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For Continued Coverage of Argentina's Presidential Election, Visit Our For continued coverage of Argentina’s presidential election, visit our special Web site, Argentina Elige, and tune into our podcast. Photo: Twitter/ Alberto Fernández Frente de Cambio Last Sunday, Argentina’s peaceful election occurred during one of the most tumultuous periods in modern Latin American history. Argentina’s normally quiet Andean neighbors, Chile and Bolivia, were racked by violent street protests. Meanwhile, Argentines, suffering their most severe economic crisis in decades, participated in peaceful campaign rallies and then 26.6 million Argentines – more than 80 percent of the electorate – voted without incident. President Mauricio Macri’s close second-place finish means that, for the first time since 1928, a non-Peronist president will finish his term and peacefully hand over power to a Peronist successor, in this case, Alberto Fernández. That is no small feat for a country famous for economic and political instability. But amid the justifiable enthusiasm over Argentina’s maturing democracy, the country’s near-term future is worrisome. Mr. Fernández’s performance in the election fell short of expectations, and raised questions about the capacity of his government to navigate one of the worst economic calamities to hit Argentina since 2001. There are also concerns about Argentina’s future foreign policy. Mr. Fernández wore his foreign policy on his sleeve on election night, praising Lula and Evo Morales, and raising fears of a major regional realignment that would isolate Argentina from its neighbors, the United States and Europe at a time when it is deeply dependent on international goodwill. The Results Mr. Macri lost his reelection bid, capturing 40 percent of the vote – only the third incumbent in Latin America to be voted out of office since the 1980s. Mr. Fernández won the presidency with 48 percent of the vote, above the 45 percent threshold required for a first-round victory. Although Mr. Macri lost the election, as expected, most observers were surprised by how well he performed, given economic conditions. Background Argentina’s electoral calendar includes an open, obligatory and simultaneous primary (PASO) that in theory gives voters an opportunity to choose candidates for the general election. But since all parties choose their candidates through backroom deals, the August PASO instead served as a poll measuring the electoral strength of the parties prior to the election two months later. In the primary, Mr. Macri suffered an unexpectedly dramatic loss. Polls suggested a close contest between him and Mr. Fernández. But Mr. Fernández ended up ahead by a 16 percentage point margin. This was nothing short of a black swan event, blindsiding markets and provoking the greatest single day selloff of a stock market anywhere in the world since 1989. The peso devalued by almost 40 percent the following day, and Argentina’s country risk ballooned, from 860 basis points to 1,460. The results kneecapped a tepid economic recovery, erased gains in the fight against inflation and undermined Mr. Macri’s hopes for a second term. Yes, We Can! In the immediate aftermath, Mr. Macri angrily chastised voters, then ended up apologizing and announcing a series of emergency economic measures reminiscent of the policies his populist predecessor had favored to address inflation and economic malaise. The policy reversal muddied Mr. Macri’s political brand, while failing to recover momentum. Marcos Peña, Mr. Macri’s chief strategist, is the architect of Mr. Macri’s long string of successful political campaigns. Following the PASO, Mr. Peña, beset by criticism from inside and outside Cambiemos, reoriented the campaign strategy. In the lead-up to the PASO, he said, “we lacked a ground game,” and he promised to get “back to the basics.” He appealed to the president’s demoralized base, with allies knocking on doors and calling on supporters to show up at rallies. In late September, Mr. Macri announced a nationwide tour of 30 cities in 30 days, spreading the word on social media with a strikingly upbeat hashtag, #SíSePuede. His message was simple: the election results were not set in stone, and Mr. Macri could prevail in a second round, if only he could force a run-off. The strategy was met with skepticism as polls, albeit of questionable reliability, suggested Mr. Fernández would prevail in the first round with more than 50 percent of the vote. But as Mr. Macri’s rallies gathered steam, even jaundiced observers of Argentine politics acknowledged something was afoot. As La Nación columnist Carlos Pagni observed, “What we see is a curious and difficult to interpret phenomenon: the lower middle and middle classes have shown their support for the ruling party.” The high point of the #SíSePuede campaign was the March of a Million, on the iconic 9 de Julio avenue in the center of Buenos Aires. Attracting hundreds of thousands of supporters, the rally flooded the world’s widest street. In Argentina, rallies of this scale are normally associated with the opposition Peronists, who have developed strong organizational linkages with governors, unions and social movements. In this year’s presidential campaign, for the first time since Radical President Raúl Alfonsín in the early 1980s, a non-Peronist demonstrated the capacity for a mass mobilization of supporters. Mr. Macri’s newfound momentum persisted through the election, when he surprised observers, and pollsters, with a significant recovery compared to the primaries. In all, Mr. Macri gained over 2.3 million votes, while Mr. Fernández only increased his support by 270,000 votes. The gap between Mr. Macri and Mr. Fernández was halved, from 16 percentage points to eight percentage points. As a result, Mr. Macri’s party performed well in the legislative elections, gaining nine seats in the lower house, where its bloc will have more seats than Mr. Fernández’s coalition. In the senate, the Peronists will have a majority, but a slim one. A Mixed Bag Although Mr. Macri lost the election, he may have saved his political career. Many analysts had warned that Mr. Macri’s poor performance during the PASO meant his days as opposition leader were numbered. Instead, his resurgence breathed new life into his political career, solidified his coalition as Argentina’s primary opposition movement, and may have saved his legacy. The same cannot be said for the biggest loser of the night, the governor of Buenos Aires province, María Eugenia Vidal. Ms. Vidal was one of Argentina’s most popular politicians, prompting months of rumors of a “Plan V” – which would have seen Mr. Macri step down as the Cambiemos candidate, and Ms. Vidal lead the ticket. When that did not materialize, supporters of the governor floated another idea, to decouple the provincial and national elections to let Ms. Vidal capitalize on her popularity and avoid an association with an unpopular president. But that would have deprived Mr. Macri of Ms. Vidal’s coattails in a brutal electoral battleground, and so Ms. Vidal agreed to run for reelection on the same day as Mr. Macri. That decision might have cost her the election. In polls leading up to the PASO, Ms. Vidal was expected to lose to her Peronist opponent, ultra-kirchnerista Axel Kicillof, but she was at least expected to outperform Mr. Macri, due to ballot splitting. As it turned out, Ms. Vidal seriously underperformed in August, attracting only 34 percent of the vote compared to Mr. Kicillof’s 53 percent, a 19 percent margin. In the general election, Ms. Vidal improved her performance, but only by four percentage points, losing to Mr. Kicillof by a wide margin. For now, it appears her failure to replicate Mr. Macri’s comeback has weakened her image as the future leader of her coalition. On the other hand, the biggest victor of the night for the governing coalition was Buenos Aires Mayor Horacio Rodríguez Larreta. Mr. Larreta succeeded Mr. Macri as mayor in 2015, and has presided over important achievements, including improving city infrastructure and expanding the government’s presence in Villa 31, one of Argentina’s largest slums. He also had the advantage of running in the capital city, a stronghold for Mr. Macri’s party, the Republican Proposal (PRO), which benefitted over the last four years from Mr. Macri’s support and the national government’s resources. In any context, defeating Mr. Larreta would have been tough for the Peronists. In this case, the opposition gambled on an outsider, Matías Lammens, as its candidate. Mr. Lammens is president of one of Argentina’s most important soccer clubs, San Lorenzo, and is young and charismatic. But in the PASO, Mr. Larreta performed well, capturing 50 percent of the vote, compared to Mr. Lammens’s 35 percent. In the election on Sunday, Mr. Larreta crushed his opponent, winning by 21 percentage points. Though he failed to make inroads in Villa 31 – where voters supported the Peronists by a margin of more than 30 percent – it was the first time since the PRO gained power in Buenos Aires in 2007 that the party avoided a run-off election. Undoubtedly, this strengthened Mr. Larreta’s claim as the natural heir to Mr. Macri, another former Buenos Aires mayor, who is also known more for his administrative know-how than his charisma. United We Stand, Divided We Fall Notwithstanding Mr. Macri’s resurgence, the big winner of the night was, of course, Mr. Fernández, who catapulted from relative obscurity to become president-elect in a mere six months. Former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had been widely expected to be the candidate for the Peronist opposition. However, despite her standing as the opposition’s most formidable politician, she remained one of the most polarizing figures in recent Argentine history, and her years out of office had not erased memories of her divisive rule.
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