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Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War
Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War CLAUDIA BALDOLI ABSTRACT This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of anti- aircraft weapons and fighters; detection of enemy aircraft by deploying radar; coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The relationship between the government and industrialists, as well as that between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the story. The article argues that the history of Italian air defenses reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies. KEYWORDS air defenses; Air Ministry; anti-aircraft weapons; bombing; Fascist Italy; Germany; radar; Second World War ____________________________ Introduction The political and ideological role of Italian air power worked as a metaphor for the regime as a whole, as recent historiography has shown. The champions of aviation, including fighter pilots who pursued and shot down enemy planes, represented the anthropological revolution at the heart of the totalitarian experiment.1 As the Fascist regime had practiced terrorist bombing on the civilian populations of Ethiopian and Spanish towns and villages before the Second World War, the Italian political and military leadership, press, and industrialists were all aware of the potential role of air 1. -
World War II at Sea This Page Intentionally Left Blank World War II at Sea
World War II at Sea This page intentionally left blank World War II at Sea AN ENCYCLOPEDIA Volume I: A–K Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor Dr. Eric W. Osborne Assistant Editor Vincent P. O’Hara Assistant Editor Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II at sea : an encyclopedia / Spencer C. Tucker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-458-0 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations— Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– II. Title: World War Two at sea. D770.W66 2011 940.54'503—dc23 2011042142 ISBN: 978-1-59884-457-3 EISBN: 978-1-59884-458-0 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America To Malcolm “Kip” Muir Jr., scholar, gifted teacher, and friend. This page intentionally left blank Contents About the Editor ix Editorial Advisory Board xi List of Entries xiii Preface xxiii Overview xxv Entries A–Z 1 Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea 823 Glossary of World War II Naval Terms 831 Bibliography 839 List of Editors and Contributors 865 Categorical Index 877 Index 889 vii This page intentionally left blank About the Editor Spencer C. -
La Regia Marina Tra Le Due Guerre Mondiali
Copertina Ramoino (sistemata depa1set) OK.qxp:Trizio.qxd 30/09/11 09:15 Pagina 1 PIER PAOLO RAMOINO LA REGIA MARINA TRA LE DUE GUERRE MONDIALI RIVISTA MARITTIMA LA REGIA MARINA TRA LE DUE GUERRE MONDIALI 1 Pier Paolo RAMOINO LA REGIA MARINA TRA LE DUE GUERRE MONDIALI Livorno 2010 Settembre 2011 2 LA REGIA MARINA TRA LE DUE GUERRE MONDIALI PREMESSA INTRODUTTIVA enti anni se pur sono uno spazio temporale considerevole per gli esseri umani, sono certamente pochi per la lunga storia di una Forza Armata e po- Vchissimi per la storia di una Nazione, ma nel caso della Regia Marina ita- liana quelli che scorsero tra il 1919 e il 1939 hanno rappresentato un periodo carat- teristico di forti cambiamenti, che riguardarono non solo il mutamento dello stru- mento navale dovuto ai progressi della tecnologia, ma anche la filosofia d’impiego dei mezzi e del personale con l’affermazione di un proprio e originale «pensiero strategico», che è ancora oggi almeno in parte alle radici delle concezioni geopoli- tiche nazionali. Questo nostro breve studio vuole tentare di mettere in evidenza l’evoluzione della nostra compagine marittima attraverso l’esame delle decisioni più significati- ve nel campo della strategia dei mezzi e dei cambiamenti più importanti della sua organizzazione. Romeo Bernotti, forse il più noto pensatore «navalista» italiano del tempo, a cui molto spesso faremo riferimento nel prosieguo del nostro discorso, dice nelle sue memorie (1) che «le vicende della Grande Guerra nel campo marittimo suscitarono notevole disorientamento. Per i successi dei nuovi mezzi si diffuse largamente l’o- pinione che l’esperienza segnasse il fallimento dei criteri di arte militare marittima che erano stimati accettabili prima del fatale luglio 1914». -
20000000 Visit
Da “Time”, 16 maggio 1938 GERMANY-ITALY: $20,000,000 Visit "King by the Grace of God and the Will of the People" is what astute, courageous, popular Vittorio Emanuele III was long before Il Duce added the title of "Emperor." Last week His Majesty surprised casual foreign observers—not Italians—by making Adolf Hitler's visit to Italy the occasion for visibly demonstrating that Benito Mussolini is not the whole cheese in Italy—although he is of course The Big Cheese, as Neville Chamberlain is in England. Up to a few weeks before the 1922 March on Rome, Fascist Mussolini was an avowed Republican pledged to upset the Throne, and he came out as a Monarchist in a public speech only a few weeks before the March. Significantly the Fascist marchers on Rome were poorly armed, whereas His Majesty had mobilized powerful army units, held discreetly in barracks and side streets of Rome. Editor Mussolini remained at Milan 400 miles away until after the March, then accepted the telegraphed invitation of Vittorio Emanuele to come to Rome and form "His Majesty's Government" as Premier. In the recent Ethiopian war it was a Fascist, Marshal de Bono, who went out to begin a "Fascist conquest'' of this part of Africa. It was a prominent Monarchist, Marshal Badoglio, who, when the war bogged down under de Bono, was sent out, and ended the war as an "Italian victory." The King has always acted so as to give fullest scope to the energy and talents of II Duce, who has always acted with the greatest respect for Vittorio Emanuele III. -
I Diari E Le Agende Di Luca Pietromarchi (1938-1940)
Ruth Nattermann (Hrsg.): I diari e le agende di Luca Pietromarchi (1938-1940). Politica estera del fascismo e vita quotidiana di un diplomatico romano del ’900 Schriftenreihe Ricerche dell'Istituto Storico Germanico di Roma Band 5 (2009) Herausgegeben vom Deutschen Historischen Institut Rom Copyright Das Digitalisat wird Ihnen von perspectivia.net, der Online-Publikationsplattform der Max Weber Stiftung – Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland, zur Verfügung gestellt. Bitte beachten Sie, dass das Digitalisat der Creative- Commons-Lizenz Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) unterliegt. Erlaubt ist aber das Lesen, das Ausdrucken des Textes, das Herunterladen, das Speichern der Daten auf einem eigenen Datenträger soweit die vorgenannten Handlungen ausschließlich zu privaten und nicht-kommerziellen Zwecken erfolgen. Den Text der Lizenz erreichen Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode RICERCHE DELL’ISTITUTO STORICO GERMANICO DI ROMA 5 Collana fondata da Michael Matheus diretta da Gritje Hartmann, Thomas Hofmann, Lutz Klinkhammer, Alexander Koller, Michael Matheus, Andreas Rehberg e Kordula Wolf I diari e le agende di Luca Pietromarchi (1938-1940) Politica estera del fascismo e vita quotidiana di un diplomatico romano del ’900 a cura di Ruth Nattermann viella Copyright © 2009 Istituto Storico Germanico di Roma & Viella S.r.l. Tutti i diritti riservati Prima edizione: settembre 2009 ISBN 978-88-8334-369-8 Traduzione di Gerhard Kuck per l’Introduzione viella libreria editrice via delle Alpi 32 I-00198 ROMA tel. 06 84 17 75 8 fax 06 85 35 39 60 www.viella.it Indice Introduzione di Ruth Nattermann Gli appunti del diplomatico Luca Pietromarchi (1938-1940) 9 I. -
British Perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935-1943
King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2017.1280520 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Hammond, R. (2017). An Enduring Influence on Imperial Defence and Grand Strategy: British Perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935-1943. INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW, 39(5), 810-835. https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2017.1280520 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. -
Front Matter
Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-47821-2 — Strangling the Axis Richard Hammond Frontmatter More Information Strangling the Axis This is a major reassessment of the causes of Allied victory in the Second World War in the Mediterranean region. Drawing on a unique range of multinational source material, Richard Hammond demon- strates how the Allies’ ability to gain control of the key routes across the sea and sink large quantities of enemy shipping denied the Axis forces in North Africa crucial supplies and proved vital to securing ultimate victory there. Furthermore, the sheer scale of attrition to Axis shipping outstripped their industrial capacity to compensate, leading to the collapse of the Axis position across key territories maintained by seaborne supply, such as Sardinia, Corsica and the Aegean islands. As such, Hammond demonstrates how the anti-shipping campaign in the Mediterranean was the fulcrum about which strategy in the theatre pivoted, and the vital enabling factor ultimately leading to Allied victory in the region. richard hammond is a lecturer at Brunel University and is a vice president of the Second World War Research Group. He is the recipient of the Society for Military History’s Moncado Prize and the Corbett Prize in Modern Naval History (proxime accessit). © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-47821-2 — Strangling the Axis Richard Hammond Frontmatter More Information Cambridge Military Histories Edited by HEW STRACHAN, Professor of International Relations, University of St Andrews and Emeritus Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford GEOFFREY WAWRO, Professor of Military History, and Director of the Military History Center, University of North Texas The aim of this series is to publish outstanding works of research on warfare throughout the ages and throughout the world. -
Littorio” Alle “Impero”
DALLE “LITTORIO” ALLE “IMPERO” Navi da battaglia, studi e programmi navali in Italia nella seconda metà degli anni Trenta AUGUSTO DE TORO Su questa stessa rivista l’autore si propose di esplorare la genesi politico- diplomatica delle prime due navi da battaglia da 35 000 tons( 1)costruite in Italia fra le due guerre mondiali, Littorio e Vittorio Veneto.( 2) Riprendendo quel filo, si (1) A. de Toro, “Le origini politico-diplomatiche delle navi da battaglia Littorio e Vittorio Veneto”, Bollettino d’Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare, marzo 1997, p. 67- 151. L’autore approfitta dell’occasione per rettificare due errori presenti in quel saggio. Il primo riguarda il promemoria intitolato “L’impostazione di una moderna nave di linea considerata alla luce della situazione politica del 5 marzo 1934”, erroneamente imputato al Comitato Ammiragli, mentre fu sottoposto a questo dal sottosegretario di stato della Marina, amm. div. Domenico Cavagnari, affinché quel comitato si pronunciasse sull’opportunità o meno di dar corso alla costruzione di navi da battaglia di 35 000 tons (p. 100 ss.). Il secondo riguarda i programmati tempi di costruzione del Littorio e del Vittorio Veneto, per errore fatti coincidere con le annualità di bilancio a partire dal 1934-1935 fino al 1939-1940 (p. 107 sg.), mentre, in realtà, il Vittorio Veneto avrebbe dovuto essere consegnato nel febbraio 1939 e il Littorio due mesi dopo. I progressivi aggiornamenti, per lo più determinati da modifiche di progetto e dal prolungamento dei tempi di consegna delle corazze, portarono a un ritardo complessivo di 14 mesi per il primo e di oltre 12 mesi per il secondo. -
3 SULLIVAN La Storia Navale Nell'italia Di Vent'anni Fa
La storia navale nell’Italia di vent’anni fa di Brian R. Sullivan Uno studio del 1994 per il Naval War College di Newport La storia navale nell’Italia di vent’anni fa Di Brian R. Sullivan 1 Within the Italian university system, the teaching of naval and maritime history has been limited recently to only two schools, the Uni- versities of Pisa and Rome, and to two scholars, the highly respected Mariano Gabriele and his student, Alberto Santoni. For many years earlier in this century, the University of Rome had a chair in naval history and policy, held by the il- lustrious expert on World War I at sea, Camillo Manfroni (1863-1935) 2. After the Second World War, Manfroni was effectively succeed- ed by Gabriele. However, since Gabriele was and remains a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance, he has been for- bidden under Italian law from being an official professor at the Universi- ty of Rome and has been only an incaricato (adjunct). Since such a posi- tion within the Italian university system has been abolished recently, it is now legally impossible for Gabriele to go on teaching at the University of Rome. Barring the unexpected, when Santoni eventually retires from the University of Pisa, the teaching of naval and maritime history may well cease there. In fact, officially, Santoni holds a chair in military histo- ry and technology and will probably be succeeded by a scholar of land warfare. The situation within the Italian Navy educational system is slightly bet- ter. The Italian Naval Academy at Livorno offers a three-year course in naval history and policy taught by Commander Pier Paolo Ramoino. -
Challenges to British Imperial Hegemony in the Mediterranean 1919-1940
Challenges to British Imperial Hegemony in the Mediterranean 1919-1940 Iliya John Marovich-Old BA(Hons 1st Class), LLBLP(Hons) Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of History and International Relations Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Flinders University March 2017 Abstract This thesis is about challenge and control, a constitutive dynamic which helped shape Britain’s inter- war Mediterranean Empire. The challenge came in the form of a significant external threat from Italy and the constant high level of internal dissent within the colonies. This study questions how British governments were able to deal with these challenges and suggests that this affected their ability make effective policy decisions in response. In the Mediterranean the external pressure and international threat to empire was best represented by Fascist Italy, with imperial ambitions of their own and belief that Britain could fetter their growth and their ambitions. Italian activity in the Mediterranean circumscribed British activity in the region, and exacerbated colonial tensions. In response to Italian aggression Britain consistently pursued a flawed policy of appeasement. In this period the Empire was subject to significant challenge but was not in decline. The British state faced economic constraints and a changing international environment which was less favourable to the maintenance of its Empire but it retained the ability to respond to these threats. This study focuses on the colonies of Malta and Cyprus as examples of colonial dissent and finds that Britain exerted high levels of control, which they attempted to conceal through illusory constitutions and a constant resort to a state of exception. -
Italo-German Collaboration and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939
1 Italo-German Collaboration and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Glyn Stone Historians have long studied the rapprochement that took place between Benito Mussolini‟s Italy and Adolf Hitler‟s Germany during the years 1935-1939, beginning with the latter‟s policy of benevolent neutrality in the Abyssinian conflict and ending with the Pact of Steel.1 The road between the two was not always straight and can be said to have been both long and winding with a number of milestones along the way.2 One of these was undoubtedly the close collaboration that took place in both the diplomatic and military spheres in relation to their joint intervention in the Spanish Civil War on the side of General Francisco Franco‟s insurgent/nationalist forces. As a factor in the Italo- German rapprochement this collaboration looms large and it is the intention of this chapter to revisit and reevaluate it by a close examination of the decision of both powers to intervene in Spain and their reasons for doing so, the extent of their military cooperation and determination to maintain support for Franco throughout the civil war and the degree of their cooperation with regard to the various diplomatic manouevrings and initiatives which took place around the conflict. I Mussolini‟s response to appeals for armed assistance from the Spanish insurgents following their failed military coup of 17-18 July 1936, which precipitated the civil war in Spain, was initially cautious. Only when he had assured himself, on the basis of reports from Italian diplomats, that neither France nor Britain nor Soviet Russia intended to intervene did the Italian dictator give the green light, on 27 July, for the dispatch of aircraft to assist in the airlift of pro-rebel Spanish Moroccan forces to the Spanish mainland and arms and munitions to those fighting in Spain.