DOCSLIB.ORG

Heinz Guderian and the Fall of France 1940

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Heinz Guderian and the Fall of France 1940 AA CaseCase StudyStudy inin Agility:Agility: HeinzHeinz Guderian’sGuderian’s SpearheadSpearhead AdvanceAdvance intointo France,France, 19401940 88th ICCRTSICCRTS 1717--1919 June,June, 20032003 Presented by Steven M. Beres and Eric J. Cochrane Evidence Based Research, Inc. [email protected] [email protected] 703-893-6800 AgendaAgenda IntroductionIntroduction AgilityAgility OverviewOverview NCWNCW ConceptualConceptual FrameworkFramework ApproachApproach CaseCase StudyStudy BackgroundBackground Guderian’sGuderian’s AdvanceAdvance intointo FranceFrance ExamplesExamples ofof C2C2 AgilityAgility UsingUsing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX PanzerPanzer CorpsCorps What’sWhat’s Next?Next? ReferencesReferences 2 IntroductionIntroduction SecretarySecretary RumsfeldRumsfeld:: “Preparing“Preparing forfor thethe futurefuture willwill requirerequire usus toto thinkthink differentlydifferently andand developdevelop thethe kindskinds ofof forcesforces andand capabilitiescapabilities thatthat cancan adaptadapt quicklyquickly toto newnew challengeschallenges andand toto unexpectedunexpected circumstances”circumstances”[1][1] [1] Cable News Network. “Rumsfeld Presses for More Agile Military”. January 31 2002. http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/rumsfeld.speech/?related 3 AgilityAgility ofof C2C2 ProcessProcess Definition:Definition: quickquick andand gracefulgraceful inin movement;movement; nimblenimble InIn aa militarymilitary context:context: thethe abilityability toto bebe effectiveeffective inin changing,changing, nonlinear,nonlinear, uncertain,uncertain, andand unpredictableunpredictable environmentsenvironments AgilityAgility isis aa propertyproperty ofof bothboth forceforce elementselements andand C2C2 processesprocesses ForceForce elementselements cannotcannot bebe effectiveeffective withoutwithout agileagile C2C2 C2C2 processesprocesses cannotcannot bebe effectiveeffective withoutwithout anan agileagile forceforce AgilityAgility alwaysalways assumesassumes effectivenesseffectiveness 4 Agility:Agility: AttributesAttributes andand DefinitionsDefinitions Robustness:Robustness: thethe abilityability toto maintainmaintain effectivenesseffectiveness acrossacross aa rangerange ofof tasks,tasks, situations,situations, andand conditionsconditions Resilience:Resilience: thethe abilityability toto recoverrecover fromfrom oror adjustadjust toto misfortunemisfortune oror damagedamage thethe abilityability toto degradedegrade gracefullygracefully underunder attackattack oror asas aa resultresult ofof partialpartial failurefailure Responsiveness:Responsiveness: abilityability toto reactreact toto aa changechange inin thethe environmentenvironment inin aa timelytimely mannermanner 5 Agility:Agility: AttributesAttributes andand DefinitionsDefinitions Flexibility:Flexibility: thethe abilityability toto identifyidentify multiplemultiple waysways toto succeedsucceed thethe capacitycapacity toto movemove seamlesslyseamlessly betweenbetween themthem InnovationInnovation thethe abilityability toto dodo newnew thingsthings thethe abilityability toto dodo oldold thingsthings inin newnew waysways AdaptivenessAdaptiveness:: thethe abilityability toto changechange thethe workwork processprocess thethe abilityability toto changechange thethe organizationorganization 6 NCWNCW ConceptualConceptual FrameworkFramework Information Value Added Sources Services Force C2 Effectors Quality of Organic Quality of Networking Information Degree of Networking Net Readiness of Nodes Degree of Information “Share-ability” Quality of Individual Information Degree of Shared Information Quality of Individual Sensemaking Quality Degree of Shared Sensemaking Individual Awareness of Shared Awareness Inter- Individual Understanding actions Shared Understanding Individual Decisions Collaborative Decisions Physical Domain ty Degree of Decision/ Synchronization li gi A 2 Information Domain C Degree of Actions/ Entities Synchronized ty Cognitive Domain ili g A e Social Domain rc o Degree of Effectiveness F ApproachApproach CaseCase StudyStudy MethodologyMethodology BasedBased onon workwork ofof Dr.Dr. RobertRobert YinYin onon casecase studystudy designdesign andand methodsmethods Definition/Problem Design of case study Data collection Data analysis Reporting ImportantImportant toto keepkeep aa casecase studystudy inin thethe contextcontext ofof whenwhen itit occurredoccurred 8 WhyWhy GuderianGuderian?? RevolutionRevolution inin militarymilitary affairsaffairs First major use of maneuver warfare Parallels “transformation” AbundanceAbundance ofof datadata Primary and secondary sources Previous studies New material released (communications, daily logs, after action reports) ManyMany differentdifferent representationsrepresentations ofof AgilityAgility throughoutthroughout thethe operationoperation 9 CaseCase StudyStudy BackgroundBackground TheThe WarWar StartedStarted inin 19391939 The Advance into France was not a surprise The Blitzkrieg tactics were seen before GuderianGuderian isis seenseen asas thethe fatherfather ofof thethe BlitzkriegBlitzkrieg Tank exercises were conducted since the early 1920’s Strategy was old, the tactics were new 10 11 12 13 14 15 Agility:Agility: RobustnessRobustness RobustnessRobustness thethe abilityability toto maintainmaintain effectivenesseffectiveness acrossacross aa rangerange ofof tasks,tasks, situations,situations, andand conditionsconditions ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand XIXXIX CorpsCorps XIXXIX CorpsCorps waswas robustrobust inin thethe factfact theythey werewere ableable toto achieveachieve theirtheir goalsgoals whilewhile advancingadvancing throughthrough thethe difficult,difficult, andand uncertainuncertain terrainterrain inin thethe Ardennes,Ardennes, duringduring thethe riverriver crossing,crossing, andand effectiveeffective maneuvermaneuver afterafter crossing.crossing. 16 Agility:Agility: ResilienceResilience ResilienceResilience thethe abilityability toto recoverrecover fromfrom oror adjustadjust toto misfortunemisfortune oror damagedamage thethe abilityability toto degradedegrade gracefullygracefully underunder attackattack oror asas aa resultresult ofof partialpartial failurefailure ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX CorpsCorps TheyThey werewere resilientresilient byby beingbeing ableable toto bouncebounce backback afterafter thethe 2nd2nd panzerpanzer waswas delayeddelayed thenthen movedmoved toto aa supportingsupporting rolerole ofof thethe 10th10th armored.armored. 17 Agility:Agility: ResponsivenessResponsiveness ResponsivenessResponsiveness abilityability toto reactreact toto aa changechange inin thethe environmentenvironment inin aa timelytimely mannermanner ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX CorpsCorps TheyThey werewere responsiveresponsive byby rapidlyrapidly reactingreacting toto aa developingdeveloping threateningthreatening situationsituation onon thethe southernsouthern flank.flank. 18 Agility:Agility: FlexibilityFlexibility FlexibilityFlexibility thethe abilityability toto identifyidentify multiplemultiple waysways toto succeedsucceed thethe capacitycapacity toto movemove seamlesslyseamlessly betweenbetween themthem ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX CorpsCorps TheyThey werewere flexibleflexible byby identifyingidentifying fivefive differentdifferent locationslocations forfor riverriver crossings,crossings, werewere ableable toto exploitexploit three,three, andand ableable toto adjustadjust accordinglyaccordingly onon thethe oppositeopposite bank.bank. 19 Agility:Agility: InnovationInnovation InnovationInnovation thethe abilityability toto dodo newnew thingsthings thethe abilityability toto dodo oldold thingsthings inin newnew waysways ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX CorpsCorps UsingUsing armorarmor atat thethe forefrontforefront supportedsupported byby infantryinfantry waswas innovativeinnovative 20 Agility:Agility: AdaptivenessAdaptiveness AdaptivenessAdaptiveness thethe abilityability toto changechange thethe workwork processprocess thethe abilityability toto changechange thethe organizationorganization ExampleExample usingusing GuderianGuderian andand thethe XIXXIX CorpsCorps DuringDuring thethe crossing,crossing, theythey werewere adaptiveadaptive byby movingmoving thethe PanzersPanzers toto aa supportingsupporting role,role, andand thenthen asas theythey crossed,crossed, immediatelyimmediately backback toto thethe primaryprimary rolerole thethe GermanGerman doctrinedoctrine supported.supported. 21 What’sWhat’s Next?Next? WeWe needneed toto recognizerecognize andand measuremeasure AgilityAgility QuantitativeQuantitative andand qualitativequalitative metricsmetrics EstablishEstablish aa baselinebaseline forfor furtherfurther researchresearch ContinueContinue explorationexploration ofof attributesattributes ofof AgilityAgility 22 ReferencesReferences Alberts David S. and Richard E. Hayes. Power to the Edge: Command…Control…and the Information Age. CCRP Publication Series. Washington DC. Builder, Carol H., Steven C. Bankes, and Richard Nordin. Command Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control RAND. [1] Cable News Network. “Rumsfeld Presses for More Agile Military”. January 31 2002. http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/rumsfeld.speech/?relatedhttp://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/31/rumsfeld.speech/?related Guderian, Heinz. Constantine Fitzgibbon (trans.) Panzer Leader.Leader. Da Capo Press: New York. Network Centric Warfare Conceptual Framework. Network Centric Warfare and Network Enabled Capabilities Workshop: Overview of Major Findings. Dec 17-19, 2002. OSD(C3I) in conjunction with RAND and EBR, Inc. Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg Stein and Day, New York. Margolis, Eric How to Fight and Win a War” (http://www.foreigncorrespondent.com/archive/sedan.html) Shimp, Chris. France 1940 (http://www.sandiego.edu/~cshimp/france_1940.htm) 23.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Koch on Macksey, 'Guderian: Panzer General'
    H-German Koch on Macksey, 'Guderian: Panzer General' Review published on Friday, August 1, 2003 Kenneth Macksey. Guderian: Panzer General. London: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 2003. xii + 228 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-85367-538-6. Reviewed by James V. Koch (Old Dominion University) Published on H-German (August, 2003) If Germany had defeated the U.S.S.R. militarily in 1941-42, it is likely that the tightly knit Guderian clan would still today occupy the estate at Deipenhof in the Warthegau in West Prussia (now part of Poland) that was given to Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in October 1942 by Adolf Hitler. What should we make of this gift from the Fuehrer to Guderian, the acknowledged genius behind German armored forces in World War II? Was it simply one among many such secretive gifts that Hitler lavished upon the paladins and favorites of the Reich on the occasions of their anniversaries and birthdays, or when they recorded an especially notable achievement? (Guderian had been awarded the rare Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross in July 1941.) Alternatively, was it a subtle bribe to muffle an occasionally insubordinate general who, despite demonstrated affinity for National Socialism and Adolf Hitler, might have been viewed by Hitler as potentially disruptive and contentious? He was, after all, "always a rebel in his profession," according to Downing, and known for speaking his mind to nearly everyone, even to hisFuehrer .[1] Does the gift further suggest that Hitler regarded Guderian, who had been sacked for ordering a retreat south of Moscow contrary to theFuehrer's orders in December 1941, as, nonetheless, an ideological comrade? These are among the interpretative dilemmas Kenneth Macksey, veteran military historian, tackles in his revision of his original 1975 biography of Heinz Guderian.
    [Show full text]
  • A War of Reputation and Pride
    A War of reputation and pride - An examination of the memoirs of German generals after the Second World War. HIS 4090 Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History University of Oslo Spring 2019 1 “For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie -- deliberate, contrived and dishonest -- but the myth -- persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic.” – John F. Kennedy, 19621 1John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address, https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm, [01.05.2019]. 2 Acknowledgments This master would not have been written without the help and support of my mother, father, friends and my better half, thank you all for your support. I would like to thank the University Library of Oslo and the British Library in London for providing me with abundant books and articles. I also want to give huge thanks to the Military Archive in Freiburg and their employees, who helped me find the relevant materials for this master. Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Oslo, Professor Kim Christian Priemel, who has guided me through the entire writing process from Autumn 2017. Peter Jørgen Sager Fosse, Oslo, 01.05.2019 3 Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………...………... 7 Chapter 1, Theory and background………………………………………………..………17 1.1 German Military Tactics…………………………………………………..………. 17 1.1.1 Blitzkrieg, Kesselschlacht and Schwerpunkt…………………………………..……. 17 1.1.2 Examples from early campaigns……………………………………………..……… 20 1.2 The German attack on the USSR (1941)……………………………..…………… 24 1.2.1 ‘Vernichtungskrieg’, war of annihilation………………………………...………….. 24 1.2.2 Operation Barbarossa………………………………………………..……………… 28 1.2.3 Operation Typhoon…………………………………………………..………………. 35 1.2.4 The strategic situation, December 1941…………………………….……………….
    [Show full text]
  • The Soviet-German Tank Academy at Kama
    The Secret School of War: The Soviet-German Tank Academy at Kama THESIS Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Ian Johnson Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2012 Master's Examination Committee: Jennifer Siegel, Advisor Peter Mansoor David Hoffmann Copyright by Ian Ona Johnson 2012 Abstract This paper explores the period of military cooperation between the Weimar Period German Army (the Reichswehr), and the Soviet Union. Between 1922 and 1933, four facilities were built in Russia by the two governments, where a variety of training and technological exercises were conducted. These facilities were particularly focused on advances in chemical and biological weapons, airplanes and tanks. The most influential of the four facilities was the tank testing and training grounds (Panzertruppenschule in the German) built along the Kama River, near Kazan in North- Central Russia. Led by German instructors, the school’s curriculum was based around lectures, war games, and technological testing. Soviet and German students studied and worked side by side; German officers in fact often wore the Soviet uniform while at the school, to show solidarity with their fellow officers. Among the German alumni of the school were many of the most famous practitioners of mobile warfare during the Second World War, such as Guderian, Manstein, Kleist and Model. This system of education proved highly innovative. During seven years of operation, the school produced a number of extremely important technological and tactical innovations. Among the new technologies were a new tank chassis system, superior guns, and - perhaps most importantly- a radio that could function within a tank.
    [Show full text]
  • Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and Their Relevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force
    COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY AIR Y U SIT NI V ER Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and Their Relevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force HOWARD D. BELOTE Lieutenant Colonel, USAF CADRE Paper No. 7 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 July 2000 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Belote, Howard D., 1963– Once in a blue moon : airmen in theater command : Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and their relevance to the twenty-first century Air Force/Howard D. Belote. p. cm. -- (CADRE paper ; no. 7) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-58566-082-5 1. United States. Air Force--Officers. 2. Generals--United States. 3. Unified operations (Military science) 4. Combined operations (Military science) 5. Command of troops. I. Title. II. CADRE paper ; 7. UG793 .B45 2000 358.4'133'0973--dc21 00-055881 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. This CADRE Paper, and others in the series, is available electronically at the Air University Research web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.” ii CADRE Papers CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by the Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s (AU) College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE). Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space power theory and application, these studies are published by the Air University Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force, the Department of Defense and other governmental organiza- tions, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learn- ing, public policy institutes, and the media.
    [Show full text]
  • The Clean Wehrmacht: Myths About German War Crimes Then and Now
    Georgia Southern University Digital Commons@Georgia Southern University Honors Program Theses 2020 The Clean Wehrmacht: Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now Narayan J. Saviskas Jr. Georgia Southern University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/honors-theses Part of the European History Commons, Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Saviskas, Narayan J. Jr., "The Clean Wehrmacht: Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now" (2020). University Honors Program Theses. 474. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/honors-theses/474 This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Honors Program Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Clean Wehrmacht: Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now An Honors Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the Department of History. By Narayan Saviskas Under the mentorship of Dr. Brian Feltman. ABSTRACT On October 1st, 1946, the Nuremberg high command trails ended. The executions and life sentences of representatives of the German military and political elite were carried out by the Allied powers. At the time, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat than the Germans tried at Nuremberg. Years later, on October 9th, 1950, former officers of the German military gathered in Himmerod Abbey. Together they wrote the Himmerod Memorandum, which laid the foundation of the German rearmament and called for the release of German soldiers (Wehrmacht) and Schutzstaffel (SS) members convicted of war crimes.
    [Show full text]
  • (Strike Together, Not Divided!): the Panzer Divisions As New Dominating Strategy of Modern Warfare Stefano Alianelli the College of Wooster, [email protected]
    The College of Wooster Libraries Open Works Senior Independent Study Theses 2013 Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern (Strike Together, Not Divided!): the Panzer Divisions As New Dominating Strategy of Modern Warfare Stefano Alianelli The College of Wooster, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Alianelli, Stefano, "Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern (Strike Together, Not Divided!): the Panzer Divisions As New Dominating Strategy of Modern Warfare" (2013). Senior Independent Study Theses. Paper 3805. https://openworks.wooster.edu/independentstudy/3805 This Senior Independent Study Thesis Exemplar is brought to you by Open Works, a service of The oC llege of Wooster Libraries. It has been accepted for inclusion in Senior Independent Study Theses by an authorized administrator of Open Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. © Copyright 2013 Stefano Alianelli The College of Wooster “Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern!” (Strike Together, Not Divided!) The Panzer Divisions as New Dominating Strategy of Modern Warfare by Stefano Alianelli Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Senior Independent Study Supervised by Hayden Schilling Department of History Spring 2013 Table of Contents Acknowledgements Introduction 1 Chapter One: Heinz Guderian and the Birth of the Panzer Divisions 6 Chapter Two: Poland: A Baptism by Fire and First Proof of Success for the Panzer Divisions 34 Chapter Three: France: Breach of Static Strategy by the Mobility of the Panzer Divisions 61 Conclusion 89 Annotative Bibliography 98 Acknowledgements I would like to give special thanks to my advisor Hayden Schilling whose devotion and interest in this project has been a great guide for accompanying me through the process of the Senior Independent Study.
    [Show full text]
  • Barbarossa Revisited: a Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 1982-03 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Stolfi, Russel H.S. Journal of Modern History, Volume 54, (March 1982), pp. 027-046 http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44218 Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941) Russel H. S. Stolfi Naval Postgraduate School In the Soviet Union in 1941, a complex, ill-understood play of events projected the German field armies in the east close to Moscow in the late autumn of the year, but ended with their ultimate defeat. The reigning Soviet interpretation of the campaign remains the one in which the natural strengths of the Russian motherland and the inspired leadership of the Communists predetermined a Soviet Russian triumph over the invading Germans. Western historians and writers also gener­ ally agree that Hitler subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable defeat by the invasion of the Soviet Union. However, critical reapprais­ al of the opening stages of the Russo-German campaign fails to sup­ port the present Soviet and western views of the war, showing rather that the German successes of the first four weeks virtually assured the seizure of Moscow-the rail, road, political, psychological, and demo­ graphic plexus of the USSR-in the late summer of 1941.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Effect of Civil-Military Relations in the Third Reich on the Conduct of the German Campaign in the West in 1940
    University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 6-1-1964 An analysis of the effect of civil-military relations in the Third Reich on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940 John Ogden Shoemaker University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Shoemaker, John Ogden, "An analysis of the effect of civil-military relations in the Third Reich on the conduct of the German campaign in the West in 1940" (1964). Student Work. 374. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/374 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE THIRD REICH ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST IN 1940 by John Ogden Shoemaker A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of History University of Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts June 1964 UMI Number: EP73012 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. DissertationPublishing UMI EP73012 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
    [Show full text]
  • Rigg Bm.Pdf (651.5Kb)
    notes note on sources Although oral testimonies are subject to fallible human memories, they have none- theless proven invaluable in explaining several documents collected for this study. Documents never before seen by historians, found in people’s closets, basements, and desk drawers, created a much fuller and complex history, especially when their owners supplied the background and history of the documents as well. These sources helped re-create the unique and tragic history of the Mischlinge, which is still so little understood over half a century later. The thousands of pages of documents and oral testimonies (on 8 mm video and VHS video) in this study are now part of the permanent collection at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg, Germany, as the Bryan Mark Rigg Collection. Although interviews need to be treated with some skepticism, they have repeatedly shown that oral history often enriches rather than contradicts historical documents. All too often, history is written without the human element, that is, without knowing what these people thought, felt, and believed. Oral history helps reconstruct many of these people’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs through their diaries, letters, interviews, and photographs. In this way, a healthy combination of hard documents or primary sources and secondary sources and testimonies expands our sense of this history. Often one reads about men and women but feels no human connection with them. The interviews were done to try to bridge this gap and to pro- vide readers with the means to enter these men’s and women’s thoughts and feelings to understand them better and to deepen readers’ knowledge of this history.
    [Show full text]
  • The SS: the End Result
    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1973 The SS: The End Result Barry J. Klazura Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Recommended Citation Klazura, Barry J., "The SS: The End Result" (1973). Master's Theses. 2737. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2737 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1973 Barry J. Klazura p: . ~ Loyofa University of Chicago Master's Thesis THE SS: THE. END RESULT " by Barry J. Klazura ,. r . ~ ! I ! I I '- ,'<fl' TABLE OF COi~1'ENTS INTRODUC'rICN •••••••••••••• • •••• • ••••••••••• •. • •• • •. •.• • • • •. 11 CRAFTER I - BEGINi~lt{GS ••·; ~ ••••••• ·••• • ••••••••••••••••••••• CHAPTER II - PURPOSE OF THE SS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• CHAPTEH III - BECBUITNENT AND STANDARDS ••••••••••••••••••• 9 CHAPTEil IV - BRANCHES • • • •••• • • •• • •• • •• • •••• • •• •. • • • • ·• • • • • • 16 a. Gestapo •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16 i b. Sicherheitsdienst •••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 ~ c. SS Po11ze1 Regeimente •••••••••• •.• •••••••• 26 d. Allgeme~ne SS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 27 i e. Totenkopfverbande •••••••••••••••••••••••• 28 .' f. Verfugungstruppe ·SS and
    [Show full text]
  • Preface Xi 1. Unternehmen Barbarossa
    © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. CONTENTS Preface xi 1. Unternehmen Barbarossa: Conception, Planning, and Execution 1 Introduction 2 Heinz Guderian and the Development of German Armored Warfare Doctrine 7 Soviet Military Thought, 1918–1941 19 Mikhail Frunze 22 Vladimir Triandafillov 26 Georgii Isserson 34 Weisung Nr. 21 and Planning for Barbarossa 39 Terrain and Weather in the Barbarossa Zone of Operations 44 Planning for Occupation, Control, Exploitation, and Extermination 53 Agricultural Exploitation 54 Security and Punitive Measures 67 Conclusion 78 2. The Commissar Order: Reflections on an Enduring Controversy 83 Introduction 84 The German View of the Commissar Order 88 Statistical Assessment of the Number of Military Commissars Executed under the Commissar Order 108 The Commissar Order and the Katyn Memorandum 110 Conclusion 116 3. Dance of the Snakes: Soviet and German Diplomacy, August 1939–June 1941 121 Introduction 122 The Non-Aggression Pact 123 The Secret Supplementary Protocol 126 The Friendship and Border Treaty 128 Soviet Moves against Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina 130 Ongoing German-Soviet Discord 141 Ellis.indd 7 10/13/15 11:20 AM © University Press of Kansas. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution prohibited without permission of the Press. viii contents The Endgame 156 Conclusion 162 4. The Soviet Intelligence Assessment of German Military Intentions, 1939–1941 164 Introduction 165 June 1940 166 July 1940 169 August 1940 175 September 1940 187 October 1940 189 November 1940 193 December 1940 194 January 1941 199 February 1941 200 March 1941 203 April 1941 211 May 1941 220 June 1941 222 Conclusion 227 5.
    [Show full text]
  • Mark Montesclaros on David Stahel: Retreat from Moscow
    David Stahel. Retreat from Moscow: A New History of Germany's Winter Campaign, 1941-1942. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019. 560 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-374-24952-6. Reviewed by Mark Montesclaros (US Army Command and General Staf College, Fort Gordon Satellite Campus) Published on H-War (June, 2020) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) The eastern front of World War II’s European number of graphics to help the reader navigate the theater continues to garner significant academic myriad military units and actions within Ger‐ interest, and with Retreat from Moscow author many’s winter campaign, as well as extensive David Stahel sheds new light on multiple aspects of notes accompanying each chapter that provide ar‐ the Soviet-German War’s winter campaign of 1941. eas for further research and exploration. This effort helps to partially correct a situation The author thrives on challenging some long- that renowned historian David M. Glantz noted in held views of the Soviet-German conflict, arguing his seminal trilogy on the Red Army at war—that a that the decisive point for the war occurred not number of battles were either forgotten or neglect‐ during seminal engagements, such as in Moscow, ed during the campaign, among them the Soviet of‐ Stalingrad, or Kursk, as have been posed by histori‐ fensive to retake the key German lines of commu‐ ans earlier. Stahel takes a broader view, contend‐ nication at Rzhev and Viazma, which spanned ing that the turning point in the East had already February 15 to March 1, 1942.[1] And while Stahel’s taken place once Operation Barbarossa, Ger‐ focus is from the German perspective of the Army many’s opening move in Russia, failed to achieve Group Center, he masterfully covers this part of its strategic objective of rapidly defeating the Red the Soviet counteroffensive as well.
    [Show full text]