Housing for whom?

Distributive justice in times of increasing housing shortages in Amsterdam

Author: Spike Snellens Student nr.: 10432590 Track: Political Science PPG Course: Politics of Inequality Supervisor: Dr. F.J. van Hooren 2nd reader: R.J. Pistorius Date: 23 June 2017 Words: 23.999

1. Abstract Famous for its egalitarian housing provision and social sector Amsterdam has inspired urban justice theorists and planners throughout Europe and beyond. However, due to a list of developments for more than ten years now the depiction of Amsterdam as a ‘just city’ is criticized. In fact, even reserved authors fear that in the near future Amsterdam will lose the features that once distinguished it as an example of a just city. In this thesis Amsterdam is treated as such, i.e. as a deteriorating just city. It is treated as a city characterized increasingly by the principle cause of injustice, i.e. shortages in housing, due to insufficient supplies and too much demand and due to the housing reforms which the past twenty years on the local, national and European level have been implemented. These shortages, in turn, are interpreted through the lens of scarce goods multi-principled distributing frameworks, a concept which was borrowed from Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel. The idea behind this conceptual framework is that multi-principled distributing frameworks highlight and downplay morally relevant considerations, i.e. both include and exclude on the basis of justice principles, which means in turn that ‘just injustice’ entails that there exist a certain un-biased balance between allocative principles. The use of this lens mirrors the idea that housing is a perennial challenge, by which is meant that distributive struggles revolve around the design of such allocating frameworks and that these can increase when shortage increases. In line with the critiques on the depiction of Amsterdam as a just city it is concluded in the end that allocation has been based one-sided on maximizing value and promoting usefulness principles first. Second, due to an imposed income limit for social housing, the underdeveloped liberalized sector, rising sales prices and the attraction of Amsterdam, it is concluded that those who benefitted most of this one-sided allocation today are the ones who are in need of prioritizing distributive principles. Third, it is concluded that the increasing shortages have created new and more entitled categories, i.e. that the multi-principled distributive framework at work became more complex. That said, fourth, in line with the larger transformation the city is undergoing the current distributing system of Amsterdam nevertheless remains biased. However as the outcome of the latter and since the social market cannot be slinked endlessly, this pressure between prioritizations has the potential as well to merge instead of collide.

1.1 Keywords Amsterdam, just city, population growth, housing reforms, housing shortages, multi- principled distributive frameworks. - 3 -

2.Foreword Before you lies my master thesis ‘Housing for whom? Distributive justice in times of increasing housing shortages in Amsterdam’ which has been written to fulfill the graduation requirements of the political science Public Policy and Governance track at the University of Amsterdam. It is outcome of a project which was undertaken for two reasons. First, as a born Amsterdammer on a personal level it is the outcome of an urge to better understand what is happening to my city since it is changing fast. In fact, the theme of this thesis I think will be the main theme the upcoming municipal elections in 2018. Second, since housing is one of if not the biggest industry on earth and since spatial planning is connected to a large amount and wide range of societal questions it is the outcome of a desire to learn more about housing in general. In fact, in hindsight in an urbanizing world recovering from a financial crisis based on unhealthy mortgages it is quite incomprehensible that in almost four years of political science not once I had to read one article about housing or planning while it evokes large questions. The preliminary investigation for this thesis was consuming as such and mind blowing and has made me worries even more about Amsterdam than I was before. That said, I never minded doing it either since it enriched, deepened and confirmed several understandings of mine about urgent topics and about the power of the government. Moreover it allowed me write this thesis in the end and to formulate the question how to interpret the distribution of the houses of Amsterdam using a multi-principled perspective. On the other hand, this nescience structured the process too and has led to a hodgepodge of touched themes. To end, I would like to say thanks here to my supervisor Franca van Hooren for her guiding efforts. Also, I would like to say thanks to the second reader Robin Pistorius.

I hope the both of you enjoy reading this thesis,

With kind regards,

Spike Snellens

23 June 2017

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3 Table of contents 4 Glossary (in 2015 Levels) 5 5 Introduction 6 6 Literature review 11 6.1 The just city Amsterdam 11 6.2 The city as a social concept 12 6.3 The urban justice discourse 13 6.3.1 Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the city’ 14 6.3.2 Harvey’s radical depiction of urban justice 15 6.3.3 Fainstein’s ‘just city’ 17 6.4 Amsterdam place within the urban justice discourse 18 6.4.1 Amsterdam as an ideal European city 18 6.5 Dutch critique on the idealization of Amsterdam 19 6.5.1Oudenampsen’s and BAVO’s critique on urban revanchism 19 6.5.2 Uitermark’s in memoriam 22 6.6 Towards another perspective on justice 24 7 Conceptual framework 25 7.1 Multi-principled distributive frameworks 25 7.2 Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel’s system translated 26 7.2.1 Treating households equally 26 7.2.2 Prioritarianism 27 7.2.3 Utilitarianism 28 7.2.4 Promoting and rewarding social usefulness 29 7.3 Legitimizing (the use of) multi-principle allocation systems 31 8 Research question 31 9 Data collection 31 10 Case description 32 10.1 Gentrifying student city Amsterdam (2001-2007) 33 10.2 A city which grew during a financial crisis (2008-2011) 35 10.3 The internationalization of Amsterdam and housing reforms (2012- 2017) 38 10.4 Conclusion in between 44 11 Research Results 46 11.1 Coalition Accords 47 - 5 -

11.2 The actions of the council 48 11.2.1 New constructions 48 11.2.2 The private social sector 49 11.2.3 Lobbying 50 11.2.4 Cooperation Agreements 2015-2019 50 12 Conclusions 52 13 Reflection 53 14 References 55 15 Attachments 68

4 Glossary (in 2015 levels)

 Income limits: 80% of the released social dwelling are allocated to households with an incomes up to €34.911 and 10% to households with an income between €34.911- €38.000.  Rent liberalization limit: €710.68 (146 points).  Social house: <146 points  Liberalized  Low income: €0 – 34.911.  Mid-income: €34.911 - €52.367 (1.5x modal).  High income: €52.367 or higher.  Cheap rentals: €0 - €710.68.  Cheap owner-occupancies: €0 - €152.000.  Mid-priced rentals: €710.68 - €971.  Mid-priced owner-occupancies: €152.000 - €249.000.  Expensive rentals: >€971.  Expensive owner-occupancies: >€249.000. Amsterdam knows four administrative scales since 2015 (In the attachments two maps are added showing the boroughs and areas). - 481 neighborhoods. - 99 boroughs. - 22+1 (Westpoort) areas. - 7+1 (Westpoort) districts. - 6 -

5 Introduction Famous for its egalitarian housing provision, its large public/social housing stock, its limited spatial segregation, the achievements of the resistance movements during the 1960s-1980s and more, for about half a century the Netherlands but Amsterdam especially has inspired urban justice theorists and planners throughout Europe and beyond. Renowned scholars such as Lefebvre (1968), Fainstein (2010), Soja (1992) and Gilderbloom, Hanka and Lasley (2009) have been depicted Amsterdam as a just city, the ideal approaching city, the world’s greatest city, the city where the right to the city has been recovered, an alternative for segregated cities, the best available model of a divers, egalitarian and democratic city and as the city to gain inspiration from. In short, Amsterdam does not suffer from a lack praise. However, for a while now and especially by Dutch ideological fellow thinkers these painted pictures are being dismissed as foregone times. Scholars such as Oudenampsen (2006), Kadi and Musterd (2015) or Uitermark (2009) argue that these depictions turn a blind eye to the neoliberal reforms since the early 1990’s in housing of The Hague and somewhat later of multiple successive councils of Amsterdam. Moreover, they argue that the city is moving away rapidly from the ideal and according to some of them Amsterdam is already no longer a ‘just city’. In other words, these critics identify a gap between the practice and the theory of the just city literature and point to the need to reconsider Amsterdam’s place in it since the ‘search for the just city’ should not cover Amsterdam’s own problems and blur this search since it is the city which is gained inspiration from (Novy & Mayer, 2009). So what is a just city? Or perhaps better said what was Amsterdam once? Just city theorists have two agendas. The first is a common search for the just city. That is, it is an academic debate in which an idealized social space is visualized which is diverse, non- competitive, locally focused, non-privatized, non-exploitative, egalitarian, democratic, anchored, decommodified and inclusive. In short, it is the search for the just city1. The second agenda in turn is externally focussed, more about what the just city is not and a critical

1 In the 1960’s-1970’s investments into inner cities discontinued because modernistic views led to the believe that the dysfunctional city characterized by deindustrialization and unemployment had to be renewed and restructured. However, at the same time a growing number of inhabitants did not suburbanize and demanded urban renewal instead, while inflowing students started to identify with such cities and no longer accepted moreover what was being perceived as needed by governments. In short, it were the days wherein construction of identity was set against technocracy, of collective use value ideals opposing capitalism and of self-governing decentralized units (Castells, 1983). In the case of Amsterdam, it were the days of Provo and squatter protests later. It is this setting which was a precondition for the birth of the just city (Uitermark, 2009). - 7 -

discourse aiming its arrows on the revanchist neoliberal answer to the left-wing achievements of the 1960’s-1980’s. In other words, it is a critique on recommodification, privatization, residualization, gentrification and polarization and on the with trickle down geography justified innovative, economic growth promoting and creative space into which the city has been reconstructed and reconceptualised by Florida (2002) and colleagues and the consequences of it such as rising inequalities, segregations, displacements, alienation, increased housing expenses, commercialization and artificial housing shortages. The subject of this thesis is the movement of Amsterdam away from the just city ideals towards this competing other conceptualization of the city and about one consequence of it especially, namely increasing shortages in houses2. For years the city knew an one-sided shortage3, which set into motion the above critiques on the just city Amsterdam. However, since some years shortages for all but those who can afford expensive rents or high mortgages are forming, which should be understood as the outcome of a combination of local policies but national policies foremost 4 which demand some explanation first. The document ‘Housing in the 1990s’ of Christian democrat Heerma fundamentally changed the thinking about housing in the Netherlands and led The Hague to decide to liberalize the housing market from the early 1990’s on. First, the housing associations for which it was praised internationally were privatized with a so-called ‘bruteringsoperatie’ in 1994. In line, second, the growth of owner-occupancy was promoted with the sale of the public dwellings and a loosened use of mortgage interest tax deductions5. After a large

2 It does not mean that when the just city Amsterdam reached maturity that it did not know shortage. In 1982 the waiting time for a public house dropt to an all-time low but it was still two years. Above, in the late 1980’s due to a rent protecting point system the entire rent sector was subject to regulation while owner-occupancies in turn constituted a low share of the stock, in 1983 6% only (AFWC, 2015: 9). In other words, Amsterdam practically was decommodified (Uitermark, 2009), which means that there existed shortage but not like today shortages. 3 Hochstenbach (2017) speaks of a ‘suburbanization of poverty’, which should be seen both as the displacement of the poorer out of the city and as the impossibility for them to access the city. 4 It is not just a phenomenon of Amsterdam only but the case throughout the Netherlands. In fact, the title of a held congress of the TU Delft sounded ‘a new housing emergency?’ (Platform31, 2016). 5 The two actions together led both to an underdeveloped liberalized rent sector (where the new shortage lies) and an enormous growth of the private debt/gdp ratio. Where in 1995 the ratio was 56% in 2011 it had grown to a staggering 125% (CBS, 2011), which was the highest ratio of the Eurozone and three times as high as some other countries. In the same period the housing prices rose about 270% on average as the consequence too. As the outcome after the Greeks the Dutch households today have the highest rent or mortgage costs of Europe, namely 29.5% of the disposable income in 2015, while the average is 22.5% (Eurostat figures). - 8 -

amount of advisory reports6 in 2000’s, third, the past seven years adding reforms were implemented to push further this set into motion transformation to a liberalized market and to solve the problems which it had caused. In short, these later reforms7 were implemented to assure in time a more stable sales market, lower debts, a flowing market, shorter waiting list for social dwellings, the development of a mature liberalized rent sector etc. (Blok, 2013). However, although minister of Housing Blok succeeded in some of these goals, many promises have not been fulfilled so far. In fact, things have worsened and new problems arose. For example, segregation in cities increased (PBL, 2016). More importantly, a sharp decline is visible in the number of new completed homes in the Netherlands since 2013. Put differently, shortage increased8 and the expectation is that it will increase further in the next years as well (Boelhouwer & Schiffer: 2016: 5-6) and shortage sets spirals into motion (De Rijk, 2017). For example, if the accessibility of the liberalized rent and owner-occupied sectors decrease sales prices and rents increase since the demand is high, which is problematic for the (lower) middle class who are squeezed because

6 The years before Stef Blok became the minister of Housing in 2012 the consensus among experts, advisory bodies and various stakeholders grew that there existed a need to reform the system (Boelhouwer and Priemus, 2010: 527). For example, both the VROMRaad (2007) and CSED (2010) concluded that an increase in demand reflected itself especially in price increases instead of extra supply. 7 Most important is that in 2011 the inflow to released social dwellings for 90% was constrained to certain incomes. In line with the decline of the welfare state this institutionalized the idea of social housing instead of public housing. Moreover, it forces mid-incomes to buy or to rent in the liberalized rental market with the underling idea that this will quickly develop the market further since it raises prices. In line, the past four years minister Blok managed to implement many ‘finishing reforms’ especially, something for which he is praised and loathed. Blok implemented a new Housing Law, reintroduced apposite allocation for social dwellings based on size and income and created a connection between rents and sales prices in the point system. He implemented an income dependent rent increase for cheap skewed tenants (those who earn above the income limit but still reside in a social dwelling) and finished the legal and financial separation between social and commercial activities of corporations (respectively DAEB vs. niet-DAEB). He introduced the ‘verhuurdersheffing’, i.e. a professional landlord and corporation tax (about €200 million for the Amsterdam’s corporations), which reduces investment space in turn and forces sales and liberalizations. But he implemented as well various rent contract flexibilizations with the Law Flowing Rental Market, introduced the possibility of a mid-income category in development plans and tightened slightly the mortgage interest deduction rules. In short, this list of finishing reforms is long and has one agenda and that is to create a social and liberalized rent market. Van der Schaar (2014) of RIGO has classified it as “shock therapy”. Moreover, housing “will never be the same”. 8 The past years 50.000 houses annually were built but due to increased immigrations the amount of households grew with 80.000 which means that the shortage increased with about 2% per year more than was built. - 9 -

of the income limit. In turn, it means too that more capitalists could buy-to-let9 instead of invest in new constructions, which means that sales prices rise further, which means that rents rise again since less can buy etc.. Rising rents and sales prices moreover means that starters are stuck and that cheap skewed tenant cannot move, which means that starters cannot save and that the latter despite the fact that social housing stocks (still) are comparatively large in turn increase the waiting time for a social dwelling, which increased already perhaps since as well not enough of these were built, which pressures the households earning just below the income level in turn the most. In short, although it might not happen as described precisely, point is that flowing is halted due to shortage and locks the market and makes it exclusive. Back to Amsterdam. These reforms have had exacerbated outcomes on Amsterdam because of the structure of its just city housing stock, i.e. because of its very large social sector/small liberalized sector. Moreover, since it is the capital with an international service sector attracting many as the consequence of Amsterdam’s own transformation, i.e. into a creative city, these shortages despite the fact that many houses will be built are extra-large10. Rents in the liberalized sector in 2016 were the highest of the country with €22 m2 a month on average and rising, especially in the private liberalized sector as the outcome of the stock and in central boroughs (Parasius, 2016). Connected, sales prices are sky rocketing. Although prices after the financial crisis dropped in five years with about 20% to an average of €219.000 in the beginning of 2013, a house in 2016 on average costed already again €309.00011 (Daamen, 2016a). The waiting lists for social houses12 are long and growing despite the large amount of socially rented dwellings (about 56%) since most released ones are/have to be sold or liberalized. Above, despite rent subsidies social tenants saw their rents rising much quicker than their salary (RIGO, 2016), while Amsterdammers with contracts and tenant protections stay right put where they are afraid for high rent jumps. In short, the market is locked and exclusive. Moreover, already longer the case forms of (government- led) gentrification are visible within the beltway but this starts to exceed its initial aim, by which it is meant that the undivided and mixed city as an ideal is pressured and that social

9 In Amsterdam in 2016 one out of six purchases was a buy-to-let. It means that the prices per square meter on average now are 90% more expensive than in the rest of the country and are rising half as fast (ING, 2017). 10 The Primos prognosis predicts that there will exist a shortage of 24.000 dwellings in the city in 2025 despite the construction of tens of thousands. For the Metropolitan Region Amsterdam it predicts a shortage of over 60.000 in the (MRA) (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). 11 Note that an expensive owner-occupancy is considered to be >€249.000 by Amsterdam. 12 An average of 8,7 years in the country but depending the borough 14 to 17 years in Amsterdam (AT5, 2015). - 10 -

segregation13 is on the rise (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). While related, lastly, next to the lower incomes the mid-incomes are being chased out of Amsterdam (in three years their percentage decreased from 14% to 11%) which exacerbates segregation and threatens the social cohesion and emancipating function of the city (Moorman, 2016). In summary, there exists problems. The housing market of Amsterdam is becoming more competitive and exclusive and many see their housing expenses rise. In the meantime, the market is polarizing and categorizing since there exist various forms of shortage since mid-incomes compete financially with higher incomes and in terms of space with lower incomes. Fact is that because the liberalized sector is small mid-incomes are pushed out and ironically that because the social sector is large low incomes are pushed out. Or, to put it differently, these groups pressure each other in search for space, and the winners are obvious. These shortages impose distributive political questions which can be addressed from various justifying angles and these angles are the subject of this thesis since the principle cause of injustice according to just city theorists is shortage (Fainstein, 2013). It is interesting to research which including and excluding legitimizations a crumbling (former) just city uses when it deals with an increase in the principle cause of injustice. Or to put it differently, it is interesting to research to what extent Amsterdam tries to be a just unjust city, by which is meant a city which tries within its powers to exclude equally. In short, it is interesting to resreach how Amsterdam adjusts its allocative and (thus) exclusive policies by adjusting the distribution of kinds of houses in both the existing housing stock and in new constructions. In order to be able to help me interpreted such processes my eyes felt on Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel (2009) their writings about scarce goods distributing multi- principled frameworks. Their thinking about allocation as a perennial challenge resembles well I believe the idea that housing is an endless story (Ekkers & Helderman, 2010). Distinguishing four value categories and eight allocative principles which are all just and defensible but unjust since all downplay relevant considerations (a given which comes to light in times of shortage), what Persad et al. argue basically is that just allocation is based on

13 Hochstenbach recognizes four deepening cleavages: rich vs. poor, young vs. old, (entrance based on) rich parents vs. poor parents and center vs. periphery (Couzy, 2017) I would argue there are more, namely as well allochtoon vs. autochtoon, Amsterdammer vs. newcomers, western expat vs. non-western guest worker and higher vs. lower education. A comparative study between European capitals on rising segregation on the other hand placed Amsterdam recently in the middle because still due to its social stock. In other words, Amsterdam is no London yet. Nevertheless it did warn for growing inequalities, foremost because of the fact that an larger share of the job market is being occupied by (international) skilled professionals (Musterd & Van Gent, 2016). - 11 -

the basis of multiple principles since if not exclusion would be one-sided and biased. The perennial challenge in turn, is to constantly adjust the framework, since by definition it is unjust. Or to put it differently in the context of the case, if shortage increases but the multiple principled framework does not, the downplaying and highlighting of certain relevant considerations becomes extra one-sided. The main question of this thesis, writing from an accepting perspective that Amsterdam is unjust, i.e. in view of the fact that the succes of the ‘unjust’ knowledge city is starting to bite itself in its own tail but without preaching to the choir that Amsterdam is unjust, is: how we can interpret the distributive housing policies of the current council of Amsterdam through the lense of a multi-principled framework appoach? What follows now first is a review of the just city literature, Amsterdam’s place in it and the critiques on it, second a more in depth description of these distributive principles will be given and third an overview of the case to clarify the current context. After this the major policies of the council will be presented and interpreted with the help of this conceptual framework in turn. Lastly, its understanding will be used to reflect on the just city literature.

6 Literature review

6.1 The just city Amsterdam Urban justice theorists have been inspired by the achievements of the urban social movements of Amsterdam in the period 1960’s-1980’s. In the 1960’s Amsterdam attracted the attention of Lefebvre. In the late-1970’s Fainstein visited the city for the first time and described it’s urban (renewal) model as an alternative for the highly segregated cities of the United States (Uitermark, 2009: 348-349). Later, in the 1990’s, Soja (1992) praised Amsterdam for fostering a tolerant culture and civic engagement by highlighting its dedication to egalitarian provisions. Fainstein (1999: 259) around the millennium portrayed Amsterdam as “the best available model of a relatively egalitarian, diverse, democratic city, with a strong commitment to environmental preservation”, and some years later even stated that Amsterdam was as a city that approached her ideal of the just city (Fainstein, 2005: 15). Gilderbloom, Hanka and Lasley (2009: 373, 389) less than a decade s wrote that “Amsterdam (…) might be the world’s greatest city” and that it was an “ideal city to gain inspiration from”. Later in 2010, although the city now diverted from her ideal city since “the principle cause of injustice - the absolute shortage of available housing” (Fainstein, 2013) affected “all - 12 -

population groups, albeit not equally”, Fainstein (2010: 162-164) still presented Amsterdam as an exemplary, inclusive, committed, encouraging and aspiring model. Moreover, such expression of praise are not made by these theorist only. They are “widespread among planners and urban scholars in Europe and beyond” (Novy & Mayer, 2009: 105). But what is it exactly what made/makes Amsterdam a just city? In the following I conceptualize ‘the city’ first and will discuss the ‘just city’ as it is known in the international literature second. After, third, I will explain Amsterdam’s position in this discourse and will give an overview of some critiques of Dutch authors on this positioning fourt.

6.2 The city as a social concept The city, according to Park (1967: 3), is “man's most consistent and on the whole his most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart's desire”. According to Harvey (2008: 23) man therefore cannot ignore questions such as what kind of urban people we want to be, what kinds of urban social ties we seek and what kinds of urban values we desire. In short, all can conceptualize their city. In fact, the profession of urban planning was born out of visions on the just city (Fanstein, 2009: 19). Urban theorists their work is to visualize ideological images of a just city and to wonder in turn how a city can work towards it in practice. Planning is both a craft and a socially orientated scientific field-overlapping discipline of normative beliefs and empirical theories. It ranges from geography and applied economics to sociology, touching subjects and themes such as cohesion, segregation, aesthetics, social desirability, construction investments, the functional city, sustainability and planning processes (De Klerk & Kreukels, 2015: 9). In the Netherlands because of its social-corporate polder-model it is especially a respected and institutionalized discipline (Boelhouwer & Priemus, 2010: 528). But the questions then are still how idealized just cities look like and first in fact what a city is. Moreover, if there exist different ideas about cities, the questions are what problems and solutions are, for who, who not and why, because planning is not a-political but rather a influential and tensed activity. To understand why visualizations of a just city are political, the best way is simply to ask yourself what a city is. The word city is one of those words which everyone uses daily but which everyone will have problems with when asked to define it as a concept. It is what Gallie (1956) has called an essentially contested concept, i.e. in efforts to define it inherently always some aspects will be left out or are brought differently than others would do. What a city is, let alone what it should be, is impossible to define unambiguously. In short, all definitions imply a conceptualization of a just city since it will be based on value judgments - 13 -

depending of angles of incidences stirring the questions asked. For example, how many people need to live together in a place before we call it a city? How important is density? Should a city have certain physical characteristics? Can we talk about a city if facilities are not concentrated hierarchically? How much development should it facilitate and express and to what extent should it be a destination of (inter)national migrants, i.e. a place of opportunity and emancipation? How anonymous should a city feel? Or to put it differently, how much feelings of community can be sacrificed? Is the city in the first a place a place to live or is economic activity more important? And lastly, from which scale point on can we start to talk about a city if we are concerned with agglomeration-effects such as innovation, increased productivity and efficiency? In short, how much swarming of encountering people should there be, leading to social, economic and/or cultural exchange? Not answering even most of these questions, I define a city as a dynamic place, a human hub, a place of participation which attracts and invites, as a center of encounter and exchange and as a place where ‘it happens’. In other words, I define it as a place where a certain way of living exists, where people can meet, connect, explore and search themselves and where a plurality of ideas fertilize each other. Or to put it differently, as a relatively large so-called socio-spatial dialectic space, i.e. as a place shaped by its inhabitants into space while it in turn shapes the inhabitants through this socially constructed nature and its urban fabric (Knox & Pinch, 2010: 340). However, others might see it completely differently. Moreover, so far I did not yet gave answers to the questions what kinds of exchange cities then should facilitate, for who, how, why and at the expense of what. But others did.

6.3 The urban justice discourse Planning was born out of conceptualizations of the just city and in theory all kind of conceptualizations of cities can be viewed as just as such. However, planning is known for its long socialistic and progressive history too and many urban justice theorists can flirt with Marxist geography, although justice remains debated of course even if theorists have similar ideological roots. Nevertheless, discussing the work of some of the founding theorist of the ‘just city’ a common thread will be visible and that is that the just city grants the ‘right to the city’, emphasizes equity, diversity and democracy, is a dialectical space, does not alienate, is free of exploitative powers, is not constrained by quantitative scarcity, works towards a demand-sided housing market logic and opposes neoliberal restructuring. In the following I discuss three of them, namely Lefebvre, Harvey and Fainstein.

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6.3.1 Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the city’ A first way to look at the ‘just city’ is in terms of access and participation. That is, both in terms of access to the city as a physical place as well as in terms of access to participation in the concept, i.e. to the city seen as socio-dialectical space. This is the domain of Lefebvre (1968), who coined first the popular slogan ‘Right to the city’, which by Harvey (2003: 939) next to a right of access to what already exists is described as the “right to change ourselves by changing the city”. The right to the city in its abstract form it is the right to be part of the city and about a city devoted to the development of people and space instead of their or its destruction and exploitation (Aalbers & Gibb, 2014: 208). It is the right to belong to the city and to coproduce its space(s), or as Mitchell & Villanueva (2010: 667) have formulated it “the right not to be alienated from the spaces of everyday life”. Lefebvre (1996: 158) himself once wrote that it is a “transformed and renewed right to urban life”. In its less philosophical and politically concrete dimension, second, the ‘right to the city’ is like a “cry and demand” (Marcuse, 2012: 37), i.e. those actual claims made to access and to a city understood as it is conceptualized. Put differently, in practice it is about those who need to enter and to benefit from it durably to be able to coproduce it but as well to use it as an uplifting enlightening power, which comes more close to Fielding’s (1992) idea of the city as an ‘escalator’. The right to the city thus is not in the legal sense a positive right (Attoh, 2011: 669). Rather it is a revolutionary idea, a claim to a city conceptualized in a specific manner but timeless as well since it does not imply some idealistic end stage. In fact, although a typical product of the late 1960’s, the past years responses to neoliberal urban reforms by academics, social movements14 and supranational organizations even are framed again in terms of it (Aalbers & Gibb, 2014: 207-208). It is about putting on emphasis on the idea that excluding forces need to challenged constantly and that continuing struggle is needed to maintain local control or to create space which is less or not alienated from the people inhabiting it. Which means, in short, that it is about access under the provision that it leads to co-production. For Lefebvre (1996: 68) for social scientists the task therefore is to unravel how alienating space with a focus solely on exchange value is produced by capitalists and bureaucracies at the expense of the realization of inclusive social use value. In other words, it

14 According to The European Action Coalition for the Right to Housing and the City who organized in 2016 a protest when the housing ministers of all EU-countries met in Amsterdam to work on an EU Urban Agenda the solution of public private partnerships to curb the increasing shortage of houses for example should be seen as a “profit-driven intervention which denies people’s right to the city” and as “false solutions [which] do nothing to curb the wholesale privatization of our cities” (Bond Precaire Woonvormen, 2016). - 15 -

is about researching democratic appropriation versus expropriation. The moral task is to research how privatization opposes valuable space creation diametrically and to understand how it intrinsically has the ability to exclude ‘that what is public’ (Aalbers & Gibb, 2014: 208-209). In terms of housing in short it is a critique of and ethical claim against commodification and more widely spoken the urban space, stirring the research in turn. In summary, the right to the city is the search for “cities for people, not for profit” (Brenner, Marcuse & Mayer, 2012). It is both a slogan and scientific research field characterized by conceptual flexibility and it has become something like an ‘understanding’ about a wide spectrum of right claims and ideas about the ‘just city’. In fact, it has become so big that it has become a set of sometimes competing claims of all kinds of unequally treated, discontented or deprived people and groups seeking to reframe their urban struggles into an united collective (Attoh, 2011: 675). Nevertheless, at the heart of the work done a common critique is visible always and that is that urban policies are becoming undemocratic and exclusive, prioritizing the needs of business and the rich over the majority (Wastl-Walter & Staeheli, 2005: 2).

6.3.2 Harvey’s radical depiction of urban justice In reaction to the ‘great mega-project era’, i.e. the time when capital and states undertook massive modernizing investment programs designed to retrofit cities to the technologies and corporate preferences of the mid-20th-century (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003: 13-21), a need grew to develop more just spatial planning programs and one of the reactionaries was Harvey. Harvey is a radical thinker who seeks ‘salvation’ in systemic change. To Harvey (1973: 98) justice is “a just distribution justly arrived at” only. However, on the other hand het describes an reliance of urbanism on production and capitalistic appropriation of social surpluses as well. In other words, some tension between practice and theory is created and he translates this is a distinction between egalitarian cities characterized by reciprocity, ranked cities characterized by redistribution and stratified cities characterized by market exchange. A just distribution justly arrived at justice can be achieved if the distribution of welfare effects are fair and equal. Capitalism on which urban life relies however according to Harvey (1975: 90-91) to ensure its reproduction demolishes “society as a process”. In other words, it demolishes the strive to create the conditions for human survival and progress, which means that urban life is locked in compulsive structures designed to calm tensions and conflict caused by the system. Therefore, the state is needed. However, the state more often is the accomplice of capital than the redistributor. In short, the tension of the state is that it both - 16 -

stands for the preservation and the creation of the use-value of property and supports the promotion of exchange-value for private gains (Ibid.: 83-84, 87-88). In practice, this means that cities have an overviewing eye, protect and create tenant rights, set quality requirements, produce themselves and finance production but that they as well are dependent of capital. In other words, according to Harvey (1975: 11-35) it is inevitable that housing infused with market logic leads to a market characterized by shortages and deteriorating quality since if it wants to function, i.e. accumulate, it will stir towards artificial scarcity always. In short, Harvey (1975: 26, 89) does not believe that an urban population in an adequate manner can be housed in a market and believes that it will lead to overpricing, i.e. the appropriation of surplus for non-egalitarian purposes, and hence to stratification as the necessary outcome. However, without systemic change this is inevitable. In summary, Harvey arguably states that if the housing market is characterized increasingly by quantitative shortages that this means that the market from a more demand- sided logic is transforming into a supply-side oriented market and that during such a process availability instead of quality for consumers becomes the decisive component of the product and that this means that people should receive protection. Vice versa, if the market instead is constrained less by quantitative shortages of houses then it will inevitably move from a supply-sided market towards a demand-side orientation wherein the quality of the product wins in importance at the expense of the mere availability of it and profits15 (EIB, 1986: 7).

15 Consider Amsterdam’s second golden age between 1850-1900 when the population of Amsterdam almost tripled as the consequence of the attraction of its industrial revolution. At that time banks started to provide revolutionary credit mortgages from the 1870’s to finance construction processes which attracted dishonest contractors and speculators. At the end of the nineteenth century large-scale new neighborhoods were built such as the Dapperbuurt, Pijp and Staatsliedenbuurt. However, many of the houses were small and expensive, build by poorly skilled construction workers, with cheap materials and without a long-term view. Hence, some call it speculative and some revolutionary building. When many collapsed quickly it led to growing political support for stricter building regulations, municipal supervision and the Housing Act of 1901 of the liberals. It became understood that housing was “at the heart of the social question “ and that “not everything should be expected from private parties” (Sleutelaar, 1902: 41). This law commenced the start of public care for housing in the form of building regulations concerning the quality and size and legal demands to plan expansion. This in turn led to plans later such as Plan Zuid of architect Berlage and the garden cities in Noord (Smit, 2012: 83-98). Moreover, the period marked the beginning of the first housing societies. However, in the ten years after the law the ‘bad surpluses’ turned into a situation of scarcity since the imposed demands meant that constructions slowed down due to higher costs while many revolutionary ones were demolished (Bosman, 2004). In short, to create the conditions for progress the state needs to balance between interests of tenants and constructors constantly. - 17 -

6.3.3 Fainstein’s ‘just city’ Lastly Fainstein, who has written extensively about the question what a just city is. Again, there are two sides to the work. As a concrete political agenda Fainstein’s (2010: 8) her work on the just city should been seen as a value laden reaction to neoliberal restructurings emphasizing competitiveness, reduced government interventions and market processes since “the principle of justice [to her are] not the same as the principle of competitiveness” (Fainstein, 2013). As an abstract search for an ideal city Fainstein’s (2010) her work should be understood is a critical assessment of the writings of philosophers such as Rawls, Gramsci, Nussbaum and Foucault. For Fainstein, three norms form the requisite preconditions for a city to act just in the end. These are: equity (i.e. impartiality and fairness), democracy (i.e. proactive and equal representation) and diversity (i.e. mutual acceptance and recognition). Importantly, these three norms together do not constitute a just city. Rather, they should be used to evaluate public decision making with since justice should be “the first evaluative criterion used in policy making (Fainstein, 2010: 6). Fainstein (2010: 17) her model of justice is a model which accepts the possibility of “non-reformist reforms”, which should be understood as an attempt to distance herself from authors who adopt all-or-nothing system transforming positions. In short, Fainstein (2010: 19) is more practical and believes that “there are many possible capitalisms with many different ways of interjecting non- capitalist principals within social and economic institutions”. According to her, the “most fruitful” approach is the “capabilities approach”, which means that the judgment of planning actions should be “based on whether their gestation was in accord with democratic norms (….), whether their distributional outcomes enhanced the capabilities of the relatively disadvantaged, and whether groups defined relationally achieved recognition from each other” (Ibid.: 55). In summary, she addresses step by step action towards a just city and tests vice versa if actions on the basis of her norms do not stir a city away from its achievements. The three evaluative principles can clash however. For example, an gentrifying renewal project can lead to more diversity in households but as well to displacement. Since such enthusiasm for democracy and diversity has not produced alternatives to inequality under pro-growth regimes legitimized with trickle down geography (Fainstein, 2005) however, when outcomes conflict equity is the norm which according her should prevail (Fainstein, 2010: 82). Equity she defines in turn as the “distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning” (Fainstein, 2010: 35-37). In other words, for her it is not a requirement that each person is treated the same but rather that a just city treats each ‘appropriate’. Or as she has - 18 -

argued herself, equality will “establish a target to be shot down”. In short, since it intervenes in relative deprivation equity is the first norm to evaluate distribution with. Lastly, unlike scholars such as Smith or Harvey who focus on macro-economic levels of development, Fainstein focusses thus on the social lower-level practices within cities and puts the people so to say back into the discussion about the city. Practically focused as she is, her work should be understood as an effort to counterbalance the worldwide influence of the neoliberalist post-modern views of authors such as Florida and Healey and the consequences of their creative competitive city on people (Lupi, 2013: 69). However, for this attitude she has been criticized too. Harvey and Potter (2009: 46) for example believe that her work will not solve but only soften injustices. Moreover, although he has praised her ideas, Mitchell (2011) finds her concrete analyses as the consequence rather “superficial”, especially if they ought to “bear the normative weight [which she] wants to place on them. Which brings us to the Dutch critiques on the depiction of Amsterdam as a just city.

6.4 Amsterdam place within the urban justice discourse Many urban theorist working on justice have described Amsterdam with superlatives. The question if Amsterdam is still just or not depends on the aim and on choices about the level of the abstraction stirring the analysis. In other words, to some Amsterdam is not just simply because it inspires still. What follows are some critiques on this depiction. However, first is outlined why Amsterdam remained idealized while the critiques rose.

6.4.1 Amsterdam as an ideal European city Amsterdam is idealized often for idealizing purposes, i.e. because it is the most just version of the ideal type ‘European city’ to which scholars attach hopes when it comes to countering exclusion and segregation. European cities have a characteristic urban fabric, economic system, specific spatial qualities and are compact. Above, for long they were autonomous and self-governing which gave them distinguishable histories, and it is thought this provides protection against globalizing capitalistic pressures. Moreover, Amsterdam is the chosen city since it is the exponent of Dutch spatial planning, renowned for its long progressive history. Besides, for a while as the consequence of vacancy and democratic protests indeed it had a decommodified housing market. In short, the praise in the first place has the aim to create maximal contrast with the ‘American city’ ideal type and to produce alternative progressive visions for the development of such (‘doughnut’) cities. In the second place the praise indeed should be seen as a compliment, i.e. as an admiration of its resistance of neoliberal pressures - 19 -

and its “nostalgic activism” against the modernist views on homogenization and segregation (Novy & Mayer, 2009: 104-108). This said, authors do start to agree that such praise should not blind the roots of the problems since this could muddle the search for the just city. In fact, if one looks at the social housing ideals in today’s European political context and how these are being pressured by restructurings in favor of a competiveness-oriented approach, free market reforms, privatization of (social) housing and individual responsibility opposed to state solutions some even question if the use of the European city type as an ideal alternative still is functional. However, exactly because of its former achievements Amsterdam remains widely seen by urban justice theorists as just16. Or to it differently, not many would argue that “utopian Amsterdam turned dystopian overnight” (Ibid.: 109-111). In short, although it is known that it no longer is what it once used to be, differences are described more in terms of degree than in kind, which can be illustrated with an example. According to Fainstein (2009: 32-34) Amsterdam in 2009 remained “a rough image of a desirable urban model” which “continue[d] to support a great deal of social and political equality” since just actions “flow from situations where rough social justice already exists” In short, she argued that the “achievement of the just is a circular process, whereby the preexistence of equity begets sentiments in its favor”. Dutch theorists, however, do not agree.

6.5 Dutch critique on the idealization of Amsterdam The truly just city is a hypothetical strife worthy principle. But what if a city close to the ideal is drifting and stirring away from it? Perhaps not surprisingly it are the Dutch theorists who’s voices are “barely noticed in the scholarly realm” (Novy & Mayer, 2009: 110-112). Instead of praising Amsterdam these have their own agenda and in contrast instead try to emphasize the negative sides and to stir to a more narrow definition of justice. De Beer (2012), who tested Fainstein’s norms, for example has concluded instead that Amsterdam has lost its just city ideals since it foremost wants to become a beautiful attractive city and no longer seeks justice for justice. What follows are some of the earlier critiques and with special attention for Uitermark whom I treat separately since he reflected extensively on the just city Amsterdam.

6.5.1 Oudenampsen’s and BAVO’s critique on urban revanchism and gentrification Oudenampsen criticized Amsterdam’s direction early and in particular its ‘I Amsterdam’

16 According to Uitermark (2009) it are exactly these achievements which accelerate Amsterdam’s demise. - 20 -

campaign17 since it represented a treason of the municipality to some of its inhabitants in the form of a promised better city by metamorphosing it into a knowledge economy. This transformation, which was set into motion by the city in the beginning of the 2000’s on the basis of Florida’s18 (2002) idea of the ‘competitive creative era’, to Oudenampsen (2006: 38) represented a choice for an “extreme makeover” and for a “process of urban ‘rebirth’ through place branding and social cleansing”. In short, colorfully he has described the process which Amsterdam as the consequence of it underwent and is going through still. To Oudenampsen (Ibid.: 38-39) the metamorphosis entailed that social dwellings were being pushed off in order to be able to create place for “sand blasted facades that distinguish the homes of the new middle class” with the minor side-effect that the “waiting lists for the remaining social housing [were] flooded by former occupants forced out of their homes and neighborhoods by renovation programs”. The “inflated rhetoric” of social mixing and differentiation which legitimized it19 in such he condemned. He deemed it as a “perverse logic” since “the less well-off inhabitants of the ‘backward’ neighborhoods who [were] supposed to be the beneficiaries of the policy, [were] also its main victims”. In other words, in his eyes social spaces were being alienated to make place for newcomers. Moreover, he criticized the “white marketing campaigns” in neighborhoods “where 70 out of every 100

17 I Amsterdam is a motto made up by the city with many meanings. For example, it is supposed to capture Amsterdam as an innovative, tolerant and liberal city of opportunity. Moreover, it is a commercial marketing slogan supposed to attract businesses, investors and tourists by setting the city apart from other international capitals. Critics from the squatting scene especially have reframed the slogan into ‘I Amsterdamned’. 18 Interesting is that Florida (2017) recently published a new book in which he explains how the reversing of decades of suburban flight and urban decline with internationalism, increased mobility and (his) ‘winner-takes- all urbanism’ has deepened inequalities, segregation, poverty and fails the middle class these days even.. 19 Addressing urban spatial segregation with social mixing finds its origin in the 19th century in Europe when the more affluent started to become concerned about the situation of the less fortunate living in slum-conditions. Although for selfish reasons too (a hoped for spillover effect was that it would prevent the lower class to organize themselves), it were the days of civilizing offensives, elevation ideals, utopian mindsets and a cooperative idea (Deben, 1989). In the Amsterdam context it were the days of Sarphati and Polak and later of Wibaut, Spakler and De Miranda. The idea of mixing in turn is the prevention of the accumulation of particular traits in an area until a concentration which is deemed problematic (never a concentration of rich). With the inflow of migrants the past decades in The Netherlands many policy makers in the 2000’s saw mixing in the form of a varying housing and tenure mix as an important tool for integration to counter segregation and to reduce the chance of prejudges (Bervoets & Loopmans, 2010). However, besides that gaps exist between the theory and empiric (Musterd & Andersson, 2005), which problematizes the legitimization of the policy, mixing should definitely not be used one-directional for too long since this can cause a suburbanization of poverty. - 21 -

inhabitants [were] first or second generation immigrants”. In other words, early already he saw that set up cultural festivals can be a tool “to change the image of the area from that of a loose cohabitation of immigrants, unemployed, elderly, and other economic losers to the image of a dynamic and cultural hot spot” (Ibid.: 40) too. In short, Oudenampsen critiqued the municipal-led gentrification of ‘underpriced’ locations around the city center. Moreover, what Oudenampsen wanted to emphasize was the ideological switch in urban thinking. That is, the switch both from ‘red-brick-socialism’20 and the time of alderman Schaefer21 towards rebranding and running the city as a business. Or to put it differently, that urban renewal entailed targeting lower classes instead of helping them and that Amsterdam tried to keep social problems at bay by moving them simply outwards. I Amsterdam therefore for Oudenampsen (2006: 40-41) was a “Trojan horse to reconquer the poor neighborhoods”, while long during vacancies after renewal were fostered consciously to guarantee a good price for the redevelopments only. In line with this reasoning BAVO (2007: 215), a group which investigates “the political dimension of art, architecture and planning”, argued that social housing was being dismissed “as an anachronism, an untenable burden, assault even, on the finances of the state”. BAVO (2007: 216) argued as well that the “right of a person to housing regardless of wealth, occupation, standing, conviction or lifestyle” was being reversed into a “return of the repressed” and described the I Amsterdam as a campaign that granted some “more rights to the city than others” and scoffed in such that apparently “some are considered to be more creative than others”. Above, BAVO (2007: 217-218) criticized the legitimization of it by “market adepts”, since these presented the dismantling of social housing “as the ultimate favor done to the people” while it is a “fraud, a convenient lie (…) informed by neoliberal dogma” actually. Both critiques mirror what is called sometimes ‘urban revanchism’, a concept coined by Smith (1994) who made name with his rent gap theory22 about gentrification. Although an

20 Think of the Amsterdam School and a building such as ‘Het Schip’, which reflects hope and elevation. 21 Schaefer was a born Amsterdammer, a former Secretary of Urban Renewal and a ‘man of the people’. As Labor alderman in Amsterdam he was responsible for the renewal wave of the late 1970’s and 1980s. His policy ‘Building for the neighborhood’ focused on renewal tailored to the needs of inhabitants. In short, he was not a displacing modernist but rather the one who arranged that households could return to ‘their neighborhood’. 22 This theory attempts to explain why capital is being reinvested into inner-cities, i.e. into the upgrading of low quality houses to produce a housing stock fitting the needs of the financially stronger suburbanized middle class. According to Smith (1979) investments into the built environment are fixed usually for a period and capital - 22 -

American concept, urban revanchism23 is the idea that the political shift of the post 1960’s redistributive period towards neoliberalism in the late capitalist city is characterized by a discourse of revenge on and blaming of undeserving working classes and minorities. It points to an exclusionary reinstated societal vision therefore and tries to grasp the attempt of richer to banish those who are not part of the vision to the urban peripheries since they ‘are in the way’ (Slater, n.d.). In short, this mirrors the rhetoric of BAVO about a return of the repressed and Oudenampsen’s Trojan Horse. Moreover, it mirrors the latter’s critique on the reconquering of the (inner-)city of Amsterdam by (white) middle-class suburbanites and creative (international) elites, legitimized by a frame of countering segregation to create the attractive places to live in, to invest in and to visit as tourist24 in this competitive era.

6.5.2 Uitermark’s in memoriam Lastly, Uitermark’s (2009) in memoriam25 for the former just city Amsterdam. In this often cited paper Uitermark explains and celebrates how the just city Amsterdam came to life in the late 1970’s-1980’s but ends by mourning “its death” which he ascribes too to the neoliberal ideologies pervading the policies from the 1990’s. Uitermark criticized that renewal once favored the universalization of housing but was used now “to recommodify the housing stock, to differentiate residents into different consumer categories and to disperse lower income households”. In fact, to him Amsterdam in 2009 was not just but “just a nice city”, therefore is unable to react to rising land values quickly. Besides, returns often are rent and not profits made on sale. The idea in turn is that disinvestment will occur and that this will cause a situation wherein the capitalized rent becomes lower than under the possible best use conditions (the potential ground rent). Therefore, if the rent gap grows sufficiently large enough to make redevelopment profitable, reinvestment can be expected to occur. 23 It is named after the Revanchists of 19th century Paris, a group of bourgeois reactionaries who fused militarism and moralism to restore ‘public order’ and who opposed the socialist uprising of the Paris Commune. 24 Intercity competition is not just a competition between cities to attract the most bright minds. I Amsterdam is focused on attracting tourists too. In fact, the letters throughout the city have become touristic hotspots. Fact is that in 2015 after Florence and Venice Amsterdam welcomed the most visitors per head of the population of all European cities (OIS, 2015: 16). In 2016 17 million tourists spent 138.568.375 nights, which was a staggering 94% increase compared to 2011. Moreover, the safe prognosis is that this amount will grow up to 23 million tourists in 2025. Of these extra 6 million above most will be foreign tourists, i.e. tourists who stay longer than Dutch visitors of which many are day-visitors (Amsterdam Marketing, 2016: 6-10). 25 The in memoriam is the protest slogan ‘housing is not a favor but a right’ turned into a meters long monument across the subway station Nieuwmarkt, which thousands pass daily without noticing these days, or do, but miss its meaning. Once it represented the institutionalized promise to protect the right to the city to all and the power of residents against imposed governmental plans. However for Uitermark foremost it is an ‘in memoriam’ today. - 23 -

which he blamed The Hague and global pressures for, to lesser extents the municipality, and as well Amsterdammers because of their lack of resistance26 against it (Ibid.: 348, 357-358). The depiction of Amsterdam as a just city in the international literature in such then was attacked upfront by Uitermark in an attempt to politicize the concept for Dutch purposes. To him the not attentive discourse started to describe too much a nice or good city but not necessarily a just one and he set out the task therefore to differentiate more clearly between the ideal and the practice. Mirroring the work of Harvey and Lefebvre Uitermark argued that cities should remained to be called just only if all forms of exploitation and alienation are absent. Or to put it differently, although other values should be valued and he too still described Amsterdam as a fascinating example, if a city wants to be just, according to him it can never exchange values such as prosperity for less equity or less civic engagement27. In short, researchers should find focus again on the two “essential but perhaps not sufficient” preconditions for urban justice, namely the fair distribution of scarcity and engaged civic control (Uitermark, 2009: 350). This first precondition means a “commitment to make the city accessible to each and every person irrespective of their purchasing power”. In other words, for Uitermark a just city is not necessarily a pleasant city since “it may be the case that houses are small or ugly”. Justice to him definitely is not the same as quality but rather the commitment to distribute “limited and imperfect housing evenly across the population”. Which means in turn, to make this possible, that cities should “either create an egalitarian income distribution or (….) create institutions that prevent households and investors from translating their economically privileged position into a privileged position in land and housing markets”. Civic control, i.e. mechanisms which engage residents with the ongoing project of making the city, i.e. the socio-dialectical space, is the second precondition. About this he writes since it will be the state enforcing accessibility, which means that there exist the threat that egalitarianism implies the danger of a concentrating power defining what is just, that residents rather than

26 This lack he explains as the outcome of the past, i.e. it are the achievements of the just city ironically which help to prevent resistance against policies seeking gentrification. For example some former activists have their ducks in a row and own a house and became interest groups in such instead. More important however is that it takes time for a liberalized stock to develop, which means that because of the size of the social sector it needs to slink, which takes times because tenants enjoy protections but also since many do not flow because of high rent jumps, which means that many released dwellings have to be liberalized or sold, which means that the access for lower incomes will decrease at least until the moment that the lower limit for the social stock will be reached. 27 It is not an substantive criticism on Fainstein her theory but rather on her practical application of it. - 24 -

simply receiving what is being allocated should have the right and capacity to inform and to shape the distribution of universal provisions to their needs (Ibid.: 350-351). As Uitermark realizes himself too, these preconditions are formulated in an impossible way and logically met nowhere. There doesn’t exists an actual just city and Amsterdam never was. But what is true is that some cities come closer to the ideal than others and that we therefore should be interested in approximations. Or to put it differently, that we should be interested in approximates moving away from the ideal. For Uitermark Amsterdam should not be pragmatically treated as a concrete just example which is to be researched comparatively, but instead as a longitudinal case from an abstract strict idealized perspective . That is, as a polarizing city “degenerated from a city that aspire[d] to be just for all into a city that is nice for many” (Ibid.: 351, 358-359). In short, to him it was incomprehensible that where in an earlier era a waiting list of two years was considered a breach of the right to housing that a city with longer and longer waiting lists was still being called just.

6.6 Towards another perspective on justice It is understood that the ‘just city’ is about the idea that the market and housing should not go together as an inseparable couplet, that it is about an search for an idealized scenario whence in practice policies can be evaluated and criticized and where planners and policy makers could stir towards, and as a political discourse that it is about combatting the neoliberal agenda dictating that ‘the market’ rather than residents needs to be freed from constraints. However, my aim is not to preach here to the choir. I fully agree with most and slowly more and more Amsterdammers in my surroundings too. It is a fact that housing since these critiques has commodified further under the eyes of minister of Housing Blok and his predecessor Donner, that further liberalizing reforms have been implemented, that (artificial) shortage has increased and has been split and polarized with an income limit and that the demand changed above. Moreover, the successes of this metamorphosis are starting to bite the city in its own tail and in the near future no significant changes have to be expected. In short we can give critique, but as Uitermark tried to persuade we should as well research from an ‘accepting position’ that housing shortages exist and try to understand what these mean within a relatively by degenerating just city. In other words, aim is to focus on the fact that scarcity implies choices which are both just and unjust.

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7. Conceptual framework A conceptual framework is the researchers own position on the problem guiding the study and is an analytical tool which helps to organize and analyze ideas and empirical material and the collection of it. Several types and purposes have been identified. For example, they can be descriptive, a practical idea, used for inductive reasoning or as an exploratory ‘working hypothesis’ based on a model used in a different study translated to the case or some kind combination (Shields & Rangarjan, 2013). The conceptual multi-principle framework presented below mirrors this. It should be understood as the outcome of a belief which grew during the literature and the to follow case description that it ‘work this way’.

7.1 Multi-principled distributive frameworks According to Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel (2009), who have written about the justice of allocating medicinal shortages, scarce distribution of medicines is a perennial challenge, which is an idea of which I believe that it comes close to the fact that housing is an endless story of muddling through (Ekkers & Helderman, 2010). Moreover, Persad et al. do not focus on egalitarian justice only, which is appealing and useful. Rather, they distinguish four justness categories, recognize the logic of those according to their own core ethical values, and subdivide these in turn into eight principles, two per value category (see table 1).

Equal treating Prioritarianism Utilitarianism Promoting usefulness First-come Most Weakest Benefiting Maximizing Instrumental Lottery Reciprocity first-served needy first first the greatest value value Table 1. Importantly, Persad et al. thus do not argue that one of these categories or principles is better than the other beforehand. Rather, the idea is that all are just and unjust due to shortage since distributive legitimizations would not be necessary in excessive times. In short, logics of justness compete and have too. This competition in turn has several imaginable existences. Imagine: if one value category ‘wins’ of the other three, competition will take place between the two internal principles only and if this too leads to an absolute victory, exclusion of the scarce good by definition will be one-sided (lottery set aside) and justified poorly. However, this is an unlikely outcome since in reality such distribution will not be accepted (endlessly) by the excluded. Rather, mirroring Uitermark, instead of simply receiving what is being allocated expected may be that households will demand a more complex allocative system. In turn, if they succeed, it means that those who were included and as the consequence are - 26 -

excluded will do the same. And those who feel those consequence as well. Etc.. This, in essence, is the idea that scarce distribution is a perennial challenge. Allocation of scarce goods then is based on what Persad et al (2009: 423) call a ‘multi- principle framework’, i.e. some combination of these categories and principles, which is a distributive system which both highlights and downplays morally relevant considerations. In theory an endless amount of forms of these are imaginable. For example, some values or principles can dominate or not, this can changes over time due to all kind of reasons28 or not, some can be applied molded, allocation can be based on a specific temporal order between principles, behind a first pre-ordering framework, per value or principle perhaps another multi-principle framework can be found etc.. Besides, the bigger the shortage, the more need to rebalance and contest the system if it is flawed and the larger the chance moreover that it will lead to extra categorizations since a stable systematical skewed allocative framework in such an instance by definition in absolute numbers would start to exclude more. In short, the point is that multi-principled distributive systems direct focus on the fact that in scarce realities excluding and including choices are made, which are just and unjust. Moreover, the less complex the framework the more biased it is and in such unjust while one could speak as well about an imaginable but perhaps not realistic ‘just injustice’, which I would define as equal exclusion and inclusion which in the end hypothetically leads to equity. The multi-principle framework of Persad et al. in other words is thought stimulating and an interesting concept to use when looking at the distribution of the scarce houses of Amsterdam. It stirs focus both to fairness and to contestation of the system.

7.2 Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel’s system translated In the following I describe the four categories and eight principles one by one. Egalitarianism which is so important for the just city theorists is not part of these logically since it assumes that no person has an inherent right to something more than others while this is the whole point behind multi-principle frameworks. Categories and characterizations have to be made.

7.2.1 Treating households equally If demand is the same exactly (which on an individual level is never the case but is if groups are created which are allowed a certain demand only) scarce resources in terms of housing

28 This could be anything, for example a shift in the characteristics of the demanding population or increased demand, a change in the supply side, political mobilization, the end of the transformation of the housing market. - 27 -

can be considered indivisible, which means that the equality of opportunity in scarce times means something different than equal allocation of amounts of a good. In short, one cannot allocate a half house, although compaction in the sense of more people per square meter is possible. That said, treating households equally entails providing equal chances to groups or to households within groups. Two principles in turn attempt to embody this value. Allocation by lottery has several advantages. First, equal moral status supports an equal claim to scarce resources. Second, allocation is based on chance instead of the characteristics of home seeking households, i.e. lotteries prevent differences to affect the outcome. Lastly, more practically lottery is quick and requires no knowledge about the recipients. However, less attractive of lottery is that it is blind for relevant factors, no matter how these are being perceived. In other words, it leads to a fear of ‘unnecessary’ exclusion by gambling by those who believe to own a ‘relevant factor’. In short, the not categorizing strength of lottery is its weakness as well, which means that randomness could be seen as inappropriate since treating households equally potentially fails to treat them as equal (Ibid.). First-come, first-served as a distributive principle is such an factor and categorization and speaks to the imagination of justice of many since it can be seen as a natural lottery. First-come, first-served as argument avoids the discontinuing of the allocation of scare houses to those who were first since these are ‘deserving’. In short, it is a non-sharing self- protective factor (like all factors given weight). However, the disadvantage of the logic is that a continuation based on waiting time oppresses the reasons to support allocation to more needy who came later (like all factors know such an counter logic). In fact, maybe some will not even join in the back of the line, which reduces the shortage indeed but means too that the access to the city is halted for newcommers and the right to the city is granted to those who wait their turn only. In short, first-come, first-served ignores relevant other differences between households and favors ‘randomly’ on one trait only (Ibid.: 424).

7.2.2 Prioritarianism Mirroring Fainstein’s equity according to this value justness is not the addition of more to the abundance of those who have much already but the provision of more to those who have little. However, what is little if having not much can be seen both as lacking one certain scarce good, i.e. an indivisible house, and as lacking goods more in general? Adding a third principle and prioritizing values in general complicate things already. It makes it politicized, and if shortage increases especially. Two principles embody the competing interpretations. The allocation of scarce resources to the most needy individuals prioritizes those with - 28 -

the worst future prospects. For some this logic is morally obvious since the most needy are the worst off overall. Inherent to it are the ideas that better-off can better help themselves in some way anyway and that worse-off are hurt harder compared to the better-off if both do not receive the scarce good or even disproportionately if the well of does receive it. In short, it argues that treating people differently does not entail that we are treating them unequally per se. Problematic of this form of prioritarianism however is that it applies too when minor gains at high costs are achieved since it undermines the prioritization of other needy. For example, one should think carefully about the allocated house in relation to the prioritized household. Who the most needy is besides is discussible, also since not allocating a scarce resource to better-off needy households can make them more needy. In short, in terms of housing this principle should be used foremost for the prioritization of smaller groups in direct need or as part of a larger group, i.e. as extra categorization behind a pre-ordering one29. The second interpretation of prioritarianism is the allocation of scarce houses to the weakest defined as a (larger) group based on a trait. Such a collective form of favoring the worst-off has the benefit that it treats households defined as part of a group the same and is therefore orderly, more workable and less politicized. However, the question remains who the weakest are. In fact, more than with individual prioritization the weakest first principle can lead to larger structural biased exclusion and polarization, while artificially created divisions with impact in turn are more heavily contested and defended. Above, feelings of injustice can be stronger since of two relatively similar households one could be included while one could fall by the wayside, which means that space for exceptions should be created (but not too much sufficient since rules should not be ambiguous. Moreover, lastly, it can become a focus blinding for other options. However, these critiques noted, by definition categorization to prevent bureaucracy is inescapable (Ibid.: 424-425). The point system defining the rent and the income limit defining which households can enter which houses undeniably are the two most important divisions structuring today the question who the weakest are.

7.2.3 Utilitarianism The two in times of shortage competing utilitarian principles direct the focus to different benefits which can be maximized and complicate the multi-principles framework further. The first maximizing strategy involves benefiting the greatest numbers which finds it

29 Note that the allocation to small needy groups in its turn in theory can be based on a second (less complex) multi-principled framework in such if the total amount of allocated houses is insufficient to house these groups. - 29 -

justification in the idea that each life is equally valuable. The strength of this principle is that it avoids comparison. In other words, this intuitive logic entails that if two or more instead of one can be helped that the first option should be chosen for always. In terms of housing one appropriate allocation on household size for example represents this principle. Keeping all things equal however is not just by definition since household are different in terms of demand. In other words, the avoidance of comparison in is the avoidance of the fact that such allocation can have different effects on different households. To give an example, although it does reduce scarcity, compaction can raise rents. In short, making three better-off a factor one more better off is not per se better than making two worse-off a factor one better off. That said, this quantity above quality prioritizing principle should be part of all multi-principle systems in times of shortages, despite the fact that houses are rather indivisible. Maximizing the highest value in its turn does take into account that the allocation of scarce dwellings has different effects on different households. Although difficult to measure what effects are, what the highest total sum of effects of a certain allocation is30, to decide politically what these should be, and since different households in governing practice means the contested exercise of group creation again, the point of this principle logic is that it can motivate the exclusion of larger groups for the benefit of smaller ones. Or to put it differently, the logic of this principle emphasizes quality above quantity for ‘good reasons’. It is the opposite of apposite allocation, but as well a limit to compaction, or arguably what Uitermark calls just, and especially if in a supply-sided market an allocation entails the sale of a social house or a new-construction built to sell or let out to the highest bidder. In short, its emphasis on quality above quantity in times of shortages is its core weakness. Moreover, the disadvantage of the principle is that it is difficult to legitimize it, also since highest value is an unsure prognosis and contested comprehension. In short, compared to the other principles the argument that ‘worse-off’ to certain extents are extra deserving should be convincing. If not, and to extents in general, its use should be small and specified (Ibid.: 425).

7.2.4 Promoting and rewarding social usefulness The last category is not about household characteristics, sizes of groups definitions, or about amounts versus quality but about usefulness and time and once more an idea that the above principles should not direct allocation on their own. What is just too according to this value is

30 Think for example about the critique on gentrification and on trickle down geografy but for example as well about the critique on the idea that a non-segregated city benefits the poorer in the long run. - 30 -

to take into consideration that specific households should be prioritized in order to enable them to promote certain other important values or as a reward for having promoted these. In others words, in view of the complexity of society and what is ‘at stake’, this form of allocation of scarce goods implies that not all houses should be allocated to reproduce or to legitimate the conventional and mainstream or to renew, circulate and innovate constantly. The instrumental value allocation principle argues that households should be prioritized to enable or to encourage future ‘usefulness’ and finds its appeal in the idea that allocation can be just if it pays itself back. For example, some allocations can lead to less use of scarce houses in the long run since they can improve flowing, while a completely different type of usefulness in turn could legitimize allocation if promotes a certain important other value, for example for the city as a whole. In short, importantly this principle does not imply as such that recipients are more deserving inherently but rather emphasizes a long term perspective on the creation of ‘more’. Or said differently, the logic recognizes the equality of each and of those who are not ‘instrumentally valuable’, but put those households on hold for a greater good. A point which connects it to the utilitarian maximizing the highest value principle. The complication surrounding the principle however again is that people differ in their perception on usefulness and that it is difficult besides to translate it into an characteristic of a group. Moreover, by ‘non-valuable non-recipients’ it can be conceived as demeaning or demonizing and especially if usefulness is defined for long in a one-sided manner. In short, it should be applied if it is undeniably appropriate and indispensable for promotion of future morally relevant principles only. If not, according to Persad et al. its use should be limited. Reciprocity lastly is instead of forward-looking a form of backward-looking allocation and in such about rewarding past ‘contributions’ instead. Sometimes it is called rectificatory justice as well, but when it aims to set unjust situations of the past right only. Distribution of houses on the basis of reciprocity involves preferential allocation to households who have done all they could, who have meant something, who have some binding, who have made certain choices for the greater good, who have reduced their need for scarce resource etc.. In short, reciprocity is about giving something in return for a made contribution instead of about giving something in return for a contribution to be made and tickles people their sense of justice so to say and stokes up the feelings of deserving. However, this said, people disagree about what a contribution is and here too it is hard to generalize a made contribution and to translate it to a group. Moreover, the principle inherently excludes newcomers (Ibid.: 426).

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9.3 Legitimizing (the use of) multi-principle allocation systems The perennial challenge which just allocation of scarce resources is I argue is the constant political and ethical distributive struggle over the design of the multi-principled framework between households, political actors, corporations etc.. In other words, the perennial challenge so to say exists out of the claims made on ‘the right to the city’. It is about contesting exclusive forces, about the cry and demand, about trade-offs to not alienate, about actors pressuring and defending the system, with a special role for the city and government in turn as distributor to not let one form of justice dominate too much or too long since these principles on their own due to shortage inherently are insufficient. Or, in the words of Persad et al. (2009: 423, 429) themselves, “society must embrace the challenge of implementing a coherent multi-principle framework rather than relying on simple principles or retreating to the status quo”. If choices are inevitable, allocation should incorporate the complexity of our moral values, moreover since man cannot ignore questions such as what kind of urban people they want to be. Besides, all distributive systems need that people perceive it as just and accept the actual allocations as democratically fair at least. In such, although a multi-principle distributive system does not always make its content explicit and expresses complexity and controversy, in my view elucidating, evaluating and discussing it is a research priority.

8 Research question The question of this thesis considering the upcoming problems, writing from an accepting perspective that Amsterdam has stirred to an unjust creative city characterized by shortage but taken into account that besides this choice the responsibility for its unjustness lies at the The Hague level foremost, is: how we can interpret the distributive housing policies of the current council of Amsterdam through the lense of a multi-principled framework appoach?

9 Data collection The choice to research the ‘case’ Amsterdam on the basis of the literature review about urban justice speaks for itself. Amsterdam has a special place within the just city literature but is deteriorating as such an city. The multi-principled distributive conceptual framework as the analytical research design in turn has been legitimized by arguing that it is accepted that scarcity exists and that a just unjust distribution of shortage in such is the ‘most achievable’ within the existing constraints. In short, what still can be distributed will be researched. Above, approaching it in this manner allows for much more than the conclusion that the city - 32 -

Amsterdam is unjust. The chosen time period, lastly, will follow naturally out of the developments the past years which are described below in the case description extensively. What rests is an explanation of the sources of the used information. There existed no demarcated plan for data collection beforehand admittedly since I started with barely any relevant knowledge about the pieces of the complex puzzle which housing is. In other words, the research started rather randomly, which started a piling of information until the pieces of the larger complex puzzle which a multi-principle framework is at some point all once had passed by. In short, information was sought on the basis of questions asked, which is why in the end all kinds of data has been used. That said, all are considered reliable and if there existed doubt sources have been double-checked (if possible). The most used ones are:

1. Het Parool, which is the daily local newspaper of Amsterdam. 2. Nul20, which is a local two monthly housing magazine covering the MRA. 3. The website of the Research Information and Statistics (OIS) of Amsterdam. 4. The website of the municipality for reports, policies, plans and legal articles. 5. The website of the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Corporations (AFWC). 6. For understanding the website of the Dutch government on the Housing Law.

10 Case study Since one can argue that demands exceed supplies but turning it around as well that supplies can lag behind demands, i.e. since scarcity can be attributed to increased demand, lacking supply or some combination, the question is first how both developed over time and what the prognoses are. In fact, the actual selling of social dwellings, production of kinds of houses, transformations, allocation etc. is based on the estimated prognosis of the relation between the both since they connect since the demands influences the supply and vice versa. Hereafter first the dynamics of the shortages on the basis of the yearly ‘Amsterdam in figures’ rapports of OIS will be sketched out. The reason that 2001 is the starting year is that it gives insight into the metamorphosis and the critiques on the just city Amsterdam. Moreover, it gives the opportunity throughout to elucidate some of the policy reforms implemented since these have changed fundamentally the logics of how the housing market works. Above, it shows how certain demands have grown and why. Aim was to present a story which touched all relevant developments and themes important for just city theorists.

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10.1 Gentrifying student city Amsterdam (2001-2007) While in 1998 the population of Amsterdam grew with almost 8.000 around from turn of the millennium growth stopped. In 2001 the population of Amsterdam grew with 800 and in 2002 with 700 people. In these years constructions were delayed and high prices led to domestic departure surpluses. In total more than 12.000 foremost ethnically Dutch young families in search of (green) suitable living space more left than came, although for the first time Dutch Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans were leaving to settle somewhere else in the MRA too, mostly in Almere. The fact that the city grew to almost 740.000 inhabitants those years next to the natural birth growth in short should be ascribed to foreign mostly non- western migration (OIS, 2003). In 2003 this changed. Again the population grew with 900 only. However, in this year due to stricter settlement requirements and the economic recession the migrant influx reduced. In other words, it was the influx of young students next to natural growth in 2003 which started to contribute more to this minor growth, although the domestic departure figures remained negative (OIS, 2004a). In 2004, a few years before the just city Amsterdam started to receive critique, growth started to grow again. This year the population grew with 3.400 people, mainly due to natural birth growth. More important, the foreign settlement surplus that year amounted 50 people due to reduced migration and increased remigration only. In other words, where the domestic departure surplus in 2001 and 2002 in total counted 12.000 people still, in 2004 this had reduced to practically zero. But this did not mean importantly that more stayed. In fact, again many young people settled in Amsterdam, which means that Amsterdammers left. An since less ethnically Dutch moved the only possible conclusion is that it were the immigrants who left/were forced to leave. Indeed, of the people moving from Amsterdam to Almere that year non less than 67% was part of an ethnic minority (OIS, 2005a). In turn, the fact that less ethnically Dutch moved and that more young people entered should be ascribed both to (student) housing production and to the fact that moving minorities and not incoming foreigners which created place. In other words, in 2004 the first signs of gentrification became visible and telling is that OIS (2005b) for the upcoming years expected domestic surpluses again, something which had not happen for decades. Moreover, assuming that the annual housing production would increase it forecasted that in 2030 835.000 people would live in Amsterdam (OIS, 2004b). Despite the delivery of 2,897 homes and a foreign departure surplus of almost 3,000 due to remigration but as well because many (ethnically Dutch) moved to other EU countries, the number of inhabitants of Amsterdam in 2005 increased with 76 people 743.027. In other - 34 -

words, people started to live bigger. The domestic departure surplus however was negative, namely 350, which means the births cached up the foreign departure surplus. That said, it were young people who benefited from the room in the housing market again especially. In fact, in 2005 20% more entered than in 2003 (OIS, 2006a). Moreover, noteworthy is that OIS (2006b) witnessed what it called a “suburbanization of allochtonen”31 and expected that the proportion of non-Western32 immigrants in central places such as Oud-West and De Baarsjes would decrease and increase in the Westelijke Tuinsteden and Noord. To fortify the meaning of this, it estimated that in 2025 some of the neighborhoods would have higher immigrant rates even than Zuid-Oost, which for decades has had the highest share. In 2006 the amount of inhabitants of Amsterdam increased with 77 people in total only33. Nevertheless, it should be marked as a turning point since for the first time in decades the domestic departure surpluses had turned into a domestic arrival surplus of 1.800. In fact, since 1850, the years 1946 and 1947 set aside, the domestic arrivals had never been so high. Above, considering the existence of natural births, for the first time in decades (some years set aside) foreign departures were positive and immediately large too, namely above the 6.00034. Above, in 2006 it were no longer students who contributed to the arrivals most but graduated ethnically Dutch 25-29 year olds instead and noteworthy too in such is that the amount of autochtonen born in Amsterdam decreased to 204.000 only, a 25% loss compared to 1992, while the non-Amsterdam born ethnically Dutch group grew to 179.000 (OIS, 2007a). In other words, it were not just allochtonen who left/were displaced. The trends moreover in 2006 started to manifested themselves spatially. The not in Amsterdam born autochtonen on average lived more in centrally located neighborhoods, i.e. the places where they came for. Put differently, original Amsterdammers on average lived more and more started to live in places such as Noord, Slotervaart, Osdorp or Betondorp, i.e. there where the affordable single-family and worker dwellings were located. However, it must be said that another trend became visible as well and that the figures show that mobility increased and changed of dynamics in general. For example, more western allochtonen

31 In the Netherlands a distinction is made between allochtonen, i.e. those who have ‘emerged from another soil’ and autochtonen, i.e. those who ‘emerged from this soil’. A person is a allochtoon if he or she is born abroad or if at least one of his or her parents is born abroad. As of 2016 these terms are no longer used by the government. 32 A non-Western allochtoon was someone whose country of origin was or lied in Turkey, Latin America, Africa or Asia (Japan, Indonesia and the former Dutch East Indies excepted). 33 This is the criticized artificial scracity, i.e. in amounts the city barely grew again while many kept coming. 34 Note the urban revanchism, i.e. the domestic departure surpluss in five years turned into a foreign one. - 35 -

emigrated and more Eastern European (Polish immigration foremost) as the consequence of the expansion of the EU came (OIS, 2007b; OIS, 2007c). Based on these developments, OIS changed the prognoses even and forecasted that Amsterdam would have 823.000 inhabitants in 2030 instead of 835.000. Nevertheless, it did start to recognize a tension between new and old Amsterdammers since the city previously attracted more varied ethnically Dutch. Moreover, because the in Amsterdam born parents with the arrival of children would create room for the ‘creatives’ if they would start to move from the centrally located neighborhoods to the planned new area Zeeburg, it was expected that this would not change (OIS, 2007d). In 2007 then the city grew with over 4.000 people to 747.290 inhabitants. This growth should be associated strongly with the availability of newly constructed houses, 6.346 in total. Many Amsterdammers that year moved to IJburg , which indeed created room for newcomers. Above, the outflow allochtonen decreased as a consequence and of Suriname from Zuid-Oost especially. This said, again many of the domestic newcomers (15.700 in total) were educated and young and again the incoming non-western migration was low, despite increased EU emigration which was negative (2.206) while the EU migration from Eastern countries and Bulgaria in particular grew further. In short, next to a considerable domestic surplus it was the natural birth growth in 2007, 4.833 more were born than died, which accounted for the population growth. OIS, in turn, adjusted its prospects in reaction and raised the 823.000 of the year before to 827.000 (OIS, 2008a; OIS, 2008b).

10.2 A city which grew during a financial crisis (2008-2011) Showing the fastest growth seen in years in 2008 in the first three months only Amsterdam grew with 4.000 people, partly due to administrative reasons but foremost because of the largest production of new dwellings in 2007 since 1984. In fact, in 2008 the population in total increased even with 1.2%, i.e. with roughly 9.000 to 756.500. It was a growth which had not occurred since 1998 and since 1974 Amsterdam had not counted so many inhabitants. Moreover, since another 5.000 dwellings were delivered the housing stock that year reached a total of 387.600, the highest amount which it until then had ever had. In other words, next to the relatively steady annual birth surplus of proximally 4.500 the growth this year for a considerable part was due to lower outward domestic migration since more families stayed. In fact, the amount of autochtonen for the first times in decades did not decrease but increased. However, this increase should be explained too by the fact that for the first time ever in 2008 the same amount of people moved from Almere to Amsterdam as vice versa while domestic inwards migration grew again above (OIS, 2008c; OIS, 2009a). - 36 -

The over 25.000 foreign establishments in total moreover made their contribution too and interesting is that it were not East-European but West-European immigrants, many between 25-34 years old, who came this year. In fact, ‘traditional migration’ from countries such as Turkey or Morocco for the first time in decades did not even contribute to the growth of Amsterdam, which means that the foreign arrival surplus (which the three preceding years after decades had become a departure surplus) should be explained out of the surplus of 4.000 EU-migrants. In summary, the year of the financial should be characterized as a year of seldom growth in which new trends started to develop while others continued. OIS, in reaction predicted that Amsterdam in 2015 would have 20.000 inhabitants more than in 2008, i.e. almost 777.000, but in the longer run still 827.000. In other words, it was expected still that the market would flow and that many Amsterdammers would move to IJburg to make space for students and young (foreign) professionals (OIS, 2009a). Because of the crisis Amsterdam in the beginning of 2009 grew barely and built less. In those months foreign and domestic migration surpluses reduced considerably. In fact, a European departure surplus developed again. All mobility decreased in the first months and the growth which occurred was due to natural births. On the other hand, a fifth to a fourth of all new dwellings still was being inhabited newcomers immediately (OIS, 2009b; OIS, 2009c) and in the last six months of 2009 the developments of 2008 showed themselves again. In total no less than 9.000 new students arrived, of which besides many were foreign western ones. Moreover, foreign migration grew in general and not just many West- and East-Europeans arrived but as well people from South-Europeans countries which were hit hard by the crisis. Above, non-western migration grew and the influx of people from the BRIC-countries, Pakistan and Ghana was exceptionally large (OIS, 2009d). In the end Amsterdam managed to build 4.427 dwellings in 2009 still. However, the population increased with a staggering 11.426 to 767.773, more than half the growth which a year before was expected for until 2015. Half should be attributed to births,1.900 to a domestic and 3.700 to a foreign settlement surplus. Nevertheless, despite these developments, due to the crisis and the prognosis that only a little over 2.000 houses were planned for 2010, but especially because the amount of movements within the city had been smaller than the amount of settlements obstructing the flowing of the market, OIS predicted that settlements would reduce. In fact, although plans for the near future such as Zeeburgereiland and Overhoeks were in the making, the long term expectation for 2030 was adjusted with 8.000 upwards to 835.000 only (OIS, 2010). In 2010 the growth however did not decrease. In fact, it was larger than the years - 37 -

before. On the first of January 2011 Amsterdam counted 780.559 inhabitants, a growth of 13.000 people proximally, and it started to become clear that the city was experiencing a growth spurt which it had not seen since the birth wave after World War II. For the fourth year in a row more autochtonen came than left, although their percentage decreased since in absolute amounts the group grew as fast as the non-western migrants (OIS, 2010). For example, the Moroccan community became larger than the Surinamese that year, also because births contributed much to the growth35. More noteworthy however was the settlement surplus of Western migrants of 7.000, an amount which had not been so high since 1964 when many South-European guest workers arrived. In summary, in 2010 it was clear that something was going on and that Amsterdam started to transform in an international knowledge city attracting young professionals and students from all places over the country and world. In fact, in total 4.044 houses were completed even, i.e. twice as much as expected in 2009, while despite the crisis the MRA in 2010 welcomed 122 international companies. Moreover, the city that year became the fastest growing tourist destination of Europe. The expectation for 2030 in such was adjusted with 15.000 to 850.000 inhabitants. The problem however was that it was expected still that in the coming years the construction of the amount of new houses would reduce (OIS, 2011b). In 2011 Amsterdam set up a think-tank and a research group called ‘Facts and Effects’. The former published a document called ‘Housing Manifest Amsterdam 2012’36 in which it proposed deflections to reverse the tide on the housing market and the latter embarking on it a document called ‘Amsterdam, vital city’37. Amsterdam itself produced a long term vision

35 In 2010 females in Amsterdam on average had 1.65 children. In 1993 this was still only 1.35. In the 1990’s and early 2000’s it were non-western migrant females as such especially who were responsible for the natural birth growth. Currently the trend is that ethnically Dutch females again receive more children while migrant females give birth to less (OIS, 2011a). Moreover, a new area such as IJburg ensured that less families moved. 36 The most important recommendations made and which to work should be implemented together were: customize allocation, invest in the Amsterdam outside the beltway, built more for mid-incomes, regionalize the social market, help low-income families, connect rents to household incomes and the popularity of a neighborhood, liberalize rents but do make them income dependent, promote flowing, lift the capping limits, make agreements with the private liberalized rent sector (Gemeente Amsterdam et al., 2011). 37 Recognizing the above problems in this document Amsterdam was described from Fielding’s perspective on the city as a ‘escalator’. It discusses the new dynamics and depicts Amsterdam as a former poor city which is becoming more differentiated. Because it identified that mid-incomes were being squeezed it warned for the increasing contrasts visible between the areas within and outside the beltway but asked attention for the fact that there exist a limit to the shrinkage of the social housing stock as well. On a lower scales it praised gentrification - 38 -

called Structure Vision 2040. Most important, this year the rule came into effect that social dwellings should be allocated to households with an income below certain thresholds38. Although growth reduced after three years in 2011 Amsterdam still grew with almost 10.000 inhabitants, while 2.939 new dwellings on balance indeed were constructed only. The reduced growth reduction was due to less migration, especially since 11.000 were born, something which had occurred for the last time in the 1970’s, while the death rate decreased above. That said, still there was a surplus of domestic and foreign newcomers. The fact that the share of non-Western Amsterdammers for the first time ever decreased moreover was a writing on the wall that a serious shortage was developing. All in all, in 2011 the expectation was raised for 2030 again, this time to 865.000. Noteworthy above is that OIS started to write about consequences of such growth such as the need to compact and the fact that young adults were starting to experience troubles moving out of their parental house (OIS, 2012a).

10.3 The internationalization of Amsterdam and Blok’s housing reforms (2012- 2017) In 2012 growth stabilized when Amsterdam grew with 1.2% to 799.442 inhabitants but the production of dwellings shrined further to a surplus of just 1.100. In this year domestic migration increased somewhat and was responsible for proximally a third of the growth (OIS, 2013a). A released fact sheet above illustrated well how the share of higher educated in the labor force since 2000 had increased to 38% of the population and how they had concentrated themselves in the 19th century belt and district Zuid over time especially (OIS, 2012b). On the and social mixing since it had led to improvements in neigborhoods. In terms of flowing in light of the expected growth it identified the reduced production as the stagnating threat for the market (Booi & Dignum, 2011: 9-20). 38 In 2009 after a lobby of amongst others the Dutch Association of Institutional Investors in Property and the liberal commisioner Neelie Kroes on the basis of the argument that corporations were competing unfairly on the liberalized market the European Commision (EC) ruled that 90% of the released social houses of corporations should be allocated to households below the income limit (DAEB-ruling). If The Hague or the EC set the limit remains unclear still (Aedes, 2016) but most point to former ministers of Housing Donner and to current mayor of Amsterdam Van der Laan. Point is that it is a relatively low limit, more or less a one-person household modal income, while in Amsterdam more than 50% of the houses are let out socially. In other words, considering the increased demand moreover, it forced many households to buy or to rent in a small liberalized market. This is called artificial shortage creation and is one of the reasons why rents rise. Moreover, it feeds support under the households earning more than the income limit to further shrink the social stock and in such institutionalizes the idea of a ‘social market’. On the other hand, due to the rising rents one could argue that it helps developing the liberalized rent market since investors like high rents. Interesting lastly is that in 2014 thirty European cities signed a resolution wherein they demanded a higher limit since it pressures the undivided city and mid-incomes. One of these cities was Amsterdam, which means that it was Van der Laan who signed it (Verbraeken, 2014). - 39 -

other hand, in another report published that year it was written that because of flexibilization and shortage new inflowing young urban professionals, unlike the ones before them who could still buy themselves into spacious houses and neighborhoods, more and more had to focus on expensive rentals (OIS, 2012c). That said, it did not mean that migration toward the larger region got going. In fact, despite increasing scarcity more than 50.000 people in 2012 found a place (although only 25.000 in an independent dwelling). habitants in 1959 would be surpassed. Moreover, the increasing shortage did not withhold another 126 international companies to settle in the MRA, an amount which surpassed the high amounts of the years before39 (OIS, 2013b) and pressured the market and the demand for its liberalization further. Therefore, considering that in the next year Amsterdam would surpass 800.000 inhabitants and 400.000 dwellings, the forecast now was that in 2025 there would be 850.000, in 2030 867.000, in 2040 887.000 and in 2050 900.000 inhabitants (OIS, 2013a), which meant that it was estimated that the all-time record of 872.428 of 1959 would be surpassed. In 2013 Amsterdam grew with another 11.743 to 811.185 inhabitants. It was the fifth

39 The attraction of the metropolis Amsterdam knows several explanations. It has for example a concentration of internationally oriented business service providers and a functioning infrastructure. Moreover, with the Zuid-As and the I Amsterdam campaign it has been promoting itself as an international knowledge city. In other words, it is not surprising that in 2012 many of the companies which came had something to do with the ICT-sector, the creative industry or the financial service provision. Above, ex-EU-Commissioner Kroes (who called on the Dutch government to bring public housing policies in line with EU competition rules) the past years has been the Dutch Special Envoy for Startups. Most important however is that large companies settle their headquarters in Amsterdam often because the Netherlands is a tax-haven offering several instruments such as the ‘CV-BV structure’ for American companies and the ‘double Irish with a Dutch sandwich’. Above, where before 2011 the rule was that expats should have a scarce specific expertise to make use of the so-called ‘30%-arrangement’, which is a tax discount of 0% tax on the highest 30% of the income, after 2011 (note that this is the year wherein the income limit was introduced) a salary-norm was implemented instead (Douven, 2012: 14). In other words, this is the ‘battle for the brains’ in optima forma (Van Staalduijne, 2016). In 2017 this norm is €37.000, i.e. just above the income limit for social houses, for people younger than 30 €28.125 and for foreign scientific researchers there doesn’t exists a salary norm. In short, this pressures Dutch mid-incomes further. For example, two expats earning the same as two Dutch employees because of this discount can pay more rent, which means that Dutch have to ask more salary, which means that companies hire expats. Above, the flexibilizations of some rent contracts towards temporal ones under Stef Blok has only exacerbated this effect. Unfortunately, figures about the use of the discount and the amount of expats are hard to find. That said, in 2013 already the number of ‘economically active international employees’ had grown with 35% compared to 2009 to 52.542, of which 88% rented a house, while the MRA housed even 104.900 (I Amsterdam, n.d.). Telling perhaps instead is that in 2016 for the third year in a row a record amount of foreign companies settled in Amsterdam, namely 157, while many others above extended their activities (OIS, 2017a). - 40 -

year in a row that growth exceeded 10.000, which meant that the city experienced the longest serious continuous growth period since 1935. As the consequence of the demographic shifts and the exclusion of families due to increasing liberalized rents and the decline of the social sector the amount of births declined but still contributed about half to the growth. Domestic migration on balance added 4.550 while importantly of those who left a considerable part were born and raised Amsterdammers again. In fact, were in 1996 still 35% of the inhabitants was an autochtone born and raised Amsterdammer their share in 2013 had reduce to 24%. Noteworthy is that foreign migration thus did not play a considerable role this year. More than 27.000 came, but more than 25.000 left as well, although it did mean that the international mobility had increased. Nevertheless, 2013 was the year wherein for the first time 50% of the population was an allochtoon, i.e. a foreign migrant or a child of one migrant at least. Moreover, the characteristics of this group were changing. For example, the amount of Western migrants increased and their share grew to 16%. But as well, that year the share of pension eligible allochtonen increased and was twice as high as in 2003, i.e. the first generation of guest workers were starting to age (also cine the amount of births decreases). In terms of housing in 2013 again the amount of households grew faster than the amount of dwellings. In fact, over the period 2008-2013 the amount of households per year on average increased twice as fast as the amount of produced houses40, decreasing the correlation between population and the stock growth, despite the given that since 2009 vacancies had decreased with 6.000. That said, one could speak of an unexpected ‘sponge- effect’, which meant that the prognosis was adjusted too. Assuming that growth was partly due to the economic recession, this year the expectation was that growth would continue but less since it was believed that this sponge-effect would decrease as soon as the economy would recover. In other words, it was thought that people living with others in time would start searching for their own place, which is why it was estimated that growth from 2019 on would fall to 3.000 on average annually until 2040. Nevertheless, it was estimated still too that the stock would remain too small and that many would have to leave the city from 2019 on. In short, because foreign migration would account for two-third of this growth it was thought, OIS warned that the domestic migration flow after only some years of surpluses would become negative again and around 5.000 even (OIS, 2014a). Considering the domestic flows, 2013 therefore was another bad year for the poorer Amsterdam born.

40 Considering the kind of influx note that many of the new households are one-person households increasing the demand for compaction and smaller houses. - 41 -

One of the fist publications on the website of OIS in 2014 is called ‘Likes attracts likes’ about increasing segregation as the consequence of the increasing concentration of highly educated mostly whites in the neighborhoods within the beltway (Platform31 & VU, 2014). Another report in which the implementation of the income limit for social dwellings was evaluated amongst others explained how mid-incomes, for example cheap skewed tenant and families, were stuck due to increasing prices and that the movement of the market was stagnating (OIS, 2014b). OIS (2014c) itself published an extensive population development prognosis in which it reflected on projections PEARL (of the Central Bureau Statistics and the Environmental Assessment Agency) and Primos (ABF Research) since these were higher than the one of OIS and as seen for years OIS made a systematical error by making too low estimations constantly. Moreover, OIS (2014d) presented its second EU-migration monitor in which it was written that in 2013 in Amsterdam an estimated 25.000 not-registered Mid- and East-Europeans and 78.000 registered EU-migrants lived, a 31% increase compared to 2000. In other words, in 2013 at least 9% of the population of Amsterdam was an allochtoon from an EU-country, of which most were West-European41. Lastly, minister Blok that year decided that the value of properties would be incorporated into the point system42 from 2015.

41 Importantly half of this group is second generation, i.e. a child of the guest workers who came in the 1960’s. 42 In the Netherlands the maximum rent for social dwellings is based on a point system. Liberalized dwellings are houses with 146 points or more and for these there exist no maximum rent, although corporations mostly do let out their liberalized dwellings based on points. This point system had been under pressure for a long time when in 2011 minister Donner introduced ‘Donner-points’, which were 25 scarcity-points. In short, the point system made differentiation between areas, which protected the undivided city, which before was not the case. In place of these scarcity-points minister Blok in 2015 incorporated property value (WOZ) with the underlying idea that it incorporates scarcity on the market too. The idea is that the WOZ determines 25% of all points in the Netherlands (Zijlma, 2015). However, since the WOZ is determined by structure, i.e. demand and supply, due to an culmination of reasons as seen sales prices in Amsterdam rise fast. In short, although the idea, the space to liberalize social dwellings is enormous (I added a table of the maximum liberalization space after full tenant mutation based on the WOZ in 2013, which was much lower than today, in the attachments). Moreover, it is based on a formula which annually is adjusted to the average national WOZ increase/decrease while in some boroughs of Amsterdam the WOZ the past years increased almost twenty times as fast as this average (in the attachments I too added the most important factors which determine the amount of points. The current numbers 7995 and 112 are the to be adjusted numbers in the formula to stick to the 25%, but note too that with ‘greening’ many houses for example can be lifted to the liberalized segment). In summary, one side-effect of this system is that it can increase segregation since prices per m2 are higher within the beltway. Above, this design has changed investments logics and has an effect on what kind of houses will be built where. Besides, it allows that even the very small centrally located houses today can be bought-to-let under liberelized prices. Lastly, the - 42 -

In terms of growth in 2014 it did reduce but little since Amsterdam grew with 11.087 people to 822.272 inhabitants still. Logically, about half was due to a birth surplus again. However, more important was that in 2014 something else happened which was not yet expected and that was that the domestic migration unlike the past eight years barely added anything, 551 only, although mobility did increase. In fact, 5.000 more left Amsterdam behind than in 2013, many between 30-39 of age, which means thus both that the amount of people coming to the city increased, namely to 35.842, but as well that more families moved or were forced to move. In short, it was foreign migration adding second most, i.e. 4.742. This amount entailed an extra addition of almost 3.000 compared to 2013, and since in 2014 compared to 2013 2.000 foreign people more came it meant that about 1.000 less left as well. Again, most of these came from EU-countries. However, more and more were arriving from the United States and the BRIC-countries too43, which meant that the in sum 3.606 delivered houses again lagged behind demands. Moreover, recall the earlier prognoses. Where in 2012 OIS still expected that the city would grow to 867.000 people in 2030, i.e. with almost 70.000 in 18 years, after 2014 it adjusted its estimation to 871.000 in 2020 on the basis of the expectation that the positive migration balance would continue and would grow further until 2025 instead on 2019. In short, despite the fact that the amount of newly constructed dwelling would increase again to a peak of 4.500 in 2017 according to the Action Plan 2014-2018 and despite the expressed ambition44 in to build another 70.000 dwellings the coming decades, OIS started to write that Amsterdam would probably not be able to hold on to many of its residents. In other words, since a sponge cannot absorb endlessly, it adjusted its negative domestic estimations of 2013 downwards (OIS, 2015). In 2015 growth again did not reduce. In fact, it increased and almost broke the record. On 1 January 2016 the city counted 834.71345 inhabitants after12.441 more people came than left. About 5.500 should be attributed to the birth surplus. More important however, where in 2013 foreign migration barely play a role but in 2014 added 4.742 already, settlements in 2015 from other countries reached a surplus peak of 8.300. Although it must be said that less

liberalization limit of €711 from 2016 until the end of 2018 has been frozen. It means that the liberalization space will enlarge further (145 entails a maximum rent of €711, per 1 July 2017 it will be 141 points).

43 The top four contributors in 2014 were India (+1.060), Italy (+785), Spain (+558) and Bulgaria (+472). 44 In 2014 the current governing coalition entered the stage, hence the Action Plan 2014-2018 and new ambition, which is based on the Structure Vision 2040 mentioned earlier 45 Note that in 2007 OIS still estimated that the city would grow to 827.000 in 2030. - 43 -

emigrated to, it was amount which had not been seen since the beginning of the 1990’s. Moreover, 1.900 of these could be attributed to Indians already, of which most were in their late twenties early thirties. In short, Amsterdam started to attract expats seriously, next to EU citizens, and the domestic migration in such became negative again indeed. Or to put it differently, where after decades of decline for a decade the domestic migration showed positive figures, i.e. which was criticized by Uitermark and his ideological colleagues, in 2015 the trend if I simplify had reversed again. In 2015 1.386 people nationally more left than settled, an amount which was bigger than was expected for even in the prognosis of 2014. However, important too is that where in 2014 already 5.000 more left than the years before, in 2015 in total 39.000 left while the domestic settlements grew with over 2.000 to 38.000. In short, the dynamic of the mobility kept growing, which means that more and more seem to come and go and temporarily so to say thus use the city 46. In fact, in 2015 it were mostly people in their twenties and thirties who left, i.e. former students, families, starters, the people with a smaller wallet still too etc.. Telling as well is that they do not only suburbanize like in earlier days by moving to surrounding municipalities such as Amstelveen, Almere, Zaanstad or Haarlem, but as well to other cities such as The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. And noteworthy too is that where in the period 1995-2013 the influx of 17-19 year olds increased from 2.000 to 4.800 in 2014 and 2015 it decreased47 to 4.500 and 4.000 respectively, although most newcomers were still between 18 and 30 years old. In summary, the composition of the city in 2015 in some aspects became more diverse than it was before. For example, while they form 78% of the entire Dutch population the percentage of autochtonen in Amsterdam decreased to 48%. In fact, 253.000 Amsterdammers in 2015 were not born in the Netherlands (OIS, 2016a). That said, all in all the shortages for many groups became larger. The fact that over 6.000 new houses were delivered in 2015 was good news as such. The stock increased to 423.785, although on the other hand it must be said that the production stood mostly in service of students and starters and consisted in many cases out of one-room dwellings. Above, since in 2015 just like in 2014 on average 2.0848 people lived in one house while almost 47.000 more households were registered than there were houses,

46 In some way this means that the right to the city is granted constantly. On the other, it can have negative effects too since this produces a specific social space. For example, it can deminished cohesion and alienate. 47 Probably less are able to leave their parental place because of rising rents. Although not sure yet, the abolition of the residential study subsidy per September 2015 moreover is might increase this decrease (OIS, 2016a). 48 In general there are more and more one-person households which explains the shortage partly as well. - 44 -

property values and rents increased again. Nevertheless, prognoses were adjusted upwards again. Where in 2012 OIS estimated still that in 2050 the city would have around 900.000 inhabitants, in 2015 it forecasted that the city in 2025 would count 906.000 inhabitants, for example because instead of 4.000 the foreign migration surplus until 2020 was set on 5.900 on average. In short, despite that it was foreseen to that in 2040 Amsterdam would count 925.000 inhabitants49 a serious domestic outflow was taken into account (OIS, 2016b). Lastly, 2016. In 2016 the population grew to 844.952 inhabitants, i.e. the growth reduced but still the city grew with a little over 10.000 people. Again, domestic departures increased, to 42.000. According to still provisional figures it means that about 3.700 more on balance left or maybe better said had to leave, an amount more than twice as big compared to 2015. In other words, considering that birth surpluses stayed the same, the conclusion is that the foreign settlement surplus was large once more. In fact, it most probably has increased50 and is estimated on 9.000 (OIS, 2017b), which means that the dynamics keep increasing. In figure 1 below the latest estimation is shown. The question now is what these developments have meant for the distribution of houses by the current council.

Births Domestic migration Foreign migration Growth Figure 1. Source: (OIS, 2017b).

10.4 Conclusion in between On the basis of the above several conclusion can be made. First, the fact that the city did not grow much until 2007 did not mean that there did not exist shortage. Around the time

49 PEARL and Primos predict a growth to 1.050.000 but their models are different. For example in these two models 98.0000 new dwellings will be built until 2040. OIS however follows Structure Vision 2040 and believes that this amount will be 64.000 since due to aging from 2025 on the production will decrease (it predicts 44.500 wellings until 2025, although in 2014 it still predicted 37.000). 50 The increase partly can be explained by the increase of war refugees from places such as Syria. - 45 -

Oudenampsen and BAVO expressed their critiques indeed many allochtonen and poorer ‘Dutch’ Amsterdammers moved or were displaced and the domestic surplus which after years formed itself should be ascribed to gentrification of the centrally located boroughs. In other words, those years already could be interpreted through a multi-principle perspective and it can be concluded, next to the fact of course that egalitarian and prioritizing principles did exist (which in practice were combined with first come, first served mostly and with reciprocity51 to lesser extents), that a utilitarian maximizing value and instrumental value principle dominated and moreover that benefiting the greatest seems very absent. In fact, this I would argue is the core argument of the critiques on the depiction of Amsterdam as a just city approached from a multi-principled perspective. Their point, in the end, was that a ‘suburbanization of poverty’ took place as the consequence of an ideological bias. Second, the rules of the game changed fundamentally since the critique of Uitermark. As seen, mobility increased and became more dynamic and international, has been released even and should be understood as the outcome of actions promoting free establishment. However where exclusion was first biased, due to the structure of the market, due to the fact that rising demand internationalized at that moment when the crisis hit the construction sector and due to the fact that in exactly this situation an income level for social houses was implemented to accelerate the larger transformation in housing, today it are those who first excluded who start to experience excluding pressures too. Interesting as such is the question to what extents this group will demand for allocation on the basis of a weakest first frame since this leads undeniably to less offer for lower incomes and in such for a demand for needy first principles by those. In fact, in such an instance factors starts to matter more again, which is another explanation for the fact that lottery will be abolished again per 2018. Third, taking into account the reforms in housing by Stef Blok too, the conclusion can be made that despite the fact that there is being built again (and will be built like never before) that the gap between demand and supply will be higher than ever. The question

51 Per 2015 maximally half of the social dwellings may be allocated with priority to home seekers with binding to the region and half of these to households with binding to the municipality. However, since 2013 no social dwellings have been granted in Amsterdam on the basis of social or economic binding anymore (Nul20, 2016a). Instead lottery was introduced because of the long waiting lists to give newcomers a chance, decreasing the chances for those owning some relevant factor in turn (used in 8% of the regular allocations since) (Nul20, 2016b). However, per 2018 due to the increasing shortage and Amsterdam will stop with lotteries again to increase the allocation on the basis of first-come, first-served (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). In short, it is about giving and taking constantly to prevent structural exclusion, although new youth contracts play a role here too. - 46 -

however is where this gap will be biggest and in turn for how long a system can remain biased. Point is, low-incomes are so to say excluded from everything above the income limit and need to share the leftover social houses. The mid-incomes are ‘protected’ however if demand is low, which it is not but one cannot endlessly take away from lower incomes. In short, if the demand stays high mid-incomes at some moment need protection. Which ironically would entail that the principle cause of injustice in the end would lead to a higher percentage of the stock with protected rents. In short, the question is how long such as polarization between low- and mid-incomes can take place and how the council has dealt with these conflicting demands to prioritize both in some way.

11 Research Results In this chapter it is described how the current Amsterdam council (elected for the period march 2014- march 2018) has stirred the allocation of both new constructions and the existing stock. Importantly, these two relate, which means that the manners in which policies interlink is hard to put under words. For example, if one social dwellings is built this does not mean that there will be one more per se since one in the existing stock might be liberalized. In other words, all policies in the end together form the stock of houses, allocated in turn by a very fluid and highly complex multi-principled framework. Complicating the space for precise explanation moreover, the reality is that every single loose allocative policy takes off some space from somewhere else, which makes the system rather inscrutable. There do not exist clear separations since households possess several factors and policies show overlap besides. Only the larger policies with some effort can be seen loose. That is, to extents. Most of the times how a policy excludes is not clear immediately at all and demands a larger understanding of how things linked together which takes time. Moreover, to describe how all allocating policies taken together take off space of each other’s allocated space would be unfinished work. There exist literally hundreds of rules and categories. Some choices therefore were made. First, ‘details’ such as differences between housing corporations in their allocative policies were ignored, just like allowed movement spaces, all kind of divisions within the group eligible to the social stock, countless appropriate allocation categories, technical factors determining which house is which kind of social house etc.. Moreover, sometimes the policies are simplified, for example because they change regularly which has effects in turn but foremost to take out legal ifs and buts. In short, focused on are what are believed to be the larger lines set out, which does not mean importantly that details - 47 -

in practice do not matter since they can have considerable effects on households. In fact, there the system changes most often so to say to blow off steam. In summary, oversight had to be created and focused will be on what has priority for the council (see table 2), i.e. the

-Based on price (rent per Cheap segment Mid-segment Expensive segment month) and income levels Owner- Owner- Owner- Rentals Rentals Rentals (gross per year) in 2015 occupied occupied occupied Per 1 January 2015 57.3% 3.8% 5.6% 11.8% 6.5% 14.9% Prognosis of need in 2025 49% 3% 11% 11% 4% 24% Prognosis stock in 2025 (without the actions of the 39% 4% 9% 14% 14% 21% Living Agenda 2015) Table 2. Source: Living Agenda 2025 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017). the allocation to lower an mid-incomes in relation. The most important actions stirring these will be presented summarized below. After, in the conclusion these are interpreted. But first the governing coalition and its communal vision on housing will be introduced on the basis of their two coalition accords .

11.1 Coalition Accords The governing coalition in the council of Amsterdam exists out of D66 (green center to right progressives), SP (socialists) and VVD (liberals). It was installed in 2014 and since it has presented two coalition accords, the second signaling a change of direction. In the first, the Coalition Accord 2014-2018 (D66, SP & VVD, 2014), it is written in the opening statements that Amsterdam’s power lies in is its provision of the freedom to realize dreams and that this freedom is not worth anything if not everybody can join in. The subtitle reads even “Amsterdam is from everybody” and in the chapter about housing they envision a city wherein people can feel at home and wherein everyone can find affordable housing, regardless of income, family and size and no matter how long someone has lived in the city. In short, the parties pictured a just city almost, arguably turning a blind eye for the problems. However, in their second accord they did not, or less. The title of this accord made in 2016 reflects the problems and is called “Amsterdam will stay from everyone”. And although still positive in the beginning, placing emphasis on the healthy economy, the growing amount of new constructions, their plans to renovate and reprofile (read gentrify) many of 20th- century houses in district Noord and the popularity of the ‘pocket-size metropolis’, the perspective of the three on the future nevertheless gloomy. For example, it is written that it understood that this popularity comes with threats and worries are expressed about the under pressure inclusive ideal, about segregation, shortages and rising prices, despite all actions - 48 -

taken which were agreed on in the first accord of 2014 and despite the fact most of the set targets were even surpassed (D66, SP & VVD, 2016).

11.2 The actions of the council In the following some of the decisive actions are presented short to show what this ideologically diverse coalition did to make sure that Amsterdam would be from everybody and does to make sure that Amsterdam will stay from everyone.

11.2.1 New constructions One of the first things the current council did was establishing the ‘Action Plan Home Construction’ in which impulses were laid which to stimulate and to facilitate the construction sector. In total €60 million was invested in order to able to reach the set goal of building 17.000 dwellings for the period 2014-2018 and from 2018 on 5.000 annually (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014a). In addition in line the municipality increased the planning stock by issuing new building plots and presented an integral and city wide inventory of housing sites called ‘Course 2025: Space for the city’52 in which the plans are laid out to realize the construction of 50.00053 houses until 2025. In other words, based on the lessons learned during the economic crisis it was understood that in order to be able to react quickly to changes in demands and to developments that Amsterdam needed to be able to adapt and designate locations efficiently, flexibly and viably and that the city should have a wide range of kinds of future locations in terms of type, size, function, mix and compaction (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2016a). Moreover, no longer 64.000 but even 94.000 new houses are planned until 2040. In 2040 district Oost should house another 48.000 people, Noord 35.000, Nieuw- West 20.000, West 15.000, Centrum 4.200, Zuid 13.000 and Zuid-Oost 10.000 (OIS, 2017b). In fact, the most recently presented plan even speaks of a new area called Haven Stad around the uninhabited district Westpoort where another 40.000 to 70.000 house should arise until 2050 (Nul20, 2017c).

52 Course 2025 is the operationalization of ‘Structure Vision 2040’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011), which by itself is a more comprehensive follow-up of ‘Living Vision Amsterdam 2020’ (Dienst Wonen, 2009). Structure Vision 2040 outlines how the demand for 70.000 can be caputured. Just like the Living Vision 2020 it expresses a sound vision on the future with certain undertones. Amsterdam in 2040 is envisaged as a knowledge and networking economy operating as a magnet on businesses. That said, it too explicitly discusses the need to form a horizon beyond the beltway and to establish several centers to preserve the undivided city. 53 Hemel (2012) speaks of a third golden age (the second passed by in note 15). - 49 -

The question in turn is how these will be divided. Although hard to predict, what is known is that the municipality mainly wants to realize housing for low and middle incomes in the future. In June 2017 alderman Ivens announced that for all the to build dwellings the council would aim for a 40 (social rentals) - 40 (mid-priced rentals/owner occupancies) - 20 (expensive rentals/ owner occupancies) division from now on, which is an enormous trend breach because since the turn of the century of all new constructions about 30% was built socially but the rest to sell or let out liberalized (Nul20, 2017d). In other words, would this happen it would entail that in theory no less than 80% of all new dwellings could regulated since an adjustment in the ‘Decision Spatial Planning’ by the successor of Blok, new minister of Housing Plasterk (2017), recently gave local governments the power to incorporate fixed sales prices and mid-rents as two extra categories into their development plans 54.

11.2.2 The private social sector According to the WiA 2015 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015) a quarter of all social houses was rented out privately and about two-third of all privately rented houses had rents beneath the liberalization limit. However, that was in 2014 before sales prices started to rise quickly, before the incorporation of the WOZ into the point-system, before the influx of expats with purchasing power etc. In the period 2007-2013 the privately socially let out amount decreased from 68.000 to 53.000 (Nul20, 2014). It was expected by the council and the corporations in 2015 that the amount, despite the construction of another 8.000 by private investors, would

54 This decision forms the foundation of these new ideas. In fact, it is agreed already that until 2025 ‘Platform Amsterdam Mid-Rentals’ (PAM) will build at least 10.000 mid-class homes of at least 50m2, of which 25% will be given with priority to skewed tenants to create space for low incomes in the social sector (PAM, 2017). The adjustment in the law which makes protected mid-rents possible works as follows: new constructed mid-income houses need to be let out for 25 years at least for mid-rents. Afterwards, the investor is free to do with it what it wants. Of course, exists. For example, Ivens is afraid that investors will raise the rents of other real-estate which they own to compensate (Daamen, 2017), something which happened already on Java-Eiland where Bouwinvest which is part of PAM lets out more and more of its properties on the basis of so-called friend contracts (Daamen & Kieft, 2016). Moreover, it does not mean that investors stand in line. In fact, the council gave PAM a discount on the ground lease of 160 million for the first 1.500 houses, which accounts for about €350 discount per dwelling per month for 25 years long. In other words, the city cannot do this constantly since now the whole of Amsterdam needs to cough up this disguised rent subsidy for mid-incomes. Besides, since for years the frame has been that corporations competed unfairlybecause they received such subsidies and therefore were strangled by the EC, it is “incomprehensible” that market investors now receive such aid (Bond Precaire Woonvormen, 2017), especially because unlike corporations they are allowed to sell or liberalize after 25 years already. - 50 -

reduce to an estimated 25.000 in 2019 (HA, AFWC & Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015: 4). In 2017 it was expected that 19.000 will be left in 2025 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017) because of the new Law Flowing Rental Market which allows landlords to let out under temporary contracts. Moreover, the council has decided to no longer work with private investors to construct private social dwellings since the ‘Noord Orleans scandal’55 (Nul20, 2017d). Since the council decided too that ‘apposite allocation’ and waiting lists do not apply to privately rented social dwellings and since the income limit for these dwellings by Amsterdam has been set on €44.360 for 2017 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2016b) to allow mid-income households to enter, it may be concluded that this sector in social terms soon will disappear.

11.2.3 Lobbying To reduce the rent gap between the regulated and liberalized sectors, to make sure that less owners of private social dwellings can liberalize these after mutation, to underscore the problematics of the point system, to protect the mid-incomes, considering that the liberalization limit has been frozen for three year while sales prices keep rising the council of Amsterdam has adopted a motion to lobby in The Hague for a liberalization limit of €973,82 (190 points per 1 July 2017) together with The Hague and Utrecht (Moorman & Nuijens, 2017). D66, the largest party which is presents itself as the mid-income party, voted against the lobby. This is noteworthy because during a debate its leader Van Dantzig stated to agree that rentals up to €1000 euro should be protected. (Van Dantzig & Moorman, 2017).

11.2.4 Cooperation Agreements 2015-2019 Because of the large amount of social dwellings and since the housing corporations own a considerable amount of liberalized dwellings the ‘Cooperation Agreements 2015-2019’ (HA et al, 2015) signed by the Tenant’s Association Amsterdam (HA), the Amsterdam Federation of Housing Corporations (AFWC) and the council is treated last. On top of the agenda as the consequence of the Blok’s reforms stood affordability56. It

55 According to the construction license ‘North Orleans’ was supposed to be for starters, students and young people. However, because of the changed point system lifting the houses over 145 points the contractor currently is letting the homes out for prices between €1.050-€1.250 a month. In fact, in the ad texts the focus laid fully on young professionals (Van der Meijden, 2017a). Ironically the contractor in defense downgraded the anger of alderman Ivens about this as “scoring with an eye on the scarcity” (Van der Meijden, 2017b). 56 In 2013 the people who signed a contract before 2011 payed on average €110 less than the people who signed a contract after 2011. In the private sector this difference was even €371 (Wijksteunpunten Wonen, 2014). - 51 -

has been agreed upon that of the released independent social houses (student residencies included) 70% to 80% will be offered below the rent subsidy capping limits. For all released independent social houses of corporations which will be rented out in the liberalized sector it is agreed that at least 65% will be offered in the mid-segment, that the average rent of these dwellings will be €850 and that these dwellings57 will be offered with priority to lower mid- income household (HA, AFWC & Gemeente Amsterdam 2016a: 7). Considering the amount of added owner-occupied and liberalized dwellings above it was understood that the limits of mixing were in sight and that the decline of social houses would be limited. Agreed is that in 2019 the corporations will let out at least 162.000 houses socially. In short, for after 2019 the idea exist that the corporations will stick to a ‘dynamic equilibrium’58, i.e. the aim is set to equal at least the number of withdrawals (HA et al., 2015: 4, 8). This lower limit is new and meant too that the ‘Covenant Splitting and Selling’ was adjusted since it allowed the corporations to sell 30.000 until 2020 and to liberalize even more (Gemeente Amsterdam, AFWC & HA, 2011). Now, for the period 2015-2019, the corporations together are allowed on average annually to sell off 2.000 and liberalize 1.000 dwellings59. Above, 47.000 dwellings owned by corporations are the bottom-line for the districts Centrum and Zuid, the area’s Oostelijk Havengebied and Oud West, borough Houthavens and the neighborhood Overhoeks, while social houses no longer are allowed to be sold in the locations IJburg, Zeeburgereiland, Buiksloterham, Overamstel, Zuidas, Overhoeks and Houthavens either (HA, AFWC & Gemeente Amsterdam, 2016b: 3-4). In broad lines there exist an general understanding in sucg that the mixed city as an shared ideal is under pressure, although it does not mean “that all area’s should be the same” (HA et al., 2015: 9). Nevertheless, the soft agreement is made to research how in areas with an proportion of social houses less than or equal to 35% of the total stock the mix can be

57 In 2015 De Alliantie owned 20.000 dwellings (90% social), Eigen Haard 35.000 (94% social), De Key 25.000 (88% social), Rochdale 30.000 (92% social), Ymere 40.000 (92% social) and Stadgenoot 30.000 (95% social) 58 The ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is based on the WiA 2013, which is an once in the two years survey. That year 187.000 households had an income below the income limit (162.000 corporate + 25.000 social: since these latter vanished quick corporations already started selling and liberalizing less (Nul20, 2016e)). Some remarks are in place. First, surveys need an error margin. In fact, the WiA 2015 counted 179.000 corporate social dwellings while according to the database of AFWC it were170.000 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2017: 13). Moreover, the amount of inhabitants grows and student houses and youth dwellings are social houses too for example. As seen already, the council will try to build 40-40-20 from now on. If the equilibrium will be raised is not clear yet. 59 This liberalization quota can be raised if the sales quota is lowered. - 52 -

preserved60. The question however still stands what kind of social dwellings there will remain per area. The ‘Program Youth and Student Housing 2014 – 2018’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014) for example already entails the creation of another 8.000 student dwellings and 2.500 youth-dwellings. Moreover, such social dwellings are let out temporarily. For example, to make better use of the existing housing stock the latter are let out for five/seven years maximally. In short, the idea is to provide the first steps on the market to prevent possible cheap skewed renting later, which in turn should provide space for newcomers. But as well that those who do not ‘make it’, i.e. those who when they are 30 years old and do not earn above the income limit, nevertheless will have had to chance to live in the city and to build up maximally twelve years of waiting time for the social sector. However, on the other hand it is agreed as well that no less than maximally 33% of the regular supply may be offered with priority to young people and starters and the corporations. In other words, other who are eligible for regular social dwellings will be further suppressed. Lastly, ‘friend contracts’. The target group of this are the households with a lower mid- income. Or to put it differently, the target are people who are eligible to social housing but together when they share do not but who alone would not be able live somewhere. This is new since it was never allowed in Amsterdam to live with more than two adults in corporate liberalized dwellings, i.e. a new household group was invented. Agreed is that in time 33% of all corporate liberalized sector dwellings will be labeled as suitable for it (HA et al., 2016: 14, 20-22), which from a maximizing benefits perspective is welcome. However, it can pressure rents as well since three ‘friends’ normally can pay more than two parents. In short, they are likely to be used more in central boroughs and possibly are ‘disguised student houses’, which means, in other words, that the cooperation agreements mirror the creative city Amsterdam.

12 Conclusions As said, it is hard to conclude which multi-principle framework is at work exactly since for this there can be simply way too much groups distinguished, the situation is to fluid and dependent of all kind of developments and external factors. In short, for such as exercise there exists to much uncertainty, exceptions, differentiation and interlinks. If it would be possible to freeze time this perhaps would be possible if the necessary data exists. Then one could indeed see how certain policies include and exclude some dozens and how the system

60 In 2015 eight area’s had a lower percentage: Oud-West/DeBaarsjes, IJburg/Zeeburgereiland, De Aker/Nieuw- Sloten and all the five area’s in the districts Centrum and Zuid. - 53 -

is constantly fine-tuned. It was tried but distance had to be taken. Besides, more interesting is to research if and when multi-principle frameworks change fundamentally, i.e. when the pre- ordering dominating principles become contested by large groups and exchanged for others. The main argument of the critics from a multi-principle perspective was given already. Inclusion and exclusion was too one-sided based on social usefulness and maximizing highest value legitimizations, two principles which the use according to Persad et al. should be limited of. But then came the income limit in 2011 while demand increased and social dwellings cannot be sold or liberalized endlessly. In fact, because the Corporation Tax diminishes the investment space the set dynamic equilibrium will only be reached quicker. Above, private social dwellings will disappear the way it looks now. In short, allocation to mid-incomes on the basis maximizing value legitimization but as well thus importantly on the basis of a weakest first legitimization will be temporary. In fact, in 2014 already more than half of all social dwellings was assigned with some form of urgency, i.e. on the basis of a most needy principle to a relevant individual factor, diminishing all chance for the larger group regular lower incomes, moreover since what it is left being transformed into students houses or let out under youth contracts (Daamen & Pen, 2014). To prevent super-gentrification (Lees, 2003), i.e. exclusion of mid-incomes, the actions of the council are more than interesting as such. It could try to reduce demand or to lower the set dynamic equilibrium but instead want to raise the liberalization limit, wants to build 40-40-20 and is willing were possible to protect mid-incomes by giving ground lease discounts. It resembles a step back into time towards allocation to two ‘weakest groups’ and almost to what could be called a public sector again. Of course, many question still stand. For example, if the liberalization limit would be set higher, what would be done with the income limit since it is this tool which decides how large demand and supply is relatively to each other. This sets the spectrum of possible inclusion and exclusion. As such, it is ironic that shortage is the underlying explanation of it. In the end, it is the principle cause of injustice.

13 Discussion If the principle cause of injustice is the absolute shortage of available housing what does equity, i.e. a distribution of benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning mean? Does it mean that shortage should affect all population groups equally? Or should allocation not be based on administrative groups but on an individual base? However how does one define who are the better off at the beginning if - 54 -

we are talking about the human right adequate housing? Who are the better off now that there exist an income limit? Is it hypocrite to prioritize mid-income now that they are the ones who are being being pressured while the past fifteen years they displaced low-incomes? On which characteristics should equal exclusion and inclusion be based if not all can be granted their right to the city? In fact, should outsiders be included and excluded as much as insiders? And what if shortages are not created by liberalized market logics in housing only but by (artificially) increased demands as well? Does it maybe mean that those claiming a right to the city should be excluded to preserve the use value of houses and to protect them from becoming commodities? Or should we indeed live smaller and share more? However then too what extents? Perhaps until people feel alienated? Just city theorists do no give attention to such questions in their strict abstract thinking. One the one hand this understandable since the discourse in the first place is a vision on the just city and the conceptual search for it. Planning, as said, was born out of idealized futures. That said, urban policies do not take place in a just city but in unjust cities since the just city does not exist. In other words, the above questions still stand. So how should these without floating in our own right critiquing from the sideline be answered? Perhaps it should be understood too that people live differently, have different demands, study more and that households sizes change.

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14 Attachments

- 69 -

A Centrum E38 Erasmuspark K26 Zuid Pijp M57 Betondorp

A00 Burgwallen Oude Zijde E39 De Kolenkit K44 Hoofddorppleinbuurt M58 Omval/Overamstel

A01 Burgwallen Nieuwe Zijde E40 Geuzenbuurt K45 Schinkelbuurt N Noord

A02 Grachtengordel West E41 Van Galenbuurt K46 Willemspark N60 Volewijck

A03 Grachtengordel Zuid E42 Hoofdweg K47 Museumkwartier N61 IJplein/Vogelbuurt

A04 Nieuwmarkt/Lastage E43 Westindische Buurt K48 Stadionbuurt N62 Tuindorp Nieuwendam

A05 Haarlemmerbuurt E75 Chassébuurt K49 Apollobuurt N63 Tuindorp Buiksloot

A06 Jordaan F Nieuw-West K52 Scheldebuurt N64 Nieuwendammerdijk/Buiksloterdijk

A07 De Weteringschans F11 Bedrijventerrein Sloterdijk K53 IJselbuurt N65 Tuindorp Oostzaan

A08 Weesperbuurt/Plantage F76 Slotermeer Noordoost K54 Rijnbuurt N66 Oostzanerwerf

A09 Oostelijke Eilanden/Kadijken F77 Slotermeer Zuidwest K59 Prinses Irenebuurt N67 Kadoelen

B Westpoort F78 Geuzenveld K90 Buitenveldert West N68 Waterlandpleinbuurt

B10 Westelijk Havengebied F79 Eendracht K91 Buitenveldert Oost N69 Buikslotermeer

E West F80 Lutkemeer/Ookmeer M Oost N70 Banne Buiksloot

E12 Houthavens F81 Osdorp Oost M27 Weesperzijde N71 Noordelijke IJ•oevers Oost

E13 Spaarndammer-/Zeeheldenbuurt F82 Osdorp Midden M28 Oosterparkbuurt N72 Noordelijke IJ•oevers West

E14 Staatsliedenbuurt F83 De Punt M29 Dapperbuurt N73 Waterland

E15 Centrale Markt F84 Middelveldsche Akerpolder M30 Transvaalbuurt N74 Elzenhagen - 70 -

E16 Frederik Hendrikbuurt F85 Slotervaart Noord M31 Indische Buurt West T Zuidoost

E17 Da Costabuurt F86 Overtoomse Veld M32 Indische Buurt Oost T92 Amstel III/Bullewijk

E18 Kinkerbuurt F87 Westlandgracht M33 Oostelijk Havengebied T93 Bijlmer Centrum (D,F,H)

E19 Van Lennepbuurt F88 Sloter-/Riekerpolder M34 Zeeburgereiland/Nieuwe Diep T94 Bijlmer Oost (E,G,K)

E20 Helmersbuurt F89 Slotervaart Zuid M35 IJburg West T95 Nellestein

E21 Overtoomse Sluis K Zuid M50 IJburg Oost T96 Holendrecht/Reigersbos

E22 Vondelbuurt K23 Zuidas M51 IJburg Zuid T97 Gein

E36 Sloterdijk K24 Oude Pijp M55 Frankendael T98 Driemond

E37 Landlust K25 Nieuwe Pijp M56 Middenmeer

- 71 -

B10

N

E

E41

F

E19 E43 E20

E21

K47 K24 K44 K46

K25 K26 K45 K49 K K52 K53 K48 K59 K54 K23

K90 K91

T94

T93 T98 T95 T92

T96 T97 - 72 -

Borough Owner- Corporate Private Borough Owner- Corporate Private occupied rentals rentals occupied rentals rentals

Centrum 32% 34% 34% K44 41% 12% 48%

A00 25% 20% 55% K45 28% 36% 36%

A01 21% 11% 68% K46 49% 10% 41%

A02 49% 12% 39% K47 40% 5% 55%

A03 41% 10% 49% K48 18% 51% 31%

A04 33% 40% 27% K49 53% 2% 45%

A05 30% 45% 24% K52 29% 19% 52%

A06 28% 38% 34% K53 18% 46% 36%

A07 42% 12% 47% K54 18% 41% 41%

A08 33% 35% 32% K90 44% 30% 26%

A09 28% 62% 11% K91 37% 30% 34%

West 29% 42% 29% Oost 31% 51% 18%

E13/E12(B10) 21% 67% 12% M27 39% 29% 33%

E14 30% 50% 20% M28 25% 61% 15%

E15/E16 34% 41% 24% M29 29% 62% 8%

E17 32% 23% 45% M30 23% 63% 14%

E18 27% 40% 33% M31 25% 59% 16%

E19 23% 55% 22% M32 24% 68% 8%

E20/E22 38% 25% 38% M33 39% 38% 22%

E21 38% 20% 42% M35/M34 47% 39% 13%

E37afg/E36 21% 47% 32% M51 41% 44% 14%

E37c 29% 50% 21% M55 18% 56% 26%

E37de 25% 42% 33% M56 40% 31% 29%

E38 44% 18% 38% M57 13% 84% 2%

E39 16% 76% 8% M58 15% 63% 22%

E40 37% 21% 43% Noord 30% 65% 4%

E41 24% 50% 26% N60 11% 85% 4% - 73 -

E42 23% 41% 36% N61 18% 78% 4%

E43 33% 19% 48% N62 16% 82% 2%

E75 27% 43% 30% N63 14% 83% 3%

Nieuw-West 31% 53% 17% N64 100% 0% 0%

F76 27% 65% 8% N65 29% 69% 1%

F77 20% 69% 11% N66 48% 52% 0%

F78(F11) 19% 68% 13% N67 58% 35% 6%

F79 48% 52% 0% N68 32% 60% 7%

F81 28% 62% 10% N69 28% 69% 3%

F82 27% 61% 12% N70 27% 68% 5%

F83 45% 43% 12% N71 29% 46% 25%

F84/F80 57% 29% 14% N73(N72) 88% 4% 8%

F85 34% 43% 23% N74 64% 19% 17%

F86 18% 50% 32% Zuid-Oost 29% 60% 11%

F87 25% 35% 41% T93ab 24% 68% 8%

F88 53% 20% 27% T93remain 18% 65% 17%

F89 19% 63% 18% T94jk 57% 27% 16%

Zuid 32% 29% 39% T94remain 24% 70% 5%

K23/K59 57% 12% 31% T95 48% 21% 32%

K24 29% 28% 43% T96(T92) 24% 69% 7%

K25 28% 33% 39% T97 38% 49% 13%

K26 15% 73% 13% T98 58% 37% 5%

16.3 Ownership ratio’s in 2015 per district and neighborhood in %

Source: WiA 2015

16.4 Rent class ratio’s in 2015 per district and neighborhood in %

€403- €618- €403- €618- Borough <€403 >€710 Borough <€403 >€710 618 710 618 710 - 74 -

Centrum 31% 40% 6% 23% K44 26% 45% 8% 21%

A00 16% 26% 14% 44% K45 30% 35% 10% 25%

A01 30% 31% 6% 33% K46 14% 50% 1% 35%

A02 32% 17% 5% 46% K47 22% 27% 12% 39%

A03 9% 29% 5% 57% K48 27% 38% 8% 28%

A04 34% 30% 11% 25% K49 6% 9% 2% 83%

A05 33% 41% 7% 19% K52 15% 37% 19% 29%

A06 33% 46% 5% 15% K53 16% 49% 12% 23%

A07 32% 38% 6% 24% K54 22% 53% 6% 19%

A08 33% 43% 4% 19% K90 16% 40% 27% 17%

A09 31% 56% 6% 7% K91 17% 35% 17% 31%

West 35% 46% 7% 12% Oost 26% 47% 9% 18%

E13/E12(B10) 39% 49% 3% 9% M27 28% 46% 11% 15%

E14 25% 53% 12% 10% M28 22% 56% 11% 11%

E15/E16 42% 40% 4% 14% M29 27% 56% 6% 11%

E17 44% 32% 9% 15% M30 36% 47% 8% 9%

E18 33% 44% 9% 14% M31 31% 47% 7% 16%

E19 31% 56% 5% 8% M32 29% 55% 8% 8%

E20/E22 41% 37% 3% 19% M33 8% 50% 8% 34%

E21 36% 50% 6% 8% M35/M34 15% 46% 6% 33%

E37afg/E36 40% 41% 6% 13% M51 5% 28% 26% 41%

E37c 42% 42% 3% 13% M55 49% 30% 6% 15%

E37de 39% 51% 3% 7% M56 13% 47% 16% 25%

E38 20% 45% 17% 19% M57 15% 72% 7% 6%

E39 36% 38% 19% 8% M58 81% 4% 6% 9%

E40 26% 45% 9% 20% Noord 21% 59% 11% 10%

E41 34% 57% 3% 6% N60 50% 42% 5% 3%

E42 42% 46% 4% 7% N61 32% 59% 4% 5% - 75 -

E43 14% 62% 9% 15% N62 19% 46% 24% 10%

E75 27% 36% 12% 25% N63 45% 51% 1% 3%

Nieuw-West 19% 51% 13% 17% N64 N/A N/A N/A N/A

F76 30% 62% 7% 2% N65 21% 63% 6% 10%

F77 33% 55% 7% 5% N66 2% 67% 20% 11%

F78(F11) 17% 53% 14% 15% N67 22% 68% 8% 2%

F79 4% 7% 66% 24% N68 5% 68% 19% 8%

F81 29% 55% 8% 8% N69 10% 70% 12% 8%

F82 13% 51% 13% 23% N70 11% 57% 12% 19%

F83 12% 70% 9% 9% N71 0% 32% 0% 68%

F84/F80 1% 52% 21% 26% N73(N72) 35% 0% 0% 65%

F85 18% 56% 17% 10% N74 0% 37% 0% 63%

F86 12% 40% 19% 29% Zuid-Oost 15% 61% 15% 9%

F87 9% 47% 12% 31% T93ab 24% 60% 10% 6%

F88 2% 30% 17% 50% T93remain 24% 57% 15% 4%

F89 21% 55% 15% 9% T94jk 29% 63% 1% 7%

Zuid 27% 38% 11% 24% T94remain 12% 61% 16% 11%

K23/K59 0% 0% 6% 94% T95 0% 50% 37% 13%

K24 44% 31% 9% 16% T96(T92) 9% 68% 13% 11%

K25 48% 35% 4% 13% T97 7% 59% 20% 15%

K26 45% 45% 7% 3% T98 11% 73% 11% 5%

Source: WiA 2015

16.5 Hypothetical effects of three The Hague policies after maximal tenant mutation

Stock After After After freezing in 2013 Donner-points WOZ in WWS liberalization limit

Housing corporations: 173.700 107.100 83.600 69.800 - 76 -

<146 points (43.8%) (27.0%) (21.1%) (17.6%)

Housing corporations: 9.000 75.600 99.100 112.900 146+ points (2.7%) (19.0%) (25.0%) (28.4%)

Private rentals: <146 57.100 N/A 40.700 32.400 points (14.4%) (10.3%) (8.2%)

Private rentals: 146+ 32.100 N/A 48.500 56.800 points (8.1%) (12.2%) (14.3%)

Total social sector 230.800 164.200 or less 124.300 102.200 (58.1%) (41.4% or less) (31.3%) (25.7%)

<95 points 111.400 N/A 1.900 1.900 (Quality discount limit) (28.1%) (0.5%) (0.5%)

95 points - 123 points 89.500 N/A 42.300 42.300 (Capping limit) (22.5%) 10.7% 10.7%

124 points – 145 29.900 N/A 80.100 58.000 points (Rent subsidy (7.5%) (20.2%) (14.6%) limit)

Total liberalized sector 41.100 107.600 or more 147.600 169.700 (10.4%) (27.1% or more) (37.2%) (42.7%)

Dwellings owned by 182.700 182.700 182.700 182.700 housing corporations (46.0%) (46.0%) (46.0%) (46.0%)

Dwellings let out 89.200 89.200 89.200 89.200 privately (22.5%) (22.5%) (22.5%) (22.5%)

Total dwellings let out 271.900 271.900 271.900 271.900 (68.5%) (68.5%) (68.5%) (68.5%)

Total owner-occupied 125.100 125.100 125.100 125.100 properties (31.5%) (31.5%) (31.5%) (31.5%)

Total Amsterdam 397.000 397.000 397.000 397.000 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

Liberalization-space 0% 38.4% 51.9% 59.8% housing corporations

Liberalization-space 0% N/A 28.7% 43.3% private rent sector

Total liberalization- 0% 28.9% or more 46.1% 55.7% space rent sector

Calculations are based on figures from WiA 2013

- 77 -

- 78 -

De Aliantie De Key Eigen Haard Rochdale Stadgenoot Ymere

A Centrum DX08 De Aker/Nieuw-Sloten DX16 IJburg/Zeeburgereiland

DX01 Centrum West DX09 Slotervaart N Noord

DX02 Centrum Oost K Zuid DX17 Noord-West

E West DX10 Oud-Zuid DX18 Oud-Noord

DX03 Westerpark DX11 Buitenveldert/Zuidas DX19 Noord-Oost

DX04 Bos en Lommer DX12 De Pijp/Rivierenbuurt T Zuid-Oost

DX05 Oud-West/De Baarsjes M Oost DX20 Bijlmer-Centrum

F Nieuw-West DX13 Oud-Oost DX21 Bijlmer-Oost

DX06 Geuzenveld/Slotermeer DX14 Indische Buurt/Oostelijk Havengebied DX22 Gaasperdam/Driemond

DX07 Osdorp DX15 Watergraafsmeer ZX99 Westpoort