Safeguards at Research Reactors: Current Practices, Future Directions
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FEATURES Safeguards at research reactors: Current practices, future directions Some new verification measures are being introduced to improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards by Giancarlo /approximately 180 research reactors and crit- immersed in a large pool of water that provides Zuccaro-Labellarte ical assemblies currently are under IAEA safe- both cooling and neutron moderation. The fuel and guards. The vast majority of the research reac- assemblies in the core of a swimming pool reac- Robert Fagerholm tors operate at relatively low power levels (10 tor are normally visible and accessible for safe- megawatts-thermal or lower) and the critical guards measurements. assemblies at virtually zero power.* From a Other types of research reactors operate at safeguards standpoint, this is important since a higher power levels (exceeding 10 megawatts- reactor's power level is a determining factor of thermal). They need more powerful heat its capability to produce plutonium. Along with removal systems and are therefore normally high-enriched uranium (HEU) and uranium- enclosed in core vessels and equipped with 233, plutonium is considered a "direct use" coolant pumps and heat exchangers. The fuel material which could be diverted for the pro- elements in the reactor core at these installa- duction of nuclear weapons. tions are usually not visible or accessible for In this article, the IAEA's safeguards safeguards measurements. implementation at research reactors is Research reactors are widely used for scien- addressed, including aspects related to diver- tific investigations and various applications. sion and clandestine production scenarios and Neutrons produced by research reactors provide main verification activities. Additionally a powerful tool for studying matter on nuclear, addressed are new safeguards measures that atomic, and molecular levels. Neutrons often are being introduced for purposes of providing are used as probes by nuclear and solid state assurances about the absence of undeclared physicists, chemists, and biologists. Neutron nuclear materials and activities. experiments can also be performed outside the biological shield by means of installed beam tubes. Additionally, specimens can be posi- Safeguarding research reactors tioned in or near research reactor cores for neu- tron irradiation, e.g. to produce radioactive iso- Several types of research reactors are in topes for medical or research use. operation. A very common type of research reac- Diversion scenarios. Under existing com- tor is the swimming pool reactor which typical- prehensive safeguards agreements, the IAEA ly operates at power levels around or below 10 has the right and obligation to verify that no megawatts-thermal. The fuel elements normally nuclear material is diverted from peaceful use consist of HEU (enriched to contain 20% or to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive more of the isotope uranium-235) or low- enriched uranium (LEU, containing less than 20% uranium-235) contained in aluminum alloy *A critical assembly is a research tool consisting of a con- plates, rods, or tubes. The reactor core is figuration of nuclear material which, by means of appro- priate controls, can sustain a chain reaction. As distinct from a research or power reactor, it normally has no spe- cial provision for cooling, is not shielded for high-power Mr. Zuccaro-Labellarte is Section Head of Procedures, operation, has a core designed for great flexibility of Division of Operations (C) and Mr. Fagerholm is a safe- arrangement, and uses fuel in a readily accessible form guards analyst in the Division of Concepts and Planning of which is frequently repositioned and varied to investigate the IAEA Department of Safeguards. various reactor concepts. 20 IAEA BULLETIN, 4/1996 FEATURES devices. States conclude these agreements elements by fertile material targets. However, with the IAEA pursuant to their obligations studies have shown that it is not possible to pro- under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of duce one SQ of plutonium in one year at a Nuclear Weapons (NPT). research reactor that operates below about 25 For research reactors, the following diver- megawatts-thermal. The actual production sion scenarios are considered: capability depends on the individual reactor Diversion of fresh or slightly irradiated design and operating parameters. fuel for clandestine chemical extraction of fis- The Agency's current safeguards system sile material. This scenario — for which com- requires that all research reactors operating at monly available chemical engineering equip- power levels above 25 megawatts-thermal are ment would be adequate — is given particular evaluated with respect to their capability to pro- safeguards attention at facilities where the fresh duce at least one SQ of plutonium (or uranium- fuel contains HEU or plutonium, for which no 233) per year. further transmutation or enrichment would be At present, there are about 30 thermal needed for use in a nuclear explosive device. research reactors with power levels of 10 About 20 research reactors under IAEA safe- megawatts-thermal or higher which are subject guards are currently using such direct-use fissile to IAEA safeguards. About 10 of these operate material in amounts equal to more than one sig- at power levels exceeding 25 megawatts-ther- nificant quantity (SQ). For safeguards purposes, mal and are subject to additional safeguards one SQ is currently defined as 8 kilograms plu- measures with respect to the clandestine pro- tonium or uranium-233 or 25 kilograms of ura- duction scenarios. nium-235 in HEU. International efforts — for example, under the US Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Elements of "classical" IAEA safeguards Reactor programme — have been directed at developing the technology needed to use LEU Currently, the IAEA's principal inspection instead of HEU fuel in research and test reactors activities at research reactors are an annual without significant degradation in their perfor- physical inventory verification (PIV); inspec- mance for experiments, costs, or safety aspects. tions serving timely detection purposes for Diversion of spent or extensively irradiated fresh (unirradiated) fuel, core fuel, and spent fuel for clandestine chemical extraction of fis- fuel; auditing of records and reports; verifica- sile material in a reprocessing facility. This tion of specific types of fuel transfers; and veri- scenario is technically more demanding and fication activities to confirm the absence of time-consuming than the one mentioned above clandestine irradiation of fertile material. because of the high level of radioactivity from the fuel which is involved. However, it is of par- A research reactor in ticular concern at about 15 research reactors Japan is used for tests under IAEA safeguards due to large accumulat- of fuel behaviour as part of nuclear safety ed quantities of spent fuel, and it is of impor- Studies. (Credit: JAERI) tance at more than 10 others. Clandestine production scenarios. The possibility exists for clandestine production of plutonium or uranium-233 through irradiation of undeclared fertile material. As techniques for using neutrons have developed, there has been an accompanying need for higher levels of neu- tron flux in order to carry out more complex and time-consuming experiments in a shorter time. Large research reactors have been constructed to provide these flux levels. At such reactors, production of substantial quantities of plutoni- um or uranium-233 through irradiation of unde- clared fertile material would be technically fea- sible. This could be achieved, for example, by placing target materials in irradiation positions in or near the core, or by replacing reflector IAEA BULLETIN, 4/1996 21 FEATURES • analysis of the facility design and operations; • containment and surveillance (C/S), among other measures (e.g. power monitoring), which confirm that the reactor is shut down or has not operated for a sufficient period; • performance of one of the following activi- ties: 1) the use of C/S measures to confirm that no unrecorded introduction of fertile materials or their removal after irradiation has taken place; or 2) evaluation of the fresh fuel consumption and the operator's data on spent fuel burnup to con- firm that they are in conformance with declared design information and reactor operations. Information of relevance to safeguards about the design of the research reactor is pro- vided to the Agency by the State. It is examined The research reactor at At the PIV, the fresh fuel and spent fuel are and verified according to established Agency Bataan in Indonesia. (Credit: Meyer/IAEA) verified using non-destructive assay (NDA) procedures and is re-examined at least once a methods to confirm that all declared fuel is year. When modifications or changes in design accounted for. Core fuel is verified by NDA information relevant to safeguards occur, they methods or by a criticality check corroborated are verified to establish the basis for adjustment by other reactor data.* Interim inspections are of safeguards procedures, and the necessary performed at research reactors at intervals adjustments are then implemented. determined by the safeguards timeliness requirements for specific inventories of differ- ent material types.** If more than one SQ is Elements of strengthened safeguards present at a facility, verifications of the core fuel at research reactors and spent fuel are carried out four times per cal- endar year at quarterly intervals, while verifica- In June 1995, the IAEA Board of Governors tion of fresh fuel containing HEU and plutoni- endorsed the general direction for a strength- um are carried out 12 times per calendar year at ened and cost-effective safeguards system, monthly intervals. Verifications of fresh fuel under Part 1 of what is known as "Programme containing less than one SQ of HEU or plutoni- 93+2". Part 1 measures are those that can be um are carried out four times per calendar year implemented under the Agency's existing legal at quarterly intervals if more than one SQ of authority provided in comprehensive safeguards HEU or plutonium (fresh and irradiated) is pre- agreements.