The Yankee Soldier's Might: the District of Maine and the Reputation

The Yankee Soldier’s Might: The District of Maine and the Reputation of the Massachusetts Militia, 1800–1812

joshua m. smith

N the spring of 1806, the residents of Portland, Maine, I were treated to an unusual display of street theater when militiaman Noah Harding reported for his scheduled muster. Harding wore three waistcoats of various colors and trousers hanging obscenely low, both adorned with bows and ribbons; on his face were outrageously large spectacles and on his feet boots covered in mold; a large dried codfish protruded from his knapsack, its tail extending well over his shoulder. It was widely agreed that he looked like a “deserter from a mad house.” Word had preceded Harding’s arrival, and a crowd had gathered. But his officers had also heard about Harding’s plan to embarrass them, and they had prepared a surprise of their own. They arrested him and, at the head of Fish Street, mounted him on an eight-foot-high “horse,” where he was forced to sit for an hour with his hands tied behind his back. Unrepentant, Harding pretended to canter on the “horse,” and he called out mock toasts to his officers. After the event passed, Harding sued his lieutenant. He was apparently unsuccessful, however,

I thank Brigadier General Leonid Kondratiuk, Director, Historical Services, the Adjutant General’s Ofﬁce of Massachusetts; Larry Glatz of Harrison, Maine; Lincoln Paine of Portland, Maine; and Alan Taylor of the University of California, Davis, for their support and assistance. I also acknowledge the Massachusetts Historical Society, which administers the New England Regional Fellowship Consortium grant program, which helped fund the research for this essay, and the staff of the Maine Historical Society for their kind assistance.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 235 and a court martial subsequently found the officer innocent of 1 any illegality in disciplining the difficult private. Harding’s demonstration, although unusually colorful, was not unique. Militiamen regularly protested mandatory musters and overbearing officers. In doing so, they drew attention to divisions in their units, divisions that reflected those in the larger society of the early American republic: the propertied versus the working class, front-country commercial villages versus backcountry agrarian squatters, Federalists versus Republi- cans, and proponents of national versus state control. Involved in policing at least as much as in formal military activities, racially exclusive, deeply parochial, varying widely in uniform and equipment, often at odds with the national government, frequently ill disciplined, and buffeted by partisan politics, the 2 militia was in an increasing state of disarray. In Massachusetts, the militia had long been a well-respected institution, but as the memory of the struggle for independence faded, internal dissensions spread, especially in the commonwealth’s far-flung District of Maine (which did not become a separate state until 1820), weakening the militia just as the nation was once again drifting toward war with England.

The Massachusetts Ideal Among the colonial militias, Massachusetts’ was the best organized, best equipped, and best regarded, a commonly held perception that signaled the colony’s commitment to the institution. The Massachusetts militia had its early roots in medieval England, where every able-bodied man was legally required to keep arms, but it was Elizabeth I who initiated training and equipping civilians to defend the kingdom in 1572.Mas- sachusetts Bay had a militia by 1636, its ofﬁcers nominated by

1 Portland Gazette, 13 October and 3 November 1806, reproduces the lieutenant’s court martial and his lengthy response to Harding’s actions. 2 See Joseph Williamson, Alfred Johnson, and William Cross Williamson, History of the City of Belfast in the State of Maine (Portland: Loring, Short and Harmon, 1913), p. 425; George Augustus Wheeler, History of Brunswick, Topsham, and Harpswell, Maine (Boston: A. Mudge and Sons, 1878), p. 690.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 236 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY an election process that was confirmed by the General Court. By 1672 the colony had codified its militia laws, exempting a range of professions and banning outright “Negroes and In- dians” from training or service. After it performed poorly in King Philip’s War, the colony reorganized its militia to favor units composed of volunteers, who were offered incentives to fight, rather than impressed men, who were compelled to do 3 so. That model survived for the remainder of the colonial pe- riod, with the militia proper largely restricted to maintaining order within a colony, while volunteer colonial forces oper- ated in conjunction with British regulars on the frontier or on 4 expeditions. Massachusetts rediscovered the importance of the militia in the years immediately preceding the War of Independence. With Boston occupied by British regulars, leaders like John Hancock and Josiah Quincy repeatedly framed a professional military as an instrument of oppression and the militia as the protector of the rights and liberties of a free society. During the Revolution, the skirmishes at Lexington and Concord, the battle at Bunker Hill, and to a degree that at Saratoga contributed to a powerful myth promoted by authors such as Mercy Otis Warren, who connected the militia’s military success to the virtue of the citizen-soldier. After independence, politicians like Elbridge Gerry continued to express their apprehension and contempt of regular military forces while promoting the militia as the guarantor, albeit an admittedly inefficient one, of a free 5 and stable republican constitution. Gerry and leaders of his ilk, supported by parochials who feared loss of prestige, also resisted reforms at the national level that would give the federal government more control over the militia. Many Americans continued to see the militia as a crucial means of protecting themselves against a potentially oppressive

3 Kyle F. Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip’s War (New York: New York University Press, 2009), pp. 19–39; 216–17. 4 Lawrence Delbert Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 5–7. 5 Cress, Citizens in Arms, pp. 44–50, 77, 89–90.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 237 central government or standing military, especially in Mas- sachusetts, where British forces’ occupation of Boston remained 6 a vivid and unhappy memory. In a congressional debate in 1789, Gerry spoke eloquently of the need for a strong militia:

What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty. Now it must be evident, that under this provision, together with their other powers, congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as make a standing army necessary. Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in 7 order to raise an army upon their ruins.

Proposals to bring the militia under federal authority were resisted across the political spectrum. Two Massachusetts con- gressmen with Maine connections who took that stand in the 1790s exemplify this bipartisan concern: David Cobb, an arch- Federalist with dreams of developing eastern Maine, and his counterpart Henry Dearborn, who had settled in the Kennebec Valley after the Revolution and was an early convert to Jefferso- 8 nian politics. Despite their and others’ reservations, however, Congress passed the federal Militia Act of 1792, which required all white males, with some exceptions, to participate, mandated the organization of militia units, and gave control of the militia to the president, under certain conditions. Massachusetts, like other states, was obliged to conform. A toast at a Jeffersonian Independence Day celebration in 1805 suggests that suspicion remained: “The Militia: Mayiteverbesoorganized,asto supercede the necessity of a Standing Army.” Even as late as 1823, a Massachusetts Federalist proclaimed, “The history of all ages proves that large armies are dangerous to civil liberty. Militia, however large, never can be; for it is composed

6 See Donald Hickey, “New England’s Defense Problem and the Genesis of the Hartford Convention,” New England Quarterly 50 (December 1977): 588. 7 George Billias, Elbridge Gerry, Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. 232; Don Higginbotham, “The Federalized Militia De- bate,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 55 (January 1998): 39–58, passim. 8 Carl Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 8–9.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 238 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY of citizens only, armed for the preservation of their own 9 privileges.” New England’s political, intellectual, and military leadership all valued the role of the militia. To founding father John Adams, the militia, along with schools, churches, and town government, was both source and image of civic stability as it reflected and reinforced the social order. As early as 1789,an author noted that in New England “the boys are early taught the use of arms, and make the best of soldiers; nor is there a country upon earth, of equal extent and population, can fur- 10 nish a more formidable army than this part of the Union.” The militia leadership reflected this attitude in public speeches and published orders. In his general orders of 1806, Adjutant General William Donnison offered his opinion about the role of the post-Revolutionary militia. “It is the duty of a nation to provide for its own security in the most effectual manner, so that each citizen may be free from the danger of violence at home, or invasion from abroad; and may be able to pursue his lawful enterprises without any unreasonable restraint or in- 11 terruption.” Donnison’s reference to the militia’s policing, or constabulary, role reflects Massachusetts’ experience of Shays’s Rebellion (1786–87), when the commonwealth mobilized the militia to quell a protest by farmers from the western counties, as well as the ongoing violence in Maine, where militia units protected land surveyors and commercial villages from agrarian squatters. Indeed, many leaders thought, the mere presence of a well-regulated, well-led militia would quell disruption by instilling a sense of order and discipline within the yeomanry (see fig. 1). As Donnison exhorted his militia in 1800:

9 Eastern Argus (Portland, Maine), 12 July 1805; William H. Sumner, An Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia to a Free Commonwealth, In a Letter from William H. Sumner to John Adams, Late President of the United States; with His Answer (Boston: Cummings and Hilliard, 1823), pp. 7–8, 32. 10 Joseph Conforti, Imagining New England: Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid–Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 94; Jedidiah Morse, The American Geography (1789; reprinted New York: Arno, 1970), p. 44. 11 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, General Orders, Head-quarters, March 12th, 1806 (Boston, 1806), Broadsides, Library of Congress.

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Fig. 1.—An illustration from Maltby’s Elements of War reﬂected his Federalist militia and social ideals: in step, disciplined, and uniform in appearance.

Fellow-Citizens of the Militia, see that your arms and accoutrements are always kept in good condition. When called to the ﬁeld, remember that order and subordination alone distinguish you from a disorderly multitude, and never forget that the honor and reputation of a Corps 12 depends entirely upon its discipline.

12 Adjutant General, General Orders, Headquarters, Boston, July 7, 1800 (Boston, 1800), Broadsides, Library of Congress.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 240 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY An idealistic view of the militia’s role in regulating social hier- archies endured well beyond the War of 1812.Aslateas1823, Massachusetts’ adjutant general was proclaiming that militia trainings are productive of a friendly intercourse in society. They give an opportunity for those who are in the humbler walks of life, to disclose their talents and virtues to others whose consideration is deserving of regard. They elicit merit from a class of men who would have no other chance of shewing it. They make every officer who has gained the good opinion of his fellows, ambitious to retain it, and those, who are coming forward into life, desirous of the dis- tinction which a commission confers. They teach civility and respect for authority. They introduce habits of subordination in society; and impress, upon the younger part of the community a sense of that obe- dience to the laws, which influences all their conduct in life; and taken in connexion with our schools of education, and our establishments for 13 moral and religious instruction, they make an orderly community. As Donnison made clear, the threat of violence was not only near at hand but could also come from abroad. In 1811, Isaac Maltby advocated for the militia’s role in defending the young nation against foreign invasion. Maltby challenged the federal government’s program of building coastal fortifications and, in his Elements of War, asked Do you also put confidence in your batteries, and fortifications of your harbors? Let not that confidence turn your views from the discipline of your citizens. Fortifications and batteries, however necessary, are stationary and immovable. But with such an extensive sea-coast, where an invader may choose his point of attack, the bulwark, to inspire confidence, must be moveable. Such an one may be composed of the bodies of hardy freemen, well-disciplined. Such a battery may inspire confidence; it will move to any point. Such men “will speak with your 14 enemies in the gates;” or meet them at the water’s edge. The Massachusetts militia also enjoyed a stellar reputation because it was a particularly well-run military bureaucracy,

13 Sumner, Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia, pp. 38–39. 14 Isaac Maltby, The Elements of War (Boston: T. B. Wait and Co., 1813), p. xxi. See also Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conﬂict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), pp. 259–68.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 241 headed by an adjutant general and a quartermaster general. The adjutant general took charge of personnel issues, such as muster rolls, inspections, and courts martial; the quartermaster general oversaw equipment and installations, such as the commonwealth’s large train of artillery. Long-serving adjutant general William Donnison and Quartermaster General Amasa Davis, only part-time soldiers, were nonetheless re- sourceful administrators who had to rent ofﬁce space and hire clerks at their own expense in expectation that the General Court would grant their annual requests for reimbursement. Administrative units, militia divisions were commanded by major generals and corresponded geographically with individual or paired counties. The oldest, largest, and best-equipped division in the state was, naturally, based in Boston and un- surprisingly denominated the First Division. Predating the regular army, the Massachusetts militia was more numerous and, in no small part because regulars were seen as immoral or amoral, generally considered to be more efﬁcient and pres- 15 tigious. As such, the Massachusetts militia embodied the New England Federalist ideal, with a stable and talented elite based in Boston capably managing outlying areas like remote Maine.

Maine’s Partisan Challenge The Federalists’ and Jeffersonians’ high-minded rhetoric regarding the militia signaled its importance in both parties’ grand schemes. Maine’s population grew quickly after the Revolution, and by 1810, it represented approximately 25 percent of the gubernatorial vote in Massachusetts. As a Jeffersonian stronghold, Maine threatened to invert the commonwealth’s political hierarchy. The militia was a valuable prize in that political struggle, and Jeffersonians sought to capture it. By doing so, they jeopardized the

15 See the notion of a “military duality” in Edward M. Coffman, “The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary,” Journal of Military History 64.4 (October 2000): 969.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 242 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY Federalists’ ideal of a hierarchical and well-disciplined citizen 16 militia. In 1807 a Portland militia private publicly complained that his Jeffersonian company officers, who suspected him of being 17 a Federalist, had abused him. That same year, a Jeffersonian colonel of a Hancock County militia regiment, upon learning that a Federalist had been elected captain, reportedly shouted out “damn him he is a Fed, shoot him.” The colonel proceeded to badger the captain, prompting him to decline the commission, which motivated other officers to instigate a court martial 18 that stripped the colonel of his commission. As Jeffersonian governors came into office in Massachusetts, they replaced retiring or deceased major generals who had themselves wielded considerable patronage powers. Once cho- sen, major generals remained in command until they resigned their commissions or died, and so in the latter years of the eighteenth century, the militia tilted toward superan- nuated Federalists who had fought in the Revolution. When Democratic-Republican James Sullivan succeeded Federalist Caleb Strong as governor in 1807, he initiated a process of politicizing the selection of senior officers when he nominated George Ulmer to command the Tenth Division. Despite the protests of many officers who thought the Federalist candidates had more experience and seniority, the legislature approved 19 Ulmer’s appointment. Ulmer, at least, had served in the Revolution, but William King had ample Jeffersonian political credentials but no military background whatsoever. Federalists suspected that the newly created Eleventh Division in mid-coast Maine had been

16 Paul Goodman, The Democratic Republicans of Massachusetts: Politics in a Young Republic (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 131–32. 17 Portland Gazette, 30 March and 6 April 1807. 18 Freeman’s Friend (Portland), 30 October 1805,andEastern Argus, 25 October 1805. 19 Portland Gazette, 9 February and 9 March 1807. Ulmer grumbled that the Fed- eralist ofﬁcers “put me to all the trouble they can”; see George Ulmer to William Donnison, 6 May 1807, Massachusetts Adjutant General Correspondence, Early Mili- tia Records, Massachusetts National Guard Museum and Archives, Worcester, Mass. (hereafter MANGMA).

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 243 fashioned simply so King could be appointed its major general in 1808, thus promoting his political career. His oppo- nents dubbed him the “Military Rocket” for his rapid rise in the military hierarchy. Sullivan, Ulmer, and King all presented a challenge to Federalist Yankee Congregationalist orthodoxy: Sullivan was the son of an Irish immigrant, Ulmer descended from German immigrants, and King was a Baptist, not a Con- 20 gregationalist. Political tampering with the militia worsened as the War of 1812 approached. In late 1811, Governor Elbridge Gerry, a partisan Jeffersonian, attempted a militia version of gerrymandering that would create no less than six new divisions within the commonwealth, three of them in Maine. In his annual ad- dress to the General Court, Gerry argued that the divisions were necessary because the population had grown, but it is apparent that, in a striking reversal of his position on the militia in the late 1780s, he worried that the Federalist-dominated militia had the power to effect a military coup. Gerry’s biogra- pher claimed that Massachusetts Federalists were “out-and-out 21 monarchists.” It is also clear that the move was intended to humiliate Major General Henry Sewall and sap his political in- ﬂuence. The old Eighth Division would be a mere rump of four infantry regiments, two cavalry, and a single artillery company, almost all of them located in backcountry settlements that were sure to cause the old general ample problems. All the populous towns on the western bank of the Kennebec would be trans- ferred to the new Seventeenth Division, under the command of the Jeffersonian John Chandler, along with the two pres- tigious light infantry companies, and would consist of seven regiments of infantry, and three companies each of cavalry and 22 artillery.

20 Portland Gazette, 9 March 1807; William Goold, “Governor Christopher Gore and His Visit to Maine,” in Collections and Proceedings of the Maine Historical Society 1.1 (January 1894): 80. 21 Billias, Elbridge Gerry, p. 318. 22 Massachusetts Council, 8 February 1812, “Commonwealth of Mass. Council Chamber...TheCommittee on Militia Affairs ...HavetakenintoConsiderationthe situation of the Eighth Division,” MANGMA.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 244 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY Militia gerrymandering was even conducted at the regimental level. When a regiment on the western shores of Penobscot Bay was split in two in 1812, Federalists vented their frustrations in the local press. Why, one asked, should carefully nurtured units “thus clandestinely have been haggled to pieces to pro- mote one aspiring man[?] I hope soon to see an administration in this Commonwealth, which instead of cutting up regiments, brigades and divisions to please a few aspiring demagogues, will respect the feelings and the interests of the Militia, and restore the dismembered limbs, which have been torn asun- der in different parts of the Commonwealth, to their natural 23 bodies.” Stunned and angered by the scope of the partisan reorgani- zation, Federalist Caleb Strong launched an investigation when he was swept back into ofﬁce in 1812; subsequently, he voided the creation of three of the six new divisions. Among those can- celed was one in Maine, the proposed Seventeenth Division, which would have been carved out of the Kennebec River Valley’s Eighth Division, bastion of Federalist stalwart Major General Henry Sewall. The commander of the new division was to have been John Chandler, a partisan Jeffersonian and close friend of Henry Dearborn’s. Finding themselves once again under Sewall’s command, some ofﬁcers with Jeffersonian leanings resigned their commissions in disgust and openly criti- 24 cized the division’s abolition. Chandler may not have received the militia commission he coveted, but his old friend Dearborn

23 Portland Gazette, 30 March 1812. The “aspiring man” was probably Col. Eras- tus Foot of Camden, an attorney who had particularly angered Federalists when he defected to Jeffersonianism. 24 Massachusetts, General Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Council Cham- ber, June 19th, 1812, Broadsides, Library of Congress. The two new divisions allowed to stand in Maine were the Twelfth, in Cumberland County, and the Thirteenth, in Oxford County, both taken from the old Sixth Division, which was now conﬁned to York County. Among those resigning was Colonel Thomas Fillebrown: see his letter to Samuel Currier, 27 December 1813, reproduced in Charles Bowdoin Fillebrown, Genealogy of the Fillebrown Family, With Biographical Sketches (Boston: The author, 1910), pp. 34–35; American Advocate, 25 June and 7 July 1812; American Advocate (Hallowell, Me.), 9 July 1812.

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TABLE 1 Maine Militia Divisions, circa 1814

Division County Infantry Cavalry Artillery Total % Pop.

Sixth York 4,531 107 72 4,710 11 Eighth Kennebec & 5,140 217 211 5,568 12 Somerset Tenth Hancock & 4,084 82 176 4,342 11 Washington Eleventh Lincoln 4,004 157 175 4,336 10 Twelfth Cumberland 3,220 138 209 3,567 8 2 151 133 2 402 Thirteenth Oxford , 118 , 12 Total 23,130 834 961 24,925

Source: Figures from William Burdick, The Massachusetts Manual: Or Political and Historical Register, for the Political Year from June 1814, to June 1815 (Boston: Charles Callender, 1814), pp. 53–57. Note: Population as a percentage of the 1810 census, which totaled 228,705 residents.

arranged to have him made a brigadier general in the U.S. 25 Army.

Maine’s Proportional Challenge As Maine’s population grew, and so its militia, it drifted further and further away from the Federalist ideal of a well- regulated, disciplined, hierarchical organization, an ideal once again espoused by the commonwealth’s governors Caleb Strong and John Brooks, who between them kept Massachusetts in the Federalist camp from 1812 until 1823. As shown in table 1,in the second decade of the nineteenth century, about 25,000 men were enrolled in Maine’s militia, a little less than a third of the commonwealth’s total force. Maine militia divisions were smaller than those in Massachusetts proper, with fewer regiments. In 1812 Maine’s oldest division was the Sixth, based in York County; its newest, and therefore smallest and least well organized, was the Thirteenth, based in Oxford County.

25 For Chandler’s disastrous military career in the War of 1812, see James E. Elliott, Strange Fatality: The Battle of Stoney Creek, 1813 (Montreal: Robin Brass Studio, 2009).

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 246 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY TABLE 2 Ratio of Muskets, Artillery, and Cavalry to Infantry in Maine Militia Divisions

Infantry to Infantry to Artillery Infantry to Division Muskets Ratio Pieces Ratio Cavalry Ratio

Sixth .78 1,133 42 Eighth .70 643 24 Tenth .66 408 50 Eleventh .76 400 25 Twelfth .75 322 23 Thirteenth .73 307 16 Average .73 535.530

Source: Burdick, Massachusetts Manual, pp. 53–57.

The largest division, the Eighth, was drawn from the rapidly growing counties of Kennebec and Somerset. On average, only about 11 percent of Maine’s population was enrolled in the militia. Younger communities in the newer frontier counties had a slightly higher proportion of military men, probably because they had a greater ratio of males to fe- males than older counties. Cumberland County had the lowest proportion of militia to population. Apparently, its diversified economy produced more exemptions from duty, such as for seamen and those enrolled in fire companies, and a significant number of its Quakers and other pacifists evidently refused to bear arms. The least well-equipped divisions faced the greatest chal- lenges. The Tenth Division had to defend a lengthy seaboard stretching from Penobscot Bay to the District’s border with the British province of New Brunswick in the east, and its western territory was a hotbed of squatter strife, which the militia was sometimes called out to suppress. The Tenth also encompassed the District’s major Native American settlements, whose populace inspired fear among Anglo-Americans dramat- ically in excess of their numbers and actual military capability. As seen in Table 2, the Tenth also had fewer muskets to offer infantrymen than any other division, a fact made abundantly

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 247 clear during the Chesapeake incident, when a British naval vessel fired on an American frigate and forced it to surrender under humiliating circumstances. As militia units prepared for what appeared to be a coming war with Britain, Major General George Ulmer personally inspected every unit in the Tenth Di- vision. While Ulmer praised the militia’s overall preparedness, he also found that units near the border and on the islands, the areas most exposed to British attack, were inadequately 26 equipped. The inland Eighth and Thirteenth Divisions also faced the prospect of overland invasion or raids from Quebec, the memory of which lingered from the battles of the French and Indian War and the Revolution, as did seaborne attacks among coastal divisions. The militia was comprised of three basic units: artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Most units consisted of foot soldiers, but each division was required to have at least one company of artillery and one of cavalry. Artillery carried the most prestige. Cavalry units attracted public attention but were few in number. The heart of the militia was the un-uniformed, sixty- four-man infantry company, whose members were often known as “stringbeaners,” joined in increasing numbers after 1800 by 27 self-selected uniformed companies. Massachusetts, for reasons that are not totally clear, had the largest artillery park of any state in the union, a full 40 percent of available artillery pieces. Between 1807 and 1812, the numbers and standardization of artillery was increasing, and brass field pieces, especially six- and three-pounders, replaced the assorted artillery on hand. Each division had from two to five

26 Eastern Argus, 27 August and 10 September 1807. 27 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, provides a useful summary of militia organization. The term “string beaners” or “stringbeaners” apparently dates from after the War of 1812; it can be found in several local histories. See William Collins Hatch, A History of the Town of Industry, Franklin County, Maine, from the Earliest Settlement in 1787 Down to the Present Time (Farmington: Press of Knowlton, McLeary and Co., 1893), p. 156; Florence G. Thurston and Harmon S. Cross, Three Centuries of Freeport, Maine (Freeport: n.p., 1940), p. 77; Emma Huntington Nason, Old Hallowell on the Kennebec (Augusta: Burleigh and Flynt, 1909), p. 334; and Charles Elventon Nash, The History of Augusta; First Settlements and Early Days As a Town, Including the Diary of Mrs. Martha Moore Ballard (1785 to 1812) (Augusta: Charles E. Nash and Son, 1904), p. 217.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 248 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY companies of artillery—with shire towns taking precedence— usually equipped with brass three- and six-pounders and one tumbrel, or cart. Cannon were distributed in pairs and kept in wooden gunhouses in the larger commercial villages. On special occasions, artillerymen routinely turned out to fire salutes, and almost as routinely one among them died or lost a limb in the process. At the conclusion of an 1807 artillery salute in Port- land, a cannon discharged prematurely, mangling the arms of 28 three artillerymen who had to have the limbs amputated. The Twelfth Division, which encompassed Portland, with its two artillery companies, had the most favorable ratio of field pieces to infantry. The oldest division in the District, the Sixth, had the least artillery, probably because other divisions that had recently been split from it had assumed some of its artillery companies. Cavalry were few in number throughout the commonwealth. Each member of a cavalry company had to own, or at least have regular access to, a horse and tack, both of which were expen- sive. Moreover, as Adjutant General Donnison recognized, “the discipline of this Corps is more arduous and difficult than any other. The horseman may learn to ride, and use the sword, but the horse to be subdued and kept in subjection, requires con- 29 stant exercise and actual service.” Maine, with its paltry roads and dense forests, was not good cavalry territory. Nonetheless, the recently-created Thirteenth Division for Oxford County had the third highest proportion of cavalry in the commonwealth. The Tenth Division again stands out as the worst provisioned, perhaps because a sizable number of its population lived on islands, where horses were seldom seen. Muster rolls reveal that in 1806 the Tenth Division’s cavalry companies were also small,

28 U.S. Militia Returns, American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Execu- tive of the Congress of the United States: Class V. Military Affairs, vol. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), pp. 261, 300, 333. Every year between 1807 and 1812,the commonwealth procured two additional brass six-pounders and one additional three- pounder; see Henry Dearborn to unknown, Portland, 1 June 1807, Henry Dearborn Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland. 29 Adjutant General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, General Orders, Head- quarters, March 12th, 1806. By order of the Commander in Chief William Donnison, Adjutant General (Boston 1806), Broadsides, Library of Congress.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 249 numbering about twenty five, including officers, and lacked key 30 personnel such as saddlers and farriers. It seems likely that these cavalry units were primarily intended to serve as couriers, vedettes, or scouts, functions useful both for a constabulary and in fending off foreign invasion. Most infantry were stringbeaners, foot soldiers whose pri- mary weapon was a musket and bayonet. The Second Militia Act of 1792 stipulated that every “free able-bodied white male citizen” in militia infantry units own a musket, bayonet, knapsack, and cartridge box, which men usually kept in their own homes. If authorities called out the militia for any reason, and a member refused to join his unit, he faced a stiff fifty-dollar fine. On the other hand, creditors could not seize a militiaman’s uniform or weapons to settle his debts. Each town was to keep a quantity of powder, flints, musket balls, and camp kettles on hand. These regulations were often observed in the breach, and the quartermaster general had constantly to remind officers and towns of their legal obligation to maintain supplies. Men regularly dodged militia duty, appeared for muster un- armed, or arrived with borrowed weapons. Soldiers’ resistance ranged from passive neglect, to picaresque protest, to outright mutiny. Nonattendance, a problem throughout the nation, was never resolved, despite the threat of fines and legal proceedings. Absenteeism had many causes—lack of time, religious qualms, a family’s disapproval of the heavy drinking that took place at musters, dislike of officers, and so on—but the one that rises above all was cost. Many men, especially those from backwoods settlements, simply could not afford to arm and equip themselves as federal and state law demanded, and they 31 bitterly resented the obligation. For their part, a number of officers were hesitant to enforce the letter of the law on their troops because it might diminish their popularity and make

30 Militia cavalry returns dated May 1806, in John Crosby Papers, Maine Historical Society. 31 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 6, 43; Portland Gazette, 11 February 1811. Quaker tradesmen, who were exempt from militia duty, were required to provide arms for their non-Quaker apprentices, but sometimes they refused to do so. For Quaker resentment, see “General Isaac Hodsdon,” undated typescript, Isaac Hodsdon Papers, Maine Historical Society.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 250 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY them vulnerable to pranks and loss of ofﬁce (and therefore local prestige) in regimental elections.

Maine’s Social Challenge Led by uniformed officers whom they elected, the stringbeaners varied in their level of commitment. Some undoubtedly took their training seriously; but many saw it as an occasion to gather with friends and drink to excess. Socially ambitious officers, on the other hand, eagerly anticipated their militia musters, performances in which they held the starring role. In the summer of 1810, Portland residents complained that militia companies paraded through the town simply so officers 32 could show off their uniforms. Vanity frequently prompted insubordination, as when one officer, who had been over- looked for promotion, marched his company, drums rolling and fifes squealing, around the rest of the regiment, all the while muttering his contempt for his superior officer. A Jeffer- sonian lieutenant colonel had been the target of the captain’s disdain, and so when he was brought before the Federalist Major General Sewall at court martial, he received no more than an official reprimand and a judgment that, while he may have made a mistake, he had certainly not wanted to “destroy 33 subordination.” Stringbeaners, who accepted the leadership of their officers only conditionally, developed various means of dealing with the obnoxious among them—those who put on airs, demanded un- necessary marching, or showered privileges on themselves and other officers. On occasion, stringbeaner resentment doomed a militia muster, as it did at Nobleboro, in mid-coast Lincoln County, in September 1806. At noon Major General Henry Sewall invited his commissioned officers to dine with him, while the rank and file remained on the muster field under arms. The officers and men of three companies from Ball- town (now Jefferson and Whitefield) and Bristol, communities

32 Portland Gazette, 30 July 1810. 33 Gazette of Maine (Buckstown), 20 March 1806.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 251 with a large number of agrarian squatters, felt insulted by the general’s gesture. Contrary to orders and led by their own officers, these companies marched off the muster field to return home. When Sewall sent mounted officers after them, the Ball- town company’s captain drew his sword and his men threatened to shoot them; Bristol’s two companies did likewise, pricking their horses as well. The mutinous officers ultimately faced a court martial, which stripped them of their commissions. Sewall, however, did not emerge from the incident unscathed: Governor James Sullivan carved a new militia division out of his in early 1807 and gave its command to the aforementioned William King, the political partisan, known to be a friend to the 34 agrarian squatters, who had absolutely no military experience. Like Noah Harding, some militiamen used humor to mock their officers’ pretentions. Such overt, public acts of social leveling severely tested officers’ patience. In Belfast, militia dressed outrageously, substituting a cow tail for a cockade, and made fun of their superiors. In Topsham—both in protest and in jest, and probably under the influence of too much liquor—stringbeaners elected men wildly incapable of taking 35 command. Unofficial militia traditions throughout New England did little to encourage good discipline, and musters could be rowdy affairs. Even death could be the unhappy consequence, as when a compatriot accidentally brained a Steuben militiaman with his musket butt during a brawl, an incident with ironic dimensions given that the town was named after the Baron von Steuben, the disciplinarian who had done so much to whip the Conti- 36 nental Army into shape. On muster days, it was customary for the members of each company to awaken their commander in the pre-dawn hours as they fired impromptu volleys into the air. This boisterous behavior, which could commence as early

34 Portland Gazette, 23 February 1807. Balltown later divided into Jefferson and Whiteﬁeld. For Federalist outrage at King’s forthcoming appointment, see Columbian Centinel, 4 March 1807. 35 Wheeler, History of Brunswick, Topsham and Harpswell, p. 690. 36 Portland Gazette, 14 October 1811.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 252 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY as midnight, continued until the captain invited the revelers into his home. In 1810 Major General Sewall reported that he was happy “to find the lawless practice of promiscuously firing on the road to be subsiding, and confidently hopes, that as civ- ilization and correct habits prevail, this barbarous custom will be entirely laid aside.” Unfortunately, another less than civil ritual still persisted: company officers screaming profanities at 37 their commands during musters. The practice known as “treating” was also a nagging problem. Enlisted men, who elected their company-level officers, compelled their leaders to lavish upon them vast quantities of food and liquor. The wealthy William Vaughan of Hallowell was rewarded for his elaborate regard for his stringbeaners with a rapid rise to colonel of the local regiment, and a militia officer in Waterford spent over a thousand dollars in the course of twelve 38 years to “support his rank.” As early as 1794, the adjutant general registered his disapproval of treating, primarily on the grounds that some otherwise qualified officers were forced to 39 resign because they could not afford the expense. But for the politically ambitious, Federalists and Jeffersonians alike, a militia officer’s rank reflected status within the community, which in turn allowed him to participate in networks that spanned geography, class, and other social differentiations. Higher-ranked officers, especially major generals, controlled considerable patronage, which could translate into power, money, or both and 40 was a significant disincentive to retire. In more populous, wealthier communities, military enthusi- asts prevailed upon the legislature to authorize what were often

37 Herald of Liberty (Augusta), 9 October 1810. 38 Henry Pelt Warren, William Warren, and Samuel Warren, The History of Water- ford, Oxford County, Maine (Portland: Hoyt, Fogg and Donham, 1879), p. 123. 39 Nash, History of Augusta, p. 223; Portland Gazette, 14 October 1811; Williamson, History of the City of Belfast, p. 425; Hatch, History of Industry, 160–61;Mas- sachusetts, Adjutant General, General Orders, Headquarters, Boston, March 1, 1794, Broadsides, Library of Congress Broadsides. 40 Laurel Ulrich, A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785–1812 (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp. 98, 318; Ronald P. Formisano, Trans- formation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s–1840s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 133–34.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 253 termed “independent companies,” often better disciplined and equipped than stringbeaner units. One of Massachusetts’ first companies of riflemen, who used a slow-loading but accurate ri- fled musket, formed in Portland, which also boasted a company of volunteer “Sea Fencibles,” a unit comprised of seamen pro- 41 visioned in nautical fashion and armed with cutlasses. These uniformed companies were generally populated by the community’s better-off sons, who could afford to purchase the required garb and gear. Even they, however, complained about training days. One company commander wrote in a letter to his future wife, “We trained last night till dark, and I was tired enough to go home and go to bed. I have not one spark of military enthusiasm—not enough to make this business the slightest 42 amusement.” Orderly books reveal the lengths to which these units went to organize and equip themselves. Militiamen were billed for special weapons or uniforms, which could be quite costly. When the Portland Artillery Company ordered new uniforms in early 1812, the unit voted to assess each member no more than $27.50, a sum that exceeded the monthly pay of a laborer, sailor, or timberman. In effect, then, such units were essentially self- screening clubs whose members often shared a political affilia- tion, usually Federalist, and who sought to fulfill their military obligations at a social distance from ordinary enlisted men. The Ellsworth Light Infantry Company styled itself the “Cobb Light Infantry Company,” in tribute to arch-Federalist David Cobb, and wore uniforms featuring a red coat, which undoubtedly angered Jeffersonians for its suggestion of British redcoats. Even when the Portland Mechanic Blues self-consciously decreed that no prospective member would be turned away on the ba- sis of politics or religion, the unit was in truth proclaiming its 43 Jeffersonian politics. Despite their tendency to overt display,

41 Eastern Argus, 5 May 1808; Portland Gazette, 2 and 9 May 1808. 42 John G. Deane to Rebecca D. Paddleford, June 1810, extracted in Llewellyn Deane, Biographical Sketch of John G. Deane and Brief Mention of His Connection with the Northeastern Boundary of Maine (Washington: R. Beresford, 1887), p. 55. 43 Portland Artillery Company Records, 4 February 1812, Maine Historical Society; “Cobb Light Infantry Records,” John Black Papers, microﬁlm, Maine State Archives,

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 254 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY state authorities recognized that not all uniformed companies were superior to stringbeaner units. As early as 1806, Adjutant General Donnison noted that “military virtues are not found in all of them; there are some instances of deviation which call 44 for reform.” Uniformed companies staged elaborate ceremonies that allowed the community’s evolving leadership to establish or project their self-serving ideals. In one such ritual, a young lady presented an elegant silk standard to the unit and exhorted the men to bring honor to the ﬂag; in return, the young men swore to defend the community’s women. Zilpah Wadsworth, daugh- ter of a Revolutionary War general and future mother of the poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, did her best to duck the exercise, but in 1799, she was pressured into the duty. To her relief, her speech—to the unit, a group of other young women, and a large crowd of spectators—was completely drowned out 45 by the martial music. Such presentations were a rare opportunity for women to speak in public on important issues. Demonstrating her knowl- edge of the classics, one young woman addressed the Augusta Light Infantry when she presented it with a white silk standard on which a motto was emblazoned in red.

Like the matrons of Rome, allow us to participate on this interesting occasion, and though all untaught, permit me, in the name of these your patrons, to present you this standard; believing, as they do, that it is never to be deserted, never to be unfurled, with the menacing attitude of war, but in the hour of your country’s danger. In that hour may you imitate and surpass the famed legions of Rome!

Augusta; “Company Regulations,” Orderly Book, Portland Mechanic Blues, 1807–25, Maine Historical Society. 44 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, General Orders, Head-quarters, March 12th, 1806, Broadsides, Library of Congress; Ricardo A. Herrera, “Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861,” Journal of Military History 65 (January 2001): 26. 45 Laura F. Sprague, “Patriotism: The Stroudwater Light Infantry Banner,” in Agree- able Situations: Society, Commerce, and Art in Southern Maine, 1780–1830, ed. Laura F. Sprague and Joyce Butler (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 222–23.

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Remember, soldiers, the prosperity of your country and your own glory are inseparably connected; that to be brave and disciplined, is to be brilliant and victorious. Should the dread hour arrive that threatens to immolate your country at the shrine of foreign ambition or internal faction—ﬂy to this standard—protect it with your lives—let retreat and capitulation be terms known to you only by name—and swear by the avenging spirit, you will adhere to the emphatic motto here inscribed—“Victory or 46 Death.”

Here were the favored sons of the community, drawn up under arms in military splendor, urged on by their female counter- parts in a display of class and erudition. Following the public pageant was a ball, a different kind of venue to ﬂaunt wealth and taste, one in which the children of the local elite could court one another. Such events were popular not only among the Federalists of the Augusta Light Infantry but among their Jeffersonian neighbors of the Hallowell Light Infantry 47 as well. In the backcountry, such exhibitions of social protocol were inverted. The vicinity around Augusta, a shire town with a courthouse and county jail, was populated by agrarian squatters who lived in fear of the attorneys and sheriff’s deputies who arrived to remove them from land they did not own. When the squatters confronted land agents, they mounted their own martial demonstrations. Their bearskin or sheepskin masks and three-feet-high caps were a grotesque parody of the Light In- fantry’s elaborate uniforms and their words a gruff imitation of Native American speech patterns. Although both fun and funny, such mockery was also intended to undermine front- country attempts to impose social order on the District of 48 Maine.

46 James W. North, The History of Augusta, from the Earliest Settlement to the Present Time (Augusta: Clapp and North, 1870), p. 340. 47 American Advocate (Hallowell), 8 October 1812. 48 Ulrich, Midwife’s Tale, p. 319; Alan Taylor, Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760–1820 (Chapel Hill: Univer- sity of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 190.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 256 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY Maine’s Record of Service In the wake of the Chesapeake incident in the summer of 1807, Maine’s militiamen, Federalists as well as Democrats, responded enthusiastically to a federal call for one hundred thousand volunteer “minute men.” Whole companies, stringbeaner and the uniformed alike, stepped forward to defend their country, far more than the national government required. The Augusta Light Infantry was among them, and Major Gen- eral Sewall declared them “well appointed, armed, equipped, 49 disciplined, uniformed & ready for service.” Militia also stepped up to perform their constabulary du- ties. In January 1808, the old Federalist Sewall called out four hundred militia in Augusta after squatters assaulted sheriff’s deputies, but Massachusetts’ Jeffersonian governor James Sul- livan ordered the militia detachment dismissed, insinuating that Sewall had panicked. When a suspicious fire that reduced the county jail to ashes broke out in Augusta in March 1809, Sewall, worried that the town was under attack by squatters, again called out the militia. The first unit he summoned was the Au- gusta Light Infantry, elite young men who could be counted on to protect propertied interests. On that occasion, the squatters refused to offer battle. The following fall, rumors circulated that squatters were planning to attack the jail to free some of their comrades. Augusta was transformed into an armed camp; for several weeks, three hundred militia served duty at an expense 50 to the commonwealth of over eleven thousand dollars. Although Augusta’s militia readily defended their community against squatters, in 1810, when local officials called up five hundred militiamen to guard land surveyors in Bristol, the sol- 51 diers deserted en masse. The militia’s willingness to enforce federal law was likewise erratic. When summoned to enforce Jefferson’s embargo in early 1809, militiamen were hesitant, even resentful. When Congress passed one last draconian act

49 Eastern Argus, 13 and 27 August 1807; Henry Sewall to James Sullivan, 22 July 1807, Massachusetts Adjutant General Correspondence, MANGMA. 50 North, History of Augusta, pp. 356–83. 51 Taylor, Liberty Men, p. 227.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 257 that permitted federal customs collectors to bypass the local major general and call on local militia companies directly to assist in apprehending embargo breakers, Massachusetts authorities were incensed that the local command structure was being violated. They openly doubted the measure’s constitu- tionality and criticized Governor Levi Lincoln for allowing it to 52 go into effect. Blatantly employing scare tactics, the Federalist press told militiamen that, if they turned out to enforce the embargo, they might be required to fire on their own brothers and fa- thers. The Portland Gazette pointedly asked, “Can you quit your social, happy firesides, your wives, your smiling infants, to point the bayonet and level the musket at the breasts of your fellow beings?” Resolving that any militiaman who supported the embargo was an enemy “to the constitution and to the liberties of his country, and ought to be treated as such,” the town of Belfast declared that the use of militia to enforce the unpopular law was one of “the most preposterous, oppressive, and despotic acts that ever disgraced a civilized nation.” The Massachusetts legislature issued a statement condemning Jef- ferson’s administration for posting militia at the ports. Such a policy, the report announced, was “irregular, illegal, and incon- sistent with the principles of the constitution . . . subversive of the militia system, and highly dangerous to the liberties of the people.” Notably, the committee that conducted the General Court’s investigation was headed by Isaac Maltby, an up-and- coming militia officer with impeccable Federalist credentials who would later write the influential military manual The Ele- 53 ments of War. Throughout the District of Maine, the militia resisted en- forcing the embargo. In the Kennebec Valley, Major General Sewall, who had been keen to call out the militia to suppress

52 Portland Gazette, 6 March and 3 April 1809;PaulJ.Scheips,The Role of Fed- eral Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2005), pp. 88–90. 53 Portland Gazette, 2 January and 6 March 1809; Higginbotham, “Federalized Mili- tia Debate,” pp. 54–55. The committee’s report is reproduced in full in the Portland Gazette, 6 March 1809.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 258 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY agrarian squatters, told the adjutant general that although he had dutifully assigned six privates to go into federal service as the law directed, “some of the men say they will not go if it is to support the Embargo.” In mid-coast Wiscasset, a Jeffersonian inquired of Major General William King, “Now I would ask you who command the Division—how you would go to work to enforce those laws which in their operation bear so hard on all your ofﬁcers & soldiers?” In the Penobscot region, where the embargo seriously fractured communities, some units de- clined to honor the federal summons. In Castine, a town sim- ilarly divided, the militia artillery commander refused to loan his cannon to federal customs authorities because, he insisted, they were state property. Those units that did respond to the call to defend the embargo proved to be poorly equipped. In Hancock County most militiamen had muskets and bayonets, but ﬂints, knapsacks, and blankets were in short supply, and more important, musket cartridges were critically low. In one unusual episode, local, state-appointed authorities in York arrested a party of militia operating under federal orders who 54 had seized a vessel they suspected of smuggling. Yankees of both political persuasions continued to harbor un- realistic views of the militia. During the embargo, Jeffersonians wanted it to function as a nationalized police force, and they also anticipated that one day it might invade Canada, as when Jeffersonian Congressman William Widgery of Portland crowed that “The Militia of the New England States [were] only want- 55 ing authority to do the business.” When war with England did break out in 1812, Jeffersonian militia commanders re- minded their soldiers that, sitting on the frontier, Maine was 56 exposed both to external and internal enemies. Massachusetts

54 Jotham Sewall to Henry Sewall, 15 January 1809, Henry Sewall Papers, and Abiel Wood Jr. to William King, William King Papers, both at Maine Historical Society; Gazette of Maine, 4 March 1809; Portland Gazette, 6 March 1809; “Company Rolls of Captains Andrew Grant and John Whiting, 20 January 1809,” Special Collections, Fogler Library, University of Maine, Orono. 55 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, p. 18. 56 American Advocate, 10 September 1812.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 259 Federalists, on the other hand, continued to think of the militia as a means of instilling discipline in and an appreciation for hierarchy among the masses as well as a source of status for local elites. Political leaders increasingly manipulated the militia for partisan ends, and the aims of state and federal government were ever more in conflict. As war approached, the divide between state and nation, Massachusetts and Maine, and even between neighbors widened. When Congress finally declared war against England, all of these factors—what Don Higginbotham has called a “breakdown of consensus” regarding the militia— 57 contributed to its lackluster performance. When Federalist governor Caleb Strong refused to call out the militia at Pres- ident Madison’s request in the summer of 1812, he took ad- vantage of the latitude that an unsettled question had afforded him—did the state or the federal government have control of the militia?—and in the process undermined support for an already unpopular war. In the end, Massachusetts’ militia units, especially Maine’s, emerged from the War of 1812 with their reputations badly scarred. When the British invaded eastern Maine in 1814,much of the militia there meekly surrendered its arms. To be fair to those units, their leader, Major General David Cobb, was a political appointee who never even set foot in Maine during the war. In the one instance when units of the Tenth Division confronted the enemy at Hampden in 1814, a British force dispersed the body of militia under the command of Brigadier General John Blake within minutes. Critics quickly dubbed the skirmish the “Hampden Races” for the unseemly haste with which the American forces fled the field. A court of inquiry packed with Federalist militia officers found Blake innocent of charges of neglect, but before the finding was revealed, Blake filed countercharges against his subordinates Colonel Andrew Grant and Major Joshua Chamberlain, accusing them

57 Higginbotham, “Federalized Militia Debate,” p. 40; Hickey, “New England’s De- fense Problem,” passim.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 260 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY both of cowardice and un-officer-like conduct, among other 58 infractions. Thereafter the public and the militia did not look kindly on Blake. Approximately a year after the court’s decision, he and his son were scheduled to inspect the units at the annual militia muster in Hampden. Blake claimed to be ill. When the younger Blake arrived at the muster field, he discovered an effigy of his father, seated on a mock-heroic horse, armed with a wooden sword, and wearing a large military hat labeled “Traitor.” When young Blake attempted to review the troops, the unit did a right face, and the straw general was paraded before them as if he were conducting the review. Capping the day’s events was a bonfire on the common at which Hampden residents hanged, shot, and threw the dummy general into the flames. The Eastern Argus not only reported the event but also 59 composed a poem to commemorate it. Massachusetts Feder- alists ignored the proceedings, and at roughly the same time, Governor Strong promoted Blake to major general in command of the Tenth Division. Republican newspapers howled, but political appointments remained within the control of old Massachusetts. Nonetheless, Blake’s reputation was ruined, and he served only briefly as a major general before resigning his 60 commission.

The Militia Vanquished Before the War of 1812, the militia had been well respected in Maine and Massachusetts. In the wake of the Chesapeake crisis of 1807, for example, the Portland Gazette published a

58 Charles M. Blake, “Memoir of General John Blake, of Brewer,” Bangor Histor- ical Magazine 2 (1886): 8–11; John Blake to Caleb Strong, 26 August 1815, “Mason Correspondence,” Bangor Historical Society. Major Chamberlain was the grandfather of Civil War hero Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. 59 Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Fieldbook of the War of 1812: A Facsimile of the 1869 Edition (Somersworth: New Hampshire Publishing Co., 1976), p. 902; Eastern Argus, 25 October and 1 November 1815. 60 As late as 1835, his family was producing testimonials from a British army officer claiming that Blake had not fled the field of battle. See “Letter of Capt. and Major Riddall to Major General Gosseline [sic]atCastine,181 Relating to Gen. John Blake,” Bangor Historical Magazine 8 (1893): 92.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 261 poem praising those who had volunteered their services. It asked, And where are Warriors to be found, To match the Yankee Soldier’s might? His brows shall be with laurels crown’d, For he shall vanquish in the fight. His foes shall be dispers’d in flight, Or sunk in untimely grave, He will make good his country’s right— 61 His Country’s thanks shall crown the brave. But problems with the militia were evident even at this early date. The “Yankee soldier’s might,” as described in the poem, was not in question, but his commitment was. The “Yankee soldiers might” turn out when called upon, but then again they might not. They might be used as a military force to repel a foreign enemy, or they might serve as a constabulary to subdue protests. They might be disciplined, or they might degenerate into an armed mob. Elites might use the militia to bolster their status, but everyday folk might take the occasion to mock them and undermine their authority. Talk of defending Massachusetts from foreign invaders, so manifest in prewar speeches, was not supported by the militia’s actual conduct during the war. In 1812 Governor Strong had refused the Madison administration’s call to activate militia units, and in general the militia had done little except fend off minor raids by British privateers and naval units. When the British did invade in force in 1814, the militia’s one effort to resist, at Hampden, turned into a rout within minutes. It was clear that the militia was not very effective militarily, and in an age in which individual rights were increasingly important, the financial demands of equipping oneself, the time demands imposed by musters, and the act of subordinating oneself to the orders of neighbors who had suddenly been transformed into officers became increasingly distasteful. Popular protests against militia musters, such as arriving in grotesque costume,

61 Portland Gazette, 27 July 1807.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 262 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY became so prevalent that state legislatures passed laws outlaw- 62 ing such behavior. Popular culture reflected the growing distaste for militia duty. After the war ended in 1815, the militia muster, always a theatrical event, found its way onto the professional stage. Displacing high-minded talk of virtue and unity, comedic representations of stringbeaner militia came to dominate the public arena. Audiences laughed at characters like Major Joe Bunker, in the 1830 play The Militia Muster, or Down East. Public prints, such as David Claypoole Johnston’s many satirical de- pictions of a farcical “Militia Muster,” reinforced the point (fig. 63 2). At about the same time, Maine humorist Seba Smith cap- italized on the trend with his character Major Jack Downing of Downingville. The militia ideal had been hijacked from the Federalists. Their image of orderly soldiers, dressed alike, and marching in unison had devolved into a rowdy, miscellaneous hodgepodge of Jacksonian everymans. Satirists’ representations of the militia were a form of protest—they deemed the militia fine oppressive, the cost of arming oneself prohibitive, the time taken away from work as wasted, and the training insufficient—and in this they had the support of the religious-based reform movements that sprang 64 up after the War of 1812 ended. Maine pacifist William Ladd of Minot founded the American Peace Society, which disdained martial training and the “military foppery” that accompanied it. Joining Ladd in opposing militia musters, William Lloyd Gar- rison wrote, “I now solemnly declare that I will never obey any order to bear arms, but rather cheerfully suffer imprisonment and persecution. What is the design of militia musters? To make men skilful murderers. I cannot consent to become a pupil in this sanguinary school.” Despite his Quaker background, tem- perance reformer Neal Dow of Portland was no pacifist, but, having twice personally experienced their ill effects, he was a

62 Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, p. 182. 63 David Tatham, “David Claypoole Johnston’s Militia Muster,” American Art Jour- nal 19.2 (1987): 4–15. 64 Conforti, Imagining New England, chap. 4.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 YANKEE SOLDIER’S MIGHT 263 captures the egalitarian impulses that led to the Militia Muster painting 1828 .—David Claypoole Johnston’s ig. 2 F demise of the militia. Image courtesy the American Antiquarian Society.

Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/TNEQ_a_00088 by guest on 02 October 2021 264 THE NEW ENGLAND QUARTERLY ﬁerce critic of muster days, which he criticized as occasions for drunken immorality. In the ﬁrst incident, when he was only twelve, Dow found a militiaman scarcely older than himself passed out in the street and pulled him to the safety of a side- walk. In the second, a drunken militiaman passed out and fell on top of Dow, pinning the future leader of America’s temper- 65 ance movement to the ground. Faced with numerous criticisms from a broad spectrum of American society, mandatory militia drill fell out of favor. The militia laws were the last remnant of the Federalist vision of an orderly, disciplined society, and even in Massachusetts that ideal crumbled after 1815. Two powerful trends combined to destroy the militia: the wave of Jacksonian common-man reforms, supported by the saved and sinners alike, which viewed mandatory drills and the requirement to purchase arms and equipment as unjust; and the growth of wage labor, a system intolerant of the distraction and time militia musters demanded 66 from workers. In the face of these societal changes, state legislatures abolished compulsory militia training in the 1840s. Massachusetts initiated the trend in 1840, and Maine followed 67 in 1844.

65 William Ladd, Essays on Peace and War: Which First Appeared in the Christian Mirror, Printed at Portland, Me.: New Series (Portland: Printed by A. Shirley, 1827), p. 66; Wendell Phillips Garrison and Francis Jackson Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, 1805–1879 (New York: Century Co., 1885), p. 125; Neal Dow, The Reminiscences of Neal Dow: Recollections of Eighty Years (Portland: Evening Express Publishing Co., 1898), p. 103. 66 Cress, Citizens in Arms, p. 29. 67 Lena Landon, “The Militia Fine, 1830–1860,” Military Affairs 15.3 (Autumn 1951): 142. See also Peter Brock, Liberty and Conscience: A Documentary History of Conscientious Objectors in America throughout the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Skeen, Citizen Soldiers, pp. 180–84.

Joshua M. Smith is Associate Professor of Humanities at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and Interim Director of the American Merchant Marine Museum.

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