༄༅། །གཞན་སྟོང་ད孴་མ荲་རྒྱན་筺ས་宱་བ་བ筴གས། The Ornament of Zhentong Madhyamaka

By Jetsun Taranatha Translated by the Dzokden Translation Committee under the direction of Khentrul Rinpoché Jamphel Lödro.

First published 2020 Current version (2020) Generated by the Dzokden Library v0.1 (Built using Open Source Software) (https://read.84000.co)

The Treasury of Definitive Meaning is an non-profit initiative to perserve and transmit the Dzokden Dharma as a cause for manifesting a golden age of peace and harmony in this world.

This work is provided under the protection of a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution - Non-commercial - No-derivatives) 3.0 copyright. It may be copied or printed for fair use, but only with full attribution, and not for commercial advantage or personal compensation. For full details, see the Creative Commons license. co. CONTENTS

e ti. Title...... i co. Contents...... iii s. Summary ...... iv ac. Acknowledgements ...... iv i. Introduction ...... v tr. The Translation ...... 1 p. Prologue...... 1 1. The Authority of the Conqueror’s Word ...... 1 2. The Three Turnings ...... 2 3. The Two Truths ...... 3 4. [The Four Reliances]...... 3 5. Distinguishing Provisional and Definitive ...... 4 6. Divisions of Madhyamaka and Mind-only...... 7 7. [The Traditions of Rangtong and Zhentong]...... 8 8. Refuting Zhentong as Non-Buddhist ...... 12 9. Refuting Reasoning in Zhentong...... 14 10. Refuting Emptiness as Only Self-Emptiness...... 15 11. Refuting Rangtong Madhyamaka as Ultimate...... 15 12. How Rangtongpas establish Zhentong ...... 18 13. Our Own System...... 21 14. [Conclusion and Dedication of Merit] ...... 22 c. Colophon ...... 23 n. Notes ...... 24

iii s. SUMMARY

A detailed analysis of the common misconceptions held during the 17th century regarding the profound view of Zhentong Madhyamaka. ac. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Translated by the Dzokden Translation Group under the direction of Khentrul Rinpoché Jamphel Lödro. The text was translated, introduced, and annotated by Ives Waldo (Rimé Lödro).

iv i. INTRODUCTION

One reason that this profound text, has not been more influential and has aroused bitter controversy is that the presentation is condensed to the point that it is, at best, easily misunderstood, and at worst, literally false. Unsympathetic opponents looking for something to refute only exacerbate this problem. Hence Jonangpas have been frequently accused of being secret Hindus, or advocates of the absolute conceptual consciousness of Mind-only. We should recall that, in Tibet, texts like this are most often used as bases for commentary for students by more learned teachers. The text is condensed into summary verses that can be easily memorized. Then the teacher fills out the argument and resolves doubts. Therefore, I feel there is a need for explanatory notation to clarify Tāranātha’s intended meaning. Lengthy footnotes and parenthetical additions can be tedious. So, while I do have some footnotes, I have also added shorter notations to the text, so that readers will not be confused about which words are Tāranātha’s. Longer notations on bolded passages are referenced to appendices A1, and so forth. Links connect passages in the text with supporting scriptures in the companion text. Capitalized epithets like “the Conqueror” or “the World Protector” refer to the historical Buddha, Śākyamuni. “Word” capitalized refers to the Buddha’s teachings. When one line of Tibetan verse is translated by two or more lines in English, the extra lines begin with a small letter. Perhaps the vagueness of Tāranātha’s approach has its virtues, though. A common oriental way of proceeding in such cases is to give a corner or two of the verbal teachings, to make students work out the rest. That makes students go beyond rote learning, and develop a thorough understanding of the intricacies of their school’s view, and its connection to the associated practice and experience.

5 tr. THE TRANSLATION The Ornament of Zhentong Madhyamaka

p. PROLOGUE

OṂ Svāsti. Namo Buddhaya.

The one who, by tongues of flame of vajra pristine wisdom,1 Consumed the mountains and forests of the view of self, The World Protector, who abides beneath the place2 Of the seven kinds of [relative] consciousness, Who became the god of gods, I bow to the Lord of Conquerors;

The one whose teachings, with [different] manners for different occasions,3 Taught to all the way of occurrence of dharmatā; Though disagreeable, childish ones were disputatious, Still gave them these authentic instructions on reasoning.

1. The Authority of the Conqueror’s Word

Though here in the Land of Snow,4 concrete, extremist doctrines,5 And the [realist] approach of the Śrāvakas6 were not accepted as the highest [formulation of Buddhist teachings]; Awakened karmic propensities of these two [approaches], [Led to] the meaning of the texts of the Highest Vehicle being wrongly explained. This needs to be corrected.

Learned [Mahāyānists], in the Land of Noble Ones,7 Declared, “The scriptures spoken by the Conqueror Shall be proclaimed as authoritative from now on. Reasoning that has exhausted faults does not speak falsely. For that reason, [the falsehoods of] the Śrāvaka [Vehicle] Cannot be the Word of the Conqueror who taught the Great Vehicle;” [Then,] when they proved the Word, Tibetans proclaimed that proving The Word of the Mahāyāna was accomplished by [certain] treatises, Some scriptures that happened to be in accord with their own ideas,

And that all [texts] saying otherwise were of [merely] provisional

1 meaning. Insofar as their meaning benefits beings, indeed it is wonderful; [Still,] meanings that do not abide in the essence8 are said to be false – [Mere] claims [of validity] cannot establish scriptures as valid.

If the Conqueror who has exhausted all faults [still] speaks falsely,9 Why mention his noble disciples who abandon all partiality And ordinary beings who still possess all faults?10 [Such] persons cannot avoid falsity. They cannot be authoritative.

Then, according to the meaning just presented, how can it be right for speakers of Buddhist doctrine To claim that the Buddha’s words are not authoritative? [Instead, we should seek the perspective from which those teachings are true.]

2. The Three Turnings

Most Tibetans claim, regarding the [Buddha’s] three turnings, That the first, by teaching all dharmas as truly existent, is false; The middle, by teaching emptiness, is of the definitive meaning; And the last, by teaching existence,11 is [again of] provisional meaning.

In general, not all the provisional meaning is false words. In the gradual path that leads to the excellent way things are, Teachings true in the relative are taught as provisional meaning – [Thus, in giving those teachings, the Buddha does not speak falsely;] But teachings of the absolute way things really are Teach the definitive meaning. So capable ones maintain.

“All teachings taught for a purpose are of the provisional meaning,”12 Some, indeed, maintain this; but, as all holy Dharma Is for the purpose of taming beings, it would [all] be provisional.

Nāgārjuna, as well as Asaṅga and his brother,13 Establish that the three turnings have a single intention: The first turning [of the wheel] teaches the relative. It is taught in accordance with the way things appear. There is no teaching that what [appears] has true existence, Within the subject of analyzing for how things are; therefore, the words [of these relative teachings] are not false.

The middle14 refutes all dharmas of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, All of the relative; but whether sugatagarbha, Exists or not is never taught or examined at all. Therefore, these two [turnings] do not contradict the last.

In any case, the first chiefly teaches the relative. In the middle, there is only half the definitive meaning; [The lack of true existence of the relative, But not the true existence of the absolute.] The last [turning] perfectly teaches the definitive absolute.15

2 The examples of medicine for the sick and learning letters; Have this intention, and others16 are contradictory.

If it the first turning were to teach, All“ dharmas are stable,”17 That would contradict the Sūtra of Katyayana. If the middle negated the absolute, [dharma]dhātu and so forth,18 That would contradict the Sutra Requested by Maitreya.19 The sūtras and [treatises]20 then would have mutual contradictions.21

3. The Two Truths

Moreover, the Buddha says in the Chapter on Changeless Dharmatā:

In that way, Subhūti, all dharmas are emanations.22 Some are emanations of the Śrāvakas. Some are emanations of the Pratyekabuddhas. Some are emanations of the bodhisattvas. Some are emanations of the tathāgatas. Some are emanations of the afflictive emotions. Some are emanations of the provisional Dharma.

Subhūti, all dharmas in that list are like emanations.

Also:

Subhūti asked, “What phenomenon is not an emanation?”

The Buddha spoke saying, “Subhūti, a phenomenon that is unborn and unceasing is not an emanation.”

Then:

Subhūti asked, “Blessed One, what phenomenon might that be?”

“Subhūti, it is the phenomenon that possess the quality of non-deception, nirvāṇa. That phenomenon is not deceptive.”

4. [The Four Reliances]

[Rangtong Objection:]

Teaching emptiness through [existent] sugatagarbha Is known to be separate from the definitive meaning sūtras.23 [This] is taught by beings who are common individuals. All such teachings are known to be of provisional meaning. [They have a hidden intention of emptiness of selfhood.] Has that not been maintained?

[Zhentong answer:]

However, when the essence is taught in the final turning, It should not be explained as an empty mental construct,24 [Mere wistful imagination of what could never exist.]

3 The absolute self is not taught as a [relative] individual, [Subject to the duality of relative concepts, Which both of us agree to be empty of true existence.] Accordingly, the final [turning] is known as “supreme,” [Because it teaches the ultimate self, the way things are.]

[You complain that our absolute self is like the gods of the Hindus.] Maheśvara and so forth indeed have been called exalted, But teaching that is not right, for the words are not validly spoken. Why? They are spoken of [entities] other than the [three] jewels, [Such words] are to be abandoned by those who seek liberation.

If they25 were true, the Conqueror’s speech would not be valid. Any masters maintaining that [such a teaching] is valid Have the same understanding as [Indian] extremists, [Including Rangtongpas who deny the Buddha’s Word.] If26 you think that, by being exalted, they do not have this fault; The same reasoning would apply to Maheśvara and so forth.

Claiming they are better than Buddha, they are no Buddhists. If, [as they claim,] their words are better than the Buddha’s, Why could the words of a [common] being not be so too? [Rangtongpas] speak of the four reliances incorrectly:

Relative existence is said to be existence. Relative nonexistence is said to be nonexistence. Absolute nonexistence is said to be existence. [Absolute existence is said to be nonexistence:] [They] do not rely on the absolute, but the relative.

When consciousness has an essence, they say it is existent.27 When it does not, [they] cut it off as nonexistent.28 Though wisdom cannot exist from the viewpoint of appearance,29 [Within the relative apprehension of consciousness,] [Exponents of Rangtong want to] claim that it does: Abandoning pristine wisdom, they teach only consciousness.

They claim that teachings taught by the Buddha are mostly false,30 While their “valid” commentaries on his intention are true; If a root text is false, their commentary cannot be true. Relying on individuals, they abandon the [holy] Dharma.

Understanding the real in terms of the two negations, [One that includes an affirmation, and one that does not,] Logicians, and those like them, rely on [fallacious] words31 [And not the infallible meaning, the Dharma of realization.]

Most of the later exponents of self-emptiness Have strayed quite far away from these four reliances, [Though,] in the Word of the Conqueror, these four are praised.

4 5. Distinguishing Provisional and Definitive

The present subject needs to be further elucidated. There are no sūtras at all that clearly teach [the approach] That the middle is definitive and the last turning is provisional.32

The Saṃdhinirmocana, Mahāparinirvāṇa, Aṅgulimāla Sūtra and others clearly explain That the middle is provisional and the last the definitive meaning. To claim that the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, teaches the essence As of the provisional meaning is33 [as weak as] the squeak of a rabbit.34

[You] ask whether [sugatagarbha] is like the extremists’ false self, [A mere delusive entity of the relative.] [Our true self] is [absolute] emptiness,35 so [we] teach these are not the same. “All emptiness negates true existence without affirmation,” Is a fault in the understanding of advocates of Rangtong,36 [Persistent proclaimers of nothingness as the way things are, Though their view is supposed to be beyond all assertions.]

[Rangtong objection:]

“The pristine wisdom of emptiness, [your alleged perceiver of] suchness, Is empty, by non-affirming negation, as nothing at all, [According to reason that analyses for absolute truth, As it is taught within the Buddha’s second turning. Therefore, not absolute, as you claim,] it is relative.”

[Zhentong answer:]

Some [of you] claim that “emptiness that analyzes the skandhas [Establishes] all phenomena as nonexistence.” [This is, indeed, the case for relative phenomena, But not for the suchness of absolute phenomena, Whose purity transcends both concepts and their analysis.]

Though emptiness [proved by] analysis37 with analytical reasoning Is, [in your] intention, a means [of establishing] suchness;38 As a means of establishing suchness possessing all supreme aspects,39 Your [negation] directly contradicts what [is to be proved.]40 [You eliminate absolute suchness, along with all other phenomena.]

[The final turning] is, indeed, described as provisional In [Candrakīrti’s] Entering the Middle Way; But, as it is described as definitive by the ictoriousV One, the final [turning] is proved to be the definitive meaning.41

Middle [turning] discourse, much in accord with the first,42 [Presents the “real,” describable dharmas of abhidharma, Characterized by impermanence, dependence, and suffering, And disproved, as we both agree, by Madhyamaka reasoning.]

5 Final turning discourse, much in accord with mantra, [Transcending all the limitations of relative concepts, Presents the actual, luminous, blissful way things are, Established by the experience of all the victorious ones.] Those reasons43 establish the final turning as supreme.

If [the third turning] is provisional, how can it be [so] profound? In particular, when the final turning44 is taught as provisional, Since [the absolute] is provisional, that is logically absurd.

After teaching the ultimate definitive meaning, If those to be tamed are told it is of provisional meaning, [Negating absolute suchness, as if it were relative things,] The stages of teaching [the two]45 will be thrown into great disorder.

When the teaching is out of order, for some individual [student,] The [true, non-conceptual] self will be conceptual.46 [It will not bear analysis,] which is incorrect. [True self] is not something suitable for analysis, [Because it transcends all concepts that could be analyzed.] Nirvāṇa, as taught in the Questions of King Dharaṇīśvara,47 [As the ultimate goal, the truth that fulfills all wishes,] Will [then] be joined to leading individuals astray, [Chasing a phantom fulfillment, in an inescapable void.]

The example of medicinal milk and that of a jewel Show as one how defilements of [true] mind are purified, [So that enlightened dharmakāya can manifest.] In the Mahāparinirvāṇa, eight misapprehensions are taught.

In particular, the kāya of the Conqueror is pure.48 The buddha field and so forth, the blissful, absolute dhātu, Are permanent mind itself. Since this is [our] absolute self, Conceiving a body of flesh and blood, [in] the truth of suffering, With instantaneous aspects whose nature lacks true existence, [As what we are] is wrong view that has the four misapprehensions.

The first turning is in accord with [the viewpoint of] the world. The middle [is in accord] with the relative [being] natureless, While the Conqueror and his children have countless good qualities.49 Indeed, it is better, in many ways, than the Śrāvaka system; Yet mostly, it still accords with the Lesser Vehicle sūtras.

The way of naturelessness50 in the last is like the middle. [What is] other [than absolute] is never taught as existing, But here many special, [absolute] dharmas are taught to exist. Among the Dharma terms of this uncommon Great Vehicle, There are the five topics, three natures, and eight kinds of consciousness; Extensively taught in the sūtras of the final turning, But taught in the middle one seldom, briefly, and unclearly.

The first [turning] is provisional.51 If the last were also provisional, The two should be predominantly in accord;52

6 Yet the first and last turnings of the wheel of Dharma have very different ways of explaining [the eacher’sT intention.]

That was the beginning of the teachings on the three turnings [of the wheel of Dharma, and the discussion of] provisional and definitive, with how the last [turning] is established as [definitive, and hence supreme.]

6. Divisions of Madhyamaka and Mind-only

Though the three turnings have a single pith of intention, [Lesser Vehicle] Śrāvakas, the exponents of Rangtong, Adherents of Mind-only, and those of Zhentong [Madhyamaka,] Have positions [very] different in [certain] particulars.

Excluding Śāntarakṣita and Vimuktisena,53 Along with their followers, the other Rangtongpas Explain the relative like the two schools of Śrāvakas,54 [The realist Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas.] The relative in Mind-only and Zhentong is similar, [As mental phenomena, included within the grasper and grasped—]

[That is,] Rangtongpas are similar to the Śrāvakas, And many Zhentong presentations55 are like Mind-only. [However,] they are not Śrāvakas and Cittamatrins, [Because their views do not accord in all respects, Particularly, their accounts of absolute emptiness.]

[For example,] the Laṅkāvatāra is taught to transcend Mind-only. The [false] view of Mind-only is that consciousness truly exists. [The Laṅkāvatāra’s true absolute56 is Dharmadhātu.] Dharmadhātu is not consciousness, so [Zhentong] is not the same.

The three vehicles, in the ultimate, are not [merely] ornamental;57 Yet one or three vehicles may or may not exist [for Zhentong], and the same is true for the cut-off family [Of beings who can never attain enlightenment.] The three natures and two truths may be maintained or not, though this is not characteristic of Yogācāra Madhyamaka, [Because those natures and truths are always present there.]

All the four doctrines present [some division] of the two truths. The three natures are also taught in the Perfection of Prajñā, And also, by [Nāgārjuna’s] Bodhicittavivarana.58

The sūtras explain a temporary cut-off family. It is taught that tathāgatagarbha is in all beings, [And so it is certain that they will actualize enlightenment.] As taught in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkara, an ultimate cut-off family is thus refuted.

7 Because there is the ultimate,59 [Zhentong] teaches one vehicle. Rangtongpas maintain three incidental vehicles, [But their absolute has neither “vehicles” nor “attainment.”]60 The Chapter Requested by Maitreya too has three. Some Rangtongpas use Mind-only for the relative. Though they say that, why speak of divisions created by fools?61

The Conqueror teaches both transcending Mind-only and not,62 As do Mañjuśrī’s instructions, composed by Mañjugoṣa, And, likewise, [the teachings of] Āryadeva and Jetāri. A tantra commentary by Avalokiteśvara, [Has all these] teachings occurring in a single presentation.

These [words] explain the [provisional] doctrines of Mind-only: Consciousness with appearance of [dualistic] grasper and grasped, [When] its essence is free from grasper and grasped, is maintained To be truly existing, absolute truth, and [ultimate] suchness. [Yet the absolute of Mind-only is dualistic consciousness.] If so, its aspects, grasper and grasped [also] truly exist.” [They cannot be seen through as delusion, when enlightenment is attained.]63 Yet, appearance of grasper and grasped is claimed to lack true existence.

[Here both mind and phenomena are real things.] “Real things, in reality, are established as only mind.” Anyone who says that is a Cittamatrin.64 How could it be otherwise? Yet, wrong appearances [that are delusive apprehensions] of real things have no true existence as anything, even mind. Why do they not transcend [the doctrine of] Mind-only?65

When phenomena of consciousness are realized as [relative appearance that has] no true existence, Relative appearance is [established as] nonexistent; therefore, this is what is taught in Madhyamaka.66

Since appearances of the absolute are [truly] existent, [The way things are is realized by pristine wisdom.] Were it not the case [that the absolute truly appears,] [As is said in the view of literalistic Rangtongpas,] These [absolute] appearances of pristine wisdom seen in the meditation of the noble ones could not be wisdom that realizes the Middle Way. [Enlightenment would be delusion, not knowing how things are.]

Now this is composed concerning the divisions of Madhyamaka and Mind-only, within which Zhentong is established as Madhyamaka, rather than as Mind-only.

7. [The Traditions of Rangtong and Zhentong]

8 Rangtongpas, when proclaiming only the texts of Nāgārjuna, Though indeed, [within that limited scope,] they are in accord; Some maintain external objects, and others refute them. Some maintain self-awareness, and others of them refute it. Some of them affirm the eight kinds of consciousnesses, [within the relative,] and others of them refute them.

They do or do not say that those in the Lesser Vehicle [Are able to] realize the two kinds of selflessnesses,67 And so forth. For every one of their fundamental doctrines, their personal fabrications yield a turmoil of different aspects.

Indeed, they only agree that no dharmas truly exist; So these “followers of the tradition-founding chariots,” Are led, without trust in them, into paths of their own ideas.

Rangtongpas lack extensive commentaries That demonstrate the self-contained necessity of Great Vehicle sūtras, abhidharma, and vinaya; And so, they analyze the view exclusively. When they explain the tradition of these three piṭakas, Some are Vaibhāṣikas, some are Sautrāntikas, Some accept the traditional texts of Yogācāra. [They cannot reach a consensus about the meaning of scripture.]

Zhentongpas all enter the ocean of the Five Dharmas of Maitreya And the textual tradition of Asaṅga and his brother; Thus, they have no root doctrines that are not in accord. In all commentarial texts on the Great Vehicle piṭakas, No quotes from Yogācāra treatises other than those are ever [superimposed on them] as postulates.

Therefore, as even many hundreds of lower mountains Cannot overshadow [their] universal monarch, [Supremely lofty Mount Meru, at the center of the world,] Rangtong writings cannot suppress these texts [of Zhentong.]

Some [Rangtongpas] claim that, for various ones to be tamed, [Compared to] the sūtras, their treatises are more powerful, as they teach the [true] intention [of the Buddha]. This has, indeed, been refuted.68 If it were [really] true, [Their sectarian comments on the Conqueror’s intention] [would be superior] to [the treatises of] Maitreya. Though [you] search the world’s ten directions, no [such works] exist, as it was validly proved by the noble one Nāgārjuna.

In commentaries wherein white [virtue] rises completely, Candrakīrti, citing the prophesies of the Laṅkāvatāra, says the Collection of Reasoning [of the noble one Nāgārjuna] Is well-known to have commentary in the style of Zhentong; The Akutobhayā69 and so forth are also much in accord with that; and the elder Dharmapāla, comments on mental awareness in Āryadeva’s Four Hundred, as being the Middle Way – That is how the subject was taught by Candrakīrti.

9 Therefore, within these texts of the noble ones, fathers and sons, The teachers of Rangtong70 can [find] no direct [support] at all. There are points [they would like] to prove, but they lack the reasons to prove them.

For the followers of Candrakīrti and Dignāga, As for direct disciples of the noble ones, Different doctrines arising was pointless; and the disputes Of Prāsaṅgika and Svatantrika arose only later on; so there was no judge [or criterion of “correct” Madhyamaka].

In particular, Zhentong is taught in the Collection of Praises, The Bodhicitta-vivarana, Five Stages, and elsewhere. Thus, both of these intentions were received by Nāgārjuna. “The doctrines of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are one,” Was clearly taught by [the master] Ratnakaraśanti. Śāntarakṣita and others taught in the same vein.

Some [later disparaged] the vehicles of personal self-awareness,71 [According to an approach of] refuting self-awareness. Mostly due to Rangtongpas, disputes were entered into between [the schools of] Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.72 “The absolute is not within the sphere of reason,” was [objected to by Rangtongpas as] an inadmissible [statement].

Nor did [Rangtong] present the five topics, three natures, and so forth, [Which are key features of the intention of Asaṅga,] So [calling their words] “explaining the unexcelled Great Vehicle” was hardly a designation that was accurate; But, the prophesied explanations of Zhentong were appropriate.

Might it be possible to [fully] explain [the Great Vehicle] [by saying] that all dharmas are only self-emptiness? – [As is claimed by many exponents of Rangtong.] The invincible knower, [Maitreya,] says the opposite. That knower’s intention commentary tradition is better; because he is the yidam of Nāgārjuna himself, Because he says the Great Vehicle is all-victorious, And because within the tantras of secret mantra, this is what is chiefly taught in maṇḍalas, Though in the sūtras it is mostly taught as well, As it is by all the close children of the Buddha. That tenth level lord himself73 taught it in such a manner. Even the Śrāvakas say that [Maitreya] is the regent.

Nāgārjuna, as a human being, attained the first level,74 [Supremely Joyful, where emptiness is first directly seen.] [This] was taught of him as human before the Conqueror. Because the source was a prophesy about the future, The Śrāvakas claimed that it had evidence that was mistaken. Those knowing intention commentaries should analyze well whether this evidence is [really] good or bad.

Depending on secret mantra, buddhahood is attainable.

10 Within the absolute truth, the invincible knower [Maitreya] Measureless eons ago, was truly, completely enlightened.

Some claim that, while Maitreya indeed expounded Zhentong, Mañjuśrī taught Rangtong, but where is that in Mañjuśrī’s texts? With oral instructions that teach the deep path of the vajra vehicle, And also maintain the view of [Kalkī] Mañjuśrī Yaśas; In his Brief Teaching Maintaining the View, he explains Zhentong. Then why, unable to see this, do others now [speak] falsely?

While [Rangtongpas] own tradition is without clear sources, They disparage others’ traditions that are excellent. Are they not corrupted by demons of grasping partiality? [When] some of them claim that that the dharmas of Maitreya are Rangtong, Their “words of great power” are [quite] exhausted within their own circle.

Most in Tibet and India do not accept those words, which is much better [than this one-sided Rangtong view]. [When] they say Tibetans, first and last, are Rangtongpas, including both doctrines in their tradition is a fault. In particular, they truly contradict the texts of the traditions of each of these [two doctrines].

There are clear prophesies by the Conqueror that Asaṅga Would write very excellent intention commentaries, Distinguishing provisional meaning from the definitive, Also, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Ratnakaraśanti, as well as other [teachers] Were excellently prophesied by the Conqueror himself.

Jñānagarbha, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti, Āryasiṁha, and others too, Explained the sūtras and tantras in which these teachers were prophesied. According to Jñānagarbha, Vasubandhu and so forth, [Were prophesied to be] highly famed as chariots. Candrakīrti heard much and conferred it with pure competence.75 When the Conqueror prophesied these exponents of Zhentong, Was it [not] destined that these knowledgeable ones, becoming human, would write intention commentaries?

Though these others were indeed supremely holy, They could not contend with those [above] who were prophesied. For example, Candrakīrti, consulting the Laṅkāvatāra, Explained, [on that basis,] it had the intention of Mind-only;

[But] Vasubandhu, consulting the Saṃdhinirmocana, Having said the intention was three-fold naturelessness, Then explained what [he] called “the teaching of naturelessness.” With sūtra texts and reasoning in equal accord, The powerful [combination of] scripture and reasoning of the venerable, supremely competent Vasubandhu

11 [Made him] a capable one equal [to any other] [among] the six ornaments [that beautify] the world.

In the noble land [of India], among the authors of treatises, The Rangtong tradition was [held to be] the highest authority. In particular, Prāsaṅgika exponents, who were [then] supreme, [Tried to] refute that there is a ground of all [karmic] seeds,76 Although, as the essence, the all ground, is irrefutable,77 [Justified both by scripture and enlightened experience.]

Apprehended and apprehender, clear awareness and its object, And capability of memory and experience, [because they were phenomena] dependent on self-awareness, Were challenged; however, mere self-awareness was not rejected.78

True existence of the dependent was indeed refuted, but that was not the case for the perfectly established. One’s mind, with its uninterrupted nature of luminosity, Was never refuted by the texts of Madhyamaka.

In particular, all ground pristine wisdom was not explained, So [Prāsaṅgika texts] were neutral regarding its existence. Though the essence adorned with the major and minor marks was maintained As provisional meaning, mere sugatagarbha was not refuted.

Regarding [the views] above, later Tibetans analyzed the founders of textual traditions, great and small, that were the sources of doctrines. Proceeding from scriptural proofs, their presentation was easy to understand.

8. Refuting Zhentong as Non-Buddhist

Also, some Rangtongpas said that, since the Zhentong tradition was similar to the extremists’ Saṃkhya school, its view was deluded.

[Rangtongpas made the claim that Zhentong was Mind-only.] If [Zhentong] is Mind-only it is contradictory, Like the Indian extremist tradition [that maintains a conceptual self]. [Rangtongpas] were arrogant about the great, eloquent teachings of the Abhidharmakoṣa and other texts [That are explanations of the Lesser Vehicle, And said they explain existence in the Greater Vehicle.] They claimed that Great Vehicle texts are like those of Indian extremists.79 This was mad talk of those who are seized by demons of jealousy.

If, [these two religions are] similar in all [respects], [the Great Vehicle] would, indeed, be [established] as Hindu [teachings]. Presentation of the four doctrines would be nonexistent. If [the two were] alike in all respects, it would be so.

The two schools of Śrāvakas would be like the Indian Vaiśeṣika.

12 [Buddhist] Yogācāra would [really] be like the Samkhya. The conduct of naked Jains would be like that of monks. Meditation on compassion would be as in Hindu tradition. The conduct of secret mantra would be [like] that of the Shaivites.

[Showing a partial similarity with Buddhis teachings,] the Five Destructions of Viṣṇu80 says:

There is complete transcendence of mere names. Things and non-things are completely abandoned. True liberation from all emission and gathering81 Has been designated “the son of the god of wealth.”82 In the real, real things do not exist. Non-things also have no unreality.83 Real things and non-things are completely liberated, By what are they known? By that itself.84

Also the Composition on the Beauty of Śiva says:

One son, Bhramā, is supremely true. The lord of awareness is [completely] limitless. [When there is] speaking only of “existence,” Doing that is described as a completed noose.85

According to what is said there, except for Rangtong exponents being just a little not the same as the other [Buddhist views, certain aspects of] the [Indian and Buddhist] views are [superficially] very similar. On that basis, [Rangtongpas invalidly claim that they] have no difference [at all]. Such texts of the extremists are cited in the autocommentary of [Śāntarakṣita’s] Ornament of the Middle Way:We are [said to be] empty of the characteristics of the god Viṣṇu. Great and small songs of the essence, Songs of Having Goodness, Songs of Establishing dominion, the “Lam ba da of Śiva,” and various Samkhya texts that [express views like those in the quotes above] are indeed heard from some of the Brahmin paṇḍitas.

Though the False Aspectarians and Saṃkhya are much alike, Their mere terminology is mostly dissimilar. Some [Hindu] terminology accords with our tantra texts. Vaiṣṇava texts are somewhat like Prāsaṅgika. The Shaivites are proclaimed to be like Svatantrika. These advocates of a creator have such particular teachings.

If two views with partial likeness are completely equal, As the best of extremist doctrines, the Saṃkhya [system], is famous, Buddhism too would have the virtue of fame. [Among] those who maintain the bondage [of saṃsāra], [Indians] who maintain that something or other exists, And those who maintain the existence of the perfectly established Except for [respectively being in] India and in Tibet, look [and see] whether the two are any different.86

According to the scriptures of the Conqueror and his children, The Zhentong [view] is correct, but [literal] Rangtong is not.87 Some [Rangtongpas], because the scriptures provide them no certainty,

13 Claim now that [their view] must be established by reasoning. Their tradition is established by neither scripture nor reasoning.

Though indeed there is a need for validation by reason; [For those who have yet to attain the noble ones’ pristine wisdom,] The way things are is profoundly established by valid scripture. If the scriptures that tell what is seen by meditation over three eons beyond calculation are incorrect, How could the thoughts of a common being be more valid, [When they can never transcend the sphere of erroneous concepts?] Moreover, this is so, because what is very hidden [From ordinary beings, but not from enlightened ones,] [Must be reliably] known by scriptural [valid cognition].

These are the teachings for abandoning controversy over whether Zhentong is like the extremists

9. Refuting Reasoning in Zhentong

Analysis how they are not established as one and many, Is [rightly] put forward regarding compounded phenomena. Uncompounded phenomena are neither one nor many.88 [Non-things] like space do not partake of these divisions.

However, when examined by minds that are confused, [By thinking reality must conform to relative concepts, And that all concepts have been refuted by reasoning,] The essence [seems to be] nothing at all, hence nonexistent. As your [Rangtong] system refutes dharmatā as nonexistent, Completely nonexistent, it can never change. [Pristine wisdom, nothing forever, has nothing to realize.]

When divided parts of place and time exist, That these parts are changeless is not possible. No place exists that could not be an object of sense perception. Time changes, because there are three times, the past and so forth.

Refuting arising, and so forth, does not refute dharmadhātu. This pristine wisdom is unborn and never ceases. Within the [various] greater and lesser [different aspects] of the noble ones’ tradition of the Middle Way, Cause and conditions, coming and going, defined and defining, Extremes of before and after, co-dependent cause and effect; All these limitless [labels], when analyzed by reason, Occur in the relative only, and not otherwise.

These causes and so forth are only things of the relative. Dharmatā does not depend on such changing dharmins. Whatever [exists] depending on conventional dharmins [is something that] does not exist in its own right. Dharmatā, which is established in its own right,

14 has no dependent establishment by cause and effect. Therefore, it does not arise in interdependence, [And does not share the emptiness of interdependent phenomena.]

This is the teaching [that the absolute is] free from the reasoning of Rangtong Madhyamaka.

10. Refuting Emptiness as Only Self- Emptiness

All [relative] dharmas89 are empty. That is Zhentong tradition.90 All [relative] dharmas are essenceless. That is Zhentong tradition. For [you] Rangtongpas, [none of the phenomena] [That constitute] the aspects91 of awareness and appearance Are maintained as “empty” [in practice], and so the mere word is received.92

If appearances, like those of a vase, are emptiness, [Because you postulate emptiness as absolute truth,] In your system, [a vase and all dharmas of the relative] are [established by reason] as being absolute truth.

If, [on the other hand,] they are not emptiness, [Because they are existent within the relative, Where alone existence and nonexistence have meaning,] That contradicts [your claim], “All dharmas are emptiness.”

Zhentongpas maintain three different kinds of emptiness And [maintain] three kinds of [related] naturelessness. These are not maintained in the absolute alone.93

[Zhentong, with such an approach,] does not contradict itself, So a very superior doctrine arises [in consequence]. [Our] empty aspect, the relative, is not absolute; and [our] absolute’s [true] appearance is not relative.

This is the teaching in how it is contradictory [to maintain] that the emptiness of all phenomena is self-emptiness alone.

11. Refuting Rangtong Madhyamaka as Ultimate

Since Rangtong transcends Mind-only, it is indeed Madhyamaka, but it is not the ultimate Madhyamaka. It has mere emptiness, but no ultimate emptiness. Its [non-affirming negation is] indeed definitive, but it is not the ultimate, definitive meaning, [As it denies experience of how things are.]

15 [For that] reason, since Rangtongpas do not proclaim The Middle Way as ultimate, how is it the Middle Way? When Rangtong texts are analyzed, there is no Middle Way. Zhentongpas analyze too, but maintain a Middle Way.

Not asserting what they maintain as the ultimate Middle Way, [Rangtongpas] “Great Madhyamaka” is not very great94 at all. It is, [in fact,] a [dissonant] mix of Cittamatrins Who do not accept [the doctrines of] Cittamatra and Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas who do not accept The sūtra collection of the Lesser Vehicle. How can they deny the texts of [Sautrāntika or] Vaibhāṣika? Don’t they all have the same ideas [about what is real]?

[Rangtong tradition says “emptiness is the absolute.”] [Yet,] in Rangtong tradition, emptiness cannot exist, [As it is nothing but a logical principle, And as no dharmas at all truly exist for Rangtong.] Because [they establish] their absolute [as] nonexistent, it cannot be the ultimate [way things really are].

Mere non-affirming negation can never reach the ultimate. What is and is not [dharma]dhātu, are both non-existent [for Rangtong]; So “absolute [dharma]dhātu” is impossible [for them]. Then how can [experience of] emptiness and the absolute dhātu, Not be [false and] relative [within the Rangtong system]?

Objects of conceptions and objects of false seeing, From the viewpoint of analysis [for the absolute], are nonexistent, as well as lacking true existence.

If these [points] do not establish such objects as relative, what could [ever] suffice [for their being so established]?

If [false and conceptual objects] can be [established as relative], the absolute dhātu, [not so established,] will be true. Since it will not be not relative, it will truly exist, It will exist from the viewpoint of analysis, and it will be [rightly] maintained as perfectly established.95

If this [does] not [serve as] the Middle Way, the way things are, Maintaining freedom from conceptual complexity will also [fail to qualify as] the Middle Way.

Does it matter if true existence is maintained,96 [As Zhentong does, and Rangtong famously does not do?] We [both] deny the truth of conceptual characteristics, But the truth [of the real], devoid of proliferating concepts, these Rangtong exponents do not grasp, even partially,97 And so they never do anything but just negate. They refute all true existence and true describable qualities. As they apply to them [all] the reasons refuting the relative.

These [reasons] are also maintained within in our [Zhentong] tradition: The perfectly established has98 no truths of complexity.

16 If there is truth with complexity, [we] refute it as relative, That is why, [though it is the essence of everything,] it is said in Madhyamaka, “The absolute is essenceless.”99

Denying three vehicles, Śrāvakas claim “[There is only] one.” [They accept only the Buddha’s original Śrāvaka teachings. Maintaining the same,] Prāsaṅgikas follow after them. The reason [this is so] is because these [two schools] are equal in their realization of the two kinds of self.100

Here, it follows that the kāya of the essence101 [Truly] exists for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, and they irreversibly enter into it [in attainment;]

[However,] their kāya of the essence is not like [ours]. If it were, the three other kāyas would have the same reasoning. Similarly, their Buddha, is not ours, and so forth.102

[Thus, abandoning the obscuration of knowables, By irreversibly entering the kāya of the essence, Requires, for them, abandoning appearance altogether. Rangtong also entails] these many, fallacious conclusions. Its view is faulty by mixture with Lower Vehicle doctrine.

Does it make a difference whether, [in attainment,] They abandon the obscuration of knowables?103 It follows from teaching the distinctions of such abandoning, That the essence is indivisible, so this cannot be reversed.

All teachings [have their power] by the power of aspiration; [When Rangtong] says that pristine wisdom has no appearance, there is nothing left [after analysis that we could aspire to]. [Their] dharmakāya without distinctions is similar.

When those of the Lesser [Vehicle] have realized the two kinds of selflessnesses of all phenomena, They see [such a] dharmakāya. That is the common fruition Of noble ones [who abide] within the Lesser Vehicle. [Though they have realized all objects as self-empty, They cannot realize their emptiness within the absolute self. They have only inferior emptiness of other Where one relative thing is empty of another.]

A vase is just without a pillar, and a pillar Is just without a vase. Divisions do not exist [Between the refuted relative and the irrefutable absolute. So for them, all phenomena are empty of themselves.] There can only be the single kind of abandoning, [that applies] non-affirming negation to everything as one.

Since the all ground does not exist, [karmic] seeds have no place. When material dharmas of mind and metal factors104 cease, The three vehicles leave no remainder. Why are they not the same? In insight that is merely non-affirming negation, [Since there are no knowables of any kind,

17 How can there be obscuration by [dualistic] knowables? Their scriptures have no clarity, but others have clear scriptures.

“All dharmas are realized to have no self of dharmas,” Is not consistent for Lesser Vehicle noble ones. Substances and falsely imputed things exist for them, and [accepted objects of] false conceptions are extensive. If these [faults] are not realized, [ultimate] realization of phenomena [as they are] is contradictory.

If you ask “is this not clear [to these Lesser Vehicle noble ones]?” it is not something suitable for them to perceive, [As there is nothing left over from phenomena they renounce To realize as the phenomena of enlightenment.] They do not know the reasons [for this limitation, And, as they have no means of eliminating concepts,] They cannot realize the [perceivable ultimate]. [Suchness] can never be discriminated merely by abiding in conceptual105 distinctions.

Maintaining external objects ascertained by six-fold consciousnesses, While refuting the [absolute] all ground as well as self-awareness, Maintaining [concrete, merely relative] objects of refuge, Like Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas, and in other ways, Rangtongpas mix [themselves] with Lesser Vehicle doctrine.

This is the refutation that Rangtong Madhyamaka is ultimate

12. How Rangtongpas establish Zhentong

When [there is the] Rangtong’s tradition’s freedom from complexity, It is non-affirming negation that no one can experience. [It is mere logical inference from inconsistency Disproving all assertions about the existence of something.] Experience of such unreality can never exist at all.

When conception makes a general image106 into its object, Seen merely from the viewpoint of abstracting [a relative nature], the [“sample”] is [verbally] labeled and held [in memory];

Because [it is established by analysis] [That] such [“natures” have no instance in experience, When objects of relative natures are seen, they] are delusion; [there is] no reality [in what is] apprehended.

If it is true that there is such freedom from complexity, it exists [as something that is] truly existing.107 [If it exists as something that is truly existing, It bears examination for the absolute.] If not, relative dharmas and lack of true existence

18 have the same scope, [as there is nothing real at all].

The pristine wisdom of the Conqueror and others, supreme, is free from proliferating complexity. When something appears from that viewpoint, it exists, and it is true. When [such dharmas] do not appear, [there is seeming] duality [Of] absolute and relative [phenomena], Equally nonexistent, from the noble ones’ viewpoint – [Like Mind-only’s empty abstractions of an absolute mind And phenomena of the relative that exist within it.]

Since non-deluded wisdom [of the absolute], sees the [true] nonexistence [of the relative], Freedom from complexity is deluded [for Rangtong]; [Not when regarded as a logical principle, But when it is taken as a quality of the real;] because [there is nothing real within the Rangtong system, so that all phenomena are] equally deluded. Thus, “relative” and “absolute” cannot be distinguished. All is alike, but insofar as the two are different, [As the only reality and virtues are those of the relative,] rather than the absolute, is it the relative That is abiding as whatever is real and good.

Though, in pure reality, [their two truths] are equally nothing, the relative, creates objects from the viewpoint of delusion. These [abstractions, by definition], are not absolute.

You now establish the relative by valid cognition, [Reaching that conclusion] in dependence on maintaining, “Absolute [reality] is certainly nonexistent, [So the only cognition of existence is relative.]” [If so,] our view deserves [your contemptuous] deprecation.

From the unexamined viewpoint of the world, all the things [of ordinary life] exist. [However,] from the viewpoint of analysis, these [same things] should be analyzed as “nonexistent.”

“The relative does not exist in absolute truth, however, as the relative, it does exist.” That is called “the viewpoint of analysis;’” But relative, in the world, is not divided from absolute. [As you equate existence and the viewpoint of the world, Invalidating the viewpoint of analysis,] In108 your tradition, the relative exists absolutely.

[You] must maintain the two truths, to be quite nonexistent. As appearance [proved to be] empty of the relative, is [what passes as] the absolute [in your tradition], You do not refute appearance of the relative.109

[You say, “Though a vase is not empty of a vase, A vase, from the ultimate viewpoint, has no true existence.”]

19 Due to [your] abandoning grasping true existence, From the ultimate viewpoint, are the two extremes abandoned, [Eternalistic existence, and a nihilistic void?] As you deny that there is absolute appearance, From the viewpoint of meditation, no appearances exist. This nothingness is your ultimate. This is not the Middle Way!

“In every case, the two truths, relative and absolute, Equally exist or not,“ [you] say, [but then,] “Absolute existence is an impossibility, So all existence is relative.” This is contradictory.

[For you,] the absolute exists as the relative, [Which is to say that truth exists as falsity.] As all is the same, the relative also is absolute, [Which is to say that falsity is the only truth.] Since the absolute exists as the relative, It follows that the absolute really is the relative, As [all] beings existing as human are human beings. [Absolute and relative make no distinction at all, And so in your system these terms are meaningless.]

Moreover, the absolute must exist absolutely. If the contrary is established, [the absolute] would be relative. The absolute could not be not established as the ground. [There would be no criterion of truth and falsity, Which is the definition of absurdity.] So the absolute is established as absolute reality.

If the absolute appears from the viewpoint of delusion, Awareness that apprehends the absolute is deluded. [Since the absolute is defined as emptiness,] It follows that emptiness is realized by delusion.

According what is maintained by later Madhyamaka, The relative exists, so wisdom is deluded, [Because in the meditation of the noble ones Wisdom sees the relative as nonexistent.] Meditation is deluded, not to mention post-meditation.

If, from that viewpoint, wisdom, is relative appearance, The relative is true, and yet when it appears, They [inconsistently] say, “it has no true appearance,” and “the relative is appearance of what does not exist.” [Their] relative [appearance] is not [false] appearance, [so it follows that the objects of] relative truth exist.

For pristine wisdom, [the relative] appears to be nonexistent, And so, [for Rangtong, pristine wisdom] is deluded. From [that] viewpoint, when something appears to be existent, it is true, and, therefore, a non-erroneous object.

So [wrongly] maintaining that refutation of refutation [Of relative true existence] has been [correctly] established,

20 Exponents of Rangtong say the following words: “If it were true [and meaningful] that the nature of [relative] dharmas is that [all such dharmas] are without any true existence, Why would that not similar to expositions of Zhentong?110”

If it is “not true,” by those two negating words, As [dharmatā] is understood as the way things are, [All is] equal in being only truly existent, With no analytical viewpoint, no absolute, and so forth.”

Thus, when some Rangtongpas analyze doctrine, their reasoning establishes Zhentong

13. Our Own System

Now a little is said about the suitability of our own system.

Since the nature of dharmas is changeless, there is certainty That dharmakāya exists within [all] sentient beings. [If,] at the beginning, dharmakaya is not there, But later it is, it has only a changeable nature. Since what is compounded never exists, it is nonexistent.

[Changeless] suchness is certainly [something] uncompounded. It is known to transcend [both] real things and non-things.111 [Because it is the way things are for enlightened beings,] It cannot be refuted; and, as it is the viewpoint of [absolute] pristine wisdom that is never deluded, Even [in knowing] delusion,112 it is not deluded. The absolute, [dharma]dhātu is [therefore,] truly existing.

Awareness of the relative is of deceptive phenomena. Material objects and non-things can never be [truly] experienced. [Thus, there are criteria distinguishing truth and falsity.] Therefore, [dharma]dhātu is absolute awareness. The suchness of the dhātu is [realized as]113 good. Since it is absolute goodness, that goodness is supreme.

[Though Rangtong claims that] relative goodness is goodness itself, [Because is it is the only goodness that there is;] Why should absolute goodness not be [said to be] good, [When it is so experienced in the truth of realization?] These words are from the Ghanavyūha Sūtra:

The ground of all various topics Is goodness, sugatagarbha, A word for that essence is “all ground” It is so taught by the buddhas.

The Abhidharmakoṣa says: "What is absolute goodness? It is suchness.”

21 By these words, the all ground is taught to be pristine wisdom. Since it is suchness, there [can be] only pristine wisdom. [When there appears to be anything else, it is delusion.] By being explained as goodness, it is not the all ground consciousness. [The experience of consciousness may be good or bad, But it is never experienced as eternal, absolute goodness.] This is teaching the all ground [of wisdom] and sugatagarbha.

In abhidharma, that suchness is taught as the cause of enlightenment, Because it is also explained to be the uncompounded, [Realization of which is realizing enlightenment. The absolute truth of cessation is the only truth,114 Because it is not unreal, and it transcends the [false] relative.

In Zhentong, by one [truth], the other one115 is empty. Therefore, if you think this emptiness is inferior, To other kinds, and especially to Rangtong’s self-emptiness, The sūtras teach seven kinds of emptiness:

(1) Emptiness of characteristics, (2) emptiness of the nature of real things, (3) Emptiness of the possible, (4) emptiness if the impossible, (5) So-called emptiness of the inexpressible, (6) The great emptiness of the absolute pristine wisdom of the noble ones, and (7) One thing being empty of another.

(1) Real things are empty of their general characteristics. (2) Real things are empty of arising by [their own] nature. (3) The skandhas, [and so forth,] are empty [of the two kinds] of self, (4) Empty of nirvāṇa, and (5) of imputed natures. (6) Pristine wisdom of the absolute is empty Of karmic seeds of all [conceptual], faulty views. (7) The individual characteristics of [relative] things, are empty of each other. So the list is explained.

Six [of these seven different kinds of emptiness] are supreme, but the seventh [kind] is the least [of them].

[Regarding the great emptiness, the ultimate way things are,] With no self of individuals, it is always empty of other.116 However, as this emptiness is anything but inferior, It is suchness, dharmakāya, and the truth of the path.117 Explained as the absolute, the changeless perfectly established. That is the uncompounded and the absolute truth.

The Five Hundred Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra says of the three kinds of emptiness:

“Because their three natures are also taught, we should have faith in them.

22 14. [Conclusion and Dedication of Merit]

[The views of] those that dispute with [the view of] Zhentong in general Are straightforwardly analyzed here, with scripture and reasoning. Moreover, as many [students of Zhentong] as closely analyze Their own tradition should know the texts [that are involved].

Free from one and many, the root of [truth in] reasoning Is reaching the absence of compounded [phenomena].118 Then we refute [concepts of] selfhood, in whatever logical style, As the Twenty Verse Treatise119 refutes external objects.

Our tradition clearly occurs in all Yogācāra texts, Chiefly the Discrimination of the Middle and Extremes. The extensive reasoning is explained in copious treatises. All this is the matchless tradition of the Middle Way.120

Though this was explained again and again by competent ones, What is [contained] in this great tradition was cast aside. Though some necessary [teachings] have been explained That are easy to understand, many new sophistries Are propagated, [in the attempt to discredit them].

This extraordinary manner of the Great Vehicle Is disparaged as Mind-only, with the implication That it should be abandoned, because of that bad name.121 Our critics claim that we take refuge in literalism. They [always like to] apply this “conquering reasoning.”

Furthermore, there are countless detailed analyses [Of disputed points within the systems of Rangtong and Zhentong] That do, indeed, make progress, but are hard to understand. If such [writings] are not helpful to other beings, They are useless. Therefore, they should not be written.

By the merit of this explanation, may limitless sentient beings Abide within the holy Dharma of the Great Vehicle, [And experience absolute truth] in all its totality. May they quickly attain the level of the all-knowing Conqueror. May they experience the joy of undefiled Dharma. c. COLOPHON

This was the Versified Ornament of Zhentong Madhyamaka. It was entirely composed in the kingdom of Patāranā, in my thirtieth year at the Jonang hermitage. May auspicious goodness increase. There are 157 new verses. Mangalaṃ. Translated and Edited.

Translated into English by Rimé Lödro (Ives Waldo).

23 n. NOTES

By Rime Lodrö

1 No phenomena characterized by the view of the two kinds of relative selfhood appear in pristine wisdom’s apprehension of absolute phenomena. They have been consumed, ingested by the mouth of pristine wisdom, blazing with tongues of flame like a forest fire. Here mountainssymbolize the solidity of preconceptions of a personal self, and forests the illusory multiplicity of its fixated objects. Bringing the inner and outer karmic energies together in practice manifests as the inner fire, tummo of yoga that purifies the winds, channels, and essences until they can manifest the non-dual phenomena of the pure and true. The dualistic relative, from that viewpoint is like a fire offering consumed by “the eater” who is the fire god. The fire at her navel makes Vajravārāhī the one who, like a sow, ingests whatever she encounters. She symbolizes the enlightenment of the Buddha. Not struggling to maintain the limitations of the relative releases a great deal of blissful energy, and at some point, the more bondage of relative delusions there is, the greater the blissful heat of realization when they are released.

2 The seven kinds of [relative] consciousnesses of saṃsāra are like the eight. The all ground consciousness is omitted, because enlightenment transmutes the relative all ground and all ground consciousness into the all ground of pristine wisdom. Then everything manifests as buddha qualities that are aspects of the kāyas and pristine wisdoms. This is Buddhahood, that has always been abiding beneath the conceptually-ordered time and place of the relative. The Buddha is the World Protector, because the enlightenment protects the world from saṃsāra.

3 Teaching students of different capacities in a manner they can understand and to which they will be receptive.

4 Tibet.

5 Formerly, different Buddhist schools like Rangtong and Zhentong were very competitive. The attitude is rather like that of fundamentalist Christians who believe that they should do anything they can to save people from the Devil, because otherwise they will burn forever in Hell. A common attack in debates between advocates of different Great ehicleV schools was to accuse opponents of clinging to [concrete], extremist doctrine by being attached to literal concepts, when true reality was beyond concepts. Critics of Zhentong call this their “conquering reasoning.” Buddhists accused Hindus, and Rangtongpas accused Zhentongpas of being attached to literal concepts of self. Hindus accused Buddhists, and Zhentongpas accused Rangtongpas, of being attached to nihilistic negation of everything. Tāranātha says in the text that attachment to Indian extremist literalism in former lives was a source of Rangtong literalism in Tibet in his time.

24 6 The Buddha taught his monastic hearers, the Śrāvakas of the Lesser Vehicle, the [realist] abhidharma philosophy of the Buddha’s first turning of the wheel of Dharma. Its approach is that reality consists of truly existing, momentary phenomena apprehended by dualistic consciousness. These have their own intrinsic natures. These natures correspond to the conceptual labels by which they are identified, and so these phenomena are allegedly apprehended as they are by dualistic, conceptual consciousness.

Within the Great Vehicle, the second turning refutes this philosophy of the first turning by analysis for absolute truth. However, Rangtongpas maintain that these relative phenomena of abhidharma are apprehended even after enlightenment, as appearance of what does not exist. Therefore, Rangtongpas deny Zhentong’s assertion of the nondual awareness of pristine wisdom in which relative phenomena do not appear. Again, Tāranātha says this is due to Rangtongpas having been Śrāvakas in former lives.

7 India.

8 Teachings that do not truly describe the essential qualities of their subject.

9 As those Tāranātha is criticizing maintain, and he denies.

10 Noble ones of the Greater and Lesser Vehicles and ordinary beings who are authors of treatises.

11 The true existence of absolute sugatagarbha with its intrinsic qualities.

12 Those who say this are thinking of examples like the Buddha teaching truly existing phenomena to students who could not understand or accept the teachings of emptiness.

13 Vasubandhu.

14 Turning of the wheel of Dharma and ff.

15 For Jonangpas definitive, ultimate, and absolute have the same scope.

16 Other intentions alleged by some.

17 Rather than impermanent, which leads to suffering, according to the first of the four noble truths.

18 If the middle turning of the wheel of Dharma negated the absolute, [dharma]dhātu and so forth… The second or middle turning negated the absolute, like all knowable phenomena, as empty of true existence. Analysis for absolute truth in the [Buddha’s] middle [turning] of the wheel of Dharma is analysis for consistency of statements that assert the existence and qualities of certain phenomena. Zhentong accepts such statements that refute absolute phenomena, when they refer to conceptual assertions about the absolute, pristine wisdom, [dharma]dhātu, and so forth. Absolute phenomena in themselves transcend assertions and denials involving concepts like existence and nonexistence. Self-establishing, they bear analysis for the absolute by default. The same is true of nirvāṇa, when it says a little earlier, “The middle refutes all dharmas of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.”

19 A sūtra of the middle turning that teaches dharmadhātu as absolute experience.

25 20 Literally, “and so forth.”

21 In the text, this line applies only to the Sūtra of Katyayana, but the same is true of the Sutra Requested by Maitreya.

22 Because they are mere mentally created appearances of what does not truly exist.

23 Middle turning sūtras, which Rangtong considers definitive, famously say that all phenomena, including sugatagarbha, lack true existence.

24 Spros pa.

25 The words teaching that the Buddhist supreme self is like the Hindu gods, and so forth.

26 Literally, “since.”

27 In the relative.

28 In the absolute.

29 Here “appearance” = false, dualistic appearance.

30 They claim that all sūtras and tantras that do not teach emptiness of self are provisional.

31 Words are fallible, because the way things are transcends the scope of words and logic.

32 The middle and final turnings of the wheel of Dharma.

33 Literally, “like.”

34 That claim has no plausibility.

35 Of other, relative things.

36 Since many sūtras of the definitive meaning teach otherwise.

37 Of the phenomena of the skandhas, and so forth.

38 Because Rangtong suchness is the self-emptiness of all phenomena.

39 The Zhentong absolute, established by the experience of pristine wisdom.

40 Literally, “what was said.”

41 By scriptural valid cognition.

42 The first and second turnings both say that absolute nirvāṇa is beyond description, while describable reality is that of the phenomena of abhidharma.

43 Therefore.

44 The Dzamthang Edition has “final” instead of “middle” here, which I prefer. Either reading works, but the argument changes.

45 Literally, “provisional and definitive.” Changed for metrical reasons.

46 When the turnings are applied to phenomena in order, 1. the second turning teaches that all relative phenomena described in the first are empty of themselves, because assertions about them involve contradictory concepts. Then 2. the third turning teaches that the true self apprehended by pristine wisdom is irrefutable, because it is beyond concepts. It remains after all relative phenomena are negated. Therefore, it is not empty. Students then try to realize the absolute in mediation.

26 When the teaching of the second and third turnings is out of order, individual students 1. first learn of pristine wisdom, the true non- conceptual self; but then 2. they are taught to negate it by conceptual reasoning. This wrongly teaches that the true self is conceptual, refutable and empty. Practice is distorted into systematic “purification” of wisdom from saṃsāric mind. When that occurs, “Nirvāṇa is joined to leading individuals astray.”

47 Sūtra and so forth.

48 Of defilements of the two obscurations.

49 Even if, for Rangtong, they do not truly exist as anything at all.

50 Or emptiness of the relative.

51 All Tibetans agree.

52 Why would any two provisional teachings would have to be similar? They would not. Tāranātha seems to be thinking of how Rangtongpas claim that the first and last turnings both teach conceptualized phenomena as absolute. Rangtong and Zhentong agree that the first turning is provisional in that way. Zhentongpas say the two are very different, because the first turning teaches refutable, conceptual phenomena, and the third turning teaches irrefutable, non-conceptual ones. If the last were also provisional in the way Rangtongpas claim, those two turnings would indeed be much more similar than they are. They would be predominantly in accord, in teaching some kind of relative phenomena as truly existing.

53 Who explained the relative according to Yogācāra.

54 Except that Śrāvakas do not then say the relative is empty from the absolute viewpoint.

55 Literally “advocates.”

56 Presented as absolute mind in Zhentong.

57 The differences are not merely verbal or stylistic.

58 s they are in Mind-only.

59 Which manifests as 1. the ground of all that is and can be, 2. the principal means of practice, and 3. the fruition attained at the appropriate time.

60 Because it is experience that transcends all concepts. Zhentong says the same about concepts of the ultimate.

61 If someone used Mind-only for the relative and literalistic Rangtong for the absolute, this combination of two incompatible, literalistic systems would indeed be foolish. It is especially so, as it reverses the order and status of the second and third turnings, making the third provisional and the second definitive, which Tāranātha argued against above.

The situation is much less clear if the combination was one of conceptually sophisticated Yogācāra for the relative and non literalistic Rangtong for the absolute. That is what Śāntarakṣita did in his Ornament of the Middle Way. His

27 was the predominant view in Tibet until it was supplanted by Tsongkhapa’s version of Rangtong, which established the viewpoint Tāranātha is arguing against. Tāranātha speaks of approvingly of Śāntarakṣita in another passage:

“The doctrines of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga are one,” Was clearly taught by the master Ratnakaraśanti. Śāntarakṣita and others taught in the same vein.

62 In different texts.

63 In Zhentong, the merely conceptual duality of grasper and grasped is a delusive split projected on a non-dual, absolute consciousness. The appearance is eliminated when the delusion is eliminated by enlightenment. Tāranātha says this is not possible in Mind-Only because its absolute is consciousness that is inherently a dualistic grasper caused to grasp different phenomena as the effect of causal laws. Therefore, it is impossible to perceive the nondual absolute of Zhentong within the view of Mind-only. Mind-only cannot succeed in experiencing the perfectly established, because its phenomena do not transcend the relative. Nor can practice eliminate dualistic delusions from consciousness that is intrinsically dualistic.

64 The Sanskrit term for an advocate of Mind-only.

65 Mind-only says that seeming appearances of external objects like rocks and trees cannot truly be said to be appearances of anything at all, since there is nothing other than the mental appearance itself that counts as experience of external rocks and trees.

Mind-only also says that these appearances exist as phenomena within the essence of mind. If everything is within mind, being within mind or external to mind makes no distinction. It is meaningless. Nothing in non-dual, enlightened reality corresponds to this merely conceptual duality. Therefore the appearances of Mind-only do not exist as mind or anything else, even mere appearance.

66 Zhentong also accepts this.

67 Some lesser Vehicle texts present limited versions of the selflessness of phenomena, through analogies that not explained by reasoning as they are in the Great Vehicle. Pratyekabuddhas are sometimes said to realize the selflessness of phenomena of the grasped object, but not of the grasping subject, a viewpoint that resembles Mind-only

68 An omniscient Buddha or a tenth level bodhisattva with non-deceptive pristine wisdom is more authoritative than an ordinary being whose perception is delusive. However, the Buddha’s sūtras of the three turnings disagree, as do the bodhisattvas’ treatises that explain them. Therefore, both Rangtong and Zhentong agree that there is a need for treatises that show by reasoning which sūtras should be regarded as definitive. orF example, when comparing

28 Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti, Tāranātha says that Vasubandhu did a better job of establishing his point with scripture and reasoning. Unfortunately, opinions can differ. Rangtongpas say that Candrakīrti did better.

69 Ga las ‘jigs med, “Not fearful of anything,” Nāgārjuna’s autocommentary on the Root Verses on the Middle Way, aka the Mūla Prajñā.

70 Literalistic Rangtong.

71 This would include the Great Vehicle tradition of self-awareness of Maitreya and Asaṅga and the tantric vehicles of self-awareness pristine wisdom.

72 Among other points, Svātantrika held, and Prāsaṅgika denied, that it was possible in Madhyamaka to put forward one’s own coherent thesis, svātantra, on how things are. Prāsaṅgika held that, since Nāgārjuna had established that all assertions were contradictory, Madhyamaka exponents could only draw out unwanted consequences in the assertions of others to show that their assertions were contradictory.

73 Maitreya.

74 Bodhisattva level.

75 This second list of teachers explained prophesies, but were not prophesied themselves.

76 Which is the basis of relative experience.

77 The relative all ground that stores karmic seeds is an aspect of the true relative in Yogācāra. It is correctly refuted by Madhyamaka with the rest of the relative. The absolute all ground that transcends karma, pristine wisdom, is irrefutable, because it is the essence of enlightened realization of the way things are.

78 The Rangtong refutations involved disproof of causal dependence of phenomena that were inherently other than each other. On this basis, Rangtongpas argued that awareness cannot be aware of phenomena that are aspects of itself, as a knife cannot cut itself. Zhentongpas replied that argument presupposes the duality and causal dependence of the relative. Refutations of the dependent do not affect the autonomous perfectly established. The arguments regarding non-dual pristine wisdom are like those for self- awareness. Rangtongpas said that sambhogakāya could not have separate qualities of the major and minor marks of sambhogakāya, and Zhentongpas accepted that the form kāyas are relative for such reasons. However, on the level of one’s true mind, luminous, nondual dharmakāya, both Rangtong and Zhentong accept the existence of buddha qualities that are co-essential with dharmakāya. However, Rangtongpas are inclined to say this absolute reality is indescribable, and Zhentongpas that it is describable within conventional discourse.

79 In the Zhentong approach to the Great Vehicle, the second turning points out the faults of the relative, and the third turning expresses ultimate truth as absolute selfhood. Rangtongpas said this viewpoint was like the Indian presentation of a supreme self that was real, while phenomena of appearance

29 were illusory. They held that this viewpoint was not beyond dualistic concepts, like Mind-only. I doubt whether this is a correct description of all Indian views is beyond the scope of this text.

80 Viṣṇu’s tenth avatar Kalkī brings about the destruction of the world at the end of the dark age and the renewal of the Golden age. The story is similar in many ways to the Buddhist story of the 25th Kalkī king of Shambhala. I don’t know the details of five destructions.

81 Similar to arising and destruction of separate dualistic relative things.

82 Because liberation that fulfills all desires is the most excellent wealth.

83 Concepts of real and unreal are transcended.

84 Similar to saying that the knower of enlightened reality is the supreme self beyond concepts of relative selfhood.

85 Because then there is the bondage of attachment to concepts.

86 Rangtongpas say that the two views are essentially alike, most importantly in maintaining a fallacious, absolute self. Zhentongpas say they have many important differences.

87 As discussed throughout the text, the Buddha’s third turning and tantras support Zhentong, and these texts are taught there to be the ultimate definitive meaning of the Buddha’s teaching. These teachings of the Buddha are explained at length by tenth level bodhisattvas like Maitreya, Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāṇi, and Kalkī Mañjuśrī Yashas, as well as by the third level bodhisattva Asaṅga and at least some texts of the first level bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. According to what they say, the Rangtong view is definitive regarding logical refutation of the relative only. Its refutation of all phenomena is not the ultimate definitive meaning regarding what can be said in conventional discourse about the experience of enlightenment. In particular, its refutations of the validity of Zhentong are not valid.

88 Madhyamaka argues logically that relative phenomena are not one because they have many qualities with separate nature. However, if the qualities are separate phenomena in their own right, how can they be qualities of one phenomenon? Therefore, relative phenomena are not many. Uncompounded phenomena are beyond all concepts, including those of one or many. Showing the absolute was beyond one and many was the principal argument of Śāntarakṣita in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra.

89 Here dharmas = phenomena = relative phenomena.

90 If the intention included absolute phenomena, sugatagarbha and so forth would also be empty.

91 Or those of grasping subject and grasped object, comprising all existent phenomena of the relative.

30 92 When all phenomena are empty, emptiness makes no distinction among phenomena. It becomes meaningless experientially. In practice, literalistic Rangtongpas follow the relative conceptualizations of the world regarding existence, nonexistence, truth, and falsity. They deny the true existence of the experiential absolute beyond conception perceived by pristine wisdom.

True, they say that things that exist in the relative do not truly exist by the criteria of their absolute, analysis for logical consistency, but since no phenomena bear the analysis, “true existence” also makes no experiential distinction among describable phenomena. It is meaningless, except as a remainder that language is subject to logical inconsistencies. However, these flaws do not keep people in the world from making ordinary practical statements about existence and nonexistence in their worldly activities, including Dharma practice.

93 1) The logically impossible imagined does not truly exist even in the relative, like the son of a barren woman. Logically impossible, conceptual absolute phenomena are merely imagined. This is what Rangtong refutes in refuting the absolute. The imagined is empty by non-affirming negation.

2) The dependent truly exists in the relative, but not in the absolute, by the above reasoning of one and many and so forth. Insofar as it refers to something shown to be impossible by reason, it is non-affirmingly negated, like the imagined. Insofar as “cause” refers to patterns of regularity that truly exist among phenomena, it is true.

3) The perfectly established exists in the absolute, but not in the relative, because it is neither conceptual nor conditioned, and so it is not observable by consciousness.

The nonconceptual, non-compounded, unconditioned, perfectly established transcends assertion and denial, so experience of it cannot be shown to be empty or non-empty by analysis. However, by definition it excludes all describable phenomena of the relative. That definition entails that it is empty of such phenomena and the kinds of emptiness that apply to them. However, since it is beyond all assertions, it is beyond that definition as well. Assertions of the existence of absolute phenomena are shown to be empty by analysis.

94 Literally: “wonderful.”

95 When Rangtong examines phenomena for logical consistency, no phenomena bear the examination. All phenomena are established as empty of absolute truth by non-affirming negation. That is established as a logical principle about the meaning of assertions. If that principle is taken to apply to experience by literalistic Rangtongpas, the result is that the distinction between absolute and relative becomes meaningless. No phenomena can be meaningfully established as either relative or absolute.

31 Zhentong uses the same reasoning as Rangtong to determine that relative phenomena, with descriptions inconsistent like “son of a barren woman,” are inconsistent, that they exist is necessarily false, and therefore they do not truly exist.

However, Zhentong also uses the experience of pristine wisdom to determine that absolute phenomena that are beyond inconsistent conceptual description exist. They cannot be analyzed by logical reasoning, and therefore they cannot fail logical examination for absolute truth. Therefore, they truly exist from the viewpoint of pristine wisdom. They also truly exist from the viewpoint of analysis. That being so, it is correct that they are perfectly established as absolute.

Zhentong’s criterion for absolute phenomena is corresponding to the way things are. Phenomena seen as nondual and nonconceptual by pristine wisdom are seen as they are. Phenomena seen as dualistic grasped objects by the conceptual grasping mind of consciousness are not seen as they are. Therefore, Zhentong has a meaningful, workable distinction between relative and absolute phenomena. The workability of each of these terms depends on the workability of the other.

96 When Rangtongpas say nothing is real, that looks like an excellent shortcut for cutting through fear of life’s negativities. That is what the Beatles thought for a while when they discovered the Maharishi.

Let me take you down 'Cause I'm going to Strawberry Fields Nothing is real And nothing to get hung about Strawberry Fields forever.

Unfortunately, that approach also turns discernment of anything positive that might be attainable into mush, so there is no hope either. So, yes, it does matter for the reasons discussed in the last section. As Tāranātha puts it:

When Rangtong says that pristine wisdom has no appearance, there is nothing left after analysis that we could aspire to.

97 Though Jonangpas hold that those in Rangtong tradition who have a proper view of self- emptiness do understand this as the meaning of statements like, “form is emptiness.”

98 OR in the perfectly established there are no truths of complexity.

99 In a sense where all essences involve the conceptual complexities of relative phenomena.

100 Rangtong denies the two kinds of self, and the Śrāvakas only the self of individuals, not the selfhood of phenomena. However, Rangtong agrees with the Śrāvakas, as Zhentong does not, that all “selves” are conceptually describable essences within relative truth. There can be no true self with true qualities that is attained by enlightenment. It follows that nothing is realized in enlightenment. It is like blowing out a candle.

32 101 Svābhavikakāya.

102 None of these can have aspects of absolute appearance.

103 The obscuration of knowables delusively regards knowable phenomena in terms of a conceptual duality of grasper and grasped. Śrāvakas are unable to abandon the obscuration of knowables because they accept many phenomena that comprise grasper and grasped as truly existing. That means that they can abandon duality only by abandoning phenomena altogether. Tāranātha says that literalistic Rangtongpas have the same problem.

Their situation is like those who are born in the formless realms, Once they enter the formless absorptions, there is nowhere else to go, until their karma of absorption is exhausted. Then they have burned up all their good karma and are usually reborn in hell. This cannot be reversed as long as they remain attached to their conceptualized viewpoint.

It is said that Pratyekabuddhas have a view like Mind-only do not realize properly the kind of emptiness that applies to the perceiver. The difference this conceptual attachment makes is that they fail to attain the path of seeing of the bodhisattva path, where the two kinds of selflessness are directly perceived. Like the Śrāvakas, they are forced to abandon all phenomena as delusory. If Zhentongpas have the literalistic views Rangtongpas accuse them of, they would have this problem as well. Then they really would be like literalistic Indians.

104 Dualistic mind that identifies the objects it apprehends as perceptions of separate, material objects and mental factors that fill in their relative qualities.

105 Rtogs read rtog. As written, it says “Merely by abiding in distinctions of realization, they cannot be distinguished, which is incorrect.

106 In the mental sense.

107 The Tibetan bden grub can mean truly existing in experience, and it can also mean truly established as a logical principle or conclusion. Both can be absolutely true, and hence, they can both bear analysis for absolute truth. The same is true for asserting “emptiness truly exists.” Tibetan passages like this one can obscure the difference between logic and experience, if they are not read carefully. That “all relative phenomena are empty of themselves” is a true logical principle entails that emptiness is the logical absolute. It does not entail by itself that pristine wisdom experiences that emptiness as the experiential absolute. That logical conclusion by inferential valid cognition does not entail that there is any experience at all, or that, if there is, there is non-delusive experience. These conclusions must be separately established.

Rangtongpas and Zhentongpas have no disagreement about establishing by perceptual valid cognition that beings have experience. They often have a big disagreement about whether perceptual valid cognition establishes non- delusive, non-conceptual experience. That is the same as disagreement over whether there is enlightened experience that is free from the obscuration of dualistic knowables, as discussed for the realization of the Śrāvakas.

33 Some Rangtongpas dispute non-dual perception altogether, or even claim that, if does occur, it is illusory. Jonangpas cite appropriate scriptures to show that this is not the correct tradition of either Nagarjuna or Asaṅga.

An Rangtong objection with more merit is that “existence” and “nonexistence” are dichotomous terms of conventional discourse that describe the relative, and that they have no literal application to absolute phenomena. Zhentongpas admit this, and this is the key to reconciling the two Madhyamaka systems, insofar as it is possible. There is much more discussion of this elsewhere in the text and appendices.

108 Literally, “according to.”

109 Rangtongpas establish logically that relative phenomena do not truly exist, because phenomena described by language are inconsistent, and so they cannot truly exist. Knowing that intellectually is called enlightenment by literalist Rangtongpas, though not for non-literalistic ones who typically practice tantra, as Jonangpas do. However, as they have not stopped the karmic winds by yoga practice, relative phenomena and their apparent intrinsic natures, continue to appear for them. Therefore, Rangtongpas say, “A vase is not empty of perception of a vase. A vase is empty of belief in true existence.”

Zhentong enlightenment is attaining the viewpoint of pristine wisdom. Relative phenomena do not appear within pristine wisdom, experientially refuting relative phenomena that do not correspond to the way things are.

110 Rangtongpas’ negation of all phenomena destroys the distinction between non- existent relative and existent absolute. The absolute for Rangtongpas is a logical principal. Insofar as they have experience of the natures, existence, and truth of the way things are, it is the natures, existence, and truth of relative phenomena.

They think they are drawing an absurd, unwanted consequence when they say that the opposite of what they say would entail Zhentong. However, since their view is faulty, there really is a meaningful distinction between truth and falsity, relative and absolute, and so forth. Tāranātha says that in the end, that they admit without wanting to do so that Zhentong is established.

111 Of the relative.

112 Experienced by other deluded beings.

113 It is established by experiential valid cognition, and its being basic goodness is part of that experience.

114 The truth of cessation of suffering is the only one of the four noble truths that is absolute. The others are relative.

115 Of the two truths.

116 Perhaps the selfhood of individual phenomena is included within the self of individuals here, since there must be both of the two kinds of emptiness of relative selfhood for the absolute to be empty of other.

34 117 There can be a path leading to the cessation of suffering, because the absolute, and pristine wisdom, as the essence of the path, are real.

118 Experience of the absolute provides reasoning with the perceptual valid cognition that establishes the propositions establishing Zhentong by reason. Until then it must be established from scripture. It cannot be established by reasoning alone, because it is beyond the scope of reason.

119 By Vasubandhu.

120 Madhyamaka. The tradition of literalistic Rangtong that does not go beyond logic can never include the Middle Way between logic and experience.

121 Rangtong and Zhentong agree that Mind-only erroneously accepts that conceptually describable mind is absolute.

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