Does the UN Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?

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UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 2

countries to reverting to conflict, the UN ac- 1 Introduction knowledged publicly that it regularly failed to In December 2005, the created a prevent such recurrences and to establish func- high-profile Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to tioning, responsive and inclusive political institu- serve as a dedicated institutional mechanism to tions in war-torn societies.1 It further acknowl- fill the gap in the international architecture for edged that the short timeframes, limited man- post-conflict response. As such the PBC was dates, financial and personnel resources, and mandated to link the political, security and eco- equipment provided often tended to grossly un- nomic functions of the United Nations in conflict derestimate what was required to achieve dura- and post-conflict situations. This paper analyzes ble peace and development. the PBC’s own integrated strategies for peace- The problems of coordination exists on four in- building in and , through ter-related levels: first, at the field level between cumulative performance reports and views of the various international actors including gov- practitioners. ernmental and non-governmental agencies in- 2 Post Cold War Peacebuilding volved in peacebuilding missions and domestic actors within the country itself. Second, within In almost all previous and on-going peacekeep- bureaucracies of major donor governments, ing and peacebuilding operations, the UN has whose different departments and agencies often been represented by the Department of Peace- pursue different goals and activities within the keeping Operations, the United Nations Devel- same mission. Third, serious problems of coordi- opment Program, the Department of Political nation also exist within the UN system, where Affairs, as well as over thirty other UN agencies, bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles are a legion. funds and programs including international fi- Fourth and finally, there are coordination prob- nancial institutions and regional organizations. lems at the headquarters level between all the Outside the UN structures, several international major international state building actors as well development agencies created dedicated emer- as the major governments supporting these ac- gency or transitional units to deal with initial tors. Arguably, each of these many actors tends post-conflict situations. Like the , the to compete for influence and visibility. While all Task Force of the Development Assistance international actors tend to subscribe to the Committee (DAC) of the Organization of the broad goals of transforming war economies into Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) liberal market democracies, there is no universal prepared guidelines for ‘Development Coopera- agreement on what is required to achieve this tion in Conflict: Prevention and Post-Conflict goal, or how to achieve it under different cir- Recovery’; the United Nations Development Pro- cumstances. gram (UNDP) expanded the mandate of its Divi- sion of Emergency Response; the United Nations It was against this background that in 2004 the former UN Secretary General tasked Children’s Fund (UNICEF) strengthened its Emer- gency Unit and prepared guidelines on armed a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and conflict and children; and the US Agency for Change to take stock of threats to international and human security and make recommendations International Development (USAID) created an Office of Transitional Initiatives. The involvement to improve the UN response. The Panel’s subse- of so many players with competing interests in quent report found that the UN had a vital and irreplaceable role in peacebuilding, with unique peacebuilding missions means that the coordina- legitimacy and comparative advantages that tion and integration of peacebuilding activities 2 remains a serious challenge. could not be replicated elsewhere . The report expressed concern about the fragmentary nature In addition, the attendant administrative burdens of the peacebuilding initiatives by many actors, normally imposed on recipient institutions by within and outside UN, each pursuing different competing demands from a multiplicity of do- and at times conflicting goals. It noted also that nors tend to further weaken their already limited and overburdened capacities, discomfiture frag- ile domestic political coalitions and, in extreme 1 UN Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations. UN circumstances, exacerbate the risks of reversals, doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809. 21 August 2000: Exe- setbacks and failures. Recalling growing research cutive Summary 2 findings on conflict studies that conclude there is Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal- lenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our about a fifty percent chance of post-conflict Shared Responsibility. New York: UN, 2004. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 3 there were inadequate relationships between • provide recommendations and informa- the UN agencies with the international financial tion to improve the coordination of all institutions (IFIs) through which it could effec- relevant actors within and outside the tively steer the relevant political-financial link- UN, and to develop best practices to ages necessary for effective post-conflict recov- help ensure predictable financing for ery. Moreover, the Report added that with re- early recovery activities and to extend sources disproportionately directed toward the period of attention given by the in- and emergency humanitarian ternational community to post-conflict needs, insufficient attention was being paid to recovery.4 the medium- to long-term tasks, such as build- It should be emphasized right from the start that ing sustainable institutions in post-conflict coun- the PBC serves solely as an advisory body to the tries. These missions often were too brief, too Security Council and the General Assembly. It limited, and too focused on speedy political and has no independent authority or decision- economic reforms to consolidate peace, particu- making power over other bodies. Furthermore, larly in fragile environments. Above all, the re- its recommendations and advice are on the basis port identified a key institutional gap: there was of consensus among the members of the PBC. no place in the UN system explicitly designed to assist countries in their transition from war to 4 Structure of the PBC peace. The PBC operates in three different configura- 3 The UN Peacebuilding Commission tions. The first configuration is the Central Or- ganizational Committee. It comprises 31 mem- As a result of the above glaring inadequacies, ber states, including seven from the Security the Panel’s report recommended the establish- Council, ECOSOC and General Assembly, as well ment of a Peacebuilding Commission, as a “sin- as five from the major financial donors and five gle intergovernmental organ dedicated to top troop contributors to the UN. The Central peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay Organization Committee determines the agenda close attention to countries at risk, ensure con- and assigns specific cases to country-specific certed action by donors, agencies, programs and groupings of representatives from the country financial institutions, and to mobilize financial under consideration, contributors of finance, resources for sustainable peace.” Thus, the UN troops and civilian police, other countries in the policy focus had to shift from speedy political region, regional and sub-regional organizations, and economy reforms to building effective, le- regional and international financial institution gitimate and sustainable governmental institu- and the senior UN representative in the field. tions. The Secretary General endorsed most of The second configuration is the Country Specific the report’s proposals in his March, 2005, report, Meeting of the PBC. It addresses issues particular In Larger Freedom.3 The to individual focus countries and brings together endorsed the proposals and subsequently the participants in New York with parties in the field General Assembly and the Security Council via video-telecommunications through a series of passed concurrent resolutions in December, formal and informal meetings at the UN Head- 2005, formally establishing the PBC. Both resolu- quarters as well as through country missions. tions mandated the PBC to: The third and final configuration is the Working • bring together all relevant actors to Group on Lessons Learned. The Working Group marshal resources and to advise on and studies and distills lessons from national and propose integrated strategies for post- international experiences in post-conflict en- conflict peacebuilding and recovery; gagement. It also develops forward looking les- sons and recommendations for post-conflict • focus attention on the reconstruction strategies and their implementation. and institution-building efforts neces- sary for recovery from conflict and to The PBC is supported by two other bodies: the support the development of integrated Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the strategies in order to lay the foundation Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The former is com- for sustainable development; prised of a wide range of experts who gather

3 The Secretary-General. In Larger Freedom: Toward 4 As outlined in the Security Council resolution UN Development, Security and Human Rights for All Doc. S/RES/1645, of 20 December, 2005 and UN UN Doc. A/59/2005. 21 March, 2005. Doc A/RES/60/180 December 30, 2005. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 4 and analyze information from the Commission dates of the international development agencies members on their peacebuilding activities, con- tend to divert attention, more often than not, tribute to the planning process for peacebuilding from embracing a common post-conflict inter- operations, conduct best practices analysis, and vention framework. As noted earlier, the PBC’s develop policy guidance. The latter mobilizes brief is to bridge the operational gap between funds from voluntary contributions in order to the UN Security Council security mandate and bridge funding gaps in the crucial time between the development mandate of the international conflict and recovery. The Fund’s initial funding financial institutions, the UN development sys- level was set at least $250 million. The Fund tem and the donors. Building and consolidating concentrates on four main areas: peace in post-conflict societies requires that the security, political, and economic risks be ad- • activities in support of the implementa- dressed simultaneously, and that support be tion of peace agreements; mutually reinforcing. In order to institutionalize • activities in support of efforts by the coordination among different actors and to in- country to build and strengthen capaci- tegrate priorities and goals, the PBC/PBSO de- ties which promote coexistence and the velops Integrated Peacebuilding Strategies (IPSs) peaceful resolution of conflict for each candidate country. The central argu- ment behind the introduction of IPSs is to de- • establishment or re-establishment of es- sential administrative services and re- velop a common approach to peacebuilding and lated human and technical capacities; reconstruction, endorsed by the relevant na- tional governments, local and international civil and society organizations, the IFIs and other outside • critical interventions designed to re- donors. It is also expected that such a platform spond to imminent threats to the would serve as an important institutional peacebuilding process. mechanism for joint decision-making, and ulti- The PBF has a two-tiered decision-making proc- mately provide a more coherent international ess with a central allocation of funding under support in post-conflict settings. the Joint Steering Committee, comprised of rep- Most analysts tend to agree that a full resolution resentatives from the recipient government, the of war-related crises will neither be effective nor UN, civil society and donors. Its mandate is to lasting unless all factors and all forces standing oversee the broad parameters for the use of the as impediments to the realization of peace, secu- Fund. The UNDP administers the Fund, with the rity and development are fully and comprehen- PBC playing an advisory role in setting the fund- sively addressed. This ‘political economy’ frame- ing priorities. The General Assembly plays the work of conflict includes an understanding of guiding role. There is also a PBF Advisory Group the uniqueness of each conflict system, in terms consisting of ten eminent persons, nominated by of its own particular socio-economic and political member states. According to the PBF’s terms of history, the root causes and immediate conse- reference, the Joint Steering Committee must quences of the conflict, the specific configura- ensure that the funded activities will support the tion of the actors and their interests, and the priorities identified in country specific strategic capacity of the key change agents. It is equally frameworks, to address any gap that cannot be vital to address the nature of the regional and funded through any other mechanism, and de- international environments within which the termine that the earmarked activities do not du- envisaged transformation from war to peace is plicate other on-going interventions. expected to take place.5 Above all, a compre- 5 The PBC and Peacebuilding hensive peacebuilding and reconstruction strat- Strategies egy needs to accommodate the multi-level char- acter of conflict, proliferating actors and rapidly Post-conflict interventions seek to address two shifting boundaries. Such a comprehensive un- overall objectives: to facilitate a transition to sus- tainable peace after the guns have gone silent and to support economic and social reconstruc- 5 See Woodward, S. “Economic Priorities for Success- tion. Not surprisingly, the enormous complexity ful Peace Implementation” in Stedman, S. et al. of peacemaking, provision of urgent humanitar- (Eds) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Boulder, 2002:183-214 and ian assistance to war-torn communities, the en- Boyce, Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality af- trenched actor interests and overlapping man- ter Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press, A- delphi Paper 351, 2002 UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 5 derstanding informs the conflict resolution ap- UN.6 Moreover, there is a general unwillingness proach, intervention methods and tools to be and individual pride to sacrifice their respective employed. Arguably, the process of peacebuild- autonomy and independence. ing is not simply a list of activities to be under- taken, with matrices of actors, methods and im- Policy Effectivness pacts. What kind of peace to be built informs By the end of 2007, the PBC had developed IPSs what types of intervention activities to be under- for Burundi and Sierra Leone and had adopted taken, in what sequence and for how long. monitoring and tracking mechanisms for peri- Unlike the seemingly ideological neutrality of odic assessments of progress in consolidating relief operations, the task of peacebuilding and 7 peace for both countries. But to what extent reconstruction is as openly political as that of have these policy instruments been effective? As development, carrying with it certain assump- mentioned before, the PBC as an advisory inter- tions about the primacy of particular norms, val- governmental organ lacks operational executive ues and institutions. authority to preside over or affect policy coher- 6 Taking Stock of PBC Performance in ence and coordination. 8 As various evaluation Burundi and Sierra Leone reports and our own interviews have confirmed, lacking any real authority to ensure that its rec- Coordination of Actors ommendations are taken up, that funds are dis- bursed from the Peacebuilding Fund, or to au- Sierra Leone and Burundi were identified as the thorize other UN agencies to carry out the work, first two PBC focus countries. By the end of the PBC has at best served as a ‘coordinating 2006, the PBC had identified overlapping the- forum’ rather than a management body with matic priorities for each country. For Burundi, power to formulate policies, approve programs the priorities were good governance, the rule of and budgets and evaluate performance reports. law, security sector reform and community re- covery. For its part, the PBC agreed to encour- Under such circumstances, therefore, the basic age effective coordination among international principles of coordination and coherence con- donors and peacebuilding agencies to help with tinue to elude the PBC. As Rob Jenkins notes, the mobilization of resources to Burundi to sup- the PBC has no authority to require independent port its peacebuilding priorities. For Sierra Leone, donor agencies or multilateral financial institu- the priorities were youth empowerment and tions to restructure their respective strategies, employment, democracy and good governance, plans and projects even if these would appear to and judicial and security sector reform. As in duplicate (or in some way undermine) the work Burundi, the PBC pledged to promote greater of peacebuilding actors, either domestic or ex- international coordination, mobilize resources ternal. 9 and generally to support the efforts of the gov- ernment.

As pointed out earlier, coordination for peace- 6 See Center for International Cooperation and Inter- building and reconstruction for post-conflict national Peace Institute. Taking Stock, Looking countries entails developing strategies, determin- Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission. Commissioned by the Permanent Mis- ing objectives, planning, sharing information, sion of Denmark to the UN April 2008:17. determining roles and responsibilities, and mobi- 7 UN Peacebuilding Commission. Strategic Framework lizing resources. It also entails synchronizing the for Peacebuilding in Burundi. UN Doc.PBC/BDI/4 22 mandates, roles and activities of various stake- June, 2007; and Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Coop- holders and actors in order to meet common eration Framework. UN Doc. PBC/2/SLE/1 3 Decem- objectives. The realization of this primary objec- ber, 2007. 8 tive has remained hugely illusive for the PBC. At See periodic internal reports of the PBC performance. General Assembly. Reports of the Peacebuilding the level of implementation, the current ap- Commission on its First and Second Sessions. UN proach to peacebuilding continues to be com- Doc. A/62/137-s/2007/458. 25 July 2007 and partmentalized. There are disjointed links be- A/63/92 – S/2008/147 24 June, 2008; and Ac- tween decisions made by major financial actors tionAID et al. Consolidating Peace? Views from Si- erra Leone and Burundi on the United Nations such as the IMF, the World Bank, international Peacebuilding Commission, 2008. development agencies and the UN development 9 Jenkins, R.” Organizational Change and Institutional systems and the political support offered by the Survival: The Case of the U.N Peacebuilding Com- mission.” Seton Hall Law Review 2008, 38 (1327):1327—1364. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 6

Sustained Attention on Countries and power between the Security Council and the Financing Possibilities General Assembly) continue to color the PBC’s proceedings, especially in the Organizational Furthermore, the PBC’s lack of authority is fur- Committee. More specifically, the study argued ther manifested by its inability to sustain an en- that some key members of the PBC, especially hanced attention on its candidate countries. This the Permanent Members on the Security Council, is, in part, reflected in the limited amount of rarely attended scheduled PBC meetings. Worse resources pledged and given and, in part, in the still, their respective representatives who partici- vagueness of the intended period of engage- pate actively in the field, in New York and via ment. The Strategic Frameworks for Burundi and their capitals, have not always engaged with a Sierra Leone recognize that both countries will single, coherent voice but instead have taken need the sustained attention of the international contradictory positions in different venues. community until the establishment of the foun- Equally disturbing, some PBC members from dations for sustainable peace and development. developing countries who are neither donors nor At the same time, financing instruments for represented in the field have always missed the long-term development tend to be too slow, opportunity to meaningfully and objectively add unpredictable and too cumbersome to respond their views. The videoconferencing facility, an to the needs in a fragile post-conflict environ- institutional arrangement to improve coordina- ment. However, according to African diplomats tion and communication between actors in interviewed in New York, because most of the Headquarters and the field, was not perceived countries on the current PBC watch list are per- by developing countries to be as interactive as ceived to have negligible economic and security physical meetings.12 Ultimately, one of PBC prin- importance to powerful states, they tend not to cipal objectives of promoting effective participa- attract as much attention as either Iraq or Bos- 10 tion and dialogue among members tends to boil nia. Not surprisingly also, the PBC work plans down to negotiations among the traditional do- for Burundi and Sierra Leone are drawn on a six- nor countries. month basis. By August, 2008, the Fund had only attracted a paltry US$260 million in pledges Engagement with National Actors from 44 foot-dragging donors. Beyond the coordination of international actors, Conflicting Interessts the PBC is grappling with equally troubling diffi- culties of fostering coherence and coordination The core members of the PBC constitute a col- among the legitimate representatives of the host lection of various member states with competing societies themselves, so that the international and/or contradictory national interests, values actors could engage meaningfully and effectively and priorities. Arguably, the long-running politi- with national leaders and other opinion makers. cal battles among member states in the Security In the Specific Country Meetings of Burundi and Council and the General Assembly tend to be Sierra Leone, the PBC consultations included quietly smuggled into the PBC arena. representation of senior government bureaucrats, A joint study by the Centre on International Co- bilateral donors and international NGOs. Indeed, operation of New York University (CIC) and the without government participation from the early International Peace Institute (IPI) found that the stages, the entire peacebuilding enterprise PBC process was highly politicized, extremely would be unlikely to reflect the political priorities cumbersome, confusing, and often frustrating in and concerns of the government and the pro- the field and at the headquarters.11 This obser- gram would inevitably be resented and rendered vation also was confirmed repeatedly by our in- ineffective, regardless of the quality of its design, terview respondents from the PBSO. First, the delivery or supervision. Similarly, a group of CIC/IPI study observes that the traditional ten- NGOs that produced the first-year report card on sions in the UN (in particular, over the balance of the PBC in June of 2007 found out that, proce- durally, the PBC had also taken initial steps in

10 terms of consulting a handful of civil society or- Interviews with African diplomats at the UN Offices ganizations in Burundi and Sierra Leone as part in New York February 2009. 11 See Center for International Cooperation and Inter- national Peace Institute. Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuild- ing Commission. Commissioned by the Permanent 12 See Center for International Cooperation and Inter- Mission of Denmark to the UN April 2008. national Peace Institute. Op. cit. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 7 of the country respective PBF National Steering 7 Conclusion Committees. The discussion has demonstrated that while the However, the same report further points out PBC offers rudimentary new approaches to that most of the civil society representatives peacebuilding many shortcomings still need to were state-appointed, mainly urban-based and be addressed, both within the PBC itself and the possessed highly questionable grassroots creden- international development regime at large. One tials. Arguably, from the elitist government key PBC reform need is to give the Commission standpoint, these are the kinds of NGOs that greater authority in decision making processes have the right knowledge, expertise and experi- that affect the coordination of actors, resources ence that can be brought to bear in facilitating and policies in order to achieve sustainable re- the process of defining peacebuilding objectives sults. On a larger scale, an enlightened peace- and the rules of engagement, as well as propos- building strategy for sustainable development ing planning and monitoring methodologies. should revisit the policy framework for war-torn However, the net effect of such ill-advised selec- economies. It should be driven by a duty of care tion criteria for participation had a two-way that transcends borders---seeking to design and deficit: the majority of the people in rural areas implement comprehensive aid, trade, investment, were not at all aware of the purpose and mean- debt, technology and power partnerships that ing of the PBC and the development of a peace- underwrite genuine sustainable development. building strategy, and the PBC did not get an Arguably, economic growth and export promo- accurate picture of the people’s needs and con- tion in Africa would be chiefly dependent on cerns beyond the capital cities. factors beyond the continent’s control. The terms of trade of non-fuel commodities vis-à-vis Nevertheless, several observers and diplomats manufactures have continued to fall, and many interviewed in New York unanimously and con- African economies continue to suffer tremen- fidently claimed that the PBC mechanism was dous losses. These losses have adversely affected engendering yet another important political the sustainable development prospects of poor space for the national NGOs to engage in policy post-conflict countries due to the fact that they making negotiations with their respective gov- contribute to increasing their debt problem and ernments, bilateral donors and multilateral to exacerbating their persistent poverty. A delib- agencies. The new space was serving the critical erate reform effort in the South’s terms of trade need of building confidence between the gov- vis-à-vis the West through some institutional ernment, the UN, donors and civil society, and mechanisms would be required in order to stem, was fostering new democratic norms of partici- or even better, reverse the current South-to- pation and consultation. Unfortunately, the poor West flow of economic resources. Seriously af- information flows, lack of adequate preparatory fected countries would require compensatory time, and formidable language barriers were and contingency financing without IMF-related often identified as obstacles to quality participa- conditions or currently compromised ODA flows. tory processes by some members of the national The World Bank recommendation of considering NGO communities in both Burundi and Sierra the provision of such a global public good, e.g. Leone. Similarly, most of the African diplomats global commodity price insurance instruments to interviewed in New York confirmed the PBC’s address the key price volatility problems of de- value-addition role in promoting productive na- veloping countries, should be aggressively pur- tional dialogues in post-conflict societies. They sued by all genuine development cooperation unanimously confirmed that as civil society or- platforms. Such a multilateral instrument would ganizations create a space to engage in the PBC also help to create conditions for a more equita- process, they gradually develop and nurture a ble trading system, reduce resource wastage and group stake in the peacebuilding, reconciliation unsustainable consumption patterns, and ex- and healing by addressing what they perceive to pand financial resources in Africa for a smooth be the root causes of the conflict. Our interview- transition to sustainable development.13 ees recommended only the need to address the weaknesses in the selection process, the em- The implementation of reforms in the interna- powerment of the selected representatives, and tional development regime will only yield posi- the promotion of a democratic policy manage- tive development results if they are re-enforced ment processes within the PBC. 13 World Bank. Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 2000. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 8 by equally enlightened governance regimes in full diversity of views and interests. Such national post-conflict societies. As noted earlier, un- reforms will go a long way to maximize oppor- democratic governance was one of the key trig- tunities that will be engendered by the proposed gers of conflicts in Burundi and Sierra Leone. The progressive international development coopera- enlightened governance in both countries should tion regime. include significant reforms in governance struc- tures that institutionalize democratic political systems at all levels of society, and that respect human rights, the rule of law and social equity.

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