The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise 2013
a complex scenario for multi-technology analysis
J. Ole Ross, Gernot Hartmann, Lars Ceranna, Nicolai Gestermann, and Christian Bönnemann
BGR / B4.3, German NDC
Science & Technology Vienna, 24 June 2015
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 1 National Data Centre Preparedness Exercises (NPE)
NPE are Ø Scenarios of potential CTBT violation (partially simulated) Ø Open to all NDCs and other Institutions engaged with CTBT verification
Ø Discussed at NDC Workshops (former “NDC Evaluation Workshop”)
NPE can improve Ø Effectiveness of verification procedures at NDCs Ø Awareness of potential needs concerning data products and skills Ø Communication among NDCs and with PTS Ø Analysis of multi-technology scenarios Ø Exchange between experts from various disciplines
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 2 NPE 2013 Scenario
Initial Situation A State Signatory points to a spatio-temporal connection of a waveform event in a certain area and (fictitious) radionuclide detections in Central Europe in September 2013.
The NPE-community is asked to give technical advise and to verify whether the hypothesis of the accusing state is justified or not
Verification Task • Identification and characterisation of the waveform event
• Analysis of radionuclide detections, source characterization, ATM backtracking
• Decision on potential CTBT relevance
• Overall question: Would it be adequate to request an On-Site-Inspection?
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 3 Information provided with NPE 2013 Scenario
Time of waveform event 4 September 2013
Region of waveform event The fictitious State of FRISIA in Central Europe
Radionuclide Findings: Iodine
5-24 µBq/m³ 131I first VIP00, Coll.Stop 8 Sep.
highest SEP63,Coll.Stop 13 Sep. Xenon
0.4-26 mBq/m³ 133Xe, first DEX33, Coll.Stop 11 Sep. highest SEX63, Coll.Stop 13 Sep. Some samples 131mXe, ratio 131m/133 0.019 – 0.027
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 4 Challenges of NPE 2013
• No REB for waveform event in FRISIA - Regional stations can be used - 2 IMS Primary, 4 Auxiliary stations • Unfavourable meteorological conditions for ATM -long transport times to stations -ambiguous WebGrape PSR
Xe-133 I-131
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 5 NPE 2013 Supplementary Information Was provided to requesting paticipants only:
Waveform analysis:
W1 Waveform detection lists of relevant IMS Primary and Auxiliary Seismic Stations as provided by the PTS
W2 Source parameter of the waveform event which caused the suspicion against FRISIA
W3 Statement of FRISIA about the character of the event
Atmospheric Transport Modelling:
A1 Number of radionuclide release locations and emission pulses
A2 Time of radionuclide release
A3 Indication of radionuclide source region
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 6 Supplementary Information W3
W3 Statement by the state of FRISIA concerning the waveform event:
“The event in question is an earthquake which occurred in the vicinity of Groningen on 4 September 2013. Following the analysis of the local experts from KNMI (Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute), this seismic event is very likely to be connected with gas exploration activities in this area. Induced seismicity is regularly observed at natural gas production fields in "FRISIA". Therefore, no release of radioactive substances was connected with the seismic event. Furthermore, all nuclear facilities in "FRISIA" operated normally without any known incident or unusual release throughout the days before and after 4 September 2013. Source: KNMI
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 7 Waveform recordings at selected seismic stations
296 km Distance to Pn 295 km epicentre Pn Pg 295 km
265 km P P S n g n Sg 243 km Pn P g Sn 217 km Pn 187 km Sg 184 km Pn Sg 135 km Pg 128 km P g Sg 117 km Filter: 1 – 8 Hz
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Wavform event: Earthquake in gas field
Appingedam
Groningen
• Reference location from KNMI calculated with phases from 14 local stations unknown accuracy • Inspection Area of 500 km2 size would be sufficient in case of an OSI
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 9 Atmospheric Transport Modelling / Radionuclide Analysis
Xe-133 I-131
à Many possible source locations à Connection of xenon and iodine unclear à Northern detections consistent with release in Frisia
Large variety of solutions presented at the NDC Workshop 2014
à Isotopic ratio analysis helps
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 10 Solution of FOI, Swedish NDC
131mXe/133Xe ratios measured at NOX49, SEX63 and RUX58
”Are consistent with xenon released after shutdown of a nuclear reactor, if the shutdown occurred several days before the event in Frisia.” The conclusions of the Swedish NDC are:
• The observed seismic event is most likely an induced event in connection to the Groningen gas field
• The xenon isotope ratios are not consistent with a nuclear explosion, rather a nuclear power plant
Source FOI ( Anders Ringbom, Anders Axelsson, Anders Mörtsell ) 11
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 NPE 2013 radionuclide release scenario
Fictitious scenario – very unlikely to happen in reality! Reactor incident at a Boiling Water Reactor location in Southern Germany: 48.5 N 10.4 E
~ 600 km distance to FRISIA seismic event
Imaginary event sequence (INES 3):
1. reactor shut down because of fuel damage 2. temporal partial loss of primary coolant 3. contamination inside reactor building 4. cooling recovered, reactor under control
Isotope I-131 Xe-131m Xe-133 Xe-133m Xe-135 Half-lifeSmall (h) leakage192.5 in containment286.4 leads125.8 to atmospheric52.6 release9.1 of volatile substances (<0.1 % of core inventory) on 4 Sept 2013 Source Term 5 TBq 10 TBq 1 PBq < 25 TBq < 1 PBq MDCThis release 5is µ pureBq/m ³NPE2013 0.15 fantasy mBq/m³ – nothing0.35 mBq similar/m³ 0.15occurred mBq/m in³ September0.7 mBq/m 2013³
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 12 NPE 2013 forward ATM
Xe-133 I-131
0.1 mBq/m³ 10 mBq/m³ 1 Bq/m³ 1 µBq/m³ 100 µBq/m³
Forward ATM setup Model run Xenon A Xenon B Iodine • HYSPLIT (NOAA-ARL) release day 09/04 09/04 09/04 • Meteorology: NCEP GDAS • horizontal resolution 0.5° time (UTC) 00 – 03 12-15 12-15 • 45 vertical levels deposition No No Yes • 500000 Particles per simulation
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 13 NPE 2013 backward ATM Xenon
WebGRAPE
PSR Xenon
2013/09/04
00-03 UTC 220 km FLEXPART- ECMWF
Distance PSR – source
(only) 220 km
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 14 NPE 2013 backward ATM Iodine
WebGRAPE
PSR Iodine
2013/09/04
12-15 UTC
FLEXPART- ECMWF
Distance Local PSR maximum- Source
440 km
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 15 Key station: VIP00 Vienna
Differential Field Of Regard for VIP00 sample of Sep. 8 release time I-131 2013/09/04 12-15 UTC
FLEXPART-ECMWF FLEXPART-NCEP
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 16 Discussions potentially triggered
Waveform • SEL event definition: include Auxiliary Seismic Stations? The event was detected at Primary Stations: GERES, NOA Auxiliary Stations: EKA, DAVOX, VRAC, HFS Radionuclide / ATM • How to categorize collocated Particulate / Noble Gas Detections? • Limitations of source localization • “Old explosions” as detections in April 2013 following DPRK test after ~55 days Diplomacy • How to react on false accusation? • What is necessary/sufficient to request an OSI • Role of National Technical Means
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 17 Evolution of NPE scenarios
Next NPE scenario:
- International control team
- New ideas welcome
- Discussion and planning at NDC Session on Friday morning
NPE 2007 NPE 2008 NPE 2009 NPE 2010 NPE 2012 NPE 2013 Iran: Zagros Chile Kazakhstan USA, Russia, FRISIA, Mountain Wyoming South West Sibiria Central Europe Earthquake Earthquake Blast: Blast: Black (Double)-Blast: Earthquake in gas Kara Zhyra Mine Thunder Mine Mezhdurechensk field; unrelated RN reactor release S waveforms S waveforms SI waveforms RN /ATM RN / ATM S waveforms ATM ATM / RN SI waveforms SI waveforms RN / ATM WMO exercise WMO exercise WMO exercise WMO exercise
Science & Technology 24 June 2015 Page 18