Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?
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Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa? pbsbofkb=jK=ordrj^jr= UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 2 countries to reverting to conflict, the UN ac- 1 Introduction knowledged publicly that it regularly failed to In December 2005, the United Nations created a prevent such recurrences and to establish func- high-profile Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to tioning, responsive and inclusive political institu- serve as a dedicated institutional mechanism to tions in war-torn societies.1 It further acknowl- fill the gap in the international architecture for edged that the short timeframes, limited man- post-conflict response. As such the PBC was dates, financial and personnel resources, and mandated to link the political, security and eco- equipment provided often tended to grossly un- nomic functions of the United Nations in conflict derestimate what was required to achieve dura- and post-conflict situations. This paper analyzes ble peace and development. the PBC’s own integrated strategies for peace- The problems of coordination exists on four in- building in Sierra Leone and Burundi, through ter-related levels: first, at the field level between cumulative performance reports and views of the various international actors including gov- practitioners. ernmental and non-governmental agencies in- 2 Post Cold War Peacebuilding volved in peacebuilding missions and domestic actors within the country itself. Second, within In almost all previous and on-going peacekeep- bureaucracies of major donor governments, ing and peacebuilding operations, the UN has whose different departments and agencies often been represented by the Department of Peace- pursue different goals and activities within the keeping Operations, the United Nations Devel- same mission. Third, serious problems of coordi- opment Program, the Department of Political nation also exist within the UN system, where Affairs, as well as over thirty other UN agencies, bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles are a legion. funds and programs including international fi- Fourth and finally, there are coordination prob- nancial institutions and regional organizations. lems at the headquarters level between all the Outside the UN structures, several international major international state building actors as well development agencies created dedicated emer- as the major governments supporting these ac- gency or transitional units to deal with initial tors. Arguably, each of these many actors tends post-conflict situations. Like the World Bank, the to compete for influence and visibility. While all Task Force of the Development Assistance international actors tend to subscribe to the Committee (DAC) of the Organization of the broad goals of transforming war economies into Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) liberal market democracies, there is no universal prepared guidelines for ‘Development Coopera- agreement on what is required to achieve this tion in Conflict: Prevention and Post-Conflict goal, or how to achieve it under different cir- Recovery’; the United Nations Development Pro- cumstances. gram (UNDP) expanded the mandate of its Divi- sion of Emergency Response; the United Nations It was against this background that in 2004 the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan tasked Children’s Fund (UNICEF) strengthened its Emer- gency Unit and prepared guidelines on armed a High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and conflict and children; and the US Agency for Change to take stock of threats to international and human security and make recommendations International Development (USAID) created an Office of Transitional Initiatives. The involvement to improve the UN response. The Panel’s subse- of so many players with competing interests in quent report found that the UN had a vital and irreplaceable role in peacebuilding, with unique peacebuilding missions means that the coordina- legitimacy and comparative advantages that tion and integration of peacebuilding activities 2 remains a serious challenge. could not be replicated elsewhere . The report expressed concern about the fragmentary nature In addition, the attendant administrative burdens of the peacebuilding initiatives by many actors, normally imposed on recipient institutions by within and outside UN, each pursuing different competing demands from a multiplicity of do- and at times conflicting goals. It noted also that nors tend to further weaken their already limited and overburdened capacities, discomfiture frag- ile domestic political coalitions and, in extreme 1 UN Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations. UN circumstances, exacerbate the risks of reversals, doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809. 21 August 2000: Exe- setbacks and failures. Recalling growing research cutive Summary 2 findings on conflict studies that conclude there is Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal- lenges and Change. A More Secure World: Our about a fifty percent chance of post-conflict Shared Responsibility. New York: UN, 2004. UN Peacebuilding Commission in Africa FES Briefing Paper 8 | June 2009 3 there were inadequate relationships between • provide recommendations and informa- the UN agencies with the international financial tion to improve the coordination of all institutions (IFIs) through which it could effec- relevant actors within and outside the tively steer the relevant political-financial link- UN, and to develop best practices to ages necessary for effective post-conflict recov- help ensure predictable financing for ery. Moreover, the Report added that with re- early recovery activities and to extend sources disproportionately directed toward the period of attention given by the in- peacekeeping and emergency humanitarian ternational community to post-conflict needs, insufficient attention was being paid to recovery.4 the medium- to long-term tasks, such as build- It should be emphasized right from the start that ing sustainable institutions in post-conflict coun- the PBC serves solely as an advisory body to the tries. These missions often were too brief, too Security Council and the General Assembly. It limited, and too focused on speedy political and has no independent authority or decision- economic reforms to consolidate peace, particu- making power over other bodies. Furthermore, larly in fragile environments. Above all, the re- its recommendations and advice are on the basis port identified a key institutional gap: there was of consensus among the members of the PBC. no place in the UN system explicitly designed to assist countries in their transition from war to 4 Structure of the PBC peace. The PBC operates in three different configura- 3 The UN Peacebuilding Commission tions. The first configuration is the Central Or- ganizational Committee. It comprises 31 mem- As a result of the above glaring inadequacies, ber states, including seven from the Security the Panel’s report recommended the establish- Council, ECOSOC and General Assembly, as well ment of a Peacebuilding Commission, as a “sin- as five from the major financial donors and five gle intergovernmental organ dedicated to top troop contributors to the UN. The Central peacebuilding, empowered to monitor and pay Organization Committee determines the agenda close attention to countries at risk, ensure con- and assigns specific cases to country-specific certed action by donors, agencies, programs and groupings of representatives from the country financial institutions, and to mobilize financial under consideration, contributors of finance, resources for sustainable peace.” Thus, the UN troops and civilian police, other countries in the policy focus had to shift from speedy political region, regional and sub-regional organizations, and economy reforms to building effective, le- regional and international financial institution gitimate and sustainable governmental institu- and the senior UN representative in the field. tions. The Secretary General endorsed most of The second configuration is the Country Specific the report’s proposals in his March, 2005, report, Meeting of the PBC. It addresses issues particular In Larger Freedom.3 The 2005 World Summit to individual focus countries and brings together endorsed the proposals and subsequently the participants in New York with parties in the field General Assembly and the Security Council via video-telecommunications through a series of passed concurrent resolutions in December, formal and informal meetings at the UN Head- 2005, formally establishing the PBC. Both resolu- quarters as well as through country missions. tions mandated the PBC to: The third and final configuration is the Working • bring together all relevant actors to Group on Lessons Learned. The Working Group marshal resources and to advise on and studies and distills lessons from national and propose integrated strategies for post- international experiences in post-conflict en- conflict peacebuilding and recovery; gagement. It also develops forward looking les- sons and recommendations for post-conflict • focus attention on the reconstruction strategies and their implementation. and institution-building efforts neces- sary for recovery from conflict and to The PBC is supported by two other bodies: the support the development of integrated Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the strategies in order to lay the foundation Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). The former is com- for sustainable development; prised of a wide range of experts who gather 3 The Secretary-General. In Larger Freedom: