IAR Journal of Humanities and Social Science ISSN Print : 2708-6259 | ISSN Online : 2708-6267 Frequency: Bi-Monthly Language: Multilingual Origin: KENYA Website : https://www.iarconsortium.org/journal-info/IARJHSS Research Article

The Strategy of the War the Universe Prince in Operation Chase the Dutch in 1825-1830 Article History Abstract: According to the Letjen TNI JS. Prabowo 2009 said, understanding the Received: 01.04.2021 meaning/definition of the war the universe as the following: (1) War of the Universe should not be done with the use of military means, for example, fought Revision: 09.05.2021 with the use of firearms, (2) the Involvement of people in the war should not be Accepted: 22.05.2021 with mempersenjatainya physically and memperankannya as a fighting force Published: 30.05.2021 armed or combatants, (3) Given the threat to state sovereignty, and territorial Author Details integrity of , not only from military power “abroad” but can also come Ernes*1 and I Wayan Midhio2 from groups within the country (the separatists) then the war the universe can Authors Affiliations occur when dealing with the separatist group. Conflict Diponegoro and the 1 began to occur when the Resident Smissaert and Patih Danurejo with Total War Strategy Master Student of accidentally ordered installing anjar (a stake) as a sign of will he made a new Indonesian Defense University path. Stake-stake is mounted flashed land Diponegoro in Tegalrejo. Diponegoro

2 do not allow the soil around Tegalrejo is crossed by new roads, ordered the Lecturer Total War Strategy of Indonesian command of his men revoke the stake is. The incident stake and road closures into Defense University open conflict Smissaerrt-Danurejo against Diponegoro, which involves armed Corresponding Author* forces. This study aims to analyze the Strategy of the War the Universe Prince Ernes Diponegoro in operation chase the Netherlands and looking for the root of the How to Cite the Article: problem, as well as the outcome of the war itself. The results of this study can be Ernes & I Wayan Midhio. (2021); The Strategy expected to have benefits in two of the following frameworks: the Benefits of the War the Universe Prince Diponegoro in theoretically, this research is expected to give a descriptive explanation about the Operation Chase the Dutch in 1825-1830. IAR J Strategy of the War the Universe Prince Diponegoro In Operation Chase the Huma Soc Sci; 2021; 2(3): 13-25 Netherlands and looking for the root of the problem, as well as the outcome of the Copyright @ 2021: This is an open-access article war itself. The practical benefits, the results of this study are expected to distributed under the terms of the Creative contribute to the development of knowledge of how the Strategy of the War the Commons Attribution license which permits Universe Prince Diponegoro In Operation Chase the Netherlands and looking for unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction the root of the problem, as well as the out come of the war itself. This Research in any medium for non commercial use (NonCommercial, or CC-BY-NC) provided the method using Descriptive research approach a Qualitative approach of original author and source are credited. Phenomenology that has been said Hadari Nawawi as a procedure of solving the problem are investigated to describe or depict the state of the subject or the object of research when the research is done by basing themselves on the necessary data about the Strategy of the War the Universe Prince Diponegoro In Operation Chase the Netherlands. It is sharpened by the metho d of descriptive qualitative to describe and analyze the Strategy of the War the Universe Prince Diponegoro In Operation Chase the Dutch in 1825-1830.

Keywords: Dutch, Operation, Prince Diponegoro, Strategy, and Universe Strategy.

INTRODUCTION Background According to the Letjen TNI JS. Prabowo, 2009, in Thought Principles on Universal War page 37, explained that when the term universal people's war rolled around, the perception that was reflected in most of the people's thinking was generally massive or massive battles involving all Indonesian people in facing enemy aggression. Many are concerned about the treatment of the people who are armed and played as combat units or combatants, or think that the concept of universal war will combine the treatment of combatants with non-combatants and civilians as stipulated in article-3 of the 4th Geneva Convention, 1949. These concerns have surfaced due to an inaccurate understanding of war. Even hearing the term universal people's war, what you can imagine is a guerrilla war that occurred during the past independence war. After all, war is completely different from battle. Universal people's war cannot be completely equated with a 'guerrilla war'. If combat generally uses lethal weapons and of course it is the affairs of the army, war does not have to use weapons and it is the state's business, not only the affairs of the army, such as trade wars, ideological wars, information wars and many other wars. It is generally known that war is defined as an armed conflict that occurs between two or more countries. However, this does not mean that the universal people's war can only be interpreted as an all-out battle in defending the Republic of Indonesia when facing enemy aggression. Universal war also does not have to mobilize civilians to be prepared to become combat forces (combatants) in the form of volunteers or volunteers, as happened during Operation Dwikora in 1963-1966 when the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation occurred. Citing the definition of war which is described as "... large-scale conflicts between (several) countries or within countries, which are related to issues of sovereignty and / or territorial integrity of a country ...". So, war does not only occur between countries, but can

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Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 also occur within countries where there are large-scale conflicts related to issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The understanding of this war is a little different when faced with TNI Law number 34 of 2004 which mandates that in carrying out its main duties to uphold state sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity and protect the entire nation, the TNI can carry out War Military Operations and Military Operations in addition to War. It is assumed that the understanding of war in the TNI Law can only occur with other countries when there is armed conflict or aggression.

According to Dr. I Wayan Midhio, M.Phil. 2021 in the course "Indonesian Universal War Strategy" in Semester II lectures, Students of the Master Program for Universal War Strategy Study Program, Defense University, 20 January 2021 explain the understanding of the meaning / definition of war and the universe as follows: (1) Universal War does not have to be done with using military means, for example, fighting using firearms, (2) The involvement of the people in war does not have to be by physically arming them and playing them as an armed combat force or combatant, (3) In view of the threat to the country's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Indonesia, not only from “foreign” military forces but also from domestic groups (separatists) so universal war can occur when dealing with separatist groups.

In the State Defense Doctrine, it is explained that the Universal People's War is essentially a total war for all Indonesian people by mobilizing all national strength and resources to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity and national safety from other nations that threaten or occupy the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Furthermore, it is said that the Universal People's War is populist, universal and territorial. Democracy is manifested through the participation of all Indonesian people according to their roles, abilities, professions and expertise as a manifestation of the rights and obligations of every citizen in defending the country. The universality is realized through the influence of all Indonesian national strengths and resources to be able to be mobilized in the interests of facing threats, both from outside and within the country. Meanwhile, territoriality is manifested in the empowerment of the entire territory of the country as a fighting space in developing a defense strategy in order to achieve goals. The Universal People's War for Indonesia today is essentially a total war for all Indonesians, but that does not mean that all people are played as combatants. This understanding is not exactly the same as total war in a universal sense.

Letjen TNI JS. Prabowo, 2009, also explained that the implementation of universal war, namely from the exploratory discussion aimed at exploring the nature and problems of war, then the understanding of the current universal war cannot be equated with an understanding or perception in the era of the war for independence (1945-1950). It must be well understood that today universal war is not an all-out war. The slogans of General A.H. Nasution, 1989; "Guerrilla points: and the defense of the Republic of Indonesia in the past and in the future Page 34 in the war in the past such as; maintain every inch of land, unyielding, or slogan of daring to die is not a dogmatic law of war, and does not have to be done literally, but only an incendiary spirit. Today the universal war is certainly no longer entirely similar to the war for independence that took place more than 60 years ago (1945-1950), which at that time was estimated to have resulted in as many as 70,000-200,000 victims of the Indonesian population. The Universal War could be held long before the occurrence of open war which was carried out by military means, even the implementation of a universal war in a "new form" which was carried out using the "smart power" approach was precisely aimed at preventing war by using military means. When efforts to prevent war by military means do not succeed, then universal war in the sense of an "all-out" war by mobilizing all strength (not just military force) of course must be carried out. However, this does not mean that all people must be armed and acted as combatants. The resistance of the entire Indonesian nation in the universal war will be more effective if each component of the nation fights according to their respective professions. The national defense strategy of the Republic of Indonesia is carried out by removing the military defense layer with the non-military defense layer as a whole and mutually supporting national defense unit and has made a choice for Indonesia that it will always prioritize diplomatic efforts as the front line of defense, and is strengthened by its role. people through political power, economy, psychology, information and technology.

The Sultanate was part of the land belonging to the kings, as a result of the division of the Mataram kingdom in 1755. Until 1820, the had an area of 73,087 counts. The territory of the Sultanate and the Sultanate extends in the southern part of Island. The easternmost boundary is the Antang District (Ngantang) which borders the Residency, the westernmost boundary is the Kertonegoro Regency, an enclave bordering the Residency and the Purwokerto and Probolinggo districts belonging to Kesunanan. The northern boundary was the residency of Tegal, , , Rembang, Gresik, and Pasuruan which were controlled by the government. In the western part, the mountainous areas of Slamet, Batur and Dieng form the natural boundary with the residences of Tegal and Pekalongan.

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Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 In the Mataram Kingdom Tradition, the area of the sultanate is divided into three categories: First, nagara, the royal area in which there is a Keraton building, which is the residence of the . Second, nagara (nagara agung). Royal territories that are around nagara or areas that are far from nagara also get the status of nagara agung. Among them include Mataram (Kalasan, Bantul, Sleman) with an area of 16,757 chunks and a population of 140,000 people, Panjang (14,567 chunks) with a population of 180,000, Gunung Kidul (714 counts). Bagelen (137,379 counts), Sumo Gagatan (407 counts), Remo (112 counts), Ledok (1,112 counts), Gowong (424 counts), Sokowati (2,723 counts), (359 counts).1 All nagara agung covers an area of 29,622 counts.

A great nagara is led by a regent who is also a nayak (minister). They are required to live in nagara (capital city).2 They get apanage (langat) and are entitled to collect taxes from the apanage twice a year, usually in the month of Mulud (Garebeg Mulud) and the month of fasting. There are 41 regents living in nagara.3

The name Pangeran Diponegoro began to appear on the political stage of the Yogyakarta Sultanate in 1812 when he helped his father, Pangeran Adipati Amangkunagoro, in a conflict against his grandfather Sultan II (Sultan Sepuh). After his father was made Sultan, he disappeared again and rarely appeared in public.4 In his memoir, he stated that he did not want to get a position and deliberately refused to be appointed as Pangeran Adipati (crown prince). As his successor, he appointed his younger brother R.M. Ambyah, who was still a child and she chose to live in Tegalrejo, an area inherited by her great-grandmother, Ratu Ageng (Widow of Sultan ), with an apanage of 500 counts.5

Formulation the Problem The formulation of the problem is an affirmation of the existence of a gap between theoretical aspects (das sollen) and realistic aspects (das sein) about the phenomenon under study. Based on the background description and research focus, the formulation of the problem in this study is: 1. What is the root cause of the Diponegoro War against the Dutch? 2. How did Prince Diponegoro carry out the Universal War Strategy in the war against the Dutch? 3. How was the end of the Diponegoro War against the Dutch and what was the cause?

RESEARCH METHOD The research method used in this research is descriptive qualitative research method as a research method that utilizes qualitative data and is described descriptively. This method is often used to analyze events, phenomena or circumstances socially, displaying the results of the data as they are without the manipulation process on the variables studied or other treatments (Sugiyono, 2005). The purpose of qualitative descriptive research is to describe and describe existing phenomena both natural and human engineering who pay more attention to the characteristics, quality, linkages between activities (Nazir, 1998).

To reconstruct an event, historical sources as the main component, the author uses written sources in the form of books, documents, journals, magazines, relevant research papers and internet sources related to the research object. The data collection technique used is the literature study technique which makes a systematic description of the literature review and the results of previous research that are related to the research carried out aimed at finding a problem to be studied (Nawawi, 1993).

DISCUSSION Universal War Strategy Universal war cannot be completely equated with guerrilla warfare. The Universal War also does not have to mobilize civilians to be prepared to become combat forces (combatants) in the form of volunteers, as happened during the Dwikora operation in 1963-1966 when the "Malaysian Indonesia Confrontation" occurred. The understanding of war in Law Number 34 Year 2004 assumes that war can only occur with other countries when there is an armed conflict or aggression.

1 Neil J., Smelser. (1969). Theory of Collective Behavior. Hal. 2 2 Diterbitkan oleh Proyek Penerbitan Buku Sastra Indonesia dan Daerah, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Jakarta 1983. Untuk selanjutnya dalam desertasi ini disebut Babad 3 Peter B.R. Carey. (1981). Babad Dipanegara: An account of the outbreak of the (1825-1830) 4 Babad 1983. Hal. 72 5 Nuhuijs. (1835). Verzameling van Officiele Rapporten Betreffende den Oorlog op Java in de Jaren 1825-1830, I. Hlm. 4 15

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 According to JS. Prabowo (2009), the definition of Universal War is:  The Universal War does not have to be fought using military means, for example fighting using firearms.  The involvement of the people in war does not have to be by physically arming and playing them as an armed combat force (combatant).  Given that threats to the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity do not only come from foreign military forces but can also come from domestic groups (separatists), the Universal War can occur when dealing with separatist groups.

According to the Great General A.H. Nasution 1953 in his book "Pokok-Pokok Gerilya" concluded that the war now is no longer between the army and the army alone is no longer just a military war, but now the people who are fighting are the people, the whole people. The war was turbulent not only in the battle areas, the war was unstable as a whole, although the final decision was determined by the defeat and win of the two Armed forces facing each other. So, war science is no longer just war science specifically with strategy, tactics and logistics, but also about politics, military, psychological and economic, I don't know what else. Military fields are no longer just military ones, but also fully political and economic ones. Military leadership is no longer about military fields, but fields as a whole as a whole. The conditions required of him are no longer just expertise in the military field, but an understanding of politics, military and economics. It is the people who fight, not just the armed forces. It is the people who declare war and determine peace, and that give birth to its armed forces. The military must always remember this, He is the spearhead of the people as well.

According to the 2014 State Defense Doctrine, War for the Indonesian nation is a Universal War that involves all Indonesian people and all national forces with populist, universal and territorial dimensions and is held to defend independence, state sovereignty, maintain the integrity of the country's territory and protect the safety of the entire nation. Democracy is manifested through the participation of all Indonesian people according to their roles, abilities, professions and expertise as a manifestation of the rights and obligations of every citizen in defending the country. The universality is realized through mobilizing all of Indonesia's national strength and resources to be mobilized to face threats both from outside and from within the country. Territoriality is realized through the empowerment of the entire country's territory as a fighting space in developing a defense strategy in order to achieve goals.

In the Universal War, the unarmed people's resistance was not intended to make the civilian people "life shields" but the unarmed people's resistance was manifested in the form of a spontaneous and comprehensive reaction from the Indonesian nation, for example in the form of diplomacy, demonstrations or in the formation of opinions and perceptions positive.

Causes of the Diponegoro War Pangeran Diponegoro was born in Yogyakarta on November 11, 1785 with the first name Mustahar and his royal title is Raden Mas Ontowiryo. Diponegoro's humility has been seen since he was a child by rejecting his father's desire to make him king and preferring to live with ordinary people in Tegalrejo with a simple life without his status as part of the royal family.

In the 19th century, like Javanese children in general, Diponegoro's youth was spent studying and moving from one to another.6 He wandered from one pesantren to another, from mosque to mosque or to quiet places (caves), as was done by Prophet Muhammad SAW in his youth. Tegalrejo's religious environment shaped Diponegoro's personality and character to become a devout Muslim. Diponegoro deeply studied the history of the Prophet Muhammad and the history of . Physical and spiritual development has changed attitudes, ideas and views about himself from society. "I am not Diponogoro, I am Ngabdul Kamid.".7 The name Ngabdul Kamid according to adopted the name Sultan Turki Abd. Al Hamid I (1774-1789) and gave strong inspiration and motivation to Diponegoro to do like him. He also began to leave Javanese clothes and replace them with the white clothes of the apostles. Symbolically this attitude affirms his idealism to follow the footsteps and actions of the Prophet. His extensive association with the and peasant communities made it easy for him to gain sympathy, support and recognition (legitimacy) of leadership from the community, especially since he was a descendant of the Sultan.8 Tegalrejo is a markplaats, namely a place to "sell and buy" ideas, ideological concepts, state politics, culture, military, strategic and action plans, a gathering place for community leaders when there was a leadership vacuum in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta; 9

6 P.J.F. Louw. III. (1904). De Java-Oorlog Van 1825-30. Hlm.57 7 Bernard H.M Vlekke. (1959). Nusantara a . Hal. 284 8 Pater Carey. (1986). hal. 62 9 P.J.F. Low, De Java-Oorlog van 1825-30, I, 1894, hlm. 97-106, Babad Dipanegara ing Nagara Ngayogyakarta Adiningrat, I, 1983, hlm,103 16

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 Diponegoro's stance is getting stronger after experiencing several events that offend his personal honor and Javanese tradition. Plus, the burden of life is getting heavier for the lower classes of society. Violation of Javanese and Islamic living norms and submitting to regulations made by foreigners who have controlled royal property (through land leasing)10 is a sign that Javanese land has fallen into the hands of infidels, therefore it must be reclaimed with the sabil based on the Qur'an.11 He finally made the decision to do something, namely to reclaim the island of Java.

On January 1, 1825, an oral (secret) agreement was made between Sunan and Sultan Hamengkubuwono V (who was still a child at that time and had to be represented by his guardian) and the Resident of (MacGillavry) and the Resident of Yogyakarta (Smissaert). This agreement was then confirmed as a written agreement on August 17, 1826 when Sultan Hamengkubuwono II (Sultan Sepuh) was reappointed as Sultan of Yogyakarta. The agreement states that the Jabarengkah and Karangkobar areas are leased to the Dutch East Indies government for 30 years with annual rent of f.100,000 for Sunan and f.26,000 for the Sultan. The Jabarengkah region consists of the Selokaton district, the Kebumen district and the Kebondalem district. Meanwhile, the Karangkobar area consists of the Wora Wari district, the Kalibeber district and the Karangkobar district itself. This agreement was rejected by the Wali Sultan Pangeran Mangkubumi and Pangeran Diponegoro because it was supposed to be the guardian who represented the Sultan but the Dutch actually involved Patih Danurejo IV (who was later known to be a Dutch henchman). Diponegoro's rejection was considered by the Dutch East Indies government as the reason for Prince Diponegoro to rebel against the Dutch. The leasing of apanage lands in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta only occurred during the British rule. The massive land leasing policy was later seen as one of the triggers for the rebellion.

The conflict between Pangeran Diponegoro and the Netherlands continued when Resident Smissaert and Patih Danurejo IV deliberately ordered the installation of anjar (stake) as a sign that a new road would be built. These stakes were installed across Diponegoro's land in Tegalrejo. Diponegoro, who did not allow the land around Tegalrejo to be crossed by the new road, ordered his men to remove the stakes. The resident who received a report that the stakes that had been installed had been removed by Diponegoro's followers, ordered Danurejo to reassemble the stakes with the escort of the Macanan troops, the Kepatihan Danuredjo guard. Diponegoro's followers then retaliated by pulling back the newly planted stakes and replacing them with their spears. The incident of stakes and road closures became an open conflict between Smissaerrt-Danurejo and Diponegoro, which involved armed forces. This conflict caused Diponegoro to get sympathy from the community. Witnessing the unfair treatment of Diponegoro, demang and their men came to Tegalrejo to defend Pangeran Diponegoro even though they were not invited. This incident was the beginning of the mobilization of Diponegoro's forces. In mid-July 1825 in Tegalrejo, approximately 1,500 people had gathered. Pangeran Diponegoro then invited his friends' , Taptayani and Kyai Nitiprojo to declare his determination to expel the Dutch and the Chinese with sabil war.

There are two main causes of the Diponegoro War, namely General causes and Special causes. Cause generally is:  Disappointment among scholars because of the entry of western culture that is not in accordance with Islamic teachings.  The area of the was getting narrower and the kings as indigenous businessmen began to lose their sovereignty.  The Netherlands intervenes in sultanate matters.  Some of the nobility felt disappointed because the Dutch did not want to follow the customs of the .  The aristocracy was also disappointed that the Dutch abolished the system of renting land by aristocrats to peasants which began in 1824.  People's lives are increasingly suffering, apart from being forced to labor, they also have to pay various taxes such as land tax, livestock tax, door tax, house moving tax, name change tax, land rental tax or accepting a position.

Meanwhile, the particular reason was because in July 1825, Patih Danurejo IV, who was a Dutch henchman and due to Dutch provocation, ordered the Yogyakarta Sultanate officials to make a road that turned out to cross the land belonging to Diponegoro who was still a relative of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. Even without his knowledge, the construction of the road displaced the grave belonging to Prince Diponegoro's family. This was met with stiff resistance from Diponegoro who was eventually out of power because he had refused to compromise with the Dutch and preferred to stay in Tegalrejo to focus on religious development and build defense in Selarong. Support for Prince Diponegoro came from various directions which made Diponegoro's troops even stronger. On June 20, 1825, a Dutch envoy came with a letter to Tegalrejo to ask Diponegoro's intentions. At that time Diponegoro's uncle (Mangkubumi) and the Yogyakarta Royal Council were in Tegalrejo. After a few sentences were composed, cannon fire was heard. However, the people resisted, because their strength was not balanced, they were forced to retreat so that Tegalrejo was

10 Babad, I, 1983 hlm. 69 11 T. Ibrahim Alfian, (ed.) dari Babad dan Hikayat Sampai Sejarah Kritis, 1987, hlm.271 17

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 successfully occupied by the Dutch. Diponegoro's residence, mosque and other buildings were burned down by the Dutch. . Universal War in the Diponegoro War Since the incident of the stake, Diponegoro's resistance has received a wide response from various parties, both from the rural people and the aristocrats, officials, clerics, and other community leaders. Of the 29 prominent aristocrats in the Yogyakarta Palace, 15 of them joined Diponegoro. In addition, 41 people out of 88 senior district heads also supported DIponegoro. Likewise, the ulama and kyai as well as their students in the pesantren environment also became the backbone, especially the prominent cleric figure Kyai Maja. Support for Diponegoro can also be proven from the extensive map of the battle area. The battlefield was widespread not only in the central area of Yogyakarta-Surakarta, but also to areas of Central and East Java such as Kedu, Banyumas, Pekalongan, Semarang, Pati, Bojonegoro, , and the surrounding areas.

Resident Smissaert himself only learned about the activities of Diponegoro followers on July 16, 1825 after receiving a note from his fellow resident in Surakarta, MacGillavry.12 It contained signs that there would be chaos in Yogyakarta. On July 20, 1825, Resident Smissaert sent a summons to Diponegoro via two couriers, in his letter asking him to come to Loji and be responsible for the gathering of a number of people in the Kedu area, the Resident also questioned the massive purchase of rice by the people around Yogyakarta. Smissaert accused Diponegoro of being the initiator of the two incidents and must be held responsible if the two incidents caused security disturbances. The two envoys were finally rejected by Diponegoro. Diponegoro rejected all accusations. Resident then asked Prince Mangkubumi for help to summon Diponegoro, in this meeting, Mangkubumi advised Diponegoro not to fulfill the call because the Loji had been prepared by Paku Alam's troops to arrest him.13

Since the incident occurred and the road closure from Yogyakarta to Tegalrejo, Diponegoro's residence has been guarded by 1,500 of his followers. They were influenced by the news that Diponegoro would be arrested.14 The Resident finally ordered a detachment of troops led by the assistant resident, Chevallier, to arrest Diponegoro. The force was 50 people consisting of infantry and hussar troops carrying two cannons. The arrival of the troops was greeted with resistance by Diponegoro's followers.15 Dalem Tegalrejo was surrounded, destroyed and burned. Diponegoro then fled to Selarong, to a strategic village at the foot of a limestone hill that had been secretly prepared as a headquarters.

At the end of July 1825, several aristocrats of Yogyakarta had gathered in Selarong, includin g Pangeran Mangkubumi, Pangeran Adinegoro, Pangeran Panular, Adiwinoto Suryodipuro, Blitar, Kyai Mojo, Pangeran Ronggo, Ngabei Mangunharjo and Pangeran Surenglogo. Diponegoro ordered Jayomenggolo, Bahuyuda and Hanggowikromo to mobilize the people in the villages around Selarong and prepare for war. He also made strategic planning and tactical measures to ensure targets to be attacked.16

Broadly speaking, Prince Diponegoro's war strategy was to seize and control the entire sultanate, then drive the Dutch and Chinese out of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. Nagara especially the Yogyakarta palace, as a strategic target that must be occupied by besieging it from all directions. The local rebellion was ignited to divide the opposing forces and the strength of the indigenous people who helped the Dutch troops.

The Diponegoro War took place in 1825-1830 and succeeded in mobilizing the indigenous people with a universal war strategy in the Diponegoro war to unite in the spirit of surrender patang. He aroused the fighting spirit and incited the courage of the fighters by declaring that the goal of this war was or sabil (holy) war which all Muslims had to fight against the Dutch and their henchmen who had caused suffering and destruction in all fields.

Furthermore, Diponegoro took several steps to achieve its strategic goals. First, invading nagara (the Yogyakarta palace) and isolating it to prevent the arrival of reinforcements from outside Yogyakarta.17 Second, sending messages containing orders to fight against Europe and China.18 The message was conveyed to the army leaders to the entire Sultanate of Kedu, Bagelan, Banyumas, Serang and to the East Monconegoro areas such as Magetan, Madiun,

12 ANRI Surat laporan pejabat Residen Yogyakarta. J.I. van Sevenhoven kepada Komisaris Jenderal Hindia Belanda. Yogyakarta, 25 Maret 1826, Arsip Djokdja 8.1 13 Babad, I, 1983, hlm. 159-160 14 Babad, I, 1983. HLM. 15, ARA, Aanmerkingen op de Nota van McGillavrij, Resident te Soerakarta, Jogyakarta, 20 Mei 1826. Arsip Koleksi H.M, de Kock, Serie 14 volgnr. 18 (1826). Pada 21 Juli 1825 15 P.J.F. Louw, I, 1894, hlm. 85 16 Sukanto, 1952. Hlm. 41, Peter B.R Carey, Babad Diponegoro, 1981, hlm. 16-42 17 J. Hageman Jez, 1856. Hlm.32, Peter Carey, 1986, hlm. 39 18 J.P. Schoemaker, MIT, 1-6, hlm. 414-416, J Hageman Jez, 1856, hlm. 58 18

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 Rajegwesi, Kertosono, Berbek, Ngrowo. He sent the same message to demangs on the border of the Sultanate and the Empire. Diponegoro then appointed regional leaders through an official appointment letter called Piagem. Third, compile a list of nobles who are judged as opponents and protect those who help. Fourth, dividing the Sultanate into several war zones.19 Then appointed regional commander and troop commander, as well as inaugurating several main assistants, including Pangeran Suryologo (Son of Sultan III) and Tamenggung Mangkuwijoyo who were given the new name Pangeran Mangkudiningrat. Diponegoro also appointed leaders of the war zone, namely, Pangeran Suryokusumo and Tumenggung Reksoprojo (Bagelen), Pangeran Abubakar and Muhammad (Lowano or Bagelan Timur), Tumenggung Handangtoro (Ledok), Tumenggung Gajah Permada (Gowong), Pangeran Notoprojo (Langon) Tumenggung Hadiwinoto and Tumenggung Mangundipiro (Kedu), Tumenggung Sumodilogo, (Parakan), Tumenggung Joyomustopo, Tumenggung Hadisuryo and Tumenggung Sumonegoro (West Yogyakarta), Kyai Muhammad Arfah, Mulyosentiko or Tumenggung Seconegoro (Kedu), Tumenggung Cokronegoro, Joywiryoo, Pangeran Surodilogo (Yogyakarta) , Pangeran Mangkudiningrat, Pangeran Notoprojo and Tumenggung Ranupati (Sambiroto), Pangeran Suryonegoro and Suranegoro (East Yogyakarta), Pangeran Sudironegoro, and Jonegoro Sumodiningrat (Gunung Kidul), Warsokusumo, Mertoloya, Wiryokusumo, Sinduredjo and Dipodirjo (Pajang), and Tumenggung Manggunnegoro (Sokowati / Sragen).20 In addition, Diponegoro appointed leaders of the war zone. The regional military leaders each received a piagem complete with a yellow oversized umbrella. The apanage they received was 10,000 counts with the strength of 1,000 soldiers.21 Fifth, compiling a palace guard consisting of six corps, including the Mantrijero Force led by Prince Adinegoro with a strength of 50 people, Daeng Forces led by Prince Soeryodipoero, Nyutro Forces led by Pangeran Suryoadi, Mandung Forces led by Pangera Kecokusumo, Ketanggung Force led by Pangeran Adiwijoyo , The Kanoman troops were led by Pangeran Teposono.22

During its development, the organizational structure, hierarchy and task arrangement of each corps did not imitate the Western model, but rather the Janissary organizational model (the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire) 23 adapted to Javanese conditions. Corps names such as Bulkiyo, Borjomuah and Turkiyoh were names previously unknown in the Javanese military organization. The Bulkiyo troops were led by Pangeran Ngabdul Khamil.24

The highest military rank is called Alibasah. The commander in charge of the troops (infantry and cavalry) is equivalent to the commander of the Janissary model division. Diponegoro appointed four people to the positions. Sentot Prawirodirjo, who was still a teenager with the rank of Basah, was promoted as Alibasah in charge of the Pinilih Corps. Then, he was again promoted to the position of Supreme Leader of the Army. Alibasah Kerto Pengalasan (Tumenggung Wirodirejo) is believed to be the Commander of the Defense Forces at Fort Pleret, the former palace of Amangkurat I. Alibasah Pangeran Sumonegoro became Commander in Kulon Progo; Alibasah Kasam Besari, Kyai Mojo's younger brother became the Commander of the Forces in Pajang and Alibasah Muhammad Ngusman (Usman) became the Commander of the Troops in Kulon Progo. In his memoir, Diponegoro also mentioned several people Basah. They are Basah Mertonegoro (son of Danurejo II), Basah Ngabdul Latip and Basah Gondokusumo. The next rank, Dulah (Agadulah), namely Commander of the Troops in charge of 400 soldiers, equivalent to a detachment. The lowest rank of officer, Seh, was an officer in charge of an army equal to a company.25 The hierarchy used also imitated the Turkish pattern, without leaving the structural pattern of the Javanese royal army organization, the santri were made permanent troops and carried out the mobilization of peasants. The standing force consists of several corps with a clear leadership and organizational structure. The organizational structure and hierarchy of the troops constituted a new experience of military organization for the . A reference and orientation referring to the Ottoman military system.

Seeing such mature preparations, it can be said that for several years Diponegoro has carried out acts of conspiracy of silence because in a relatively short time he was able to mobilize forces. He deliberately prepared himself for a political power struggle in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. This began when he refused the nomination as crown prince by John Crawfurd (1812) and rejected Resident Baron de Salis' offer to become Sultan (1822), proving that he had his own stand and ideology about the state and state system.

At least, for 12 years he had made preparations including building a gunpowder factory in Geger Village (under Tumenggung Brojosentiko), in the south of Yogyakarta, Parakan, Gunung Kidul and in Kembangarum (Kedu) as well as large-scale purchases of rice by the community, in mid-1825.

19 Peter B.R. Carey, Babad Diponegoro an Account of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825-30), 1981, hlm. 18-36, Babad, I, 1883, hlm. 190-191 20 Nota MacGillavry, Surakarta, 19 Juli 1825, P.J.F. Louw, I, 1894. Hlm. 252 21 J Hageman Jez, 1856, hlm. 70-71 22 Babad, I, 1983. Hlm. 206 23 A.W.P. Weitzel, I, 1852, hlm. 36. Babad. I, 1983, hlm. 199 24 Babad, I, 1983, hlm. 217-218, A.W.P Weitzel, I, 1852, hlm. 36 25 J. Hageman Jez. 1856. Hlm. 84 19

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 The absence of de-facto leadership in the Sultanate was the right momentum and a good opportunity for Diponegoro to seize power. The Dutch government was never aware of Diponegoro's behavior and was not aware of the magnitude of the danger that was threatening.

The incident during the Sultan's coronation, road closures and the attack on Tegalrejo were the triggers that ignited the fires of the rebellion that had been prepared. The rebellion emerged among Javanese people who were longing for the arrival of a Ratu Adil after nearly 70 years of suffering.

In Selarong, several battalions were formed led by Pangeran Ingabei Joyokusumo. Pangeran Praboe Wiromenggolo and Sentot Prawirodirjo. Each troop had different uniforms and attributes so that the unit could be clearly identified. Throughout July 1825, Diponegoro followers occupied almost the entire suburb of the city. Yogyakarta is under siege from all directions.

Exactly three weeks after the incident of the Tegalrejo invasion, on Monday 7 August 1825, Diponegoro's troops attacked Yogyakarta from all directions with a force of 6,000 people, where these troops were divided into three colonies. The first colony, was led by Pangeran Abubakar (Brother Diponegoro, a son of Sultan III). This column moved from the East and attacked the palace. Destroying the Kali Code bridge, burning Chinese and European settlements and destroying tax gates. The second colony led by Pangeran Adinegoro, succeeded in controlling the Yogyakarta- -Surakarta connecting road. The third colony, under the leadership of Prince Blitar, moved from the south and controlled the Bantul highway. The troops were trying to seize the palace. The houses of the regents (Tumenggung) who were considered to be opponents were damaged, looted and burned. A total of 10 regents were arrested, including Tumenggung Mertoloyo, Tumenggung Wiryokusumo, Tumenggung Notoyudo, Tumenggung Danusuma and Tumenggung Sumorejo. Two Tumenggung people, Sindunegoro and Ronodiningrat, were injured in the attack. Yogyakarta turned into a forest of fire.

The invasion of Diponegoro's troops shocked the Dutch East Indies army and panicked the Sultanate and Indian Government officials. Resident Smissaert immediately reported to General de Kock because of the severely imbalanced power. He asked to immediately be sent for troops to protect his suffering family. The Yogyakarta garrison, which only had a force of about 200 people, could not possibly face the rebel forces which were much larger in number, the Dutch troops retreating to the east (Surakarta) were intercepted at . The Mangkunagoro Legion led by R.M Suwongso was destroyed at Randugunting (Kalasan). The commander of his troops was taken prisoner and taken to Selarong.

During the raid, Diponegoro's troops also looted logistics warehouses and transported them out of town. The looting resulted in a large part of the population of Yogyakarta suffering from food shortages. Sultan Hamengkubuwono V was rescued and given a tight guard at the Vreddenburg fort. Meanwhile, the Yogyakarta Palace was successfully defended by the Keraton Guard led by Major Wironegoro without causing significant damage.

After being burned, the country of Yogyakarta was not occupied but isolated. Diponogoro's troops blockaded all entrances to the city and guarded the outskirts of the city. Yogyakarta is a city of death and food shortages. The prisoners and booty were taken to Selarong, and confronted with Pramudeng. Diponegoro troops managed to occupy Yogyakarta for seven days. The invasion of strategic countries has far-reaching implications. The participants of the conspiracy of silence, especially the tumenggung and the subordinates, mobilized troops to face war. As a result, in a short time almost the entire Sultanate was in turmoil. The only mistake in the strategy of the Diponegoro troops was that they did not fully occupy the country, especially the Keraton which was a symbol of power, all other vital objects were captured.

On 24 July 1825, reports about the events of 21 July 1825 in Yogyakarta reached the Commissioner General van der Capellen and this was very surprising to him because so far there had never been any reports from the residents about the real condition of Yogyakarta. On July 31, 1825, van der Capellen immediately summoned Road Van Indie to convene. From the decision of the trial, appointed the Supreme Commander of the Dutch East Indies Army, Lieutenant General H.M. de Kock, as Government Commissioner for the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Surakarta Sultanate. De Kock was given full control over military and civilian forces to crush the rebellion.

20

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 General de Kock left for Surakarta secretly and his arrival was greeted coldly by Surakarta officials, either the Dutch or the court. The meeting with Sunan did not yield any concrete decisions, but de Kock was relieved that Sunan promised to help form an army of ruffians. The troops will be given the task of looting and burning villages that side with the opponent.26 De Kock realized that he had to work hard to overcome various difficulties. The number of troops in Surakarta and Yogyakarta is only 3 regiments (one infantry regiment, one hussar regiment and one artillery regiment). Plus, the Mangkunagoro Legion, which numbered around 1,800 people. Some of them are besieged in Yogyakarta. He continued to receive reports that rebellion was widespread throughout the Yogyakarta sultanate, while his troops did not know the terrain well. No map is complete and most available maps are in a bad state and flawed. Most of the areas of the Yogyakarta sultanate are hilly. The weather conditions are also very unfavorable because the dry and rainy seasons change erratically. The troops, which were mostly unfamiliar with the terrain, were a limiting factor for mobility. He also received reports that the rebellious character was very brave and fanatical and hated Europeans and Chinese. While in Surakarta he was not able to implement government decisions optimally, but succeeded in compiling a plan de campagne (campaign plan) to quell the rebellion. Plan de Campagne consists of: a) Formed an alliance with Sunan Surakarta and Mangkunagoro to isolate Diponegoro. b) Seizing the strategic objectives of the country of Yogyakarta from the hands of the rebels to restore the sovereignty of the Dutch East Indies Government and the authority of the Sultan. Then free the Yogyakarta Garnizun troops from the enemy's siege. c) Secure strategic ground communication routes between Suryakarta-Klaten and Klaten-Yogyakarta. d) Securing the Semarang- and Salatiga-Surakarta land lines of communication. e) Securing land communication lines on the North Coast between Semarang-Rembang. f) Secure the pekalongan-Semarang ground communication route. g) Liberating areas belonging to the Dutch East Indies Government in Demak, Rembang (Keresidenan Semarang), Jabarangkah (Keresidenan Pekalongan), Karangkobar (Banyumas) Kedu and Bagelan to the border of the Bogowonto River. h) Summoning troops operating outside Java and establishing initial lines at several landing ports on the North Coast. Then the troops moved to the south to beat back the enemies who were in the southern part of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. i) Recruit trusted people to find information about opponents. In general, de Kock wanted to lead the rebels to a killing area in the area between the Progo and Bogowonto rivers. There are differences in the division of regional command (war) between the Babad Diponegoro 1983 version and J. Hageman Jez, De Ooarlog op Java. 1856, p. 84-85. Sentot Prawirodirjo, the younger brother of Ronggo Prawirodirjo IV Regent Wedono Madiun, joined Diponegoro since mid 1826. ARA. Letter of Reply from the Banjarsari Family to Diponegoro, 7 September 1826, H.M Collection Archives, de Kock, Serie 14 Volgnr. 17 (1826).

General de Kock summoned all troops assigned to , West and South , Palembang, Bangka and West . He summoned troops led by Major General van Geen who were in Supa, South Sulawesi; Captain Roest's troops in , Bangka, Palembang, Michiels troops in . They were ordered to immediately leave for Java and head to their respective target areas. Major General van Geen was appointed Commander of the Field Operations Command who was responsible for leading all military operations. On arrival in Semarang, his troops immediately headed for the interior of the Semarang residency and its surroundings. Major Sollewijn's troops landed in Demak and were ordered to overcome the enemies around Demak. Captain Roest's troops landed in Rembang which then moved inland to the residency of Rembang. Captain Michiels 'troops from West Sumatra landed in Tegal and were ordered to assist Lieutenant Colonel Cleerens' troops. These troops arrived in Java almost at the same time, namely in mid-September 1825.

Lieutenant Colonel Adjutant Cleerens, Tegal Military Commander, joined Captain Michiels' Force who arrived from West Sumatra and moved from Weleri to the South (up to the west bank of the mouth of the Bogowonto River). Major Sollewijn, who landed on the coast around Demak, succeeded in repelling the Diponegoro troops who had occupied Demak. Captain Roest's troops landed in Rembang and headed for the Madiun area.

Lieutenant Colonel Cochius, Commander of the Surakarta Garrison, was ordered to liberate Yogyakarta with the strength of two hulptroepen infantry companies (Sumenep Company and Mangkunagoro Legion Company), one platoon (25 people) cavalry (huzar), 12 dragonders (light cavelery) from the Mangkunagoro Legion and artillery troops.27 Furthermore, General de Kock planned a large-scale operation to retake Yogyakarta and destroy the Diponegoro headquarters in Selarong with careful and careful preparation.

26 De Stuers, 1847, hlm. 146, Nahuijs, Verzameling van Officele Rapporten, betreffende den Oorlog op Java in de Jaren 1825-1830, I, 1835. Hlm. 20-22. 27 De Stuers, 1847, hlm.162, A.W.P. Weitzel, I, 1852, hlm. 58-60 21

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 On 22 September 1825, General de Kock arrived in Klaten to consolidate. He personally led the operation to retake Yogyakarta with a force of 3 colonies (7,500 people). On Saturday (24 September 1825), at 7 am, Yogyakarta was invaded. The first Colone troops succeeded in repelling the Diponegoro troops and liberating Yogyakarta. Ten princes suspected of helping the rebels were arrested and taken prisoner. They include; Pangeran Joyokusumo, Pangeran Blitar, Pangeran Abubakar and Pangeran Hadisuryo.28 General de Kock then announced that he would pardon those who had helped the rebels.29

He also wrote letters to Diponegoro and Mangkubumi who were in Selarong. However, Diponegoro rejected a reply to make peace. After receiving a reply, de Kock immediately ordered a second colonel to invade Selarong, but Selarong Village was empty. The leaders of the Diponogoro troops had scattered leaving Selarong in various directions.30 The failure of the invasion caused the war to drag on. According to Babad, Diponegoro left Selarong with the escort of 1,000 Bulkiyo and Mandung troops. Next to Jekso (Dekso), a village that is strategically located so that it is later used as the headquarters to replace Selarong

General de Kock issued an order to give chase if at any time his troops received information about Diponegoro whereabouts.31

On October 24, 1825, de Kock received information about Diponegoro's whereabouts on the west bank of the Bedog River. He led the operation himself, accompanied by civilian officials with a force of three colonies (1,258 people). The first colony was led by Major Sollewijn, the second colony was led by Captain van de Polder and the third colony was in the middle. All colonies are in Bantul. General de Kock went with the first colony to Srangkan. In Jeblok Village the troop movement was intercepted by Diponeggoro's troops and there was a great battle. The troops of the second colony and the third colony heading north arrived at Kasihan. Diponegoro is in the village. He concentrated his troops in the village to block the opposing forces so that an intense battle broke out.

Diponegoro's troops fought bravely regardless of cannon fire. During the battle, 40 people died from the Mandung troops (Diponegoro's guard). Diponegoro managed to escape from the enemy's encirclement and fled to Gegulu on the west bank of the Progo River. Sollewijn's troops from Mangir chase towards Gegulu. There his troops faced very tough terrain. The village of Gegulu was burned but Diponegoro has escaped to Kaliwatang. Near Kaliwatang, Sollewijn's troops were intercepted by Diponegoro's guards. On the Diponegoro side, 30 people fell victim. Once again Diponegoro escaped and was expected to head for Tangkilan, still on the west bank of the Progo River. In this pursuit operation, General de Kock failed to arrest Diponegoro. He only managed to clear the opponent's base around nagara (Yogyakarta). The pursuit operation was continued to the North Yogyakarta area led by Major General van Geen with a force of two colonies. Each of the troops was led by Lieutenant Colonel Cochius and Major Sollewijn, plus a reserve force led by Captain Verboon. The operational targets were Ngrajeg and Jumeneng Villages. It turned out that Diponegoro had also left the village. He was escorted by Mandung troops led by Tumenggung Mertolovo. Meanwhile, Colonel Cochius received information about the concentration of rebel forces in Pleret, the former palace of Sunan Amangkurat I. Pleret Fort, which is more than 20 feet high and has thick walls, is a good place of defense. Their strength is between 800-1,000 led by Tumenggung Kerto Pengalasan.

On June 9, 1826, Colonel Cochius with a force of 7,342 men stormed Fort Pleret from four directions. This battle took a lot of casualties. After fighting for almost a day, Kerto Pengalasan, the leader of the Diponegoro Army, managed to escape and headed north to Jekso (Dekso). 32 The pursuit operation was continued at Jekso (Dekso), the new Diponegoro Headquarters. Colonel Cochius was assigned the task of leading the attack in the Jekso (Dekso) area but Diponegoro managed to escape to the West. As a result of continuous pursuit operations, Diponegoro and his troops moved north, towards the southern foot of . Arriving at Kejiwan, the movement of his troops was held back by Sollewijn's troops. On August 9, 1826, there was intense fighting and Sollewijn's troops were defeated. Several mortar guns and several horses fell to the Diponegoro troops.

Diponegoro intended to concentrate his strength so that he could link up with Kyai Modjo's troops in Pajang to attack Surakarta. Before reaching Pajang, his troops first destroyed the Dutch troops around Dilanggu. On 23 August 1826, the village of Gading was successfully occupied by Diponeggoro troops resulting in the breakdown of the

28 Babad, I, 1953, hlm. 230. Confidentieele Nota van der Assistent Resident P.F.H. Chevallier om bij de komst van Z.E. den Luitenant Gouverneur, Luitenant Generaal de Kock te Jogjakarta te worden overhandigd, P.J.F. Louw, I, 1894, Bijlage III, hlm. 598-601. 29 A.W.P. Weitzel, I, 1852, hlm. 10, Babad, I, 1983. Hlm.240. Hageman Jez. 1856. hlm. 27 30 Van der Kemp, 1896, hlm, 547 31 De Stuers, 1847, hlm. 59-60 32 A.W.P Weitzel, I. 1856. Hlm.50 22

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 Surakarta-Klaten communication line. For the Netherlands, Delanggu is a gewichtige punt (strong point) because if Delanggu falls, Solo and its surroundings will be threatened.

With the strength of 10,000 people, in the afternoon of August 28, 1826, Delanggu was attacked from three directions. The city of Delenggu, which was only defended by no more than 500 people, failed to hold back the invasion of Diponegoro's troops.33 A number of trains carrying money and logistics were seized. Diponegoro's troops finally managed to link-up with Kyai Mojo's troops from Pajang. The road to the city of Sola, General de Kock's Headquarters, was open. It can be said that the pursuit operations during 1825-1826 initiated by General de Kock had failed to capture Diponegoro. General de Kock spent two years in military operations trying to arrest Diponegoro without progress. This operation gave NOIL soldiers experience to get to know the terrain because for nearly nine years (since 1816) the island of Java was always in a safe and peaceful state. The number of victims who fell during the chase operation reached 48%, including those who died due to illness and exhaustion. This is an indication of the troop's untrained training.34

The Dutch government had predicted that it would be able to put down the rebellion in a short time, but it turned out that this estimate was wrong. The Diponegoro rebellion shocked the Dutch government and military. The safety of more than nine years, since 1816, had reduced their readiness and awareness of the permanent dangers of warfare among the Javanese aristocracy, even when the symptoms were evident. Most of the ambtenaar also do not understand the condition of society, as a result they are wrong in making political decisions. Resident Baron de Salis' mistake in adopting a three- year-old child and adopting his guardian, Pangeran Mangkubumi and Pangeran Diponegoro, who were known and known as a recalcitrant, had indirectly paved the way towards rebellion.

A Sultan in the understanding of Javanese society, besides being the highest leader of the army (senopati ing ngalogo) is also the highest leader in religion. This concept has been understood since the time of Sunan Amangkurat I (1646-1677). The requirement for a Sultan to have a wife makes a child not fulfilling these requirements.

The public's understanding of the concept of Raja has never been "caught" by the ambtenaar.35 Initially the regional elites did not protest the appointment of a child as Sultan because of the role of his guardians who were considered to be honorable people. Prince Mangkubumi is the son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono II (Sultan Sepu), while Diponegoro is the grandson of Sultan Sepuh. They are known as people who are very devout to religion even though politically the relationship between the two is not good. They could accept the child Sultan because he was accompanied by two very respected guardians, but when the Sultan's wali rebelled, even though the reasons they did not know clearly, they immediately joined in the rebellion. The sharp conflict between aristocrats is not well studied by the government.

Diponegoro's ability to influence society was greatly ignored by the Dutch East Indies government. He was considered only as a mysticus, a dreamer (dromer) who liked to fantasize about greatness (megalomaniac) and believed in superstitions. De Stuers described 1825-1826 as a year of disaster, a sad experience.36 Diponegoro is very popular among the lower class, especially farmers and the community of santri and aristocrats. The public accepts his tough character and fanatical attitude towards the teachings of Islam as the charisma of a descendant of the King.

A month after the Tegalrejo raid, a Regent of Wedana in the western region of Mount Suming, Temenggung Raden Ronggo Surodilogo received a letter from Diponegoro. This letter gave him the authority on behalf of Pangeran Mangkubumi and Pangeran Diponegoro to mobilize all demang, penatus, penekel, penglawe, penajungan and all the people to fight against the infidels who would destroy the land of Java. He also ordered that taxes remain to be levied to aid in wars against Europeans. The entire territory of the Yogyakarta Sultanate was in turmoil, several Monconegoro regents took action in rebellion against the Dutch and the Sultanate. The rebellion that spread throughout the Yogyakarta Sultanate was the result of Diponegoro's careful and patient wait for the right moment to act. Increasingly burdensome tax policies, land leasing and expulsion of people from the village by tenants are the height of community anxiety. In the view of the lower classes of society, Diponegoro is the fair queen awaited his arrival. The series of events and ideals that formed the Islamic ballad became the causal factor for the rebellion that quickly spread and was difficult to extinguish by military force.37

33 P.J.F. Louw, I, 1894. hlm. 297 34 De Stuers, 1812, hlm 70-74. 35 Babad, I, 1983, hlm. 293 36 De Stuers, 1843, hlm. 150 37 Babad I, 1983, hlm. 144 23

Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25 Pangeran Diponegoro used a guerrilla warfare strategy which received support from all the people spread across several areas in Java by taking up arms against the Dutch. Pangeran Diponegoro also made use of all available strength and resources to support his guerrilla war. The war zone that expanded in several areas in Java was used as a battlefield and space for fighting in developing a guerrilla war strategy against the Dutch. This shows that Prince Diponegoro has implemented a Universal War strategy characterized by Populist, Universal and Territorial.

The End of the Diponegoro War The Diponegoro War took place in 1825-1830 and succeeded in mobilizing the indigenous people to unite in the spirit of “sadumuk bathuk, sanyari bumi ditohi tekan pati”, a finger of the head of an inch of land was defended to death. Diponegoro's struggle was assisted by Kyai Mojo as a spiritual leader in battle. He aroused the fighting spirit and incited the courage of the fighters by declaring that the goal of this war was jihad or sabil (holy) war which all Muslims had to fight against the Dutch and their henchmen who had caused suffering and destruction in all fields. During the initial period of war (1825-1826), Pangeran Diponegoro won many victories such as the capture of the Pacitan area on 6 August 1825, the Purwodadi area on 28 August 1825, Alibasah Sentot Prawirodirdjo's troops won in the Kasuruan area on 28 July 1826, a victory in the region. Lengkong on 30 July 1826 and a resounding victory at Delanggu on 28 August 1826.

After suffering many war defeats in several areas, in 1827 General De Kock changed his strategy and war tactics to weaken the strength of Diponegoro's troops, by applying the Fort Stelsel tactic by building forts in each area that had been controlled by the Dutch as a center of defense to narrow it down the space for Prince Diponegoro's troops to move and to cut off communication lines and lines of communication between Diponegoro troops and other regions. Then a connecting infrastructure between the forts was built in the form of roads or bridges. No less than 165 stelsel forts were built by the Dutch in many places in Java including: Semarang, Ambarawa, , Kulonprogo, Magelang and other areas. In addition, to weaken Diponegoro's troops, the Dutch also used tactics to approach the army leaders to want to surrender and side with the Dutch. This tactic was successful, Pangeran Notodiningrat, the son of Pangeran Mangkubumi, surrendered on April 18, 1828, Pangeran Aria Papak surrendered in May 1828, the kyai Mojo (the spiritual leader of Pangeran Diponegoro's army) was arrested after failing to reach an agreement in negotiations with the Dutch on 31 October 1828 then he was exiled to Minahasa until he died in 1849. Alibasah Sentot Prawirodirdjo was the last leader of the Diponegoro troops who were still persistent in launching attacks on Dutch fortresses in Naggulan. With the help of Pangeran Ario Prawirodiningrat, the Regent of Madiun, the Dutch managed to persuade Sentot to come to the negotiating table by reaching an agreement that Sentot would remain the leader of the troops and that his troops were still allowed to wear turbans. But not long after Sentot and his troops were sent to West Sumatra by the Dutch, he was captured by the Dutch and exiled to Cianjur because he thought his troops had joined the Padri. Sentot was then transferred to Bengkulu until he finally died in 1855. With the surrender of Alibasah Sentot coupled with the surrender of his son Pangeran Dipokusumo, the strength of Prince Diponegoro's troops was getting weaker, but Prince Diponegoro still fought back, even the Dutch issued a contest for anyone who could catch Prince Diponegoro will receive a prize of 20,000 ringgit. But this attempt failed.

After struggling with persistence, Prince Diponegoro was finally willing to negotiate with the Dutch. The first negotiations between Pangeran Diponegoro and the Dutch represented by Colonel Cleerens were held on 16 February 1830 in the village of Remo Kamal. This first negotiation failed to reach an agreement and Prince Diponegoro was allowed to return to his headquarters. The second negotiation was held on March 28, 1830 at the residence of the Resident of Kedu. Even this second negotiation failed to reach an agreement, but General De Kock broke his promise because when Prince Diponegoro was about to leave the negotiating table, he was arrested by Dutch troops and immediately exiled to Ungaran, then taken to the Semarang Karisidenan Building, then on April 5, 1830 he was brought to Batavia using the Pollux ship, on April 11 arrived in Batavia and was taken prisoner at Stadhius pending a decision from the Governor General Van den Bosch. On May 3, 1830, Pangeran Diponegoro and some of his followers were transferred to and taken prisoner at Fort Amsterdam. In 1834, he was transferred again to Fort Rotterdam in until he died and was buried on January 8, 1855. From the description above, it can be seen that in the period 1825-1826, Prince Diponegoro's troops won many victories in battles in various regions with the Dutch. This is thanks to his leadership charisma which is shown through his concern for the fate of the little people, his persistence in defending his territory and his enthusiasm against all forms of injustice displayed by the Dutch troops and their lackeys among the natives. This was considered capable of pumping up militancy and fighting spirit of his troops and succeeded in mobilizing the power of the people spread across several regions in Java to unite and support Prince Diponegoro's struggle against the Dutch with his guerrilla war strategy. But on the other hand, until the final period of the Diponegoro war in 1830, the Dutch succeeded in weakening the strength of the Diponegoro troops by applying several tactics, namely the Fort Stelsel tactic and its cunning tactics through invitations to the negotiating table and by taking advantage of the traitors of the struggle among the natives (Dutch stooges). Finally, the war that has been going on since 1825 ended with a Dutch victory, marked by the arrest of Prince Diponegoro on March 28, 1830 through Dutch cunning at the negotiating table.

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Ernes & I Wayan Midhio; IAR J Huma Soc Sci; Vol-2, Iss- 3 (May-Jun, 2021): 13-25

CONCLUSION The conclusions obtained in response to the three problems raised in this study are: 1) The root of the problem that was the cause of the outbreak of the Diponegoro war was the presence of the Dutch East Indies government on the island of Java in particular, which caused people's lives to suffer even more, apart from being forced to labor, the people also had to pay various kinds of taxes such as land tax, livestock tax and various kinds of burdensome taxes other. Disappointment among the ulama because of the entry of western culture that is not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. The area of the Mataram Sultanate was getting narrower and the kings as indigenous businessmen began to lose their sovereignty because the Dutch intervened in matters of the sultanate. And the climax was when the Dutch ordered the Yogyakarta Sultanate officials to build a road which turned out to be grabbing the land belonging to Prince Diponegoro and even displacing the burial area belonging to Prince Diponegoro's family. 2) The charisma and leadership of Pangeran Diponegoro, based on his concern for the suffering of his people, managed to gather support and strength for the people to unite and participate in taking up arms against the Dutch. The support and involvement of all the people on the island of Java, in particular, increasingly determined the success of the guerrilla war strategy carried out by Pangeran Diponegoro. This is a Populist characteristic of the Universal War Strategy. Prince Diponegoro demonstrated the Universal characteristic of the Universal War Strategy by utilizing all available resources to support his guerrilla warfare, such as utilizing agricultural products to meet the logistical needs of guerrilla warfare, as well as utilizing diplomatic channels both with friends and enemies. While Regional characteristics were shown by Prince Diponegoro through the expansion of war areas throughout Java as a battlefield in guerrilla warfare. 3) Even though in the early period of the war around 1825-1826, Prince Diponegoro won many victories in various regions in Java, but the war that had been going on since 1825 ended with a Dutch victory marked by the arrest of Prince Diponegoro on March 28, 1830 through Dutch cunning tactics in the negotiating table. Although successfully won by the Dutch, the Dutch suffered enormous losses because they had to pay a very large war cost of around 25 million guilders or the equivalent of USD 2.2 billion at this time, plus the death of approximately 15,000 Dutch colonial troops.

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Journal 1. Ajat Sudrajat. (1998). Perang Diponegoro: Antara Gerakan Mahdisme dan Mistisisme Islam. Yogyakarta: Cakrawala Pendidikan. 2. Djoko Surjo. (1990). Kepemimpinan Pangeran Diponegoro Dalam Perspektif Sejarah. Semarang: Seminar Sehari di Universitas Diponegoro. 3. Sukrismiyati. (2015). Strategi Politik Pakubuwana VI Melawan Kolonial Belanda Tahun 1823-1830. Jurnal CANDI Vol. 12. No. 2. 4. Peter B.R. Carey. (1981). Babad Dipanegara: An Account of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825-1830). 5. ANRI Surat laporan pejabat Residen Yogyakarta. J.I. van Sevenhoven kepada Komisaris Jenderal Hindia Belanda. Yogyakarta, 25 Maret 1826, Arsip Djokdja 8.1.

Legislation 1. Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004, tentang TNI. 2. Peraturan Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia Nomor 25 Tahun 2014, Tentang Doktrin Pertahanan Negara.

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