The Changing Face of European Armaments Co-Operation

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The Changing Face of European Armaments Co-Operation THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS CO-OPERATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMAMENTS POLICY 1990 - 2000 JOCELYN LOUISE MAWDSLEY PhD Thesis University of Newcastle upon Tyne Department of Politics Submitted October 2000 NEWCACTLE UNIVrrTTY LI try L)U IU),' ) T&s L,Y?5 Abstract This thesis investigates the changing nature of Western European armaments collaboration between 1990 and 2000. Falling defence budgets, American defence restructuring, a decreasing world armaments market and moves towards a European Defence and Security Policy, have forced greater co-operation between Western European states on armaments policy. Although the European Union and Western European Union have responded to these changing circumstances, the most far- reaching co-operation has been intergovernmental; in defence procurement, the establishment of OCCAR, and in defence industrial policy, the Framework Agreement. These developments show the emergence of a core group of countries in armaments matters; the most important of which are Britain, France and Germany. The thesis argues that, notwithstanding these institutional developments and the similar external and domestic pressures on West European states, national armaments policies continue to reflect distinctive national paths, and that these differences adversely affect the prospects of increased armaments coil aborati on. Synthesising new institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, the thesis examines policy continuity and change in Britain, France and Germany in this period by considering state-defence industry relations, state-military relations and the defence procurement bureaucracy. It scrutinises the policy changes made in the three countries in response to the pressures on the Western European armaments sector. It contends that national strategic culture, models of state-industry relations and the culture of defence procurement organisations continue to reflect historical patterns and domestic constraints, and thus are proving resistant to the changes in policy. The thesis concludes by assessing the prospects for greater European armaments collaboration. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Table of Contents 11 Glossary V Acknowledgements viii Introduction: The Europeanisation of Armaments Policy 1) Introduction 2) A History of Collaboration?: The Transatlantic Record 8 3) The Pressures for a European Solution i) A Smaller World Armaments Market 13 ii) Restructuring and Rationalisation ofAmerican Defence Industry 14 iii) The Functional Reasons for European Collaboration 15 iv) The Desire to Create a European Security and Defence Identity 17 4) How Should Armaments Collaboration be Managed? i) The European Union Reaction 19 ii) Whither European Armaments Policy? 20 5) Research Questions 23 6) Methodology i) Boundaries of Study 25 ii) Rationale behind the Chosen Methodology 32 7) Overview of Thesis 36 Chapter 2: Armaments Co-operation: Mapping the Past and the Future 1) Introduction 39 2) A Triumph of Presentation over Achievement: The Franco-German Relationship i) Introduction 40 ii) The Record of Franco-German Armaments Co-operation 48 iii) Why do Projects Fail? 62 3) OCCAR: An Attempt at the Integration of Defence Procurement in Europe i) Introduction 71 4) The Beginnings 73 i) The Devil Lies in the Detail: Establishing OCCAR 78 ii) Reactions to OCCAR 81 iii) Conclusion.' Can OCCAR Succeed? 89 5) Conclusion 93 Chapter 3: The Integration of Armaments Policy: Constructing a Framework for Analysis 1) Introduction 96 2) Armaments Policy and European Integration Theory 96 3) Explaining Decision-Making in Armaments Policy 103 i) The Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex 105 ii) The State and Defence Industry.' A Changing Relationship 111 iii) The State-Military Relationship 121 iv) Defence Procurement Bureaucracy.' The State Between Industry and the Ailililary 127 4) Conclusions: A Framework for Analysis 133 11 Chapter 4: Competition was not Enough: The British Search for 'Faster, Cheaper, Better' Defence Procurement 1) Introduction 140 2) Changing the Face of Defence Procurement: The Levene Reforms 148 i) The Actual Reforms 151 ii) Were the Reforms Effective? 154 iii) The Government 's Relationship with Defence Industry after the Levene Reforms 156 iv) The Contradictions in the Model of Defence Procurement Policy 161 3) Problems in Defence Procurement Decision-Making 162 i) The Military Role in Defence Procurement 162 ii) The Civil Servants: Defending Defence or Treasury Policy? 165 4) Smart Procurement: 'Cheaper, Faster, Better' 167 i) Smart Procurement. Real Change? 168 ii) How Successful is the Smart Procurement Initiative? 172 5) The Strategic Defence Review 176 6) Defence Industrial Policy 177 7) Europeanising Defence Procurement and Industrial Policy 181 8) Conclusions 186 Chapter 5: Reforming the French Defence Procurement Process: The Challenge of Tradition to the Forces of Europeanisation and Modernisation 1) Introduction 191 1) La Délégation Générale pour l'Armament: Just as Procurement Agency? i) The Establishment of DGA 198 ii) Lacking Political Scrutiny and a Technocratic Elite 206 iii) The Moves Towards Reform 210 3) The Helmer Reforms: Rationalisation and Efficiency Meet Technocracy 213 i) Reforms to the Procurement Process and Internal Structure 214 ii) Redefining the Role of the DGA 219 iii) French Arms Exports 223 iv) Has French Defence Procurement and Industrial Policy been Modernised? 225 4) The Europeanisation of French Defence Industrial and Procurement Policy 227 i) The Europeanisation of French Defence Policy 227 ii) Collaborative Weapons Projects 229 iii) Industrial Restructuring 233 iv) How Far has French Defence Industrial and Procurement Policy been Europeanised? 235 5) Conclusion 237 Chapter 6: German Armaments Policy: Can History be Forgotten? 1) Introduction 243 2) Defence Procurement Policy 252 i) The General organisation of German Defence Procurement 257 ii) Contracts and Tendering Process 260 iii) Forward Planning and Research Investment 263 3) Defence Industrial Policy 267 i) German Defence Industry; Restructuring and Responding to the End of the Cold War 272 111 ii) Competitive or Disadvantaged? 276 iii) Export Regulations 279 4) The Challenges and Difficulties of the Post-Reunification Period 283 5) The Schröder Government's Response: Can History be Overcome? 288 6) Conclusion 292 Chapter 7: Policy Culture Continuity or Change?: Can a Common Armaments Policy be Envisaged? 1) Introduction 299 2) State-Defence Industry Relations 300 3) Strategic Culture 307 4) Defence Procurement Bureaucracy 314 5) The Integration of Armaments Policy? 320 6) Future Research 324 7) The Wider Implications of the Thesis 326 Appendix 1 1) Attributable Interviews 331 Appendix 2 1) Diagrams of Defence Procurement Structures and Procedures 333 Bibliography 338 lv GLOSSARY Abbreviations ABC Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weapons ACE Allied Command Europe BAe British Aerospace BDI Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie BDLI Bundesverband der deutschen Luft- und Raumfahrtindustrie BICC Bonn International Center for Conversion BWB Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung CAJA Confédération Amicale des Ingénieurs d'Armement CDU Christlich Demokratische Union CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty) CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHEAr Centre des Hautes Etudes de 1 'Armernent CMP Code des Marches Publiques COEJA COmbined Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal CPs Cardinal Points Specification CsU Christlich Soziale Union DCN Direction des Constructions Navales DERA Defence Evaluation and Research Agency DGA Délégation Générale pour 1 'Armement DGAP Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswartige Polilik DMA Defence Manufacturers Association DMA Délégation Ministerielle pour 1 'Armement DoD Department of Defense DPA Defence Procurement Agency EAA European Armaments Agency EAC Equipment Acquisition Committee EADS European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company EDC European Defence Community EDIG European Defence Industries Group EFA European Fighter Aircraft EMU Economic and Monetary Union ESDI European Security and Defence Identity EU European Union EUCLID European Co-operative Long-term Initiative for Defence FAR Force d'Action Rapide FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDP Freie Demokratische Partei GDR German Democratic Republic GEC General Electric Company GIAT Groupement Industriel des Armemenis Terrestres GICAT Groupement des Industries Concernées par les MatCriels de DcVense Terrestre GIFAS Groupement des Industries Fran çaises Aéronautiques ci Spatiales V IEPG Independent European Programmes Group 'ISS International Institute of Strategic Studies IPT Integrated Project Team JACS Joint Armaments Co-operation Structure (English acronym for OCCAR) JSF Joint Strike Fighter KONVER a European Union fund to compensate areas badly affected by defence cuts after the end of the Cold War Lol Letter of Intent MBB Messerschmidt-Bölkow-B lohm MIC Military Industrial Complex MP Member of Parliament MoD Ministry of Defence MRAV Multi Role Armoured Vehicle NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OCCAR Organisme Conjoint de Cooperation en Matière d'Armement ODIG OCCAR Defence Industries Group PAAMS Principal Anti Air Missile System PE Procurement Executive POLARM a European Council ad hoc working group on a European armaments policy R&D Research and Development RMA Revolution in Military Affairs SBAC Society of British Aerospace Companies SDR Strategic Defence Review SEA Single European Act SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SMA Service
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