 136–137. 248 orationes ecclesiae] Processionale ad usum insignis ac praeclarae ecclesiae Sarum, ed. W. G. Henderson (Leeds: M’corquodale & Co., 1882), 109. Manuale et processionale ad usum insignis ecclesiae Eboracensis, ed. W. G. Henderson, The Publications of the Surtees Society vol. 63 (Leeds: McCorquodale, 1875), 169.
242 ipsi om. O 244 Domini om. B 245 Constat add. quod O | inquit om. B 246 praeiudicasse] praedicasse O | uniti] unici P 248 rogat] orat ABCQ | Deum] Dominum HO | per] pro O 250 passionem add. et B 251 inquiunt] inquit P 252 suggesta oratio inv. ABCHQ | omnia praedicta inv. P 253 illorum] istorum GOP | cum om. P 254 veteris] sui P 204 consequens causa misericordiam impetrandi — non quod quidquam scrupulosum in nostra lege celamus quod non audeamus disputationi cuiuscumque philosophantis ostendere; — et illum modum loquendi docet Ieronimus ex illo dicto Iudae, Iesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto 260 salvans, secundo eos qui non crediderunt perdidit, et
Apostolus (1 ad Corinthios 10), Neque tentemus Christum, sicut quidam eorum tentaverunt, non quod iam esset Iesus
Christus natus ex Maria virgine, sed quia illa persona quae tempore suo est Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei 265 consilio incarnata et materialis essentia semper praesto : sic ergo sancti patres in quocumque tempore fuerunt, vere sciverunt Christum esse, fuisse, et fore, et propositiones formatae ab eis fuissent verae (Christus est, fuit, vel erit incarnatus), quamvis non tunc fuisset ita quod Christus est 270 incarnatus — Nam ut saepe dixi, sicut propositio potest
259 Ieronimus] Cf. “Quod apostolus Iudas uolens dilucidare apertius: Iesus, inquit, populum ex Aegypto saluans, secundo eos, qui non crediderunt, perdidit [Iud. 1:5]. Et alibi Paulus: Neque tentemus Christum, sicut quidam eorum tentauerunt [1 Cor. 10:9]. Non quod iam esset Iesus aut Christus natus ex Maria, sed quia in illo unico filio Dei iam unitas personae commendatur, quae occulta erat in mysterio.” Paschasius Radbertus, De assumptione 10.61, p. 137. 260 Iesus … 261 perdidit] Iud. 1:5 262 Neque … 263 tentaverunt] 1 Cor. 10:9
257 scrupulosum] scrupulosis A; scrupulos B | celamus] colamus ABCQ, sed A corr. 258 audeamus] audiamus O | disputationi] disputationem P 259 illum] istum P | docet] dicit B 260 Iesus] Christus O 261 salvans] sanans G | eos] eis ABCQ 262 ad om. A 264 quia] quod P | illa rep. H 265 est2 om. O | aeterna] creatura Q | sempiterno] semper C; semper in GOP | Dei om. C, et spat. vac. septem litteras comprehendens 266 et om. O 267 ergo] sibi O | vere … 268 sciverunt inv. ABCHQ 268 esse fuisse inv. A | et2 add. per O 269 fuissent] fuisset P 270 non tunc inv. ABCHQ | tunc] iterum OP | ita om. AB 271 dixi add. quod B 205 esse hic vera cum hoc quod hic non sit suum primarie signatum (sed satis est quod ipsum sit alicubi
— Nam incarnatio, mors Christi, et adventus ad iudicium sunt fides credita a qua fide absit falsitas sive fictitia, et 280 cetera; — unde Gregorius (23 Moralium capitulo 15) exponens illud Iob 33, Semel loquetur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetet, ita scribit, “In Deo ideo dicere quodlibet tempus audacter licet, quod in eo nullum proprie dici licet.” Unde notat causam eius (32 Moralium capitulo 285
5), dicens quod “Deus praeteritorum non reminiscitur,
281 23 Moralium] Cf. “Semel loquitur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetit [Iob 33:14], hoc intellegi subtilius potest, quod Pater unigenitum consubstantialem sibi Filium genuit. Loqui enim Dei est Verbum genuisse. Semel autem loqui est Verbum aliud praeter unigenitum non habere. Vnde et apte subditur: Et secundo idipsum non repetit [Iob 33:14], quia uidelicet hoc ipsum Verbum, id est Filium, nonnisi unicum genuit. Quod autem non ait, locutus est, sed loquitur…liquet omnibus quia Deo tempus nec praeteritum congruit, nec futurum. Tanto ergo in eo quodlibet tempus ponitur libere, quanto nullum uere…Inde itaque in eo dici proprie nullum licet. Verbum namque Pater sine tempore genuit.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob 23.19.35, p. 1170–1171. 282 Semel … 283 repetet] Iob 33:14 285 32 Moralium] Cf. “Quomodo ergo Deus praeteritorum reminiscitur, cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt eius nutui semper praesentia assistunt?” Ibid., 32.5.7, p. 1632.
272 esse hic inv. Q | hic2 … sit] non sit hic B 274 esse om. P 275 nunc non inv. B | primarie] primarium CQ 276 ipsum] illud GOP aliquando] alicubi H 280 fide om. O | sive] sui P 281 15] 3 ABCQ 282 illud] idem O | secundo] tertio P 283 idipsum] ipsum AB; ad ipsum HO | scribit] scribitur BP 285 dici om. ABCQ | Unde notat] unum vocat O | 32] 30 H; 12 Q 286 praeteritorum] praeterito O 206 cum ipsa quae in semetipsis praetereunt, eius intuitui semper praesentia assistunt”; et exemplificat satis notabiliter (34 Moralium capitulo 5 tripliciter); unde (9
Moralium 25) expresserat istud diffusius exponens illud 290
Iob 10, Numquid sicut dies hominis, dies tui? “Deo,” inquit, “nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc ventura quasi quae non apparent desunt, quia is qui semper esse habet, cuncta sibi praesentia conspicit”; et idem dicit Anselmus
(Monologion 19). 295
Ideo, ut saepe dixi, nisi omne tempus praeteritum vel futurum fuerit Deo praesens, paterentur theologi magnas
289 34 Moralium] Cf. “Scriptura sacra ita nonnunquam tempus praeteritum futurumque permiscet, ut aliquando futuro pro praeterito, aliquando uero utatur praeterito pro futuro. Futuro namque pro praeterito utitur cum Ioanni mulier paritura masculum, qui regat gentes in uirga ferrea, demonstratur [cf. Apoc. 12:5]. Quod quia incarnato Domino ueniente iam tunc factum fuerat, res gesta nuntiabatur. Rursum praeterito utitur pro futuro, sicut per psalmistam Dominus loquitur, dicens: Foderunt manus meas et pedes meos, dinumerauerunt omnia ossa mea [Ps. 21:17–18]. Quibus uidelicet uerbis species dominicae passionis quasi iam transacta describitur, sed tamen adhuc longe post futura nuntiatur. Hoc ergo loco quo dicitur: Cum sublatus fuerit, timebunt angeli [Iob 41:16], nil obstat intelligi quia sub futuri temporis modo praeterita describuntur.” Ibid., 34.7.12, pp. 1741–1742. | 9 … 290 Moralium] Cf. “Eique nec transacta praetereunt, nec adhuc uentura, quasi quae non appareant desunt, quia is qui semper esse habet, cuncta sibi praesentia conspicit.” Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob, 9.47.72, ed. Marcus Adriaen, CCSL 143 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1979), 507. 291 Numquid … tui] Iob 10:5 295 Monologion 19] Anselmus Cantuariensis, Monologion 19–24, S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, vol. 1, ed. Francis Salesius Schmitt (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946), 33–44.
287 semetipsis] semet ABCQ; semetipso P | eius om. O | intuitui] intuitu ABCHQ; intuitum OP 289 34] 24 A | 5 add. et 9 ABCQ tripliciter om. A 290 istud] illud BGHOP 291 Iob] Iohannis A, sed corr. mg. 292 transacta] transfacta CQ | adhuc] ad hunc O | quasi om. ABCHPQ 293 apparent] appareant GOP | is] hiis OQ | qui] quae O 294 dicit] om. P 296 nisi add. ut Q 297 futurum] futurorum B 207 angustias in expositionibus scripturarum, ut (psalmo 21) tempore David dicit dicta Sapientia, Foderunt manus meas et pedes meos, et sic de multis dictis
Dei aeternitas coassistit omni tempori praeterito vel futuro.
Unde ad istum sensum loquitur sapiens Ecclesiastici 47,
Christus purgavit peccata ipsius. Et patet quod facta 305 instantia non impugnat sensum datum ad istam scripturam,
Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est Sapientia.
Sunt autem multi alii sensus huic litterae adaptati: [1]
Ut hii dicunt quod, extensive loquendo de motu, Sapientia increata movetur obiective a cognitis terminantibus eius 310 actum. [2] Hii dicunt quod, cum tot sunt genera motus quot et entis, et Deus ad omnem punctum mundi continue acquirit dominia, est in illa manerie motus relationis summe mobilis. [3] Tertii autem dicunt quod in omni motu est dare ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis secundum 315
299 Foderunt … 300 meos] Ps. 21:17 305 Christus … ipsius] Cf. Ecclus. 47:13 307 Omnibus … Sapientia] Sap. 7:24 311 tot … 312 entis] Cf. «Ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἴδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.» Aristoteles, Physica 3.1, ed. Ross, 201a8–9. “Quare motus et mutationis sunt species tot quot et entis.” Aristoteles, Physcia, ed. Bossier et Brams, 98. Vide etiam Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 148, #97.
298 expositionibus] expositione ABCHQ 299 tempore] tempori O 300 dictis om. ABCHQ | scripturis] scripturae CGOPQ 301 pueriliter] simpliciter B | posita] positae ABH | ita] ista P 302 in om. AB 303 tempori] tempore OP | vel] et ABH 304 istum] illum GOP 305 purgavit] pugnavit O | ipsius] illius B; eius P | patet] potest CQ 308 alii om. P | huic] hoc CQ | adaptati] damnati O 311 quod om. ABCGHOP | cum om. P | genera motus inv. GHOP 312 quot] quod P entis] entes HO 313 motus] metus O 315 et posterioritatis om. ABCQ 208 successivam denominationem subiecti in materia motus, et omne tale secundum esse intelligibile ordinatum et descriptum est aeternaliter in Sapientia increata, et secundum illas rationes dicitur figurative summe mobilis.
Sed prior expositio, cum sit litteralior de virtute sermonis, 320 verior, et fidei conformior, plus placeret. Unde quamvis
Auctor scripturae intenderit omnes istos sensus, primum tamen principalius ut sit introitus ad alios consequentes.
Et sic Augustinus de virtute sermonis salvat textus scripturae plus imbrigabiles ut illud Iohannis 10, 325
Sermonem quem audistis non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris. Dicit enim illud (Homilia 76) esse verum de virtute sermonis.
Non, inquit, miremur; non paveamus. Non est 330 minor Patre vel impar sibi. Non enim mentitus est. Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat. Non est hic sibi contrarius, sed forte non sine mysterio ibi dixit pluraliter, hic singulariter, volens hic intelligere semetipsum
326 Sermonem … 327 Patris] Io. 14:24 327 Homilia 76] Cf. “Et sermo quem audistis non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris [Io. 14:24], non miremur, non paueamus: non est minor Patre, sed non est nisi a Patre. Non est impar ipso, sed non est a seipso. Neque enim mentitus est dicendo: Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non seruat [Io. 14:24]. Ecce suos dixit esse sermones; numquid sibi ipse est contrarius, ubi rursus dixit: Et sermo quem audistis non est meus [Io. 14:24]? Et fortasse propter aliquam distinctionem, ubi suos dixit, dixit pluraliter, hoc est sermones; ubi autem sermonem, hoc est Verbum, non suum dixit esse, sed Patris, seipsum intellegi uoluit.” Augustinus Hipponensis, Tractatus 76.5, p. 519. 330 impar sibi] Cf. Io. 14:28 331 Qui … 332 servat] Io. 14:24
316 denominationem] denotationem O 322 istos] illos ABCQ 323 ad add. omnes Q 325 10 om. ABCQ; 14 H 329 paveamus] paciemus O 330 Non om. P | Non enim inv. Q 331 est om. P | non1 … me] me non diligit HO | sermones meos] sermonem meum AB 332 hic om. P 333 non om. OP 335 209 qui, cum sit Sermo vel Verbum Dei Patris, non autem sermo sui ipsius, verum dixit ad litteram. [1] Quod si gramaticus ex accusativo casu offenditur, potest dici quod facta constructione recta, non sit antithesis. (Nam qui non diligit Christum, non servat 340 sermones suos, id est, sententias vel veritates quas praecipit observari.) [2] Sed ut manifestet quid ex hoc sequitur, subiungit, Et sermonem quem audistis (supple non servat), per quam copulationem docemur metaphysicam quod omnes huiusmodi veritates aeternae 345 sunt idem essentialiter Verbo Dei. [3] Et tertio ut doceat quod ille Sermo sit idem essentialiter Deo Patri, licet personaliter distinguatur, subiungit, Non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris. Licet autem sensus catholicus posset esse quod sermo vocalis non sit Verbi ex se modo quo 350
Apostolus dicit, Solum Patrem habere immortalitatem, ut exponit Augustinus (1 De Trinitate et 1 Contra
343 Et … audistis] Io. 14:24 348 Non … 349 Patris] Io. 14:24 351 Solum … immortalitatem] Cf. 1 Tim. 6:16 352 11 … Trinitate] Cf. “Hinc etiam consequenter intellegitur non tantummodo de patre dixisse apostolum Paulum: Qui solus habet immortalitatem [I Tim. 6:16], sed de uno et solo deo, quod est ipsa trinitas…Neque enim quia ipse filius alibi loquens uoce sapientiae (ipse est enim sapientia dei [I Cor. 1:24]) ait: Gyrum caeli circuiui sola [Ecclesiasticus 24:8], separauit a se patrem. Quanto magis ergo non est necesse ut tantummodo de patre praeter filium intellegatur quod dictum est: Qui solus habet immortalitatem.” Augusitnus Hipponensis, De Trinitate libri xv 1.6.10, ed. W. J. Mountain,
339 quod om. C | sit] fit O 340 non2 … 341 suos] sermones suos non servat P 341 suos om. ABCQ | id est om. O; idem Q 342 praecipit] praecepit HO 343 supple] supplendum BCQ 344 non restit. A; om. BCQ 345 huiusmodi] huius GOQ 346 tertio] secundo P 347 ille] iste P | idem add. licet G mg. | Deo om. GOP | licet om. G 348 personaliter] Pater O | distinguatur] distinguantur ABCQ 350 sit add. et P 210 Maximinum capitulo 10), tamen prior sensus est subtilior et mihi carior.
Et sic intelligendus est sensus Apostoli (ad 355
Philippenses 2) quod Christus, Cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo, sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens. Pro cuius intellectu notandum quod sicut forma Dei est deitas, sic forma hominis est humanitas. Utraque enim est forma 360 substantialis, cum quaelibet persona divina sit illud quo est
Deus, quia
CCSL 50 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1968), 39. | 12 … 353 Maximinum] Cf. “De immortali Deo. Quarto loco egi tecum de immortali Deo etiam Filio. Quoniam tu illud quod ait Apostolus, Qui solus habet immortalitatem (I Tim. VI, 16); sic intelligi voluisti, tanquam de solo Patre sit dictum: cum ille hoc non de Patre dixerit, sed de Deo, quod est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Ostendi ergo et Filium habere immortalitatem secundum substantiam divinitatis suae. Nam secundum carnem quis negat eum fuisse mortalem?” Augustinus Hipponensis, Contra Maximinum haereticum 1.4, PL 42, col. 746. 356 Cum … 358 accipiens] Phil. 2:6–7
353 tamen] cum Q 354 mihi] inde A 355 est om. BCQ | sensus Apostoli] Apostolus ABCQ 356 Christus om. O 357 esse se inv. B 358 semetipsum] seipsum G 359 deitas] divinitas O | sic] sicut B 360 est2 om. P 361 illud] id G; idem P | quo] quod BGOP 362 Deus1 om. GOP | deitate] divinitate O 363 hominis om. P | illud] id G; idem P | quo] quod BGOP | homo quia] hoc GP | quia … homo2 om. per hom. O 365 habet2 … 366 absolute inv. ABCQ 366 necessario] necessitate O | et] add. Q lin. | accepit] accipit O; excepit Q, sed corr. mg. alt. man. 211 theologos, etsi non in Metaphysica Aristotelis, saltem in verbis Apostoli compendiose, addiscere.
Ex quo patet quod non ex propria reputatione vel 370 arbitrio proprio sine veritate substrata vendicavit se esse aequalem Patri, quasi raperet sibi honorem Patri debitum, ut fecit Satanas, cum naturaliter et communiter inest sibi cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto esse Deum, quod commune esse sibi et Patri ostenderat, quando dixit, Ego et Pater 375 unum sumus. Augustinus autem format talem rationem:
Nihil quod est naturale et essentiale supposito est rapina, sed Christum esse aequalem Deo est naturale et per se inest Verbo. Ergo hoc non est rapina, sed, faciendo se esse naturam visibilem, exinanivit misericorditer semetipsum. 380
Semetipsum dicit propter identitatem personae quae est
Filius Hominis et Dei Filius. Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se
375 Ego … 376 sumus] Io. 10:30 376 Augustinus] Cf. “Illi uni proprium erat, illi rapina non erat, cui natura erat. In patris aequalitate natus est de patre.” Augustinus Hipponensis, Sermones de vetere testamento, id est sermones i–l 30.7, ed. Cyrillus Lambot, CCSL 41 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1961), 388. “Qui cum in forma dei esset, sicut dicit apostolus, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis deo; neque enim usurpationis erat, ut rapina diceretur, sed naturae inerat, ut esset aequalis.” Augustinus Hipponensis, S. Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi epistulae […] pars iii: ep. cxxiv–clxxxiv a 140.4.12, ed. Al Goldbacher, CSEL 44 (Vindobonae: Academia Litterarum Caesarea Vindobonensis, 1904), 164. 381 Semetipsum … 382 Exinanivit] Cf. Phil. 2:7
368 in1 om. O 369 Apostoli compendiose inv. Q 371 substrata] subtracta ACP, sed corr. C; abstracta Q 373 fecit] facit HO 374 Sancto om. CGOPQ | commune … 375 esse] coinest HO 375 esse om. ABCHPQ | Patri] Patre C | quando dixit om. A 377 est1 om. C | est naturale] essentiale C 378 sed … 379 rapina om. per hom. ABCQ 381 Semetipsum om. ABCPQ; sed ipsum O 382 Hominis … Filius2 om. per hom. ABCQ | dicit om. ABCQ | quia rep. C 212 ad extra esse naturam corpoream quae in mundi principio, prius origine quam formam habeat, est inanis. Ad quem sensum, ut exponit Augustinus (12 Confessionum), 385 scriptura in principio Genesis dicit, Terra erat inanis et vacua. Nec video quomodo exinanitio potius possit intelligi quam quod res extra facta inanis essentia sit, et sic
“exinanita.” Et hoc est verum de Christo ad litteram, cum sit trium naturarum quaelibet. Et hinc vere dicit Veritas 390
(Iohannis 14), Pater maior me est, quia cum Christus sit tam aequivoce divinitas et humanitas, potest respectu praedicati absoluti intelligi secundum rationem divinitatis vel secundum rationem humanitatis, sicut exigit praedicatum. 395
Et patet ex dictis superius quod non est repugnantia,
Pater est maior Christo, et idem, Pater est simpliciter aequalis Christo. Immo, intelligendo personam Christi secundum duas naturas aequivoce, non est repugnantia inter ista, Pater est maior Christo, et idem, Pater non est 400 maior Christo. Nec debent tales praedicationes abici de
385 12 Confessionum] Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessionum libri xiii 12.29 (40), ed. Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1981), 238–240. 386 Terra … 387 vacua] Gen. 1:2 391 Pater … est] Io. 14:28 397 Pater1 … Christo] Cf. Io. 14:28
383 a d om. B | quae add. cum H 384 origine] originem ABH | formam] formaret P 385 12] 2 ABCQ 387 potius] proprius G; prius OP 388 quod add. sit ABCHQ | essentia] essentialiter HO | sit] sic ABCHQ | et] ut GHOP | sic] fit O; sit CHQ 390 vere dicit inv. B 391 cum om. B 393 divinitatis … 394 rationem om. per hom. P 397 Christo] me B; om. P | Pater2 add. est C | est simpliciter inv. ABC 400 ista] illa G | et … 401 Christo om. O 401 maior] auctor C | debent] dicunt Q 213 virtute sermonis quia sunt figurativae, quia perinde negaretur hoc, Ego et Pater unum sumus; et Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus Deus, et cetera, cum in prima sit aequivocatio et in secunda sit conceptio personarum. 405
Immo si non fallor, omnis locutio nostra de Deo est figurativa, ut quandocumque dicitur quod Deus est mobilis, natus, passus, et cetera, est constructio non synecdochica, sed figura quae anthropospathos dicitur, quando scilicet humana passio Deo tribuitur (ab anthropos 410
“homo,” et pathos “passio”). Non enim habemus nomina quae sine figura Deum signent.
Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod aliqua res
403 Ego … sumus] Io. 10:30 418 ipsa … 419 genita] Cf. Natura divina “non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater qui generat, et Filius qui gignitur, et Spritus Sanctus qui procedit.” Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum 804 (432), ed. Heinrich Denzinger, 33a ed. (Barcinone: Herder, 1965), p. 262.
402 quia1] quod H | perinde] per idem ABCHQ 403 et2 om. ACGHOPQ | et3 om. GOP 404 et cetera om. ABCQ | prima] persona P 405 sit2 om. GHOP 408 cetera] cum P | constructio] conclusio ABCQ 410 scilicet om. P | tribuitur] attribuitur HO 411 pathos] peratos (sic!) P 412 Deum] Dei OP | signent] signarent G; signant P 413 ergo] igitur OP | quod] quia P 414 quia] quae C 415 poterit moveri inv. GHOPQ 416 mobile] immobile P 417 ista] illa ABCQ | in add. illo C 419 cetera] talis ABH; cum P | Essentia] essentiae C 214 materiae primae est suppositum, ignis compositum ex 420 materia et forma, et tamen ipsa materia non potest sic componi. Petrus comedit, moritur, vel aliter transmutatur, et tamen natura specifica quae est Petrus non potest taliter transmutari. Ideo in omnibus istis similibus oportet diligenter attendere ad praedicationem secundum 425 essentiam et formalem. Et patet quod non sequitur
Deus est mobilis. Et omne aliud a Deo est mobile. Ergo omnis res est mobilis. 430 quia aliqua res non est mobilis. Et si quaeratur, Quid non est mobile?, potest dici, aequivocando, quod nihil non est mobile, quia natura divina est mobile. Et sic, intelligendo praedicationem secundum essentiam non-formalem, tunc
OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE. 435
Quod si dicatur istam responsionem, cum sapiat contradictionem, interimere disputationes theologicas, cum incidit in redargutionem quae est meta vilissima respondentis, dicitur quod multum proficeret modum disputandi sophisticum, principaliter propter apparentiam 440 arguentis et redargutionem patulam respondentis, ex peccato Luciferi introductum,
428 mobilis] mobile O 432 nihil add. est C; mobile P | non om. A, sed add. mg. alt. man. 434 tunc om. GHOP 435 quod … mobile om. per hom. O | est2 om. PQ 437 interimere] interime P 438 cum] vel P; non Q | est om. O 441 redargutionem] responsionem B 442 introductum … esse om. B 443 praetermissum] praetermissis BCQ 215 quam scriptura meminit est a Diabolo introducta. Cur, inquit serpens, praecepit vobis Deus ut non comederetis de 445 omni ligno paradisi? (Genesis 3) Unde omnis quaestio indubie attestatur super ignorantiam vel peccatum. Tamen non negandum est quin quaestiones theologicae possunt tractari meritorie, cum Veritas quaesivit a peccatoribus plurimas quaestiones. Oportet tamen quod utrobique 450 intendatur Dei gloria augmentanda, sophistarum superbia destruenda, et ignota veritas detegenda. Omne autem quod amplius est in disputatatione theologica a Malo est. Ideo quaestio sicut et iuramentum occasione vel poena peccati introducta est. 455
Et ista est sententia Augustini (2 De doctrina
Christiana 31), ubi docet in disputationibus cavere rixandi libidinem et ostentationem frivolam puerilem. Nec ducunt argutiae sophistarum theologos ad metam aliquam, sed detegit eorum versutiam harundineam qua prius 460
444 Cur … 446 paradisi] Gen. 3:1 453 a … est2] Cf. Mt. 5:37 454 iuramentum] Cf. Gen. 21:22–34 456 2 … 457 Christiana] Cf. “Sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in litteris sanctis sunt, penetranda et dissoluenda, plurimum ualet; tantum ibi cauenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi aduersarium. Sunt enim multa, quae appellantur sophismata, falsae conclusiones rationum et plerumque ita ueras imitantes, ut non solum tardos, sed ingeniosos etiam minus diligenter attentos decipiant.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De doctrina Christiana 2.31.48, ed. Joseph Martin, CCSL 32 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1962), 65–66.
444 meminit] invenit O | introducta Cur] introductatur O 445 praecepit] praecipit H 447 indubie attestatur inv. ABCHQ 452 Omne] omnis B 455 est om. B 456 ista] illa ABCQ 457 in rep. CQ | rixandi … 458 libidinem inv. B 458 Nec] nunc O | ducunt] dicunt P; dicunt Q, sed corr. 459 argutiae sophistarum inv. B | theologos] theologum GOP aliquam] aliam BH 216 pompaverant et hoc ex propriis eorum principiis. Unde frequenter ut colores “sapientiae” sophisticae minus appareant, obvio eis, negando negativas quae ad sensum aequivocum satis catholice concedi poterunt. Ut dando exclusivam huius universalis, Omnis res est mobilis, 465 formo sic exclusivam ut apparentia sophistica sit minus evidens, Tantum res mobilis est res, quod est falsum pro rebus aeternis. Concedi tamen posset quod, Nihil aliud quam mobile est res, accipiendo mobile essentialiter substantive; et tamen, Aliud quam mobile est res, posito 470 quod mobile praedicetur formaliter adiective. Sed
Augustinus et alii sancti doctores non curarunt de istis apparentiis sophistarum. Unde in dialogo Ad Felicianum,
“Genuit,” inquit, “et non genuit Maria Filium Dei.”
Sed ulterius arguitur quod Verbum Dei non sit 475 simpliciter mobile ratione assumpti hominis. (Nam nulla persona movetur propter habitum vel accidens essentialiter
473 Ad Felicianum] Cf. “Genuit ergo Maria et non genuit Filium Dei: genuit, quando ex ipsa secundum carnem natus est Christus; non genuit quando de Patre sine initio exstitit Filius: genuit, quando ex hac Verbum caro processit, ut habitaret in nobis (cf. Io. 1:14); non genuit quando in principio erat Deus Verbum [Io. 1:1], quod originem praestitit universis. Nolite ergo partu virginis determinare originem Dei Verbi: nolite de virgine genitum corpus coaeternum dicere deitati; quia Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus (I Tim. 2:5) prima nativitate coaeternus est Patri, secunda particeps temporis nostri; in illa auctor temporis, in ista particeps est aetatis.” Vigilius Tapsensis (Pseudo-Augustinus Hipponensis), Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis 12, PL 42, col. 1167.
464 poterunt] potuerunt BCHQ 465 est mobilis] immobilis Q 466 apparentia] evidentia ABCQ | minus … 467 evidens inv. OP 472 doctores om. ABCGHQ 474 Maria om. P 475 Verbum] Verbi B 477 vel … 478 separatum om. O 217 separatum.) Sed humanitas Christi est habitus Verbo Dei accidentaliter copulatus. Ergo propter eius lacerationem vel passionem non sequitur passio Verbi Dei. Confirmatur 480 triplici exemplo: [1] Primo ex hoc quod homo non laceratur vel comburitur, etsi vestimenta eius taliter patiantur. [2] Secundo ex hoc quod humanitas conceditur per tempus notabile non fuisse, quando tamen non conceditur Verbum Dei conformiter non fuisse. Non ergo 485 sequitur si ista humanitas movebatur a non-esse acquirendo essendi terminum, tunc et Verbum. [3] Tertio confirmatur ex figura Abrahae patriarchae qui, cum voluit
(Genesis 22) immolare filium suum Isaac, non hunc occidit sed arietem quem vidit post tergum haerentem 490 cornibus. Cum ergo passio Christi fuit per Isaac allegorice figurata, videtur quod non persona Christi sed eius humanitas fuit passa.
Hic dicitur quod non esset concedendum Verbum pati propter passionem suae humanitatis, nisi Verbum esset 495 personaliter illa humanitas. Sed quia Verbum est ex integro illa humanitas tam secundum corpus quam
490 arietem … 491 cornibus] Cf. Gen. 22:13
478 separatum] separatis ABCQ 480 vel passionem om. C | sequitur] est O 482 taliter] totaliter O 486 ista] illa GOP | movebatur add. post H a1] post ABQ | a non-esse] per consequens esse C 487 tunc add. est P 490 vidit] videt P | tergum] tergenten B, sed corr. tergem lin. 496 est … 497 integro] ex integro est ABCHQ 497 quam add. secundum HO 218 animam, et actiones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum, patet quod illa humanitas non pateretur vel ageret, nisi quia Verbum quod est eadem hypostasis vel 500 persona sic agit vel patitur. Firmiter itaque est tenendum quod Verbum Dei et per consequens Deus ipse pendebat dolens et passus in cruce, et sic de ceteris humanis actibus quos evangelium de Iesu prosequitur. Et sic licet humanitas Christi sit essentia, substantia, vel natura 505 separata non conservative sed essentialiter a deitate quae
Christus est, non tamen sic separatur quin sit persona
Christi.
Sed pro nomine habitus est notandum quod habitus quadrupliciter sumitur, ut exponit Augustinus (83 510
498 actiones … 499 suppositorum] Cf. «Αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστόν εἰσιν.» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristoteles), Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (Aristotle’s Metaphysics) 1.1, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1975), 1:981a16–17. “Actus autem et omnes generationes circa singulare sunt.” Aristoteles, Metaphysica [...] Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin- Diem, vol. 25, fasc. 3.2 in Aristoteles Latinus (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 12. Vide etiam: Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 115, n. 5. Cf. “Actiones autem sunt suppositorum et individuorum.” Aquinas, Tertia pars Summae theologiae q. 7, art. 13, resp, Opera omnia 11, p. 125, col. a. “Actiones singularium sunt secundum Philosophum.” Thomas Aquinas, De unione Verbi incarnati art. 1, arg. 16, ed. Walter Senner, Barbara Bartocci, et Klaus Obenauer (Leuven: Peters, 2015), 90. 510 83 … 511 quaestionum] Cf. “Multis modis habitum dicimus: [1] uel habitum animi, sicuti est cuiuscumque disciplinae perceptio usu roborata atque firmata; uel habitum corporis, secundum quem dicimus alium alio esse suculentiorem et ualidiorem, quae magis proprie habitudo dici solet; uel habitum eorum quae membris nostris accommodantur extrinsecus, secundum quem dicimus uestitum, calciatum, armatum, et si quod eiusmodi est. In quibus omnibus generibus, siquidem nomen hoc ductum est ab illo uerbo quod est habere, manifestum est in ea re dici habitum, quae accidit alicui, ita ut eam possit etiam non habere…Verumtamen hoc
498 ac] et P 501 itaque om. P | itaque est inv. O 503 et1 om. Q 506 conservative] conservantem CQ | deitate] divinitate O 219 quaestionum, quaestione 73) exponendo illud Apostoli (ad
Philippenses 2), Habitu inventus est ut homo: [1] Primo pro sapientia quae est veritas quam addiscimus quae manens non-mota movet animam quam informat. [2]
Secundo pro alimentis habitis mutantibus corpus quod 515 nutriunt et digestione mutatis. Omne quidem substantiale nobis adiacens quod mutat et mutatur adiacendo subiecto dicitur habitus huiusmodi; habitus quidem, quia denominat subiectum habere quod sibi accidentaliter adiacet. [3] Tertium genus est quando habituata formantur 520 interest, quod quaedam eorum quae accidunt nobis ut habitum faciant non mutantur a nobis, sed ipsa nos mutant in se, ipsa integra et inconcussa manentia, sicuti sapientia cum accidit homini non ipsa mutatur, sed hominem mutat, quem de stulto sapientem facit. [2] Quaedam uero sic accidunt, ut et mutent et mutentur: sicuti cibus et ipse amittens speciem suam in corpus nostrum uertitur, et nos refecti cibo ab exilitate atque languore in robur atque ualentiam commutamur. [3] Tertium genus est, cum ipsa quae accidunt mutantur ut habitum faciant, et quodammodo formantur ab eis quibus habitum faciunt, sicuti est uestis; nam cum proiecta uel reposita est, non habet eam formam quam sumit cum induitur atque inducitur membris. Ergo induta accipit formam quam non habebat exuta, cum ipsa membra et cum induuntur et cum exuuntur in suo statu maneant. [4] Potest esse etiam quartum genus, cum ea quae accidunt ad faciendum habitum nec ea mutant quibus accidunt, nec ab eis ipsa mutantur, sicuti anulus digito, si non nimis subtiliter attendatur. Verumtamen hoc genus aut nullum est, si diligenter discutias, aut omnino rarissimum.” Augusitnus Hipponensis, De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus 73.1, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CCSL 44A (Turnholti: Brepols, 1975), 209–210. 512 Habitu … homo] Phil. 2:7 514 manens non-mota] Cf. «Ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ.» Aristoteles, Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.7, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxonii: Typographeum Clarendonianum, 1975), 2:1072a25. “Est aliquid quod non motum mouet.” Aristoteles, Metaphysica […] Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, 256.
512 est om. GOP 513 veritas] veritatis P 514 manens] movens ABQ 515 mutantibus] nutrientibus B; in mutantibus P 516 substantiale … 517 nobis inv. B 517 nobis add. vel B | et] vel C 518 huiusmodi] huius Q huiusmodi habitus om. per hom. O | quia] qui P 519 accidentaliter … 520 adiacet inv. B 220 a subiectis habituatis non exinde mutatis, ut vestis exuta habet aliam formam quando proicitur, quam quando membris aptata induitur. [4] Quartum genus habitus est quod habitus nec exinde mutat substantiam cui advenit, nec mutatur, ut anulus in digito. Omnia autem haec 525 quattuor, cum denominant substantiam habituari vel habere, dicuntur in praedicatione secundum essentiam esse habitus, ut motus dicitur materialiter esse res quae est motu dicto formaliter acquisita, ut patet 3 Physicorum commento 4. Sumitur autem sufficientia istorum quattuor 530 penes hoc quod primus habitus mutat substantiam cui advenit et non mutatur. Secundus mutat et mutatur. Tertius mutatur et non mutat. Quartus vero nec mutat necessario nec mutatur.
Sed praeter haec quattuor quae in se sunt substantiae 535 sumitur habitus apud philosophos formaliter ad duos sensus aequivocos: [1] Primo pro qualitate
529 3 … 530 4] Averrois Cordubensis, Aristotelis De physico auditu libri octo, ed. Marcus Antonius Zimara (Venetiis, 1562), fol. 87r, col. a–b.
521 habituatis] humanitatis G | non … 522 quando1 om. ABCOPQ, et spat. vac. decem litteras comprehendens Q; perfectius H 522 proicitur om. ABCHQ; proficitur O 523 membris] membrorum A; membrum CQ; om. B | aptata] adaptata B | induitur] induuntur H | est … 525 mutatur om. ABCHOPQ 525 Omnia] omnis O | haec] hoc Q 526 cum om. B substantiam] subiecta OP | habituari] habituri GP 528 esse1] est O esse res inv. B 529 dicto] ducto P | patet] et B 530 commento] 9o H sufficientia] sufficientiam B | istorum] illorum ABCHQ 531 substantiam] subiectum GOP 532 et1 om. GOP | Secundus … mutatur2 om. per hom. O | Secundus … 533 mutatur om. per hom. P 533 vero om. BH | nec] non ABC | necessario] necessitato O 535 haec] hoc Q | in se] non ABCQ 536 sumitur] sumuntur O | formaliter om. ABCQ | duos] suos GOP 221 praedicamentali de prima specie qualitatis, sive sit habitus corporis (ut sanitas), sive habitus animae (ut virtus intellectualis aut moralis). (Habitus autem spiritualis ex 540 habitu primo modo dicto materialiter generatur, sicut habitus corporalis efficitur ex secundo.) [2] Sed secundo modo sumitur habitus pro forma respectiva de decimo genere quod est habere, possessio, vel habitio, et talis habitus causatur ab habitu tertio et quarto modis 545 materialiter intellectis. Divitiae enim denominant homines divites, possessionatos, vel habentes formaliter. Et patet quod istae sex maneries habitus sunt satis aequivocae.
Dicitur ergo quod humanitas assumpta a Verbo est habitus tertii modi, cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans 550 vel faciens ipsum aliam personam quam praefuit. Ideo dicunt sancti quod humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem; et religiosi qui Christum induunt, habent habitus
551 praefuit] Cf. “Iste autem habitus non est ex primo genere, non enim manens in se natura hominis naturam dei commutauit; neque ex secundo, non enim et mutauit homo deum et mutatus ab illo est; neque ex quarto, non enim sic adsumtus est homo, ut neque ipse mutaret deum nec ab illo mutaretur; sed potius ex tertio: sic enim assumptus est, ut commutaretur in melius, et ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius atque coniunctius quam uestis ab homine cum induitur.” Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus 73.2, p. 211. 553 Christum induunt] Cf. Gal. 3:27
538 praedicamentali scripsi. passionali ABCQ; praeternaturali GOP sive sit] supersit O | habitus … 539 corporis inv. ABCHQ 539 ut1] vel O 540 aut] vel B | Habitus … spiritualis] aut habitus spiritualis et ille ABQ; aut habitus specialis et ille C | autem] aut P 541 modo om. ABCQ sicut] sive AB 542 habitus om. ABCQ 545 causatur ab] pro B 547 possessionatos] possessionantes O 548 istae] illae ABCHQ 550 actu] acti Q | mutans] mutas O 551 vel om. P | ipsum] ipsam BH 552 detegens] tegens G 553 deitatem] divinitatem OP | habitus] habitum B 222 corporis hoc notantes quod accidit Deo humanitas sed inseparabiliter. Ideo dicit Augustinus in dialogo Ad 555
Felicianum quod humanitas est accidens Verbo, non quod sit res inhaerens ut accidentia novem generum (cum sit praecipua creata substantia), nec quod sit coaeva Verbo, vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens ad subiectum, sed
— contingenter ex tempore, nobis ineffabiliter — inest 560
Verbo non mutando naturam cui advenit, sed formata mirabiliter, quia Verbo Dei identificata vel hypostatice copulata, cum secundum Augustinum (1 De Trinitate),
555 Ad … 556 Felicianum] Cf. “Non separo, ne Dei Patris unam secundum carnem, et alteram secundum majestatem introducere videar prolem: quia idem Dei Filius et sine initio processit ex Patre, et secundum tempus nasci est dignatus ex virgine. Impassibilis in suo, passus in nostro, dum incomprehensibilem majestatem velut quodam indumento carnis vestire est dignatus ex utero.” Vigilius Tapsensis, Contra Felicianum 9 (PL 42, col. 1164). 561 formata … 562 mirabiliter] Cf. “Deus qui humane substancie dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti. et mirabilius reformasti. da nobis per…huius aque et uini misterium eius diuinitatis esse consortes qui nostre humanitatis dignatus est fieri particeps ihesus christus filius tuus. Qui tecum.” Missale ad usum ecclesie Westmonasteriensis […] fasciculus II, ed. Iohannis Wickham Legg, Henry Bradshaw Society 5 (Londinii, 1893), col. 488–489. 563 1 … Trinitate] Cf. “Nisi tamen idem ipse esset filius hominis propter formam serui [Phil. 2:7] quam accepit qui est filius dei propter dei formam [Phil. 2:6] in qua est, non diceret apostolus Paulus de principibus huius saeculi: Si enim cognouissent, numquam dominum gloriae crucifixissent [I Cor. 2:8]. Ex forma enim serui crucifixus est, et tamen dominus gloriae crucifixus est. Talis enim erat illa susceptio quae deum hominem faceret et hominem deum…Nam ecce diximus quia secundum id quod deus est glorificat suos, secundum hoc utique quod dominus gloriae est; et tamen dominus gloriae crucifixus est, quia recte dicitur et deus crucifixus, non ex uirtute diuinitatis sed ex infirmitate carnis; sicut dicimus quia secundum id quod deus est iudicat, hoc est ex potestate diuina non ex humana, et tamen ipse homo iudicaturus est [cf. II
554 quod om. CGOPQ, et spat. vac. undecim litteras comprehendens Q sed add. non H 556 humanitas] humanitatis O; consequenter P 559 vel sicut] ut GOP | consequens] consequitur GOP | ad om. P 560 ineffabiliter] inefficabiliter (sic!) O | inest] minime P 561 formata add. unita A mg.; unita C; add. unita Q lin. 563 copulata] copulatam P 223 “Talis fuit unio incarnationis quae Deum faceret hominem et hominem Deum.” 565
[1] Et patet quod dicta humanitas est forma in tribus conveniens cum formis per se in genere accidentis: [a]
Primo in hoc quod praesupponit naturam cui contingenter advenit, longe priorem ipsa naturaliter, quam accidens praesupponit creatam substantiam quam informat. [b] 570
Secundo in hoc quod non facit naturam cui advenit esse quid vel aliud quam absolute neccesario semper erat. [c]
Et tertio quod non potest esse sine supposito Verbi Dei cui inseparabiliter sed contingenter adhaeret. Et constat quod proprietates proportionales analogice conveniunt generi 575 accidentis. Assimilatur autem passionibus quae dicuntur per se egredi de propriis principiis subiectorum, cum non potest abesse postquam infuit, tamen non inseparabiliter consequitur ad Verbum, sicut passio ad subiectum, sed sicut accidentia separabilia deesse poterit a subiecto. 580
[2] Convenit secundo cum accidentibus absolutis per se in genere, cum sit per se substantia motiva et mobilis denominans subiectum proprie et per se moveri formaliter.
Tim. 4:1] sicut dominus gloriae crucifixus est.” Augusitnus, De Trinitate 1.13.28, p. 69.
564 unio] unionis B | faceret] facere O 566 patet] et B 567 accidentis om. P 571 esse om. ABCQ 572 aliud] aliquid O | erat] erit A 573 Dei om. GOP 574 adhaeret] adhaereat GOP 576 Assimilatur] assimilantur BOQ | dicuntur] dicunt PQ 577 principiis om. ABCQ 578 tamen non] cum GHOP 579 ad1 om. ABCQ | ad Verbum om. P | subiectum dub. substantiam C 581 Convenit add. sibi P | accidentibus] actibus O absolutis] absoluta P 583 subiectum dub. substantiam C 224 [3] Tertio convenit cum accidentibus respectivis.
Nam sicut relationes, habituationes, et respectus 585 consimiles non exinde movent naturam cui inhaerenter adveniunt, sic indubie forma servi quae est humanitas non potest movere naturam divinam, cum deitas solum denominatione respectiva denominatur ex eius adiacentia summe mirabili. 590
Convenit autem cum ceteris formis substantialibus specialiter in his tribus: [1] Primo quod facit suppositum cui advenit esse aliud quam praefuit, quia priusquam
Verbum fuit pure deitas, nunc est homo. [2] Secundo in hoc quod est idem hypostatice cum supposito cui advenit. 595
Sicut generaliter omnis forma substantialis est idem essentialiter vel personaliter cum subiecto formae et composito ex eisdem, sic, inquam, ista humanitas, cum sit eiusdem rationis cum aliis, est idem personaliter Verbo
Dei, licet Verbum commune sit natura divina quae non 600 potest esse illa humanitas. Sed cum sit individuum humanae naturae, homo Iesus suscipit saltem in praedicatione secundum essentiam praedicta temporalia
587 forma servi] Phil. 2:7
584 convenit] conveniunt B 585 habituationes] habitiones GHOP 586 cui] cum ABC; om. Q 588 deitas] divinitas O 590 mirabili] miraculi O 591 formis substantialibus inv. B 592 specialiter om. BGHOP 593 praefuit] praevenit P | priusquam scripsi. postquam codd. 594 fuit pure] pure fuit Q | deitas] divinitas O 595 hypostatice cum inv. B 597 personaliter] personali A, sed corr. | et] vel B; vel C, sed corr. ln. 599 est] et ABCQ 600 divina] Dei P 601 individuum] modum C 602 Iesus add. Christus H | suscipit] suscepit P 603 praedicatione add. et HO 225 quae historia evangelica de Christo contexuit, ut post declarabitur. 605
Et patet mira subtilitas in verbis Apostoli, quando dicit, Habitu inventus ut homo. Non enim video alium terminum quo posset aptius quoad auditorii intellectionem, copiosius quoad philosophicam considerationem, aut expressius quoad fidei explanationem, humanitatem 610
Christi exprimere. Ideo, respectu sententiae Apostoli qui fuit prudentissimus praedicator, et Augustini sui discipuli qui fuit scripturae sacrae subtilissimus explanator, oportet nos ignaros colla mentis submittere.
[1] Quantum ad primam trium confirmationum patet 615 quod similitudo non est sufficiens, cum humanitas Christi non solum sit ut vestimentum Verbo vel ignis ferro, sed vera Christi quiditas, idem personaliter cum subiecto.
[2] Ad secundam negatur consequentia, quia motio, passio, et similia positiva, cum sint praedicta personalia, 620 sunt personae Verbi ratione formae assumptae principaliter tribuenda. Non sic autem negationes quae non sunt praedicta personalia. Ideo dixi superius quod inceptio non est esse et prius-non-fuisse, sed causatur ex istis, cum
606 in verbis om. ABCQ 609 philosophicam] propheticam Q 611 respectu] isti GP 613 qui fuit om. C | fuit] fuerit O 615 confirmationum om. et spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens C; con et spat. vac. quattuor litteras comprehendens Q 617 ut om. G ignis] vermis GOP 619 negatur] negetur P | quia] quod H 620 sint] sunt C 621 ratione … assumptae] assumptae ratione formae A 624 istis] illis ABCQ; hiis P 226 stat illa esse aeterna, et inceptionem solum instantaneam et 625 faciens inceptionem non potest facere dictam negationem.
Ideo non oportet si Deus temporaliter generatur quod ante non fuit, cum satis est quod sit illud ex vi generationis quod non effectualiter fuit ante.
[3] Ad tertiam patet quod non oportet esse in toto 630 correspondentiam figurati cuiuslibet ad figuram. Unde satis est quod Abraham ducens filium significet Deum
Patrem qui de facto duxit et obtulit super montem
Calvariae Filium suum unigenitum,
636 risus] Cf. Gen. 17:17, 18:9–15, 21:6 643 Isaac … 644 ligna] Cf. Gen. 22:6 644 ligatus … struem] Cf. Gen. 22:9
625 illa] ista P 627 ante] aliquando B; autem OP 628 generationis add. quando A 629 non add. est O 630 esse … toto] in toto esse ABCHQ 632 ducens] dicens C; om. et spat. vac. quinque litteras comprehendens Q | significet] significationem P 633 qui] quae Q 637 nostri Domini inv. AB | Domini … Christi] figurans Dominum Iesum Christum G; Dominum Iesum Christum P 640 deitatem] divinitatem OQ 641 pertinet] pertinent ABCPQ 643 sequeretur] sequitur ABCQ 644 super] ad ABCQ 227
Christus affixus est ad crucem. Igitur cum Isaac noster ex 645 partibus nostris quantitativis componitur quae tam varie movebantur (et mota parte totius, movetur et totum cuius est pars), sequitur quod Christus compositus ex illis partibus movebatur. Nec credo philosophum dicere Deum esse hominem, nisi consequenter dicat eum componi ex 650 partibus et consequenter moveri ad motum progressivum partium, cum impossibile sit aliquid non moveri quod tamen subiective habeat in se motum. Unde Ieronimus exponendo fidem Catholicam, “Passus est,” inquit, “Dei
Filius non putative sed vere.” Et idem docet Augustinus in 655
647 et1 … 648 pars] Cf. «Ὁ αὐτὸς τοῦ μορίου καὶ παντός.» Aristoteles, Physica 3.5, ed. Ross, 205a11. “Idem partis et omnis est.” Aristoteles, Physcia: Translatio Vetus, ed. Bossier et Brams, 119. Vide etiam Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, p. 148, #107. 653 Ieronimus] Cf. “Nos autem ita dicimus susceptum a Dei Filio passibile nostrum, ut Dei tamen impassibile permaneret. Passus enim Dei Filius non putative, sed vere omnia, quae Scriptura testatur, id est, esuriem, sitim, lassitudinem, dolorem, mortem, et caetera hujusmodi. Secundum illud passus est, quod pati poterat, id est, non secundum illam substantiam quae assumpsit, sed secundum illam quae assumpta est. Ipse enim Dei Filius secundum Deitatem suam impassibilis ut Pater, invisibilis ut Pater, inconvertibilis ut Pater. Et quamvis persona Filii propria, id est, Dei Verbum, suscepit passibilem hominem, ita tamen ejus habitatione secundum suam substantiam Deitas verbi nihil passa est, ut tota Trinitas, quam impassibilem necesse est confiteri.” Fortasse hic auctor est Augustinus vel Pseudo-Augustinus (PL 39, col. 2182), vel Pelagius (PL 45, col. 1717; PL 48, col. 490B, 501C), vel Alcuinus vel Albinus (PL 101, col. 1064A). Vide etiam Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in iv libris distinctae 3.5.1.7, ed. tert., tom. 2 (Romae: Ad Claras Aquas, 1981), 44.
645 cum om. O 646 nostris om. GHOP | quantitativis] quam C | quae] qui Q, sed corr. mag. alt. man. | tam] tamen B 649 credo om. B 650 esse om. P 652 partium] per totum GOP; pro Q, sed corr. | cum … 653 motum om. B | aliquid] ac Q 228 Enchiridion 40 et decretalis in Clementis: De summa
Trinitate et fide Catholica: 660 Confitemur, inquit, Filium Dei una cum Patre aeternaliter subsistentem, partes nostrae naturae simul unitas, ex quibus ipse verus Deus in se existens fieret verus homo (humanum videlicet corpus passibile, et animam intellectivam seu 665 rationalem ipsum corpus vere, et per se, et essentialiter informantem) assumpsisse, ex tempore in virginali thalamo ad unitatem suae hypostasis seu personae; et quod in hac assumpta natura ipsum Dei Verbum pro omnium operanda salute, non solum 670 affigi cruci et in ea mori voluit, sed etiam emisso iam spiritu, perforari lancea sustinuit latus suum.
[1] Ecce primo univocatio Christi cum fratribus propter veram convenientiam in natura specifica. [2] Ecce secundo vera passio Iesu Christi nostri. [3] Et tertio cum 675
656 Enchiridion 40] Cf. “Cum itaque de aliquo nascatur aliquid etiam non eo modo ut sit filius, nec rursus omnis qui dicitur filius de illo sit natus cuius dicitur filius, profecto modus iste quo natus est christus de spiritu sancto non sicut filius, et de maria uirgine sicut filius, insinuat nobis gratiam dei qua homo, nullis praecedentibus meritis, in ipso exordio naturae suae quo esse coepit, uerbo deo copularetur in tantam personae unitatem ut idem ipse esset filius dei qui filius hominis, et filius hominis qui filius dei, ac sic in naturae humanae susceptione fieret quodammodo ipsa gratia illi homini naturalis quae nullum peccatum posset admittere.” Augusitnus Hipponensis, Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide, spe et caritate 12.40, ed. E. Evans, CCSL 46 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1969), 72. 660 Confitemur … 671 suum] Clementis Papae V, Constitutiones, Liber 1, Titulus 1: “De summa Trinitate et fide catholica,” in Corpus iuris canonici…pars secunda: Decretalium collectiones, ed. Aemilius Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1955), col. 1133. Vide etiam Enchiridion symbolorum 900–901 (480), ed. Denzinger (1965), p. 283. 670 emisso … 671 spiritu] Cf. Mt. 27:50 671 lancea … suum] Cf. Io. 19:34
656 40] 4 ABCQ | decretalis] decretalia P 660 Confitemur] confitetur P 663 fieret add. tibi C; foret O | humanum] humani C | videlicet] scilicet B 664 passibile om. H | intellectivam] intellectivas P 665 et1 om. G et2 om. AB 666 assumpsisse add. et O 667 hypostasis] hypostaticae ABCQ 668 personae om. P 669 omnium] omni HO 670 sed … 671 suum om. P 674 veram om. ABCHQ; propriam O | Ecce] et P 675 passio] add. Domini nostri Q | Christi om. GO | nostri om. ABCQ 229 passus sit et mortuus, sequitur quod fuit homo pro sancto triduo.
676 quod om. B | sancto] illo ABCHQ; secundo P 677 triduo add. et cetera C; add. Sequitur feria secunda post Iubilate, et cetera Q
Chapter 8: The Translation of the Longer Text
On the Incarnation of the Word
Prologue
Having first touched upon a treatise on the soul, which is propaedeutic to knowing the mystery of the Incarnation, it remains [for us] to undertake somewhat cautiously a treatise on the blessed Incarnation with diligence, reverence, and fear: (1) With diligence, for no subject matter is more difficult for the intellect, and consequently the mind must give it more attention. (2) With reverence, for no theological subject matter is more worthy of devotion because it includes in a single packet the venerable mystery of the whole creation and recreation. (3) And with fear, for as in no [other] subject matter does one merit more swiftly, so nowhere [else] is one more easily and perilously prone to stray.
This treatise is divided into thirteen chapters:
Chapter 1, by declaring from the testimonies of the saints that Christ is his manhood and consequently a creature, interprets [the sayings] of the Doctors on the Scriptures and the Creed that seem opposed thereto.
Chapter 2 declares how this opinion differs from the Arian heresy.
Chapter 3 shows that Christ was a man during the triduum, raises various objections, and resolves them.
230 231 Chapter 4 juxtaposes the opinions of the modern doctors that the truth may shine forth all the more.
Chapter 5 by establishing that the Word did not lose its manhood during the triduum, proves that it could not lose the nature it assumed.
Chapter 6 shows that Christ is univocally man with other men, and by answering objections declares that Christ is a creature according to the testimonies of many Doctors.
Chapter 7 by declaring the mobility of Christ interprets the verse, which is ambiguous to many, [namely] how the supremely mobile Wisdom (cf. Ws 7:24) can be in habit found as a man
(Phil 2:7 DRV).
Chapter 8 raises three objections to the specific identity of Christ with others and resolves them.
Chapter 9 sums up [our] position on [Christ’s] manhood, and by telling the three roots that cause the discrepancies of the moderns, resolves their three objections in [due] order.
Chapter 10 persuades by twelve proofs that the assumed manhood is Christ and strengthens this [conclusion] by the testimonies and examples of the Doctors.
Chapter 11 resolves the contradictions on which the moderns seemingly base their doctrine by citing ten tricks, granting which, they consequently assent to the possibility of the loss [of Christ’s manhood].
Chapter 12 by citing conflicting opinions regarding the assumption of the creature, declares that if [Christ] were to assume many manhoods, he would be many men, as the opinion of [St.] Thomas has it.1
1 Cf. “I answer that it was not fitting that human nature in all its supposites be assumed by the Word: (1) First, because the multitude of supposites of human nature, which is natural to it, would be taken away, for [in that
232 Chapter 13 corroborates the doctrines of others that then he would be neither one man nor many men, but both one and many. And thus it harmonizes the doctrines of the moderns with
[those of] the ancients.
…
Chapter Seven
[Objection 1: No divine person, including Christ, can be mobile.]
Secondly, some argue in the first place that one must not concede that Christ is mobile.
(For if Christ is mobile, then God is mobile.) But no god is mobile. Therefore, neither is Christ.
They argue the minor premise thus: Something is immobile, but there is nothing if there is no
God. Therefore, God is immobile. And because the one God is every god, it follows that every god, and consequently every divine person, is immobile without qualification, and consequently none is mobile. Therefore, if God is mobile and everything other than God is mobile, it follows that every being is mobile, and thus none is immobile. Hence, it follows that Christ did not suffer, die, or dwell with men, because then he would be liable to cease and annihilable.
[Reply to Objection 1, Part 1: Three arguments proving that the first principle must be immobile.]
case] in the assumed nature one would not consider any supposite other than the person assuming, as was said above. If there were no human nature other than that assumed, it would follow that there would be only one supposite of human nature, which is the person assuming. (2) Secondly, this would detract from the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, precisely as the firstborn among many brethren (Rom. 8:29) according to his human nature, as he is the firstborn of every creature (Col. 1:15) according to his divine [nature]. For then all men would be of equal dignity. (3) Thirdly, it was fitting that, as one divine supposite is incarnate, so also that he would assume only one human nature, that unity may be found on each side.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 3.4.5, body.
233 Here we say that something is necessarily altogether immobile. This is clear in three ways: (1) First from this, everything that is moved must rest upon something fixed and unmoved.
The created universe has moved. Therefore, it must rest upon something fixed and unmoved.
Therefore, as the mixed things of earth rest upon the round world that cannot be moved (Ps.
93:1) at its center by being tossed or driven about hither or thither, so everything that is moved, because it is so disposed to move by another, must lie within the limits established by its chief orderer. [But] because being moved is [an indication] of imperfection and the ability to move
[other things is an indication] of perfection without qualification, pure perfection is clearly prior to the imperfection modeled upon it.
(2) Second, the same is clear from this, many eternal truths, both affirmations and negations, are altogether immobile. (For example, “Nothing can simultaneously be and not be”;
“Many entities can be,” etc.) Therefore, because every being of reason must be founded upon an absolute essence, it follows that one must grant that there is an immobile essence or nature on which the aforesaid truths rest [and from which] they receive their immobility.
(3) Third, the same is clear from this, that first, pure nature is at the end of [all] possible perfection, for otherwise it would not be supremely perfect. But if it could be moved, it could become more perfect. Therefore, it cannot be moved. For if it could be moved, it would be
[moved] especially in the order of cognition. But it eternally orders all things because it does not receive its theoretical or practical knowledge from things external to it. Therefore, it is not moved in the order of cognition by its effects, and much less [does it move] in respect of place, increase, or change. For otherwise, there would be in it passive potency before actuality mixed
234 with active potency, because the ability to move [other things] differs from the ability to be moved. And thus it could become more or less perfect, which does not befit the summum bonum.
[Reply to Objection 1, Part 2: Although the first principle is per se immobile, it is also mobile in virtue of Christ’s assumed manhood. It can therefore be the ultimate supposite and mover of mobile things.]
Having established, therefore, that there is something and something altogether immobile, we must consequently say that whatever can be, is necessarily mobile. [This conclusion] is clear thus: Something cannot be, unless it be [either] a created essence or an uncreated essence. Every created essence is mobile. Every uncreated essence is a mobile.
Therefore, the conclusion [follows of necessity]. The minor premise is clear from this, that the uncreated essence is a mobile supposite. Therefore, it is a mobile. The consequence is clear that it is a mobile thing, because it is the person of the Word, which can move, and not only this, but it has a nature united to itself whereby it can move. And thus I understand Wisdom 7:24, Wisdom is more moving than any motion, which (as it seems to me) can be understood in accordance with
Catholic doctrine, truly, and literally of the eternal Wisdom, which is incarnate at its own time.
Because he was bruised according to his assumed manhood for our iniquities (Is. 53:5) bestowing goodness and life to all things in a manner that exceeds all that any other creature is sufficient or able to do, he doubtless has had an overflowing motion that as the life [of all things] brings into being and governs all the motion of the sensible world and of every one of its parts.
Therefore, as Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics imagines the motion of the prime mover
235 to be as it were “the life of living things,”2 because by its mediation perfection is made to flow into the world subordinate [to it], so most truly and without pretense that Wisdom is the prime mover in efficacy and dignity in respect of the man it assumed, for by the mediation of his primal motion the entire universe before and after is being perfected, because every other creature through Christ’s Passion is being restored to its original perfection by which it might serve God and favored man. [I assert this doctrine] not to fabricate falsehoods out of regard for the piety [of some], but because most truly, in the literal sense, according to the words themselves the prime mover is the uncreated Wisdom, and because his motion or passion, more than the motion of the heavens, brings to perfection every other creature before or after. For every creature apart from man according to its original institution ought to serve man, and thus [every creature] is in a sense worsened by the sin of the first man from whom [every creature] today would abundantly have perfection, had he stood in original righteousness. Therefore, because human nature was quite gloriously restored by the full satisfaction wrought [on the Cross] through the passion and consequently through the motion of this Wisdom, clearly this passion corrects every operation of nature subject to the human race. And because every service before and after rendered to the human race would in a sense be futile had this redemption not intervened, [this Wisdom] clearly bestows life upon the past and the future more swiftly than the motion of the heavens. And because the trickery and sin of the demons is thereby diminished and the happy fellowship of the angels is increased, it clearly bestows goodness upon the spiritual creation more than [any] possible motion of the heavens. Nor is it surprising that the intrinsic mover of this motion was
2 Cf. “Is [motion] in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally constituted things?” Aristotle, Physics 8.1 (250a14–15), trans. R. P Hardie and R. K. Gaye, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 354.
236 not an intelligence or the mover of a celestial sphere, but the most precious spirit of the Son of
Man and the Son of God by nature, who is made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they, as the Apostle says in Hebrews 1:4. And this, I believe, is the sense of the Apostle in Colossians 1, when he says that God purposed to restore in Christ all things, which are in heaven and on earth (Eph 1:9–10), as Gregory the Great explains in his Moralia 31.38.3
[Reply to Objection 1, Part 3: The divine Wisdom is more mobile than any other creature in respect of velocity, swiftness, and in general.]
Therefore, by understanding the Word of God personally as [this] Wisdom, as Augustine and Jerome teach, [all] must concede that it is supremely mobile. On the contrary, by attending more to the literal sense, we can grant that said Wisdom was not only more mobile, but moved more effectually than any other creature as regards velocity, swiftness, and in general: (1) As regards velocity, at the instant of his generation the [the Lord Jesus] was full of spiritual gifts and afterwards, probably at his ascension, he moved in a straight line with the same velocity as the prime mover moves in a circle, or [with as much velocity] as anything can move, for the cause of his deceleration before his disciples’ gaze cannot easily be imagined (cf. Lk 24:51; Acts 1:9–10).
Therefore, Christ while ascending of his own power from limbo to the farthest heaven passed through the most extended, passable space with the greatest velocity.
3 Cf. “The Mediator came that by the redemption of the human race he might make amends for the loss of the angels and perhaps make the measure of the heavenly country to overflow more richly…[Hence,] of the Father it is said, he purposed in himself that in the dispensation of the fullness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth even in him (Eph 1:9–10). In him indeed things on earth are being restored, while sinners are converted to righteousness. In him things in heaven are being restored, while humbled men return to that place whence the apostate angels fell by pride.” Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 31.49.99.
237 (2) As regards swiftness, his brief Passion has clearly restored the whole world before and after to a better equilibrium than the perpetual motion of the prime mover could have done.
(“For principles,” says Aristotle, “are smallest in respect of quantity.”)4
(3) In general, because Christ is a corporeal creature and an incorporeal creature, each of which moves in such a variety of ways, he is clearly more mobile than the rest. Indeed, he moved by his generation and Death, by increase and alteration, and finally by varied forms of locomotion, namely over the earth, water, and air; by “pushing, pulling, carrying, and twirling”5 that by that imperfect act he might restore his own to perpetual repose. Hence, as the natural philosopher commends motion as an “effectual sign” not only for philosophizing, but [also] for bringing nature’s intention to completion, so doubtless the theologian commends voluntary passion. And it is certain from the third book of the Physics that passion is either motion or an accident closely related to motion.6 Therefore, most truly and in the literal sense, the Wisdom of
God the Father is thus said to be more mobile than all other creatures (cf. Ws 7:24).
4 Cf. “It is this problem which has practically always been the source of the differences of those who have written about nature as a whole. So it has been and so it must be; since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold. Admit, for instance, the existence of a minimum magnitude, and you will find that the minimum you have introduced, small as it is, causes the greatest truths of mathematics to totter. The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end.” Aristotle, De caelo 1.5 (271b6–13), trans. J. L. Stocks, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 404. 5 Cf. “The motion of things that are moved by something else must proceed in one of four ways. For there are four kinds of locomotion caused by something other than that which is in motion, viz. pulling, pushing, carrying, and twirling. All forms of locomotion are reducible to these.” Aristotle, Physics 7.2 (243a15–18), trans. Hardie and Gaye, 343. 6 Cf. “The solution of the difficulty that is raised about the motion—whether it is in the movable—is plain. It is the fulfillment of this potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power of causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable, for it must be the fulfillment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this; it is a mover because it actually does it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. Hence, there is a single actuality of both alike.” Aristotle, Physics 3.3 (202a12–19), trans. Hardie and Gaye, 256.
238 [Objection 2: There was no Christ before the Incarnation.]
But some object to this interpretation because of this, that there is no Christ before the
Incarnation, and consequently the author of this verse did not intend the mobility of the incarnate
Wisdom in the literal sense.
[Reply to Objection 2: The created order, past and present, presupposes the fact of the Incarnation. Christ is consequently present to all times.]
To this I say that whatever may be said of [the objection’s] fittingness, the consequence is not valid, for in virtue of the fact that all the past is present to God, it is certain that the author of this verse well knew how Christ continueth ever (Heb. 7:24). According to the voice of his chosen vessel (Acts 9:15) [i.e., St. Paul], Jesus Christ, today, tomorrow [is] the same forever
(Heb. 13:8). And this fact Jerome makes outstandingly clear in his epistle, “On the Assumption of the blessed Virgin” to Paula and Eustochius. Indeed, the patriarch Abraham knew of Christ’s
Incarnation (i.e., that Christ is incarnate at his proper time) according to the testimony of the
Truth. Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day (i.e., the time of the Incarnation and not only the day of eternity). He saw [it] and was glad (Jn 8:56 DRV).7 To this in Homily 43 Augustine adds the argument:
When, [Augustine] says, in Genesis 24 Abraham sent his servant to find a wife for his son Isaac, [Abraham] bound him with this oath that he might faithfully fulfill
7 Cf. “Hence the Lord said to the Jews, Before Abraham was, I am (Jn 8:58). With these words he showed that he who was speaking, was always in the mystery of unity [i.e., the Godhead]…For before Abraham was is the shortness of his manhood, but I am declares the eternity of his nature. Doubtless, the speaker implies that he already was in this eternity by the sacrament [i.e., mystery] of his Incarnation.” Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Jerome), On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin 10.61.
239 what he had been bidden. For a great event was occurring when a bride was sought for Abraham’s seed. But that the servant might know what Abraham knew, that he did not carnally desire descendants nor had in mind anything carnal regarding his lineage, he said to the servant he was sending, Put thy hand under my thigh and swear by the God of heaven (cf. Gn 24:3, 4, 9). What, [Augustine] asks, does “the God of heaven” have to do with “Abraham’s thigh”? And he answers: Because [Abraham’s] lineage is denoted by his thigh, [Scripture] signified by this oath that the God of heaven would come in the flesh from the lineage of Abraham. Fools, [Augustine] says, find fault with Abraham’s prophecy as though he had done something purely childish when he said this, but because he believed in the blessing of his seed, he believed that the Messiah would be incarnate of his seed.8
And secondly, Jerome declares the same regarding the patriarch Isaac’s prophecy when he sensed Christ by savor of prophecy and said, See, the smell of my son is as the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed (Gn 27:27), and so of each of the patriarchs. For because they were saved with us by the same faith, they clearly believed in the Lord’s Incarnation just as we do, and consequently that the Lord is incarnate at his own time. “Time,” says Jerome, “certainly presents no obstacle to the mystery of man and God uniting.”9
And [our response] is evident to the frivolous objections of sophists by which they inveigh against the prayers of the church by which she beseeches God by [the Lord’s]
8 Cf. “When father Abraham sent his servant to seek a wife for his son Isaac, he bound [the servant] by this oath to fulfill faithfully what he was bidden, and that he might also know what he was doing. For a great thing was taking place, when a spouse was sought for the seed of Abraham. But that the servant might recognize what Abraham knew, that he did not long for descendants according to the flesh and that he did not have anything carnal in mind regarding his posterity, he said to the slave he was sending, Put thy hand under my thigh and swear by the God of heaven (cf. Gn 24:9). What does the God of heaven have to do with Abraham’s thigh? Now you understand the oath. By ‘thigh’ [he means] ‘posterity.’ Therefore, what was that oath except that it meant that the God of heaven was to come in the flesh from Abraham’s descendants?” Augustine of Hippo, 124 Sermons on the Gospel of John, Sermon 43.16. 9 Cf. “For catching a whiff afar off of this field of the womb, the patriarch Isaac said, ‘See, the smell of my son is as the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed’ (Gn 27:27). Although those who think too little imagine that the saints of the old covenant understood the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation less [than we do], [those saints] were saved by the same grace [as we]. Hence, time certainly presents no obstacle to the mystery of God and man uniting so that he, who had not yet been born of the Virgin Mary, was already in [time] from the beginning of the world through the unity of his person. Many Scriptural proofs declare this fact.” Paschasius Radbertus, On the Assumption 9.60–10.61.
240 Incarnation, Nativity, Circumcision, Baptism, Fasting, Passion, Death, Resurrection, and
Ascension to be delivered from peril. (Vain, they say, is the proposed prayer, because all the aforesaid [events of the Lord’s life] neither are nor can be.) But it is certain that although each of them is past to us and temporally future to the Fathers of the old covenant, [each] truly does exist at its proper time and consequently is a cause of [the faithful past and present] obtaining mercy.
(We hide nothing problematical in our religion that we would not dare to disclose to the disputation of any student of philosophy.) And this manner of speech Jerome teaches from that saying of Jude, Jesus, he says, having saved the people out of the land of Egypt, did afterwards destroy them that believed not (Jude 1:5 DRV). The Apostle also [says the same] in I Corinthians
10:9, Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted [him], not because Jesus Christ was already born of the Virgin Mary,10 but because that person, who at his proper time is Christ, is eternal and incarnate by the everlasting counsel of God and the essence of matter was always present. Therefore, regardless of when the holy Fathers lived, they truly knew that Christ was, had been, and would be, and the propositions formed by them were true ([e.g.,] “Christ is, was,” or “shall be incarnate”), although it was not then [the case] that Christ is incarnate. (For, as I have often said, as a proposition can be true here despite the fact that its primary denotation does not refer to here—because it suffices that it be true somewhere, [so] a proposition can correspondingly be true now despite the fact that its primary denotation does not refer to now— because it suffices that it be true at some time.) And Augustine with the other Doctors is to be understood in this way, [when they teach] that the faith of the Fathers of the old and new
10 Cf. “The Apostle Jude wishes to explain this fact quite openly. Jesus, he says, having saved the people out of the land of Egypt, did afterwards destroy them that believed not (Jude 1:5 DRV). And Paul [says] in another place, Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted [him], not because Jesus or Christ was already born of Mary, but because in that single Son of God the unity of his person was already declared which had been hidden in a mystery.” Paschasius Radbertus, On the Assumption 10.61.
241 covenants is the same. (For the Incarnation, the Death of Christ, and his Coming Again to judgment are articles of faith; in which faith far be it that there be any falsity or fiction, etc.)
Hence, Gregory the Great in Moralia 23.15 explaining Job 33:14, God shall speak once, and shall not repeat not the selfsame thing the second time, thus writes, “Speaking presumptuously, one may predicate any time of God, because properly speaking none may be predicated of him.”11 In Moralia 32.5, he gives the reason for this, saying that “God does not remember the past because the past in itself is always present to his sight.”12 And he gives a rather notable example of this point in Moralia 34.5 in three ways.13 Hence, in Moralia 9.25 he had expressed this point more extensively, explaining Job 10:5, Are thy days as the days of man? “The past,” he says, “has not passed for God, nor are the things yet to come lacking to him, like the things that do not appear, for he who always has being sees all things as present to himself.”14 And Anselm says the same in Monologion 19.
11 Cf. “God speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time. [Job 33:14] This can be understood rather ingeniously, [namely] that the Father begot the only begotten Son as consubstantial with himself. For God’s speaking is his having begotten the Word. But to speak once is to have no Word other than the Only Begotten. Hence, it aptly adds, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time, i.e., he begot only this Word, i.e., the Son. But because he does not say ‘has spoken,’ but ‘speaketh’…it is clear to all that neither the past tense nor the future befits God. Therefore, any tense is predicated of him loosely, but none truly…Hence, no [tense] can be properly said of him, for the Father begot the Word without time.” Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 23.19.35. 12 Cf. “How, therefore, does God remember the past, when the past in itself is always present to his will?” Ibid., 32.5.7. 13 Cf. “Sometimes Holy Scripture so mixes passed and future tenses that at one time it uses the future [tense] for the past and at another the past [tense] for the future. For it uses the future [tense in Revelation 12:5] when John saw that a woman was to bring forth a son who was to rule the nations with a rod of iron. Because at that time the incarnate Lord had already come, [John] saw a historical event. On the other hand, [Scripture sometimes] uses the past [tense] for the future, as when the Lord speaking through the psalmist says, They have dug my hands and feet. They have numbered all my bones (Ps 21:17–18 DRV). Assuredly, these words depict the Lord’s passion as though it had already happened, but yet it was still to be revealed long afterwards. Therefore, when [Scripture] says in this passage, When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear (Job 41:16 DRV), nothing prevents us from understanding that past events are described in the future tense.” Ibid., 34.7.12. 14 Cf. “And to him the past is not past, nor are the things that are yet to come lacking, as though they do not appear, because he who always has being sees all things as present to himself.” Ibid., 9.47.72.
242 Therefore, as I have often said, unless all time, past or future, were present to God, theologians would suffer great difficulties in the expositions of Scripture, as in the time of David
Wisdom says the words, They have pierced my hands and my feet (Ps 22:16). And thus [the same principle holds true] of many things said in the Scriptures that would be asserted childishly and without reason under distinct tenses unless the fact be impressed upon us that the infinite eternity of God coexists at every time, past or future. Hence, the wise man of Ecclesiasticus 47:11 speaks in this sense, Christ took away his sins. And [any other] given instance clearly does not impugn the interpretation we give to this verse, Wisdom is more moving than any motion (Ws 7:24).
[Objection 2 being refuted, other interpretations of Wisdom 7:24 are considered.]
Many other interpretations, however, have been adapted to this text: (1) For example, some [interpretations] by speaking of motion broadly say that the uncreated Wisdom moves objectively by the thoughts that delimit its act. (2) Other [interpretations] say that because “there are as many kinds of motion as there are [kinds] of being”15 and [because] God continuously acquires dominions at every point of the world, that in that manner of relative motion [the divine
Wisdom] is supremely mobile. (3) A third [degree of interpretation] says that in every motion an order of priority and posteriority is given according to the successive denomination of the subject in the matter of motion, and every such thing according to its intelligible being is ordered and delineated eternally in the uncreated Wisdom, and [thus] according to these reasons [the divine
Wisdom] is figuratively called “supremely mobile.” But the first exposition, because it is more
15 Cf. “Hence, there are as many types of motion or change as there are meanings of the word is.” Aristotle, Physics 3.1 (201a8–9), trans. Hardie and Gaye, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 354.
243 literal, more true, and more conformable to the Faith, please [me] more. Hence, although the
Author of Scripture has intended all these senses, [he] nevertheless [intended] the first as the more important that it may be the door to the other senses consequent [upon it].
[Other Scriptural passages touching upon the Incarnation are interpreted in the same way.]
And thus Augustine saves the literal sense of more controversial texts of Scripture, e.g., that verse in John 10, The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me (Jn
14:24). For [Augustine] says that this [verse] is literally true in Homily 76.
Let us not wonder, he says; let us not be afraid. [Christ] is not less than the Father (cf. Jn 14:28) or unequal to himself. Surely, he has not lied. He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words (Jn 14:24 DRV). Here he does not contradict himself, but perhaps not without mystery there he uses the plural and here the singular, wishing [us] here to understand himself who, because he is the Speech or Word of God the Father, but not the speech of himself, has spoken the literal truth.16
(1) But if a grammarian is offended by the accusative case, it can be said that the right construction was used, not its opposite. (For he who does not love Christ, does not keep his words, i.e., the sayings or truths he commands to be observed.) (2) And to manifest what follows from this, he adds, And the word which ye hear (supply “he keepeth not”). By this copula, we are taught the metaphysics that all the eternal truths of this kind are the same in essence as the Word of God. (3) And thirdly, to teach that that Speech is essentially the same as God the Father,
16 Cf. “‘And the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me.’ Let us not wonder or be afraid. He is not less than the Father, but he only exists from the Father; he is not unequal to himself, but he is not from himself. Neither has he lied by saying, ‘He that loveth me not keepeth not my words.’ Behold, he said that the words are his own. On the other hand, he has not contradicted himself, has he, when he said ‘And the word which ye hear is not mine’? And perhaps [he said this] because of some distinction. When he spoke his own [words], he used the plural, i.e., ‘words’; but where he said ‘word,’ i.e., the Word, he did not speak his own [word], but he wanted himself to be understood [as the Word] of the Father.” Augustine of Hippo, Tractate on the Gospel of John 76.5.
244 although personally different, he adds, is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me (Jn 14:24).
Although an orthodox interpretation [of this passage] could be that the vocal speech is not the
Word’s of himself in the way in which the Apostle says, only the Father hath immortality (1 Tm
6:16), as Augustine explains in De Trinitate 117 and Contra Maximinum 1.10;18 nevertheless, the prior interpretation is more subtle and more precious to me.
And thus we must understand the doctrine of the Apostle in Philippians 2 that Christ, who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:6–7 DRV). To understand this [verse], note that as “the form of God” is “Godhead,” so “the form of man” is “manhood.” For each is a substantial form because each divine person is that by which [each] is God, for [each] is God formally in virtue of the Godhead, as each human person is that by which [each] is man, for [each] is man formally in virtue of manhood. [Christ,] however, has both of these forms as [he is] a subject in virtue of them formally; one [form], nevertheless, he has by an absolute necessity and the other he received in time. And this most spiritually exalted metaphysics of forms I would like our theologians to learn forthwith, if not in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, then at least in the words of the Apostle.
17 Cf. “Hence, we consequently also understand that the Apostle Paul said not only of the Father but [rather] of the one and only God, who only hath immortality (1 Tm 6:16), because he is the Trinity itself. For neither did the Son separate the Father from himself when he said in another place with the voice of wisdom (for he is the Wisdom of God [1 Cor 1:24]), I alone compassed the circuit of heaven (Sir 24:5)]. How much more, therefore, is it not necessary to understand [the Apostle] to be speaking solely of the Father and not of the Son when he said, who only hath immortality (1 Tm 6:16)?” Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 1.6.10. 18 Cf. “Regarding God’s immortality: In the fourth passage I discussed with you God the Son, [who is] also immortal. For you have so wished to understand that passage of the Apostle, who only hath immortality (1 Tm 6:16), as pertaining to the Father alone, although [the Apostle] said this not of the Father but [rather] of God, because he is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Therefore, I have shown that the Son also has immortality according to the substance of his divinity. For who denies that he was mortal according to the flesh?” Augustine of Hippo, Against Maximinum the Heretic 1.4.
245 Hence, it is clear that not in virtue of his own reputation, nor of his own will, [nor] without the sure foundation of the truth did [the Lord Jesus] claim to be equal to the Father, as if to snatch at the honor due to the Father as Satan did, because in common with the Father and the
Holy Ghost being-God belongs to him by nature. He had shown that this was common to him and the Father when he said, I and the Father are one (Jn 10:30 DRV). And Augustine forms the argument as follows: Nothing that is natural or essential to a supposite is robbery, but Christ’s equality with God is natural and belongs to the Word per se. Therefore, this is not robbery, but by making himself to be a visible nature he mercifully emptied himself (cf. Phil 2:7). Himself, it says, because of the identity of the person who is the Son of Man and Son of God. He emptied, it says, because he made himself to be a bodily nature ad extra that is empty by a priority of origin before it has form at the beginning of the world. In this sense, as Augustine explains in
Confessions 12, Scripture says at the beginning of Genesis, The earth was void and empty (Gen.
1:2 DRV). Nor do I see how [this] emptying can be better understood than that having become a res extra, he became an empty essence, and thus “emptied.” And this is literally true of Christ, because he is each of [his] three natures. And hence Truth speaks truly in John 14:28, the Father is greater than I (DRV), for because Christ is equivocally both his divinity and manhood, he can be understood in respect of an unqualified predicate according to the nature of his Godhead or according to the nature of his manhood, as the predicate requires.
From the aforesaid there is clearly no repugnance [between] “the Father is greater than
Christ,” and likewise, “the Father is equal to Christ without qualification.” On the contrary, by understanding the person of Christ equivocally according to two natures, there is no repugnance between, “the Father is greater than Christ,” and likewise, “the Father is not greater than Christ.”
246 Nor should such predicates be disregarded according to the literal sense for being figurative, because thereby this would be denied, I and the Father are one (Jn 10:30 DRV), and “the Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost are one God,” etc., because in the first [predicate] there is equivocation and in the second [predicate] a concept of persons. On the contrary, unless I am mistaken, our every expression for God is figurative. For example, whenever we say that “God is mobile, born, has suffered,” etc., the construction is not synecdochical, but a figure of speech called
“anthropopathy,” namely when a human passion is attributed to God (from anthropos “human being” and pathos “passion”). For we do not have words that signify God without [some] figure of speech.
[The author returns to his main point: God is not mobile, but he is a mobile.]
Therefore, to return to the matter at hand, we grant that there is something [which], because it is the divine nature, is altogether immobile, as follows: In no way can it be moved, although it is a mobile supposite (e.g., “Christ suffered”). This logical argumentation is clear in an example: The divine nature is indeed the Word begotten both in eternity and in time, and yet the divine nature itself is not begotten, etc.19 The essence of prime matter is the supposite; [the essence of] fire, a composite of matter and form, and yet [prime] matter itself cannot be so composed. Peter eats, dies, or changes in some other way, and yet the nature of the species that
Peter is cannot change in such a way. Therefore, in all similar cases one must diligently attend to
19 Wyclif probably has part of the Fourth Lateran Council’s condemnation of Joachim of Fiore in mind here. Cf. The divine nature “does not beget, is not begotten, and does not proceed, but it is the Father who begets, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds.” D. 804.
247 essential predication and formal predication. Clearly, [the following syllogism] does not follow:
God is mobile. And everything other than God is mobile. Therefore, everything is mobile. because something is non-mobile. And if the question is raised, “What is non-mobile?”, we can say by equivocation that nothing is non-mobile, because the divine nature is a mobile. And thus, by understanding essential, but not formal, predication, then EVERYTHING THAT IS, IS A MOBILE.
[Sophists at Oxford are chastised for their conceited displays of pseudoscience.]
But if someone were to assert that this reply, because it savors of contradiction, does away with theological disputations by incurring scathing criticism, which is a most vile aim of a respondent, I say that [such a disingenuous question] greatly furthers the sophistic mode of disputation, which was established by a sin of Lucifer and winked at in theological schools principally for the display of the disputant and the open refutation of the respondent. As a sign of this the first question Scripture recalls was posed by the Devil. Why, said the serpent, hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise? (Gen. 3:1 DRV) Hence, every question undoubtedly bears witness to ignorance or to sin. Nevertheless, it must not be denied that theological questions can be discussed meritoriously, for Truth [himself] asked many questions of sinners. Nevertheless, on both sides [of a disputation] one must intend that the glory of God be increased, that the pride of sophists be laid waste, and the unknown truth be laid bare.
All else in theological disputation is of the Devil (cf. Mt 5:37). Therefore, questions, like oaths
248 (cf. Gn 21:22–34), were introduced [into the world by at least] the occasion, [if not also] the penalty, of sin.
And this is the opinion of Augustine in On Christian Doctrine 2.31, where he teaches that in disputations one must beware the urge to quarrel and frivolous and childish ostentation.20 Nor does sophistry lead theologians to any [desirable] goal, but it does reveal the [sophists’] feeble craftiness wherewith previously they had been puffed up and this from their own principles.
Hence, that the pretentious displays of sophistical “wisdom” may be seen less, I frequently withstand them by denying their negations that in an equivocal sense could surely be granted in accordance with Catholic doctrine. For example, by granting the limiting statement of this universal, “Everything is mobile,” I form the limiting statement thus that the display of sophistry be less manifest: “Only a mobile thing is a thing,” which is false in respect of things eternal. I could, nevertheless, grant that “Nothing other than a mobile is a thing,” by taking “mobile” essentially as a substantive, and yet “Something other than a mobile is a thing,” granted that
“mobile” be predicated formally as an adjective. But Augustine and the other saintly doctors care not for these displays of the sophists. Hence, in his dialogue To Felician [Augustine] says, “Mary
[both] did and did not beget the Son of God.”21
20 Cf. “But especially important is the discipline of disputation, which must be entered into and worked out for all kinds of questions that present themselves in the study of the Scriptures. One must nevertheless be on one’s guard against the urge to quarrel and against a certain childish display in order to deceive one’s opponents. For there are many false conclusions of arguments called ‘fallacies’ that very often so imitate true [arguments] that they deceive not only the dull-witted, but also brilliant people who are not paying full attention.” Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Doctrine 2.31.48. 21 Cf. “Therefore, Mary [both] did and did not beget the Son of God. She did beget [him], when Christ was born of her according to the flesh; she did not beget [him], when the Son existed of the Father without beginning. She did beget [him], when the Word [made] flesh proceeded from her that he might dwell among us (cf. Jn 1:14); she did not beget [him], when in the beginning God was the Word (Jn 1:1) that granted a beginning to all things. Do not limit the beginning of God the Word by the Virgin Birth; do not say that the body begotten of the Virgin is coeternal with the Godhead, for the Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tm 2:5), by his first birth is coeternal with the Father, and by a second [birth] is partaker of our own time. By the prior [he is] the author
249 [Objection 3: Whereas Christ’s manhood suffered on the Cross, God did not.]
But [some] argue further that the Word of God is not mobile without qualification by reason of its assumed manhood. (For no person moves because of a habit or an essentially separate accident.) But Christ’s manhood is a habit joined accidentally to the Word of God.
Therefore, the suffering of the Word of God does not follow from [Christ’s] torment or suffering.
[This objection] is confirmed by a triple proof: (1) First from this, a man is not torn or burnt, even if his clothes undergo such action. (2) Secondly from this, we grant that [Christ’s] manhood did not exist for a notable time. We do not, however, grant that at the same time the Word of
God likewise did not exist. Therefore, it does not follow that if that manhood was moved from non-being to acquiring the term of being, that the Word was too. (3) The third is confirmed by the image of the patriarch Abraham, who, when he wished to sacrifice his son Isaac (Gn 22), did not slay him but [rather] the ram he saw behind his back caught by its horns. Therefore, because
Christ’s Passion was prefigured allegorically by Isaac, it seems that the person of Christ did not suffer, but [only] his manhood.
[The principal Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ’s manhood is like an accident inhering in the Divine Word, the Divine Word is the ultimate subject of all of Christ’s acts.]
Here we say that one should not grant that the Word suffers because of the suffering of its manhood, unless the Word personally was that manhood. But because the Word is entirely that manhood as regards both body and soul, and [because] actions and passions pertain in the first
of time; by the latter, a sharer of the human realm.” Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine of Hippo), Dialogue to Felician the Arian on the unity of the Trinity 12.
250 place to supposites, clearly that manhood would not suffer or act unless the Word, which is the same hypostasis or person [as that manhood], so acts or suffers. And so we must firmly hold that the Word of God and consequently God himself hung in sorrow and suffered on the Cross, and so of the other human acts the gospel recounts of Jesus. And thus, although Christ’s manhood is an essence, substance, or nature separated not by conservation but by essence from the Godhead that Christ is, [his manhood] is not so separate that it is not the person of Christ.
But as regards the word “habit,” we must note that “habit” is taken in four ways, as
Augustine explains in the Eighty-three Questions, question 73, to explain that saying of the
Apostle in Philippians 2:7, being…in habit found as a man (DRV). (1) First, [“habit” is understood] as the wisdom that is the truth we learn, which, “remaining unmoved, moves” the soul it informs.22 (2) Secondly, [“habit” is understood] as the nutrients that, once eaten, change the body they nourish and are changed by digestion. Indeed, every substantial thing associated with us that changes and is changed by associating with a subject is called a “habit” of this kind, a “habit” indeed because it specifies that a subject “has” what associates with it accidentally.23
(3) A third kind [of habit] is when habituated things are formed by habituated subjects that are not changed thereby, as when a garment that has been taken off has a different shape when it is cast aside than when it aptly clothes parts of the body. (4) The fourth kind of “habit” is [the type] of habit that neither changes the substance to which it comes nor is changed [by it], as a ring on a finger.24 All four of these, because they specify that a substance is “habituated” or “has,” are said
22 “There is something which moves without being moved.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7 (1072a25), trans. W. D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 879. 23 The reader should keep in mind here that the Latin for “habit” (habitus) is related to the Latin verb for “having” (habere). 24 Cf. “We use the word ‘habit’ in many ways: (1) either ‘mental habit,’ e.g., the comprehension of any discipline solidified by use, or ‘bodily habit,’ as when we say that one person is stronger or more vigorous than
251 to be “habits” according to essential predication, as “motion” is said to be materially a thing that has been formally acquired by the said motion, as is clear in Averroes’s fourth comment on
Physics 3.25 The sufficiency, however, of these four [kinds of habits] is understood from this, that the first [kind of] habit changes the substance to which it comes and is not changed. The second changes [the substance to which it comes] and is changed. The third is changed and does not change [the other substance]. The fourth, on the other hand, neither changes [the other substance] necessarily nor is changed.
But besides these four [kinds of habits], which in themselves are substances, “habit” is understood formally among philosophers in two equivocal senses: (1) First, for the category of quality in reference to the first species of quality, be it a “habit of the body” (e.g., health), or a
“habit of the soul” (e.g., intellectual or moral virtue). (A “spiritual habit,” however, is materially generated from a habit in the first way mentioned, as a “bodily habit” is produced from the second.) (2) But in a second way, “habit” is understood as the respective form of the tenth genus, which is “to have,” “possession,” or “the act of having.” Such a “habit” is caused by a habit another. (Usually, [‘habit’ in this sense] is more properly called a ‘disposition.’) [In this sense,] ‘habit’ [is also taken for] those things that are outwardly put on the body, e.g., clothing, shoes, weapons, and anything of that kind. In these instances, since the noun derives from the verb ‘to have,’ clearly ‘habit’ is predicated of that which happens to someone, such that he or she can also not have it…This, nevertheless, is important that certain of those things that happen to us such that they produce a ‘habit’ [in us] are not changed by us, but in themselves change us, while their permanency remains whole and unshaken, as when wisdom comes to a man and does not change [thereby], but [rather] changes the fool to make him wise. (2) Certain things, however, so happen that they change and are changed, e.g., food, which loses its appearance and is turned into our body, and we refreshed by the food go from weakness and sluggishness to strength and vigor. (3) The third kind is when those things that happen [to the body] change while producing a habit, and in a certain sense are given shape by those things in which they produce the habit, e.g., clothing. For when it is cast or taken off, [clothing] does not have that shape which it takes when it is worn and covers the body. Therefore, put on, it takes on a shape it does not have when it is taken off, while the parts of the body, both when clothed and when bare, remain in their own state. (4) There can also be a fourth kind [of ‘habit’], when those things that happen to produce a habit neither change those things to which they come nor are changed by them, e.g., a ring on a finger, if one does not particularly pay attention [to it]. This kind, nevertheless, is either non-existent, if you scrutinize it closely, or extremely rare.” Augustine of Hippo, Eighty-three Different Questions 73.1. 25 Unfortunately, Averroes’s commentary has never been translated into English and the portion that Wyclif refers to is too long to quote here in English translation.
252 understood materially in the third or fourth ways. For riches specify that people [are] “rich,”
“endowed with property,” or “formally possess [property].” And clearly, these six kinds of habits are altogether equivocal.
Therefore, we say that the manhood assumed by the Word is a “habit” in the third way because it comes to a being in act, not changing or making [the Word] a different person than it was before.26 For this reason, the saints say that [Christ’s] manhood is as it were a piece of clothing covering the Godhead, and vowed religious who have put on Christ (Gal. 3:27) have a bodily habit, noting this, that [Christ’s] manhood comes to God but inseparably. For this reason,
Augustine in his dialogue To Felician says that [Christ’s] manhood is an accident [belonging to] the Word,27 not that it is a thing inhering like the accidents of the nine genera, because it is the foremost created substance [of all], nor that it is coeval with the Word, or like a passion naturally consequent to a subject, but contingently in time, ineffably to us, it belongs to the Word not by changing the nature to which it comes, but wondrously fashioned, [it is] identified with the Word of God or hypostatically united [to it], because according to Augustine in De Trinitate 1, “Such was the union of the Incarnation that it made God a man and a man God.”28
26 Cf. “This habit is not of the first kind, for human nature does not change the divine nature while remaining unchanged. Nor is it of the second kind, for man has not changed God while being changed by him. Nor [is] it of the fourth [kind], for man was not so assumed that he neither changed God nor was changed by him. It is rather of the third kind, for [man] was assumed that he might be changed for the better, and was ineffably shaped by [God] more excellently and more intimately than [any] clothing worn by man.” Augustine of Hippo, Eighty-Three Different Questions 73.2. 27 Cf. “I do not separate [the two natures] lest I seem to introduce one offspring according to the flesh and another according to the [divine] majesty. For the same Son of God has both proceeded from the Father without beginning and deigned to be born of the Virgin in time. Impassible in his own [nature], he suffered in ours, since he deigned to clothe his incomprehensible majesty, as it were, with the garment of [our] flesh from the [Virgin’s] womb.” Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine), Dialogue to Felician 9. 28 Cf. “Nevertheless, unless he who was ‘the Son of Man’ because of the form of a servant (Phil 2:7), which he assumed, were the same as ‘the Son of God’ because of the form of God (Phil 2:6) in which he is, the Apostle Paul would not say of the princes of this world, For had they known [it], they would never have crucified the Lord of glory (I Cor. 2:8). For he was crucified in virtue of the form of a servant, and yet the Lord of glory was crucified.
253 [How Christ’s manhood resembles accidents of various kinds and a substantial form]
(1) Clearly, said manhood is a form agreeing in three [respects] with per se accidental forms: (a) First in this, it presupposes a nature to which it contingently comes, [which is] by far naturally prior to it, as an accident presupposes the created substance it informs. (b) Secondly in this, it does not make the nature to which it comes to be a particular thing or anything other than what it always was by an absolute necessity. (c) And thirdly, it cannot be without the supposite of the Word of God to which it inseparably but contingently adheres. And its proportional properties certainly agree analogically with the genus of accident. On the other hand, [Christ’s manhood] resembles properties, which are said to arise per se from the proper principles of their subjects, because it cannot be absent after it has been present; nevertheless, it is not inseparably consequent to the Word, as a property to its subject, but like separable accidents it can be lacking to its subject. (2) Secondly, [Christ’s manhood] agrees with absolute, per se accidents because it is a motive and mobile substance formally specifying that properly and per se a subject is moved.
(3) Thirdly, it agrees with relative accidents. For as relationships, habitual states, and [other] similar relations do not thereby move the nature to which they come by inherence, so doubtless the form of a servant (Phil 2:7), which is [Christ’s] manhood, cannot move the divine nature, because the Godhead is specified solely by a relative specification from its supremely marvelous proximity.
For such was that assumption [of our nature] that it made God a man and a man God…For behold…he glorifies his own, insofar as he is the Lord of glory, and yet the Lord of glory was crucified. For rightly is it said that God was crucified, not in virtue of his Godhead but in virtue of the weakness of his flesh…Insofar as he is God, he judges, that is by divine and not by human power. And yet the man himself shall judge [the quick and the dead] (II Tim. 4:1), even as the Lord of glory was crucified.” Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 1.13.28.
254 On the other hand, [Christ’s manhood] agrees with other substantial forms especially in these three [respects]: (1) First, because it makes the supposite to which it comes to be other than what it was before, for previously the Word was purely the Godhead, [but] now it is a man. (2)
Secondly in this, it is the same hypostatically as the supposite to which it comes. As generally every substantial form is the same essentially or personally as the subject of the form, which is composed of the same things, so, I say, that manhood, although it is of the same nature as other
[men], is personally the same as the Word of God, although the Word shares in the divine nature, which cannot be that manhood. But because he is an individual of human nature, the man Jesus receives at least according to essential predication the temporal predicates that the gospel records of Christ, as shall hereafter be declared.
And the wondrous subtlety in the words of the Apostle is [now] clear when he says, in habit found as a man (Phil 2:7 DRV). For I do not see another term [besides “habit”] wherewith one could express Christ’s manhood more aptly as regards the understanding of the audience, more abundantly as regards philosophic scrutiny, or more precisely as regards the defense of the
Faith. For these reasons, out of respect for the doctrine of the Apostle, who was a most prudent preacher, and of Augustine his disciple, who was a most subtle interpreter of Holy Writ, we simpletons must submit the necks of [our] minds.
[Reply to the three parts of Objection 3]
255 (1) As regards the first of the three objections,29 the comparison clearly does not suffice because Christ’s manhood is not only like a garment [on] the Word or fire [in] iron, but Christ’s true quiddity, the same personally as its subject.
(2) As regards the second, I deny the consequence because motion, passion, and [other] similar positive [characteristics], although they are personal predicates, are to be granted to the person of the Word principally by reason of the assumed form [of man]. They are not, however, thus negations, which are not personal predicates. For this reason, I have said above that the beginning [of the Incarnation] is not “being” and “previously not having been,” but it is caused from these [principles], because it is certain that they are eternal and the beginning merely instantaneous, and the one effecting the beginning cannot effect the said negation. For this reason, [the objection] is not necessary if God is begotten in time as that which he was not before, because it suffices that he be that thing by force of generation that in effect he was not before.
(3) As regards the third, clearly the correspondence of any particular signified thing to signifier is not necessary in every respect. Hence, it suffices that Abraham when taking his son
[up the mountain] signifies God the Father, who in fact led and offered upon Mount Calvary his only begotten Son, who, like Isaac the only begotten, was sacrificed upon the mountain where the temple was built. [Isaac] was indeed an image of our “laughter” (i.e., of our Lord Jesus
Christ) (cf. Gn 17:17, 18:9–15, 21:6). And it suffices that [Christ’s] manhood [is] personally the same as our dear Isaac. As the ram is the same in its kind as Isaac, who prefigured [it], so when the person of the Word suffered and was slain, according to his Godhead and soul he was always
29 The word translated here as “objections” really means “corroborations.” Wyclif means to say, “as regards corroborating my response to the first objection…”
256 unharmed, and so of the other things that are not fittingly applied to this passage [of Scripture].
But it is certainly repugnant to a symbol that there be correspondence in every respect, for then evidently Christ’s mobility would follow, because Isaac bore the wood (cf. Gn 22:6), as Christ
[bore] the Cross; [Isaac] was bound to the pile [of wood] (cf. Gn 22:9), as Christ was affixed to the Cross. Therefore, because our dear Isaac is composed of our quantitative parts, which moved in so many different ways (and “if a part of a whole moves, the whole of which it is a part moves too”),30 it follows that Christ composed of these parts moved. Nor do I believe that a philosopher
[should] say that God is a man, unless he consequently [also] say that [God] is composed of parts and consequently moves according to the progressive motion of [his] parts, because it is impossible that something not move that subjectively has motion within itself. Hence, Jerome, while expounding the Catholic faith, said, “The Son of God suffered not putatively but truly.”31
And Augustine teaches the same in Enchiridion 4032 and [so does] Pope Clement’s decretal, “On
30 Cf. “It is the nature of every kind of sensible body to be somewhere, and there is a place appropriate to each, the same for the part and for the whole, e.g., for the whole earth and for a single clod, and for fire and for a spark.” Aristotle, Physics 3.5 (205a10–12), trans. Hardie and Gaye, 262. 31 Cf. “But we say that the Son of God so assumed our passible [nature] that the Godhead remained impassible. For the Son of God suffered not putatively but truly all those things to which Scripture bears witness, i.e., hunger, thirst, weariness, sorrow, death, and other things of that kind. Insofar as he suffered, he suffered as he could, i.e., not according to the substance that assumed [i.e., his Godhead], but according to [the substance] that was assumed [i.e., his manhood]. For according to his Godhead the Son of God is impassible like the Father, incomprehensible like the Father, invisible like the Father, changeless like the Father. And although the proper person of the Son, i.e., the Word of God, assumed a passible man; nevertheless, in virtue of his dwelling according to his substance, the Godhead of the Word suffered nothing, like the entire Trinity, which we must confess is impassible.” Augustine or Pseudo-Augustine (“Sermon 236: Part 4: On the Catholic Faith” 5, PL 39, col. 2182); Pelagius (“Booklet of Faith Sent to [Pope] Innocent” 5, PL 45, col. 1717; PL 48, col. 490B and 501C); and Alcuin or Albinus, “Confession of Faith: Part 3: On God One and Triune, Christ, and many other Ecclesiastical Dogmas” 15, PL 101, col. 1064A. 32 Cf. “Because something may be ‘born’ of something else, yet not be a son, and [because] conversely not everyone who is called a ‘son’ is born of him whose son he is called, assuredly the way whereby Christ was born of the Holy Ghost [yet] not as [the Holy Ghost’s] son, and of the Virgin Mary [precisely] as her son, indicates to us the grace of God whereby man at the beginning of his nature wherewith he began to be, by means of no preceding merits, was joined to the Word of God into such a personal union that the Son of God was the same as the Son of Man and the Son of Man [the same] as the Son of God, and so in the assumption of human nature in a certain sense
257 the supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith”:
We confess, it says, that the Son of God, eternally subsistent with the Father, assumed in time and from the Virgin’s womb to the unity of his hypostasis or person the parts of our nature united simultaneously together (i.e., a human, passible body and an intellective or rational soul that truly, per se, and essentially informs [his] very body), wherewith he being in himself true God, became true man; and that, to effect the salvation of all, in this assumed nature the Word of God himself not only willed to be affixed to the Cross and to die thereon, but also, having yielded up the ghost (cf. Mt 27:50), suffered his side to be pierced with a lance (cf. Jn 19:34).33
Behold, first the univocation of Christ with [his] brethren because of the true agreement in [their] specific nature. Behold, secondly the true Passion of our [Lord] Jesus Christ. And thirdly, because he suffered and died, it follows that he was man during the holy triduum.
grace itself, which could admit no sin, became natural to that man.” Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love 12.40. 33 The Sources of Catholic Dogma 480, ed. Henry Denzinger, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, [2001]), 189–190.
Chapter 9: Authenticity, Title, Genre, and Date
I. Authenticity
De incarnatione Verbi is undoubtedly part of Wyclif’s authentic corpus. He mentions the work by name in at least eleven of his other works, including De intellectione Dei, De ecclesia,
De universalibus, De apostasia, De potestate papae, De blasphemia, De compositione hominis,
De dominio divino, De materia et forma, Trialogus, and De veritate sacrae scripturae.1 DIV is also mentioned by name in an early fifteenth-century Hussite catalogue of Wyclif’s works.2
Likewise, the book was condemned by name in Archbishop Zbyněk Zajíc’s missive of June 16,
1410 to the faculty and administration of Charles University.3 Finally, Thomas Netter (d. 1430) cites the book at least eight times in his massive Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae catholicae, his caustic and illiberal attack upon Wyclif’s legacy.4
1 Iohannis Wyclif, De ente librorum duorum 2.1.4, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London, 1909), 76; Iohannis Wyclif, Tractatus de ecclesia 6, ed. Iohann Loserth (London: Trübner, 1886), 126; Iohannis Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus 5, 10, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 104, 214; Iohannis Wyclif, Tractatus de apostasia 14, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London: Trübner, 1889), 183; Iohannis Wyclif, Tractatus de potestate pape 6, ed. Johann Loserth (London: Trübner, 1907), 104–105; Iohannis Wyclif, Tractatus de blasphemia 2, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London: Trübner, 1893), 20; Iohannis Wyclif, De compositione hominis 6, 7, ed. Rudolf Beer (London: Trübner, 1994), 111, 114; Iohannis Wyclif, De dominio divino: Libri tres 1.9, 1.11, ed. Reginald Lane Poole (London: Trübner, 1890), 55, 77, 79; Iohannis Wyclif, De materia et forma 6 in Miscellanea philosophica, vol. 1, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London: Trübner, 1902), 216; Iohannis Wyclif, Trialogus 2.7, 3.27, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9, ed. Gotthardus Lechler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 99, 224, 225, 268, 271, and 273; et Iohannis Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 31, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg, vol. 3 (London: Trübner, 1907), 246, 253. 2 Anne Hudson, “The Hussite Catalogue of Wyclif’s Works,” Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), III, 3, 19. 3 František Palacký, ed., Documenta magistri Joannis Hus: Vitam, doctrinam, causam in Constantiensi Concilio actam (Prague, 1869), 380. For the historical circumstances and effects of this letter, see Howard Kaminsky, “The Politicians and the Radicals: 1409–1413,” in A History of the Hussite Revolution (Berkley: University of California Press, 1967). 4 Thomas Netter, Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae Catholicae 1.3.39–43 (Venice, 1571), 1:120–136. 258 259 II. Title
DIV’s surviving manuscripts and the other sources just referred to indicate that in the half-century or so after the treatise was written, DIV did not have a single title. Wyclif himself usually calls it De incarnatione, but sometimes De incarnatione Verbi.5 As discussed in chapters
1 and 3, manuscripts AB have De incarnatione, C has De benedicta incarnatione, GP have no title written before the eighteenth century, MO have De incarnatione Verbi, and P has De incarnatione Christi. Netter similarly used both De incarnatione Verbi and De incarnatione.6
Archbishop Zajíc referred to the work as De incarnatione Verbi divini.7 Because M’s version of the text is the oldest, and because Wyclif himself seems to use De incarnatione Verbi as the unabbreviated title, I have judged it to be the title by which the treatise should be known. In this,
I agree with Aubrey Gwynn and J. A. Robson.8
III. Genre
De incarnatione Verbi’s genre is a matter of some dispute. Since the mid-nineteenth century, certain scholars, including Edward Harris, Herbert Workman, R. H. Hodgkin, Williell
5 Wyclif, De universalibus 5, p. 104; Wyclif, De compositione hominis 6, p. 111; and Wyclif, De dominio divino 1.9, 1.11, pp. 55, 77. 6 Walden uses the longer title, for instance, in Doctrinale 1.3.39, p. 120, and the shorter title on the very next page. 7 Palacký, Documenta magistri Joannis Hus, 380. 8 Aubrey Gwynn, The Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), 212; J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 123, 125, 134, 139, 165, 194, and 267. 260 Thomson, and G. R. Evans, have judged it to be part of Wyclif’s Sentences commentary.9
Robson was open to but not entirely convinced of this interpretation.10 Similarly, in 2009 Lahey urged caution against making a too-hasty judgment as to DIV’s genre, but he has assured me in person that he now believes that DIV is part of Wyclif’s Sentences commentary.11 William
Courtenay, on the other hand, has come to the opposite conclusion.12 Although Courtenay does not directly address the question of why DIV could not have been part of a Sentences commentary, he makes two remarks that no doubt shed light on his judgment. Among the changing trends in Sentences commentaries Courtenay sees over the course of the fourteenth century, he notes that the themes of “the Incarnation, Christology, and the hypostatic union” were typically no longer discussed; instead, scholars commented mostly upon book one.13
Thomas Oey develops this train of thought further and assumes that if DIV were a Sentences commentary, it must have been the whole of Wyclif’s commentary. Because a whole Sentences commentary dedicated exclusively to Christology would surely be odd, Oey reasons, DIV probably was not such a commentary.14
These arguments are far from demonstrative. First, since the time that Courtenay wrote, the explicitly Christological portion of Robert Holcot’s Sentences’ commentary has been
9 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, xx; Herbert B. Workman, John Wyclif: A Study of the English Medieval Church (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 1:97, 1:138; R. H. Hodgkin, Six Centuries of an Oxford College: A History of the Queen’s College 1340–1940 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949), 29–30; Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38; and G. R. Evans, John Wyclif: Myth & Reality (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2005), 111. 10 Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 134–135. 11 Stephen E. Lahey, John Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 252, footnote 23. 12 William J. Courtenay, Schools & Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 359. 13 Ibid., 255–256. 14 Thomas Geoffrey Oey, “Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture within the Context of his Doctrinal and Social Ideas,” (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1991), 138. 261 published. Scholarship dates it to the 1332–1333 academic year.15 Second, as Robson argued in
1961, DIV may very well be only one of the treatises that began as part of Wyclif’s commentary.
His Summa de ente could likewise be based on his commentary on the first book of the
Sentences.16 Third, although surviving Sentences commentaries from the period typically do ignore books three and four, DIV does have certain features that make it similar to other commentaries of its era. As Paul Bakker and Chris Schabel have noted, “as a rule, post-1344 commentaries are considerably shorter than pre-1344 commentaries, and they tend to ask a few large questions rather than a great number of shorter ones.”17 Bakker and Schabel go on to note, however, that these larger questions sometimes include any number of other, subordinate questions that at first glance seem to have little to do with the larger question under discussion.18
Thus, instead of commenting upon Lombard’s Sentences in its integrity, theologians in Wyclif’s day preferred to make small portions of Lombard’s work their occasion for discussing the pressing questions of the day. Robert Holcot (d. 1349), for instance, used Lombard’s treatment of the angels as an occasion to discuss future contingents.19 Likewise, in De incarnatione Verbi
Wyclif does not address every point the Lombard makes, and he sometimes wanders into material not directly pertinent to Christology (e.g., the distinction between essential and formal predication, and the nature of time).
15 Hester Goodenough Gelber, “Robert Holcot, Obligational Theology, and the Incarnation,” in Studies in Later Medieval Intellectual History in Honor of William J. Courtenay, ed. William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel (Leuven: Peeters, 2017), 357–391. For the date of Holcot’s commentary, see ibid., 364. 16 Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 133–135. 17 Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 1, Current Research, ed. G. R. Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 426. 18 Ibid., 429–431. 19 Courtenay, Schools & Scholars, 256. 262 Comparing DIV to fourteenth-century Sentences commentaries in a general way, however, neglects its particularity. Its contents clearly indicate that it began as a series of lectures
Wyclif gave on the Sentences. First, chapter 1 of the treatise addresses the question of whether
Christ is a creature. After a few introductory remarks, Wyclif cites book 3.11 of Lombard’s
Sentences, where this topic is discussed. The whole of chapter 1 is clearly a response to
Lombard’s argument.20 Likewise, at the beginning of chapter 2 Wyclif refers to and quotes from book 3.11.2.1, and in the middle of chapter 4 he refers to and quotes book 3.21.1.6.21 Later in the treatise, Wyclif addresses material found earlier in the Sentences. In chapter 9, he refers to book
3.7.2; in chapter 10, he refers to book 3.9.22 Moreover, to develop his thought, Wyclif cites and builds upon the Sentences commentaries of Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus more than once.23
Wyclif also often cites the same patristic material as Lombard. As discussed in chapter 11 of this dissertation, in DIV 7 Wyclif refers to the seventy-third of Augustine’s Eighty-Four Questions, quotes Augustine’s De Trinitate 1.13.28 twice, and reproduces a quotation from Pseudo-Jerome, all of which also appear in book 3 of the Sentences.24 Moreover, as was noted in chapter 1, all the texts in manuscript O were identified as Sentences commentaries when the manuscript was acquired by Oriel College in 1454. Although this identification is by no means definitive, it has
20 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 1, ed. Harris, 3. Unfortunately, Harris misread Arabic numeral 11 for Roman numeral ii. 21 Ibid., 2, p. 14; Ibid., 4, p. 60. Unfortunately, on p. 14 Harris has again misread Arabic numeral 11 for Roman numeral ii. 22 Ibid., 9, p. 157; 10, p. 183. 23 Wyclif refers to Aquinas’s commentary in ibid., 12, p. 203 and 13, p. 227; to Scotus’s commentary in ibid., 6, p. 96; 10, p. 161; 11, p. 185; and 13, p. 220; and to Bonaventure’s commentary in ibid., 4, p. 49 and 60. 24 Wyclif refers to or quotes this material on ln. 507–532, 562–563, and 652–653 of the Latin text found in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. The same material appears in Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in iv libris distinctae: …Tomus ii: Liber iii et iv, 3rd ed., 3.6.3, 3.6.6, 3.7.1.4, 3.15.1.12, and 3.22.1.3 (Grottaferrata: Ad claras aquas, 1981), 52, 56, 60, 97, and 136. 263 lent support to the argument advanced here, as others have noted.25 Finally, given that the earliest surviving form of DIV is a reportatio, it is certain that DIV was first delivered as a lecture.
Although some may remain unconvinced, the preponderance of evidence clearly points to DIV being part of Wyclif’s Sentences commentary.
IV. Date
Problematic for the question of when DIV was written is the fact that it survives in three different forms, the reportatio, the text contained in ABCOPQ, and the expanded text found in G.
Wyclif probably wrote the additional material found in G after his forced retirement to
Lutterworth in 1381. Thus, the question of DIV’s date taken up here will address the question of the reportatio and the version found in ABCOPQ.
The date at which Wyclif composed DIV has been a matter of some disagreement. Harris dated the treatise to 1363–1367.26 Workman estimated “about 1370.”27 Robson claimed, “all scholars date [DIV] to c. 1374,” but he offered no proof for such an assertion.28 Thomson preferred “the fall of 1372.”29 Although the dates differ, the reasoning behind them is the same:
If Wyclif wrote DIV as part of his Sentences commentary, he wrote it during his first year as a bachelor of theology in order to complete his doctorate in theology.
25 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, xx; Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 134; and Anne Hudson, “Books and their Survival: The Case of English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works,” in Medieval Manuscripts, Their Makers and Users (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 236. 26 Harris, preface to De benedicta incarnacione, ix. 27 Workman, John Wyclif, 1:97, 1:332. 28 Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 194. 29 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 38. 264 William Courtenay has shown that in Wyclif’s day it typically took seven years of study for a candidate to become a bachelor of theology; only thereafter were candidates permitted to comment upon Lombard’s Sentences.30 Wyclif completed Oxford’s arts course in the spring of
1361 and obtained a license of non-residence from his parish at Fillingham on August 29, 1363 in order to pursue the BTh. If the 1363–1364 academic year were his first toward the BTh, however, he would have completed the degree in the spring of 1370. And yet he was bachelor of theology before July 23, 1369.31 Thus, only three possibilities are probable: (1) Wyclif could have worked for two years as a parish priest in Fillingham, obtained the license of non-residence at the right time, and then finished the theology course in six years instead of seven. (2) He could have started the theology course immediately after finishing the arts course; in this case, he would have been in violation of his canonical duties towards his parish for two years and would have finished the BTh in the spring of 1368. (3) He could have worked for a year at Fillingham, returned to Oxford in the autumn of 1362, and obtained the license of non-residence only after neglecting his parochial duties for an entire academic year. In this case, he would have completed the BTh in the spring of 1369.
In comparison with (3), (1) and (2) seem unlikely. Thus, Wyclif probably lectured on
Lombard’s Sentences during the 1369–1370 academic year. If this interpretation is correct, the reportatio contained in manuscript M must have been produced during that time. Because it seems likely that Wyclif would have prepared his commentary for publication before moving on
30 Courtenay, Schools & Scholars, 41–42. W. J. Courtenay, “Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif,” in The History of the University of Oxford: Volume 2: Late Medieval Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 4. 31 Anne Hudson and Anthony Kenny, “Wyclif , John (d. 1384),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 60:616. 265 to lecturing on the Bible, he probably also produced the version of DIV contained in ABCOPQ in the 1369–1370 academic year. In this, I agree with Aubrey Gwynn.32
32 Gwynn, The Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif, 212.
Chapter 10: Wyclif’s Christology in General
I. The High- and Late-Medieval Origins
Since 1980 scholarship on high- and late-medieval Christology has outgrown the limitations of Leonine Thomism, and thanks in part to Marilyn McCord Adams’s work on
Ockham, some major differences between the Christologies of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham have now been firmly established in scholarship. Although a thoroughgoing review of all the pertinent scholarship is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the following scholarly trends are notable:1 As regards the study of Aquinas, Thomists, most recently Michael Gorman, have exhibited a marked interest in Aquinas’s doctrine of Christ’s created manhood. According to the
Angelic Doctor, does this manhood have its own created esse or existence?2 Thomists struggle to find a single answer to this question, for in four passages Thomas seems to say no, whereas in a fifth he seems to say yes.3 The question is important, because scholars often point out that
1 For an introduction to the patristic and early medieval background of later Christology, see Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012); Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and C. W. Marx, The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England (Woodbridge, Suffolk: D. S. Brewer, 1995), especially chap. 1: “The Devil’s Rights and the Doctrine of the Redemption (I): The Twelfth-Century Controversy and its Origins,” 7–27. For an introduction to high- and late- medieval Christology in general, see Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1999). 2 Michael Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). For an introduction to Aquinas’s Christology in general, see Joseph Wawrykow, “Hypostatic Union,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 222–251. For the historical background of Aquinas’s position in light of Lombard’s Sentences, see Michael B. Raschko, “Aquinas’s Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard’s Subsistence Theory,” The Thomist 65, no. 3 (July 2001): 409–439; and Jason L. A. West, “Aquinas on Peter Lombard and the Metaphysical Status of Christ’s Human Nature,” Gregorianum 88, no. 3 (2007): 557–586. 3 In Chapter 4 of Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, Gorman directs his readers to the following passages in Thomas’s corpus: ST III, q. 17, a. 2; In Sententias 3, d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Quodlibet 9, q. 2, a. 2; Compendium theologiae 1, c. 212; and De unione a. 4, resp. Only in the last does Aquinas seem to affirm a unique 266 267 Aquinas’s Christology differs from that of Scotus on this very point: The Subtle Doctor is firmly committed to the view that Christ’s created manhood maintains a distinct, created existence and haecceity within the hypostatic union.4 This difference in Christological outlook naturally leads to another: Scotists typically hold that ex potentia absoluta God could have assumed human nature only for a time, whereas Thomists think that once the Incarnation happens God strictly speaking cannot annul the union.5 Another important difference in outlook is also apparent:
Whereas Thomists insist that the union occurs at the level of the person, they typically refrain from using the relationship of accidents inhering in their respective substance as a model to explain the hypostatic union. Instead, they usually prefer the model of parts to their respective wholes. Contrariwise, the accidents/substance model is Scotus’s preferred mode for explaining the ontology of the Incarnation.
It must be stressed that what was said in the last paragraph concerns matters of trends in scholastic schools. Two important caveats are in order, however: (1) Certain texts of Aquinas can be cited to support two of the positions just attributed to Scotism. In the first, as already mentioned, Aquinas recognizes a distinct, created, human, and secondary being (esse) in Christ that complements and is subordinate to his divine being (esse):
And therefore, as Christ is one without qualification because of the unity of his supposit, and two in a certain respect because of the two natures, so he has a single being [esse] without qualification because of the single, eternal being [esse] of the eternal supposit. There is, however, another being [esse] of this supposit,
“Aquinas, Scotus, and the Christological Mystery: Why Christ is Not a Human Person,” The Thomist 71, no. 3 (July 2007): 451–474. 4 For an introduction to Scotus’s Christology, see Richard Cross, “Jesus: God and Man” and “Jesus: Predestination and Merit,” chap. 9 and 10 in Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 5 For more on the disagreement, in addition to Adams, What Sort of Human Nature?; and Reichmann, “Aquinas, Scotus, and the Christological Mystery”; see also Richard Cross, “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” The Thomist 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 171–202; Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Alfred J. Freddoso, “Human Nature, Potency and the Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 3, no. 1 (January 1986): 27–53. 268 not insofar as it is eternal, but insofar as it became man in time. That is, if it is not accidental being (because man is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God, as was discussed above), it is nevertheless not the principal being of his supposit, but rather secondary.6
Secondly, in at least two points in his corpus Aquinas does acknowledge that the inherence of the
Lord’s humanity in the divinity is like an accident’s inherence in its respective substance:
Such a comparison, however, can be found in creatures. For a subject and accident are not so united that a third thing is constituted therefrom. Hence, the subject in such a union [i.e., the union of substance and accidents in man] is not ordered as a part, but is something whole and entire, because it is a person, hypostasis, and supposit. An accident, however, is drawn to the personality of the subject, so that the same person is both human and white, and likewise the same hypostasis and the same supposit. Therefore, according to a certain analogy, the person, hypostasis, and supposit of the Son of God is the person, hypostasis, and supposit of the human nature in Christ.7
Human nature in Christ somewhat resembles an accident, especially an accident of habit, in three respects: (1) It accrues to the divine person after complete being [esse], as an article of clothing and all other accidents. (2) It is a substance in itself and accrues to another, as clothing does to a human. (3) [Human nature] is improved by the union with the Word but does not change the Word, as an article of clothing takes the shape of the one wearing it. Hence, the ancients said that [human nature] verges on an accident, and for this reason certain people add that it degenerates into an accident. Nevertheless, it is not properly so called, because human nature does not degenerate in Christ; on the contrary, [human nature] is ennobled all the more.8
6 “Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi et duo secundum quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi; est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non inquantum est aeternum, sed inquantum est temporaliter homo factum. Quod est, si non sit esse accidentale—quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est—, non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium.” Thomas Aquinas, De unione Verbi incarnati art. 4, resp., ed. Walter Senner, Barbara Bartocci, et Klaus Obenaur (Lovanii: Peeters, 2015), 134. 7 “Potest autem huiusmodi exemplum aliquale in creaturis inueniri. Subiectum enim et accidens non sic uniuntur ut ex eis aliquod tertium constituatur, unde subiectum in tali unione non se habet ut pars, sed est integrum quoddam quod est persona, ypostasis et suppositum; accidens autem trahitur ad personalitatem subiecti, ut sit eadem persona hominis et albi, et similiter eadem ypostasis et idem suppositum. Sic igitur secundum similitudinem quandam persona, ypostasis et suppositum Filii Dei est persona, ypostasis et suppositum humane nature in Christo.” Thomas Aquinas, Compendium theologiae seu brevis compilatio theologiae ad fratrem Raynaldum, lib. 1, cap. 211, ed. J. Perrier, G. de Grandpré, A. Dondaine, et H.-F. Dodaine, Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia 42 (Romae: Editori di San Tomamaso, 1979), 164, col. a–b, ln. 88–99. 8 “Natura humana in Christo habet aliquam similitudinem cum accidente, et praecipue cum habitu, quantum ad tria. —Primo, quia advenit personae divinae post esse completum, sicut habitus et omnia alia accidentia. — Secundo, quia est in se substantia et advenit alteri, sicut vestis homini. —Tertio, quia melioratur ex unione ad Verbum et non mutat Verbum; sicut vestis formatur secundum formam vestientis et non mutat vestientem. 269
It should be noted that, despite later Dominican hostility to Scotism, certain important and controversial features of Scotus’s Christology are rooted in what Aquinas actually taught. Later
Thomists have merely downplayed the importance of such texts to give their doctrine a consistency that is lacking in Aquinas’s corpus. (2) Because Ockham disagrees with Scotus in none of the points discussed here, Scotist Christology could just as accurately be termed
Ockhamite Christology.9
II. Wyclif’s Christology: Introduction
In the midst of so much disagreement, where does Wyclif’s Christology belong? One goal of this dissertation is to encourage the scholarly motion whereby Wyclif’s thought is being reattached to the trunk of late-medieval thought from which it was hewn. In fact, he does have a contribution to make to at least some of the disagreements just described. The rest of this chapter is devoted to giving an overview of Wyclif’s Christology in general; the next chapter of this dissertation seeks to offer commentary on De incarnatione Verbi (DVI) 7, to put its argument into focus, and to ground it in Wyclif’s doctrine of predication.
Unde ANTIQUI dixerunt quod vergit in accidens. Et QUIDAM propter hoc addiderunt quod degenerat in accidens: quod tamen non ita proprie dicitur; quia natura humana in Christo non degenerat, immo magis nobilitatur.” Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi 3.6.4.2 ad 1, vol. 3, ed. Maria Fabianus Moos (Parisiis: P. Lethielleux, 1933), 247, #120. 9 For the natural development of Ockham’s Christology out of Scotus’s, see Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1967), 249–258. For more on Ockham’s Christology, in addition to Freddoso, “Human Nature, Potency and the Incarnation,” see also P. T. Geach, Logic Matters (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 289–301; Marilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence and Subsistence: or, Was Ockham a Nestorian in Christology?,” Noûs 16, no. 1 (1982): 62–75; Richard Cross, “Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 58 (1991): 126–156; and Alfred J. Freddoso, “Logic, Ontology and Ockham’s Christology,” The New Scholasticism 57, no. 3 (September 1983): 293–330. 270 Only rarely since the nineteenth century have scholars addressed Wyclif’s Christology.
The first to take up the task was Gotthard Lechler, who in 1873 thoughtfully engaged Wyclif’s theology in his two-volume biography of Wyclif.10 His scholarship is impressive, given its enduring value, and given that the Wyclif Society only began printing their editions of Wyclif’s works in 1882. Scholarship then remained dormant until 1955, when Martin Schmidt published a
German article on Wyclif’s Christology and ecclesiology.11 In 1991, Thomas Geoffrey Oey’s doctoral dissertation included a chapter-long overview of Wyclif’s Christological thought.12
Thereafter, DIV, and not merely Wyclif’s Christology in general, received some attention.
Michael Treschow first used DIV to contrast the anthropology and soteriology of some sixteenth- century Protestant thinkers with that of Wyclif, and then worked out the structure of the work in light of its seventh chapter.13 Stephen Lahey later built upon Treschow’s work and began to situate DIV in its historical context.14 Finally, around the turn of the century Richard Cross began writing an article entitled, “Wyclif on the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” which he intended to publish in a Festschrift dedicated to Jeremy Cato. Unfortunately, as it stands the piece is not yet finished, but what he has written is still extremely helpful in elucidating some of the finer points
10 Gotthard Lechler, “Lehrstück von der Person Christi und dem Werk der Erlösung,” in Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation (Leipzig, 1873), 1:512–523. For an English translation, see Gotthard Lechler, “Doctrine of the Person of Christ, and the Work of Redemption,” in John Wyclif and his English Precursors, trans. and ed. Peter Lorimer (London, 1878), 2:67–76. 11 Martin Schmidt, “John Wyclifs Kirchenbegriff: Der Christus humilis Augustins bei Wyclif,” in Gedenkschrift für D. Werner Elert: Beträge zur historischen und systematischen Theologie (Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1955), 72–108. 12 Thomas Geoffrey Oey, “Christ and Scripture,” in “Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture within the Context of his Doctrinal and Social Ideas” (PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1991), 175–200. 13 Michael Treschow, “The Understanding of Man in the Reformers: Or Reformation Realism,” in Christian Anthropology: The Trinitarian Theology of Man, ed. Susan Harris (Charlottetown, PEI: St. Peter Publications), 81–116. Michael Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross at the Centre of Creation: John Wyclif’s De Benedicta Incarnacione, Chapter Seven,” Crux 33, no. 2 (June 1997): 28–37. 14 Stephen E. Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” in A Companion to John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, ed. Ian Christopher Levy (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 127–198. 271 pertinent to DIV.15 What follows in this chapter and the next brings together and builds upon insights from all these scholars. Although this new treatment of Wyclif’s Christology may not be definitive, it is hoped that it will be the most complete and systematic treatment of the issue to date.
But first two caveats are in order. Ideally, the Christological works of the most important
English theologians between Ockham’s rise to prominence and Wyclif’s early days at Oxford would be consulted to see if and how they shed any light on Wyclif’s doctrine. These theologians include Nicholas Aston, Robert Holcot, Adam Wodeham, and Richard FitzRalph.16 Aside from
Holcot’s, the pertinent texts of these thinkers are not yet edited.17 As such texts become available, future scholarship must take them into consideration. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Wyclif stood in dialogue with Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. Here, we will endeavor to shed light upon that dialogue.
Secondly, early scholarship tended to think of Wyclif as an unoriginal thinker as regards
Christology. As Lechler put it,
Wiclif speaks of the person of Christ as the God-man on innumerable occasions.…But all his enquiries into the personality of the Redeemer, divine and human in one, in so far as they are of a doctrinal character, suffer under a certain monotony and stiffness. He simply repeats in a stereotyped fashion the traditional Christology of the Church, along with the proofs alleged in support of it by the Fathers and Scholastics. But of profound original reflection on the godly mystery we find no trace; his thought upon it never flows in the channel of speculation. Wiclif emphasises the truth that Christ was a true Man, that He is, in fact, our Brother; and he defends the doctrine of the true humanity of the Redeemer against dialectical objections. On the other side, he.…maintains with all distinctness the pre-existence of Christ, the eternity of His personal Being. And
15 The author extends his sincerest thanks to Dr. Cross for giving him a copy of the article. 16 In his “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology” (166–168), Lahey mentions the first three men in this list. In a private conversation, he added FitzRalph. 17 For Holcot’s Christology, see Gelber, “Robert Holcot, Obligational Theology, and the Incarnation,” 357– 391. Richard Cross assures me that, as far as he is aware, none of the major Oxford theologians between Ockahm and Wyclif had any noticeable effect upon Wyclif’s Christology. 272 further, the idea of the incarnation of God, the union of both natures in the one person of the God-man, as well as all questions respecting the possibility and necessity of the incarnation, were all taken up into his system…entirely in the form in which they had been settled in the course of the Christological contests of the fourth and fifth centuries, and in which they had been speculatively carried out by Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, and others. On these points, and all which stands in connection with them, we are not able to discover anything characteristic or peculiar in his mode of thought or treatment.18
Schmidt follows Lechler’s judgment.19 Although stressing Wyclif’s orthodoxy is a salutary exercise, the judgment that his Christology is hyper-orthodox to the point of being boring is simply false. Here we endeavor to show some measure of his originality.
III. Wyclif on the Necessity of Creation and the Incarnation
The chief difference between the Christology of the mature Wyclif and that of his predecessors consists in his insistence that Creation and the Redemption, the two-fold cosmic motion that causes the motion of all else, are strictly speaking necessary. As Wyclif phrases it himself in the Trialogus, his summa theologiae written at the end of his life and capturing his mature thought:
18 Lechler, John Wyclif and his English Precursors, trans. and ed. Lorimer, 67–68. “Auf die Person Christi, seine Gottmenschheit, kommt Wiclif unendlich oft zu sprechen…Aber alle seine Erörterungen über die gottmenschliche Person des Erlösers, so weit sie lehrhaft sind, leiden an einer gewissen Monotonie und Steifheit. Er wiederholt in stereotyper Weise die kirchlich überlieferten Begriffe und Sätze des christologischen Lehrstücks, nebst ihren von Kirchenvätern und Scholastikern gegebenen Begründungen. Aber von selbständiger Vertiefung in das gottselige Geheimniss finden wir keine Spur. Die spekulative Erkenntniss kommt bei ihm nicht in Fluss. Wiclif betont die Wahrheit, dass Christus wahrer Mensch gewesen, legt Nachdruck darauf, dass er in der That unser Bruder ist, und vertheidigt den Satz von der wahrhaftigen Menschheit des Erlösers gegen dialektische Einwendungen. Auf der andern Seite…Wiclif die Präexistenz Christi, die Ewigkeit seines persönlichen Seins mit aller Bestimmtheit behauptet. Ferner den Begriff der Menschwerdung Gottes, der Vereinigung beider Naturen in der einen Person des Gottmenschen, so wie die Erörterungen über Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit der Menschwerdung hat Wiclif ganz so sich angeeignet, wie sie theils im Laufe der christologischen Kämpfe des IV. und V. Jahrhunderts festgestellt, theils von Augustin, Anselm von Canterbury und anderen spekulativ ausgeführt worden sind. In diesem und allem was damit zusammenhängt, können wir etwas charakteristisches nicht entdecken.” Lechler, Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, 2:512–513. 19 Schmidt, “John Wyclifs Kirchenbegriff,” 103. 273 Every part of the world is created necessarily, because every part of the world is, and if it is, it necessarily is. And the fact that it is created necessarily is evident from this, that it is necessarily brought forth from intelligible being to actual existence. Therefore, its creation is called “an act of God ad extra.” (For if any part of the world is singled out, if its intelligible being and its being of existence are not distinguished, it is eternal by an absolute necessity, like God.) And clearly, that a thing be always differs from its being eternally, for the world always is, for it exists at every [moment of] time, and yet it does not exist eternally, as is clear from its creation (for [at] the instant of its creation it must begin as the world).20
Many things must be noted [for the matter at hand]: (1) We suppose that the story of human sin is borne in mind, that man sinned from ignorance, because the woman was seduced and the man was deceived by the weight of the sin. (2) We suppose that the man and woman perceived the great weight of punishment that had been imposed on them and fruitfully repented before death. (3) We suppose…that, the sin of the first man not withstanding, justice would necessarily be maintained undisturbed, whole, and entire. Given these presuppositions, we assert that the divine Word was necessarily incarnate, because according to the second presupposition the human race was necessarily saved in its principle, and it could not be saved unless Christ were incarnate. Therefore, the intended conclusion follows. It was indeed necessary that that man be saved, because he so fruitfully repented, and God cannot deny his mercy to one who thus repents. According to the third presupposition, it was necessary that satisfaction be made for sin; therefore it was necessary that the same human race make as much satisfaction as it had lost in its first member; this no man could do, unless he were simultaneously God and man. For every other man is not sufficient on his own to make satisfaction for his own sin; how then could he make satisfaction for the whole race? Who, I ask, could be as humble as Adam was proud? Because he was implicitly proud ([i.e., because] he implied that he [had] attained equality with God, and suggested that he was not obliged to obey God’s commandment), the person to make satisfaction clearly had to descend in humility from a highly exalted position. But where would that equality be, if, as a man-not-God [i.e., Adam] had presumed equality with the Lord, the God-man had not descended from equality with God to the humility of man? And so the Apostle says in Philippians 2:7 that Christ emptied himself, taking the form of a slave. Nonetheless, note that the presumption of the first man
20 “Quaelibet pars mundi necessario est creata, quia quaelibet pars mundi est, et si est, necessario est; et quod necessario creatur, ex hoc evidet, quod necessario producitur ab esse intelligibili ad existentiam actualem; ideo ejus creatio vocatur actio Dei ad extra. Nam quacunque parte mundi signata, nisi suum esse intelligibile et suum esse existere distinguantur, ita absolute necessario est aeterna sicut Deus. Et patet, quod aliud est rem semper esse et [aliud] illam aeternaliter esse, cum mundus semper est, quia in omni tempore, et tamen non aeternaliter, ut patet ex ejus creatione, nam [ad] instans creationis oportet incipere sicut mundum.” Ioannis Wyclif, Trialogus 2.1, ed. Gotthardus Lechler (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1869), 76. Cf. John Wyclif, Trialogus 2.1, trans. Stephen E. Lahey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 70. 274 was criminal and counterfeit, but the assumption and abasement of Christ, the second man, was real and true. Secondly, note that the second man did not fall, as he could not, from the form of the Godhead, because [the Godhead] cannot be an accident in anything, but rather it was preserved when he assumed our manhood, which was a substance in him, although it was foreign to the Godhead. And if you muse on why the second or middle person [of the Trinity] was obliged to be incarnate rather than the first or third, I assert that this sin was committed in ignorance; therefore, it had to be erased by the person of Wisdom, which is only the Word of God. Therefore, because some divine person must send another to make satisfaction for sin, and the Father cannot be sent, because he is the first person in origin of the Trinity, he clearly had to send another person to be incarnate, which for multiple reasons was most fittingly the Word of God. Therefore, because even the least unfittingness would be impossible for God, human salvation had to be so effected. And clearly, because the sin of the first man had to be erased by the means of due satisfaction, Christ had to be thus incarnate. And his death necessarily followed afterwards, because Christ had to suffer in proportion to Adam’s disproportionate presumption, for otherwise there would be no satisfaction for the [sin] committed. Thus, as Adam was proud unto a death inflicted graciously, so the second Adam had to be humble unto a bodily death received and suffered graciously. And so the Apostle says, Christ became obedient for us unto death (Phil. 2:8). [Death] was also necessarily received on a tree, so that as man perished by the forbidden fruit of the tree, man might also be saved by the fruit extended from the tree. And there are many other correspondences on both sides.21
21 “Notanda sunt multa: Et primo omnium notata historia peccati hominis supponitur, quod ipse peccavit ex ignorantia, cum mulier sit seducta, et vir ex peccati gravedine est deceptus. Secundo supponitur, quod vir iste et femina sentientes tantam poenae gravedinem innovatam, ante mortem poenituerunt fructuose. Et tertio supponitur…quod non obstante peccato primi hominis, servanda sit ex integro justitia inconcussa. Istis suppositis dicitur, quod necesse fuit Verbum divinum incarnari, quia necesse fuit genus humanum salvari in suo principio, juxta suppositionem secundam; et salvari non poterat, nisi Christus fuisset incarnatus; ideo sequitur intentum. Salvari quidem oportuit illum hominem, cum tam fructuose poenituit, et Deus non potest negare suam misericordiam taliter poenitenti. Et cum juxta suppositionem tertiam oportet quod fiat satisfactio pro peccato, ideo oportet, quod illud idem genus hominis tantum satisfaciat quantum in protoplasto deliquerat, quod nullus homo facere poterat, nisi simul foret Deus et homo. Omnis enim alius homo non suffecit ex se ad satisfactionem pro proprio peccato attingere, quomodo ergo satisfaceret pro toto suo genere? Quis rogo potuit ad tantum humiliari, sicut Adam superbivit? Cum enim ille superbivit implicite, implicans se ad aequalitatem Dei attingere, quia innuebat se non debere mandato Dei obedire, patet quod oportuit personam satisfacientem a tanto gradu exaltationis humilitate descendere; sed ubi foret illa paritas, nisi, sicut homo-non-Deus aequalitatem Domini praesumebat, sic homo-Deus ab aequalitate Dei ad humilitatem hominis descendisset? Ideo dicit Apostolus ad Phil. ii., quod Christus semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens. Notandum tamen tibi est, quod praesumptio primi hominis more criminis fuit falsa, sed assumptio et minoratio Christi secundi hominis fuit realis et vera. Notandum est tibi secundo, quod iste secundus homo non cadebat, sicut non potuit, a forma deitatis, cum non potest esse accidens alicui, sed illa servata humanitatem assumpsit, quae licet fuerit in se substantia, tamen fuit a deitate extranea. Et si mussitas, quare potius secunda vel media persona plus quam prima vel tertia, debuit incarnari, dictum est tibi, quoniam hoc peccatum ex ignorantia est commissum, ideo oportet quod ex personali sapientia sit deletum, quae est solummodo Dei Verbum. Cum ergo oportet quod aliqua persona Dei mittat personam aliam, quae satisfaciat pro peccato, et Pater non potest mitti cum sit persona prima originaliter Trinitatis, patet quod necesse est, ut mittat personam aliam incarnandam, quae propter rationem multiplicem fuit convenientissime Verbum Dei; ideo cum minimum inconveniens foret in Deo impossibile, patet quod oportet salvationem hominis taliter se habere. Et patet cum oportuit peccatum primi 275
A proper understanding of these passages requires knowledge of Wyclif’s doctrines of the divine ideas and of necessity. Unfortunately, here we are severely impeded by the absence of a critical edition of Wyclif’s De ideis, which has never been published.22 Consequently, some of what is said here may in time need to be revised in light of future scholarship. Wyclif’s doctrine of necessity, on the other hand, has received some scholarly attention, first because Wyclif was condemned at the Council of Constance for teaching that all things happen by an absolute necessity, and second because scholars wanted to understand how Wyclif reconciles divine foreknowledge with human free will.23
As regards God, Wyclif at the end of his life was firmly committed to the view that God can only will the best, and thus for the mature Wyclif, divine willing is always antecedent to divine doing, both ad intra (within the Trinity) and ad extra (in respect of the created order). As such, God cannot do other than what he does. Wyclif came to this position in part because he sincerely considered, properly understood, and systematically rejected Scotus’s doctrine of the hominis deleri satisfactione debita mediante, quod oportuit Christum taliter incarnari; et necesse fuit mortem postea sequi, cum oportuit Christum proportionabiliter pati sicut Adam improportionabiliter praesumebat, aliter enim non foret satisfactio pro commisso. Ideo sicut Adam superbivit usque ad mortem gratiose inflictam, sic oportet quod secundus Adam humilietur usque ad mortem corporis gratiose acceptam et passam. Et ideo dicit Apostolus quod Christus factus est pro nobis obediens usque ad mortem. Et fuit necessarium ipsam acceptam fuisse in ligno, ut sicut ex fructu ligni vetito periit homo, sic ex fructu ligni passo salvetur homo; et sunt aliae multae congruentiae utrobique.” Wyclif, Trialogus 3.25, ed. Lechler, 214–216. Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus 3.25, trans. Lahey, 174–175. 22 Stephen Lahey is intent on remedying this defect in scholarship. I thank him for sharing with me in advance a draft of his edition of De ideis. 23 On May 4, 1415, the Council of Constance condemned forty-five articles drawn from the works of Wyclif, the twenty-seventh of which reads as follows: “Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt.” For the condemnation in context, see Joannes Dominicus Mansi, ed., Sacrorum conciliorum nova, et amplissima collectio, vol. 27 (Venetiis, 1784), col. 633; Denzinger et Schönmetzer, ed., Enchiridion symbolorum, 319, #1177 (607); and Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 1:412. For scholarship on Wyclif’s views of necessity, see Anthony Kenny, “Freedom and Necessity,” in Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 31–41; Ian Christopher Levy, “Grace and Freedom in the Soteriology of John Wyclif,” Traditio 60 (2005): 279–337; Luigi Campi, “Determinism between Oxford and Prague: The Late Wyclif’s Retractions and their Defense Ascribed to Peter Payne,” in Europe after Wyclif, ed. J. Patrick Hornbeck II and Michael Van Dussen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 115–134; and Chris Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 289–292. 276 divine ideas and creation.24 As Luigi Campi summarizes the matter, in his De scientia dei
Wyclif quickly presents Scotus’s doctrine as follows: In the first instant of nature the divine essence represents to the divine intellect both parts of a contradiction in their intelligible being, “ut neutra, et non ut facienda.” In the second instant of nature the divine intellect represents both to the divine will, which eternally determines itself towards one of the two. Then, the divine intellect apprehends the determination of the will, and such a cognition is certain, as God unfailingly knows the determination of his will towards the production of a contingent individual or state of affairs—though Scotus maintains that, while such an individual or state of affairs exists, it is still possible that in the same instant it could have not existed, since God could have chosen otherwise.25
Wyclif, however, rejected Scotus’s doctrine.
For this account seems to introduce a sort of discursive process between divine understanding, will, and knowledge, and to imply that the determinateness of divine knowledge is caused by that of the divine will—and therefore, that divine will is ultimately prior to divine knowledge. Moreover, Wyclif adheres to Aquinas’s account in asserting that God’s knowledge is certain and invariable by virtue of his eternity, and stresses again the distinction between knowledge as essentially identical with God and knowledge as a relation of reason. The primary cause of divine relative knowledge and will, as well as of their determinateness, is in fact God’s simple nature, in which knowledge and will are indistinct. For God’s nature, absolutely considered, wills and causes while knowing, and knows while willing and causing, and the extremes which are the objects of God’s relative knowledge or will are put into being as a result of such a previous non- discursive process. Considered as relations of reason, instead, divine knowledge and will are formally distinct one from the other, and ordered among them by priority of nature—so that…divine knowledge precedes divine will.26
This rejection happened gradually over the course of Wyclif’s career. Earlier, Wyclif held that there were more ideas in the divine mind than actually existent creatures and that in the moment of creation, the divine will had an essential role to play in selecting which ideas would be God’s
24 For Soctus’s doctrine of the divine ideas and how he develops Aquinas’s doctrine on the same, see Timothy B. Noone, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas: Scotus’s Evaluation,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 307–324. 25 Luigi Campi, “Introduction” to Ioannis Wyclif, De scientia Dei, ed. Luigi Campi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), cxviii–cxix. 26 Ibid., cxix. 277 models for creation.27 Although whole books could no doubt be written on how and why Wyclif changed his view, one factor should be kept in mind from his atomism. For Wyclif, the components, both material and temporal, of the created order must be finite, because God must have definite knowledge of all he has made, and God cannot have definite knowledge of an infinite number of entities.28 As such, Wyclif’s God is not intensively infinite. As Wyclif says in
De logica, “It is impossible that any number of substances, points, or anything other than God be simply infinite, because every such number has God extrinsically limiting its end and intrinsically limiting it at the ultimate level of its constitutive points.”29 Although it cannot at present be proven, the principles that led Wyclif to his atomism may have gradually altered his view of the divine ideas as well. For Scotus’s doctrine requires that God have comprehensive and infallible knowledge of the whole spectrum of metaphysical possibilities, and for Scotus at least, these possibilities are infinite in the strictest sense of the word. When God creates the world, says
Scotus, God selects a finite number of perfectly known possibilities and gives that finite number of possibilities actual existence. In short, if God, in Wyclif’s view, cannot know an infinite number of actually or possibly existing creatures, perhaps God cannot know an infinite number of divine ideas either. Regardless, by the time Wyclif wrote the Trialogus, he held that there are only divine ideas of actually existent things: “God does not understand your [non-existent] son, a mountain made of gold, or anything unintelligible, although he understands these signs [i.e.,
27 Ibid., cviii–cxii. 28 For more on Wyclif’s atomism, see Emily Michael, “John Wyclif’s Atomism,” in Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, ed., Christophe Grellard and Aurélien Robert (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 206–207; and Bernhard Pabst, Atomtheorien des lateinischen Mittelalters (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), 306–316. 29 “Impossibile est quod aliquis numerus substanciarum vel punctorum, vel aliud preter deum sit simpliciter infinitum, cum omnis talis numerus habet deum finem suum extrinsecus finientem et ultimum eius punctuale finiens intrinsecus.” Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de logica 9, vol. 3, ed. Michael Henry Dziewicki (London, 1899), 36, ln. 27– 31. 278 what these vocal utterances signify]. And thus there are no ideas of such things, because there is no idea of something that does not exist.”30
Perhaps a few passages from The Trialogus are in order to illustrate Wyclif’s mature doctrine regarding the subordination of will to intellect in God. In at least two passages Wyclif notes that God could do otherwise, if he so willed, but nowhere does he assert that God can will other than what he does in fact will.31 The reason why is found in the second major quotation given above from the Trialogus, “the least unfittingness would be impossible for God”; that is,
God in Wyclif’s view is bound by what is most fitting or best. This important limitation on divine power, it should be noted, applies both to the inner workings of the Trinity and to the created order. As Wyclif says, “Clearly, God is not compelled to do anything, although
[whatever he does] happens by an absolute necessity. For instance, he is not compelled to produce the Word or Holy Spirit, although by an absolute necessity he does so. Nevertheless, this action [i.e., producing] ad intra is necessarily eternal, but [his] making is in time. Therefore,
[his] making is called contingent.”32 Thus, God the Father freely and necessarily produces the other persons of the Trinity, but he does so solely because he wills to; and he wills to, solely because such production is best, and best presumably according to a cosmic standard that is somehow identical to his own being. The same hierarchy of faculties is at work in God qua
Creator: The cosmic standard just referred to determines that creation is best, God knows this
30 “Deus non intelligit filium tuum, montem aureum, et inintelligibile, licet intelligat ista signa; et sic non sunt ydeae talium, cum non-existentis non sit ydea.” Wyclif, Trialogus 1.9, ed. Lechler, 67. 31 “Et certum est, quod omnes adversarii nesciunt probare possibilitatem talium casuum, ut quod Deus potest esse asinus etc.; bene tamen est verum, quod potest si velit.” Wyclif, Trialogus 3.27, ed. Lechler, 225. “Nam ex determinatione et ordinatione Dei aeterna oportuit Christum illum spiritum assumpsisse; nec credo quod alium sibi potuit hypostatice univisse; potuit tamen si voluisset.” Ibid., 3.28, p. 228. 32 “Et patet quod Deus non illibertatur quidquam facere, licet absolute necessario illud fiat, sicut non illibertatur producere Verbum vel Spiritum Sanctum, licet absolute necessario illud agat; actio tamen ista ad intra necessario est aeterna, et factio est temporalis; ideo dicitur quod factio est contingens.” Ibid. 279 standard perfectly and wills its conclusions necessarily, and thus the actually existent universe of actually existing things necessarily comes into being. Notice too that Wyclif has redefined the word contingent. When applied to divine acts, the contingent for Wyclif, is merely God acting non-eternally. Such action is, nonetheless, still necessary on Wyclif’s account.
Such an account of necessity not only alters the usual meaning of the word contingent; it also changes possible. In another, notable passage in the Trialogus, Wyclif explains his position in this way:
I remember having said in the first book [of the Trialogus] that all that happens, happens by an absolute necessity. And thus, God cannot produce or understand anything, unless he understand or produce it in fact. But because I once constantly defended the opposite view, and the demonstration is no longer clear to me that proves this, I commonly use this trick: Grant me one so-called possible thing, which is in fact not the case. I suppose that this so-called thing is possible, if God wills it. But because I do not know that God has determined the opposite, and I do know that there are many things that are in fact the case that we do not fully understand, lest we digress superfluously in uncertainty, I prefer to treat of the possible truth, which is in fact the case, because many such things we culpably do not know. For the truth, which is more fruitful, ought to be known first, and I especially doubt whether something made up [for the sake of argument] is possible, or whether God has determined the opposite. Therefore, I look for a reason in such things by which one could prove if [such a thing] is possible or true.33
Here, note three important features of the mature Wyclif’s thought: (1) For Wyclif, the only creatures that are possible are things that are actually created at some time. The meaning of possible within the context of creation is thus reduced to creatures that have been, are, or are not-
33 “Recolo me dixisse in libro primo, quod omnia quae eveniunt, necessario absolute eveniunt. Et sic Deus non potest quidquam producere vel intelligere nisi quod de facto intelligit et producit. Sed quia quondam defendi constanter hujus oppositum, nec claret mihi adhuc demonstratio quae hoc probat, ideo utor communiter hac cautela, proposito mihi tanquam possibili uno, quod non est de facto, suppono hoc tanquam possibile, si Deus voluerit; sed quia non scio, quod Deus determinavit oppositum, et scio quod multa sunt de facto, quorum dubia et sententias ignoramus, ideo ne evagemur superflue in incerto, vellem quod tractaremus de veritate possibili quae est de facto, cum multas tales culpabiliter ignoramus. Veritas enim magis fructuosa deberet primo cognosci, et specialiter dubito, utrum unum fictum sit possibile, vel Deus determinavit oppositum; ideo expecto rationem in talibus, qua probaretur hoc esse possibile sive verum.” Ibid., 3.8, pp. 154–155. Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus 3.8, trans. Lahey, 132–133. 280 yet-actual, but will be at some point in the future. What most people would consider never- going-to-be-created but still possible creatures or unfulfilled possibilities on the part of God are labeled as such solely out of human ignorance; if we but knew more about the “possibility” in question, we would realize that it was never truly “possible” at all.
(2) Second, by limiting the possible in this way, Wyclif does away with the distinction between God’s absolute power and God’s ordained power, which under the influence of Duns
Scotus and William of Ockham had become of the utmost importance to fourteenth-century theology and philosophy. Much novelty necessarily results from Wyclif’s limitations upon the divine will. Contrary to the predominant theological current in his day that took its origin from
Lombard’s Sentences, Wyclif held the following: Speaking strictly, even ex potentia absoluta,
God cannot: (a) fail to create the world; (b) create a world other than the world he has in fact created; (c) redeem the human race in any other way; (d) assume any nature other than human nature;34 (e) assume more than one human nature;35 (f) assume any human nature other than
Jesus’s;36 or (g) annul the hypostatic union at any time.37 All seven divine acts occur, in Wyclif’s view, by an absolute necessity. Moreover, speaking strictly, even ex potentia absoluta: (h) the
Father and the Holy Spirit cannot, either individually or collectively, assume any created nature.38
34 Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione 4, 9, et 10, ed. Edward Harris (London, 1886), 65, 158, et 162. 35 Ibid., 12, 13, pp. 201–202, 216–223. 36 Ibid., 5, pp. 78–80. 37 Ibid., 3, 5, pp. 43, 65–84; Wyclif, Trialogus 3.27, ed. Lechler, 226. For more on Wyclif’s view that God ex potentia absoluta cannot annul the hypostatic union, read below. 38 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 5 et 13, ed. Harris, 78, 222–223. 281 (3) Finally, an important conclusion follows from the preceding. If God only does and wills the best and cannot will or do anything else, not only is the world we live in necessary, it is also the best possible world. As Luigi Campi has noted, this approach to both God and the world aligns the mature Wyclif perfectly with the approach to metaphysics that Arthur Lovejoy termed
“the principle of plentitude.”39 Campi aptly sums up the conclusion of Wyclif’s iconoclastic novelty: “At the end of a process of retraction mostly oriented to avoiding arguments—or their abuses—that he reckoned to be misleading sophistries, and with the paradoxical result of reaching hardly defendable conclusions from supposedly more cautious premises, Wyclif came to maintain, as noticed by Leibniz, something close to Abelard’s opinion that God cannot do but what he does—a tenet whose condemnation at Sens in 1140 was a watershed in Western theological debate on determinism.”40 In short, at the end of his life Wyclif rejected an orthodox understanding of the divine will and professed instead the necessitarian view of Aristotle: “All is from necessity.…Therefore, that which is, when it is, and that which is not, when it is not, are necessary.”41 For this, he was justly condemned.
39 For more on the principle of plentitude, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), especially Chapter 3, “The Chain of Being and Some Internal Conflicts in Medieval Thought,” 67–98. 40 Luigi Campi, “Determinism between Oxford and Prague,” 121. 41 «Ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντα.…Τὸ µὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ὅταν ᾖ, καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν µὴ εἶναι ὅταν µὴ ᾖ, ἀνάγκη.» Ἀριστοτέλης (Aristotelis), Περὶ ἐρµηνείας (Liber de interpretatione) 9, in Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1974), 18b.6, pp. 55–56, ln. 6–7; 19a.23–24, pp. 57–58, ln. 23–24. Cf. “Omne quod est, quando est necesse est esse. Et omne quod non est, quando non est, necesse est non esse. Sed omne quod est simpliciter esse est necesse.” Jacqueline Hamesse, ed., Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval: Étude historique et édition critique (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974), 306, #20. 282 IV. Wyclif on the Atonement
Although the mature Wyclif was persuaded that the Redemption happens by a strict necessity and that Anselm’s doctrine of the Atonement is best, he takes multiple approaches to the question of how and why Christ’s work on the Cross saves the redeemed. In addition to
Anselm’s theory, Wyclif endorsed at least three earlier patristic views. Two of these views, it should be noted, by his day had ceased to be stressed or endorsed by professional theologians:
(1) At one point, he approved of the view, inspired by I Peter 1:4, that humans are saved by partaking of the Godhead, but such partaking is only possible because Christ first partook of our manhood. As Wyclif says in De veritate sacrae scripturae, St. Augustine
while expounding Ps. 147 (146):5, His wisdom is infinite, declares how we are partakers of God and of all his members, and from the testimony of Scripture concludes thus, “Therefore, if he is the same and indivisibile, and cannot change in any respect, by partaking of his Godhead we shall be immortal, but before we could be made partakers of his deathless life, it was necessary that he become a partaker of our living death. For as he is mortal, not of his substance but of ours, so we are immortal, not of our substance but of his. Hence, we shall be partakers, let no one doubt; the Bible says so.”42
(2) Wyclif also endorsed the Christus Victor theory of the Atonement in which Christ saves his own by freeing them from the tyranny of the devil. As Wyclif notes while expounding I
Corinthians 15:23, “But the Apostle means that Christ shall hand over the kingdom of the church, which he has conquered by his passion, by warring against the devil, and shall drive out
42 “Iterum super Psal. centesimo quadragesimo sexto exponendo illud Psalmi, Sapiencie eius non est numerus, declarat, quomodo sumus participes dei et omnium membrorum eius, ex testimonio scripture sic concludit: ‘Igitur si ipse est idem sic indivisibilis et mutari ex nulla parte potest, participando eius divinitatem erimus inmortales, sed antequam efficeremur participes inmortalitatis ipsius, oporteret, ut ipse fieret particeps mortalitatis nostre. Sicut autem ipse est mortalis non de sua substancia, sed de nostra, sic nos inmortales, non de nostra substancia, sed de sua. Participes ergo erimus, nemo dubitet, scriptura hoc dixit.’” Ioannis Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 3, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg, vol. 1 (London: The Wyclif Society, 1905), 59, ln. 11–22. For the original quotation of Augustine, see Augustinus Hipponensis, “In Psalmum 146 enarratio” 5.11, Enarrationes in Psalmos ci–cl, ed. D. Eligius Dekkers et Iohannes Fraipont, CCSL 40 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1956), 2130, ln. 39–47; and Augustinus Hipponensis, “In Psalmum cxlvi enarratio: Sermo,” Enarrationes in Psalmos, PL 37, col. 1906. 283 all the princes of darkness by his assault. Thus death, which is the devil and his members, shall be destroyed at the very last, when they shall be thrust perpetually downward from the body of
Christ; not that all death shall cease to be, but the vessels of death and the sin that mortifies them shall no longer have the occasion to assail the church.”43 (3) Finally, Wyclif fully affirmed the ancient, patristic view that God created humans so as to replace the pure spirits who became demons.44 As he says in his De antichristo,
The fall of the Devil clearly benefits the church of Jesus Christ, because her ruin must be restored by God’s grace, and because she is not to be restored with the angels. Because the angels are confirmed unshakeably in grace without the possibility of merit and the demons are hardened in their offense, the restoration is to be made with men. And therefore, by God’s grace and by reason of the Devil’s fall, as many men are to be saved in the heavenly country as the devils who fell from that country. And because by vexing the faithful, the devils…expand the city of our God, showing forth the greatness of his power in virtue of this, that they are held fast in prison, the sin of the devils clearly benefits holy mother church on every side.45
43 “Intendit autem Apostolus, quod Cristus tradet regnum ecclesie, quod conquisivit passione, pugnando contra diabolum, evacuabitque ab eius insultu omnes principes tenebrarum, et sic mors, que est diabolus et membra eius, novissime destruetur, quando deorsum a corpore Cristi perpetuo detrudetur, non quod omnis mors desinet esse, sed vasa mortis et peccatum ipsa mortificans non habebunt amplius tempus ecclesie insultandi.” Ioannis Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 30, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg, vol. 3 (London: The Wyclif Society, 1907), 227, ln. 18–p. 228, ln. 3. Cf. Ioannis Wyclif, De civili dominio: Liber secundus 15, ed. Iohann Loserth, vol. 2 (London: The Wyclif Society, 1900), 207, ln. 6–8; Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de mandatis 23, in Tractatus de mandatis divinis accedit Tractatus de statu innocencie, ed. Johann Loserth and F. D. Matthew (London: The Wyclif Society, 1922), 313; and Ioannis Wyclif, Sermo 47, Sermones, vol. 4, Sermones Miscellanei, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1890), 383. For more on the Christus Victor theory of the Atonement, see C. W. Marx, The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995), especially Chapters 1 and 2, “The Devil’s Rights and the Doctrine of the Redemption (I): The Twelfth-Century Controversy and its Origins” and “The Devil’s Rights and the Doctrine of the Redemption (II): Commentaries and Encyclopaedic Texts,” 7–46. 44 For more on the history of the idea that God’s primary purpose in creating man was to replace the fallen angels, see Vojtěch Novotný, Cur homo?: A History of the Thesis Concerning Man as a Replacement for Fallen Angels, trans. Pavlína and Tim Morgan (Prague: Karolinum Press, 2014). 45 “Patet autem quod casus diaboli prodest ecclesie Jesu Christi, quia oportet ruinam illam ex Dei gracia reparari, et cum non sit reparanda in angelis. Eo quod boni sunt confirmati extra statum merendi et mali in crimine obdurati, patet quod ista reparacio est in hominibus facienda. Et ideo ex Dei gracia racione lapsus diaboli sunt tot homines salvandi in patria quot diaboli ab ipsa patria ceciderunt; et cum diaboli exercitando fideles…augent rempublicam Dei nostri ostendentes magnitudinem sue potencie, ex hoc quod sunt sic inclusi in carcere, patet quod peccatum diabolorum undique prodest sancte matri ecclesie.” Ioannis Wyclif, Operis evangelici liber tertius et quartus: Sive de antichristo 1.54, ed. Iohann Loserth (London: 1896), p. 197, ln. 28–p. 198, ln. 4. 284 If we keep in mind this passage and Wyclif’s view that God is necessarily bound by what is most fitting, we can see how Wyclif would have been led to the view that the fall of Satan would compel God to create man, for fittingness requires that rational creatures of some kind take the place vacated in the celestial hierarchies by the Luciferian rebels.
Despite these endorsements of earlier patristic views, however, Wyclif affirms Anselm’s doctrine as the pre-eminent and best theory for explaining how Christ saves us, and he does so in at least two texts besides the Trialogus.46 The primary reason for the Incarnation in this view is to remedy sin. Robert Grosseteste and Duns Scotus, however, famously held the doctrine that is commonly called “the primacy of Christ,” that even if there had been no sin, the divine Word would still have become incarnate.47 Where does Wyclif fall in relation to that view? Richard
Southern claimed that Wyclif followed Grosseteste (and hence Scotus) by viewing the
Incarnation as necessary even in the absence of sin, but unfortunately Southern cited nothing to justify this assertion.48 Thomas Oey takes Southern to task and directs his readers to the following passage in Wyclif’s De antichristo:49
By reason of the fall of the first man, our Jesus was incarnate; nor does it behoove us to be disquieted as to whether God would have been incarnate had man not sinned, for by the eternal predestination of God man was freed through Christ’s Incarnation from the penalty of sin. Therefore, as it is necessary that Christ be incarnate, so it is necessary accidentally for this end, that he be incarnate for the salvation of man. And in this sense St. Gregory the Great can be understood in the Easter Exultet, “Rejoice now, all ye heavenly legions of Angels,” where it says
46 Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 3, vol. 1, p. 211, ln. 25–p. 212, ln. 10; and Ioannis Wyclif, De civili dominio 3.25, vol. 4, ed. Iohann Loserth (London: The Wyclif Society, 1904), 579, ln. 25–30. 47 For more on this doctrine in Grosseteste and Scotus, see Daniel P. Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste,” The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 374–391; and Justus H. Hunter, “Rereading Robert Grosseteste on the Ratio Incarnationis: Deductive Strategies in De Cessatione Legalium III,” The Thomist 81 (2017): 213–245. 48 R. W. Southern, Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 299, 306. 49 Oey, “Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture,” 196–197. 285 that Adam’s sin (and ours) was necessary, and the iniquity blessed that deserved to have such and so great a Redeemer.50
Insofar as current scholarship dates the De antichristo to the last two years of Wyclif’s life, there is good reason to think that it contains his mature thought.51 Thus, there should be no doubt that by the end of his life Wyclif rejected Grosseteste’s and Scotus’s doctrine as superfluous. For if the actually existent created order cannot be otherwise, speculations regarding a non-existent, conterfactual universe are a pointless waste of time. On the other hand, Wyclif may have held a different view earlier in his career. That possibility is referred to again later in this chapter and taken up in the next.
V. Wyclif on the Fruit of the Atonement
What according to Wyclif results from Atonement? (1) First, because the Atonement necessitates certain cosmic acts on the part of God, it contributes to the cosmic motion that
Wyclif discusses at some length in De incarnatione 7. As Schmidt noticed, “The new, deciding
50 “Occasione istius [i.e., casus primi hominis] Jesus noster fuerat incarnatus; nec oportet nos solicitari, utrum Deus incarnaretur homine non peccante, quia Dei preordinacio eterna est quod homo per Christi incarnacionem a pena peccati taliter liberetur. Ideo sicut necessarium est Christum incarnari, sic necessarium est pro hoc fine per accidens, hoc est, pro salvacione hominis ipsummet incarnari. Et ad istum sensum intelligi potest Gregorius in cantico illo ecclesie, Exultet iam angelica turba celorum, ubi dicit quod necessarium fuit Ade peccatum et nostrum, et felix fuit culpa que talem ac tantum habere meruit redemptorem.” Ioannis Wyclif, Operis evangelici liber tertius et quartus: Sive de antichristo liber primus et secundus 1.54, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1896), 198, ln. 20–32. For the text of the Exultet as Wyclif would have known it, see Francisus Henricus Dickinson, ed. Missale ad usum insignis et praeclarae ecclesiae Sarum (Oxonii, 1861–1883), 338–343; and William G. Henderson, ed. Missale ad usum insignis ecclesiae eboracensis, The Publications of the Surtees Society 59 (Durham, 1874), 1:111– 118. For an English translation, see A. Harford Pearson, trans., The Sarum Missal Done into English, 2nd ed. (London, 1884), 160–162; and Frederick E. Warren, trans., The Sarum Missal in English, The Library of Liturgiology & Ecclesiology for English Readers 8 (London: De la More Press, 1911), 1:270–273. For the history of the Exultet in general, see A. Strittmatter, “Exultet iam angelica turba,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (Detroit, MI: Gale, 2003), 5:566–568. 51 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 220. 286 characteristic that…[Wyclif’s reception of Anselm’s doctrine] adds to the picture…, lies in this, that Christ’s humility itself develops as the necessary element in the idea of God and salvation history. Thereby, from a static conception there emerges a dynamic, formative principle of history.”52 This dynamic, formative principle elevates the world to a degree of perfection that would have been impossible had humans never sinned. While explicating Romans 5, Wyclif explains,
God cannot justly forgive someone’s mortal sin unless he pour out as much grace as that from which [the sinner] fell, or more. The entire person of the human race has more abundant grace than the grace of the state of innocence from which Adam fell, because, it seems, more abundant grace was granted to that man [i.e., Adam] who was [in a certain sense] all men. Therefore, the Apostle says, Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound (Rom. 5:20). Likewise, if someone who turns completely to the good, is more good and mighty than a perverse person of his race is wicked, the good person accordingly causes more good than the wicked person causes harm. But so it is with the second earthly and heavenly Adam. Therefore, the blessing of the heavenly Adam exceeds the curse of the first Adam. And therefore the Apostle says, But not as the offense, so also is the free gift (Rom. 5:15), for he declares that the gift exceeds the offense because of the extent of the good root over the wicked root.53
So powerful is the medicine of the redemption that it would suffice to redeem many worlds.54
Although the English sermons that were once attributed to Wyclif are no longer thought to be his, current scholarship does attribute them to his Oxford followers.55 In any case, for the
52 “Der entcheidend neue Zug, den diese Erörterung zum bisher gezeichneten Bilde hinzubringt, liegt darin, daß die humilitas Christi als notwendiges Element aus dem Gottesbegriff und der Heilsgeschichte selbst entwickelt wird. Damit wird sie aus einer statischen Eigenschaft zum dynamischen, gestaltenden Principiz einer Geschichte.” Schmidt, “John Wyclifs Kirchenbegriff,”103. 53 “Deus non potest remittere persone…iuste peccatum mortale, nisi infundat tantam graciam, a quanta cecidit, vel maiorem…Persona tota humani generis habet maiorem graciam, quam fuit gracia status innocencie, a qua cadebat Adam, [quoniam] qui fuit omnes homines, videtur, quod maior gracia sit illi homini attributa. Ideo dicit Apostolus quod, Ubi habundavit delictum, superhabundavit et gracia. Item si persona conversa omnino ad bonum sit magis bona atque potencior quam persona sui generis perversa sit mala, congruit quod persona bona magis bonificet, quam persona mala dampnificet. Sed sic est de secundo Adam terreno et celesti; igitur bonificacio Adam celestis excedit dampnificacionem primi Adam. Et ideo dicit Apostolus, Non sicut delictum, ita et donum, sed donum declarat excedere delictum propter excessum radicis bone super radicem malam.” Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 30, vol. 3, p. 204, ln. 15–p. 205, ln. 5. 54 Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de ecclesia 3, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1886), 59, ln. 30–32. 287 sake of completeness, the light they shed on Wyclif’s doctrine should be noted here. Whoever preached the third sermon of the collection (for the third Sunday after Trinity) gives the traditional interpretation of the parable of Luke 15:8–10 but stresses the great bouleversement that the Incarnation causes for the whole world.
This woman is Jesus Christ, the Wisdom of the Father. The ten drachmas are God’s rational creatures, for they are all made according to the image and likeness of the Trinity. The tenth drachma, which was lost, is mankind; the lit lantern is Christ’s manhood; the turning of everything in the house upside down is the great transformation that the manhood of Christ makes in this world. For the angel would not suffer John to kneel and worship him (cf. Rev. 22:8–9), for his Lord was John’s brother, and the angels were his servants. And so many things of this world were turned upside down, since every part of this world was ennobled by Christ’s manhood.56
Similarly, in a Christmas sermon the preacher stresses not merely that the whole created universe attains a new and higher dignity because of Christ’s Incarnation, but also that the Incarnation is the greatest of God’s works, greater even than creatio ex nihilo.
This birth of Christ was greater than any other, yea, greater than the creation of Adam…, for our Lady and Joseph surpass Adam and Eve, …and the shepherds that came to them surpass Adam’s children. And the birth of Christ altogether surpasses all else that God ever did, for the Incarnation is greater than the creation of the world out of nothing. It requires greater mastery to make a virgin bear a child and remain a virgin than to form Adam out of the earth or to fashion Eve out of Adam’s rib, but it is immeasurably greater still for the Divine Word to become flesh. For here men’s wits must fail. But nature has given us an
55 Pamela Gradon and Anne Hudson, “Date, Authorship, and Audience,” in English Wycliffite Sermons, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 28–37; J. I. Catto, “Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford 1356–1430,” in The History of the University of Oxford, vol. 2, Late Medieval Oxford, ed. J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 224; Kantik Ghosh, The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and the Interpretation of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 113; and G. R. Evans, John Wyclif: Myth & Reality (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2005), 235. 56 “This womman ys Iesu Crist, wysdom of the fadur. Þese ten dragmes ben his resonable creatures, for þey ben alle made to ymage and lyknesse of þe Trinnyte. The tenþe dragme þat was lost ys mannus kynde, þe lanterne þat was liȝtned ys þe manhode of Crist. Þe turnyng up of þis hows ys chaunghynge of states þat ben maad in þis world by manhede of Crist, for þe aungel wolde not suffre Ion to knele and worchipe hym, for his Lord was Ionys brother, and þe aungeles weren his seruauntes; and so many þyngys of þis world weren turnede vpsodoun, siþ euery part of þis world was betured by Cristus manhed.” Anne Hudson, ed., English Wycliffite Sermons, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 235, ln. 73–83. See also Thomas Arnold, ed., Select English Works of John Wyclif, vol. 1, Sermons on the Gospels for Sundays and Festivals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869), 9. 288 analogy: As…man’s soul is one person with him, so the second person of the Trinity is the same person as that man…for this child is…the Wisdom of the Father of heaven…by virtue of his Godhead…And if we take good heed of him, Christ is three natures and one person, for Christ is Godhead, body, and soul, and each of these three.… All the world is ennobled by him, as though he created the world anew.… Man is ennobled since he is redeemed and made God’s son and heir, and therewith the brother of Christ, who is both God and man. The angels in heaven are ennobled, since they have more fellowship and the fellowship of the saints increases their joy. And thus all the fiends in hell are ennobled against their will, for [the number of] their company is decreased, and they suffer harm of many.57
By the end of the next chapter of this dissertation, it should be clear that the emphases in both these sermons are entirely consonant with Wyclif’s doctrine—especially as regards seeing in
Christ three natures (body, soul, Godhead) and not merely two (manhood, Godhead)—and as regards the angels.58 If Wyclif did not preach these sermons, he may as well have.
(2) Second, the Atonement effects the salvation of the elect. As we have seen, at the end of his life Wyclif imposed far more limitations on the divine will than many of his predecessors, including Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. For asserting that God cannot do but what he does, Wyclif was condemned at the Council of Constance. Curiously, Wyclif’s doctrine of free will in creatures is comparatively broader than those of Aquinas and many of his
57 “Þis natiuite of Crist was more þan ony oþer, ȝe, and more þan Adammus makyng…; for oure Lady and Iosep passedon Adam and Eue…; and þes herdus þat camen to hem passedon Adammys children. And algatis þe burþe of Crist passede oþre deedis þat euere God dude; for it is more to make God man þan to make þis world of nowt; It is maystrie to make a virgine to bere a chyld and dwelle a virgyne, more þan to make Adam of erþe, or to make Eue of Adamys ryb; but it is wiþowte mesure more to make God to be man, for here mennys wyttus moten fayle. But on ensaumple haþ kynde ȝyuen to us: as…mannys soule is þe same persone wiþ hym, so þe secounde persone of God is þe same persone wiþ þis man.… …For þis child is…wisdom of þe Fadur of heuene…by his godhede.…And ȝif we taken good hed to hym, Crist is þre kyndus, and o persone; for Crist is godhede, and body, and soule, and ech on of þes þree.…For al þis world by hym is betured, and as who made a new world.…Man is betured siþ he is bowt and mad Godus sone and his eyr, and þerwiþ þe broþur of Crist, which is boþe God and man; aungelus in heuene ben betured, siþ þei have more felowschipe, and such felowshipe of seyntus makuþ hem more glad togydre; and þus alle þe fendus in helle ben beturede, aȝeynus þer wylle; for þer company is maad lesse, and þei han harm of monye.” Pamela Gradon, ed., English Wycliffite Sermons, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 210–211, ln. 101–133. See also Arnold, ed., Select English Works of John Wyclif, vol. 1, 319–320. 58 For more on the Christology of these sermons, see Schmidt, “John Wyclifs Kirchenbegriff,” 104–105. 289 predecessors.59 Current scholarship suggests that Wyclif held in common with Richard
Campsall, Adam Wodeham, and Robert Holcot “that God’s knowledge [of free human choices] is contingent, such that it is within the power of human beings to make it happen that God knows something different from what he knows.”60 As Wyclif phrases it in De universalibus,
Many effects are in the rational creature’s free power of contradiction such that he or she can make them to be or not to be, for otherwise merit and demerit would be taken away. And thus it is in the power of a human being to bring about in an indefinite number of God’s eternal volitions that none of them shall be, and vice versa for his non-volitions. Here note that divine volition with respect to a creature’s existence can be understood as a relation [and] as a mental entity with its basis in God’s willing a thing to be according to its intelligible being (which is absolutely necessary) and with its term in the creature’s existence in its proper genus. Such a relation depends upon each of its terms, in virtue of the fact that because God wills Peter or some other creature to be, it must be. And thus, although a creature’s existence is in time, it causes in God an eternal relation of reason that is always being caused and [yet] is always completely caused.61
Positing a dual relation between God and each of his rational creatures has important consequences for Wyclif’s doctrine of predestination. As Luigi Campi puts it,
Wyclif refers to soteriological topics in suggesting the notion of a sort of chiasm between the causalities exerted by God and creatures as extremes of a relation of reason, for God causes creatures eternally but they are caused in time, whilst creatures cause [i.e., have an effect upon] God in time but he is caused eternally [i.e., the effects of creatures upon God are experienced eternally].…Wyclif rejects the idea that God’s immutability is compromised by the fact that his knowledge is
59 Theo Kobusch makes the interesting point that Wyclif’s commitment to free will in humans necessarily results from his realism. For more on this, see his Die Philosophie des Hoch- un Spätmittelalters (München: C. H. Beck, 2011), 478. 60 Levy, “Grace and Freedom,” 284. 61 “Multi effectus sunt in libera poteatate contradictionis rationalis creaturae sic quod potest facere ipsos fore et potest facere quod non erunt, quia aliter tolleretur meritum atque demeritum. Et sic est in potestate hominis facere de quotlibet volutionibus aeternis in Deo quod nulla earum erit et sic de non-volutionibus et econtra. Pro quo notandum quod volutio Dei, respectu existentiae creaturae, potest intelligi secundum habitudinem relativam, ut est res rationis fundata in Deo volente rem esse secundum esse intelligibile—quod est absolute necessarium—et terminata ad existentiam creaturae in proprio genere. Et talis habitudo dependet ab utroque extremo, cum ad hoc quod Deus velit Petrum vel aliud factibile esse requiritur ipsum esse. Et ita existentia creaturae, licet sit temporalis, causat in Deo relationem rationis aeternam, quae semper causatur et semper est completa causata.” Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus, ed., Ivan J. Mueller (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1985), 343, ln. 321–338. Cf. Kenny, Wyclif, 37. 290 eternally caused by a creature causing it in time. What Wyclif aims at proving…with an overt anti-Pelagian intent, is that, even if it is true that a predestined creature causes in time God’s eternal predestination of it to salvation, it is not true that such a creature therefore merits its own predestination or “prima gratia.”62
In short, according to Wyclif, God’s foreknowledge of an individual’s eternal destiny is not coercive; it is rather caused eternally and immutably by the creature’s free choice. Consequently,
Maurice Keen’s assertion that “Wyclif’s belief that all human knowledge depended on God’s eternal foreknowledge naturally made him a radical predestinarian” is simply false.63
Wyclif also firmly believed that antecedently God does in fact will the salvation of every single human being.64 Such a thoroughgoing commitment to God’s universal salvific will led him to the view that God probably offered everyone one final opportunity to merit or demerit salvation immediately before death. As he says in De dominio divino, “It seems probable that every human spirit other than Christ will in the last instant before death finally be able to merit or demerit. For…no one can be made blessed unless he first earns it, but infants slain for Christ, like those who die immediately after baptism, are blessed. Therefore, they must have earned it beforehand. And so there remains for them a moment before death wherein they can merit.”65
62 Campi, “Introduction” to Ioannis Wyclif, De scientia Dei, cxxiv. 63 Maurice Keen, “Wyclif, the Bible, and Transubstantiation,” in Wyclif in his Times, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 3. Cf. “Like all three of our later reformers [i.e., Luther, Calvin, and Cranmer], Wyclif upholds firmly the doctrine of predestination lest man glory in himself in any way.” Michael Treschow, “The Understanding of Man in the Reformers or Reformation Realism,” in Christian Anthropology: The Trinitarian Theology of Man, ed. Susan Harris (Charlottetown, PEI: St. Peter Publications, 1997), 114. This misunderstanding is no doubt due to Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 212–214, whose account is not as nuanced as Levy’s. 64 Levy, “Grace and Freedom,” 279. 65 “Videtur probabiliter posse dici quod quilibet spiritus humanus citra Christum habet unum momentum ante mortem in quo finaliter mereri poterit vel demereri. Nam…nemo potest beatificari nisi previe mereatur: sed infantes pro Christo occisi, sicut alii statim post baptismum mortui, sunt beati; ergo oportet quod previe mereantur: ergo relinquitur illis una morula ad merendum.” Ioannis Wyclif, De dominio divino libri tres 3.4, ed. Reginald Lane Poole (London, 1890), 235, ln. 3–9. Wyclif wrote De dominio divino between 1373 and 1374 (Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 39). In the quotation just cited, Wyclif endorses as his own the opinion of Uthred of Boldon that every single human being, including unbaptized infants, pagans, and Muslims, in the moment before death experiences a clear vision of 291 Thus, for Wyclif, the free and contingent choice of the human will determines both God’s knowledge of where individuals spend eternity and his will either to reward or punish them in accordance with their merits; God’s grace is ultimately resistible. On the other hand, Wyclif believed that Christ died solely for those who would be saved. “Clearly, Christ did not redeem all men from damnation to the Kingdom, because many shall not rise in the judgment, but they shall remain in the everlasting prison of their sins with the foreknown, whom he did not redeem to glory.”66 Finally, despite God’s universal salvific will, the majority are still damned:
The Apostle urges us to put on armor not of iron or of another metal that would weigh us down, but spiritual armor that lightens those armed therewith (cf. Eph. 6:11), that, persevering in it unto the end, they may arrive at their heavenly reward. Hence, that the world puts on tarnished armor instead of spiritual, is an evident sign that many descend to hell in close array and few but rarely ascend to the heavens.…For because the armor of God is light, it draws [the wayfarer] away from lesser things and leads him to God and…blessedness. Contrariwise, because the tarnished armor is heavy, it leads [the foreknown] to the center [of the earth], and consequently to the devil and…everlasting punishment.67
God, wherein he or she can either definitively accept or reject God’s gracious offer of salvation. Although Uthred was not condemned by name, Simon Langham, Archbishop of Canterbury, did censure his opinion on November 9, 1368. Consequently, Wyclif’s public endorsement of it was both a willful act of insubordination toward the university and ecclesiastical authorities and an act of solidarity with a fellow theologian with a penchant for controversy. By 1377 or 1378 Wyclif and Uthred had come to disagree publicly but respectfully regarding the nature of property. For Wyclif’s relatively restrained arguments against Uthred, see Ioannis Wyclif, “Determinatio Johannis Wyclif ad argumenta magistri Outredi de Omesima monachi,” Opera minora, ed. Johann Loserth (London: The Wyclif Society, 1913), xlviii–l and 405–414; and Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 229–231. For more on Uthred in general, see Jeremy Catto, “Boldon, Uthred” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biogtraphy, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 6:466–467. For Uthred’s censured opinions and their context, see M. D. Knowles, “The Censured Opinions of Uthred of Boldon,” Proceedings of the British Academy 37 (1951): 305–342, especially 314 and 334. 66 “Et patet quod Christus non redemit omnes homines a dampnacione ad regnum, cum multi sunt qui non resurgent in iudicio, sed manebunt in perpetuo carcere peccatorum cum prescitis quos non redemit ad gloriam.” Wyclif, De civili dominio 3.26, vol. 4, p. 607, ln. 19–22. Cf. “Ego sepe locutus sum, quod Cristus solum redemit predestinatos, quos ordinavit ad gloriam.” Ioannis Wyclif, De veritate scripturae sacrae 30, vol. 3, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (London: The Wyclif Society, 1907), 215, ln. 9–10. 67 “Movet Apostolus accipere armaturam non ferri vel metalli alterius nos gravantem, sed armaturam spiritualem alleviantem suos armatos, cum ducunt finaliter perseverantes in illis ad celestia tamquam premium. Unde quod mundus accipit armaturam opacam dimissa hac armatura est signum evidens quod multi spissim descendunt ad inferos et pauci raro ascendunt ad celos…; nam armatura Dei cum sit levis, subtrahens ab inferioribus ducit hominem ad Deum et beatitudinem…, armatura autem opaca cum sit gravis, ducit hominem ad centrum, et per consequens ad diabolum et penam perpetuam.” Wyclif, Sermo 55, Sermones, vol. 3, Super epistulas, ed., Johann Loserth (London, 1889), 477, ln. 11–24. For more on the Devil’s location at the center of the earth, read below. 292 If we weave together the different strands of Wyclif’s soteriology, we come to the following conclusions: (1) God antecedently wills that every single human person be saved. (2)
God grants to all sufficient opportunity to avail themselves of his grace. (3) People are free to refuse that grace. (4) If they refuse, their refusal is not due to any defect in God; rather, their refusal determines God’s consequent will to damn them. (5) Only a minority of people actually avail themselves of God’s grace and are thereby saved. (6) Their free choice to do so determines
God’s consequent will to reward them with eternal life. (7) In a real sense, the redeemed merit or earn their salvation.68 (8) Christ died to redeem only this minority of people.
In the end, whether or not one is saved is known only to God. God’s knowledge of a person’s eternal destiny conditions how he views every moment of that individual’s life. Wyclif
can thus admit that there are many among those whose damnation is foreknown who are in a present state of righteousness, while many among those predestined to glory have sinned gravely in their present unrighteousness. Yet the foreknown are never in a state of final persevering grace, nor the predestined in a state of final obstinacy. By this standard, the foreknown always sin far more gravely than the predestined, despite their present state of righteousness. Because God never newly begins to love or hate, one’s final status, which is known to God alone, is ultimately determinative of God’s attitude throughout. Yet…, God’s attitude is itself conditioned by his eternal knowledge of the free human response to grace and righteousness.69
In sum, given Wyclif’s unorthodox denial of real freedom in God and his rather unusual insistence on extensive human agency, Wyclif’s doctrine was at once heretical and original.
68 Cf. “It is noteworthy that Wyclif specifically rejects the notion that nobody can be said to merit beatitude, inasmuch as it is a gift from God given purely by grace. In fact, he reckons such a position heretical, arguing instead that human beings do indeed merit, only not de condigno; no one should give to anyone, unless there be some worthiness on the receiver's part, albeit only de congruo. Even as people merit, Wyclif insists that God furnishes both the merit and the means to merit, first exciting and even necessitating the person to merit. Yet when God necessitates merit, it is by way of hypothetical, not absolute, necessity, thereby preserving the person’s free will.” Levy, “Grace and Freedom,” 316–317. 69 Levy, “Grace and Freedom,” 295–296. 293 Thus, Chris Schabel’s assertion, “In addition to being orthodox [regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will]…, Wyclif was also, for the most part, unoriginal” is simply false.70
(3) Third, the Atonement firmly establishes the man Jesus as the Redeemer and universal head of the church. All those who are saved are saved through his manhood. Because of Wyclif’s caustic condemnations of the abuse of papal power in his day (and hence of the church visible), he was content to have recourse to the Augustinian understanding of the ecclesia ab Abel (and hence to the church invisible) and to insist that the grace required for the salvation of all the saints of both covenants flows to them from the man Jesus. As Wyclif notes in the Trialogus, “I do not doubt that Christ’s passion, by the efficacy of its fruit, extends both into the future and into the past; and thus, one can grant that Christ’s passion is not now in its proper existence but in its fruit. In this way, I understand Revelation 14:13, And their works do follow them, and
Revelation 13:8, Jesus was slain from the foundation of the world.”71 In a sermon preached on
Advent Sunday, Wyclif stresses the same theme:
The faith of the fathers of the old and new covenants is the same, because both believe that Christ in his time is incarnate and suffers to redeem the human race. And thus his passion, death, and resurrection, which are future to the fathers of old, are past to us. And as the power of Christ’s merit after its completion [on the Cross] extends even to the end of the world, so the power of the same merit before its completion [on the Cross] extends even to the beginning of the world. Were it not so, no human being after the transgression of the first man would have been morally righteous or saved.72
70 Chris Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1316–1345, 290. 71 “Non dubito quin passio Christi tam ad posterius tempore quam anterius in fructus efficacia se extendit; et ita concedi potest, quod passio Christi est modo non in propria existentia sed in fructu; et sic intelligo illud Apocal. xiv., Opera enim illorum sequuntur illos, et illud, quod Jesus occisus est a principio mundi.” Wyclif, Trialogus 4.12, ed. Lechler, 288. 72 “Eadem as est fides patrum veteris et novi testamenti, quia utrique credunt quod Christus tempore suo incarnatur et patitur, redimendo genus humanum; et sic passio, mors et resurreccio que antiquis patribus est futura est nobis preterita. Et sicut virtus meriti Christi se extendit usque ad finem mundi post eius complecionem, sic virtus eiusdem meriti se extendit usque ad principium mundi ante eius implecionem; et nisi sic esset, nunquam fuisset persona humani generis post prevaricacionem primi hominis iusta moraliter sive salva.” Ioannis Wyclif, Sermo 23, Sermones, vol. 4, p. 198, ln. 25–35. 294 Wyclif likewise affirms that because of Christ’s preeminent status as God, man, and Redeemer, his Godhead is due the worship of latria, his manhood latria and hyperdulia, and the whole Christ love, latria, and hyperdulia at once:
Nothing suffices to redeem the human race perfectly, as it is now being redeemed, unless it be God. Christ’s manhood so redeems. Therefore, it is God. For [Christ’s manhood] suffered every suffering by which Christ gave his blood for [our] redemption.…It follows that it established the redemption, for otherwise that manhood would not be so worthy of love and the worship of latria. Nevertheless, without doubt every Christian ought to love Christ’s manhood as much as Christ himself, insofar as he is a man. Nay rather, these are the same and are to be worshipped with numerically identical veneration, as Master Lombard shows in the Sentences 3.8 on the testimony of blessed Augustine. For Christ, insofar as he is manhood itself and consequently a creature, ought to be worshipped with hyperdulia, and every other creature ought to be venerated solely with dulia. For preeminent honor ought to be attributed to Christ, who in virtue of the hypostatic union is the Creator and also a creature. And that honor is significantly called “hyperdulia.” And in virtue of the fact that the same Christ is the Creator, he ought to be worshipped with the latria due to God alone. Likewise, because Christ’s manhood is the Word, it ought to be worshipped with latria, and because it is per se a creature, it ought to be worshipped with hyperdulia, as Christ. Hence, from two different perspectives both Christ and his manhood, which is personally Christ himself, ought to be worshipped with both latria and hyperdulia. But far be it, were that manhood not Christ! Hence, latria is clearly not to be shown merely to the Deity, but to God alone.73
As Richard Cross has pointed out to me, Wyclif’s doctrine in this passage is at least doctrinally suspect, for the assertion “Christ’s manhood so redeems. Therefore, it is God,” is arguably
73 “Nichil sufficit redimere genus humauum perfecte, ut modo redimitur, nisi ipsum sit Deus: humanitas Christi sic redimit: ergo est Deus. Ipsa enim fuit passa omni passione [=omnem passionem?], qua Christus dedit sanguinem in redempcionem.…Sequitur quod ipsa fecit redempcionem; aliter enim non esset illa humanitas tante diligenda nec latria adoranda. Cum tamen indubie quilibet Christianus debet tantum diligere humanitatem Christi quantum et Christum sub racione qua homo: ymo hec idem sunt et colenda eadem pietate in numero, ut ostendit Magister 3° Sentenciarum Dist. 8. ex testimonio beati Augustini. Christus enim ex hoc quod est ista humanitas et per consequens creatura adorari debet yperdulia, et omnis alia creatura venerari debet tantum dulia. Nam excellens honor debet Christo attribui, qui ex unione ypostatica est Creator ac eciam creatura; et illa vocatur significanter yperdulia; et cum hoc, cum idem Christus sit Creator, debet latria soli Deo debita adorari. Correspondenter humanitas Christi cum sit Verbum, debet adorari latria, et cum in se sit creatura debet adorari yperdulia sicut Christus. Et sic tam Christus quam ista humanitas, que est personaliter ipse Christus, debet secundum duplicem racionem eadem tam latria quam yperdulia adorari: sed absit hoc, nisi illa humanitas foret Christus! Ex quo patet quod non solum deitati, sed soli Deo est latria exhibenda.” Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 10, ed. Harris, p. 182, ln. 32–p. 183, ln. 25. 295 Monophysitism. Shortly after this passage, Wyclif suffers a bout of even more explicit heretical ecstasy and asserts that per impossibile, if the hypostatic union were annulled, he would still render the worship of latria to Jesus’s then non-divine manhood.74 For such devotional intemperance he was severely chastised by his later critics, including Thomas Netter (c. 1375–
1430) and Denis Pétau (1583–1652).75 Nevertheless, Wyclif’s view quoted above that Christ’s created manhood is due the worship of latria because of the hypostatic union is perfectly orthodox and is consonant with the doctrine of Peter Lombard and with devotion to the Sacred
Heart of Jesus in our own time.76 Nevertheless, in two later works Wyclif modified the view he expressed in De incarnatione and held instead that Christ’s manhood, despite the hypostatic union, is due only hyperdulia.77 It should be noted that in one of these two later works, De eucharistia, Wyclif seeks to justify his rejection of transubstantiation, which he still accepted when he wrote De incarnatione.78 Thus, his views on both the Incarnation and transubstantiation gradually grew heterodox in tandem.
Regardless of his changing views, Wyclif consistently held up the man Jesus as the supreme visible object of religious devotion and encouraged all to take refuge in him. In a sermon when he despaired of any attempt to reform the episcopate and papacy, he reminded his audience that the true bishop of their soul is Jesus himself: “The bishop who consecrates us and
74 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 10, ed. Harris, 184. 75 Thomas Waldensis (Thomas Netter), Doctrinale antiquitatum fidei ecclesiae catholicae 1.3.44.1 (Venetiis, 1571), 135. Dionysius Petavius Aurelianensis (Denis Pétau), Theologicorum dogmatum, vol. 4, De incarnatione Verbi 15.4.12 (Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1650), 2:536–537. 76 Harris’s edition cites Lombard 3.8, but in fact Wyclif intends Lombard 3.9. For more on this, see Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in iv libris distinctae 3.9, vol. 2: Liber iii et iv, 3a ed. (Romae: Ad claras aquas, 1981), 70– 71. 77 Oey, “Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture,” 198, footnote 100, citing Wyclif, De mandatis 23, p. 313; and Ioannis Wyclif, De eucharistia tractatus maior 9, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1892), 316, ln. 19–22. 78 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 11, ed. Harris, 190–191. 296 surpasses our bishops is the bishop of souls (cf. I Pet. 2:25) and a priest forever (Heb. 5:6, 7:17,
7:21). He consecrates all his subjects to offer themselves perpetually as victims to the Trinity (cf.
Rom. 12:1), and by objective charity to teach their fellow citizens the sacred law that is perpetually taught by the Godhead. Therefore, to that Bishop be glory and dominion, for he is at once king, emperor, and…pope.”79 Wyclif goes so far as to note in the Trialogus that Christ is a better intercessor than all other saints; thus, the intercession of all the rest is superfluous: Christ
is the best mediator and intercessor…and most kind by reason of his charity and infinite mercy. Therefore, someone would be foolish to seek another intercessor, because given two suitable choices, someone would be foolish who chose the one that was less suitable without a reason. For Christ ever liveth and is most ready to make intercession for us with the Father (cf. Heb. 7:25), and penetrates the mind of any wayfarer who loves him. Hence, other saints need not mediate so as to win an audience with him, because he is more kind and more prone to help than any of them.80
In sum, “The final conclusion of all Scripture and of every one of its parts is this, that Christ,
God and man, is the Redeemer of the human race in a most fitting way, the author of all salvation, and the one who will reward us in the end. He is thus our redemption, salvation, and reward; nay rather, [he is] all that is needful for the human race.”81
79 “Episcopus autem nos consecrans et excedens nostros episcopos est episcopus animarum et sacerdos in eternum; qui ascribit omnes suos regnicolas ad offerendum perpetuo se ipsos hostias Trinitati et ad docendum caritate obiectiva concives suos legem sacram, que per deitatem perpetuo est edocta; illi ergo episcopo fuit [=sit?] gloria et imperium, cum sit simul rex et imperator et…papa.” Wyclif, Sermo 21, Sermones, vol. 4, p. 183, ln. 31–p. 184, ln. 2. Cf. Wyclif, De ecclesia 2, p. 43. 80 “Est mediator et intercessor optimus…et benignissimus ratione caritatis et misericordiae infinitae. Stultus ergo foret qui alium intercessorem inquireret, quia propositis duobus eligibilibus, qui minus eligibile sine causa praeponeret, foret stultus; Christus enim est semper vivens apud Patrem ad interpellandum pro nobis paratissimus illapsus in mente[m] cujuslibet viatoris, qui ipsum dilexerit. Unde non oportet ad captandum ejus colloquium sanctos alios mediare, cum sit benignior et pronior ad juvandum, quam aliquis eorum.” Wyclif, Trialogus 3.30, ed. Lechler, 236. Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus 3.30, trans. Lahey, 189. 81 “Conclusio autem finalis tocius scripture et cuiuslibet partis sue est, quod Cristus, deus et homo, est humani generis secundum modum congruentissimum redemptor, tocius salutis autor et ultimus premiator. Et sic est nostra redempcio, salvacio et premiacio, ymmo omne, quod est necessarium humano generi.” Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 31, vol. 3, p. 242, ln. 19–24. 297 VI. Wyclif’s Use of Geometric and Cosmographic Analogies in Christology
One curiosity in Wyclif’s approach to Christology is his use of mathematical and cosmographic imagery to explain what Christ is. The difficulty and delight that lies at the heart of the medieval worldview is that both Christ and Satan, heaven and hell, each in its own way, occupies the center of the human realm. As C. S. Lewis notes in The Discarded Image, central to
Dante’s project in The Divine Comedy is the inversion of the natural order of the Ptolemaic universe.82 In the order of unredeemed nature, Lucifer’s recalcitrant refusal to accept his proper place in the cosmic hierarchy results in his egotistical rule from the very center of the earth; at that center, he becomes ever more constrained and impotent by the icy mire of his own guilt. As a result of such diabolic egocentrism, with every step people take, they are but walking “on the rind of hell.”83 Nevertheless, as wayfarers make their journey heavenward, they realize that
Christ is in fact the true center of the spiritual universe; the evil they have left behind constitutes the ultimate margin and irredeemable periphery of all things. As regards Wyclif, he too sometimes views hell at the center:
Clearly, with as much diligence as possible all Christians ought to nourish the inner man (cf. Rom. 7:22, Eph. 3:16) with the food of faith regarding virtue and vice, so that they may walk along the way that leads to the kingdom and leave behind the way that leads to the [infernal] prison. For although the way that leads to hell…seems easy and pleasurable at the beginning, it is nonetheless difficult and miserable at the end. As the damned say in Wisdom 5:7, We wearied ourselves in the way of wickedness and destruction: yea, we have gone through deserts, where there lay no way. To illustrate the point, an exemplum perceptible
82 For a good introduction to how the medievals understood their place in the visible cosmos, see C. S. Lewis, “The Heavens,” in The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 92–121. For the cosmic inversion at the heart of The Divine Comedy, see page 16 especially. 83 John Ciardi, “Notes” to Canto 3 of Dante’s Inferno, in Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans. John Ciardi, (New York: New American Library, 2003), 35, endnote to lines 7–8. See also ibid., canto 32, p. 254, endnote to line 73. 298 to the senses can be mentioned here…: Everything that passes directly…from the circumference [of a circle] to its center, has narrower space continuously as it approaches the center. All the damned so pass from the circumference to hell, which is at the center. Therefore, the way continuously becomes narrower for them. But, as regards those who pass directly [to the center], Wisdom seems to say, Then shall the right aiming thunderbolts go abroad (Wis. 5:21). Christ uses this manner of speech when he says in Luke 10:18, I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.84
Naturally, the absolute center so spoken of is the abode of Satan: “For sin immediately removed the first angel from heaven to the center, which is the place of the greatest heaviness.”85 And yet,
Christ by the practice of a humility that triumphs over Satan’s pride, emptied himself and thereby established himself as the center and foundation of all things:
As pride is the beginning of the other sins, so humility is the foundation of the other virtues. And hence, because Christ is the Wisdom of God the Father, he was incarnate in the humility of the blessed Virgin Mary, as is clear from Luke 1. For as Christ could not sin by pride, so none can be more humble than he, for as he is the center of the whole human race, so nothing can be lower than this center. (For because a thing’s lowness is determined by its nearness to the center, clearly no one can be more humble than Christ.)…Therefore, it behooves all those who are to be saved to establish their spiritual edifice upon this center, for otherwise it could not reach up to heaven. For so high a tower must have a fixed foundation, but according to the Apostle, For other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ (I Cor. 3:11).86
84 “Patet cum quanta diligencia omnis christianus pascere de\bet interiorem hominem cibo fidei de virtutibus et viciis, ut sic tendat per viam ducentem ad regnum dimissa via ducente ad carcerem. Est autem via ducens ad inferos…licet videatur in principio facilis et gaudiosa, est tamen in fine difficilis et dolorosa iuxta illud Sap. Vo, 7 dictum a dampnatis: Lassati sumus in via iniquitatis et perdicionis et ambulamns vias difficiles. Potest autem ad hoc poni exemplum sensibile…: Tale omne quod directe transit…a circumferencia ad centrum, continue habet spacium striccius versus centrum. Omnes dampnati transeunt sic a circumferencia versus infernum qui est in centro. Ergo continue fiet eis via striccior. Qui autem directe transeunt, videtur per illud Sap. V°, 32 [sic]: lbunt directe emissiones fulgurum; ad modum loquendi Christi Luce Xo, 18: Vidi Sathanam sicut fulgur de celo cadentem.” Wyclif, Sermo 60, Sermones, vol. 4, p. 474, ln. 34–p. 475, ln. 14. 85 “Peccatum enim subito subduxit primum angelum a celo ad centrum, quod est situs maxime gravedinis.” Wyclif, Sermo 62, ibid., p. 483, ln. 34–36. 86 “Sicut enim superbia est initium peccatis aliis, sic humilitas est aliis virtutibus fundamentum; et hinc fuit Christus, quia sapientia Dei Patris, in humilitate beatae Mariae virginis incarnatus, ut patet Lucae i. Sicut enim Christus non potuit superbire, sic non potuit esse ipso humilior, cum sit ut centrum toti humano generi, quo centro non posset esse inferius; nam cum res aliqua sit eo inferior quo centro propinquior, patet quod nemo potest esse Christo humilior.…Ideo oportet quemlibet salvandum spirituale aedificium constituere in hoc centro, quia aliter non posset ejus altitudinem erigere usque ad coelum. Turrim enim tam altam oportet habere immobile fundamentum, sed secundum Apostolum fundamentum aliud nemo ponere potest praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Jesus (I Cor. 3:11).” Wyclif, Trialogus 3.11, ed. Lechler, 164–165. Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus 3.11, trans. Lahey, 140. 299 In one of his sermons, Wyclif continues the same theme. Because Christ is both the cosmic principle that all rests upon and the rock spoken of in Matthew 7:24, Christians must build their lives upon him. “As the center of the world is the lowest possible, thus it behooves a man to be grounded spiritually and most humbly upon Christ, who like the giant Atlas is naturally outside the earth, but holds it up in the middle of the world by the hand of his power. But this spiritual house [i.e., one’s own spiritual life; cf. Matt. 7:24–27] is destined to fall, if in the end it is built upon earthly things.”87 Like the foreknown who run to Satan at the center of hell, the predestined, no matter what their station in life, must run to Christ at the true center of the spiritual life. As Wyclif says in a sermon preached in honor of St. Martin,
Because Christ according to his Godhead is “an intelligible circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere,” and [because] according to his manhood he is everywhere in the midst of his church, one can reach him by very different radii. For as one can draw a straight line from any point of a circle to its center, so regardless of the state in which Christ has put the wayfarer, he or she can run directly to Christ, as to the [circle’s] center.88
Two things are worthy of note here: (1) The theologoumenon Wyclif quotes descends ultimately from the second definition of God in the Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers, a widely influential medieval text of uncertain authorship.89 The original, however, speaks of an “infinite
87 “Sicut ergo centrum mundi est infimum possibile, sic oportet hominem terram profundari spiritualiter in Christo humillime, qui tamquam Atlas gigas naturaliter a terra extrinsecus manu sue potencie in mundi medio servat ipsam. Domus autem hec spiritualis est caduca, si super terrestribus finaliter sit fundata.” Ioannis Wyclif, Sermo 54, Sermones, vol. 1, Super evangelia dominicalia, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1887), 387, ln. 12–17. 88 “Cum autem Christus secundum divinitatem sit ‘circulus intelligibilis cuius centrum est ubique et circumferencia nusquam,’ ac secundum humanitatem sit ubique in medio sue ecclesie, patet quod secundum valde disparatas semidiametros contingit ipsum attingere. Sicut enim a quocunque puncto circuli contingit usque ad centrum lineam rectam protrahere, sic in quocunque statu Christus posuerit viatorem contingit ipsum ad Christum ut centrum directe currere.” Ioannis Wyclif, Sermon 17, Sermones, vol. 2, Super evangelia de sanctis, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1888), 126, ln. 20–28. 89 For the Latin text, see Françoise Hudry, ed., Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, CCCM 143A (Turnholti: Brepols, 1997), 7. For a bilingual edition, see Juan Acevedo, ed. and trans., The Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers: Liber xxiv philosophorum: Editio minima (Matheson Trust: 2015), 4, available online https://themathesontrust.org/papers/metaphysics/XXIV-A4.pdf, accessed October 5, 2019. 300 sphere” (sphaera infinita) and not an “intelligible circle” (circulus intelligibilis). It is unclear whether Wyclif intended to alter the meaning of the theologoumenon by his misquotation. (2) In this passage, Wyclif seems to endorse the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood. Yet, he condemns that very view in his De Trinitate: “This is not an expository syllogism: This Word is everywhere. This Word is this manhood. Therefore, this manhood is everywhere. For in the major premise the Word is the subject of something predicated of it by essential predication. Therefore, it does not follow that this manhood is everywhere, for the Word is everywhere, not according to its manhood, but according to its Godhead.”90 It would be reasonable to suppose that Wyclif came to deny the doctrine as a result of his denial of transubstantiation, but such is not the case.
Whereas Thomson dates De Trinitate to c. 1370, he dates the saints-day sermons to c. 1378–
1384.91 Perhaps a reconciliation of the two views is now impossible, or perhaps Wyclif had a very specific meaning in mind when he said “in the midst of his church.” Regardless, the issue is taken up again in the next chapter of this dissertation.
Christ, however, does not merely reign at the center of the circle, he also reigns at the beginning, summit, and end of the cosmic cycle of creation. Here, current scholarship suggests that Wyclif is building upon the thought of Grosseteste who in his Hexaëmeron identified Christ with both the seventh day of creation and its crowning glory; through Christ the whole created order is making its return to God:92
90 “Non est iste syllogismus expositorius, Hoc verbum est ubique, Hoc verbum est hec humanitas, Ergo hec humanitas est ubique. Nam in maiori subicitur verbum respectu predicamenti [potius et melius: praedicati] de eo predicacione essenciali. Ideo non sequitur, quod ista humanitas sit ubique quia verbum non secundum humanitatem sed secundum deitatem est ubique.” Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de Trinitate 12, ed. Allen DuPont Breck ([Boulder, CO?]: University of Colorado Press, 1962), 131. 91 Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 30, 122. 92 Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” 186. 301 1. And on the seventh day God ended his work (Gen. 2:2).…And by this verse one can understand allegorically that by assuming flesh in the sixth age [of world history] Christ brought all things to their end and consummation. For he brought all natures, as it were, into the unity of a circle, which before the Incarnation did not make a complete return into the circle. 2. For God according to his Godhead does not have a univocal nature in common with any creature, but when God became man, the God-man shared univocally in the nature of the rational creature, and the cycle was brought to completion.…For an angel and the [human] soul are one by nature of rationality and intelligence. But the rational soul and human flesh are united by a personal unity in every singular human being. Human flesh, however, has materially in itself all the elements of this world. The human soul also shares in oneness with plants by virtue of nutrition and with the brute beasts by virtue of sensation. 3. But when the Son of God assumed flesh, God and man were united by a personal unity. Therefore, the one Christ, the Son of God, the God-man, is one God with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and shares the same undivided nature of the Godhead with them. The same Christ is also one in nature with man. But man from the perspective of his body has a unity and a natural fellowship with all the elements and elemental bodies. But from the perspective of his soul, he shares in nutrition and growth with plants, sensation with the brute beasts, and rationality with the angels. For an angel shares in rationality with Christ the man. And so in Christ, God and man, all things are gathered together and made apt for unity. Nor would natural things reach this final consummation, if God were not a man. Therefore, in Christ all things are brought to completion and fulfilled by a certain natural perfection and consummation.93
93 “1. Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum.…Et secundum hanc literam potest intelligi allegorice quod Christus sexta etate carnem assumens omnia complevit et consummavit. Omnes enim naturas quasi in circuli unitatem reduxit, que ante incarnationem non habuerunt plenam in circulum reversionem. 2. Deus enim secundum divinitatem non habet naturam communem et univocam cum aliqua creatura, sed cum Deus factus est homo, Deus-homo communicavit in natura univoce cum racionali creatura, et perfecta est circulacio.…Angelus enim et anima sunt unum in natura racionalitatis et intelligentie. Anima autem racionalis et caro humana uniuntur in unitatem persone in quolibet singulari homine. Caro autem humana habet in se materialiter omnia huius mundi elementa. Anima eciam humana participat unitate virtute nutribili cum plantis et sensibili cum brutis. 3. Deus autem et homo, Filio Dei assumente carnem, uniuntur in unitatem persone. Unus igitur Christus, Dei Filius, Deus et homo, unus est Deus cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto, eandem et indivisam communicans cum eis divinitatis naturam. Idem quoque Christus unum est in natura cum homine. Homo autem ex parte corporis unitatem habet et communicacionem naturalem cum omnibus elementis et corporibus elementatis. Ex parte autem anime communicat in vegetabilitate cum plantis et sensibilitate cum brutis et racionali natura cum angelis. Angelus namque cum Christo homine communicat in racionalitate. Et ita in Christo, Deo et homine, sunt omnia recollecta et commodata ad unitatem; nec esset ista consummacio in rerum naturis, nisi Deus esset homo. In Christo igitur perfecta sunt omnia et consummata naturali quadam perfeccione et consummacione.” Robert Grosseteste, Hexaëmeron, ed. Richard C. Dales and Servus Gieben (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 275, ln. 30–p. 276, ln. 24. 302 In this quotation, Grosseteste no doubt refers to his doctrine in the De cessatione legalium that conceives of Creation and Redemption along the following lines:
= God 1 and 7
6 2
5 3
= sinful blob of mankind 4
Figure 1: Grosseteste’s Circular Model of Human Redemption94
We begin with God in himself at the top of the circle (1), who creates Adam (2) and from Adam,
Eve (3). From Eve descends the sinful blob of mankind at the bottom of the circle (4). God begins the upward stroke of the circle by creating the Blessed Virgin from the sinful blob (5), who bears Christ (6). Because Christ is God, through him all of material reality returns to God
(7), the source from which all creation takes its origin.
94 Adapted from Robert Grosseteste, On the Cessation of the Laws, trans. Stephen M. Hildegrand (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 250, reproduced courtesy of CUA Press. 303 A few comments are in order here to explicate the symbolism of this circle: (1) God and the sinful blob are at opposite poles of the circle, for sin renders the human race as distant from
God as it can be. (2) Christ and Adam are found on the same horizontal, for Christ is the new
Adam (cf. Rom. 5, I Cor. 15). (3) Mary and Eve are likewise on the same horizontal, for according to the ancient tradition first recorded by Irenaeus of Lyons (d. c. 200), Mary is the new
Eve, the Mother of all the spiritually living.95 (4) Jesus and Eve are found on the same diameter, for as Jesus is the only man to be made from only woman (i.e., from the Virgin Mary, his mother), so Eve is the only woman to be made from only man (i.e., from Adam’s rib). (5) Christ occupies the sixth place on the circle, because the Incarnation spiritually fulfills and redeems man, who was created on the sixth day of creation. (6) Finally, because Christ is also God, he sits enthroned in the first and seventh position at the head of the circle, for qua universal efficient and universal final cause, he is both the beginning and end of all creation (cf. Col. 1:15–20, Rev.
22:13). Naturally, the identification of Christ with the seventh day of creation and his enthronement at the top of the circle has everything to do with the doctrine of the primacy of
Christ. Although the Incarnation remedies human sin in this account, it more importantly crowns creation with the perfection it ought to have, and thereby completes it.
As was said, Wyclif seems to build upon Grosseteste’s understanding of Creation and
Redemption. He notes in De compositione hominis:
The nature [of man]…is constituted of body and soul, which are distinct from each other; and thus…because every man is a human being, [every man] is the number six, divisible, and thus the first perfect number under heaven. (For by reason of his soul, [man] is three, namely memory, reason, and will; and by reason of his body, which is the other qualitative part of the composite, he seems also, like his soul, to be three supposits, namely matter, form, and the conjunction
95 For more on the role of Mary as the New Eve in the theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, see M. C. Steenberg, “The Role of Mary as Co-Recapitulator in St. Irenaeus of Lyons,” Vigiliae Christianae 58 (2004): 117–137. 304 of them [i.e., of matter and form].) But as on the seventh day of the production of the material world, God rested, so now he rests in the singularly and marvelously new man, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, because he is the Creative Essence in respect of these six, shall be seven. Consequently, he makes blessed both efficaciously and objectively all the powers of creation that can be made blessed per se.96
A few comments are in order to untangle Wyclif’s number symbolism. Here, as Rudolf Beers notes, the Latin text may be corrupt.97 Consequently, translation and interpretation are more challenging than usual. The phrase “the first perfect number under heaven” (primus perfectus numerus sublunaris) is deceptively difficult, because “primus,” when applied to a number, sometimes means “prime,” but here it does not have that meaning. According to the Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources, “perfectus” when applied to a number, means “that equals the sum of its aliquot parts.”98 In other words, six is special because it is the first positive integer equal to the sum of its divisors (i.e., 1x2x3=1+2+3=6). When applied to man, man is six, because man is two (body+soul), and each of these two is three: His soul is the created
Augustinian trinity of memory, reason, and will, and his body is the created trinity of matter, form, and their union. As was said, man is also fittingly identified with the number six, for he was created on the sixth day of creation. In this scheme, Christ is seven, for he is six in virtue of being man plus the Godhead. He is also the seventh day, that is, the cosmic Sabbath in which the
96 “Et est…natura ex corpore et anima integrata, que distingwatur ab utraque et sic…quelibet persona hominis, cum sit homo, [est] integer sex, et divisim [?=divisibilis], et sic primus perfectus numerus sublunaris. (Nam racione anime est tria, scilicet memoria, racio et voluntas; et racione corporis, quod est altera pars compositi qualitativa, videtur eciam sicut anima supposita esse tria, scilicet materia, forma et earum connexio.) Septimo autem tamquam septimo die produccionis materiarum mundi, deus quiescens † in singulariter ac mirabiliter novo homine domino nostro Jesu Cristo, qui cum ad ista sex sit creatrix essencia, erit septem et per consequens omnes vices [=vires?] creature beatificabiles in se tam efficaciter beatificans quam eciam obiective.” Ioannis Wyclif, De compositione hominis 1, ed. Rudolf Beer (London, 1884), 11, ln. 10–25. Cf. Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” 172. For more on this quotation in context, see Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” 170–174. 97 Wyclif, De compositione hominis 1, ed. Beer (London, 1884), 11, note to lines 20–21. 98 DMLBS s.v. perficere 7a. 305 whole Trinity takes its rest.99 Note that if Wyclif in De compositione hominis is building upon
Grosseteste’s doctrine in the Hexaëmeron, he may be endorsing a version of the doctrine of the primacy of Christ. Given that De compositione has been dated to c. 1372, nothing prevents
Wyclif from changing his mind before writing De antichristo in late 1382.100
Finally, understanding the divine act of creation in light of mathematical principles naturally led Wyclif to a Pythagorean view of how God creates and redeems the world. Although one scholar has emphasized Wyclif’s Pythagorean understanding of creation, scholarship has yet to consider the influence of Pythagorean thinking on Wyclif’s theology of the Incarnation and
Redemption.101 Due to that lack of scholarship the following passage has baffled a number of
Wyclif scholars contacted for assistance:
Unless a Christian knows how to square a circle, he is not a member of the church. The squaring of the circle is surely knowable, as is clear in the Categories (7b31; see also Posterior Analytics 75b40), but it was not yet known in Aristotle’s time. It is certain that a figure with three points in the image of the Trinity [i.e., an equilateral triangle] has three points upon which it is built, none of which surpasses the rest, as neither the sides nor angles do, but they constitute the figure and angles on both sides. By a mystical analogy, the whole Trinity of persons and their understanding is equal, like the sides, so also their properties are like the angles, and they have a shared essence that is everywhere whole and entire, like the figure. And as the three angles are equal to two right angles, so the three divine persons are by identity equal to a common principle and a common principiated. Therefore, if in the middle of the three points a point is placed that bears the likeness of the essence that by reason of communicability is distinguished from the persons, then that thing, which is simultaneously a square and a circle, represents our God, who according to one of the twenty-four philosophers is “an intelligible circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.” But this, which is simultaneously an intelligible circle and a square, according to the manifold manner of showing mercy to the church,
99 Cf. Desmond Paul Henry, “Wyclif’s Deviant Mereology,” in Medieval Mereology (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1991), 383–405. 100 For the dating, see Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf, 36, 276. 101 Aurélien Robert, “Space, Imagination, and Numbers in John Wyclif’s Mathematical Theology,” in Space, Imagination and the Cosmos from Antiquity to the Early Modern Periods, ed. F. A. Bakker, Delphine Bellis, and Carla Rita Palmerino (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 107–131. 306 established the sensible square, when in the fullness of time (cf. Gal. 4:4) it bound together the four elements into the four humors and four complexions, and assumed the full man he [had] so made. For then the sensible square of humanity and the intelligible circle of divinity each became by nature the same supposit of the Word of God.102
Here, Wyclif plays with the geometrical motif of squaring the circle that was “associated in the
Middle Ages with the mystery of the Incarnation.”103 Philip the Chancellor (d. 1236), Alan of
Lisle (d.c. 1203), and Dante (d. 1321) all use it in their poetry to express the relation between the divine nature (circle or sphere), the Trinity (triangle), and creation, including the creation of matter and man (square).104 As one would expect from poets, the geometry involved often transcends the limitations of Euclidean space. By Dante’s day squaring the circle with only a
102 “Nisi christianus sciverit quadrare circulum, non est de membris ecclesie. Quadratura quidem circuli est scibilis, ut patet in Predicamentis, sed fuit in tempore Aristotelis nondum scita. Constat quidem quod figura tripunctalis ad instar Trinitatis habet tria puncta supposita quorum nullum excedit reliquum sicut nec latera vel anguli, sed habent figuram et angulos utrobique. Correspondenter mistice tota Trinitas personarum est parilis et nocio personarum ut latera nec non et proprietates earum ut anguli, et communem habent essenciam ubique plenariam ut figuram. Et sicut omnes illi tres anguli valent duos rectos, sic omnes tres persone divine valent ydemptice commune principium et commune principiatum. Si ergo in medio trium punctorum sit punctus positus, gerens similitudinem essencie que secundum racionem communicabilitatis distinguitur a personis, tunc figurat illud simul existens quadratum et circulus Deum nostrum qui secundum unum de viginti quatuor prophetis est Circulus intelliglbilis cuius centrum est ubique et circumferencia nusquam; iste autem simul circulus intelligibilis et quadratum secundum multiplicem racionem miserendi ecclesie constituit quadratum sensibile, quando in plenitudine temporis compaginavit quatuor elementa in quattuor humores ac quattuor complexiones et assumpsit plenum hominem quem sic fecit. Tunc enim sensibile quadratum humanitatis et circulus intelligibilis divinitatis factum est utrumque natura idem suppositum Verbi Dei.” Wyclif, De ecclesia 5, ed. Loserth, p. 100, ln. 13–p. 101, ln. 9. 103 Ronald B. Herzman and Gary W. Towsley, “Squaring the Circle: Paradiso 33 and the Poetics of Geometry,” Traditio 49 (1994), 113. See also Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 150–153; Robert Levine, “Squaring the Circle: Dante’s Solution,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 88, no. 2 (1985): 280–284; and Piero Boitani, “The Sibyl’s Leaves: Reading Paradiso XXXIII,” in The Tragic and the Sublime in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 223–249. 104 The texts of Philip the Chancellor’s and Alan of Lisle’s poems can be found in Dronke, Fabula, 152. For more on Alan of Lisle’s “Rhythmus de incarnatione,” see Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Alain de Lille: Textes inédits avec une introduction sur sa vie et ses œvres (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1965), 37–44. The “Rhythmus” can also be found in full in Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, “Alain de Lille et la Theologia,” in L’homme devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac (Paris: Aubier, 1964), 127–128; and PL 210, col. 578A–B. Philip’s poem can be found in full in Guido Maria Dreves, ed., Lieder und Motetten des Mittelalters, vol. 20 of Analecta hymnica medii aevi: Cantiones et Muteti (Leipzig, 1895), 88, #89. For more on Philip the Chancellor’s poetry, see Peter Dronke, “The Lyrical Compositions of Philip the Chancellor,” Studi Medievali 28 (1987): 563– 592; and David A. Traill, “More Poems by Philip the Chancellor,” Journal of Medieval Latin 16 (2006): 1–18. For the squaring of the circle in Dante, see Paradiso, canto 33, ln. 115–135. For a translation of the pertinent parts of the first two poems, see the Appendix of this dissertation. 307 straightedge and compass was considered possible solely for God. As regards Wyclif, the commentary here is necessarily brief due to space constraints: (1) Using an equilateral triangle to symbolize the Trinity is a commonplace. Difficulties first arise in consideration of the fourth point placed in the middle of the triangle. The fourth point may represent the divine essence simply. In that case, Wyclif may intend to bring to mind the scutum fidei image, which by his day had appeared in ecclesiastical art and architecture for more than a century. This interpretation is unlikely, however, because in the poets referred to and in the quotation from the
Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers, the circle or sphere represents the divine nature. In that case, the fourth point is probably the divine idea of man, who bears “the likeness of the essence that by reason of communicability is distinguished from the persons,” i.e., the image of God. (2)
The addition of the fourth point pulls God out of himself, so to speak, so that the material world, based on the number four, can emerge and bring into existence the conditions necessary for the creation first of man, and secondly of the man Jesus. The tradition of the number four representing three-dimensional space and extended matter goes back at least to Philo.105 One should note that the three of the Trinity plus the four of extended matter yields the seven of the incarnate Christ. As we have seen, Wyclif associated seven with Jesus in a special way. (3)
Wyclif may intend his readers to recall the image of Vitruvian man when they read of a circle and square constituting Christ. (4) Finally, Wyclif insists that the squaring of the circle must occur in the soul of the Christian. In context, this refers to belief in the Incarnation.
“Theologically, the problem is how to reduce the infinite-sidedness and no-sidedness of the
105 Φίλων ὁ Αλεξανδρεύς (Philo of Alexandria), Περἰ τῆς κατὰ Μωϋσέα κοσµοποιΐας (On the Account of the World’s Creation Given by Moses) 15.47–17.53, vol. 1, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 36–41. For more on this passage in context, see H. Flanders Dunbar, Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy (New York: Russel and Russell, 1961), 501–502; and Hindy Najman and Benjamin G. Wright, “Perfecting Translation: The Greek Scriptures in Philo of Alexandria,” in Sibyls, Scriptures, and Scrolls (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 2:900–901. 308 divine with the world of our foursquare elements. It cannot be done by man; but it can be done for man by God; most fittingly it can be done for man by God made man.”106
VII. Wyclif on Christ as Scripture
Although, as noted, scholarship cannot consider all the authors after Ockham who may have influenced Wyclif’s Christology due to lack of critical editions, the virtually unanimous consensus of contemporary scholarship views Wyclif’s identification of the ideal form of Holy
Writ with the uncreated Logos as his greatest innovation in Christological thinking.107 In short, for Wyclif, the inner spiritual reality of the Bible is not merely the Word of God; it is rather God the Word. Curiously, by identifying the sacred text with God himself and imagining it as a divinized and supernatural entity, Wyclif did to the Bible what many Muslims do to the
106 Anthony Esolen, “Notes for Canto Thirty-three,” in Dante Alighieri, Paradiso, ed. and trans. Anthony Esolen (New York: Modern Library, 2007), 491. 107 For some of the scholarship on this identification, see Michael Hurley, “‘Scriptura sola’: Wyclif and his Critics” Traditio 16 (1960), 295; J. A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools: The Relation of the ‘Summa de ente’ to Scholastic Debates at Oxford in the Later Fourteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 146, 163; Beryl Smalley, “The Bible and Eternity: John Wyclif’s Dilemma,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (1964): 73–89; A. J. Minnis, “‘Authorial Intention’ and ‘Literal Sense’ in the Exegetical Theories of Richard Fitzralph and John Wyclif: An Essay in the Medieval History of Biblical Hermeneutics,” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature 75 (1975): 1–31; Maurice Keen, “Wyclif, the Bible, and Transubstantiation,” in Wyclif in his Times, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 4; Michael Tresko, “John Wyclif’s Metaphysics of Scriptural Integrity in the De veritate sacrae scripturae,” Dionysius 13 (December 1989): 153–196, especially 173–178; Oey, “Christ and Scripture,” 181–182; Kantik Ghosh, “John Wyclif and the truth of sacred scripture,” in The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and Interpretation of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22–66, especially 54–56; Ian Christopher Levy, “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture in its Christological Context,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003): 227– 240; Lahey, “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology,” 197; Stephen E. Lahey, John Wyclif (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137, 147–148; Ian Christopher Levy, Holy Scripture and the Quest for Authority at the End of the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 54–66; and Ian Christopher Levy, “The Place of Holy Scripture in John Wyclif’s Theology,” in The Wycliffite Bible: Origin, History and Interpretation, ed. Elizabeth Solopova (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 27–48, especially 37. 309 Qur’ān.108 Should new evidence come to light that an earlier theologian had explicitly understood the Christian Scriptures in the same way, Wyclif may prove to be a significantly less original thinker than he is thought at present.
How did Wyclif come to this curious position? The earliest known instance in which he committed himself to this view is the lecture that became De incarnatione 5. Therein, he argues against Scotus’s and Ockham’s view that God ex potentia absoluta can annul the hypostatic union. If Wyclif’s arguments are put into their broader Oxford context, they include the following: Even Ockham acknowledged that strictly speaking, God ex potentia absoluta cannot do certain things. For instance, even Ockham admits that ex potentia absoluta God is held bound by the principle of non-contradiction and cannot change the past. Scotus goes further and holds that even ex potentia absoluta God can never command any of his rational creatures to hate him.109 Building upon such reasonable limitations on the divine will, Wyclif argues further: (1)
108 Stephen Lahey made this observation to me in private conversation. For more on the Qur’ān in Islam as something uncreated, see Richard C. Martin, “Createdness of the Qur’ān,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, THREE, first published online 2015, http://dx.doi.org.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_24418. 109 For Scotus’s view that the first two precepts of the Decalogue are so binding that God ex potentia absoluta can never dispense from them, see John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 3, d. 37, q. u., ed. P. Barnaba Hechich, et al., Ioannis Duns Scoti…Opera omnia 10 (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis, 2007), 271–291. For an English translation, see Thomas Williams, trans., “The Decalogue and the Natural Law,” in Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2010), 601–604. For more on Soctus’s doctrine of the partial contingency of the moral order, see William J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubina Editore, 1990), 100–103. For Ockham’s view that if God commanded people to hate him, such hatred would constitute a meritorious act, see Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in Librum secundum Sententiarum (reportatio) q. 15, ed. Gedeon Gál et Rega Wood, Guillelmi de Ockham: Opera philosophica et theologica: Opera theologica 5 (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1981), 352–354; and Rega Wood, Ockham on the Virtues (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1997), 270. For the devlopment of ethics from Scotus to Ockham, see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 90–93. For more on the agreement of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham that God ex potentia absoluta cannot change the past, see Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 2:1218–1228; Wood, Ockham on the Virtues, 22; J. J. MacIntosh, “Aquinas and Ockham on Time, Predestination and the Unexpected Examination,” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998): 181–220; and Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 122–123. When Michael Allen Gillespie writes, “Ockham even maintains that God can change the past if he so desires,” he is in error. See his Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 17. He asserts the same error on page 22. The sources he cites do not confirm his conclusions. 310 Ex potentia absoluta God cannot annul the union, because he would only be justified in doing so in light of preceding demerits in the man Jesus. Jesus, however, was impeccable for two reasons:
(a) Qua man, he always enjoyed the beatific vision, but one who enjoys such vision necessarily cannot sin. (b) Qua Divine Word, Jesus is God and God by definition cannot sin. (2) Further, by definition, those who enjoy the beatific vision necessarily enjoy it forever. But were the union annulled, the man Jesus would lose the beatific vision. Moreover, if the beatific vision can never be lost, surely the same is true of the hypostatic union. (3) The loss of the union would be so spiritually traumatic that the man Jesus would probably sin and be damned as a result. But the man Jesus is God’s most beloved creature and such sin would then be primarily attributed to
God. (4) Both Creation and the Incarnation are equally necessary. But Christ being blessed necessarily follows from the Incarnation. In that case, Christ being blessed is as necessary as the past. But not even God can change the past. (5) What Christ sees in the beatific vision is necessarily the case. But Christ’s soul cannot but see his own perpetual beatitude in the beatific vision. (6) As described at the beginning of this chapter, Aquinas also held that God cannot annul the union. Although arguments from purely human authority are of the worse kind, surely the authority of the Doctor angelicus must count for something even among the Franciscans.
Therefore, even ex potentia absoluta God could never annul the union. QED.
In the spirit of scholastic disputation, Wyclif now proposes a reasonable objection to his arguments: Whatever God does freely and contingently, he can also undo and annihilate. But he freely assumed Christ’s human nature. Therefore, he can both separate the two natures and even annihilate Christ’s manhood. Whereto retorts the Doctor evangelicus: God’s agency is necessarily creative, not destructive. He would never worsen or damn a creature for its own sake.
God merely destroys sin by punishing and/or correcting sinners, but only insofar as they are 311 sinful. Furthermore, the divine will is necessarily more limited by the divine essence in ways that
Scotus rejects. Contrary to the Doctor subtilis, God cannot even ex potentia absoluta annihilate time, annihilate the world, or do anything wicked. The annihilation of any creature is absolutely impossible even for God, because such annihilation would result in the annihilation of the creature’s corresponding divine idea. But the annihilation of even a single divine idea would result in a void in the divine mind. And surely the divine nature abhors such a vacuum.
Arguments like these make it reasonable to infer that Wyclif must have been a most enthusiastic, zealous, and entertaining, albeit sometimes absentminded and confusing, lecturer.
Some of his students, after all, probably did risk persecution by spreading their master’s ideas after his dismissal from the University. A reasonable response to these arguments from a Scotist might proceed as follows: Wyclif’s primary error consists in his view of necessity outlined earlier in this chapter: God necessarily does what is best. The created world we inhabit is thus the best possible; any other course of action is thus unfitting of God, and hence strictly speaking impossible. What is lost in such a theology is the simple fact that because there can be no proportion between the infinite and the finite, no single created universe can be strictly speaking the best in every respect, for no finite act (which creation necessarily is) can exhaust the divine creativity. Thus, if we agree with Aquinas that God could have created a more perfect or a less perfect universe than our own,110 we must accept that the Incarnation as we know it, though fitting, is not strictly speaking necessary. God could have willed to redeem us by some other way. Other possible scenarios for effecting human salvation include universes in which sinners are redeemed without a God Man, or in which the Divine Word assumes humanity merely for a
110 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 1, art. 25, dist. 5–6; Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei 1, art. 5; et Summa contra Gentiles 2, cap. 23–30. For more on these texts in context, see Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 73–86; Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, 88–92; and Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 120–121. 312 finite amount of time. Moreover, Wyclif’s view that God ex potentia absoluta is compelled to offer fallen but penitent mankind some means of salvation is positively Pelagian and heretical.
God ex potentia absoluta could have decided instead to damn us all.
In the midst of such disagreement, Wyclif sought to bolster his position with Biblical authority:
But if someone has been waiting…for the witness of Scripture as proof…, behold Truth himself says in John 10:35–36, while addressing the Pharisees, The Scripture whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world cannot be broken. To understand this, three things must be noted in order: (1) The Truth is not speaking of our handmade Bibles, which are bundles of words written in ink and parchment, for such “Scripture” is daily being unbound by craftsmen; moreover, “sanctification” and “being sent into the world” do not apply to them [i.e., to mere codices]. The Scripture so spoken of, however, is the Book of Life (Rev. 3:5, 13:8, et passim) in which all things are inscribed, because it is the intrinsic Word of God.…Hence, the Holy Spirit, to leave us an illustration that speaks of the life-giving Scripture, adds in the masculine gender, Whom the Father hath sanctified, to suggest to us the connection we must make to the Son. For the custom of Scripture and Augustine is to refer to persons by masculine adjectives and to natures by neuter adjectives. And the Apostle alludes to this manner of speech in Galatians 3:16, He saith not, “And to seeds,” as of many, but as of one, “And to thy seed,” who is Christ. Without doubt, the holy Apostle has in mind both number and gender. (2) I grant that the Truth is not speaking of the separation of the mind from the body or of the Father from the Son in this saying. Not of the first, because in John 2:19–21 he prophesies to the Jews that they would separate the temple of his body from his soul, and he would raise it up in three days. Therefore…, he clearly did not intend that his body could not be separated from his soul. Nor is the other interpretation pertinent, because there is binding and loosing of the two natures to each other and not of the persons of the same, supreme, indivisible Essence.… (3) It remains…that he meant the inseparability of the Godhead from the manhood, which he expressed by the noun, Scripture, that [the Jews] might search the Scriptures that bear witness to these two natures hypostatically joined together. Hence, in John 5:39 it says, Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me. For [the Jews] would not have grounds to claim that he blasphemes by calling himself the natural Son of God, if they had sufficiently scrutinized the Scriptures. (For if in the law it was written of the Messiah or Christ who would be in two natures and one hypostasis…, how is there a pretext for concluding that he blasphemes by the assertion of his natural sonship?) But the middle term by which this reproach holds is the truth that this Scripture (in the sense explained) cannot be broken. 313 (For it follows therefrom that the uncreated nature is in the supposit of the Word, and therewith the created nature is temporally but indissolubly united.) Hence, in a most meaningful way, the Truth makes the negative assertion that the Scripture cannot be broken, because although the saints in the heavenly country are inseparably joined to God, they could have been separated contingently, for they were for a time sinful wayfarers. But the Lord Jesus Christ, the man assumed by the Word, at no time [was or] will be able to sin. And hence, the conclusion is clear. Otherwise the saintly doctors would not have grounds for cursing with anathema those who grant that the loss [of Christ’s manhood] or such a dissolution of his [two] natures [is possible].111
Wyclif’s assertions require some explanation. Crucial to the argument is his grammatical construal of John 10:35–36. To bring out the sense that appears in virtually all modern Bibles, the Latin must be punctuated along these lines:
111 “Quod si quis in evidenciam…expectat testimonium scripture, ecce Veritas loh. 10. alloquitur Phariseos, Non potest, inquit, solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum. Pro cuius intellectu sunt tria notanda per ordinem: Primo quod Veritas non loquitur de scriptura nostra artificiali aggregata ex †figuris† atramenti et pellibus mortuorum; tum quia talis scriptura cottidie per artifices potest solvi; tum eciam quia illi non competit sanctificacio et missio in mundum: sed illa scriptura est Liber vite cui inscribuntur omnia, cum sit intrinsecus Sermo Dei.…Unde Spiritus Sanctus ad relinquendum nobis exemplar, quod loquitur de scriptura vitali, subdit in genere masculino, Quem Pater sanctificavit, innuendo nobis relacionem faciendam ad Filium. Mos enim est scripture et Augustini per adiectivos masculinos personas concipere et per neutros naturas. Et isti modo loquendi alludit Apostolus ad Gall. 3°, Non, inquit, dicit seminibus quasi in multis, sed semini tuo, qui est Christus. Indubie, sicut sanctus Apostolus notavit numerum, sic et genus. 2°. supponitur quod Veritas non loquitur de solucione mentis a corpore vel Patris a Filio in hoc dicto: de prima non, quia supra Ioh. 2o. dicit ludeis prophetice quod solverent templum corporis sui ab anima et ipse in tribus diebus excitaret illud.…Ergo…patet quod hic non intellexit corpus non posse solvi ab anima. Nec alius sensus est pertinens; tum quia ligacio et solucio est duarum naturarum ad invicem et non personarum eiusdem summe indivisibilis essencie.… Ideo relinquitur 3°…quod intellexit insolubilitatem deitatis ab humanitate, quas expressit nomine ‘scripture,’ ut vel sic scrutarentur scripturas, que testimonium perhibent de istis duabus naturis sic ypostatice copulatis. Unde et loh. 5. dicitur Scrutamini scripturas in quibus vos putatis vitam eternam habere, et ille sunt que testimonium perhibent de me. Non enim haberent evidenciam dicere quod blasfemat dicendo se esse Dei Filium naturalem, apposito sufficienti scrutinio scripturarum. (Nam si in lege scriptum sit de Messia vel Christo futuro in duabus naturis et una ypostasi…, quomodo est color concludendi blasfemiam ex assercione filiacionis naturalis?) Medium autem per quod tenet ista inveccio est veritas quod Non potest solvi hec scriptura ad sensum expositum. (Nam ex illo sequitur quod sit natura increata in supposito Verbi, et cum hoc natura creata temporaliter sed insolubiliter copulata.) Unde signantissime Veritas dicit negativam quod Non potest solvi scriptura, quia, licet sancti in patria sint Deo inseparabiliter copulati, tamen contingentissime possunt solvi, cum sint pro tempore suo viantes peccabiles. Homo autem assumptus a Verbo Dominus lesus Christus pro nullo tempore peccare poterit. Et patet conclusio. Nec aliter haberent sancti doctores evidenciam imprecandi anathema eis qui concedunt dimissionem vel solucionem huiusmodi naturarum.” Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 5, ed. Harris, p. 73, ln. 4–p. 75, ln. 5. 314 Si illos dixit deos, ad quos sermo Dei factus est, et non potest solvi Scriptura; quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum vos dicitis quia, “Blasphemas!,” quia dixi, “Filius Dei sum”?112
Thus punctuated, the text means:
If [God] said that they, to whom the Word of God came, were gods, and the Scripture cannot be broken [i.e., cannot be in error], do you say to the one the Father has sanctified and sent into the world, “You blaspheme!,” because I said, “I am the Son of God”?
So construed, the sense requires the addition of a dative pronoun like ei before quem. Such an addition is permissible, because according to the standards canons of Latin grammar the antecedent of a relative pronoun is sometimes omitted, if the antecedent is indefinite.113 Wyclif’s interpretation, on the contrary, presupposes the following punctuation or something similar:
Si illos dixit deos, ad quos sermo Dei factus est, et non potest solvi Scriptura quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum, vos dicitis quia, “Blasphemas!,” quia dixi, “Filius Dei sum”?
The meaning thus generated would be:
If [God] said that they, to whom the Word of God came, were gods, and the Scripture whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world cannot be broken, do you say, “You blaspheme!,” because I said, “I am the Son of God”?
In short, all depends upon the antecedent of the pronoun quem. Is the antecedent of this pronoun the indirect object presupposed by the verb dicitis, or the noun Scriptura found immediately before? Taken on its own the Vulgate is ambiguous. But the Greek New Testament is not:
112 Secundum Iohannem 10:35–36, Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, 4th ed., ed. B. Fischer, et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994), 1678. 113 B. L. Gildersleeve and G. Lodge, Gildersleeve’s Latin Grammar, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1895; Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2000), 399, #621; and J. H. Allen and J. B. Greenough, New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges, ed. J. B. Greenough, G. L. Kittredge, A. A. Howard, and Benj. L. D’Ooge, rev. Anne Mahoney (Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2001), 179, #307c, 315 Εἰ ἐκείνους εἶπεν θεοὺς πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι ἡ γραφή, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ ἡγίασεν καὶ ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσµον ὑµεῖς λέγετε ὅτι βλασφηµεῖς, ὅτι εἶπον· υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ εἰµι;114
In order for the Greek to generate Wyclif’s desired meaning, the pronoun ὃν would have to refer to the noun γραφή, a grammatical impossibility. To bolster his argument, Wyclif also cites
Galatians 3:16: Non dicit, “Et seminibus,” quasi in multis, sed quasi in uno, “Et semini tuo,” qui est Christus.115 Here, quod and not qui is required grammatically. In this case, the Vulgate accurately corresponds to the Greek text:
Οὐ λέγει· καὶ τοῖς σπέρµασιν, ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐφ’ ἑνός· καὶ τῷ σπέρµατί σου, ὅς ἐστιν Χριστός.116
Nevertheless, if the first passage cannot reasonably be construed as Wyclif would have it, the subsidiary passage adds nothing to the argument.
The rest of Wyclif’s argument is equally dubious. To argue, as he seems to do, that the grammatical sense of John 10:35–36 primarily concerns the hypostatic union is not credible if the passage is taken in context, especially because solvi can just as easily be construed as “to be in error” or “ to be dispensed with.” The fact remains that in De incarnatione 5 he turns the Bible into a supernatural entity and identifies that entity with both the second person of the Trinity and the Book of Life spoken of in the Book of Revelation.
Later in his career, Wyclif continued to develop the same theme. In 1372, approximately two years after he delivered the lectures that became De incarnatione, Wyclif publicly debated the nominalist theologian and Carmelite friar John Kenningham. Whereas Kenningham proposed a less exalted theory of biblical inspiration and stressed that the Bible is something human and
114 Κατὰ Ἰωάννην 10:35–36, Novum testamentum graece, 27th ed., ed. Eberhard Nestle, et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2001), 284. 115 Ad Galatas 3:16, Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, 1805. 116 Πρὸς Γαλάτας 3:16, Novum testamentum graece, 497. 316 created, because it is the words that compose it, Wyclif argued instead that the Bible can contain no errors, for the Divine Word is immediately present through it to well-trained interpreters who approach the text with due faith.117 Again, Wyclif speaks as though the divine idea of the Bible were somehow synonymous with God himself: “I say that the New Testament is eternal, and consequently most ancient, as is the Old Testament as regards the part that cannot grow old.”118
Three to four years later, in De civili dominio, Wyclif maintained the same doctrine and clarified his position by postulating three levels of Scripture:119 (1) the Book of Life, (2) the truths inscribed in the Book of Life, and (3) the codices that contain the Biblical texts as we know them. His arguments with his Nominalist opponents no doubt forced him to clarify his position:
Nevertheless, here there is a disagreement as to the meaning of the words, as certain doctors prefer to object with a childish interpretation, but do not want [their interpretation] to be understood as an assertion on par with the orthodox one. And so they assert that sacred Scripture in the literal sense (de virtute sermonis) is false. I, however, leave such nonsense to be dealt with by the logicians, for I am concerned instead with understanding the Book of Life and the eternal truths found in it, each of which is sacred Scripture [in the strict sense]. Our codices, on the other hand, I call sacred Scripture in an equivocal and tertiary sense. “Equivocal” I say, because [the codex] is only a faint image humanly instituted to signify Scripture in the first two senses. This image is properly understood to the extent that one ceases to pay it heed, and [to the extent that] the mind is solely fixed on the truth that one is more duty bound to understand.120
117 What remains of the debate can be found in Thomas Netter, Fasciculi zizaniorum magistri Johannis Wyclif cum tritico, ed. Walter Waddington Shirley (London, 1858), 4–103, 453–476, and 477–450. Thomson dates the debate to 1372. (Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 227.) For more thereon, see Minnis, “‘Authorial Intention’ and ‘Literal Sense,’” 27–28; and Stephen Penn, “Truth, Time and Sacred Text: Responses to Medieval Nominalism in John Wyclif’s Summa de ente and De veritate sacrae scripturae” (PhD diss., The University of York, 1998). 118 “Dico quod Novum Testamentum est aeternum et per consequens antiquissimum, sicut et Vetus Testamentum, secundum partem quae non potest veterascere.” Ioannis Wyclif, “Determinatio contra Kylingham carmelitam,” in Thomas Netter, Fasciculi zizaniorum magistri Johannis Wyclif cum tritico, ed. Walter Waddington Shirley (London, 1858), 455. 119 Thomson dates De civili dominio to 1375–1376. (Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 48.) 120 “In isto tamen est verbalis dissensio, ut quidam doctores magis volunt sensum puerilem obicere, sed cum sensu catholico volunt ipsum non assertive cointelligere; et sic dicunt scripturam sacram de virtute sermonis esse falsam. Istud autem dubium relinquo loycis pertractandum, solicitus ad intelligendum librum vite et veritates eternas in ipso fundatas; quorum uterque est scriptura sacra. Codices autem nostros voco scripturam sacram equivoce tercio modo dictam; equivoce dico, quia non est nisi pictura remota humanitus inposita ad significandum 317 In De mandatis, written around the same time as De civili dominio, Wyclif likewise identifies the
Word of God with the Decalogue. “This Wisdom, which is essentially the divine nature and personally the Word of God, is really the Ten Commandments and God’s law.”121 In De veritate sacrae scripturae (1377–1378), Wyclif proceeds to give the most elaborate exposition of his identification of the Bible with the God the Word. He now sees five degrees of Scripture:
Hence, I was accustomed to posit five degrees of sacred Scripture: (1) The first is the Book of Life [spoken of] in Revelation 20 and 21. (2) The second is the truths written in the Book of Life according to their intelligible being. Each of these [degrees of] Scripture is absolutely necessary; they do not differ essentially, but [only] according to the point of view of the knower, as was said in De ideis. (3) Third, Scripture is understood as the truths [of the Faith] that are to be believed in their genus that according to their existence or effect are written in the Book of Life. (4) Fourth, Scripture is understood as the truth that is to be believed, as written in the book of the natural man (i.e., [in] his soul). Some people call this [degree of] Scripture a bundle of the acts and truths spoken of in the third way. Others [call] it a habit of the intellect, and still others an intention or species [of knowing]. (5) But in the fifth way, sacred Scripture is understood as the codices, words, or other human [conventions] that are the signs [necessary for] recalling a preceding truth, as Augustine says in his forty-first epistle to Paulina, “On seeing God.” But [Scripture in this sense] can be understood in multiple ways, either personally and concretely as those signs, however they signify, or as those [signs] without qualification, so that they convey the divine sense [i.e., what God intends them to mean]. And in this way, I understand the sacred Scripture that is perceptible to the senses. In John 10:35–36, Christ understands the most sacred Scripture in the first way, when he says, The Scripture whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world cannot be broken. From these words, he seems to hint that he is the Truth itself, for humanly speaking, Christ was firmly established in holiness, for he was anointed with the oil of grace in the sight of his fellows, as it says in Psalm 44:8. God the Father sent that book into the world to save it, for in Galatians 4:4– 5 the Apostle says, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law. Nay rather, the whole Trinity and consequently the divine Word sent himself. Humanly speaking, he is the nobleman who went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom and to scripturas priores; que eo melius intelligitur quo dimissa attencione ad illam animus in veritatem debitam intelligi magis unice suspenditur.” Ioannis Wyclif, De civili dominio: Liber tertius 19, ed. Johann Loserth, vol. 4 (London: The Wyclif Society, 1904), 403, ln. 26–38. 121 “Ista autem sapiencia, que essencialiter est natura divina et personaliter verbum Dei, est realiter mandata decalogi et lex Dei.” Ioannis Wyclif, De mandatis 16, p. 170, ln. 31–33. Thomson dates this work to 1375–176. (Thomson, The Latin Writings of John Wyclif, 45.) 318 return (Lk 19:12). This book cannot be destroyed, because the Godhead and manhood are indissolubly joined together by a sevenfold grace in the same person. Every Christian ought to study that book, because it is all truth. Hence, that we may be taught to understand in this verse (Jn 10:35–36) that book and not human works, the Holy Spirit established in the correct copies the relative pronoun whom and not which, that we may be led to understand it according to the Apostle’s manner of speech in Galatians 3:16, To thy seed, who is Christ.…And it is clear from the faith of Scripture that Scripture must be supremely authoritative beyond the signs perceptible to the senses [i.e., beyond the bare words]. The subtle theologian will not deny the other three [grades of] Scripture, however. Hence, the scripture perceptible to the senses in words or in codices is not sacred Scripture except by equivocation, as a man in a picture or in the imagination is called a man because of the likeness to the real man. Scripture in the first sense, however, is most proper and holy: (a) Most proper, because it is written by the Supreme Wisdom, and this writing is so proper to God that it cannot be shared with another nature. Therefore, this book is most properly a book and most free. (b) And most holy because of the holiness of its subject, because of the steadfastness of the doctrine written in it, and because of the benefit of its end, for it was sent into the world for human salvation.122
122 “Unde solebam ponere quinque gradus scripture sacre: Primus est liber vite, de quo Apoc. vicesimo et vicesimo uno. secundus est veritates libro vite inscripte secundum esse earum intelligibile, et utraque istarum scripturarum est absolute necessaria, non diferens essencialiter, sed secundum racionem, ut dictum est in materia De Ydeis. tercio sumitur scriptura pro veritatibus credendis in genere, que secundum existenciam vel effectum inscribuntur libro vite. quarto sumitur scriptura pro veritate credenda, ut inscribitur libro hominis naturalis ut anima, quam scripturam quidam vocant agregatum ex actibus et veritatibus tercio modo dictis, quidam, quod est habitus intellectivus, et quidam, quod est intencio vel species. sed quinto modo sumitur scriptura sacra pro codicibus, vocibus aut aliis artificialibus, que sunt signa memorandi veritatem priorem, quomodo loquitur Augustinus epist. undequadragesima Ad Paulinam De Videndo Deum. sed hoc potest multipliciter intelligi, vel personaliter et concretive pro illis signis quomodocunque signaverint, vel simpliciter pro illis, ut signant sensum dei; et sic intelligo scripturam sacram sensibilem. Primo modo sumit Cristus scripturam sacratissimam Joh. decimo, quando dicit: Non potest solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum. ex quibus verbis videtur veritatem se ipsam innuere, cum Cristus firmatus fuit et factus est sanctus humanitus, quia Oleo gracie unctus pre participibus suis, ut dicitur Psal. quadragesimo quinto. Illum librum misit Deus Pater in mundum salvandum, cum Gal. quarto dicat Apostolus, Misit Deus Filium suum, factum ex muliere, factum sub lege, ut eos, qui sub lege erant, redimeret. ymmo tota Trinitas et per consequens ipsummet verbum divinitus misit se ipsum. humanitus est homo nobilis, qui abiit in regionem longinquam accipere sibi regnum et reverti. iste liber non potest solvi, cum deitas ac humanitas septiformi gracia copulantur insolubiliter in eadem persona. illum librum debet omnis cristianus adiscere, cum sit omnis veritas. unde ut doceamur in hoc dicto intelligere illum librum et non opera hominum, ordinavit spiritus sanctus in correctis codicibus hoc relativum ‘quem’ et non ‘quam’, per quod fiat relacio ad intellectum iuxta modum loquendi apostoli Gal. tercio, Semini tuo, qui est Cristus.…et patet ex fide scripture, quod oportet esse scripturam summe autenticam preter signa sensibilia. alias autem tres scripturas non negabit subtilis theologus. unde ista scriptura sensibilis in vocibus vel codicibus non est scriptura sacra nisi equivoce, sicut homo pictus vel ymaginatus dicitur homo propter similitudinem ad verum hominem. prima autem scriptura est propriissima et sacratissima; propriissima, quia a summa sapiencia inscripta, que inscripcio est deo tam propria, quod non potest comunicari alteri nature. ideo iste est liber liberrimus. et est sacratissima propter sanctitatem subiecti, propter sentencie inscripte firmitatem et propter finis utilitatm. est enim propter salutem hominum mundo missa.” Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 6, vol. 1, p. 108, ln. 2–p. 111, ln. 12. 319 Here, Wyclif employs the same citations of John 10:35–36 and Galatians 3:16, as before; in respect of those passages, the argument is the same. When Wyclif speaks of “a sevenfold grace”
(“septiformi gracia”), he no doubt refers back to his reception of Grosseteste’s teaching that
Christ is seven, as quoted above from De compositione hominis 1. More importantly, the degrees of Scripture have expanded from three to five. Current scholarship asserts that the five levels correspond to Wyclif’s doctrine of universals. At the top of the hierarchy, universals are the same as God himself; at the lowest level, they are merely verbal signs, as Scripture written in a codex is merely Scripture by equivocation:
Let us look at each level of the fivefold system before comparing the two systems, level by level.…The first and highest level is Christ the Word and [the] Book of Life, thus corresponding to the divine intellect. The second level corresponds to the truths inscribed therein; these are the eternal exemplar reasons (universale ante rem). The third level corresponds to the universals existing in the individual subject (universale in re), since these are “the truths that must be believed in their genus, which according to existence or effect are inscribed in the Book of Life.” Level four, which is “an aggregate abstracted from actions and truths of the third level,” corresponds to the universals existing in mente, here called “intention or species.” These are the conceptual universals abstracted from particulars (universale post rem). The fifth and lowest level consists of the written or vocal signs formed on the basis of these concepts. And bear in mind that the manuscripts i.e., the fifth level of Scripture, are only called Scripture in an equivocal sense, just as his lowest level of universal is only called such equivocally. In fact, both are specifically compared to the portrait of a man bearing only the likeness of the real person. For this universale repraesentatione is but a sign of the prior universals.123
Although, as Ian Christopher Levy has pointed out, here Wyclif’s doctrine of universals is conventionally Neo-Platonic,124 I believe Wyclif also has in mind the various degrees of theological knowledge according to the different modes of knowing: (1) The ultimate objects of theological knowledge are identical to the Book of Life, that is, to God himself. As such, they
123 Levy, “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture,” 238–239. Lahey endorses Levy’s interpretation of the text (Lahey, John Wyclif, 148). 124 Levy, “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture,” 227, 228, 230, 231, and 233. 320 form a single object of divine cognition. (2) Nevertheless, from the perspective of human knowers, the truths of the faith even in the mind of God are manifold. (3) These truths that humanly speaking are plural when they descend earthward, are the truths of the faith as taught by theologians. Such truths would include the articles of the Creed. (4) Wyclif stresses that at the fourth level, the truths are written in the book of the natural man (“inscribitur libro hominis naturalis”). Such truths would be those accessible philosophically without the Christian revelation. When Wyclif says “ut anima,” he may mean “in the soul,” as translated above, or he may mean “e.g., the soul.” In that case, Wyclif means to say that knowledge of the soul and presumably also of its immortality are accessible to non-Christian philosophers. (5) Last, the truths of the faith, contained primarily in the Bible, are the bare words of Scripture.
Wyclif maintained the same doctrine until life’s end, writing in the Trialogus:
But to put the matter more precisely, one must note the equivocation of the word Scripture: (1) First, Scripture signifies Jesus Christ, the Book of Life, in whom all truth is written, according to John 10:35–36, The Scripture whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world cannot be broken. (2) Second, [Scripture] signifies the truths written in the Book of Life, either the exemplar and eternal reasons, or other temporal truths. (3) Third, more commonly among the rabble, [Scripture] signifies the bundle of the codices containing God’s law and the truth that God places into them. I, however, did not learn to call such bare material writing “sacred Scripture,” for those codices are not sacred, if sacred doctrine is not present to them. And thus, I regard “sacred Scripture” without qualification as the bundle of those codices [together with] sacred doctrine.125
125 “Sed ut loquar strictius, notanda est tibi aequivocatio de scriptura. Primo enim scriptura sacra signat Jesum Christum librum vitae, in quo omnis veritas est inscripta, juxta illud Johannis x.: Non potest solvi scriptura, quem Pater sanctificavit et misit in mundum. Secundo modo signat veritates in ipso libro vitae inscriptas, sive sint rationes exemplares aeternae sive veritates aliae temporales. Et tertio modo famosius quo ad vulgus signat aggregatum ex codicibus legis Dei et ex veritate quam Deus ipsis imponit; sed hoc nudum scriptum materiale non didici vocare scripturam sacram, quia illi codices non sunt sacri, nisi illis assit [=adsit?] sententia sacra. Et tunc intelligo simpliciter, aggregatum ex illis codicibus et sacra sententia esse scripturam sacram.” Wyclif, Trialogus 3.31, ed. Lechler, 238–239. 321 Therewith, Wyclif reduced the senses in which one can understand the word “Scripture” back to three, but he has clarified one important point. Only here does he explicitly identify Jesus with the Book of Life.
Certain consequences follow from divinizing the Bible: (1) Every part of the Bible must be literally true: “Hence, I am accustomed to say that every part of sacred Scripture is true in virtue of the divine Word. This virtue is indeed the Word of God and the incarnate Wisdom of which the same Wisdom speaks in John 17:17, Thy word is truth, and the Apostle in I
Corinthians 1:23–24, But we preach Christ…, the power [i.e., virtue] of God.”126 (2) The Bible contains all truth. “It is impossible that one of the faithful or an infidel speaks the truth, unless that truth is in Scripture. This is clear from the end of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine 2, where he says that all truth is in it. And so, any truths spoken by the good or bad ought to be believed only insofar as, implicitly or explicitly, they accord with the authority of the First who speaks.”127 Wyclif clarifies elsewhere that the truths we usually associate with Scripture are found there explicitly, whereas the truths we associate with other texts, including mathematical truths (e.g., the characteristics of triangles proved in Euclid’s Elements), are found in Scripture implicitly.128 (3) Bible study is a supreme religious duty for all, for ignorance of the Bible is
126 “Ideo soleo dicere, quod quelibet parts scripture sacre est vera de virtute sermonis divini. que quidem virtus est Verbum Dei…et sapiencia incarnata, de quo dicit eadem sapiencia Joh. decimo septimo: Sermo tuus veritas est, et Apostolus prima Cor. Io: Nos autem predicamus Cristum, Dei virtutem.” Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 5, vol. 1, p. 103, ln. 20–25. 127 “Impossibile est fidelem vel infidelem dicere veritatem, nisi illa sit in scriptura. patet ex Augustino secundo De Doctrina Cristiana in fine dicente. quod omnis veritas est in illa. et sic quibuscunque veritatibus dictis a bono vel malo debet tantum credi, ut alicui implicite vel explicite, quantum attinet ad autoritatem primi dicentis.” Ioannis Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 15, vol. 1, p. 405, ln. 4–6. Cf. Wyclif, Trialogus 1.8, 3.31, ed. Lechler, 64, 240. 128 Ioannis Wyclif, Sermo 28, Sermones, vol. 3, ed. Iohann Loserth (London, 1889), 218, ln. 14–25. For more on this passage and the last, see Hurley, “‘Scriptura sola’: Wyclif and his Critics,” 347, footnote 11. Here, Wyclif was clearly influenced by Grosseteste’s Dictum 19. For more on it, see James R. Ginther, “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thriteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon (Dictum 19),” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 (2000): 108–134. 322 ignorance of Christ: “Therefore, every Christian is bound to know the Scriptures, for ignorance of the Scriptures is ignorance of Christ, because Christ is the Scripture we ought to know, and the faith we ought to believe.”129 (4) Finally, Bible study is the ultimate cause of the beatitude of the saints in glory: “The whole of Sacred Scripture is the one Word of God, and every part of it ought to be amplified in accordance with that Word in its integrity, which the blessed in the heavenly country see as a multitude of the truths dictated by God.”130
It should be noted that Wyclif’s doctrine of the Bible qua divine emanation was spread by
Wyclif’s lollard followers in the vernacular. As it says in Wycklyffes Wycket, God “and his Word are all one and they may not be separated.”131 The lollard reception of Wyclif’s doctrine is also preserved in a flyleaf found in Trinity College, Dublin, ms. 24. Therein, the view that Biblical texts are in any way comparable to other kinds of literature is condemned as an invention of
Antichrist:
Christian men should speak plainly to Antichrist. We say that Holy Writ is taken commonly in three ways: (1) In the first way, Christ himself is called Holy Writ in the Gospel, when he says, “The Writing may not be destroyed that the Father has hallowed and sent into the world.” (2) In the second way, Holy Writ is called the truths that are contained and signified by common Bibles. These truths may not fail. (3) In the third way, Holy Writ is called the books that are written and made of ink and parchment. And this sense is not so proper as the first and second. But we take it on faith that in the second way, the truths written in the Book of Life
129 “Igitur omnis cristianus tenetur scripturas cognoscere. ignorare namque scripturas est ignorare Cristum, cum Cristus sit scriptura, quam debemus cognoscere, et fides, quam debemus credere.” Ioannis Wyclif, De veritate scripturae sacrae 21, vol. 2, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (London: The Wyclif Society, 1906), 170, ln. 1–5. 130 “Tota scriptura sacra est unum Dei Verbum, et quelibet pars eius debet ingrossari usque ad illum Verbum integrum, quod beati in patria vident multitudinem veritatum a Deo dictarum.” Ibid., 19, p. 112, ln. 4–7. 131 God “and hys worde is all one and they maye not be separated.” Thomas P. Pantin, ed., Wycklyffes Wycket: Which he Made in Kyng Rychards Days the Second (Norenburch, 1546; reprinted, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1828). The book is unpaginated, but the quotation may be found on page 19 of the pdf that can be downloaded here: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101077982278, accessed October 9, 2019. For more on Wycklyffes Wycket, see Margaret Aston, “John Wycliffe’s Reformation Reputation,” in Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion (London: Hambledon Press, 1984), 257–258, 266; and J. Patrick Hornbeck II, “Wyclyffes Wycket and Eucharistic Theology: Cases from Sixteenth-Century Winchester,” in Wycliffite Controversies, ed. Mishtooni Bose and J. Patrick Hornbeck II (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 279–294. 323 are Holy Writ. God says so and this we know by faith. And as our sight makes us certain of what we see, so our faith makes us certain that these truths are Holy Writ. If Holy Writ in the third sense be burnt or cast into the sea, Holy Writ in the second sense may not fail, as Christ says.132
Wyclif’s doctrine is also presupposed by the translation of John 10:35–36 found in both versions of the Wyclifite Bible:
If he seide hem goddis, to whiche the word of God is maad, and the scripture, which the fadir halwide, and sente in to the world, may not be vndon, and ȝe seyn, for I blaspheme, for I seide, I am Goddis sone?
Yf he seide that thei weren goddis, to whiche the word of God was maad, and scripture may not be vndon, thilke that the fadir hath halewid, and hath sent in to the world, ȝe seien, That thou blasfemest, for Y seide, Y am Goddis sone?133
Crucially, no English version of the Bible produced thereafter, Catholic or Protestant, reflects
Wyclif’s misconstrual of the passage. Here, for instance, is Tyndale’s translation:
If he called them goddes vnto whom the worde of God was spoken (and the scripture can not be broken) saye ye then to him, whom the father hath sainctified, and sent into the worlde, thou blasphemest, because I sayd I am the sonne of God?134
132 “Cristen men shulde speke pleynly to Antecrist. We seyen that hooly wryt is taken on þree maneres comynly. On the firste manere Crist him silf is clepid in the gospel holy wryt, whanne he seiþ þat þe writynge may noȝt be fordon þat þe Fadir haþ halwid and sent into the world. On the secounde manere holy wryt clepid truþis þat ben conteyned and signyfied bi comyn biblis, and þes truþis may noȝt faile. On þe þridde maner holy wryt is clepid bookis þat ben writen and maad of enk and parchemyn. And þis speche is nouȝt so propre as the first and the secunde. But we taken of bileue þat þe secunde writ, of truþis writen in the book of lyf, is holy wryt, and God seiþ it, and þis we knowen by bileve. And as oure siȝt makeþ us certyn of þat þing þat we seen, so oure bileue makiþ us certyn þat þes trewþis ben holy wryt. Ȝif holy wryt on the þridde manere be brent or cast in the see, holy writ on the secunde manere may noȝt faile, as Crist seiþ.” Thomas Arnold, ed., Select English Works of John Wyclif, vol. 3, Miscellaneous Works (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871), 186–187. For more on this quotation in context and its source, see Minnis, “‘Authorial Intention’ and ‘Literal Sense,’” 14–16. 133 John 10:35–36, Josiah Forshall and Frederic Madden, eds., The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, in the Earliest English Versions Made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and his Followers (Oxford, 1850), 6:267. For more on the Wycliffite Bible, see Mary Dove, “Wyclif and the English Bible,” in A Companion to John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, ed. Ian Christopher Levy (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 365–406; Mary Dove, ed., The Earliest Advocates of the English Bible (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2010); and Elizabeth Solopova, ed., The Wycliffite Bible: Origin, History and Interpretation (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 134 John 10:35–36, N. Hardy Wallis, ed., The New Testament Translated by William Tyndale 1534 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 210. 324 In conclusion, there can be no doubt that for Wyclif the Bible is Jesus. The response of scholarship to Wyclif’s peculiar doctrine has been mixed. Ian Christopher Levy is clearly enamored of it:
The composition and subsequent plight of Scripture is remarkably close to that of Christ the Incarnate Word. Just as Christ is fully God and fully man, so Scripture can be seen as the product of a hypostatic union, namely the Divine Word and parchment. The Word assumed perishable flesh, liable to injury and death at the hands of sinners, and so too the Word is united to cured goat hide, liable to scribal error and the yet worse blasphemous senses imposed upon it by impious sophists. Yet as Christ could not suffer in his impassible divinity, so the Word, the Book of Life, cannot be altered or destroyed in its eternal truth. Those who deface Scripture can do no damage to the truth preserved in the devout catholic soul where Christ, the substance of Scripture, dwells.135
Robson, however, takes a more sober view: Wyclif held that “the word of God was…the material form of the eternal Word, itself a divine exemplar existing prior to the composition of the Scriptures in historic times. Each syllable of Scripture is true because it is a divine emanation: Wyclif had come to accept literal fundamentalism.”136 If we are to take Wyclif at his word, we must conclude that in a real sense he worshipped the Bible, for bibliolatry is the natural outcome of his theology of Scripture.137
It remains to consider any other factors that may have led Wyclif to his peculiar position.
As noted, the doctrine of Christ qua Scripture is the greatest innovation in Wyclif’s Christology.
He arrived at it through polemical arguments with the Franciscan school and through an interpretation of the Vulgate text of John 10:35–36 that cannot be justified in light of the Greek.
135 Levy, “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture,” 237. 136 Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools, 163. 137 Cf. Oey, “Christ and Scripture,” 115–116. Curiously, Wyclif accuses his opponents of turning the Bible into an idol by interpreting it in ways that do not subserve sanctity, yet his opponents never identified Scripture with the uncreated Word of God. (Wyclif, De veritate sacrae scripturae 6, vol. 1, p. 116, ln. 5–7.) 325 But what other factors may be involved? The present author has only two observations to make that, as far as he is aware, have not yet appeared in any of the literature on the subject:
(1) As noted earlier, Wyclif cites the end of book 2 of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine in support of his doctrine:
As the amount of gold, silver, and clothing the Israelites stole from the Egyptians is smaller than the riches they afterwards obtained in Jerusalem, especially in the days of King Solomon, so all the useful knowledge gathered from the books of the heathen is small in comparison with the knowledge of the divine Scriptures. For whatever a man learns elsewhere, is condemned in Scripture if it is harmful; if it is useful, it is found there. And because people will find there all they usefully learn elsewhere, they will find there much more abundantly things which are learned nowhere else, but only in the marvelous depths and marvelous humility of those Scriptures.138
Is it reasonable of Wyclif to assert that here Augustine means to say that all truth, including the truth of mathematics, is precontained in the Scriptures? Perhaps. In context, however, Augustine may merely intend that whereas knowledge of extra-biblical texts is useful for the purposes of
Biblical interpretation, no such extra-biblical knowledge is strictly speaking necessary for the humble, devout, and faithful soul to experience the Lord Jesus through the Scriptures. In The
Confessions, Augustine also identifies the Scriptures as the locus where he seeks the Christ who all along was seeking him. “I pray through our Lord Jesus Christ thy Son…, by whom thou didst seek them that did not seek thee, but thou didst seek them that they might seek thee; [through] thy Word by whom thou madest all things…; through him, I pray, who sitteth at thy right hand and intercedeth with thee for us, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge
138 “Quantum autem minor est auri, argenti uestisque copia, quam de Aegypto secum ille populus abstulit, in comparatione diuitiarum quas postea Hierosolymae consecutus est, quae maxime in Salomone rege ostenduntur, tanta fit cuncta scientia, quae quidem est utilis collecta de libris gentium, si diuinarum scripturarum scientiae comparetur. Nam quicquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi invenitur. Et cum ibi quisque invenerit omnia, quae utiliter alibi didicit, multo abundantius ibi inueniet ea, quae nusquam omnino alibi, sed in illarum tantummodo scripturarum mirabili altitudine et mirabili humilitate discuntur.” Augustinus Hipponensis, De doctrina christiana 2.42.63, ed. Ioseph Martin, CCSL 32 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1962), 74, ln. 1–12. See also PL 34, col. 64–65. 326 (Col. 2:3). These I seek in thy books.”139 Here, Augustine explicitly asserts that the treasures of wisdom and knowledge contained in Christ are to be found in the Bible also. A variant in the manuscript tradition is of interest here, for the version of the text given in the Patrologia latina, says not these (ipsos), but rather him (ipsum); that is, “Him I seek in thy books.”140 Later in The
Confessions, Augustine gives us another opportunity to think about the proper role of the Bible in one’s private devotions: “It is thy Word that…teacheth us. Thus, he spake through flesh in the
Gospel; he sounded outwardly in the ears of men that he might be believed, and inwardly sought, and found in eternal truth, where he, the only good teacher, teacheth all his disciples. There, I hear thy voice, O Lord…, for who is he that teacheth us, save the stable Truth?”141 Here,
Augustine presupposes a distinct mediatorial role of the Scriptures through which the Uncreated
Word speaks, and where he wills to be sought. The exact relation between the Uncreated Word and the Scriptures is, however, left undefined. Unfortunately, we cannot know for certain what
Augustine would have made of Wyclif’s appropriation and development of his thought.
139 “Obsecro per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum filium tuum…, per quem nos quaesisti non quaerentes te, quaesisti autem, ut quaereremus te, uerbum tuum, per quod fecisti omnia.…Per eum te obsecro, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. Ipsos quaero in libris tuis.” Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessionum libri xiii 11.2.4, ed. Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 (Turnholti: Brepols, 1981),196, ln. 47–55. 140 “Obsecro per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum filium tuum…, per quem nos quaesiisti non quaerentes te, quaesisti autem ut quaereremus te; Verbum tuum per quod fecisti omnia.…Per eum te obsecro qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis, in quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi (Coloss. II, 3). Ipsum quaero in Libris tuis.” Augustinus Hipponensis, Confessionum libri tredecim 11.2.4, PL 32, col. 810–811. 141 “Ipsum est Verbum tuum, quod…loquitur nobis. Sic in Evangelio per carnem ait; et hoc insonuit foris auribus hominum, ut crederetur et intus quaereretur et inveniretur in aeterna veritate, ubi omnes discipulos bonus et solus magister docet. Ibi audio vocem tuam, Domine, dicentem mihi, quoniam ille loquitur nobis qui docet nos…Quis porro nos docet, nisi stabilis veritas?” Augustinus, Confessionum 11.8.10, PL 32, col. 813. For more on this passage in context, see Robert D. Crouse, “‘In aenigmate Trinitas’ (Confessions, XIII,5,6): The Conversion of Philosophy in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Dionysius 11 (December 1987): 53–62, especially 59. For the structure of The Confessions, see R. D. Crouse, “Recurrens in te unum: The Pattern of St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Studia Patristica 14, part 3, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976): 389–392. 327 (2) In comparison with many of their continental and post-Reformation counterparts, late- medieval English liturgical books call for especially elaborate ceremonial to be used during the proclamation of the day’s Gospel at Mass. A lengthy procession, a prolix sequence, the use of lit candles and incense, and the chanting of the Gospel pericope sometimes from the rood loft added solemnity to the liturgical action.142 The beauty and quality of evangelistaries and missals from the era may also have influenced his doctrine.143 Except on the Feast of Corpus Christi and during its octave, the ceremonial used at the proclamation of the Gospel may actually have been more elaborate than that used to venerate the consecrated host. Although one cannot know for certain, it may be that the outward veneration done to the evangelistary or missal at Mass predisposed Wyclif to see in the Gospel, as proclaimed and preached during the course of the liturgy, a locus of Christ’s presence equal to or surpassing that in the Eucharist.
142 The numerous sequences are typically one of the first things informed people notice when they peruse the Sarum Missal. For more on the Sarum Rite in general, see F. Thomas Bergh, “Sarum Rite,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913), 13:479–481. For more on some of the sequences in the Sarum Missal, see Bradford Lee Eden, “The Thirteenth-Century Sequence Repertory of the Sarum Use” (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 1991). For more on the chanting of the Gospel from the rood loft, see Francis Bond, Screens and Galleries in English Churches (London: Henry Frowde, 1908), 10, 121, and 153. 143 I can find no single piece of scholarship on thirteenth- and fourteenth-century English evangelistaries, but the following gives a sense of the splendor that such books had in the Middle Ages: David Ganz, “Touching Books, Touching Art: Tactile Dimensions of Sacred Books in the Medieval West,” Postscripts 8.1–2 (2012): 81– 113.
Chapter 11: A Commentary on De incarnatione Verbi, Prologue and Chapter 7
The Prologue
As was made clear in chapter 10, Wyclif probably subscribed to some version of the primacy of Christ when he wrote De incarnatione. The study of the Incarnation is to be taken up with reverence, says Wyclif, because it includes “the venerable mystery of the whole creation and recreation.”1 Here and elsewhere in the treatise, Wyclif expresses his view that the
Incarnation is the crowning glory of creation; without the Word made flesh, the teleological strivings of the created order would be for naught. Note that the word translated here as
“mystery” could also be rendered “sacrament.”
Chapter 7
As will become clear in the footnotes below, during the course of this lecture Wyclif primarily intends to comment upon book 3, distinction 6 of Lombard’s Sentences. From time to time, he does refer nonetheless to other passages in the Sentences, but these are not his primary concern.
1 “Totius creationis et recreationis venerabile sacramentum.” See Chapter 7 of this dissertation, ln. 12–13. 328 329 Objection 1: No divine person, including Christ, can be mobile.
In proper scholastic fashion, Wyclif begins his lecture with an objection. Put in simplified form, the objection asserts that the Incarnation is impossible, because it requires that God himself be moved and change, an impossibility in any serious, Aristotelian Gedankenwelt. This objection is a serious one and in our own time has proven persuasive among so-called “open theists.” Even
Richard Cross, for instance, holds that the Incarnation, if true, requires a serious revision of traditional theism’s insistence that in the strict sense, God cannot change. As Cross notes,
We cannot use the reduplicative “qua” to try to block Christological contradictions. So if being human entails changing, then the second person of the Trinity can be neither timeless nor immutable. Given that the second person of the Trinity has every property essential for being divine, no divine person is essentially timeless or immutable. And since nothing can be first timeless and then temporal, timelessness cannot be a contingent property. Thus God is not timeless if the Incarnation is true. (God’s eternity is just his everlastingness.) Neither can any divine person be immutable, though of course any divine person can be factually unchanging for as long as he chooses. (God can be immutable [incapable of change] on this account, but only if we understand “immutable” to mean that his essence cannot change—i.e., that he cannot come into existence or pass out of existence.) Equally, God is impassible only in the sense that nothing happens to him that he does not want—not in the sense that he cannot feel pain (since I take it that the second person of the Trinity genuinely felt pain at many points in his earthly life).2
Although the arguments against this position are sound and have been taken up afresh by at least one major and recent academic monograph, they unfortunately have not proven universally persuasive.3 This, no doubt, is due at least in part to the failure to distinguish clearly between divine and human modes of causality, and to give philosophy its due place in theology.
2 Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 317. 3 Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God. 330 “Therefore, if God is mobile and everything other than God is mobile, it follows that every being is mobile, and thus none is immobile. Hence, it follows that Christ did not suffer, die, or dwell with men, because then he would be liable to cease and annihilable.”4 Michael
Treschow thinks that here Wyclif is combating Docetism.5 He is mistaken. Instead, here Wyclif combats the Arianism that might otherwise ensue if his arguments are false. If the nature of the divine Word is mobile per se, then the divine Word is not really God; if he is not God, he is not strictly speaking indestructible and could not endure the trauma of the Crucifixion.
Reply to Objection 1, Part 1: Three arguments proving that the first principle must be immobile.
The three arguments for God’s immobility are not in Wyclif’s usual order. As in DIV 5 and in his Determinatio against John Kenningham, Wyclif typically argues from grammar or logic to physics, and thence to metaphysics, but here he begins with physics.6 I cannot detect any noticeable benefit that accrues from placing physics first. Note that for Wyclif, doing natural theology according to this three-fold progression corresponds to Aquinas’s famous five-fold demonstration of the existence of God. The fact that Wyclif usually alters Aquinas’s method by giving grammar pride of place testifies to Wyclif’s hatred of nominalism. For Wyclif, because all things are being spoken by and through the divine Word, at the core of each thing’s being lies its
4 “Si ergo Deus sit mobilis et omne aliud a Deo sit mobile, sequitur quod omne ens sit mobile, et sic nullum immobile. Ex quo sequitur quod Christus non sit passus, mortuus, aut cum hominibus conversatus, cum tunc esset desinibilis et annihilabilis.” Chapter 7, ln. 73–78. 5 Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross,” 31 and 37, footnote 19. 6 Ioannis Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 5, ed. Harris, p. 76, ln. 3–23; Ioannis Wyclif, “Determinatio [Johannis Wyclif] contra Kylingham carmelitam,” in Thomas Netter, Fasciculi zizaniorum magistri Johannis Wyclif cum tritico, ed. Walter Waddington Shirley (London, 1858), 453. In a private conversation, Stephen Lahey offered me this observation regarding Wyclif’s usual method for doing theology. 331 semantic content, which the human intellect abstracts and then reflects in its verbalization of the world.7 Such abstraction and verbalization, however, presuppose that within and behind things are stable and unchanging essences, which are perceptible to the human intellect under current epistemic conditions. For Wyclif, these essences are identical with the divine ideas. In short, Wyclif hated nominalism in part because he knew that nominalism’s parsimonious ontology and theory of concept-formation would in time lead to atheism, which it did.8
“Here we say that something is necessarily altogether immobile. This is clear in three ways.”9 In the first and second arguments, Wyclif argues against “the idea of [a] God in motion, a God who can change, [because it] would lead to the conclusion that the universe be nothing but flux or chaos.”10
The divine Wisdom must be immobile, because “if it could be moved, it would be
[moved] especially in the order of cognition (obiective). But it eternally orders all things because it does not receive its theoretical or practical knowledge from things external to it.”11 Here,
7 For more on the relation between grammar and metaphysics in Wyclif’s view, see Alessandro D. Conti, “Wyclif’s Logic and Metaphysics,” in John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, ed. Ian Christopher Levy (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 67–125; Laurent Cesalli, “Le ‘pan-propositionnalisme’ de Jean Wyclif,” Vivarium 43, no. 1 (2005): 124–155; Laurent Cesalli, “Intentionality and Truth-Making: Augustine’s Influence on Burley and Wyclif’s Propositional Semantics,” Vivarium 45, no. 2 (2007): 283–297; and Kobusch, Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters, 476–478. 8 Although Ockham thinks that natural theology can strictly speaking demonstrate the existence of God qua universal, conserving cause, he denies that philosophy can demonstrate that there is only one God or that the First Principle is endowed with intellect. He did hold that the traditional proofs for both God’s unity and wisdom are sufficient to merit the informed credence of the wise. There can be no doubt, however, that in the long run such novel limitations imposed upon philosophic demonstration opened the door to modern atheism. For more on these points of Ockham’s natural theology, see Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), 269–270; Adams, William Ockham, 2:966–979; Rega Wood, Ockham on the Virtues, 30–34; Armand Maurer, “The Existence of God,” in The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), 159–183; and Jenny Pelletier, “Metaphysics and Theology,” in William Ockham on Metaphysics: The Science of Being and God (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 206–270. 9 “Hic dicitur quod necesse est aliquam rem esse omnino immobilem, quod patet tripliciter.” Chapter 7, ln. 79–80. 10 Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross,” 31. 11 “Si enim posset moveri, hoc foret potissime obiective. Sed aeternaliter ordinat omnia, cum non capit 332 Wyclif means to say that God’s knowledge of creatures derives not from changeable knowledge of them, but rather from his unchangeable knowledge of himself qua universal cause.
Later in DIV 7 (in the section labeled “Other Interpretations of Wisdom 7:24”), however, Wyclif argues that “speaking…broadly…the uncreated Wisdom moves objectively (obiective) by the thoughts that delimit its act.” It is safe to say that these two passages require reconciliation. Note that both passages speak of God moving obiective. In the second, Wyclif probably has in mind his doctrine of a double relation between God and his rational creatures discussed in chapter 10.
Suffice it to say, according to Wyclif, the free choices of God’s rational creatures are compossible with God’s eternal ordering of the created order.
Reply to Objection 1, Part 2: Although the first principle is per se immobile, it is also mobile in virtue of Christ’s assumed manhood. It can therefore be the ultimate supposite and mover of mobile things.
At the end of his life, because of his forced retirement to Lutterworth, the Doctor evangelicus was surely a bitter man who had nothing but bile and venom for his opponents.
Every so often, however, some truly beautiful piety emerges from his pen, as when he extols the man Jesus as the supreme object of religious devotion. The section of DIV 7 stretching from the first quotation of Wisdom 7:24 to the reference to Gregory the Great’s Moralia 31 is one such passage where Wyclif’s unsullied, evangelical love of the Savior bursts through.12 This may be the most beautiful instance of Wyclif’s Latin to survive. It is at least probable that here Wyclif imitates the Latinity of the papal letters of his day.
suam speculationem aut praxim a rebus extra.” Chapter 7, ln. 101–103. 12 Chapter 7, ln. 120–165. 333 The content of this part of the treatise is surely curious and not immediately easy to understand. Wyclif has just striven to prove that physics, grammar, and metaphysics require that something altogether immobile and changeless be presupposed by all created things.
Immediately thereafter, however, Wyclif asserts coyly, “Every uncreated essence is a mobile,” or perhaps, “Every uncreated essence is a mobile thing.”13 The fact that he begins his argument with a premise that seemingly contradicts the conclusion to which he has just reasoned must have been a source of confusion for his students.14
In the prologue to all of DIV, Wyclif tells the reader that in chapter 7 he will strive to interpret a single verse from the book of Wisdom in light of an Aristotelian commitment to God as first mover unmoved. Wyclif does so, first and foremost by identifying Aristotle’s prime mover with the divine Word of the Christian revelation and the Wisdom proclaimed in the book of Wisdom, chapter 7:
As Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics imagines the motion of the prime mover to be as it were “the life of living things,” because by its mediation perfection is made to flow into the world subordinate [to it], so most truly and without pretense that Wisdom is the prime mover in efficacy and dignity in respect of the man it assumed, for by the mediation of his primal motion the entire universe before and after is being perfected, because every other creature through Christ’s Passion is being restored to its original perfection by which it might serve God and favored man.…Most truly, in the literal sense, according to the words themselves the prime mover is the uncreated Wisdom…; his motion or passion, more than the motion of the heavens, brings to perfection every other creature before or after.15
13 “Omnis essentia increata est mobile.” Chapter 7, ln. 114–115. 14 The confusion will not be clarified for those who do not understand the difference between essential and formal predication until the section labeled “The author returns to his main point: God is not mobile, but he is a mobile.” For more on this distinction, read below. 15 “Sicut ergo Aristoteles (8 Physicorum) imaginatur motum primi mobilis esse quasi vitam viventibus, cum mediante illo influitur perfectio mundo supposito, sic verissime sine fictitia illa Sapientia est primum mobile efficacia et dignitate secundum assumptum hominem, mediante cuius motu primo omnium totus mundus ante et post perficitur, cum quaelibet alia creatura per Christi passionem ad perfectionem primariam, qua Deo serviret et placito homini, instauratur.…Verissime, de vi sermonis, secundum seriem verborum primum mobile sit Sapientia increata…, eius motus vel passio perficit plus quam motus caeli quamlibet creaturam aliam post vel ante.” Chapter 334 Of all the scholarship published to date on Wyclif, Michael Treschow’s interpretation of this passage is surely the best:
So what manner of being is the incarnate Word? According to Wyclif, it is the primum mobile, the most powerful of all things that move, whose motion sets everything else in motion.…Aristotle conceived of the primum mobile as the first being in the natural order, whose existence emerges from the act of self- knowledge and self-love in God.…Reinterpreting the primum mobile as Christ is the best reading of Aristotle, Wyclif argues, for it allows his primum mobile to be properly and completely efficacious.16
Wyclif is well aware, [however,] that his idea of the primum mobile is not quite what Aristotle intended.…Wyclif’s primum mobile agrees with Aristotle’s in that it is [a] natural entity contiguous with God, through which the life of God goes forth into all the rest of nature. But Wyclif’s primum mobile goes further…into paradox, as it is God himself in nature undergoing the most abject humiliation.… [For] Christ our Wisdom, the Word of God incarnate, performed the most powerful of all possible motions. He took the life…that [God] has in himself, entered with it into the midst of time and creation, and there…suffered and died.…This terrible, small moment inverts in significance…[and] gives life to all creation, once and for all…; [its] smallness…testifies to [the vastness of] its…power.17
The end of that motion is again paradoxical. By it, Christ gives his people rest.18
At the heart of Wyclif’s argument lies his commitment to the orthodox doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum: All that is predicated of Christ’s created manhood is rightly predicated also of the divine Word. The divine Word, however, is the cosmic principle through which all things were made (Jn 1:3). The orthodox doctrine requires that by means of the hypostatic union, the divine Word itself be the ultimate supposite of all the acts of the man Jesus, including his passion and death. Thus, although the divine Word is per se immobile, it must also be simultaneously mobile in virtue of Christ’s assumed manhood. This divine mobility Wyclif
7, ln. 128–141. 16 Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross,” 33. 17 Ibid., 34–35. 18 Ibid., 35. 335 thinks is somehow presupposed by the created order. Here, Wyclif’s doctrine of creation differs in important and necessary respects from an Aristotelian or Neoplatonist doctrine of emanationism, wherein lower grades of being necessarily emerge from the First Principle. In such a metaphysics and ontology, because prime matter is as uncaused as the First Principle, its essential features cannot be accounted for by the essential features of the First Principle. Instead, the ultimate effects of the First Principle upon matter merely cause the orderly motion whereby finite, material things come into existence. Because matter in this scheme cannot be destroyed, it necessarily endures forever; because the First Principle likewise cannot be destroyed and necessarily acts upon matter in predictable ways, matter must necessarily act as it does forever.
In short, in a pagan doctrine of emanationism, the First Principle is not necessary to account for matter’s existence, but only for its ordered motion.19 With a Christian doctrine of creation, however, the ontological independence of matter from the First Principle is denied. Instead, not merely the motion but also the existence of matter must be accounted for by God’s creative act, which is necessarily an act of both intellect and will.
But how then can matter and material things emerge if they embody so many characteristics entirely alien to the divine nature, their ultimate source (ἀρχή)? Here, Wyclif proposes a solution. The doctrine of divine ideas that was common in Wyclif’s day requires that the divine models God uses to create preexist in the divine mind. One such divine idea must be the idea of the man Jesus. Thus, at various points in DIV, Wyclif takes pains to prove that it is doctrinally correct to assert in the idiom of the primitive church that the divine Word assumed not merely human nature (natura humana), but also man (homo).20 Such an expression need not
19 For more on the Neoplatonist doctrine of emanationism, see Charles M. Stang, Our Divine Double (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), especially 237–244. 20 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 9, ed. Harris, 146–147, 152. See also Chapter 5, p. 82. 336 constitute Adoptionism or imply that the divine Word assumed an already-existing human being; rather, the Church Fathers intend instead that the divine Word became a man by assuming the nature of manhood, and thus joined to itself the divine idea of man. As Stephen Lahey has phrased it, “In Wyclif ’s Christology, his conception of the universal man is central to the metaphysics of the Incarnation. On becoming a man, Christ incorporated the universal man into the identity of the second person of the Trinity. Since the universal man is each of its particulars, by Wyclif ’s description, Christ became Everyman.”21 Later in the same book, Lahey continues, according to Wyclif,
the Word assumed not a human nature, but humanity as such. Perhaps the right approach is to imagine that Deity, the universal divine nature shared by the persons of the Trinity, needs something more than a human nature to offset its magnitude in the Christ. The balance is achieved by the Word’s assuming humanity as such.…[Wyclif] argues that, if every man would be Everyman, then Everyman would only be one man, and if Christ assumes humanity, then Christ, too, would be Everyman. It cannot be that Christ is every man, of course, nor that Christ is more than one man, nor can the universal humanity itself be a man capable of receiving accidents like individual men.…[Consequently,] in assuming humanity Christ did not assume every relation that holds between the universal and its particulars.22
Wyclif’s argument in DIV 7 seemingly requires that the divine Word’s manhood be presupposed by the act of creation. If the divine-human supposite is the same as Aristotle’s prime mover, it would seem that God first assumed the idea of Christ’s manhood and hypostatically joined it to the divine Word before anything was created, including the man Jesus. The Incarnation for
Wyclif would consequently happen both in eternity and in time, or rather it would happen in time, because it first happened in eternity. In this account, God would first will ad extra to assume the manhood of Jesus, and then to create the rest of material reality so as to manifest in
21 Lahey, John Wyclif, 96. 22 Ibid., 147. 337 time the man Jesus, hypostatically joined to the divine Word. In DIV 9, however, Wyclif stresses that the Incarnation is not eternal:
Hence, because no hypostatic union is eternal, that which is assumed must be exclusively a creature. Indeed, every act of assumption effects the identity of one thing with another, but every such effecting is exclusively temporal. Therefore, because that which is assumed cannot have preexisted temporally, that which is assumed must clearly be exclusively a creature, for Christ’s manhood is neither a person [other than the divine Word] nor any nature other than a created [nature], although it is the Creator. For the person of the Word creates all things according to its Godhead, not according to it [i.e., its manhood].23
But if the whole Christ, both God and man, is to be identified with Aristotle’s prime mover, and the ability of the mover to cause motion is due to Christ’s assumed manhood, how was motion possible before God became man? Hopefully, future research into Wyclif’s thought will shed light on this question. In any event, his teaching that Christ is the Creator qua Godhead, but not qua manhood, accords with Lombard’s doctrine.24
Although Wyclif probably held some version of the primacy of Christ when he wrote
DIV 7, the stress he places on the Lord’s passion in this text prevents the informed reader from coming to that conclusion too hastily. Doubtless, Wyclif does insist that the Incarnation remedies sin; thereby, in the spirit of Grosseteste’s circular model of human redemption the whole material universe attains the perfection it ought to have:
For every creature apart from man according to its original institution ought to serve man, and thus [every creature] is in a sense worsened by the sin of the first man from whom [every creature] today would abundantly have perfection, had he stood in original righteousness. Therefore, because human nature was quite
23 “Ex istis patet cum nulla assumptio hypostatica sit aeterna, quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam: Omne quidem assumere est efficere identitatem unius ad aliud, sed omne efficere est solummodo temporale. Ergo cum assumptum non potest temporaliter praefuisse, patet quod oportet assumptum esse solummodo creaturam, quia nec alia persona nec alia natura est Christi humanitas quam creatura, licet sit Creator, quia persona Verbi quae secundum deitatem, non secundum ipsam creat omnia.” Ioannis Wyclif, De incarnatione Verbi 9. For more on the manuscript origins of this passage, see Chapter 4. 24 Peter Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word, dist. 12, chap. 1, trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2010), 47. 338 gloriously restored by the full satisfaction wrought [on the Cross] through the passion and consequently through the motion of this Wisdom, clearly this passion corrects every operation of nature subject to the human race. And because every service before and after rendered to the human race would in a sense be futile had this redemption not intervened, [this Wisdom] clearly bestows life upon the past and the future more swiftly than the motion of the heavens. And because the trickery and sin of the demons is thereby diminished and the happy fellowship of the angels is increased, it clearly bestows goodness upon the spiritual creation more than [any] possible motion of the heavens.25
It is not entirely clear, however, if, when he wrote DIV, Wyclif believed that the Fall of Man could have been avoided. Consequently, in this passage Wyclif fails to address the question of whether the due perfection of the material world would require the Incarnation if man had not sinned. Insofar as Wyclif asserts that created motion presupposes the Incarnation, it would seem that God would still have to become man in this account if there had been no sin. It remains true, nonetheless, that Wyclif does not intend to address the question explicitly here and that he rejected the primacy of Christ by the end of his life. By referring to Gregory the Great’s Moralia at the end of this section, as was noted in chapter 10, Wyclif endorses the ancient Patristic view that God created man in order to make up for the loss of the apostate spirits.
Does DIV 7 shed any light on Wyclif’s view of the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood? At minimum, Wyclif holds that once the Incarnation happens in time, the Lord’s assumed manhood is the ultimate cause of the motion of all other mobile things. One might argue that if a thing is present in its effects, then Christ’s body must be present wherever there is motion.
25 “Nam quaelibet creatura citra hominem debet ex institutione primaria servire homini, et sic peccato primi hominis (a quo hodie redundanter haberet perfectionem ipso stante in originali iustitia) quodammodo peioratur. Cum ergo per passionem et per consequens per motionem huius Sapientiae, facta plena satisfactione sit natura humana gloriosius restituta, patet quod ista passio rectificat omnem operationem naturae quae humano generi est subiecta. Et cum omnis servitus post et ante facta humano generi, non interveniente ista redemptione, foret quodammodo cassata, patet quod compendiosius motu caeli vivificat praeterita et futura. Et cum exinde dolus et peccatum demonum mitigatur, laetum angelorum consortium augmentatur, patet quod ultra possibilitatem motus caeli spiritualem bonificat creaturam.” Chapter 7, ln. 141–156. 339 The divine Wisdom bestows “goodness and life to all things in a manner that exceeds all that any other creature is sufficient or able to do.”26 Here and elsewhere in DIV 7, Wyclif presupposes that the man Christ, despite the hypostatic union, is a creature. Although Peter
Lombard in the Sentences condemned all those who would call Christ a creature,27 in DIV 1
Wyclif argues on the basis of Patristic evidence that there is an orthodox sense in which Christ
(i.e., the union of the three natures: divine, spiritual, and bodily) can be understood as a creature.
“The prime mover is the uncreated Wisdom…, because his motion or passion, more than the motion of the heavens, brings to perfection every other creature before or after.”28 No
English translation can capture both meanings of the Latin word here rendered as “passion.”
Because the Latin words for “suffering” (“passio” and “pati”) can also refer to actions undergone by any substance, Wyclif can seamlessly apply philosophic concepts made popular by the study of Aristotle’s Physics to Christ’s suffering upon the Cross. Hence, readers without sufficient
Latin should keep in mind that “suffering,” “passion,” “undergo,” and “being acted upon” can all be used to translate the same Latin words.
Reply to Objection 1, Part 3: The divine Wisdom is more mobile than any other creature in respect of velocity, swiftness, and in general.
Wyclif quickly transitions to focusing on the motion of the Divine Word from an entirely different perspective. When he says that the divine-human supposite is mobile, he does not merely mean that it is the ultimate ground of the motion of other things, like Aristotle’s prime
26 “Bonificans et vivificans omnia ultra hoc quod sufficeret vel poterit alia creatura.” Chapter 7, ln. 125– 126. 27 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 11, trans. Silano, 44–47. 28 “Primum mobile sit Sapientia increata, et…eius motus vel passio perficit plus quam motus caeli quamlibet creaturam aliam post vel ante.” Chapter 7, ln. 139–141. 340 mover or self-thinking thought; he also means that Christ’s manhood moves as one material object among many. Because, as was made clear in chapter 10, Wyclif conceives of the universe along Ptolemaic lines, he understood that during the course of the Lord’s Resurrection and
Ascension, the Lord’s glorified body had to travel literally from the tomb to the outermost heaven. Such bodily motion crowns the Lord’s earthly life of motion proper to any man, and, as was said in the last section, restores the equilibrium that was lost by sin.
Christ “moved by his generation and Death, by increase and alteration…that by that imperfect act he might restore his own to perpetual repose.”29 Note that the ultimate end of the divine Wisdom’s cosmic motion is the everlasting rest of the saints.
“Hence, as the natural philosopher commends motion as an ‘effectual sign’ not only for philosophizing, but [also] for bringing nature’s intention to completion, so doubtless the theologian commends voluntary passion.”30 Wyclif’s description of motion as an “effectual sign” hearkens back to earlier medieval discussions about the sacraments as “effectual signs” of God’s grace.31 As Wyclif stresses throughout DIV, he is firmly committed to the view that the study of physics (i.e., the study of motion and of material things insofar as they are in motion) should lead the philosopher to the recognition of something necessarily unmoved that functions as the universal cause of all else. Once apprehended as an invitation to contemplation, motion becomes, as it were, a sacramental; that is, to those with a proper disposition, it provides the occasion for
29 Movebatur quidem generatione et morte, augmentatione et alteratione, ac demum motu locali multiplici, scilicet super terram, aquam, et aerem, pulsione, tractione, vectione, et vertigine ut actu illo imperfecto reduceret suos ad quietem perpetuam.” Chapter 7, ln. 189–193. 30 “Unde sicut naturalis philosophus commendat motum tamquam signum efficax nedum ad philosophandum, sed ad intentum naturae perficiendum, sic nimirum commendat theologus voluntariam passionem.” Chapter 7, ln. 193–197. 31 For more on this in the context of high and late scholasticism, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Powerless Causes: The Case of Sacramental Causality,” in Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, ed. Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 47–76. 341 the reception of a kind of grace. Thereby, motion does its part to help nature, first and foremost human nature, to achieve its supernatural end.
Reply to Objection 2: The created order, past and present, presupposes the fact of the Incarnation. Christ is consequently present to all times.
Whatever one makes of Wyclif’s appropriation of Augustine’s and Paschasius
Radbertus’s (i.e., Pseudo-Jerome’s) rather fanciful arguments, his use of the Rogationtide Litany and of some of his Scriptural sources would seem to be sound. There can be no objection to the most important events of Christ’s life bringing about the salvation of the saints of the Old
Covenant, for by faith in the coming Messiah, they too were ultimately saved. Wyclif’s endorsement of Boethius’s definition of eternity as totum simul is likewise unremarkable and orthodox, and the passages in Gregory the Great’s Moralia clearly confirm Wyclif’s doctrine of time. Note that, as in the prologue, the word translated here as “mystery” could also be rendered
“sacrament.”
And [our response] is evident to the frivolous objections of sophists by which they inveigh against the prayers of the church by which she beseeches God by [the Lord’s] Incarnation, Nativity, Circumcision, Baptism, Fasting, Passion, Death, Resurrection, and Ascension to be delivered from peril. (Vain, they say, is the proposed prayer, because all the aforesaid [events of the Lord’s life] neither are nor can be.) But it is certain that although each of them is past to us and temporally future to the Fathers of the old covenant, [each] truly does exist at its proper time and consequently is a cause of [the faithful past and present] obtaining mercy.32
32 “Et patet ad obiectus garrulos sophistarum quibus invehunt contra orationes ecclesiae quibus rogat Deum per incarnationem, nativitatem, circumcisionem, baptismum, ieiunium, passionem, mortem, resurrectionem, et ascensionem a periculis liberari. Inanis, inquiunt, est suggesta oratio, cum omnia praedicta nec sunt nec possunt esse. Sed constat quod unumquodque illorum, cum sit nobis praeteritum et futurum suo tempore patribus veteris testamenti, quod vere est pro suo tempore et per consequens causa misericordiam impetrandi.” Chapter 7, ln. 247– 256. 342 Here Wyclif refers to petitions in the litanies that were sung in his day in
Rogationtide processions and sometimes at the Easter Vigil. This text was abbreviated, translated, and edited by Archbishop Cranmer as the Litany in the Book of Common Prayer.33 In his note on this portion of the text, Harris wonders who the “Rationalists or Puritans” are that
Wyclif refers to.34 While their identity is not yet clear, their arguments are clear enough: Because the events of the Lord’s life invoked in the Litany are unrepeatable events of the past, strictly speaking, these events neither are nor can be now. As is clear in his debates with Kenningham,
Wyclif more than his nominalist opponents stressed that all of human history, past, present, and future, is present equally to God’s eternity. Consequently, nothing prevents the events of Christ’s life from effecting the salvation of all who are to be saved, including the saints who died before the coming of Christ.
As regards each salvific event existing “at its proper time” (pro suo tempore), note that the Latin tempus, which is usually rendered time, means tense in a grammatical context. Wyclif’s doctrines of time, ontology, and epistemology presuppose the ambiguity.35 Because, as was noted earlier, grammar according to Wyclif is merely the human intellect reflecting in its own finite way the semantic content presupposed by the essence of each created thing spoken in and through the divine Word, the time of a historical event is also its grammatical tense in the divine mind.
33 For the broader context of this liturgical practice, see Terence Bailey, The Processions of Sarum and the Western Church (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971), especially 25–26 and 95–98. 34 Edward Harris, notes to Tractatus de benedicta incarnacione, by Ioannis Wyclif, ed. Edward Harris (London, 1886), 244. 35 For more on Wyclif’s doctrine of time, see Breck, “John Wyclyf on Time,” 211–218. 343 “That person, who at his proper time is Christ, is eternal and incarnate by the everlasting counsel of God and the essence of matter was always present.”36 This remark may be the most important part in this chapter of De incarnatione. Wyclif means to say that because the essence of matter was always present in the divine mind, the second person of the Trinity was at liberty to assume the form of matter together with the form of man from all eternity.
“And Anselm says the same in Monologion 19.”37 In Monologion 19, Anselm addresses the ways in which “nothing” can be said to be before and after God. He does not, however, there address how all times are simultaneously present to God. Perhaps Wyclif has in mind
Monologion 20–22 and 24 instead, where Anselm explains how God can be said to be present to all times and to none, but there Anselm emphasizes only God’s presence to the finite order, not that order’s presence to God’s eternity. Thus, Wyclif’s citation of Monologion 19 to support his point here is slightly sloppy.
“And thus [the same principle holds true] of many things said in the Scriptures that would be asserted childishly and without reason under distinct tenses unless the fact be impressed upon us that the infinite eternity of God coexists at every time, past or future.”38 As discussed a few paragraphs earlier, the word rendered here as “tenses” can also be rendered “times.”
36 “Illa persona quae tempore suo est Christus, est aeterna et sempiterno Dei consilio incarnata et materialis essentia semper praesto.” Chapter 7, ln. 264–266. 37 “Et idem dicit Anselmus (Monologion 19).” Chapter 7, ln. 294–295. 38 “Et sic de multis dictis
It is reasonable to suppose that here Wyclif has in mind not three degrees of Scriptural interpretation, but rather three distinct schools of thought. According to Stephen Lahey, however, all three different interpretations concur with Wyclif’s own doctrine. On the assumption that all three senses of interpretation are his own, Wyclif ascends according to his preferred mode of argumentation (1) from grammar, or here what he takes to be the literal or grammatical sense of
Scripture, (2) to the sense that coheres with the study of physics, and finally (3) to the metaphysical sense. It is also possible that Wyclif has in mind different groups of students who naturally would defer to their master’s opinions.
“Some [interpretations] by speaking of motion broadly say that the uncreated Wisdom moves objectively by the thoughts that delimit its act.”39 As was noted under “Reply to Objection
1, Part 1,” this argument is remarkable because it admits that the divine Wisdom per se “moves” in the sense that a double relation exists between God and his rational creatures such that what they freely choose is a partial cause of what God unchangeably knows. The free acts of such creatures thus “delimit [the divine] act.” After rehearsing all three arguments, Wyclif asserts that this argument is his favorite because he deems it best. Intriguingly, there is a real possibility that for Wyclif, authentic free will in creatures is only possible because the Incarnation is presupposed by the creation of man.
39 “Ut hii dicunt quod extensive loquendo de motu Sapientia increata movetur obiective a cognitis terminantibus eius actum.” Chapter 7, ln. 309–311. 345 Other Scriptural passages touching upon the Incarnation are interpreted in the same way.
Wyclif now proceeds to interpret other passages of Scripture that are important for
Christology yet appear contradictory to the untrained eye. The first is John 14:24. Here Wyclif is concerned with what appears to be a grammatical error in the Vulgate version of John 14:24: Qui non diligit me, sermones meos non servat. Et sermonem quem audistis non est meus, sed eius qui misit me, Patris (He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words. And the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me), where grammatically we would expect to find sermo and not sermonem.40 To rectify this apparent error, Wyclif proposes that readers supply the additional words “non servat” from earlier in the verse. If we do so and change the punctuation accordingly,
Wyclif’s revised text would read, “He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words. And the word which ye hear he keepeth not. It is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me.” Reconciling
Philippians 2:6–7, John 10:30, and John 14:28 is a commonplace in Christological discourse.
“And this most spiritually exalted metaphysics of forms I would like our theologians to learn forthwith, if not in the Metaphysics of Aristotle, then at least in the words of the Apostle.”41
Michael Treschow, a staunch but philosophizing Protestant, uses this passage to contrast
Wyclif’s understanding of the proper role philosophy should play in Biblical interpretation to
Luther’s: Wyclif
claimed to find his whole doctrine of universals in Scripture. But he never thought that Scripture should be left alone to explain itself without the support of such disciplines as philosophy. Luther repudiated Aristotle as having no value for the study of theology and the study of ourselves in relation to God.…[As Luther once asserted in a diatribe against his opponents,] “The truth is that a man cannot
40 Chapter 7, ln. 325–327. 41 “Et istam altissimam metaphysicam de formis vellem nostros theologos, etsi non in Metaphysica Aristotelis, saltem in verbis Apostoli compendiose, addiscere.” Chapter 7, ln. 366–369. 346 become a theologian unless he becomes one without Aristotle.”42 Now Wyclif is indeed famous for championing the Bible, and rightly so.…[But] If we are to understand ourselves aright, we must understand ourselves theologically as in Christ, and this, [believed Wyclif,] involves the metaphysics of universals. Christ is our brother because he is man, and as we share his manhood we share the benefits of his divinity and his recreation of humanity in himself. And while Scripture is the place whereby we learn this, the comprehension of such Scriptural realism is supported, Wyclif says, by Aristotle. It is no small irony that the “Morning Star” of the Reformation suggested in his very discussion of the recreation of man in Christ that Aristotle is part of the deeper study of Christian theology. The Bible is the sine qua non but Aristotle aids in its disclosure of its greatest truths.43
In short, Wyclif’s belief that the study of Aristotle is necessary for a right understanding of
Scripture, together with his ignorance of the Greek New Testament, alienates him unbridgeably from certain later Protestant impulses.
“He emptied, it says, because he made himself to be a bodily nature ad extra that is empty by a priority of origin before it has form at the beginning of the world. In this sense, as
Augustine explains in Confessions 12, Scripture says at the beginning of Genesis, The earth was void and empty (Gen. 1:2 DRV).”44 The editing of this passage posed a great challenge.
Although most of Confessions 12 is dedicated to explicating the very beginning of Genesis, nowhere in Confessions 12 does Augustine cite or interpret Philippians 2:7. In Confessions 12.29
(40) Augustine does, however, explain how a thing can be prior in origin to something else and
42 Martin Luther, “Disputation against Scholastic Theology” 44, in Luther: Early Theological Works, ed. and trans. James Atkinson (London: SCM Press, 1962), 269. Cf. “To say that a theologian who is not a logician is a monstrous heretic is in its turn to make a monstrous, heretical statement.” “It is a waste of time to work out a logic of faith. The intermediate hypothesis is beyond its terms and categories.” Ibid., 270, #45 and #46. 43 Treschow, “The Understanding of Man in the Reformers,” 115. See also Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross at the Centre of Creation,” 30. 44 “Exinanivit dicit, quia fecit se ad extra esse naturam corpoream quae in mundi principio, prius origine quam formam habeat, est inanis. Ad quem sensum, ut exponit Augustinus (12 Confessionum), scriptura in principio Genesis dicit, Terra erat inanis et vacua.” Chapter 7, ln. 382–387. 347 uses the relation of music and sound as an analogy to illustrate his point. The passage is too long to quote in a footnote to the translation.45
“And this is literally true of Christ, because he is each of [his] three natures.”46 Unlike most standard accounts of Christology, in Wyclif’s view Christ is three natures (bodily, spiritual, and divine) and not merely two (human and divine). This view, however, is consonant with the second Christological theory made famous by Peter Lombard in The Sentences and was recognized as orthodox by the medieval schoolmen: “That man [namely Christ] was not composed only of a rational soul and flesh, but also of a divine and human nature, that is, of three substances: divinity, flesh, and soul.”47 Note, however, that whereas Wyclif says natures
(naturarum), Lombard says substances (substantiis).
“Our every expression for God is figurative.…For we do not have words that signify God without [some] figure of speech.”48 Here, Wyclif takes a stance on Scotus’s doctrine of the univocity of being and its import for theological language. Against the apophatic tradition of
Pseudo-Dionysius especially, Scotus held that if the language used to describe God is to have any intrinsic meaning at all, at least a single, non-analogous, logically univocal concept (ratio) must apply to both God and creatures. Famously, in his proof for the existence of God, Scotus uses the concept of being (ens) and seeks to prove the existence of God qua infinite being (ens infinitum) in counterdistinction to creatures or finite being (ens finitum).49 The alternative view,
45 See Augustine of Hippo, Saint Augustine: Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 268–270. 46 “Et hoc est verum de Christo ad litteram, cum sit trium naturarum quaelibet.” Chapter 7, ln. 389–390. 47 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 6, chap. 3, num. 1, trans. Silano, 26–27. 48 “Omnis locutio nostra de Deo est figurativa.…Non enim habemus nomina quae sine figura Deum signent.” Chapter 7, ln. 406–412. 49 For an introduction to the proof, see Allan B. Wolter, “Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God,” The American Catholic Philosophical Association 28 (1954): 94–121. 348 here endorsed by Wyclif, requires that because all human language used for God is ultimately analogous, we can have no reliable knowledge about God in himself during the course of this mortal life. Given how deeply Scotus’s realism and linguistic theory affected Wyclif, it is most curious that Wyclif did not endorse Scotus’s doctrine of univocity.
The author returns to his main point: God is not mobile, but he is a mobile.
The essence of prime matter is the supposite; [the essence of] fire, a composite of matter and form, and yet [prime] matter itself cannot be so composed. Peter eats, dies, or changes in some other way, and yet the nature of the species that Peter is cannot change in such a way. Therefore, in all similar cases one must diligently attend to essential predication and formal predication.…And thus, by understanding essential, but not formal, predication, then EVERYTHING THAT IS, IS 50 A MOBILE.
Here, Wyclif illustrates the important distinction between formal and essential predication, which is required for the inner coherence of much Christian theology.51 As Wyclif himself defines it,
Formal predication is predication in which there is predicated something which formally inheres in a subject. By “formally inhering in,” I mean something which identically applies to the subject in respect of the notion by which it is, as A divine person is God; Man is an animal; and Peter is musical, and in general whenever a superior is primarily and per se predicated of its inferior, or an accident of its subject. For Godhood is the form by which each divine person is God, and
50 “Essentia materiae primae est suppositum, ignis compositum ex materia et forma, et tamen ipsa materia non potest sic componi. Petrus comedit, moritur, vel aliter transmutatur, et tamen natura specifica quae est Petrus non potest taliter transmutari. Ideo in omnibus istis similibus oportet diligenter attendere ad praedicationem secundum essentiam et formalem.…Et sic intelligendo praedicationem secundum essentiam non-formalem, tunc OMNE QUOD EST, EST MOBILE.” Chapter 7, ln. 419–433. 51 For some scholarship on the difference between formal and essential predication, see Paul Vincent Spade, introduction to On Universals, by John Wyclif, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), xxxi–xli; Alain de Libera, La querelle des universaux: De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996), 410–411; Alessandro D. Conti, “Analogy and Formal Distinction: On the Logical Basis of Wyclif’s Metaphysics,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 6 (1997), 153–158; Alessandro D. Conti, “Wyclif’s Logic and Metaphysics,” in Companion to John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, ed. Ian Christopher Levy (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 100–101; and Campi, introduction to De scientia Dei, by Wyclif, ed. Campi, xcv. 349 similarly animality is the form by which each animal is animal. And correspondingly, being musical is the form whereby formally Peter is musical. And similarly with each accident inhering in a substance.52
Formal predication is thus predication in the primary and usual sense of the term, be it substantial or accidental. “This happens whenever an item in the categorical line [i.e., of
Porphyry’s tree] is predicated of something inferior, or an accident of its subject of inherence.”53
Essential predication might be better labeled “indirect predication.”54 As Wyclif puts it,
“Essential predication is predication in which the same essence is the subject and predicate, even though the notion of the predicate differs from the notion of the subject, as in God is man; Fire is water; The universal is particular.”55 Because this no doubt sounded incoherent even to fourteenth-century readers, Wyclf continues,
In the first, theological example, it is clear that the notion of the subject, being God, is different from the notion of the predicate, being man; the first notion or form is deity, and the second is humanity, and it entails a formal contradiction for deity to be humanity. In the second example, drawn from natural philosophy, it is clear that it entails a formal contradiction for fieriness to be wateriness. So fire is not water in form, or formally in respect of the ultimate particular, but essentially or materially, in that the same essence which is at one time fire is at another time water.
52 Wyclif, On Universals 1, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 4, ln. 170–184. Cf. “Est autem praedicatio formalis praedicatio que praedicatur formaliter inexistens subiecto. Et voco ‘formaliter inexistere’ illud quod identice convenit subiecto secundum rationem qua est, ut Persona divina est Deus; Homo est animal; et Petrus est musicus, et breviter quandocumque per se primo superius praedicatur de suo inferiori, vel accidens de suo subiecto. Nam deitas est forma, qua quaelibet persona divina est Deus. Et animalitas est forma, qua omne animal est animal. Et sic de terminis superioribus respectu suorum inferiorum. Et correspondenter esse musicum est forma, qua Petrus formaliter est musicus. Et ita de quolibet accidente inhaerente substantiae.” Ioannis Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus 1, ed. Ivan J. Mueller (Oxonii: Typographeus Clarendonianus, 1985), 28–29, ln. 171–184. 53 Conti, “Analogy and Formal Distinction,” 155. 54 Cf. ibid., 154. 55 Wyclif, On Universals 1, trans. Kenny, 4, ln. 195–198. Cf. “Praedicatio vero secundum essentiam est praedicatio in qua eadem essentia est subiectum et praedicatum, licet alia sit ratio praedicati quam sit ratio subiecti, ut hic: Deus est homo; Ignis est aqua; Universale est singulare.” Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus 1, ed. Mueller, 30, ln. 194–198. 350 As for the third, logical example, it is clear that it entails a contradiction for being common to many supposites to be the same as not being common to many supposites. So what is meant is that in the same essence there inhere these different notions or substantial dispositions. Thus, in the same essence there inheres both being a man and being this man. And being a man is common to every man, and thus is formally universal, while being this man is restricted individually to this essence.56
Paul Vincent Spade’s commentary explicating essential predication is the most useful to us here:
What is the motivation behind the theory of essential predication? It is easy to understand why one wants to have a kind of real predication whereby man is an animal, Peter is musical, or the Father is God. But what philosophical or other pressures would ever lead one to postulate a special kind of real predication whereby Socrates is a species? Why would one want to say such a thing at all?…[Wyclif’s] implicit reasoning seems to be roughly as follows: What is wrong with the following syllogism?
Socrates is a man. Man is a species. Therefore, Socrates is a species.
If we are concerned with the formulation of this inference in language, where the predication is not real predication but the linguistic kind, then the answer is that there is an equivocation with respect to the middle term man. In the first premise, it is taken in what medieval logicians called “personal supposition,” and refers to men—Socrates among them. But in the second premise, the term man is taken in what medieval logicians called “simple predication,” and refers not to individual men but to the universal human nature. Hence, there is a fallacy of equivocation, the syllogism implicitly has four terms, and the conclusion does not follow from the premises. But this device is not open to us if we are asking not about predication in language, but about real predication. What is predicated of Socrates in the first premise is the very same entity—indeed, indiscernibly the same entity—as that which serves as the subject in the second premise: the universal human nature.
56 Wyclif, On Universals 1, trans. Kenny, 5, ln. 200–218. Cf. “In primo igitur exemplo theologico patet quod alia esl ratio subiecti, qua Deus est, et alia ratio praedicati, qua est homo, cum prima ratio vel forma sit deitas et secunda humanitas et claudit contradictionem formalem deitatem esse humanitatem. In secundo exemplo naturali patet quod claudit contradictionem formalem igneitatem esse aquaeitatem. Ideo ignis non est aqua secundum formam vel formaliter secundum ultimum singulare, sed essentialiter vel materialiter, quia eadem essentia, quae nunc est ignis, nunc est aqua. Et quoad tertium exemplum logicum patet quod claudit contradictionem communicabilitatem multis suppositis esse incommunicabilitatem multis suppositis. Ideo intelligitur quod eidem essentiae insunt istae rationes vel substantiales dispositiones, ut eidem essentiae inest esse hominem et esse istum hominem. Et esse hominem est commune omni homini et sic universale formaliter, sed esse istum hominem est individualiter appropriatum isti essentiae.” Wyclif, Tractatus de universalibus 1, ed. Mueller, pp. 30–32, ln. 199–218. 351 Equivocation cannot be appealed to here to block the syllogism. And indeed, the inference appears to meet all the usual requirements for a valid syllogism. Thus, unless one is willing to say that the traditional patterns of syllogistic reasoning fail when applied to cases of real predication, one is forced to accept the inference. A similar situation arises with the following inferences:
The Son is God. The Son is a man. Therefore, God is man (i.e., human nature).
Socrates is a man. Man is a universal. Therefore, Socrates is universal.
But Socrates is singular. Therefore, the universal is singular.
In fact, most if not all the cases in which Wyclif appeals to essential predication involve situations of this kind, situations in which an inference that could be blocked in speech, by pointing to a fallacy of equivocation arising out of the different kinds of supposition or reference a term can have, cannot be blocked in this way when it is real predication that is involved.57
In other words, essential predication “shows a partial identity between subject and predicate, which share some, but not all, metaphysical component parts, and does not require that the form connotated by the predicate-term is directly present in the essence denotated by the subject- term.”58 If, according to a realist ontology, an individual really does instantiate the universals it shares in or divides, then an individual must be those universals; but the most important distinguishing feature of a universal, being predicable or true of many, by definition cannot be true of an individual. Thus, “according to Wyclif, universals and individuals are realiter the same, but formaliter distinct since they share the same empirical reality—that of individuals— but considered as universals and individuals they have opposite constituent principles:
57 Spade, introduction to Wyclif, On Universals, trans. Kenny, xli–xliii. 58 Conti, “Analogy and Formal Distinction,” 157. 352 communicabilitas and incommunicabilitas respectively.”59 Consequently, Socrates is human nature is formally false, for the reality of Socrates cannot exhaust or comprehensively instantiate the whole reality of human nature, nor is Socrates an essential part or instance of human nature, for human nature could exist in other instances even if Socrates had not existed. On the other hand, Socrates is human nature is true essentially or indirectly insofar as he does instantiate that universal.
Upon reflection, essential predication proves to be inescapably necessary for Christian theology, for certain assertions in the Scriptures, Creeds, and liturgy are false without it. When, for instance, it is said that God has become a man, we do not mean that The whole divine nature has become a man, for it is heretical to assert that the Father or Holy Spirit was incarnate; rather, we mean that one person of the Godhead, the divine Word, has become incarnate. Thus, the assertion God has become man is false according to formal predication, but true according to essential predication. Another useful example has bearing upon ecclesiology: The assertion The
Church is sinful is formally false but essentially true, for although the Church qua mystical body of Christ can only be holy, the Church is nonetheless her human members. Because most of those members are sinful, the Church, which they compose, is also sinful.
To return to De incarnatione, Wyclif’s examples should now be clearer. According to essential predication, individual, finite, and material things are prime matter, for they are composed of prime matter and form; however, when individual, finite, and material things change, prime matter does not change. Likewise, if Peter were human nature formally, human nature would change as Peter changes. But because Peter is merely human nature indirectly or essentially, human nature remains unchanged as Peter changes. As regards God, because of the
59 Ibid., 154. 353 Incarnation, everything that is, including God, is essentially mobile. Thus, God is simultaneously mobile and immobile, but not in the same respect.
Only one grammatical point remains to clarify the text. As we saw in chapter 10, Wyclif was fond of imitating Augustine grammatically. “For the custom of Scripture and Augustine is to refer to persons by masculine adjectives and to natures by neuter adjectives.”60 When understood in light of the different kinds of predication, this principle requires that a formal predicate be masculine or feminine, but an essential predicate neuter. In DIV 7, Wyclif consistently observes such grammatical usage:
Something cannot be, unless it be [either] a created essence or an uncreated essence. Every created essence is mobile. Every uncreated essence is a mobile. Therefore, the conclusion [follows of necessity]. The minor premise is clear from this, that the uncreated essence is a mobile supposite. Therefore, it is a mobile.61
When Wyclif writes, “Every created essence is mobile (mobilis),” he uses a feminine adjective for every created essence is mobile formally. When he writes, “Every uncreated essence is a mobile (mobile),” he uses a neuter adjective, for the divine essence is mobile essentially in virtue of the Incarnation, but not formally. Or to clarify matters in Latin, according to Wyclif’s
Augustinian grammar, Omnis essentia increata est immobilis formaliter, sed mobile essentialiter.
Oxford logicians after Wyclif also observed such grammatical usage.62
60 “Mos enim est scripture et Augustini per adiectivos masculinos personas concipere et per neutros naturas.” Wyclif, De benedicta incarncacione 5, ed. Harris, p. 73, ln. 27–29. 61 “Non est possibile aliquid esse, nisi illud sit essentia creata vel essentia increata. Omnis essentia creata est mobilis. Omnis essentia increata est mobile. Ergo conclusio. Minor patet ex hoc quod essentia increata est suppositum mobile. Ergo illa est mobile.” Chapter 7, ln. 112–117. 62 Conti, “Analogy and Formal Distinction,” 156–157. 354 Sophists at Oxford are chastised for their conceited displays of pseudoscience.
This amusing part of Wyclif’s lecture was no doubt prompted by a very confused student sincerely asking Wyclif to explain his conclusion that everything, including God, is somehow a mobile, a conclusion that seems to contradict the conclusion that Wyclif reasoned his way to at the beginning of the lecture. Wyclif responds by assuming that the student must be an insincere sophist intent on ostentatiously displaying his facility at logic. Seized by zeal for the truth and misjudging his student, Wyclif then compares him to Satan. The exchange must surely have been entertaining for some in the lecture hall to observe. Consequently, this portion of DIV 7 more than any other evinces signs of orality that confirm that DIV started as a series of lectures.
“I say that [such a disingenuous question] greatly furthers the sophistic mode of disputation.”63 This section of the longer text of DIV 7 contains one of the few instances where recourse to the reportatio clarifies the meaning of the text. The words “such a disingenuous question” are based on the phrase contrariae quaestiones found only in the corresponding passage of the shorter text. The disingenuous question referred to is “What is non-mobile?” posed at the end of the preceding paragraph.
“As a sign of this the first question Scripture recalls was posed by the Devil.”64
Comparing a student who in all probability asked a reasonable and sincere question in class to the Devil testifies to Wyclif’s intolerance for views he deemed erroneous. Such zeal to stamp out dissent from his students foreshadows the refusal of the University and ecclesiastical authorities to tolerate his own dissent.
63 “Dicitur quod multum proficeret modum disputandi sophisticum.” Chapter 7, ln. 439–440. 64 “In cuius signum prima quaestio quam scriptura meminit est a Diabolo introducta.” Chapter 7, ln. 443– 444. 355 “All else in theological disputation is of the Devil (cf. Mt 5:37). Therefore, questions, like oaths (cf. Gn 21:22–34), were introduced [into the world by at least] the occasion, [if not also] the penalty, of sin.”65 By referring to Matthew 5:37, Wyclif emphasizes the moral gravity of the ostentatious display of sophistry and compares it to swearing without due cause. Although many English versions of Matthew 5:37 say something to the effect of anything more than this comes from evil (RSV), other translations say instead anything more is from the evil one (NAB).
Because the Greek text includes the article (ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ), the Evil One is probably intended.
Thus, Wyclif is correct to understand the Malo so spoken of as the Devil.
Because Wyclif refers to oaths and Matthew 5:37 at the same time, he probably has
Lombard’s Sentences in mind.66 In 3.39.4, Lombard stresses that ideally one should never swear an oath, but doing so for a serious reason is permissible. The necessity to swear, however, is still the result of sin, for permissible oaths are only required in a world in which people sometimes sin by lying. By making this reference, Wyclif means to say that students are permitted to ask questions about as rarely as they are permitted to swear oaths, that is, almost never.
Objection 3: Whereas Christ’s manhood suffered on the Cross, God did not.
Wyclif now responds with an objection to his thesis along Nestorian lines. In the first,
Wyclif cites the habitus theory made famous by Peter Lombard, and entertains the possibility that motion is wrongly predicated of the divine Word, because during the course of the Lord’s
65 “Omne autem quod amplius est in disputatatione theologica a Malo est. Ideo quaestio sicut et iuramentum occasione vel poena peccati introducta est.” Chapter 7, ln. 452–455. 66 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 39, chap. 4, trans. Silano, 164. 356 life only his human nature moved, not his Godhead.67 In the second, the orthodox doctrine asserts that although the divine Word always was, the man Jesus was created at a particular point in time. But if the man Jesus did not exist before his conception in the womb of his Mother, and all that is predicated of the man Jesus can also be predicated of the divine Word, then there should be a distinct sense in which non-being can be predicated of the divine Word before the
Incarnation happens in time. Finally, Wyclif interprets the sacrifice of Isaac along Christological lines. In this interpretation, Isaac represents not the whole Christ, but merely Christ’s Godhead.
In short, even if Nestorianism is false, there must be a sense in which, despite the communicatio idiomatum, certain things can be truly and rightly predicated of the second person of the Trinity but not of the man Jesus, and vice versa.
After discussing at some length how the Lord’s manhood is like a habitus (a Latin word with many meanings), Wyclif addresses the three objections and then concludes his lecture.
The principal reply to Objection 3: Although Christ’s manhood is like an accident inhering in the Divine Word, the Divine Word is the ultimate subject of all of Christ’s acts.
Because “actions and passions pertain in the first place to supposites, clearly that manhood would not suffer or act unless the Word, which is the same hypostasis or person [as that manhood], so acts or suffers.”68 Here, Wyclif endorses the substance-accident relation as his preferred philosophic model for understanding the Incarnation. This preference on Wyclif’s part is not particularly unusual. As Richard Cross has pointed out, the substance-accident model was
67 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 6, chap. 4, trans. Silano, 28. 68 “Actiones ac passiones sunt primo suppositorum, patet quod illa humanitas non pateretur vel ageret, nisi quia Verbum quod est eadem hypostasis vel persona sic agit vel patitur.” Chapter 7, ln. 498–501. 357 preferred in the Middle Ages by virtually everyone “other than card-carrying Thomists.”69
After the death of Aquinas, it became increasingly important. “By the 1280s, thinkers who accept [it]…see it as more than a model: they allow it some real explanatory power, and delineate precisely those ways in which the hypostatic union is and is not like a substance- accident relation.”70 According to this model, the Lord’s manhood is like an accident in that it does not constitute its own supposite; instead, it inheres in the divine Word, which constitutes the ultimate ontological ground of the man Jesus and of all his acts. The most important drawback to this analogy is that the potentialities of normal substances are actualized (or not) by their changing accidents. Contrariwise, as the man Jesus changed, no potentiality was actualized in the divine Word.
“But as regards the word ‘habit,’ we must note that ‘habit’ is taken in four ways, as
Augustine explains in the Eighty-three Questions, question 73.”71 Here, Wyclif is commenting upon Lombard’s Sentences 3.6.6.72
“A ‘habit’…‘has’ what associates with it accidentally.”73 The reader should keep in mind here that the Latin word for “habit” (habitus) is related to the Latin verb for “having” (habere).
“Besides these four [kinds of habits]…‘habit’ is understood formally among philosophers in two equivocal senses.”74 The Latin upon which this paragraph is based was quite difficult to edit textually, first because the manuscript tradition for it was particularly diverse, and secondly
69 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 115. 70 Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 78. 71 “Sed pro nomine habitus est notandum quod habitus quadrupliciter sumitur, ut exponit Augustinus (83 quaestionum, quaestione 73).” Chapter 7, ln. 509–511. 72 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 6, chap. 6, trans. Silano, 29–31. 73 “Habitus…habere quod sibi accidentaliter adiacet.” Chapter 7, ln. 518–520. 74 “Praeter haec quattuor…habitus apud philosophos formaliter ad duos sensus aequivocos.” Chapter 7, ln. 535–537. 358 because the text required the emendation of praedicamentali mentioned at the beginning of chapter 7. In the preceding paragraph, Wyclif has summarized Augustine’s doctrine that the
Latin word habitus can be taken in four senses, all of which refer to substances. This Augustinian understanding of habit qua substance must be reconciled with an Aristotelian understanding of habit qua accident, which Wyclif does here. The first accidental sense completes the first two
Augustinian senses; the second accidental sense completes the other two Augustinian senses.
“The saints say that [Christ’s] manhood is as it were a piece of clothing covering the
Godhead.”75 The verb translated here as “covering” can mean either “to disclose or reveal” or “to cover or conceal.”76 Earlier in DIV 7, in the section labeled “Sophists at Oxford are Chastised for their Conceited Displays of Pseudoscience,” it definitely means “ to reveal.” (“Nevertheless, on both sides [of a disputation] one must intend that the glory of God be increased, that the pride of sophists be laid waste, and the unknown truth be laid bare.”) Here, Wyclif may intend to say that
Christ’s manhood is like a piece of clothing revealing the Godhead. Because Christ’s manhood can be said both to hide and reveal the divine Word, the ambiguity may be intentional.
“Vowed religious who have put on Christ (Gal. 3:27) have a bodily habit, noting this that
[Christ’s] manhood comes to God but inseparably.”77 As was noted in chapter 4, here Harris’s edition of DIV 7 is most defective. On the basis of no manuscript evidence at all, he added the word non (“not”) to the text, immediately before inseparabiliter (“inseparably”). Unfortunately, this emendation to the text is not noted as such in his apparatus and may have been intentional.78
75 “Dicunt sancti quod humanitas est quasi vestis detegens deitatem.” Chapter 7, ln. 552–553. 76 See DMLBS, s.v. “detegere” 3 and 4. 77 “Religiosi qui Christum induunt, habent habitus corporis hoc notantes quod accidit Deo humanitas sed inseparabiliter.” Chapter 7, ln. 553–555. 78 Wyclif, De benedicta incarnacione 7, ed. Harris, p. 119, ln. 17 and footnote 9. 359 “According to Augustine in De Trinitate 1, ‘Such was the union of the Incarnation that it made God a man and a man God.’”79 This quotation appears twice in Lombard’s
Sentences 3.7.1.4 and 3.22.1.3.80
How Christ’s manhood resembles accidents of various kinds and a substantial form
And thirdly, it cannot be without the supposite of the Word of God to which it inseparably but contingently adheres. And its proportional properties certainly agree analogically with the genus of accident. On the other hand, [Christ’s manhood] resembles properties, which are said to arise per se from the proper principles of their subjects, because it cannot be absent after it has been present; nevertheless, it is not inseparably consequent to the Word, as a property to its subject, but like separable accidents it can be lacking to its subject.81
In this section, Wyclif strives to work out the details of the substance-accident model for understanding the Incarnation, as he understands it. One difficulty with Wyclif’s account, as discussed in chapter 10, is that, at least when he wrote the Trialogus, Wyclif held the view that the Incarnation cannot not happen. In that work, Wyclif claims that God is compelled to do what is most fitting, and hence to become incarnate to redeem penitent man. Secondly, as Wyclif argues at length in DIV 5, God cannot, even ex potentia absoluta, annul the union once it has begun. How then for Wyclif can the union of manhood and Godhead in Christ be termed
79 “Secundum Augustinum (1 De Trinitate), ‘Talis fuit unio incarnationis quae Deum faceret hominem et hominem Deum.’” Chapter 7, ln. 563–565. 80 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 7, chap. 1, no. 4, trans. Silano, 32; dist. 22, chap. 1, num. 3, p. 93. 81 “Et tertio quod non potest esse sine supposito Verbi Dei cui inseparabiliter sed contingenter adhaeret. Et constat quod proprietates proportionales analogice conveniunt generi accidentis. Assimilatur autem passionibus quae dicuntur per se egredi de propriis principiis subiectorum, cum non potest abesse postquam infuit, tamen non inseparabiliter consequitur ad Verbum, sicut passio ad subiectum, sed sicut accidentia separabilia deesse poterit a subiecto.” Chapter 7, ln. 573–580.
360 contingent at all? If, according to Wyclif, Christ’s manhood “cannot be absent after it has been present” to the divine Word, how “can” it still “be lacking to its subject”?
As was discussed in chapter 10, Wyclif’s doctrine of necessity became more extreme as he grew older. When he wrote DIV 7, he had probably not yet reasoned his way to the view that
God is bound ex potentia absoluta to redeem mankind in the particular way he has. Thus, in the passage under discussion Wyclif can still assert that Christ’s manhood adheres to the divine
Word both inseparably (for God cannot annul the union once it has begun) and contingently (for being human is not a necessary property of the Godhead). More importantly perhaps, here
Wyclif also stresses that despite the union, the two natures remain forever unmixed and formally distinct.
Reply to the three parts of Objection 3
“As regards the second, I deny the consequence.”82 Here, Wyclif responds to the second part of Objection 3. It states that there must be a sense in which non-being is predicable of the divine Word before the conception of the man Jesus. Wyclif denies the assertion, because strictly speaking, negations are not predicates. Thus, before the conception of Jesus, nothing can be predicated of the divine Word in virtue of Jesus’s manhood, including non-being.
“Hence, it suffices that Abraham when taking his son [up the mountain] signifies God the
Father, who in fact led and offered upon Mount Calvary his only begotten Son, who, like Isaac the only begotten, was sacrificed upon the mountain where the temple was built.”83 Here, Wyclif
82 “Ad secundam negatur consequentia.” Chapter 7, ln. 619. 83 “Unde satis est quod Abraham ducens filium significet Deum Patrem qui de facto duxit et obtulit super montem Calvariae Filium suum unigenitum,
Word (and hence God himself) suffered during Christ’s Passion, or so the objector argues. To overcome this objection, Wyclif argues that this objection is not valid in every respect. Because the divine Word and Christ’s human soul were unharmed during Christ’s Crucifixion, they do resemble Isaac, while Christ’s body resembles the ram. Nonetheless, if Isaac does represent
Christ’s Godhead and human soul, but not Christ’s body, then we are justified in saying that
Christ’s Godhead and soul suffered as well, for Isaac carried the wood requisite for sacrifice and was laid thereon, as Jesus carried his Cross to the Crucifixion and was nailed thereto.
“When the person of the Word suffered and was slain, according to his Godhead and soul he was always unharmed.”84 Wyclif’s assertion here must be reconciled with the following from
DIV 5: “The [divine] Word in virtue of the man he has assumed suffers and is saddened more than [all] other mortals.”85 By stressing not merely the Lord’s suffering, but also his sadness,
Wyclif asserts that Christ’s human soul, and not merely his body, suffered more than all others.
Thus, when Wyclif asserts in DIV 7 that the Lord’s soul always remained “unharmed” (salva),
Wyclif does not intend “blissfully uncontaminated by sorrow.”
Curiously, earlier Christian thinkers interpreted the Atonement in ways that differ from
Wyclif’s. For Wyclif, Abraham represents God the Father; Isaac, Christ’s Godhead; and the ram,
Christ’s manhood. In this interpretation, God the Father is the officiating priest. Other theologians, however, assigned different roles to the characters. According to Origen, “The templum constitutum est.” Chapter 7, ln. 631–636. 84 “Passa et occisa persona Verbi secundum deitatem et animam
Christ’s divinity and humanity as two subjects.”86 Consequently, for Origen, “Jesus is the Lamb of God only as a human being…; as the divine Word, Wisdom, peace, and justice of God, however, he is the Great High Priest who sacrifices the Lamb….The chief ‘mechanism’ that makes Jesus’s death salvific is not his divine identity or even the proximity of God in his death, but Jesus’s sinlessness and perfect obedience as a human being.”87 Hence, for Origen, the officiating priest is Christ’s Godhead. Blessed Duns Scotus offers us yet a third way of viewing the mystery:
We should also note that Scotus differs from Anselm in wanting to see Christ's work as an offering by the human nature to the Trinity, and not as an offering by the Son (the second person of the Trinity) to the Father. Underlying this move is his account of the hypostatic union, according to which it is simply not possible for the Son alone, without the Father and Holy Spirit, to have any causal action over human nature—a principle Scotus reminds us of when explaining that it is not the case that, as Aquinas held, the value of Christ's work is infinite in virtue of the divine person. Scotus seems to suppose that for an action a to have infinite intrinsic worth, it must be the case that a is caused by—not just predicated of—a divine person.88
Here, the man Jesus is the officiating priest and presumably the victim offered as well.
All Christians who take the Bible seriously must view the Lord’s death upon the Cross as a sacrifice for sin that somehow reconciles the human race to God; nevertheless, the Christian tradition is surprisingly divided as to what exactly was offered in sacrifice, by whom, and to whom.
86 Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 38. 87 Ibid., 40. 88 Cross, Duns Scotus, 131–132. 363 “‘The Son of God suffered not putatively but truly.’”89 The original source of this quotation has apparently not yet been identified with certainty. As discussed in chapter 12,
Wyclif attributes this quotation to Jerome because Peter Lombard had done so in his Sentences
3.5.1.7.90
89 “‘Passus est,’ inquit, ‘Dei Filius non putative sed vere.’” Chapter 7, ln. 654–655. 90 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 5, chap. 1, num. 7, trans. Silano, 20.
Chapter 12: Some Notes on Wyclif’s Use of his Sources
Before concluding, here I discuss some trends in Wyclif’s use of his sources in DIV 7.
Naturally, the source Wyclif quotes or refers to the most is the Bible. Below is a list of his
Scriptural references in DIV 7:
Gn 1:2 Gn 3:1 Cf. Gn 17:17, 18:9–15, 21:6 Cf. Gn 21:22–34 Cf. Gn 22:6 Cf. Gn 22:9 Cf. Gn 22:13 Cf. Gn 24:3, 4, 9 Gn 27:27 Jb 10:5 Jb 33:14 Ps 21:17 Ps 92:1 Is 53:5
Cf. Ws 7:24 Ws 7:24 Ws 7:24 Ws 7:24 Cf. Ecclus. 47:13
Cf. Mt 5:37 Cf. Mt 27:50 Jn 8:56 Jn 10:30 Jn 10:30 Jn 14:24 Jn 14:24 Jn 14:24 Jn 14:24 Jn 14:28 Jn 14:28 Cf. Jn 14:28 Cf. Jn 19:34
364 365 Cf. Acts 9:15 1 Cor 10:9 Cf. Gal 3:27 Eph 1:9–10 Phil 2:6–7 Phil 2:7 Phil 2:7 Phil 2:7 Cf. Phil 2:7 Cf. 1 Tm 6:16 Heb 1:4 Heb 7:24 Cf. Heb 13:8 Jude 1:5
(1) If we keep in mind that De incarnatione is a Christological treatise that seeks to interpret a single verse of the Book of Wisdom (7:24) in light of an Aristotelian commitment to God as First
Mover, much in this list is unsurprising. What is of interest is how frequently Wyclif refers to
Genesis. His engagement with Patristic sources commenting on or referring to the first book of the Bible does not entirely explain why he refers to it so often. Although only further research will reveal whether such interest in Genesis is typical for Wyclif and why, his love of Robert
Grosseteste’s Hexameron may in the end prove an important part of the explanation. (2)
Secondly, Wyclif was prone to the misidentification of the Scriptural passages he quotes. When he quotes Ephesians 1:9–10 (ln. 159–163 of chapter 7), he claims instead to be quoting
Colossians 1. When he quotes John 14:24 (ln. 325–327), he claims to be quoting John 10. It is surely amusing to note that the so-called “Morning Star of the Reformation” was prone to a certain sloppiness with his biblical sources. Stephen Lahey has assured me that such sloppiness is typical throughout Wyclif’s corpus. (3) Finally, Wyclif quotes not merely Jerome’s Vulgate but Alcuin’s recension of the Vulgate. For instance, although standard editions of Job 33:14 in the Vulgate read Semel loquitur Deus et secundo idipsum non repetet (Job 33:14), Wyclif wrote 366 instead, loquetur, a variant found in Alcuin’s recension.1 Another example indicative of the same trend is Wyclif’s quotation of Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 47:11 (47:13 in the Vulgate tradition),
Christus purgavit peccata ipsius, where the Clementine Vulgate says Dominus, not Christus.2
Wyclif’s quotation of Alcuin’s recension testifies to the authenticity of DIV.
The second most important authority for Wyclif is the Aristotelian corpus and the commentarial tradition thereon. Below is a list of the passages from Aristotle and Averroes
Wyclif refers to or quotes in the critical edition found in chapter 7:
Aristotle, De caelo 1.5 (271b6–13) Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1 (981a16–17) Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7 (1072a25) Aristotle, Physics 3.1 (201a8–9) Aristotle, Physics 3.3 (202a12–19) Aristotle, Physics 3.5 (205a10–12) Aristotle, Physics 7.2 (243a15–18) Aristotle, Physics 8.1 (250a14–15)
Averroes’s commentary on Physics 3
Why Wyclif should refer to Physics 3 as often as he does is not yet clear. A critical edition of his
Physics commentary will shed additional light on the question. Unfortunately, while this dissertation was being written, Ivan Mueller passed away without finishing that important project. As we await the completion of Mueller’s work by the next generation of scholars, one reflection on Wyclif’s reception of Aristotle is fitting here.
We must always remember what “doing philosophy” meant at fourteenth-century Oxford.
Students were required to memorize short quotations or summaries from the Aristotelian corpus and other authorities and then to reason therefrom, as students even today are made to reason
1 Cf. the apparatus for Job 33:14 in Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem, 4th ed., 757, col. b with p. xxxviii. 2 Cf. the apparatus for Sirach 47:13, ibid., 1089, col. a with pp. xxxix and xliii. 367 from premises as they construct and follow the proofs in Euclid’s Elements. Jacqueline Hamesse has done critical work on the history of the reception of Aristotle, and a brief perusal of her book reveals the amount of material that students in Wyclif’s day were usually expected to know offhand.3 Concern for the doctrine of the historical Aristotle was, however, lost in the midst of the reception. This fact is not that surprising if one considers that by the golden age of scholasticism, Aristotelianism had become so entangled with Neo-Platonic commentary that
Aristotle himself was typically misunderstood as a kind of Neo-Platonist.4 Given the creative misunderstandings that naturally ensued from such confusion, it should be only slightly surprising that in De incarnatione Wyclif seems to misconstrue Aristotle’s doctrine of matter quite grossly. As Wyclif notes in the longer text, Christ is more mobile than any mobile because
“as regards swiftness, his brief Passion has clearly restored the whole world before and after to a better equilibrium than the perpetual motion of the prime mover could have done. (‘For principles,’ says Aristotle, ‘are smallest in respect of quantity.’)” It would seem that given how
Wyclif has received and manipulated the Aristotelian inheritance, here he attributes to the
Philosopher a doctrine of atomism that the Philosopher himself would have found detestable.5
Hamesse’s work indicates that Wyclif is referring to De caelo 1.5.6 In a modern translation from the original Greek, below is the passage referred to in full:
3 Jacqueline Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval: Étude historique et édition critique (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1974). 4 Cf. “Il y a de révélateurs structurels qui doivent permettre de suivre en détail le jeu complexe des travestissements et des métamorphoses d’une philosophie dans l’autre.…La théorie des Formes éponymes…parasite en secret l’aristotélisme.” Libera, La querelle des universaux, 33–34. 5 For the history of medieval atomism in general, see Bernhard Pabst, Atomtheorien des lateinischen Mittelalters (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994). For Wyclif’s atomism in particular, see ibid., 306–316; and Michael, “John Wyclif’s Atomism.” 6 Hamesse, Les auctoritates Aristotelis, 161, #20. 368 It is this problem which has practically always been the source of the differences of those who have written about nature as a whole. So it has been and so it must be; since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold. Admit, for instance, the existence of a minimum magnitude, and you will find that the minimum you have introduced, small as it is, causes the greatest truths of mathematics to totter. The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end.7
Here Aristotle argues that atomism is so radically defective a theory that, once admitted, it negates all sound mathematics thereafter, exactly the opposite of Wyclif’s view.8 Perhaps Wyclif himself sincerely believed that a doctrine of atomism could be ascribed to Aristotle. Or perhaps he intentionally misconstrued the Aristotelian philosophy. If the misconstrual was intentional,
Wyclif did to the Stagirite what he did to other authors his contemporaries regarded as authorities. For in the midst of controversy regarding the Eucharist, Wyclif often intentionally abused his sources, either by explaining away what he regarded as erroneous, mispunctuating a quotation to twist its meaning, or overtly declaring a revered theological authority, including
Thomas Aquinas, to be heretical.9 Thus, when the so-called Doctor evangelicus was consciously subversive, he was sometimes downright dishonest and positively cunning.
Patristic and early medieval authors constitute the third group of Wyclif’s sources, chiefly Augustine, the Father of Latin Theology:
Augustine of Hippo, Against Maximinum the Heretic 1.4 Augustine of Hippo, Confessions 12.29 (40)
7 Aristotle, De caelo 1.5 (271b6–13), trans. J. L. Stocks, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 404. 8 For more on Wyclif’s temporal and material atomism, see Emily Michael, “John Wyclif’s Atomism,” in Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, ed. Christophe Grellard and Aurélien Robert (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 183–220. 9 For Wyclif’s doctrine of the Eucharist in general and his misconstrual of Patristic and medieval authorities on the topic in particular, see Heather Phillips, “John Wyclif’s De eucharistia in its Medieval Setting” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1980), 306–323. For more on Wyclif’s Eucharistic doctrine in general, see Heather Phillips, “John Wyclif and the Optics of the Eucharist,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 245–258. 369 Augustine of Hippo, Eighty-three Different Questions 73.1 Augustine of Hippo, Eighty-three Different Questions 73.2 Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love 12.40 Augustine of Hippo, On Christian Doctrine 2.31.48 Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 1.6.10 Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity 1.13.28 Augustine of Hippo, 124 Sermons on the Gospel of John, Sermon 43.16 Augustine of Hippo, Tractate on the Gospel of John 76.5
Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine), Dialogue to Felician the Arian on the unity of the Trinity 9 Vigilius of Thapsus (Pseudo-Augustine), Dialogue to Felician the Arian on the unity of the Trinity 12
Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 9.47.72. Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 23.19.35 Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 31.49.99 Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 32.5.7 Gregory the Great, Moralia on Job 34.7.12
Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Jerome), On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin 9.60–10.61. Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Jerome), On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin 10.61. Paschasius Radbertus (Pseudo-Jerome), On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin 10.61.
Early medieval author identified as Jerome in Lombard’s Sentences
Wyclif’s heavy reliance upon Augustine in DIV 7 gives credence to the legend recorded by
Thomas Netter that Wyclif’s students gave him the sobriquet, “John of Augustine.”10 Regardless of the legend’s historicity, Wyclif was an Augustinian through and through. As regards Wyclif’s other Patristic sources, Vigilius, Bishop of Thapsus, flourished about a century after Augustine’s death. To him the scholarly consensus at present attributes the authorship of Dialogue to Felician
10 “Sui discipuli vocabant eum famoso et elato nomine Ioannem Augustini.” Netter, Doctrinale antiquitatum 1.2.34 (Venice: Jordan Zilettum, 1571), 1:106, col. b. Lechler’s citation directing readers to this quotation is in error. See Lechler, John Wyclif and his English Precursors, 2:65, endnote 140. 370 the Arian on the unity of the Trinity, although some may still dispute this claim.11 Similarly, in the Middle Ages the very popular On the Assumption of St. Mary the Virgin was thought to be a letter of Jerome, although now it is attributed to Paschasius Radbertus, the ninth-century abbot of
Corbie and opponent of Ratramnus in Eucharistic controversy.12 Finally, there remains the quotation, “the Son of God suffered not putatively but truly,” which Wyclif quotes and attributes to Jerome towards the end of De incarnatione 7. The original source of these words has apparently not yet been identified with certainty. Scholarship has variously identified the author as Augustine or Pseudo-Augustine,13 the heretic Pelagius,14 or someone who flourished in the court of Charlemagne.15 As noted in chapter 11, Wyclif attributes this quotation to Jerome because Peter Lombard had done so in his Sentences 3.5.1.7.16
Wyclif also quotes or refers to a few later authorities, some of them academic, others canonical, and at least one liturgical:
Anselm, Monologion 19
The Fourth Lateran Council’s condemnation of Joachim of Fiore Pope Clement’s decretal, “On the supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith”
11 For more on Vigilius, see The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, 3rd ed. (2005), s. v. “Vigilius,” accessed August 20, 2018, http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxycu.wrlc.org/view/10.1093/acref/9780192802903.001.0001/acref- 9780192802903-e-7191?rskey=7njkRN&result=1. 12 For more on On the Assumption, see T. A. Agius, “On Pseudo-Jerome, Epistle 9,” The Journal of Theological Studies 24, no. 94 (January 1923): 176–183. For more on Paschasius, see The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd ed., s. v. “Paschasius Radbertus, St,” accessed August 21, 2018, http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxycu.wrlc.org/view/10.1093/acref/9780192802903.001.0001/acref- 9780192802903-e-5160?rskey=6FFW8L&result=5. 13 Augustine of Hippo, Sermon 236, part 4, “On the Catholic Faith” 5, PL 39, col. 2182. 14 Pelagius, “Booklet of Faith Sent to [Pope] Innocent” 5, PL 45, col. 1717. See also PL 48, col. 490B and 501C. 15 Either Alcuin or Albinus, “Confession of Faith,” part 3: On God One and Triune, Christ, and many other Ecclesiastical Dogmas 15, PL 101, col. 1064A. 16 Lombard, The Sentences: Book 3, dist. 5, chap. 1, num. 7, trans. Silano, 20. 371 Rogationtide litany, Sarum Processional Prayer said at mixing of the chalice?
Because Wyclif’s use of Anselm and Lateran IV as theological authorities should require no explanation, we consider instead his canonical and liturgical sources. At the end of DIV 7 Wyclif quotes the decretal De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica found in the Clementinae, the canonical legislation promulgated by Pope Clement V (1305–1314) in light of the canons of the Council of
Vienne (1311–1312).17 The particular canon quoted at length by Wyclif “condemned the doctrine that the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is not vere et per se the form of the human body, [which had been] attributed to Peter John Olivi, a leading figure of the Franciscan
Spirituals, who was not, however, formally condemned.”18 The inclusion of this canon in the
Enchiridion symbolorum has increased its importance for the study of Catholic theology.19
Wyclif’s references to the liturgy may in the end prove to be of interest because in virtue of his denial of transubstantiation he was found guilty of a liturgical heresy, despite being an ordained priest who probably said Mass multiple times a week. As was noted in chapter 11,
Wyclif condemns as sophistae those who object to the petitions in the Rogationtide litanies on the pretext that because the events of the Lord’s life are past, they cannot be the cause of the
Church receiving mercy in the here and now. In another part of DIV 7, the liturgical reference is merely probable:
17 For more on the Clementinae, see Leonard E. Boyle, “Clementinae,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed, (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 3:800. The complete Latin text of the Clementinae may be found in Corpus iuris canonici…pars secunda: Decretalium collectiones, ed. Aemilius Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1955), col. 1133–1200. Wyclif quotes from the very beginning of the Clementinae’s first book. It may be viewed here: https://archive.org/stream/BD1141952#page/n601/mode/2up, accessed August 27, 2018. 18 M. François, “Vienne, Council of,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed, (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 14: 489–491. 19 The Sources of Catholic Dogma 480, ed. Henry Denzinger, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, [2001]), 189–190. 372 Contingently in time, ineffably to us, [Christ’s manhood] belongs to the Word not by changing the nature to which it comes, but wondrously fashioned (formata mirabiliter), [it is] identified with the Word of God or hypostatically united [to it], because according to Augustine in De Trinitate 1, “Such was the union of the Incarnation that it made God a man and a man God.”20
Here Wyclif may be referring to a prayer said at the mixing of the chalice in some medieval uses of the Mass: “O God, who didst wondrously fashion (mirabiliter condidisti) the grandeur of human nature and more wondrously didst restore (mirabilius reformasti) the same: Grant us by the mystical union of this water and wine to be coheirs of the Godhead of him who deigned to become a partaker of our manhood, even Jesus Christ thy Son our Lord, who liveth and reigneth with thee in the unity of the Holy Ghost, God, world without end. Amen.”21 Although this collect does not appear in the missals of Salisbury, York, or Hereford, it was included in the missal of
Westminster Abbey for use at the mixing of the chalice.22 Although it cannot be known for certain whether Wyclif had this prayer in mind when he wrote De incarnatione 7, the fact remains that he may have.
Finally, a note about an important but unnamed source Wyclif must have had in mind when he wrote DIV 7. The Super Sapientiam Salomonis of Robert Holcot (d. 1349) survives in more than 170 manuscripts and consequently must have been incredibly popular in Wyclif’s
20 “Contingenter ex tempore, nobis ineffabiliter—inest Verbo non mutando naturam cui advenit, sed formata mirabiliter, quia Verbo Dei identificata vel hypostatice copulata, cum secundum Augustinum (1 De Trinitate), ‘Talis fuit unio incarnationis quae Deum faceret hominem et hominem Deum.’” Ln. 560–565 of chapter 7. 21 The earliest known version of this prayer does not mention water or wine and appears as a collect for the Christmas season in the ancient Roman sacramentaries. It was used at the offertory of the Mass in the Roman Curia from the fourteenth century onwards and thence passed to the Tridentine Missal. For more on this prayer, see Ferdinand Holböck, Der eucharistische und der mystische Leib Christi (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1941), 203; Joseph A. Jungmann, The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development, trans. Francis A. Brunner (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1951), 2:62–63; and Archdale A. King, Liturgy of the Roman Church (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1957), 279–283. 22 “Deus qui humane substancie dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti. et mirabilius reformasti. da nobis per...huius aque et uini misterium eius diuinitatis esse consortes qui nostre humanitatis dignatus est fieri particeps ihesus christus filius tuus. Qui tecum.” Missale ad usum ecclesie Westmonasteriensis [...] fasciculus II, ed. Iohannis Wickham Legg, Henry Bradshaw Society 5 (London, 1893), col. 488–489. 373 day.23 Because no critical edition of the commentary exists at present, an edition and translation of the part of the commentary in which Holcot comments upon Wisdom 7:24–25 is included in the Appendix of this dissertation. Below is the passage that may have given Wyclif the creative spark to interpret Wisdom 7:24 in light of the Incarnation:
Wisdom is more moving than any motion (Wis. 7:24). Note that an agent has great power in acting to the extent that it produces its effect speedily and swiftly. Hence, an agent of infinite power can act atemporally. Therefore, because the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit is in some way of infinite power, but every mobile mover is of finite power, clearly wisdom is more mobile, i.e., more powerful in moving than every [other] mobile, and consequently has sufficient speed.24
23 Richard Sharpe, A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540 (Turnout: Brepols, 1997), 553. For more on the Super Sapientiam, see Beryl Smalley, “Some Latin Commentaries on the Sapiential Books in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 18 (1950–1951), 117–121; Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 235–248; and John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt, “The Book of Wisdom,” in Robert Holcot (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 162–188. 24 Robert Holcot, Super Sapientiam Solomonis 101. “Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia. (Sap. 7:24) Ubi notandum est quod quanto agens est maioris virtutis in agendo, tanto celerius et velocius producit effectum. Unde agens infinitae virtutis agere potest in non tempore. Quia ergo sapientia quae est donum Spiritus Sancti est quodammodo infinitae virtutis, omne autem movens mobile est virtutis finitae, patet quod sapientia est mobilior, id est, virtuosior in movendo omni mobili, et per consequens habet sufficientiam celeritatis.” For the early printed editions from which this was edited, see the Appendix of this dissertation.
Chapter 13: Conclusion
Chapter 1 of this dissertation proves that manuscript Q (Prague, Metropolitan Chapter
Library, D.35 [600]), is ten years older than previous scholarship supposed. Martin Dekarli of the
Austrian Academy of the Sciences assures me that the correct date indicates that Wyclif’s ideas spread to Bohemia earlier than was previously thought. Chapter 2 brings to light the relations of the eight manuscripts that contain a copy of DIV. Although the Bohemian manuscripts were copied later than the English ones, the Bohemian scribes were far more diligent than their
English counterparts. Crucially, manuscript G (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 337/565) contains additional text, which is missing in all other manuscripts and indicates that Wyclif expanded the treatise, probably during his forced retirement to Lutterworth. Chapter 3 proves that contrary to Edward Harris’s judgment, manuscript M (London, British Library, Royal 7
B.111) is primitive. It is a reportatio and can be dated to the 1369–1370 academic year, when
Wyclif delivered the lectures that in time became the final version of the treatise. Because it is a reportatio, one can reasonably suppose that it was written in the hand of one of his students.
Chapter 4 argues for the need for a new edition of De incarnatione Verbi. Although Harris’s work is sometimes sufficient for purposes of study, it is too riddled with error to persist as the academic standard. It is also based on five of the eight surviving manuscripts, only two of which
Harris had seen in person. Chapters 5 and 6 contain the critical edition and translation of the prologue and chapter 7 of the reportatio. Chapters 7 and 8 contain the same for the definitive version of the text. Chapter 9 argues that, contrary to William Courtney’s judgment, DIV is a
Sentences’ commentary, and dates the treatise to the 1369–1370 academic year.
374 375 Chapter 10 begins the themes-based portion of the dissertation. It grounds Wyclif’s
Christology in both the Christological debates of his own time, and draws attention to Wyclif’s originality. For the first time, Wyclif’s use of geometrical and cosmological images to explain who and what Christ is are noted. The history of Wyclif’s doctrine of Christ as Scripture is worked out in full and put into its proper Augustinian context. Most importantly of all, because of the length of the passages quoted, often for the first time in translation, Wyclif is made to speak in his own voice to Christological questions. Thus, readers can hear in modern English the sometimes transgressive, sometimes pietistic voice that was silenced for centuries by the Council of Constance in 1415. Chapter 11 provides a roadmap through the translated portion of DIV for inexperienced readers, who may feel disoriented as they read a lecture given at fourteenth- century Oxford for the first time. Crucially, Wyclif’s stance on the primacy of Christ and the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood is considered at some length, and the difference between formal and essential predication explained. Chapter 12 considers Wyclif’s use of his sources and compares his treatment of Aristotle to that of authorities he intentionally misconstrued. Chapter
13 concludes these researches and hopefully provides a sense of coherent unity.
As regards opportunities for future research, only as Wyclif’s corpus becomes available in reliable critical editions and sound translations can the contours of his doctrine, and how that doctrine changed, be fully appreciated. This dissertation should enable a proper critical edition and translation of the whole of De incarnatione Verbi, and should encourage codicologists to do full codicological surveys of all the surviving manuscripts that contain Wyclif’s texts. Finally, more attention must be given to how and why Wyclif’s Christology changed as time went by, especially as regards the ubiquity of Christ’s manhood and the primacy of Christ. Appendix: Other Latin Texts and English Translations
I. Portions of Two Poems on the Incarnation and the Squaring of the Circle
A. From Alan of Lisle’s “Rhythmus de incarnatione”
Suae artis in censura Geometra fallitur, Dum immensus sub mensura Terrenorum sistitur. In directum curuatura Circuli conuertitur, Speram claudit quadratura, Et sub ipsa clauditur. In hac Verbi copula Stupet omnis regula.1
The geometer is deceived by the judgment of his art, While the Infinite halts under the measure of earthly things. The curve of the circle is turned into a straight line; The square encloses the sphere and is enclosed within it. At this union of the Word every rule is astonished.
B. From Philip the Chancellor
Centrum capit circulus Quod est maius circulo In centro triangulus Omni rectus angulo,
1 Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, “Alain de Lille et la Theologia,” in L’homme devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac (Paris: Aubier, 1964), 127–128. See also Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 152; Alain de Lille, Alain de Lille: Textes inédits avec une introduction sur sa vie et ses œvres, ed. Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1965), 38; and PL 210, col. 578A–B. 376 Sed fit minor angulus Unus de triangulo, Dum se mundi figulus Inclusit in vasculo.2
The circle contains the center Which is bigger than the circle. In the center, a triangle With three right angles, But one angle of the triangle Becomes smaller While the Potter of the world Encloses himself in the vessel [of the Virgin].
II. From Robert Holcot’s Super Sapientiam Solomonis
A. Latin Text
Note: The Latin text below was edited from the 1489 printed edition of the text and corrected in light of that printed by Konrad Winters of Cologne before 1476 and now housed in the University of Düsseldorf’s library.3
Omnibus enim mobilibus mobilior est sapientia: attingit autem ubique propter mundiciam suam. Vapor enim est virtutis Dei, et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera, et ideo nihil inquinatum in illa incurrit (Sap. 7:24–25).
Posita commendatione multiplici Spiritus Sancti cuius donum est sapientia, restat iam ipsius sapientiae excellentia declaranda. Commendatio autem †sapientiae†4 sic procedit. Primo commendat sapientiam ex his quae ei conveniunt absolute ex seipsa, secundo ex his quae ei conveniunt in comparatione ad alia. Secunda pars ibi: Est enim haec speciosior sole. (Sap. 7:29)
2 Guido Maria Dreves, ed., Lieder und Motetten des Mittelalters, vol. 20 of Analecta hymnica medii aevi: Cantiones et Muteti (Leipzig, 1895), p. 88 #89; and Dronke, Fabula, 152. 3 A pdf of the 1489 printed edition may be consulted here: http://capricorn.bc.edu/siepm/DOCUMENTS/HOLCOT/RobertusHolcot_SuperSapientiamSalomonis(1489).pdf, accessed March 9, 2019. Lecture 101 is found on images 347–349 of the pdf. Winters’ edition may be consulted here: http://digital.ub.uni-duesseldorf.de/urn/urn:nbn:de:hbz:061:1-135536, accessed March 9, 2019. Lecture 101 is found on fol. 206r–208r, images 445–449. 4 Printed editions read sapientiam. 377 Circa primum duo facit. Nam primo ostendit eius nobilitatem in essendo, secundo eius potestatem in regendo, ibi: Et cum sit una omnia potest. (Sap. 7:27) Circa primum duo facit. Primo commendat sapientiam per conditiones proprias, secundo per locutiones tropicas.
Secunda pars ibi: Vabor est enim. (Sap. 7:25) Circa primum duo attribuit sapientiae omnia gubernanti, videlicet sufficientiam celeritatis et coexistentiam praesentialitatis. Quantum ad primum dicit sic: Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia. (Sap. 7:24) Ubi notandum est quod quanto agens est maioris virtutis in agendo, tanto celerius et velocius producit effectum. Unde agens infinitae virtutis agere potest in non tempore. Quia ergo sapientia quae est donum Spiritus
Sancti est quodammodo infinitae virtutis, omne autem movens mobile est virtutis finitae, patet quod sapientia est mobilior, id est, virtuosior in movendo omni mobili, et per consequens habet sufficientiam celeritatis.
Secundo habet coexistentiam praesentialitatis. Et quantum ad hoc dicit: Attingit autem ubique propter munditiam suam. (Sap. 7:24) Omnia enim per sapientiam disponuntur et reguntur. In Ps. [103:24]: Omnia in sapientia fecisti; Repleta est terra possessione tua.5 Sicut enim deducit magister Alexander cognomento Nequam, in omni creatura corporea quantumcumque sit modica potest ratio humana videre infinitam Dei potentiam, infinitam sapientiam et bonitatem (cf. Rom. 1:20). Verbi gratia ut de atomo fiat exemplum. Satis enim approbat humana ratio et acceptat quod mensura potentiae agentis sumatur secundum
†proportionem†6 facti ad illud de quo fit. Tanta enim videtur potentia facientis, quantum ipsum factum excedit illud de quo fit. Cum ergo ratio invenerit atomum esse aliquid ex nihilo, et sciat quod si atomus excederet nihil, infinitum excederet, concludit quod potentia ducens atomum de
5 Winter’s edition gives a very strange reading here: Omnia in sapientia fecisti: recedens est tibi possessio tua. 6 Printed editions read portionem. 378 nihilo ad esse est infinita. Secundo videbit ratio quod cum atomus sit corpus, habet inter se tres lineas intersecantes se ad angulos rectos. In qua sectione posito circino conscribi potest sphaera super atomum. Et videt in sphaera infinitos circulos posse describi, immo infinita corpora infra sphaeram esse imaginabilia. Et ultra infra circulos omnes figuras fore inscriptibiles quae †cum†7 sunt infinitae, super quas infinitae possunt erigi demonstrationes tam de magnitudinibus quam de numeris. Ergo videbit ratio humana in atomo vel in flore infinitam scientiam obiective descriptam. Infinitam vero scientiam non potest descripsisse agens quodcumque nisi sapientiae infinitae. Ergo humana ratio, si est bona, videbit et inveniet in uno atomo infinitam sapientiam
Conditoris.
Tertio videbit ratio mentis humanae quod in assecutione huius infinitae scientiae quae est in atomo est magna utilitas animae et delectatio admirabilis. Et si forent infiniti intellectus infinitas haberent delectationes, immo unus intellectus in infinitum potest delectari in acquirendo notitiam istius atomi. Ergo potest ratio concludere quod ille qui atomum creavit, infinitae est bonitatis, qui rem infinitae utilitatis de sua bonitate creavit.
Sic ergo ex minimo atomo potest homo concludere Deum esse infinitae potentiae, sapientiae, et bonitatis. Aliter exponi potest de Deo qui est in rebus omnibus per essentiam, potentiam, et presentiam. Per essentiam, inquam: Essentia cuiuslibet rei est quaedam participatio divini esse et sic essentia cuiuslibet rei adest inquantum habet esse sicut causa adest proprio effectui. Per potentiam adest inquantum omnia agunt virtute ipsius. Per presentiam inquantum omnia immediate disponit et regit. Attingit ergo sapientia divina ubique (id est, in omni loco) propter suam munditiam (cf. Sap. 7:24). Quia cum in omni loco sit corpus, in omni corpore scientia potest esse infinita obiective (id est, conclusiones scibiles infinitae) et hoc propter suam
7 Printed editions read tamen. 379 munditiam (id est,
Sic ergo describit sapientiam per conditiones absolutas et proprias. Consequenter eam describit per locutiones figurativas et tropicas. Cum dicit, Vapor est enim (Sap. 7:25), ubi incipit subtiliter describere sapientiam per figuras et similitudines, et ponit quinque similitudines quibus sapientia comparatur. Dicit enim quod methaphorice loquendo ipsa est vapor, emanatio, candor, speculum, et imago (cf. Sap. 7:25–26). Vapor est quoddam corpus subtile extractum de terra vel de aqua per calorem solis, sicut patet primo Meteorologica. Tamen stricte et proprie loquendo vapor est aer humidus et extrahitur de aqua; exhalatio est sicca et extrahitur de terra. Et de istis duobus generantur omnes aereae impressiones cuiusmodi: Sunt nubes, pluviae, grandines, nix, tonitruum, ros, pruina, et cetera multa. Est ergo sapientia quasi vapor virtutis Dei (Sap. 7:25), id est, subtilis effectus divinae virtutis causatur in mente rationali. Secundo dicit quod est quaedam emanatio claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera (Sap. 7:25), id est, claritas emanans sincere ab omnipotenti Deo. Emanare idem est quod scaturire, sicut aqua ascendens de terra dicitur emanare. Sincerus dicitur quasi sine cera, id est, sine mollitudine et fluxibilitate purus, constans et mundus. Et ideo nihil inquinatum incurrit in illam propter munditiam suae claritatis (Sap.
7:25, 24), sicut sol quantumcumque turpia loca illuminet, nihil tamen inquinati contrahere potest.
Et emanatio quaedam, et cetera (Sap. 7:25). Deus enim fons est a quo emanat omne genus gratiarum. Est enim in fonte iugiter emanante perpetuitas pretiosa, suavitas saporosa, et comitas copiosa. Primo in fonte est perpetuitas pretiosa. Quidquid enim bonitatis vel copiae invenitur in rivulo, totum emanat de fonte. Et eodem modo quidquid delectabilitatis et bonitatis est in creatura, totum emanat de fonte bonitatis divinae infinitae. Ecclesiastius 1 [vs. 5]: Fons sapientiae Verbum Dei in excelsis. Ad istum fontem sitiunt animae sanctae iuxta illud psalmi:
Sicut cervus desiderat at fontes aquarum, et cetera, sitivit anima mea ad Deum fontem vivum [Ps.
380 41:2–3].8 Cervus hausto serpente moritur nisi citius attingat ad aquam. Desiderat enim naturaliter vitam suam prolongare. Unde sicut dicit glosa super illud, Quemadmodum desiderat, et cetera
[Ps. 41:2], cervus senio gravatus excrescentibus pilis atque cornibus, explorato serpente, ipsum narribus haurit, quo hausto veneno aestuat. Unde fontem ad bibendum ardentissime desiderat, a quo si deficiat moritur, et inde vitam abbreviat quo prolongasse putavit. Moraliter homo serpentem haurit quando diaboli suggestionibus acquiescit et noxias sibi delectationes incorporat per peccatum. Sed nunc veneno aestuat, quando transacta delectatione foeditatem peccati considerat. Tunc enim fontem misericordiae desiderat, cum Deo reconciliari per sacramentum paenitentiae affectat. Si autem contigat quod post haustum serpentis, id est, commissionem peccati, fontem gratiae non attingat, damnum perpetuae mortis incurrit. Fons autem gratiae de quo putei aquarum viventium emanant est Christus, in cuius corpore multa vulnera quasi multi putei exstiterunt. Ecclesiasticus 50 [vs. 3]: In diebus ipsius emanaverunt putei multi aquarum et quasi mare adimpleti sunt supra modum. De istis fontibus dicitur (Isaiah 12 [vs. 3]), Haurietis aquas in gaudio de fonte salutis.
Secundo est in fonte emanante suavitas saporosa. Dulcior enim aqua est in fonte quam in rivulo, et isto modo delectabilior dulcedo est in Christo quam in creatura quacumque. Dulcedo enim fontis est secundum conditiones terrae de qua emanat, sicut dicit Aristoteles 51 De sensu et sensato. Et ideo aqua currens per terram amaram et sulphuream et sic emanans est amara naturaliter, sed aqua emanans de terra pura et sabulosa sit dulcis et clara. Christus autem fons sapientiae manavit de terra humili Virgine videlicet gloriosa in qua nihil austeritatis, nihil amaritudinis, nihil lutosae foeditatis erat. Unde nihil amaritudinis in fonte qui Christus dicitur inveniri potest. Iacob 3 [vs. 11]: Numquid fons de eodem foramine emanat dulcem et amaram
8 Standard versions of the Vulgate have fortem, not fontem here. 381 aquam? Et tamen ipse de ingratis hominibus qui divina delectatione contempta in terrenis voluptatibus immerguntur graviter conqueritur. Jeremias 2 [vs. 13], Me dereliquerunt fontem aquae vivae et foderunt sibi dissipatas cisternas quae continere non valent aquas.
Tertio in fonte iugiter emanante invenitur comitas copiosa. Est enim fons in omnibus communis pauperibus et divitibus hominibus et iumentis. Isto modo Christus iustis et peccatoribus omnibus clemens invenitur et propitius. Genesis 2 [vs. 6], Fons ascendebat de terra irrigans universam superficiem terrae.
Dubitatio irrationalis esse potest an Deus sit in qualibet creatura adorandus. Quod non.
Quia si sic, tunc cum in aliqua creatura sit adorandus, Deus pari ratione in alia quia in qualibet est essentialiter. Quod autem sit adorandus in aliqua creatura patet Exodus 3, quia Moyses adoravit Deum in rubo. Et in Genesis [18:2] habemus quod Abraham adoravit Deum in angelo.
†Quapropter† christianus adorat Deum in crucifixo vel in imagine intendens praecise adorare
Deum et non peccat. Ergo cum Deus sit essentialiter in lapide, si aliquis existentem in lapide intendit adorare, non peccat eadem ratione. Propterea quod est maioris potentiae Deo magis est attribuendum, sed maioris potentiae videtur conservare rem per absentiam suam quam per praesentiam, sicut ex nobilitate regiae maiestatis est quod ubique regat in regno, licet ubique personaliter non existat.
Contra: Quidam effectus dependent ex suis causis quod sine earum praesentia non existunt propter vehementiam causalitatis et dependentiam effectus, sicut patet de radio et sole.
Sed omnes res summe a Deo dependent et Deus est causa intima omnis rei. Ergo est omni rei essentialiter praesens. Ad quaestionem dicit Chrysostomus quod Deus est ubique scimus, sed quomodo sit ubique intellectu non capimus.
382 Ad primum quod Deus non est adorandus in quolibet suo signo sed tamen in proprio, quod est aliqua res ad hoc ordinata ut in ea Deus honoretur, sicut fuit rubus ardens sine combustione et angelus apparens Abrahae.
Ad secundum non sunt docendi simplices ut sic in lapidibus et lignis Deum adorent propter similitudinem ad idolatriam, quamvis possit homo adorare Deum sub pia intentione in quacumque re sine peccato. Quia tamen habere posset speciem mali, melius est a talibus adorationibus abstinere.
Ad tertium dicendum quod maioris potentiae est regere per praesentiam quam per absentiam universa. Unde ille qui potest esse absens indiget moveri et transferre se frequenter.
Motus autem est actus imperfecti, nec potest aliquis ita perfecte regere absens sicut praesens.
B. English translation
For wisdom is more moving than any motion: she reacheth everywhere by reason of her pureness. For she is a vapor of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty God: therefore no defiled thing cometh into her (Wis. 7:24–25).
After a manifold commendation of the Holy Spirit whose gift is wisdom, it now remains to declare the excellence of wisdom herself. The commendation of wisdom proceeds in this way:
First, [the sacred text] commends wisdom in respect of those things that befit her absolutely in respect of herself; secondly, in respect of those things that befit her in comparison with other things. The second part of the text: She is more beautiful than the sun (Wis. 7:29).
As regards the first, [the sacred text] asserts two things: First, it shows her nobility in being; second, her power in reigning. (And being but one, she can do all things [Wis. 7:27].)
383 Regarding the first, the text asserts two things: First, it commends wisdom in virtue of her own circumstances; secondly, by figurative expressions. The second part of the text: For she is a vapor. As regards the first, [the text] attributes all things to wisdom’s governance, namely sufficient speed and coexistent presentiality. As regards the first, the text says this: Wisdom is more moving than any motion (Wis. 7:24). Note that an agent has great power in acting to the extent that it produces its effect speedily and swiftly. Hence, an agent of infinite power can act atemporally. Therefore, because the wisdom that is a gift of the Holy Spirit is in some way of infinite power, but every mobile mover is of finite power, clearly wisdom is more mobile, i.e., more powerful in moving than every [other] mobile, and consequently has sufficient speed.
Secondly, [wisdom] has coexistent presentiality. As regards this, [the text] says, she reacheth everywhere by reason of her pureness. For all things are properly arranged and governed by wisdom. As it says in Psalm 103:24: Thou hast made all things in wisdom; the earth is full of thy riches. For as master Alexander Neckam deduces, in every bodily creature, however tiny it may be, human reason can see the infinite power of God, his infinite wisdom and goodness (cf. Rom. 1:20). Let an atom serve as an example. Human reason surely approves and accepts that the measure of an agent’s power is calculated according to the proportion of the thing made in relation to [the matter] from which it is made. For the power of the one who produces an effect is perceived to be as great as the thing made exceeds [the matter] from which it is made. Therefore, because reason finds that an atom is something [created] from nothing, and knows that if an atom exceeded nothing, it would exceed the infinite, it concludes that the power bringing the atom forth from nothing to being is infinite. Secondly, reason will see that because an atom is a body, it has within itself three lines intersecting at right angles. If an arc is placed at that intersection, a sphere can be drawn over the atom. It likewise sees that an infinite number of
384 circles can be traced on the sphere; indeed, an infinite number of bodies are imaginable within the sphere. Moreover, all shapes can be drawn within the circles because the shapes are infinite in number. With them an infinite number of demonstrations can be made regarding both magnitude and number. Therefore, according to the order of cognition, human reason will see infinite knowledge traced into an atom or a flower, but no agent whatsoever can have traced
[there] infinite knowledge except one of infinite wisdom. Therefore, human reason, if it is good, will see and find in a single atom the infinite wisdom of the Creator.
Third, the reason of the human mind will see that in the acquisition of this infinite knowledge from an atom, there is great benefit for the soul and a delight that elicits wonder. And if there were infinite intellects, they would have infinite delights. Indeed, a single intellect can be delighted infinitely by acquiring the knowledge of this atom. Therefore, reason can conclude that he who created the atom is of infinite goodness, because he of his goodness created a thing of infinite benefit [for the soul].
Therefore, in this way man can conclude from the tiniest atom that God is of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. [This idea] of God can be expressed in another way, for he is in all things by essence, power, and presence. By essence, I say: The essence of anything is a certain participation in divine being, and thus the essence of anything is present to the thing insofar as it has being, as a cause is present to its proper effect. By power he is present insofar as all things act by virtue of him. By presence insofar as he immediately disposes and rules all things. Therefore, divine wisdom reacheth everywhere (i.e., in every place) by reason of her pureness (Wis. 7:24). Because a body is in every place, in the order of cognition in every body knowledge can be infinite (i.e., knowable conclusions are infinite), and this by reason of her pureness (i.e., by reason of her inability to become contaminated by any defect).
385 Therefore, in this way [the text] describes wisdom by her own absolute conditions.
Subsequently, it describes her by figurative and non-literal expressions. When it says, For she is a vapor (Wis. 7:25), where it begins subtly to describe wisdom by symbols and likenesses, it records five likenesses to which wisdom is compared. For it says by speaking metaphorically that she is vapor, emanation, brightness, mirror, and image (cf. Wis. 7:25–26). Vapor is a certain subtle body drawn forth from the earth or from the water through the heat of the sun, as is clear in the first book of the Meteorologica. Nevertheless, speaking strictly and properly, vapor is humid air drawn forth from water, whereas gas is dry and drawn forth from the earth. From these two all such phenomena of the air are produced: clouds, rains, hail, snow, thunder, dew, hoarfrost, and many other things. Therefore, wisdom is like the vapor of the power of God (Wis.
7:25); that is, a subtle effect of divine power caused in a rational mind. Secondly, it says that it is a certain pure emanation of the brilliance of almighty God (Wis. 7:25); that is, brilliance emanating purely from almighty God. To emanate is the same as to flow forth, as water rising from the earth is said to emanate. Pure [i.e., sincerus] derives from sine cera [i.e., without wax]; that is, pure, constant, and clean without weakness and a tendency to change. And therefore, by reason of the pureness of her brilliance no undefiled thing assaileth her (cf. Wis. 7:25, 24),9 as however long the sun shines upon foul places, it can never acquire anything defiled.
And a certain emanation, etc. (Wis. 7:25). For God is a spring from which every kind of grace flows forth [i.e., emanates]. For in [this] spring that flows continually there is a precious perpetuity, a savory sweetness, and an abundant affability. First, there is a precious perpetuity in the spring. For any goodness or abundance found in a river flows in full from a spring. And in the same way, any delight and goodness in creation flow in full from the spring of the divine and
9 Here, Holcot has produced a concatenation of the text. 386 infinite goodness, as it says in Ecclesiasticus 1:5: A spring of wisdom is the Word of God on high. Holy souls thirst for that spring according to Psalm 42:1–2: Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks, so longeth my soul after thee, O God. My soul is athirst for God, the living spring.10 If the hart has sucked in a serpent, it dies unless it quickly reaches water. To be sure, it naturally longs to prolong its life. Hence, as the gloss says on this verse, Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks, if the hart is burdened by old age and its bristles and antlers are growing too large, it seeks out a serpent and sucks it in through its nostrils. [The hart] then moves to and fro in violent commotion because of the [serpent’s] poison. Hence, it fiercely longs to drink at a spring; if it fails to reach [the spring], it dies, and thus it shortens its life in proportion as it thought to have prolonged it. As regards the moral sense, a man sucks in a serpent when he acquiesces to the instigations of the Devil and absorbs harmful delights through sin. But now he moves to and fro in violent commotion when the delight passes and he examines the hideousness of his sin. Then indeed he longs for the spring of mercy when he strives to be reconciled to God through the sacrament of penance. But if it happens after sucking in the serpent (i.e., after committing sin) that he does not reach the spring of grace, he incurs the penalty of everlasting death. But the spring of grace from which wells of living waters flow is Christ, for the many wounds in his body have become as it were many wells. As it says in Ecclesiasticus 50:3, In his days many wells of water flowed out, and they were filled as the sea above measure. Of these springs it is said in Isaiah 12:3, With joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation.
Second, there is in the flowing spring a savory sweetness. For water is sweeter in a spring than in a river, and in this way the sweetness that is in Christ is more delightful than that which is
10 Here, Holcot has quoted a slightly different version of the sacred text than that in the standard versions of the Vulgate. They read fortem (i.e., strong), not fontem (i.e., spring). 387 in any creature. For the sweetness of a spring depends upon the conditions of the earth from which it flows, as Aristotle says in De sensu et sensato 51. And therefore, water running through bitter and sulfurous earth and flowing in this way is naturally bitter, but water flowing from pure and sandy earth is sweet and clear. But Christ, the spring of wisdom, flowed from the lowly earth of a virgin, in truth a glorious Virgin, in whom there was no harshness, bitterness, or muddy filth.
Hence, no bitterness can be found in the spring that is called Christ; as James 3:11 says, Doth a spring send forth from the same hole water sweet and bitter? And yet he denounces the froward who disdain delight in divine things and are drowning violently in earthly pleasures. As it says in
Jeremiah 2:13, They have forsaken me the spring of living water, and hewed them out broken cisterns, which can hold no water.
Third, in the spring that flows continually there is found an abundant affability. For the spring is in all things and shared by the poor, the rich, and beasts. In this way, Christ is found merciful and favorable to all, to the righteous and to sinners. As it says in Genesis 2:6, A spring rose out of the earth, watering all the face of the earth.
An unreasonable doubt is possible regarding whether God is to be worshiped in every creature. It seems not. For if he is, then because he is to be worshiped in any creature, by a similar argument God is in another essentially, because he is everything essentially. But that he is to be worshiped in any creature is clear in Exodus 3, because Moses adored God in the burning bush. And in Genesis 18:2 we read that Abraham worshiped God in an angel. Wherefore, the
Christian who intends to worship God without qualification or reservation in a crucifix or in an image does not sin. Therefore, because God is essentially in a stone, if anyone intends to worship him existing in a stone, he does not sin for the same reason. Consequently, that which pertains to a greater power must be attributed to God most of all, but it seems to pertain to a greater power
388 to conserve a thing through its absence rather than through its presence, as a king reigns everywhere in his kingdom in virtue of his majesty, although he does not exist in an individual capacity everywhere.
On the contrary: Certain effects depend on their causes because without their presence
[these effects] do not exist due to the intensity of the causal relation and the dependence of the effect, as is clear from a ray [of sunlight] and the sun. But all things depend supremely on God and God is the inmost cause of everything. Therefore, he is essentially present to everything. In response to the question, Chrysostom says we know that God is everywhere, but how he is everywhere we do not grasp with the intellect.
To the first objection that God is not to be worshipped in any of his images, but rather in his own person, [I answer that] anything is ordered for this, that God be honored in it, as the burning bush that was not consumed and the angel who appeared to Abraham.
To the second: The simple are not to be taught to worship God in this way in stone and wood because of the resemblance to idolatry, although with a godly intention God can be worshiped without sin in anything. Nevertheless, because this could have the appearance of evil, it is better to abstain from such a manner of worship.
To the third: It pertains to a greater power to rule all things by its presence than by its absence. Hence, the one who can be absent must move and go from one place to another frequently. Motion, however, pertains to an imperfect act, nor can anyone rule as perfectly while absent as while present.
389 Bibliography
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Edited Primary Sources
Aristotle. Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de interpretatione. Edited by L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974. ———. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 2 vols. Edited by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. ———. Aristotelis de caelo: libri quattuor. Edited by D. J. Allan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936. ———. Aristotelis Physica. Edited by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. ———. Metaphysica [...] recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka. Edited by Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem. Aristoteles Latinus 25, fasc. 3.2. Leiden: Brill, 1995.
390 ———. Physica: Translatio Vetus. Edited by Fernand Bossier and Jozef Brams. Aristoteles Latinus 7, fasc. 1.2. Leiden: Brill, 1990. Alanus de Insula. Alain de Lille: Textes inédits avec une introduction sur sa vie et ses œvres. Edited by Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1965. Alcuin of York or Albinus. “Confessio Fidei.” PL 101. Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion. Edited by Francis Salesius Schmitt. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis archiepiscopi opera omnia 1. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1946. Aquinas, Thomas. Compendium theologiae seu brevis compilatio theologiae ad fratrem Raynaldum. Edited by H. F. Dondaine, W. A. Wallace, J. Perrier, and G. de Grandpré. Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia 42. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979. ———. De unione Verbi incarnati. Edited by Walter Senner, Barbara Bartocci, and Klaus Obenauer. Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 21. Leuven: Peeters, 2015. ———. Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi. Vol. 3. Edited by Maria Fabianus Moos. Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933. ———. Tertia pars Summae theologiae. Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII p. m. edita 11. Rome: Sancta Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, 1903. Arnold, Thomas, ed. Select English Works of John Wyclif. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1869–1871. Augustine of Hippo. Confessionum libri xiii. Edited by L. Verheijen. CCSL 27. Turnhout: Brepols, 1981. ———. Confessionum libri tredecim. PL 32. ———. De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus. Edited by A. Mutzenbecher. CCSL 44A. Turnhout: Brepols, 1975. ———. De doctrina christiana. Edited by J. Martin. CCSL 32. Turnhout: Brepols, 1962. ———. De Trinitate libri xv. Edited by W. J. Mountain. CCSL 50. Turnhout: Brepols, 1968. ———. Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide, spe et caritate. Edited by E. Evans. CCSL 46. Turnhout: Brepols, 1969. ———. In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus 124. Edited by R. Willems. CCSL 36. Turnhout: Brepols, 1954. ———. Enarrationes in Psalmos ci–cl. Edited by E. Dekkers and J. Fraipont. CCSL 40. Turnhout: Brepols, 1956. ———. Enarrationes in Psalmos, PL 37. ———. S. Aureli Augustini Hipponensis episcopi epistulae [...] pars iii: ep. cxxiv–clxxxiv a. Edited by Al Goldbacher. CSEL 44. Vienna: Academia Litterarum Caesarea Vindobonensis, 1904. ———. Sermon 236: “De fide Catholica.” PL 39. ———. Sermones de vetere testamento, id est sermones i–l. Edited by C. Lambot. CCSL 41. Turnhout: Brepols, 1961. Bateson, Mary, ed. Catalogue of the Library of Syon Monastery Isleworth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898. Denzinger, Henricus and Adolfus Schönmetzer, eds. Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fideri et morum. 33rd edition. Barcelona: Herder, 1965. Dickinson, Francisus Henricus, ed. Missale ad usum insignis et praeclarae ecclesiae Sarum. Oxford, 1861–1883.
391 Dreves, Guido Maria, ed. Lieder und Motetten des Mittelalters. Analecta hymnica medii aevi 20. Leipzig, 1895. Fischer, B; I. Gribomont; H. F. D. Sparks; W. Thiele; Robertus Weber; H. I. Frede; and Roger Gryson, eds. Biblia sacra iuxta vulgatam versionem. 4th edition. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1994. Forshall, Josiah and Frederic Madden, eds. The Holy Bible Containing the Old and New Testaments, with the Apocryphal Books, in the Earliest English Versions Made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and his Followers. Oxford, 1850. Friedberg, Aemilius, ed. Corpus iuris canonici […] pars secunda: Decretalium collectiones. Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1955. Gradon, Pamela and Anne Hudson, eds. English Wycliffite Sermons. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983–1996. Gregory the Great. Moralia in Iob. 3 vols. CCSL143–143B. Edited by Marcus Adriaen. Turnhout: Brepols, 1979–1985. Hamesse, Jacqueline, ed. Les Auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval: Étude historique et édition critique. Louvain-La-Neuve: Publications Universitaires, 1974. Henderson, William G., ed. Manuale et processionale ad usum insignis ecclesiae Eboracensis. The Publications of the Surtees Society 63. Leeds: McCorquodale, 1875. ———. Missale ad usum insignis ecclesiae eboracensis. The Publications of the Surtees Society 59–60. Durham, 1872–1874. ———. Processionale ad usum insignis ac praeclarae ecclesiae Sarum. Leeds: M’Corquodale & Co., 1882. Hudry, Françoise, ed. Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum. CCCM 143A. Turnhout: Brepols, 1997. Legg, Iohannis Wickham, ed. Missale ad usum ecclesie Westmonasteriensis [...] fasciculus II. Henry Bradshaw Society 5. London, 1893. Lombard, Peter. Sententiae in iv libris distinctae: […] Tomus ii: Liber iii et iv. 3rd edition. Grottaferrata: Ad claras aquas, 1981. Nestle, Eberhard, Erwin Nestle, Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, Johannes Karavidopoulos, Carlo M. Martini, and Bruce M. Metzgeret, eds. Novum testamentum graece. 27th edition. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2001. Ockham, William. Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum (reportatio). Edited by Gedeon Gál and Rega Wood. Opera theologica 5. St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1981. Palacký, František, ed. Documenta magistri Joannis Hus: Vitam, doctrinam, causam in Constantiensi Concilio actam. Prague, 1869. Pelagius. “Libellus fidei Pelagii, ad Innocentium ab ipso missus.” PL 45. Radbertus, Paschasius [Pseudo-Ieronimus Stridonensis]. De assumptione sanctae Mariae virginis. Edited by A. Ripberger. CCCM 56C. Turnhout: Brepols, 1985. Scotus, John Duns. Ordinatio: Liber tertius a distinctione vigesima sexta ad quadragesimam. Edited by P. Barnaba Hechich, Benedictus Huculak, Iosephus Percan, and Saturninus Ruiz de Loizaga. Ioannis Duns Scoti […] opera omnia 10. Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis, 2007.
392 ———. Quaestiones in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis: Libri I–V. Edited by R. Andrews, G. Etzkorn, G. Gál, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Maricil, T. Noone, et al. Opera philosophica 3. St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1997. Vigilius Tapsensis [Pseudo-Augustinus Hipponensis]. Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis. PL 42. Wallis, N. Hardy, ed. The New Testament Translated by William Tyndale 1534. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938. Wyclif, John. De civili dominio. 4 vols. Edited by Iohann Loserth. London: The Wyclif Society, 1885–1904. ———. De compositione hominis. Edited by Rudolf Beer. London, 1884. ———. De dominio divino: Libri tres. Edited by Reginald Lane Poole. London, 1890. ———. De materia et forma, in Miscellanea philosophica 1, edited by Michael Henry Dziewicki. London: The Wyclif Society, 1902. ———. “Determinatio [Johannis Wyclif] contra Kylingham carmelitam.” In Fasciculi zizaniorum magistri Johannis Wyclif cum tritico, edited by Walter Waddington Shirley. London, 1858. ———. De ente librorum duorum. Edited by Michael Henry Dziewicki. London: The Wyclif Society, 1909. ———. De veritate sacrae scripturae. Edited by Rudolf Buddensieg. 3 vols. London: The Wyclif Society, 1905–1907. ———. “Determinatio Johannis Wyclif ad argumenta magistri Outredi de Omesima monachi.” In Opera minora, edited by Johann Loserth. London: The Wyclif Society, 1913. ———. Operis evangelici liber tertius et quartus: Sive de antichristo. Edited by Johann Loserth. London, 1896. ———. Sermones. Edited by Johann Loserth. 4 vols. London, 1887–1890. ———. Tractatus de apostasia. Edited by Michael Henry Dziewicki. London, 1889. ———. Tractatus de benedicta incarnactione. Edited by Edward Harris. London, 1886. ———. Tractatus de blasphemia. Edited by Michael Henry Dziewicki. London, 1893. ———. Tractatus de ecclesia. Edited by Johann Loserth. London, 1886. ———. Tractatus de logica. Edited by Michael Henry Dziewicki. 3 vols. London, 1893–1899. ———. Tractatus de mandatis. In Tractatus de mandatis divinis accedit Tractatus de statu innocencie. Edited a Johann Loserth and F. D. Matthew. London: The Wyclif Society, 1922. ———. Tractatus de potestate pape. Edited by Johann Loserth. London: The Wyclif Society, 1907. ———. Tractatus de Trinitate. Edited by Allen DuPont Breck. Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1962. ———. Tractatus de universalibus. Edited by Ivan J. Mueller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. ———. Trialogus. Edited by Gotthardus Lechler. Oxford, 1869.
393 English Translations of Historic Works
Acevedo, Juan, ed. and trans. The Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers: Liber xxiv philosophorum: Editio minima. Matheson Trust, 2015. Aristotle. De caelo. Translated by J. L. Stocks. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: The Modern Library, 2001. ———. Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001. ———. Physics. Translated by R. P Hardie and R. K. Gaye. In The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001. Augustine of Hippo. Saint Augustine: Confessions. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Denzinger, Henry, ed. The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Translated by Roy J. Deferrari. Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2001. Grosseteste, Robert. On the Cessation of the Laws. Translated by Stephen M. Hildegrand. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012. Lombard, Peter. The Sentences: Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word. Translated by Giulio Silano. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2010. Luther, Martin. “Disputation against Scholastic Theology.” In Luther: Early Theological Works, edited and translated by James Atkinson. London: SCM Press, 1962. Pearson, A. Harford, trans. The Sarum Missal Done into English. 2nd ed. London, 1884. Philo of Alexandria. On the Account of the World’s Creation Given by Moses. In Philo 1, translated by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. Tanner, Norman P., ed. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. 2 vols. London: Sheed & Ward, 1990. Scotus, John Duns. “The Decalogue and the Natural Law,” translated by Thomas Williams. In Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions, 3rd ed, edited by Arthur Hyman, James J. Walsh, and Thomas Williams, 601–604. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2010. Warren, Frederick E., trans. The Sarum Missal in English. The Library of Liturgiology & Ecclesiology for English Readers 8, 9. London: De la More Press, 1991. Wyclif, John. On Universals. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. ———. Trialogus. Translated by Stephen E. Lahey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Introductions, Prolegomena, and Notes to Major Works
Campi, Luigi. Introduction to De scientia Dei, by John Wyclif, xi–cxxxv. Edited by Luigi Campi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Ciardi, John. Notes to The Divine Comedy, by Dante Alighieri. Translated by John Ciardi. New York: New American Library, 2003. Esolen, Anthony. Notes to Paradiso, by Dante Alighieri. Edited and translated by Anthony Esolen. New York: Modern Library, 2007.
394 Harris, Edward. Preface to Tractatus de benedicta incarnactione, by John Wyclif, vii–xxviii. Edited by Edward Harris. London, 1886. Lechler, Gotthard. Prolegomena to Trialogus, by John Wyclif, 1–35. Edited by Gotthard Lechler. Oxford, 1869. Mueller, Ivan J. Introduction to Tractatus de universalibus, by John Wyclif, xv–xciii. Edited by Ivan J. Mueller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. Muller, Jean-Pierre. Introduction to Commentaire sur Les sentences, by Jean de Paris (Quidort), Livre 1, ix–xl. Edited by Jean-Pierre Muller. Rome: Herder, 1961. Spade, Paul Vincent. Introduction to On Universals, by John Wyclif, vii–xlvii. Translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985.
Secondary Literature Pertinent to Textual Editing
Bainbridge, Virginia R. “Syon Abbey: Women and Learning c. 1415–1600.” In Syon Abbey and its Books: Reading, Writing and Religion, c. 1400–1700, edited by E. A. Jones and Alexandra Walsham, 82–103. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2010. Catto, Jeremy. “Some English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works.” In From Ockham to Wyclif, edited by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, 353–359. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Catto, Jeremy and Beryl Smalley. Wyclif & His Followers: An Exhibition to Mark the 600th Anniversary of the Death of John Wyclif: December 1984 to April 1985. Oxford: Bodleian Library, 1984. Cheney, C. R. “A Register of Mss Borrowed from a College Library, 1440–1517: Corpus Christi College, Cambridge Ms 232.” Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society 9, no. 2 (1987): 103–129. Clarke, Peter D. and Roger Lovatt. The University and College Libraries of Cambridge. London: British Library, 2002. Coxe, H. O. Catalogus codicum mss. qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur. Oxford, 1852. Dekarli, Martin. “Before and After Wyclif: Sources and Textual Influences.” Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 56, fasc. 2 (2016): 121–133. Denis, Michael. Codices manuscripti theologici bibliothecae palatinae Vindobonensis latini aliarumque occidentis linguarum. Vol. 1, part 2. Vienna, 1794. Derolez, Albert. The Palaeography of Gothic Manuscript Books: From the Twelfth to the Early Sixteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Drogin, Marc. Anathema! Medieval Scribes and the History of Book Curses. Montclair, NJ: Allanheld and Schram, 1983. Gillespie, Vincent, “The Mole in the Vineyard: Wyclif at Syon in the Fifteenth Century.” In Text and Controversy from Wyclif to Bale: Essays in Honour of Anne Hudson, edited by Helen Barr and Ann M. Hutchison, 131–162. Turnhout: Brepols, 2005. ———. Syon Abbey. London: British Library, 2001. Grotefend, H. Taschenbuch der Zeitrechnung des deutschen Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Hannover, 1898. Hudson, Anne. “Accessus ad auctorem: The Case of John Wyclif.” Viator 30 (1999): 328–338.
395 ———. “Appendix II: Supplement to Manuscript Listings.” In Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. ———. “Books and their Survival: The Case of English Manuscripts of Wyclif’s Latin Works.” In Medieval Manuscripts, Their Makers and Users, 225–244. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011. ———. “Compilations for Preaching and Lollard Literature: II. Lollard Literature.” In vol. 2 of The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain, edited by Nigel Morgan and Rodney M. Thomson. 329–339. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. ———. “Cross-Referencing in Wyclif’s Latin Works.” In The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life: Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff, edited by Peter Biller and Barrie Dobson, 193–215. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999. ———. “The Debate on Bible Translation, Oxford 1401.” The English Historical Review 90, no. 354 (January 1975): 1–18. ———. “The Hussite Catalogue of Wyclif’s Works.” In Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings, part 3, 1–35. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. ———. Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. ———. “Introduction: Wyclif’s Works and their Dissemination.” In Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings, part 1, 1–16. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. ———. “The Survival of Wyclif’s Works in England and Bohemia.” In Studies in the Transmission of Wyclif’s Writings, part 16, 1–43. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. ———. “Trial and Error: Wyclif’s Works in Cambridge, Trinity College MS B.16.2.” In New Science out of Old Books: Studies in Manuscripts and Early Printed Books in Honour of A. I. Doyle, edited by R. Beadle and A. J. Piper, 53–80. Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1995. James, Montague Rhodes. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Gonville and Caius College. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907–1914. Jayne, Sears and Francis R. Johnson. Introduction to The Lumley Library: The Catalogue of 1609, 1–37. London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1956. Latham, R. E., D. R. Howlett, R. K. Ashdowne, eds. Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources. London: Oxford University Press, 1975–2013. Lewis, Charlton T. and Charles Short. A Latin Dictionary Founded on Andrews’ Edition of Freund’s Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879. Long, R. James. “Scholastic Texts and Orthography: A Response to Roland Hissette.” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 41 (1991): 149–151. Madan, Falconer and H. H. E. Craster. A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Vol. 2, part 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922. Madan, Falconer; H. H. E. Craster; and N. Denholm-Young. A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Vol. 2, part 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937. de Marchi, L. and G. Bertolani. Inventario dei manoscritti della r. biblioteca universitaria di Pavia. Vol. 1. Milan, 1894. Menhardt, Hermann. Das älteste Handschriftenverzeichnis der Wiener Hofbibliothek von Hugo Blotius 1576. Denkschriften 76. Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, 1957. Minio-Paluello, L. “Two Erasures in Ms. Oriel College 15.” Bodleian Library Record 4 (1953): 205–207.
396 Muller, Jean-Pierre. “Les reportations des deux premiers livres du Commentaire sur Les sentences de Jean Quidort de Paris O.P.” Angelicum 33, fasc. 4 (October–December 1956): 361–414. Patera, Ad. and Ant Podlaha, eds. Soupis Rukopisů knihovny metropolitní kapitoly pražské [List of Manuscripts of the Library of the Prague Metropolitan Chapter]. Vol. 1: A–E. Prague: Česká akademie císaře Františka Josefa, 1910. Robinson, P. R. Catalogue of Dated and Datable Manuscripts c. 737–1600 in Cambridge Libraries. 2 vols. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1988. Sharpe, Richard. A Handlist of the Latin Writers of Great Britain and Ireland before 1540. Turnhout: Brepols, 1997. Silagiová, Zuana and František Šmahel, eds. Catalogi librorum vetustissimi Universitatis Pragensis. Turnhout: Brepols, 2015. Šmahel, F. Die Präger Universität im Mittelalter: The Charles University in the Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Stein, I. H. “Two Notes on Wyclif.” Speculum 6, no. 3 (July 1931): 465–468. Tabulae codicum manu scriptorum praeter graecos et orientales in bibliotheca palatina Vindobonensi asservatorum. Vol. 1. Vienna, 1864. Thompson, S. Harrison. “A Gonville and Caius Wyclif Manuscript.” Speculum 8, no. 2 (April 1933): 197–204. ———. “A Note on Peter Payne and Wyclif.” Medievalia et Humanistica 16 (1964): 60–63. ———. “Some Latin Works Erroneously Ascribed to Wyclif.” Speculum 3, no. 3 (July 1928): 387–391. Thomson, Williell R. The Latin Writings of John Wyclyf: An Annotated Catalogue. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983. Trovato, Paolo. Everything You Always Wanted to Know about Lachmann’s Method: A Non- Standard Handbook of Genealogical Textual Criticism in the Age of Post-Structuralism, Cladistic, and Copy-Text. Padua: Libreiauniversitaria.it, 2014. Warner, George F. and Julius P. Gilson. Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Old Royal and King’s Collections. 4 vols. London: The Trustees of the British Museum, 1921. West, Martin L. Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique Applicable to Greek and Latin Texts. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1973.
Secondary Literature with Serious Treatment of DI
Lahey, Stephen E. John Wyclif. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. ———. “Wyclif’s Trinitarian and Christological Theology.” In A Companion to John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, edited by Ian Christopher Levy, 127–198. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Lechler, Gotthard. Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1873. ———. John Wyclif and his English Precursors. 2 vols. Translated and edited by Peter Lorimer. London, 1878. Oey, Thomas Geoffrey. “Wyclif’s Doctrine of Scripture within the Context of his Doctrinal and Social Ideas.” PhD dissertation. Vanderbilt University, 1991.
397 Treschow, Michael. “On Aristotle and the Cross at the Centre of Creation: John Wyclif’s De Benedicta Incarnacione, Chapter Seven.” Crux 33, no. 2 (June 1997): 28–37. ———. “The Understanding of Man in the Reformers: Or Reformation Realism.” In Christian Anthropology: The Trinitarian Theology of Man,” edited by Susan Harris, 81–116. Charlottetown, PEI: St. Peter Publications, 1997. Schmidt, Martin. “John Wyclifs Kirchenbegriff: Der Christus humilis Augustins bei Wyclif.” In Gedenkschrift für D. Werner Elert: Beträge zur historischen und systematischen Theologie, 72–108. Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1955.
Other Wyclif Scholarship
Aston, Margaret. Lollards and Reformers: Images and Literacy in Late Medieval Religion. London: Hambledon Press, 1984. Breck, Allen D. “John Wyclyf on Time.” In Cosmology, History, and Theology, edited by Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, 211–218. New York: Plenum Press, 1977. Catto, J. I. “Wyclif and Wycliffism at Oxford 1356–1430.” In The History of the University of Oxford. Vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford, edited by J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, 175–261. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Cesalli, Laurent. “Le ‘pan-propositionnalisme’ de Jean Wyclif.” Vivarium 43, no. 1 (2005): 124– 155. ———. “Intentionality and Truth-Making: Augustine’s Influence on Burley and Wyclif’s Propositional Semantics.” Vivarium 45, no. 2 (2007): 283–297. Conti, Alessandro D. “Analogy and Formal Distinction: On the Logical Basis of Wyclif’s Metaphysics.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 6 (1997): 133–165. ———. “Wyclif’s Logic and Metaphysics.” In John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, edited by Ian Christopher Levy, 67–125. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Courtenay, W. J. “Theology and Theologians from Ockham to Wyclif.” In The History of the University of Oxford. Vol. 2: Late Medieval Oxford, edited by J. I. Catto and Ralph Evans, 1–34. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Dove, Mary, ed. The Earliest Advocates of the English Bible. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2010. ———. “Wyclif and the English Bible.” In A Companion to John Wyclif: Late Medieval Theologian, edited by Ian Christopher Levy, 365–406. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Evans, G. R. John Wyclif: Myth & Reality. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2005. Ghosh, Kantik. The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and Interpretation of Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Henry, Desmond Paul. Medieval Mereology. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 1991. Hornbeck II, J. Patrick. “Wyclyffes Wycket and Eucharistic Theology: Cases from Sixteenth- Century Winchester.” In Wycliffite Controversies, edited by Mishtooni Bose and J. Patrick Hornbeck II, 279–294. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011. Hudson, Anne and Anthony Kenny. “Wyclif , John (d. 1384).” In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 60:616–630. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Hurley, Michael. “‘Scriptura Sola’: Wyclif and his Critics.” Traditio 16 (1960): 275–352.
398 Keen, Maurice. “Wyclif, the Bible, and Transubstantiation.” In Wyclif in his Times, edited by Anthony Kenny, 1–16. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Kenny, Anthony. Wyclif. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. Levy, Ian Christopher. “Grace and Freedom in the Soteriology of John Wyclif.” Traditio 60 (2005): 279–337. ———. Holy Scripture and the Quest for Authority at the End of the Middle Ages. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012. ———. “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture in its Christological Context.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003): 227–240. ———. “The Place of Holy Scripture in John Wyclif’s Theology.” In The Wycliffite Bible: Origin, History and Interpretation, edited by Elizabeth Solopova, 27–48. Leiden: Brill, 2017. Michael, Emily. “John Wyclif’s Atomism.” In Atomism in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, edited by Christophe Grellard and Aurélien Robert, 183–220. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Minnis, A. J. “‘Authorial Intention’ and ‘Literal Sense’ in the Exegetical Theories of Richard Fitzralph and John Wyclif: An Essay in the Medieval History of Biblical Hermeneutics.” Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature 75 (1975): 1–31. Pabst, Bernhard. Atomtheorien des lateinischen Mittelalters. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994. Pavlíček, Ota. “Wyclif’s Early Reception in Bohemia and his Influence on the Thought of Jerome of Prague.” In Europe after Wyclif, edited by J. Patrick Hornbeck II and Michael Van Dussen, 89–114. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017. Penn, Stephen. “Truth, Time and Sacred Text: Responses to Medieval Nominalism in John Wyclif’s Summa de ente and De veritate sacrae scripturae.” PhD dissertation. The University of York, 1998. Phillips, Heather. “John Wyclif and the Optics of the Eucharist.” In From Ockham to Wyclif, edited by Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, 245–258. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. ———. 1980. “John Wyclif’s De eucharistia in its Medieval Setting.” PhD dissertation. University of Toronto, 1980. Robert, Aurélien. “Space, Imagination, and Numbers in John Wyclif’s Mathematical Theology.” In Space, Imagination and the Cosmos from Antiquity to the Early Modern Periods, edited by F. A. Bakker, Delphine Bellis, and Carla Rita Palmerino, 107–131. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019. Robson, J. A. Wyclif and the Oxford Schools: The Relation of the ‘Summa de ente’ to Scholastic Debates at Oxford in the Later Fourteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961. Smalley, Beryl. “John Wyclif’s Postilla Super Totam Bibiliam.” Bodleian Library Record 4 (1953): 186–205. ———. “The Bible and Eternity: John Wyclif’s Dilemma.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 27 (1964): 73–89. Solopova, Elizabeth, ed. The Wycliffite Bible: Origin, History and Interpretation. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
399 Thomson, Samuel Harrison. “The Philosophical Basis of Wyclif’s Theology.” The Journal of Religion 11, no. 1 (January 1931): 86–116. Tresko, Michael. “John Wyclif’s Metaphysics of Scriptural Integrity in the De veritate sacrae scripturae.” Dionysius 13 (December 1989): 153–196. Workman, Herbert B. John Wyclif: A Study of the English Medieval Church. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926.
Secondary Literature Pertaining to Christology
Adams, Marilyn McCord. “Relations, Inherence and Subsistence: or, Was Ockham a Nestorian in Christology?” Noûs 16, no. 1 (1982): 62–75. ———. What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of Christology. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999. Beeley, Christopher A. The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012. Benson, Joshua. “The Christology of the Breviloquium.” In A Companion to Bonaventure, edited by Jay M. Hammond, J. A. Wayne Hellmann, and Jared Goff, 247–287. Leiden: Brill, 2014. Campi, Luigi. “Determinism between Oxford and Prague: The Late Wyclif’s Retractions and their Defense Ascribed to Peter Payne.” In Europe after Wyclif, edited by J. Patrick Hornbeck II and Michael Van Dussen, 115–134. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017. Coolman, Boyd Taylor. The Theology of Hugh of St. Victor: An Interpretation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Cross, Richard. “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation.” The Thomist 60, no. 2 (April 1996): 171–202. ———. The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. ———. “Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham.” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 58 (1991): 126–156. Freddoso, Alfred J. “Human Nature, Potency and the Incarnation.” Faith and Philosophy 3, no. 1 (January 1986): 27–53. ———. “Logic, Ontology and Ockham’s Christology.” The New Scholasticism 57, no. 3 (September 1983): 293–330. Gavrilyuk, Paul L. The Suffering of the Impassible God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Gelber, Hester Goodenough. It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350. Leiden: Brill, 2004. ———. “Robert Holcot, Obligational Theology, and the Incarnation.” In Studies in Later Medieval Intellectual History in Honor of William J. Courtenay, edited by William O. Duba, Russell L. Friedman, and Chris Schabel, 357–391. Leuven: Peeters, 2017. Gier, Nicholas F. God, Reason, and the Evangelicals: The Case Against Evangelical Rationalism. Latham, MD: University Press of America, 1987. Gillespie, Michael Allen. Nihilism Before Nietzsche. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
400 Ginther, James R. Master of the Sacred Page: A Study of the Theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30–1235. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. Gorman, Michael. Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Horan, Daniel P. “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste.” The Heythrop Journal 52 (2011): 374–391. Hunter, Justus H. “Rereading Robert Grosseteste on the Ratio Incarnationis: Deductive Strategies in De Cessatione Legalium III.” The Thomist 81 (2017): 213–245. de Libera, Alain. “When did the Modern Subject Emerge?” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82, no. 2 (2008): 181–220. Lonergan, Bernard. The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ. Translated by Michael G. Shields. The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 7. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. Marx, C. W. The Devil’s Rights and the Redemption in the Literature of Medieval England. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995. Nielsen, Lauge Olaf. Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the period 1130–1180. Leiden: Brill, 1982. Novotný, Vojtěch. Cur homo?: A History of the Thesis Concerning Man as a Replacement for Fallen Angels. Translated by Pavlína and Tim Morgan. Prague: Karolinum Press, 2014. Oberman, Heiko. The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1967. O’Collins, Gerald. What Are They Saying About Jesus? New York: Paulist Press, 1977. Principe, Walter Henry. Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967. ———. Hugh of Saint-Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1970. ———. Philip the Chancellor’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975. ———. William of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963. Rahner, Karl. Christ, Mary, and Grace. Vol. 1 of Theological Investigations. Translated by Cornelius Ernst. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961. Raschko, Michael B. “Aquinas’s Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard’s Subsistence Theory.” The Thomist 65, no. 3 (July 2001): 409–439. Reichmann, James B. “Aquinas, Scotus, and the Christological Mystery: Why Christ is Not a Human Person.” The Thomist 71, no. 3 (July 2007): 451–474. Schabel, Chris. Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Sobrino, Jon. Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach. Translated by John Drury. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978. Wawrykow, Joseph. “Hypostatic Union.” In The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, edited by Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, 222–251. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.
401 West, Jason L. A. “Aquinas on Peter Lombard and the Metaphysical Status of Christ’s Human Nature.” Gregorianum 88, no. 3 (2007): 557–586. White, Thomas Joseph. The Incarnate Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015.
Other Pertinent Secondary Literature
Adams, Marilyn McCord. “Powerless Causes: The Case of Sacramental Causality.” In Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, edited by Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters, 47–76. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007. ———. William Ockham. 2 vols. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. Agius, T. A. “On Pseudo-Jerome, Epistle 9.” The Journal of Theological Studies 24, no. 94 (January 1923): 176–183. Allen, J. H. and J. B. Greenough. New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges. Edited by J. B. Greenough, G. L. Kittredge, A. A. Howard, and Benj. L. D’Ooge. Revised by Anne Mahoney. Newburyport, MA: Focus, 2001. d’Alverny, Marie-Thérèse. “Alain de Lille et la Theologia.” In L’homme devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac. Vol. 2, 111–128. Paris: Aubier, 1964. Bailey, Terence. The Processions of Sarum and the Western Church. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971. Bakker, Paul J. J. M. and Chris Schabel. “Sentences Commentaries of the Later Fourteenth Century.” In Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Volume 1: Current Research, edited by G. R. Evans, 425–464. Leiden: Brill, 2002. Bergh, F. Thomas. “Sarum Rite.” In The Catholic Encyclopedia, 13:479–481. New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913. Boitani, Piero. The Tragic and the Sublime in Medieval Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Bond, Francis. Screens and Galleries in English Churches. London: Henry Frowde, 1908. Boyle, Leonard E. “Clementinae.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia. 2nd ed., 3:800. Detroit: Gale, 2003. Catto, Jeremy. “Boldon, Uthred.” In Oxford Dictionary of National Biogtraphy, 6:466–467. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Costambeys, Marios. “Bracebridge [Brasbrigg], John.” In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 7:141. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Courtenay, William J. Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power. Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1990. ———. Schools & Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. Cross, F. L. and E. A. Livingstone. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Cross, Richard. Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Crouse, Robert D. “‘In aenigmate Trinitas’ (Confessions, XIII,5,6): The Conversion of Philosophy in St. Augustine’s Confessions.” Dionysius 11 (December 1987): 53–62.
402 ———. “Recurrens in te unum: The Pattern of St. Augustine’s Confessions.” In Studia Patristica 14, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone, 389–392. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976. Dronke, Peter. Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974. ———. “The Lyrical Compositions of Philip the Chancellor.” Studi Medievali 28 (1987): 563– 592 Dunbar, H. Flanders. Symbolism in Medieval Thought and its Consummation in the Divine Comedy. New York: Russell and Russell, 1961. Eden, Bradford Lee. “The Thirteenth-Century Sequence Repertory of the Sarum Use.” PhD diss. University of Kansas, 1991. Emden, A. B. A Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963. ———. A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957–1959. Forte, Stephen L. “A Study of Some Oxford Schoolmen of the Middle of the Fourteenth Century with Special Reference to Worcester Cathedral MS. F. 65.” 2 vols. B. Litt. thes., University of Oxford, 1947. François, M. “Vienne, Council of.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia. 2nd ed., 14:489–491. Detroit: Gale, 2003. Ganz, David. “Touching Books, Touching Art: Tactile Dimensions of Sacred Books in the Medieval West.” Postscripts 8.1–2 (2012): 81–113. Geach, P. T. Logic Matters. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972. Ghosh, Kantik. “Logic and Lollardy.” Medium Aevum 76, no. 2 (2007): 251–267. Gildersleeve, B. L. and G. Lodge. Gildersleeve’s Latin Grammar. 3rd ed. Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2000. Gill, J. “Basel, Council of.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia. 2nd ed., 2:134. Detroit: Gale, 2003. Ginther, James R. “Natural Philosophy and Theology at Oxford in the Early Thriteenth Century: An Edition and Study of Robert Grosseteste’s Inception Sermon (Dictum 19).” Medieval Sermon Studies 44 (2000): 108–134. Goubier, Frédéric. “Wyclif and the Logica Augustini.” Medioevo 36 (2011): 137–164. Green, V. H. H. Bishop Reginald Peacock: A Study in Ecclesiastical Life and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945. Gwynn, Aubrey. The Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940. Hall, Catherine. “Markaunt, Thomas.” In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 36:680–681. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Hamesse, Jacqueline. Les auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval: Étude historique et édition critique. Louvain-La-Neuve: Publications Universitaires, 1974. Hankey, Wayne. “Making Theology Practical: Thomas Aquinas and the Nineteenth Century Religious Revival.” Dionysius 9 (1985): 85–127. “Herzberg-Fränkel, Sigmund.” In Österreichisches biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950. Vol. 2, 296. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1959. Herzman, Ronald B. and Gary W. Towsley. “Squaring the Circle: Paradiso 33 and the Poetics of Geometry.” Traditio 49 (1994): 95–125.
403 Hodgkin, R. H. Six Centuries of an Oxford College: A History of the Queen’s College 1340– 1940. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1949. Holböck, Ferdinand. Der eucharistische und der mystische Leib Christi. Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1941. Jeauneau, Édouard. “Plato apud Bohemos.” Mediaeval Studies 41 (1979): 161–214. Jungmann, Joseph A. The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its Origins and Development. 2 vols. Translated by Francis A. Brunner. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1951–1955. Kaminsky, Howard. A History of the Hussite Revolution. Berkley: University of California Press, 1967. Kennedy, Leonard A. “The De anima of John Sharpe.” Franciscan Studies 29 (1969): 249–270. King, Archdale A. Liturgy of the Roman Church. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1957. Knowles, M. D. “The Censured Opinions of Uthred of Boldon.” Proceedings of the British Academy 37 (1951): 305–342. Knox, Ronald. On Englishing the Bible. London: Burns and Oates, 1949. Kobusch, Theo. Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters. München: C. H. Beck, 2011. Levine, Robert. “Squaring the Circle: Dante’s Solution.” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 88, no. 2 (1985): 280–284. Lewis, C. S. The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. de Libera, Alain. La querelle des universaux: de Plato à la fin du Moyen Âge. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996. Lohr, Charles H. “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Johannes de Kanthi–Myngodus.” Traditio 27 (1971): 251–351. Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964. MacIntosh, J. J. “Aquinas and Ockham on Time, Predestination and the Unexpected Examination.” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998): 181–220. Martin, Richard C. “Createdness of the Qur’ān.” In Encyclopedia of Islam THREE, BrillOnline 2015. http://dx.doi.org.avoserv2.library.fordham.edu/10.1163/1573- 3912_ei3_COM_24418 Maurer, Armand A. Medieval Philosophy. New York: Random House, 1962. ———. The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999. McKisack, May. The Fourteenth Century: 1307–1399. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959. Najman, Hindy and Benjamin G. Wright. “Perfecting Translation: The Greek Scriptures in Philo of Alexandria.” In Sibyls, Scriptures, and Scrolls, 2:897–915. Leiden: Brill, 2017. Noone, Timothy B. “Aquinas on Divine Ideas: Scotus’s Evaluation.” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 307–324. Pelletier, Jenny. William Ockham on Metaphysics: The Science of Being and God. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Robinson, John A. T. Honest to God. London: SCM Press, 1963. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian Faith. Edited by H. R. MacKintosh and J. S. Stewart. London: T & T Clark, 1999. Schwane, Joseph. Histoire des Dogmes. Vol. 4: Période du Moyen Age. 2nd ed. Translated by A. Degert. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1903.
404 Slotemaker, John T. and Jeffrey C. Witt. Robert Holcot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Šmahel, F. “Payne, Peter [Peter Engliss].” In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 43:208– 213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Smalley, Beryl. “Some Latin Commentaries on the Sapiential Books in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries.” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 18 (1950–1951): 117–121. Southern, R. W. Robert Grosseteste: The Growth of an English Mind in Medieval Europe. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Stang, Charles M. Our Divine Double. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. Steenberg, M. C. “The Role of Mary as Co-Recapitulator in St. Irenaeus of Lyons.” Vigiliae Christianae 58 (2004): 117–137. Strittmatter, A. “Exultet iam angelica turba.” In New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., 5:566–568. Detroit, MI: Gale, 2003. Traill, David A. “More Poems by Philip the Chancellor.” Journal of Medieval Latin 16 (2006): 1–18. Wedel, Theodore Otto. The Mediaeval Attitude toward Astrology Particularly in England. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. Wolter, Allan B. “Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God.” The American Catholic Philosophical Association 28 (1954): 94–121. Wood, Rega. Ockham on the Virtues. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1997.
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