Budapest Report on Christian Persecution 2019

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BUDAPEST REPORT ON CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION 2019

Edited by JÓZSEF KALÓ, FERENC PETRUSKA, LÓRÁND UJHÁZI

HÁTTÉR KIADÓ Sponsor

PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE

Authors Tristan Azbej Ferenc Petruska Ekwunife Basil Byrappa Ramachandra Antal Birkás István Resperger Gábor Csizmazia Gergely Salát Vilmos Fischl Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy Péter Forisek Eszter Petronella Soós János Frivaldszky Péter Tarcsay József Kaló Muller Thomas András Kóré Zsigmond Tömösváry Viktor Marsai Lóránd Ujházi József Padányi Péter Wagner Pampaloni Massimo Péter Krisztián Zachar Csongor Párkányi Péter Zelei

ISBN 978 615 5124 67 9

The ideas and opinions contained in the present book do not necessarily represent the position of the Hungarian Government. The responsibility for the informations of this volume belongs exclusively to the authors and editors.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical metholds, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. CONTENTS

Welcoming thonghts of Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary ...... 7 The dedication of Cardinal Péter Erdő, the Archbishop of Esztergom–Budapest ...... 9 Foreword of Brigadier General Árpád Pohl, Dean ...... 11

GENERAL SECURITY POLICY REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE SECURITY OF CHRISTIANS

József Padányi: The significance of civil-military cooperation in missions and mission preparation in crisis areas ...... 15 József Kaló: Violent acts against Christians in 2019 ...... 25 Azbej Tristan: Hungarian assistance to Iraq through the Hungary Helps Program ...... 41 István Resperger: Methods of militant Islam in the Islamist State and the Boko Haram terror organizations ...... 55 Péter Wagner – Péter Zelei: The security situation of Christian communities in orthernN Iraq ...... 77 András Kóré: The historical engagement of Hungary in the protection of persecuted Christians and its efforts in the present in supporting Christian communities in Africa ...... 87 Gergely Salát: Christian persecution in North Korea ...... 109 Ramachandra Byrappa: The situation of the persecuted Christians in India and Sri Lanka ...... 127 Zsigmond Tömösváry: The role of the Russian Orthodox Church in helping Christian communities in the Middle East ...... 139 Péter Forisek: The first thousand years of Christianity inorth N Africa ...... 151 Viktor Marsai: The situation of persecuted christians on the African continent ...... 159 Basil Ekwunife: Security situation of christianity in Nigeria ...... 167

5 BUDAPEST REPORT ON CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION 2019

LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

Ferenc Petruska: Hungarian legislative processes in protecting persecuted Christians and Christian culture . 187 Gábor Csizmazia: United States efforts to aid persecuted Christians ...... 195 Antal Birkás: Developments to protect persecuted Christians – awakening conscience in the UK: The Truro Review ...... 205 Eszter Petronella Soós: Secularism in France: regulations from 1905 ...... 215 Péter Tarcsay: How do Visegrad countries help persecuted Christians? ...... 225

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES’ INVOLVEMENT TO PROMOTE THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANS

Lóránd Ujházi: Canonical aspects of the relationship between the apostolic Holy See and the People’s Republic of China ...... 235 Vilmos Fischl: The role of the ecumenical council of the churches in Hungary in aiding persecuted Christians ...... 259 János Frivaldszky: Expropriated use of love and acceptance to accommodate migrants in large numbers and build a multicultural society ...... 273

METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS TO STUDY THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS

Péter Krisztián Zachar: The role and responsibility of Christian intellectuals in aid of persecuted Christian communities ...... 283 Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy: Changes in the religious geography of Christianity in our days ...... 291 Massimo Pampaloni sj: The pontifical oriental institute at the service of the Christian East ...... 305 Thomas Muller: Measuring persecution of Christians worldwide – the World Watch List of Open Doors International and the methodology behind it ...... 313 Csongor Párkányi: Research on the relationship between religion and security at the National University of Public Service ...... 333

6 Dear Reader,

A quarter-billion people. That is the number of our Christian brothers around the world who are persecuted for their faith. However, in a lot of European countries, the tragedies they are experiencing are surrounded by silence. For many years, the Western world, which has forgotten its Christian roots, has been regarding this phenomenon with indifference. In the last decade, we have built a Christian Democratic state in Hungary and included the protection of Christian culture in our Fundamental Law. At the same time, however, we immediately saw that the defence of Christian freedom is a command that transcends our borders. Being a Christian means to act since love, hope and faith are nothing but empty words, empty coins without action. This culture of freedom to act obliges us, Hungarians today, to give hope to our persecuted brothers, to help them start a new life in their homelands, while it is also urging us to be sober and take help where the trouble exists, and not to bring the trouble here. That is why we have established the State Secretariat for the Aidof Persecuted Christians and published the Budapest Report for the third time, which not only provides an accurate picture of the attacks on Christian communities and fills a gap, but also presents the results of our reconstruction efforts in areas previously affected by war. We are certainly aware that Hungary’s strength alone is not enough for this task, but we trust that our stance will encourage other countries to act, for the old wisdom is still true today: nothing persuades us but the truth, and nothing saves us but love. Soli Deo gloria!

October 2019 Budapest Viktor Orbán Prime Minister of Hungary

PREFACE

The Hungarian Government has been assisting persecuted Christian communities as part of its public policy for several years now. As a result of that, it has set up several new programs. The Hungarian uthoritiesa support the reconstruction of those places of worship, private property educational and medical institutions which have been damaged in sectarian clashes. Besides these examples, the Hungarian cabinet also decided to set up a new scholarship program for persecuted Christian youth and as a groundbreaking initiative, it also publishes a yearly summary about the situation of persecuted Christians. The authors of this work give a regional analysis/evaluation of various Christian communities. They overview the prospects of exiled Oriental Churches, the international community, and multiple countries, organizations and religious communities. Those countries are given specialattention in the Budapest Report, whose governments are attempting to help Christian communities in need, either through either legislation or assistance programs. That is why this publication includes studies about the United States of America, Great Britain and Russia. The persecution of Christians can have several reasons besides religious fundamentalism and extremism. Therefore, this volume also includes studiesexamine the suffering of Christian communities in communist North Korea, and those threatened by nationalism in other countries of Asia. The regional policy of the Holy See is also presented, to show how the Holy See, as a legal entity, tries to assist the various local Churches and Christian believers. Not only Hungarian authors’ studies are included in this year’s publication. It is a great step forward that researchers from large international organizations and noted foreign universities have also contributed to this volume. Readers get an insight into the operations and methodology of the World Council of Churches and the Open Doors human rights organization. It is an important sign that a study written by a professor from the

9 Pontifical Oriental Institute is included in this publication. The Pontifical Oriental Institute has deliberately altered its research portfolio in recent years. The Institute now also studies the security situation of Oriental Christians, besides its traditional research areas which have been examining the history, theology, philosophy of and interreligious dialogue with Oriental Christianity. This is how the Institute wants to build a “bridge” between oriental Christians and the Western world. The present publication is also a part of that bridge. It speaks in Hungarian and English to a large audience, from decision-makers through the aid workers and human rights organizations to university researchers and the general public. To make the publication play its full role and become the voice of persecuted Christians, I wish every success and send my blessing to all those people who worked on it, as well as to every benevolent people who are going to read it.

Dr. Péter Erdő Cardinal, Primate, Archbishop of Esztergom-Budapest WELCOMING THOUGHTS

This year is the third time that Hungary publishes the “Budapest Report on the Persecution of Christians”. It is a great honour for us that the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and the Implementation of Hungary Helps Program of the Prime Minister’s Office has assigned the Facultyf o Military Sciences and Officer Training at the University of Public Service to edit the Report. Our faculty has also done a lot in recent years to do internationally recognized research projects about religion and security. An integral part of this research is an assessment of the past, philosophy, theological and Church-disciplinary traditions, interreligious and interdenominational dialogues of the persecuted religious communities, particularly Christian denominations, and their current security situation. In this spirit, we have organized several international and domestic conferences. We have published more than a hundred Hungarian and foreign language publications on religion and security in national and international journals. Monographs, conference volumes and their foreign language translations have also been published. Within the framework of the KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15 Public Service Development Program underpinning good governance, an autonomous research group was established at the Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training, to study and research religious extremes and the situation of persecuted Christians at the academic level. We are currently running a “Religion and Security” unit at our faculty, which has a twofold objective: to conduct research at the academic level and enrich the domestic and international scientific life and to disseminate the results of the research widely to everybody who might be interested in the subject. Editing the “Budapest Report” is related to both of our missions: writing professional reports and studies on the life, (security) situation, exile of Christian communities, the response of the world and the “great powers”, assistance from the Christian Churches and international organizations, or, in the case of the latter, on their possible passivity. The publication has been written in plain language so that the summaries and reviews can easily be understood by a large audience to help raise awareness of the issue. The present publication has also been published in English, making the research results available for international scientific forums and strategic decision-makers. Editing the report relates to the mission of the University since the National University of Public Service as a whole is committed to conducting research which contributes to the objectives of the Hungarian Government with scientifically proven results. Aiding persecuted Christian communities has become a constant, clear

11 WELCOMING THOUGHTS objective of the Hungarian Government, which aims to help specific Christian communities as well as global security. Our research and active participation in editing the present publication represents our commitment to the objectives described above. I sincerely hope the ”Budapest Report” serves the best interests of professional circles and the wide audience!

Dr. Árpád Pohl Dean National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training

12 GENERAL SECURITY POLICY REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE SECURITY OF CHRISTIANS

József Padányi1

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

Military operations – in peace, war or in crisis response operations – are never conducted in a vacuum. During the preparation phase, as well as during the while we conduct of operations, the military planners must not ignore the population, various non-governmental organizations, and every other civilian actor who may affect the success of the military operations in any way. It is easy to see that this attention has to take different forms according to the needs of the given mission. (Fischl 2019; Forgács 2019; Ujházi 2019) Cooperation with the inhabitants, meeting the demands of the population in wartime, or during a flood relief operation are three different things. Similarly, the amount of freedom of movement non-governmental organizations may enjoy is quite different during a migration situation than in an armed conflict. This paper will not go into details of these differences, but rather it will discuss the principles, cooperation possibilities and necessities which have already been proven in reality. Currently, the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)2 is considered to be a type of support activity which helps the military commander to make well-grounded decisions. It requires the establishment of continuous cooperation with the local population and its leaders (religious, tribal, community, ethnic), the civilian government and non-governmental organizations, law enforcement organizations, civil defence organizations, church organizations, the prominent members of the private sector, the national authorities and other international organizations. This goal is based on mutual respect during the operations. (Fischl 2019) Consequently, the tasks of the military personnel, CIMIC staff, earmarked for this job can be divided into three groups: – supporting the work of the military leader (commander); – maintaining permanent cooperation between the military and the civilian organizations; – supporting the civilian sector.

1 National University of Public Service. 2 CIMIC – Civil-Military Cooperation.

15 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

This ranking also shows the order of priority in our understanding, with the proviso that a change in the intensity of operations may also change the order of these activities. However, the primary objective during every operation is to accomplish the military task and the priority of this cannot be questioned. In the long list of partners, the population occupies the number one position because well-balanced cooperation with every local community is vital if want to establish and maintain a secure environment. We also have to accept that in most cases the military force is not the decisive factor. It is worth examing how soldiers and authors in military science approached the circumstances that affect military operations in the past. The significance of the operational environment, and especially the role populations may play in this field, was emphasized in the earliest works of military science. A great number of classical Chinese authors addressed this issue. It was already a prevalent opinion in the works of military scientists of the Warring States period that you have win wars not only on the battlefields but also in the hearts of the people (the nation, people and soldiers of the enemy). It means that Chinese military scientist of this period also understood the importance of a concept which nowadays we call winning hearts and minds (Tokaji-P. Szabó 2018). Certainly, the emphases have changed over the centuries and winning the support of a domestic population has become equally important, for example, if we consider the war- renouncing atmosphere in the United States during the Vietnam War.3 In another chapter of the above-mentioned book (The Methods of Fighting), successful fighting is connected to four important tasks: – “providing the necessary conditions, resources, workforce, supplies, necessary for the everyday life of the domestic population in times of war; – making efforts to ensure military victory; – minimizing the number of casualties; – making sure that the domestic territory and its policies are stable from a military point of view.” (Tokaji-P. Szabó 2018) We can see that three out of the four conditions directly prove that the author clearly understood that: the success of the military force itself can not bring about military success. The needs of people must also be

3 On 15 November 1969, the biggest anti-war demonstration in the history of the United States took place, in which only in Washington more than one hundred thousand people got to the streets. Later, news about bombing Cambodia was followed by student demonstrations, despite the determination of the law enforcement units. The author of this paper talked to several Vietnam War veterans, who carry the never healing wound of being spat at by their own countrymen when, after landing in the USA, they were leaving the airport in uniform.

16 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS satisfied, so maintaining their satisfaction is indispensable in preserving the adequate public opinion, and the operation of the society which is a factor of the possibilities (political stability). The following idea refers to an eternal dilemma which was discussed in the chapter titled Discussions on Fighting of the same treatise. “There are three cases when (the military commander) does not follow the order of the monarch: he would rather die than to station (his army) at an undefendable location; he would rather die but will not send (his army) to a battle which cannot be won, he would rather die but will not turn his military against the population. So these are the three primary principles.” (Tokaji-P. Szabó 2018). The third principle has been haunting political leaders through the ages and social systems and has been the source of an irresolvable dilemma for military commanders. The lessons learned can lead the authors to recommend avoiding self-serving ruthlessness and the abuse of power in the same chapter. “The army of true kings does not unnecessarily kill the elderly and the weak, does not destroy the crops, does not detain those who surrender, does not mercy those who oppose it, and does not binnacle those who defect the adversary. When conducting its operation, it is not against the population, but those who instigate unrest and confusion among the population. Those who hide villains among the population are also considered villains. So those following his blade will be spared, those going against it will be destroyed.” Following the victory, we must not forget about the operational environment and the situation of the population either: ”Having accomplished (the fight) the best are rewarded, the officers are awarded government positions which go with government pay. The (occupied) land is distributed and the (population) is reconciled.” (Tactical strategy) (Tokaji-P.Szabó 2018) A similar idea also appeared in Montecuccoli’s mind when he wrote: “Who will till the land if (the peasants) are robbed and the population is ousted? The troops and the garrisons will go bankrupt as they depend on the crops of the land.” (Montecuccoli 2019) Miklós Zrínyi (VII) had a similar opinion when he wrote about the sustainment of the army, the acquisition of food in a military operation. It is seemingly a quick, cheap and simple way to take away by force what an army needs. However, in the longer run, it is more useful if we buy supplies for money provided by the state. It certainly costs a lot but it is more expensive if the soldier himself “takes the bread from the poor man’s house... and the poor man bargains with an axe.” At first, it seems that is cheaper if the state doesn’t pay for resources, yet “when poor people suffer, the money of the state quickly runs out”. Zrínyi( 2003) Several examples are known from this period when the violent acquisition of food reached created uprisings which destroyed complete military formations.

17 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

We can see that in this period the military leaders’ thinking was characterized by the need to preserve the deployability of the forces, and to ensure that they can feed their people and their animals. Therefore, this was the main factor which determined the framework of cooperation with the people of the land. Every well-prepared military leader has recognized the importance of civil-military cooperation. Some were led by necessity, others by recognition. Later, as the circumstances of fighting changed, the framework of civil- military cooperation also evolved to these changes. As time passed the voice of non-governmental organizations, local population activism and the role of the media became more and more substantial. The military forces deploying to crisis areas had to evermore attention to political, economic conditions, humanitarian development. Furthermore, they had to establish and maintain the stability in social and legal issues through a secure environment rather than by the deployment of military force. The quote by General Eisenhower is indicative of the changing emphases which he experienced when the end of the Second World War was approaching: “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters... And what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town.” (HDF Civil-military cooperation and Psychological operations center 2012) The peacekeeping operations during civil wars in the Balkans raised the importance of civil-military cooperation to an even higher level. “A couple of days ago we did not know what CIMIC was, but today we cannot live without it.” – said Admiral Leighton W. Smith, NATO forces commander in 1995. (William 1998, 25) Shortly after the start of IFOR4 operations, it became clear that a military element was needed which could cooperate, communicate, and coordinate the military and civilian actors professionally and efficiently. One can rightly ask what made IFOR operations so different, and which factors raised the flag of CIMIC so gh.hi In our opinion, the most important difference compared to previous operations was that new objectives required new procedures and tools. In war, the objective of the military force is to defeat the enemy, occupy its territory, and to force our will with all possible means on the enemy. This requires a massive military force, a huge arsenal, and soldiers trained for these type of operations. IFOR was a peacekeeping operation to make the measures of the Dayton Peace Accords effective. It required a safe environment free from armed fighting. The different objectives required a different approach, including the recognition that without cooperation the military force is condemned to fail. The efficient tool of cooperation is the systemf o CIMIC tasks.

4 Implementation Force (IFOR), NATO-led military force supporting the realization of the Dayton Peace Accords.

18 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

The author of this paper spent two years in the Balkans theatre and has direct experiences of the value of civil- military cooperation. We accomplished several tasks – within the framework of civil-military cooperation – that had no direct military advantages. We took part in the reconstruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, helped to reconstruct a destroyed Catholic church in Okucani, supported the international police, the local communities and the repatriates. All of these activities contributed to the acceptance of fact the foreign soldiers are deployed to your area, and they are there to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment.5 The decision-makers at NATO also realized the importance of civil-military cooperation, and in 2007 they established a CIMIC Center of Excellence: the main task of this centre is to evaluate the lessons learned in civil- military cooperation and to distribute the lessons we learned from our past experiences through the educational- training frameworks as soon as possible. The Hungarian Defence Forces also established a “Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Center”. The mission of the Center is to: – develop and improve CIMIC and PSYOPS capabilities, support Hungarian Defence Forces missions in Hungary and abroad; – participate in the armed defence of the country, manage emergencies under NATO obligations, as well as in operations which are conducted under another bi- or multilateral agreements; – support military force commanders in establishing and sustaining cooperation with the civilian population, local authorities, governmental and non-governmental organizations, national and international organizations which are present in the areas of operations, as well as in influencing target group(s) which are important to achieve our political and military objectives. (https://honvedelem.hu/szervezet/107908_ mh_ckelmk) These thoughts are easy to write down, but a lot more difficult realize.to The international community – and its military forces as their tools – had to face multiple challenges, like the genocide in Srebrenica, the situation of the Rohingya refugees, or conducting disaster relief operations in an increasing number of cases. There are no universally accepted answers and methods for these situations because every situation is different and the civilian environment is also not homogenous either. Each civilian actor has its own motivation, legal status, assignment, mission, agenda and it is also not sure that all of them want to go in the same direction. The situation is further complicated yb the fact that certain civilian

5 Several NATO and European missions have served in the Balkans. In Bosnia Herzegovina the IFOR (1996) and the SFOR-Stabilization Force (1997-2004), EUFOR-European Union Force (2004-). The KFOR-Kosovo orceF (1999-) in Kosovo.

19 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS actors do not want to cooperate with the soldiers at all. The reasons for that are either emotional or security- related. The diversity and the different motivations of various civilian actors require the establishment of flexible CIMIC capabilities. This is vital since they have to able to cooperate in various periods, in peace support, disaster relief and rescue operations, as well as in the reconstruction of the infrastructure, the development of education, the building of democratic foundations, and the list of diverse situations goes on and on. Yet, there is one factor that never changes: every action where non-governmental organizations actively participate will affect the security situation, so the military force has to pay attention to those. It is vital to assess how can the military cooperate with various civilian actors and to know their incidental limitations before the start of military operations. It helps decision-making and enhances credibility. As the chapter titled “The Commander’s Garden” of the book we have already quoted from several times above says: “Reliability: be ready for committed cooperation!” (Tokaji-P. Szabó 2018) The CIMIC task system will only be an efficient tool for commanders and non-governmental organizations if it can meet a couple of general requirements. Those are the following (CIMIC Handbook 2019): – Familiarizing with, understanding and accepting of the civilian environment and the civilian actors. It means that one of its most important tasks is to collect, analyze and assess information. It is the only way for us to achieve the stage that the military force can start establishing the framework of cooperation credibly and confidently, making a minimum of mistakes. – Familiarizing with and respecting the objectives, customs, symbols, history of the non-military organizations which are involved in the operation. It will bring forward synergies during the cooperation, which will strengthen the acceptance of and respect for the military force on the principle of reciprocity. – Making clear distinctions between tasks and obligations. It means that the primary task of the military force is to achieve the objective, which defines the provision of needs and services. This is a task of the civilian actors in the first place. – Respecting each other, which means openness, taking competent responsibilities, presenting and exploiting capabilities, establishing and sustaining credibility and transparency in short. We speak about reciprocity which is not a one-way street. – Joint preparation, planning of tasks of mutual interest. It means to identify the way of achieving the objectives, as well as the timely clarification of the joint efforts – possibleays w of sharing the work and responsibilities. – Establishing the order of cooperation and its organizational framework.

20 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

A highly sensitive part of the cooperation is information sharing. In our view, we can not share information with different actors in an unrestricted way. This is important for security, credibility and military-professional reasons. Sharing and publicizing certain pieces of sensitive information may render the work of the organizations impossible, may jeopardize the safety of its personnel and as a result, prevents them from achieving their objectives. The basis, ways and nature of information sharing must be made clear from the beginning, and this policy must be respected and enforced in a transparent and controllable manner. When the protection of persecuted Christians is discussed, all the ideas we have discussed so far get a concrete meaning. It is a crisis where the representatives of the armed forces, international organizations, local communities, civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the private sector have to work together. The issue of persecuted Christians has been raised to the governmental level in Hungary.6 The Hungary Helps Agency, which was registered on 14 April 2019, is a not for profit company in the exclusive ownership of the State. The primary mission of the Agency is to ensure that assistance will reach the persecuted communities and the victims of humanitarian catastrophes. The Agency’s secondary mission is that it should empower Hungary to contribute to the elimination of those processes, which may trigger international migration wave by providing immediate, on-site, immediate assistance. The armed forces, based on the principles and procedures discussed above, contributed to achieving the common objectives in the past years as follows: – The Hungarian Defence Forces mobilized a lot of personnel and equipment when it participated in the construction and maintenance of the Temporary Security Border Barrier. It also supported the police forces with personnel, reducing the burden of migration on our country. The Hungarian Defence Forces constructed an approximately 300 km long Temporary Security Border Barrier. It carried out border defence activities in cooperation with the police by deploying multiple temporary task forces of the Hungarian Defence Forces. Until the summer of 2018 soldiers defended the borders in considerable numbers, after that they assisted the work of the police with special combat service units. From the summer of 2019, considerable size military units have been serving at the border again. We also carry out helicopter reconnaissance and demonstration tasks, military police personnel conduct patrol tasks with working dogs and we do on water patrols with our riverine assets. Currently, 650 soldiers are conducting patrol tasks in three rotations, and after we add the military logisticians and other support personnel about 1000 soldiers are deployed at the border area. Besides those

6 The work is coordinated by the State Secretariat responsible for the aiding of persecuted Christians and the Hungary Helps Program.

21 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

soldiers, another 1000 personnel are on standby as a reserve at 24-hour readiness (https://honvedelem.hu/ cikk/116351_ujra_katonak_vedik_a_hatart). – The foreign commitments of the Hungarian Defence Forces also contributed, by establishing and sustaining a secure environment, to the reduction of migratory pressure. In February 2019 at a meeting of the NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels, the Minister of Defence of Hungary announced plans to increase the number of personnel in NATO missions from the current 1000 limit to 1200 between 2019 and 2022. To cover the increased costs Ministry of Defence have allocated 1.5 billion HUF in the next year’s budget, which figure will rise to 2.9 billion HUF in 2021 and to 2 billion HUF in 2020. https://honvedelem.hu/( cikk/116531_megjelent_a_misszios_szerepvallalas_noveleserol_szolo_hatarozat) In Afghanistan, the National Support Element Afghanistan, the Support Platoon, the Special Operations Element of the Hungarian Defence Forces conduct its duties together with more than one hundred soldiers in individual positions. In Kosovo 385 Hungarian soldiers are deployed, in the KFOR Tactical Reserve Battalion, as well as individual positions, while 160 Hungarian soldiers are stationed, as part of the HDF EUFOR Contingent and in other positions, in Sarajevo. Other major Hungarian missions include European Union Training Mission, Mali; HDF Baltic Armed Air Defence Readiness Subunit, Lithuania; HDF Iraqi Training Support Contingent, Iraq; UNIFIL, Lebanon. – In the fields of education research as well, there is active cooperation between the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training at the NUPS and the State Secretariat. The staff of the Faculty took an active role in the preparation of a report titled “Budapest Report on Christian Persecution 2018”, which is a collection of 21 papers about that key issue. The report of 2019 was also supported by the members of the faculty. In September 2017 an “Extremism, Religious Extremism Ludovika Research Group” was established at the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training. The first event of the research group waseld h on 27 September 2017 by Dr Miklós Maróth who is a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Director of Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies. On this occasion, Professor Maróth talked about the significant European research about Middle East religions. On 6 October 2017 Dr Joanne Washington, a researcher at the Marymount University held a workshop about “The role of religious organizations in the preparation of specialists dealing with the victims of armed conflicts.” On this occasion she demonstrated those educational and training systems which are used in the United States to prepare people for working with refugees. On 9 November 2017, Dr Béla Jungbert, a retired Ambassador, described “The situation of Christians in Israel and Palestine”. The gist of his talk was that the creation of a stable Israel and Palestine must be a priority if we want

22 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

to preserve the future of the Christians in the Holy Land. On 5 November 2018 an event titled “Knightly orders then and today”, illustrated how those organizations currently support persecuted Christians all over the world. On 11 April 2019 the State Secretariat and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Religion and Security Study Group of the Military Science and Officer Training Faculty of the NUPS, held a joint conference. At this event, State Secretary Tristan Azbej described how the Government and the scientific sector can cooperate in aid of persecuted Christians. (https://hhk.uni-nke.hu/oktatasi-egysegek/honvedelmi- jogi-es-igazgatasi-tanszek/tudomanyos-elet-tudomanyos-forumok/tudomanyos-forumok-es-egyeb) The list could go on and on to describe other areas of the cooperation, but the examples have been selected to prove that the military is ready, capable and is actively contributing to joint efforts in this field. Its special assets, specialists, lessons learned during military operations and its proven procedures all provide such valuable value, which would be a mistake not to utilize. The order and the structure of civil-military cooperation are the best examples of their capability, which cannot be spared when the Government is trying to support persecuted Christians.

Literature

The State Secretariat responsible for the aiding of persecutedChristians and the realization of the Hungary Helps Program. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/az-uldozott-keresztenyek-megsegiteseert- es-a-hungary-helps-program-megvalositasaert-felelos-allamtitkar/hirek/nyugaton-is-elismerik-a-magyar- humanitarius-segitsegnyujtas-modelljenek-hatekonysagat. (Web: 11 September 2019) CIMIC Handbook (2012): https://www.cimic-coe.org/products/conceptual-design/downloads/ccoe- publications/field-handbook/ (Web: 11 September 2019) Fischl Vilmos (2019): A háború felfogásának változásai Luthernél a kétféle kormányzás tanításának tükrében. In Gőcze István ed. Keresztény teoretikusok, államférfiak és katonák háborúelméletei. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem. 7–23. Forgács Balázs (2019): Morus Tamás (Thomas More) és B. H. Liddel Hart elméletei az indirekt hadviselésről. In Gőcze István ed. Keresztény teoretikusok, államférfiak és katonák háborúelméletei. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem. 51-63. Montecuccoli, Raimondo: A magyarországi török háborúkról. Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó. 2019.

23 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN MISSIONS AND MISSION PREPARATION IN CRISIS AREAS

HDF Civil-military Cooperation and PSYOPS Center – Mission https://honvedelem.hu/szervezet/107908_ mh_ckelmk (Web: 11 September 2019) MH Civil-katonai Együttműködési és Lélektani Műveleti Központ (2012): A siker kulcsa – az együttműködés. MH Civil-katonai Együttműködési és Lélektani Műveleti Központ. Budapest, Zrínyi Média. Mától katonák védik a határt: honvedelem.hu https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/116351_ujra_katonak_vedik_a_ hatart (Web: 11 September 2019) Megjelent a missziós szerepvállalás növeléséről szóló határozat. https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/116531_ megjelent_a_misszios_szerepvallalas_noveleserol_szolo_hatarozat (Web: 11 September 2019) Tokaji Zsolt – P. Szabó Sándor (2018) (szerk.): A kínai hadtudomány klasszikusai. Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest. Tudományos fórumok és egyéb. https://hhk.uni-nke.hu/oktatasi-egysegek/honvedelmi-jogi-es-igazgatasi- tanszek/tudomanyos-elet-tudomanyos-forumok/tudomanyos-forumok-es-egyeb (Web: 11 September 2019) Perjés Géza (1963): Mezőgazdasági termelés, népesség, hadseregélelmezés és stratégia a 17. század második felében (1650–1715). Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó. Ujházi Lóránd (2019): A szentszéki migrációs politika a realista biztonságelméletek tükrében. In Gőcze István ed. Keresztény teoretikusok, államférfiak és katonák háborúelméletei. Budapest, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem. 35–51. Zrínyi Miklós (2003) összes művei. Budapest, Kortárs Kiadó. William R., Phillips (1998): Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to Peace Implementation in Bosnia. NATO Review 46. évf. 1. sz. 25.

24 József Kaló

VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

There are various manifestations of the phenomenon of the persecution of Christians, ranging from the cultural isolation to the hindering or restricting of religious practice, through state discrimination to intimidation. But the most brutal, and also the most noteworthy form of persecution is physical violence. Those may arise from diverse sources: some are motivated by fundamentally religious, or they may be generated based on political and economic motivations. In all cases, the goal is to limit or completely disable the religious or faith practice of the individual or community. Violent acts themselves manifest in multiple forms: minor physical assault, attacks on buildings and/or symbols, deportation to labour and extermination camps, murders and the actual annihilation of the whole communities. The most recent version of the World Watch List, which is published by the Open Doors International Foundation1, is the World Watch List 2019. This publication relies on data from 2017/18 and was published at the beginning of 2019. The top ten places of the list of the 50 countries most affected by Christian persecution were held by North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Iran and India. Since last year’s report (World Watch List 2018) there have been changes in the ranking starting from the fourth place (Libya, Yemen and Iran advanced, while Sudan, Eritrea moved lower). Iraq moved out of the top ten, and India is back in the top ten of this dishonourable ranking for the first time in 72 years. 2 When we look at the level of violence against Christians, the order is slightly different: Pakistan and Nigeria are leading with 99.9%, they are followed by the Central African Republic (97%), Egypt (95.5%), Mali (92%), India (91%), then Ethiopia and Mexico share a spot (81%), Syria (78%), Colombia (75.5%), Indonesia (72%), followed by Myanmar (67%) in the tenth place. (World Watch List 2019)

1 The World Watch List is an annual report compiled by Open Doors International and published annually since 1992. The report is released in January, but the data included is from the previous year (for example, the 2019 report is based on data from November 1, 2017, to October 31, 2018). The list evaluates and scores the 50 countries most affected by Christian persecution based upon six aspects. Instruments of pressure include measures and actions against private life, family life, community life, national life, and church life. A sixth, very important, independent category is the score for violence against Christians and their church. For more, visit https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/about-the-ranking/ (15 September 2019). 2 According to the authors of the list, in 7 of the 10 countries above, Christian persecution is induced by violent Islamization. (World Watch List 2019).

25 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

During the period examined by the World Watch List 2019, 4,136 Christians were killed, on average, there were 11 murders per day, and 2,625 were detained without trial, warrant or conviction. 1,266 churches or other religious buildings were attacked for anti-Christian motives. The Open Doors International Foundation estimates that nearly 245 million Christians are potentially exposed to violence due to their faith, this is 30 million more compared to the previous period which is a 14% increase. By the time this report is completed3, the following key actions from the countries listed above may be highlighted:

Pakistan

According to Pakistan’s infamous blasphemy laws4, Christians continue to live in daily fear, even facing the death penalty. Radical Islamists have gained greater political influence and the new government needs to maintain good relations with some radical groups. Christians are treated as second-class citizens, and the conversion from Islam to Christianity carries great risks. (World Watch Monitor, 2019) Although the case of Asia Bibi5 has led to international condemnations of the blasphemy law, there are still dozens of Christians and other non-Muslims on death row for blasphemy. (The Persecution of Ahmadis 2019) On 15 January 2019, a Pakistani lower court acquitted a Christian woman of blasphemy after 3 years of trial for lack of evidence. Acquittal in blasphemy cases is completely unusual, as these cases are usually referred to higher courts by lower courts. Before her arrest on a false charge, the police brutally tortured the suspect: they broke her spine which prevented her from getting out of bed. According to the family, this was the reason why their 3 and a half-year-old daughter drowned because her mother couldn’t take care of her properly. Even after

3 15 September 2019 4 The concept of blasphemy law is discussed in sections 295-298 of the Pakistani Criminal Code, on the grounds of religious offence. The origins of the law go back to British colonial times when European colonists wanted to avoid religious-based conflicts. However, in 1986, the original law was supplemented with a section which states that life imprisonment or death must be the verdict for anyone who offends Prophet Mohammed or the Qur’an. (The Persecution of Ahmadis 2019). 5 Asia Bibi is a Christian mother of five children who was sentenced to death by rope in 2010 under Pakistan’s blasphemy law. In an argument with female Muslim colleagues in 2009, she allegedly made slanderous comments on Prophet Mohammed. However, after an eight-year stay on the death row, the Pakistani Supreme Court acquitted her in October 2018 – for which international pressure on Pakistan also played a major role. Having heard the news of her expected release, riots and demonstrations began in all major cities in Pakistan. Although the Supreme Court ordered the release of Asia Bibi, she could not leave the country until the review of the sentence was completed. Finally, she left Pakistan for Canada in May 2019. (S4C News 2019).

26 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 her acquittal, the family did not dare to return to their village because they were afraid of being lynched by their neighbours. (World Watch Monitor 2019) On 19 February four Christian women were falsely accused of blasphemy near Karachi. A mass of angry Muslims attacked Christian-inhabited residential buildings and a temple, and about 200 Christian families were forcibly expelled from their place of residence, and their livestock was also killed. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) On 25 February a Muslim man kidnapped a Christian mother of three, forced her to convert to Islam and to marry him. According to her husband, the authorities were reluctantly dealt with the matter and later they simply stated her conversion to Islam. The husband appealed to the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Court. (Pakistan Christian Post 2019) Unfortunately, kidnappings and violent conversion to Islam is one of the greatest threat for religious minorities. It is estimated that nearly a thousand Pakistani Christian and Hindu women are abducted, raped and forced to convert to Islam every year. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) In early June, a Christian pastor, his wife and their university student daughter were attacked by a crowd of more than 30 people at their home. The family, which only suffered minor injuries,as w rescued by a passing police officer, but they became homeless as the attackers occupied their home. oice(V of the Martyrs 2019) On 23 July a Christian church was attacked by a group of Muslim men in a village of Bhikhi in Punjab. The attackers entered the church during prayer time and they assaulted several members of the congregation. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019)

Nigeria

Nigeria is at the forefront in the intensity of the violence with Pakistan, in particular, due to an increased number of attacks on Christian communities by Fulani shepherds. As a result of these attacks, hundreds of people have lost their lives and villages and churches were razed to the ground. Muslims are the overwhelming majority in the north of the country, while Christians dominate the southern regions. In Nigeria’s Muslim- majority areas, Christians are treated as second-class citizens. Converts from Muslim backgrounds are persecuted by their own family members, who reject them and put pressure on them to reject their Christian conversion. (World Watch List 2019)

27 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

On 14 and 28 January, the Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram attacked Rann, a town in northeastern Nigeria, killing about 60 Christian inhabitants. City and community leaders were lined up and then killed in cold blood. According to a Reuters report, only one person was left alive to testify about what he had seen. The biggest part of the settlement was burnt. Approximately 30 to 40 thousand people fled the region. (S4C News 2019) At the end of February, 32 Christians were murdered and several buildings were burned down by extremists in Kajuru province by Fulani people. (S4C News 2019) On 4 March, armed militias of Fulani shepherds attacked three settlements in Benue State, killing 23 people, according to local sources. Three days later, the attacks continued in the area, this time causing the deaths of several fathers from three families. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) By the middle of March, 120 Christians were murdered by Fulani extremists in Kaduna State. During the raids, neither women nor children were spared. (S4C News 2019) On 23 March, three young Christians were also killed by Fulani shepherds near the village of Mante and 17 houses were set on fire. As they continued their attacks, 11 other homes and churches were burned down in the village of Nidan, resulting in hundreds of Christians fleeing their homes in the wake of the two attacks. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) In the second half of March, hundreds of Christians were killed by Boko Haram militants in Adamawa State. For hours, Islamist militants devastated most of the area inhabited by Christians and destroyed many settlements. (S4C News 2019) On 14 April, Fulani militants broke into a Baptist congregation in Nasarawa and started firing indiscriminately: 17 believers were killed and further 8 were wounded. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) At the beginning of May, attacks continued against the local Christian community in Kaduna State which caused the death of one man and 19 others were kidnapping of - including a pastor. (Persecution.org, 2019) In 2017, the Nigerian Christian Association registered the kidnapping of 40 pastors, by either Fulani or Boko Haram terrorists. (S4C News 2019) On August 1, a Catholic priest was murdered by Fulani militants in Enugu Province. After the murder, church officials held a demonstration to protest against Fulani violence and ongoing atrocities against Christians. (S4C News 2019)

28 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

The Central African Republic

Almost 4 million out of 5 million inhabitants of the Central African Republic’s population are Christians, but there is a significant Muslim minority in the north-east of the country. The Seleka group, which is an alliance of armed militias, which mobilized formerly marginalized Muslims to fight the anti-Balaka group of animists and nominal Christians. This civil war-like conflict is the main source of persecution as both militant groups carry out attacks on local Christians and their communities. Since last year, the situation of Christians in the country has continued to get worse as Muslims exert more pressure on them. In addition to jihadists, Christians are also threatened by criminal groups, and the activities of these group often overlap each other. The country continues to suffer from anarchy. Large groups of Christians live in extremely poor conditions in refugee camps. (World Watch Monitor 2019; World Watch List 2019) On the night of 19th–20th May a 77-year-old French-Spanish nun was murdered by unknown perpetrators. Her attackers intruded her room, took her to the centre of the educational building and beheaded her. The sister had taught poor girls for decades. (France 24 2019) In the first half of June, 50 people were killed and several were wounded in an armed attack in mostly Christian-populated villages in the northwest region of the country near the border with Chad. The attack shocked the public since this attack happened after the government have already signed a peace agreement with the representatives of a total of 14 armed militias in February. (Persecution.org 2019)

Egypt

Out of a population of nearly 100 million people, Egyptian Christians, who make up about 10% per cent of the population have to suffer persecution in various ways. Converts from Muslim ackgroundsb are under enormous pressure from their families to return to the Islamist faith. The life of Christian congregations is severely restricted by various measures, such as the prohibitions on worship and community gatherings. In recent years, Islamist extremist groups have committed several violent and deadly acts against Christians. (World Watch List 2019) On January 5, an explosive ordnance disposal expert died and two of his associates were injured when they try to disarm an explosive device found on a roof near a church in Nasr, near Cairo. (BBC 2019)

29 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

In January, Egyptian authorities closed three Coptic Christian churches, due to pressure from extremist Muslims. (S4C News 2019) In March, three Coptic men were injured when unknown gunmen – supposedly Islamist extremists - opened fire on their cars. (S4C News 2019) In the second week of April, local Islamists attacked a Coptic Christian community, who were seeking to expand their church in the village of Naga al-Ghafir in the province of Sohag. The enraged crowd was armed with sticks and iron bars, and two Christian priests were also injured in the attack. Authorities have not arrested the perpetrators. (S4C News 2019) At the end of May, a Christian mother was kidnapped near Cairo. According to the family, the woman had previously received threatening messages seeking to force conversion to the Islamist faith, which, if denied, would have led to the murder of one of her sons. The family reported the case to the police utb authorities refused to take action, saying the woman had left the home of her own accord. The abduction of Christian women is a common phenomenon in Lower Egypt, where most of the Christians live. Islamist extremists, often with overt or covert of police support, abduct women to force their to conversion to Islam and then they make them marry Muslim men. (Persecution.org 2019) The Egyptian government is doing its utmost to protect local Christian communities. Pointing in this direction, in March, another 156 Christian churches and service buildings were approved by the government’s commission for this purpose, bringing the number of approved religious venues to 783. Since 2016, more than 3,700 churches have applied for legal status under a new law that was designed to make it easier to establish and build churches in Egypt. (World Watch Monitor 2019) By July, the number had risen to 1021. (Voice Of The Martyrs 2019

Mali

The majority of Mali’s 19 million Muslims has traditionally practised a tolerant version of the Islam, however, more and more militants appear in the country. Especially in the north of the country, this intolerance led to the outbreak of violence by jihadist and criminal groups against more than 400,000 Christian believers. (World Watch List 2019) The peaceful situation between Muslims, Christians and followers of tribal religions ended in 2012 when a bloody civil war broke out in the north of the country. The Tuareg have made alliances with radical Islamists to establish their own state. The ihadistsj took control of the northern region,

30 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 causing hundreds of thousands to flee to the south or abroad. In 2013, the Islamists wanted to extend their control to the southern areas of the country and tried to overthrow the secular government, but France managed to defeat the insurgents after a quick military intervention. Mali has since been a de facto divided state, which of course has an impact on the life of the approximately 200,000-strong Malian Catholic community. In the north, the church structure has largely been destroyed, but in the south, the situation of Christians is much more favourable, even though violent acts occur from time to time. Nevertheless, the Catholic community is growing dynamically; most people convert to Christianity from animistic religions. (S4C News 2019) On the morning of 9 June, Sunday, in the Mopti region of central Mali, the mainly Christian-inhabited village of Sobame Da was attacked by armed Muslim extremists who indiscriminately killed its inhabitants: not excepting the women, the children and the elderly. During the massacre, the village itself was burned down and even the domestic animals were slaughtered. The number of victims was between 100 and 35.1 After the massacre, hundreds of Christians fled the area. Barnabasfund( 2019; The Persecution of Christians 2019) By the middle of August, according to the UN, more than 150 children were killed in Mali and other 75 were injured in various attacks. Twice as many children were forced to serve in the militias than in the previous year. More than 900 schools were closed due to violence and insecurity.

India

Of India’s more than 1,300 million inhabitants, nearly 65 million are Christians, who are frequently targeted by predominantly Hindu nationalist groups. The number of attacks has increased in recent years, as Hindu radicals believe they can attack Christians without consequences. Nationalists believe that to be Indian you must also be a Hindu, and therefore every other religion, including Christianity, are alien and must be rejected. In some regions of the country, the conversion from Hinduism to Christianity has led to extreme persecution, discrimination and violence. (World Watch List 2019) On February 7, Hindu radicals attacked a Protestant congregation during worship in the Chapar village of Uttar Pradesh. Believers were severely beaten, even the women were not spared. (Asia News 2019; The Persecution of Christians 2019) On 11 February, three gunmen murdered a father of five children, who had recently converted to Christianity, near the village of Raigarh Tehsil in Odisha State. His decapitated body was simply left in the middle of the

31 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 road. Since his conversion, the man and his family have been constantly harassed by other villagers. (World Watch Monitor 2019) While in 2018 Christians across India had suffered an average of 20 atrocities per month, there were a total of 77 anti-Christian incidents in the country in the first two months of 2019 alone. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) At the end of March, 200 Hindu radicals attacked a Christian high school in Tamil Nadu. The attack was triggered after a student of the school committed suicide. The sisters working in the school were strangled, threatened and beaten and the attackers also damaged the school building. The police did not send officers to protect the school staff. The Catholic Bishop’s Faculty publicly condemned the incident and called for an investigation into the perpetrators. (Persecution.org 2019) On 19 March, Hindu nationalists interrupted a Christian prayer meeting in Tamil Nadu. Believers were dragged to the streets, their Bibles were confiscated and burned on the spot. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) On June 12, 20 residents of Mahuatoli village in Jharkhand state, East India, attacked 12 local Christian families and tried to force them to convert to tribal religion. The village leaders gave an ultimatum to the twelve Christian families: either returning to the local tribal religion or they would be expelled from the settlement. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) At the beginning of August, a 250-strong Hindu mob armed with clubs attacked participants in a Christian wedding, threatening to kill everyone. Police have accused Christians of disturbing the peace of the community, by their violent evangelization, and they arrested several people, including the pastor and his three-year-old child. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) In the second half of August, 40 Catholic pilgrims were attacked by Hindu extremists in Tamil Nadu, 6 of whom were arrested for attempted murder. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) On August 23, 100 Christians were attacked by Hindu radicals in the village of Jalampur in Bihar. The attack took place during the screening of a Christian movie, and attackers armed with swords and sticks demanded the deaths of the organizers. (Persecution.org 2019)

32 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

Ethiopia

Although two-thirds of Ethiopia’s population is Christian, radical Islamist tendencies are growing at local, regional and national levels. Especially in rural areas, where most of the Muslims live, Christians are harassed. In areas which are not under government control, Christians are particularly vulnerable to attack. All Christian communities are subject to persecution, although some denominations are more affected than others. Non- traditional Christians are subject to severe persecution by the government and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. More than 40% of Ethiopians belong to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and nearly 20% are members of Protestant missionary Churches. Most of the missionary ministers are from North America. Converts from either Muslim or Orthodox backgrounds to other denominations, particularly in the east and southeast, and their families and communities are subject to harsh treatment. In some areas, Christians are denied access to community resources and are often expelled from society. Besides, in some regions of the country, mobs often attack Christian churches. (World Watch List 2019; S4C News 2019) At the beginning of the year, an Ethiopian police officer was arrested, dismissed and forced to move to another part of the country after confessing his Christian faith to colleagues. (World Watch Monitor 2019) On 9 February, Somali Islamists attacked Christians in Halaba Kulito, a mostly Muslim-populated city. Extremist militants set fire to ten churches. Local security forces arrived late, several churches were destroyed in the fire. Despite all the devastation, the churches gathered again the next day to worship. (S4C News 2019)

Mexico

Mexico is traditionally a Christian country, and strangely enough, official protection of Christians is not guaranteed here either. The reason for this is the drug war, which has lasted for decades and has claimed tens of thousands of lives. Money held by drug cartels is influencing government behaviour through corruption. Because the government is incapable of stopping the violence, some Christian communities are forced to develop their security strategies, which includes convincing the leaders of criminal groups. Organized criminal groups attack priests and pastors, while the leaders of indigenous peoples persecute those who have converted to Christian faith. (World Watch List 2019) In areas predominantly inhabited by indigenous people, those

33 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 who convert from indigenous religious beliefs to members of non-traditional Protestant denominations also have face persecution. (World Watch Monitor 2019) On July 28, leaders of the Cuamontax Huazalingo village in Hidalgo State forced four Protestant Christians to leave the settlement. Community leaders told the victims that their expulsion happened because they did not signed an agreement which banned Protestants from entering the village. Two Baptist families were attacked in their homes, the buildings were damaged to force them out of the village. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019) On August 18, Father Alfrery Líctor Cruz Canseco was shot dead on the pulpit in Tlalixtac de Cabrera. His attacker tried to flee, but members of the church captured him and handed the murderer to the authorities. The motive for the murder is still unknown, but this incident is part of a series of attacks targeting religious leaders, as another pastor, Aaron Méndez Ruiz, disappeared in violent circumstances shortly before August 3. Religious leaders are constantly threatened, abducted or killed, and the perpetrators are rarely held accountable for either lack of evidence or lack of investigation. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019)

Syria

In 2018, the pressure on Christians in Syria as a whole decreased, but violence remains widespread against Christians in the rebel-dominated areas of the civil war-torn country. Converts from Islam to Christianity, even in the more secure parts of Syria, are under severe pressure and discrimination from their communities. (World Watch List 2019). During the Civil War, Christian churches and Christian-owned businesses were favourite targets during terrorist attacks committed by the Islamist State and other extremist groups, and there are several reports which say that many Christians are kidnapped and murdered in Syria. Nevertheless, most of the remaining Christian citizens of Syria are committed to staying in Syria and rebuilding their country. Others return to their homes following the military defeat of the Islamist State. (World Watch Monitor 2019) In June, 15 Christian children were abducted in Qamishli, a town in the north-east of the country. (Persecution.org 2019) On July 8, a 60-year-old Armenian Christian woman was abducted in the village of al-Yaqoubi Yeh in Idlib province. She was tortured for hours, raped several times and then stoned to death. A retired Arabic teacher was an active member of the local church. The perpetrators are believed to have been terrorists of the Al-Nusra Front. (Persecution.org 2019)

34 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

On 11 July, a Syrian Orthodox temple was attacked with a vehicle-borne explosive device in Qamishli. The assassination was carried out in the afternoon in a district populated by Syrian and Armenian Christians in the Wasta province when traffic was heavy in the shopping streets around the church. Eleven people were injured during the attack, and the church, as well as the surrounding buildings, suffered significant physical damage. The Islamist State claimed responsibility for the action. (Voice of the Martyrs 2019; Persecution.org 2019)

Colombia

As a result of violence by guerrillas or other criminal groups, church leaders are often harassed, blackmailed or even murdered. Christians are seen as a threat by these groups because they behave differently in society. The indigenous people who convert to Christianity and the missionaries who work among them risk imprisonment, torture and confiscation of their property. (World Watch List 2019) On February 9, a Protestant pastor was killed by armed groups in Caucasia, in the violence-stricken state of Antioquia. The pastor has just finished a service and was leaving the church whene h was killed with five shots. (World watch monitor 2019) Two other pastors were also murdered in September last year in the same region, one in the company of his family. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) On February 18, a Catholic priest who supported Venezuelan refugees was murdered in southern Bogota. Both of the attackers were Venezuelan refugees whom he supported, the main motive of the attack was that the 2 Venezuelan refugees wanted to make a profit. Vatican( News 2019)

Indonesia

32 million of the nearly 267 million inhabitants of the world’s most populous Muslim country are Christian. Conservative Muslim political parties and radical Islamist groups exercise significant influence, resulting in Sharia- inspired politics and anti-Christian public opinion. As the government tightens the laws governing blasphemy, Christian believers have to suffer more attacks from radical Islamist groups. (World Watch List 2019) Many people who convert from Islam to Christianity are persecuted by their families. However, the intensity is not uniform variable, mainly in the form of isolation and verbal violence. Only a small percentage of converts

35 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 have to suffer physical violence because of their Christian faith. The level of persecution varies from region to region. In places like West Java or Aceh – where radical Islamist groups are powerful and have a great influence on society and politics, we will find more intense forms of persecution of Christians. Besides, if a church actively engages in conversion activity, as many Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations do, they will soon be confronted by radical Islamist groups. (World Watch List 2019) On February 27, an alleged Muslim religious leader accompanied by a gang of six-man armed by samurai swords broke into the home of a Christian man. He accosted the man that he was playing Christian music at dawn while the believers at a nearby Islamist boarding school were doing the morning prays. The attackers damaged the families loudspeakers and insulted the other family members. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) In early April, a Catholic painter and his family have been expelled from a village near the town of Yogyakarta because of the families Christian faith. (The Persecution of Christians 2019) In September, a video was released by Ustadz Abdul Somad, Indonesia’s presumably most popular Muslim preacher, in which a female audience member asked him: why was she always shivering when she saw crosses. The preacher’s replied that the reason for this is that Christian crosses are inhabited by evil spirits. In other words, crosses are the work of the devil. Somad is a key member of one of the two large moderate Muslim organizations in Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia. (The Persecution of Christians 2019)

Myanmar

The Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) has for years been targeting the Christian Chin minority – 4 million out of the country’s nearly 54 million inhabitants – in line with its Buddhist fundamentalist and unification efforts. Since 2017. there has been an armed conflict between the Myanmar army and the Rohingya rebels. Buddhist militants on the military side joined the civil war, not only targeting Rohingya Muslims but they also targeting members of Christian communities. (S4c news 2019) More than 100,000 Christians live in refugee camps without adequate food and health care. Radical Buddhist monks occupied several Christian church properties and built Buddhist shrines in their place. (World Watch List 2019) On 16 January, extremist Buddhists broke into a Protestant pastor’s house and forced him to go with them. Members of the five-member gang told him he was only being interrogated, but that was the last time that his

36 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 family saw him alive. Together with fifty other prisoners, they were deported ot the Sittwe region in southern Rakhine State and executed on 1st February. The perpetrators were presumably embersm of the rebel Arakanese army fighting against minorities. (S4c news 2019)

Sri Lanka

Although Sri Lanka is not included in the top ten of the World Watch List 2019, on which our report is based, we must nevertheless highlight this country because one of the most serious anti-Christian attacks took place there in 2019. The island state, with nearly 21 million inhabitants, is predominantly Buddhist, but it has a population of about 2 million Christians living alongside Hindu and Muslim religious minorities. Those who convert from a Buddhist or Hindu background to the Christian faith are exposed to harassment and discrimination by their families and communities. Christian congregations are mostly harassed by their neighbours and local officials, demanding the closure of their buildings, which they consider illegal. This repeatedly leads to physical attacks against Christians by the protesting mob, especially in rural areas. (World Watch List 2019) On Easter Sunday, April 21st 2019, jihadist suicide bombers carried out a series of concerted attacks in three Catholic temples, resulting in 253 deaths and more than 500 injuries. The Islamist State took responsibility for the assassination. (Persecution.org 2019) On August 4, a group of radical Buddhist monks attacked and beaten up a young Methodist Christian in Mahiyanganaya village in the central part of the country. Church leaders have submitted a complaint to the local police but no arrests have been made. (Persecution.org 2019) On August 31, Muslim extremists attacked a Christian family, setting fire ot their homes and demanding their conversion to Islam. The family lived in the village of Walathappatti, in the eastern part of the country. (The Persecution of Christians 2019)

Literature

Asia News (2019). Source: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Christians-beaten-during-prayer-in-Uttar- Pradesh-46210.html (web: 15 September 2019)

37 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019

Barnabasfund (2019). Source: https://barnabasfund.org/en/news/jihadists-massacre-entire-christian- village-in-mali-killing-at-least-100-many-burnt-to-death (web: 15 September 2019) BBC (2019). Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46772729 (web: 15 September 2019) France 24 (2019). Source: https://www.france24.com/en/20190522-central-african-republic-french- spanish-nun-murdered-vatican (web: 15 September 2019) Pakistan Christian Post (2019). http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/head-line-news-details/7064 (web: 15 September 2019) Persecution.org (2019). Source: (web: 15 September 2019): https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/08/nineteen-christians-kidnapped-one-killed-violent-attacks-fulani- militants-nigeria/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/13/bloodshed-continues-central-african-republic/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/05/30/christian-woman-disappears-lower-egypt/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/08/15/un-warns-rising-threat-children-mali/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/04/05/christian-school-attacked-radicals/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/09/09/hindu-radicals-demand-death-organizers-christian-film- screening-india/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/21/15-syrian-christian-children-kidnapped/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/07/17/christian-woman-stoned-death-syria/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/07/14/isis-claims-car-bomb-detonated-outside-church-northeast-syria/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/06/27/slow-recovery-sri-lanka-christians-easter-bombings/ https://www.persecution.org/2019/08/16/young-christian-sri-lanka-assaulted-radical-monks/ S4C News (2019). Source (web: 15 September 2019): https://s4c.news/2019/02/05/60-embert-vegzett-ki-a-boko-haram-nigeriaban/ https://s4c.news/2019/03/02/muszlim-szelsosegesek-oltek-meg-tobb-mint-30-keresztenyt-nigeriaban/ https://s4c.news/2019/03/19/120-keresztennyel-vegeztek-nigeriaban-harom-het-alatt/ https://s4c.news/2019/03/26/olyan-volt-mint-egy-temeto-tobb-szaz-halottja-van-a-legutobbi-nigeriai- tamadasnak/ https://s4c.news/2019/09/07/oromhir-nigeriaban-kiszabadult-fogsagabol-egy-lelkesz/ https://s4c.news/2019/08/06/ujabb-papot-oltek-nigeriaban-fulani-utonallok/ https://s4c.news/2019/01/21/harom-templomot-zarattak-be-egyiptomban/

38 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 https://s4c.news/2019/03/18/ismeretlen-fegyveresek-tamadtak-meg-kopt-munkasokat-egyiptomban/ https://s4c.news/2019/04/16/koptokra-tamadtak-szelsoseges-iszlamistak-egy-egyiptomi-faluban/ https://s4c.news/2019/01/15/a-nehezsegek-kozepette-is-novekszik-az-egyhaz-maliban/ https://s4c.news/2019/02/19/templomokat-gyujtottak-fel-etiopiaban/ https://s4c.news/2019/02/19/templomokat-gyujtottak-fel-etiopiaban/ https://s4c.news/2019/03/28/egy-nap-alatt-tiz-templomot-gyujtottak-fel-etiopiaban/ https://s4c.news/2019/02/22/elraboltak-majd-megoltek-egy-mianmari-lelkeszt/ https://s4c.news/2019/02/22/elraboltak-majd-megoltek-egy-mianmari-lelkeszt/ https://s4c.news/2019/05/08/asia-bibi-elhagyta-pakisztant/ The Persecution of Ahmadis (2019). Source: (web: 15 September 2019): https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/the-blasphemy-law-in-pakistan-ahmadis/ The Persecution of Christians (2019). Source: (web: 15 September 2019): https://www.christianpersecution.com/mali/mali-95-christians-killed-in-attack-no-one-was-spared/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/india/india-christians-beaten-during-prayer-in-uttar-pradesh/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/india/india-persecution-of-christians-spikes-dramatically-with-77- incidents-in-january-and-february/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/india/india-hindu-nationalists-beat-christians-at-prayer-meeting- burn-bibles/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/india/india-christian-wedding-party-attacked-by-mob-with-rods- and-sticks/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/india/india-40-christians-on-pilgrimage-attacked-by-suspected- hindu-radicals/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/colombia/colombia-another-protestant-pastor-killed-leaving-the- church-terrified/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/indonesia/indonesia-christians-in-christian-majority-papua- province-increasingly-under-threat/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/indonesia/indonesia-christian-family-expelled-from-muslim-village- solely-because-of-their-faith/ https://www.christianpersecution.com/indonesia/indonesias-most-popular-Islamist-preacher-says- christian-crosses-are-inhabited-by-evil-spirits/

39 VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN 2019 https://www.christianpersecution.com/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-muslim-extremists-order-christian-tamils-to- convert-or-move-out-of-traditional-homeland/ World Watch List (2019). Source: https://www.opendoorsusa.org/2019-world-watch-list-report/ (web: 15 September 2019) World Watch Monitor (2019). Source: (web: 15 September 2019): https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/countries/pakistan/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2019/01/wife-beaten-so-badly-she-cant-walk-and-hes-now-deep-in- debt-pakistani-christian-freed-from-3-year-false-trial-for-blasphemy/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/countries/car/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/india-christian-convert-killed-and-left-on-the-road-beheaded/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2019/02/ethiopia-ethnic-somali-christian-police-man-forced-to- relocate-after-talking-about-his-faith/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/countries/mexico/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/countries/syria/ https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2019/02/another-colombian-pastor-killed-leaving-the-church- terrified/ Vatican News (2019). Source: https://www.vaticannews.va/hu/egyhaz/news/2019-02/megoltek-egy- papot-kolumbiaban.html (web: 15 September 2019) Voice of the Martyrs (2019). Source: (web: 15 September 2019): https://vom.com.au/pakistan-four- christian-women-falsely-accused/ https://vom.com.au/pakistan-christian-teen-abducted-and-forcefully-converted-to-islam/ https://vom.com.au/pakistan-christian-family-left-homeless-following-mob-attack/ https://vom.com.au/pakistan-christian-prayer-service-attacked-by-mob/ https://vom.com.au/nigeria-fulani-militants-kill-over-20/ https://vom.com.au/nigeria-nasarawa-state-subjected-to-fulani-attacks/ https://vom.com.au/nigeria-infant-dedication-concludes-in-massacre/ https://vom.com.au/india-christian-families-forced-to-reconvert-or-be-banished/ https://vom.com.au/mexico-protestants-forcibly-displaced/ https://vom.com.au/mexico-pastor-killed-during-church-service/ https://vom.com.au/syria-bomb-attack-on-qamishli-church/

40 Azbej Tristan

HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM

The Hungary Helps Program is the Hungarian Government’s comprehensive humanitarian and development framework program, which, expressing the solidarity of the Hungarian people, enables providing assistance to those communities in the world who are either persecuted or are in need in a rapid, effective and direct way. The Hungarian Government pays special attention to the fate of Christians, who we consider to be the most persecuted religious group on the world. The program also aims to make Hungary na influential contributor to the process which aims to eliminate all of those the causes and processes which create forced international migration. Hungary believes that this goal can only be achieved if we enabling the survival and prosperity of all local communities in their homelands if we improve their living standards. Since its inception, the most important area for the Hungary Helps Program has been war-torn northern Iraq, including the Christian- majority Nineveh Plateau, where tens of thousands of people have received with indispensable help to stay in place through numerous projects. This study intends to present briefly this successful work.

I. Introduction: Christian past, present and future in Northern Iraq

Christian communities in Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein

The Mesopotamian Plains of the past between the Tigris and the Euphrates ivers,r are one of the cradles of Christianity and some of the Christian communities who inhabit this region have lived for almost 2 millennia within the borders of modern-day Iraq. However, they had to face changing conditions over the reign of President Saddam Hussein (1979–2003). The Arab Socialist Baath Party, whose policies were secular, nationalist and pan-Arab and not expressly anti-Christian, took several measures which was painful for the Christian communities in Iraq. The consequences of these actions included het weakening of their unique linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities, through the nationalization of the Iraqi Christian education system to

41 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM the physical deportation and extermination of Christians. The Baathist government intentionally divided the country’s Christian communities by emphasizing the existing denominational and ethnic differences between them, which diminished the power and influence of Iraqi Christians. In 1993, as part of the “Return to Faith Campaign” framework, the state strongly turned to Islam. This included investing unprecedented resources in the construction of mosques and in of the incorporation of Sharia law into the Iraqi legal system, yet in the last decade of Saddam’s era, Christians could enjoy relative religious peace and freedom. This and a state (!) program which provided funds for the renovation of major Christian properties, including countless churches, made Iraq a destination for Christians who had to flee neighbouring countries. Between 1979 and 2003, the Assyrian Chaldean Tariq Aziz was the country’s deputy prime minister, but he also held the position of foreign minister and he was one of Saddam Hussein’s confidential advisers. (Kóré, 2018). Following the overthrow of the Baath regime and the outbreak of the Iraqi war in 2003, the general social and economic situation of Christians in the country began to deteriorate severely. As a result of the Allied military intervention, the Iraqi central government lost control over the country’s territory and it also lost its ability to maintain law and order. The ensuing power vacuum exacerbated Sunni-Shiite relations and soon serious physical attacks began against people belonging to the stigmatized Christian minority. Christian communities have been marginalized in all spheres of life, they had to experience discrimination at all levels of government which reduced their access to public services. Their position on the labour market has lsoa deteriorated which threatened the wealth security of the whole community.

The expansion of the Islamist State and the destruction of the Nineveh Plateau

Since 2003, several Islamist groups have emerged from the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant of these is the Islamist State (IS), which became an independent organisation in April 2013 and carried out about ten thousand military operations of various magnitude in Iraq in the same year. On 10 June 2014 IS captured Mosul, the most significant and populous city in Northern Iraq, which became an important milestone in the history of the IS. A month later, when IS seized a contiguous territory in eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq, it official proclaimed the foundation of a caliphate. After this moment, the terrorist organization which aimed to become a state institutionalized its atrocities against Christians. The Islamist State occupation of the areas of ancient Christianity meant unprecedented suffering for the Christian community in Iraq which was in a very precarious position due to the loss of its intellectual centres

42 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM and economic power. They were exposed to serious physical atrocities, cruel executions and forced conversion, and the heavy burden of the religious tax (jizya), imposed on Christians on religious grounds, further limited the chances of their survival. In 2008 nearly 12,000 Christians were forced to flee Mosul because they were threatened by Muslims and stigmatized as “Western collaborators.” The last representatives of a two-thousand- year-old Christian community in Mosul, which dates back to the first century A.D. left the city in July 2014. By this time, the burning and expropriation of Christian properties, including valuable lands and public spaces, became common practice throughout the war-torn country. As a result of the ordeal of Iraqi Christianity since 2003 and the devastation of the last half-decade, the community, which once numbered one and a half million people, is estimated to have fallen to just 230,000 today (Open Doors USA, 2018). This dramatic decline was mainly caused by mass escape and heavy emigration, the causes of which were, besides the lack of physical security, severe economic insecurity, loss of wealth and impoverishment, and the largely destroyed educational and healthcare infrastructure. The Nineveh Plateau in the northern part of the country is particularly affected, since close to 200,000 Christians have migrated to other parts of the country, such as Erbil and Duhok in Kurdistan, Iraq, and Lebanon and Jordan.

Obstacles in the way of ongoing reconstruction and the repatriation of Christians

IS has lost its territory and Iraqi government forces and allied Northern Iraqi militias have taken control of the territory of the entire country. According to the latest data provided by the Nineveh Reconstruction Committee this year, more than 14,000 residential buildings have become uninhabitable in nine Christian settlements of the Nineveh Plateau due to fighting and damage done by Islamists. Material damage caused by the destruction of the Nineveh Plateau over three years is estimated to reach $ 230 million - 68.6 billion HUF. And the cost of rebuilding the city of Mosul could be as high as $ 2 billion (597 billion HUF). The strong repatriation trend between January 2017 and April 2018 has now stopped. Despite this, the reconstruction of residential buildings is continuing at a fast pace. So far, about 7,680 residential buildings, 55 per cent of the damaged residential buildings, have been restored in the area. However, the resettlement of the fleeing Christian population is hindered by a coefficient of several factors. Destruction of the local infrastructure and the slow pace of its rehabilitation are important factors that hinder the return of refugees. Although educational institutions have been rebuilt in many settlements of the Nineveh Plateau, the rehabilitation of basic health care and the replacement of absentee doctors is still unresolved. Water

43 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM and power supply do not meet local needs and there are major outages. Because of the climate in Northern Iraq, the region needs well-constructed drinking water wells and irrigation systems, and essential agricultural equipment. The Islamists wanted to cut the roots of the local Christians by destroying their churches and the cemeteries of their ancestors. On the Nineveh Plateau alone, 370 church properties were damaged, including the 1400-year- old building of St. Elias Monastery south of Mosul, which was destroyed in 2014. The destruction of these sacred sites, which also served as public spaces, and other pieces of the architectural heritage has weakened the community identity of scattered Iraqi Christians and significantly reduces het chances of their return. The Christian-inhabited area of the Nineveh Plateau has long been a disputed area for which the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan has a strong claim. Since a referendum, organized by the regional government in Erbil in September 2017 on secession from Iraq, where 92 per cent of voters opted for secession, the area has clashes between Sunni Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Shiite Muslim People’s Mobilization Unit (PMU) militias, who are supported by the Iraqi government. The free movement of repatriated Christian residents is often restricted, which also hampers the development of local economic life. The IS confiscated the lands and other property of Christians in the conquered territories, much of which, following the liberation, was seized , with the support of Shiite militias, by Muslim Arabs and Shabaks often at the expense of those Sunni Muslims, who in the meantime had moved into the empty houses of fleeing Christians. In the absence of proper legal representation and substantial protection of property rights, returning Christians are often unable to regain their old land, which served not only as an emotional connection with their ancestors and homeland but also, above all, it was the foundation of their independent existence. Baghdad is unable to guarantee the property rights and legal security of minorities due to the volatile internal political situation. Also, another economic factor that impedes the repatriation is the large-scale destruction of retail shops, which used to be the primary source of income for a large proportion of the Christian population. Most of the existing jobs have already been filled by Muslims, as a result, able-bodied Christians who either remained or returned to the area are displaced from local economic life, forcing many to emigrate again. The great majority of the newly appointed staff at the Christian-majority Qaraqosh Hospital and the university are Muslim. Increased insecurity and fear discourage many Christian families from returning.

44 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM

II. Our strategy: the Hungarian humanitarian model

Christianity is the most persecuted religious group worldwide, as four out of five people persecuted or otherwise discriminated against due to their religion are Christian (Mounstephen, 2019). Over the past decade and a half, the growing geopolitical instability of the Middle East, the rise of radical Islam, and growing religious and ethnic conflicts have shaken the Christian communities of the region and forced them to leave their homeland to an extent never seen before. The roots of Christian culture and the Western world lie in the Middle East. Their rupture and demise may shock the foundations of universal human civilization. As a country with a thousand-year-old Christian culture, Hungary is committed to the preservation of universal and local Christian culture and values. And as part of these values, it takes responsibility for and is committed to protecting those Christian communities which are subject to persecution worldwide. The Hungarian Government regards the romotionp of the survival and prosperity of persecuted Christian communities as well as the provision of decent living conditions in their homelands as a priority. The guiding principle of the Government’s humanitarian policy is to bring aid where the trouble exists, not to bring the trouble to Europe and our country. Instead of encouraging and organizing mass migration across continents, we need to provide direct on-the-spot assistance which addresses the immediate needs of the communities concerned. This will eliminate the root causes of international migration and saving many already fragile communities from the disadvantages of emigration. It is one of the unprecedented and practical principles of the Hungarian humanitarian model that, after establishing close contact with the Church leaders of the persecuted and in-need communities, assistance will be distributed directly through these Churches and their affiliates which ensures that the humanitarian assistance will benefit the designated recipients alone. In 2017, the Government of Hungary established the Hungary Helps Program through a government decree1, which aims to provide a uniform framework for the distribution of humanitarian aid and foreign development funds provided by Hungary. To ensure quick and efficient assistance, the rliamentPa adopted Act CXX of 2018 on the Hungary Helps Program. The legislation placed the coordination of international humanitarian aid activities under the responsibility of the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and the Implementation of the Hungary Helps Program: to facilitate the aid distribution and the Government established the Hungary Helps Agency, which was registered on 14 April 2019, as a 100% state-owned nonprofit ompany.c This agency

1 titled Government decree 244/2017. (VIII. 28.) on the Hungary Helps Program.

45 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM is responsible for the management of budget grants and donations managed by Hungary Helps Program to help persecuted Christian communities, and to provide humanitarian assistance. The operation of the Hungary Helps Agency ensures rapid and effective delivery of assistance to persecuted communities and victims of humanitarian catastrophes. This agency further boosts Hungary ability to make a decisive contribution to the elimination of local processes that cause international migration by providing immediate assistance locally.

III. Humanitarian and development projects under the Hungary Helps Program

1. Reconstruction of Tell-Askuf (Chaldean Catholic Church)

Located 30 kilometres north of Mosul, the Chaldean settlement of Tell-Askuf is a Catholic-majority city and one of the oldest Christian communities in the world, with a history which goes back to about two thousand years. In August 2014, IS troops stormed the city. Although the Kurdish Peshmerga was able to re-occupy the city in the same month, yet in May 2016, there was another Islamists incursion. Although the city was liberated the same day, the Islamists in the city did their best to destroy the settlement. In Tell-Askuf they damaged 1,287 residential buildings and 21 religious properties, including the church of the town, which forced some 1,300 Christian families to leave their homes, most of whom found refuge in the Ankawa district of Erbil. In 2017, the Hungarian government supported the Chaldean Catholic Church with 580 million HUF for the reconstruction of the city2. The Hungarian assistance enabled the renovation of 950 damaged housing units which enabled approximately 1,000 families to return to their hometown and begin rebuilding their lives. The severely damaged St. George’s Church, five schools and the local kindergarten were also restored from the same grant. Besides, the funds covered the establishment of a new public cemetery, since the ancient cemetery of the city was severely damaged by Islamists who wanted to erase the Christian past of this town by destroying its heritage sites. The revival of the community is marked by the fact that years later, baptisms and weddings took place in the temple. In neighbouring Bakofa and Batnaya, also inhabited by Christians, 41 and 42 residential houses were also reconstructed.

2 Government resolution 1162/2017. (III. 27.) on supporting persecuted Christians living in the Middle East.

46 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM

2. Construction of the Primary School of the Virgin Mary in Erbil (Chaldean Catholic Church)

Tens of thousands of Christians from other parts of the country and Syria have arrived in Erbil’s Christian- majority Ankawa district in recent years and the quarter has become a crowded refugee camp; besides the camps, refugees are accommodated in hangars and in under construction or abandoned buildings. The increased population puts a heavy strain on local public services, and the construction of a new school building has become necessary to provide education for refugee children. It is estimated that every fifth Iraqi school has become unusable for educational purposes due to the devastation of the IS, and almost two million children receive no education at all. In 2016, the Hungarian government supplemented an 80 million HUF donation by the Hungarian Catholic Church with 120 million HUF, so a total of 200 million HUF was provided by Hungary for this purpose to the Chaldean Catholic Archdiocese of Erbil3. This funding enabled the construction of the three-story state-of-the- art Virgin Mary (Marya Mana) Primary School which opened its doors on 2 October 2017 and so hundreds of Christian and non-Christian children from Erbil and elsewhere could continue their education.

3. Supporting the operation of St. Joseph’s Hospital in Erbil (Chaldean Catholic Church)

The proliferation of the IS has had disastrous consequences for the healthcare system in Northern Iraq, which has been underfunded for decades and was already weak. On the one hand, worsening working conditions and physical threats have led to a surge in the number of doctors leaving the region, at least a quarter of Iraqi doctors are estimated to have emigrated, accompanied by a shortage of doctors forced into Syria when Islamists were retreating. Moreover, fighting has caused considerable damage to the local healthcare infrastructure and the growing number of people in need of health care have access to fewer resources. All together six hospitals were destroyed, other 23 were severely damaged nationwide; life expectancy has decreased by about four years. Tens of thousands of Christian families fled to Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan in Iraq, which have put a heavy strain on the city’s healthcare system: St. Joseph’s Hospital in Erbil is the only hospital in the entire region which offers free healthcare facility for chronic patients. By May 2017, the hospital’s medication stocks has completely been depleted. The Government of Hungary has provided 290 million HUF for St. Joseph’s Hospital in 2017

3 Government resolution 1157/2016 (IV. 5.) on the financial support of education for refugee children in the Middle East.

47 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM and 2018 which covered the cost of medication supply in both years4, which enabled the hospital to continue treating local patients and refugees alike. Thanks to the gradual integration of refugees into local society and their resettlement elsewhere, the clinic has gradually reduced its refugee care status in 2019.

4. Restoration of Christian Homes on the Nineveh Plateau (Syrian Orthodox Church)

In 2017, the Hungarian Government provided 310 million HUF for the implementation of the Syrian Orthodox Church’s humanitarian projects in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon as part of the Hungary Helps Program5. Iraq was allocated 55 million HUF out of this grant which enabled the restoration of 22 damaged residential houses in Qaraqosh, 13 in neighbouring Bahzani, 12 in Bashiqa and 10 in Bartella. Christian families who fled their settlements on the Nineveh Plateau are returning ot their homes, and are gradually relieving Erbil, Duhok and other settlements that have sheltered them from the hardships of recent years.

5. Construction of St. George’s Church of Diana (Assyrian Oriental Church)

Diana, an Assyrian Christian town which belongs to the Erbil Diocese of the Eastern Church of Assyria, is located 70 kilometres northeast of Erbil, has become one of the largest cities in Iraqi Kurdistan in the last half- century, with a population growing tenfold since 1980. Throughout history, Diana has served several times as a safe haven for refugees, most recently for Christians expelled from the Nineveh Plateau by the IS. The Kurdish name of the city simply means “Christian”. In 2018, the Government of Hungary contributed 143.4 million HUF to the construction of Diana’s new St. George’s Church6. The new church has a larger capacity than the one it replaced which wasin a poor static condition, thus, it now fully meets the needs of the reviving and refugee community of Assyrian Christians in Nineveh. Strengthening local ecclesiastical infrastructure can play a very important role in convincing refugees

4 Government resolution 1829/2016. (XII. 23.) on the tasks of the Deputy State Secretariat for the aid of persecuted Christians and the financial resources thereof; Government resolution 1088/2018. (III. 13.) on the extension of the funding of the medication supplies of the St. Joseph’s Hospital, founded by the Chaldean Catholic Church. 5 Government resolution 1162/2017. (III. 27.) on supporting persecuted Christians living in the Middle East. 6 Government resolution 1170/2018. (III. 27) on supporting the projects of the Assyrian Oriental Church.

48 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM or IDPs to return home. The new church was handed over to the local community on 15 May 2019 and this event was attended by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Tristan Azbej, State Secretary.

6. Reconstruction of the Training Center in Alqosh (Chaldean Catholic Church)

Although the IS failed to capture the Assyrian Christian city of Alqosh on the Nineveh Plateau in 2014, yet during the siege of the nearby Mosul much of the city’s population fled to Duhok. Due to the security provided by the Peshmerga, many families now have returned to Alqosh. However, to reconcile local society and boost economic life, it was necessary to set up a new educational centre to support community life and to hold events. So in 2018, the Hungarian Government provided 261.2 million HUF to the Alqosh Diocese of the Erbil Chaldean Catholic Archdiocese7. The funds will cover the construction of a new training centre in Alqosh, which will be open to everyone regardless of religious affiliation, this includes Christians and members of the much- affected Yazidi minority. By repairing the damaged parts of buildings, completing the construction, equipment and accessories supplied, the institution will act as a centre of the community. Moreover, it will also provide the local workforce with valuable training opportunities to succeed in the economy. The project can bring about lasting improvement and a new chance to succeed in their homeland for about 200 families.

7. De-mining, decontamination and reconstruction of residential buildings in Qaraqosh (Mosul Archdiocese of Syrian Catholic Church)

Iraq’s once-largest Christian city Qaraqosh, with a population of 53,000 mostly Syrian Catholic inhabitants was occupied by the IS in August 2014 following the retreat of Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Almost all of the 11,000 Christian families sought refuge in the surrounding areas. Thecity was liberated from Islamist rule in April 2017, but about 7,000 residential buildings, business several churches were either damaged or destroyed. In Qaraqosh, the Islamists were especially destructive, they brought in people from Mosul and paying them $ 10 per every burnt down. Since its liberation, more than 3,200 homes have been restored, allowing more

7 Government resolution 1242/2018. (III. 13.) on supporting the school-construction project in Alqosh of the Chaldean Catholic Archdiocese in Erbil.

49 HUNGARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ THROUGH THE HUNGARY HELPS PROGRAM than 5,700 families, about 26,000 people to return. In 2018, almost twenty thousand people celebrated Easter together in liberated Qaraqosh. In 2017, the Government of Hungary agreed to support the implementation of the Syrian Catholic Church’s several humanitarian projects in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon with 310 million HUF.8 Out of this amount, apart from some smaller repairs, 41.2 million HUF has been earmarked by the Church for projects in Iraq. This funding enabled the renovation of 76 housing which improved the living conditions of about 900 people. In 2018, the Hungarian Government financed the complete reconstruction of 35 destroyed residential buildings in Qaraqosh with a grant valued at 320 million HUF9. This project included professional mine clearance, demolition work and the complete removal of ruins. Once this project has been completed 500 more people can return to their hometown, mainly Christian families who are currently abroad but intend to return to Iraq, and some internally displaced persons.

8. Construction of the Um al Noor Primary School in Erbil (Syrian Orthodox Church, Mosul Metropolia)

In 2018, the Hungarian Government supported the construction of the Um al Noor Primary School in Erbil with 320 million HUF under the auspices of the Mosul Syrian Orthodox Metropolia.10 When the investment is completed, approximately 170 local and refugee Christian children will have access to primary education in the Ankawa district of Erbil, which accommodates tens of thousands of Christians. Basic school supplies and new jobs related to the project are expected to provide an incentive for long-term family resettlement, preventing further migration from Iraq.

8 Government resolution 1162/2017. (III. 27.) on supporting persecuted Christians living in the Middle East. 9 Government resolution 1663/2018. (XII. 6.) on supporting the projects of the Syrian Catholic and Syrian Orthodox Archdiocese in Mosul. 10 Idlib.

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9. Support for the Yazidi minority in Iraq (Hungarian Ecumenical Relief Organization, Chaldean Catholic Church)

In 2014, IS militants occupied the Northern Iraqi province of Sinjar, where hundreds of men belonging to the Yazidi minority were massacred and thousands of women were abducted, most of them were forced into sex slavery. By 2015, about half a million Yazidis had been forced to leave their homeland and seek refuge in other areas of Nineveh and Duhok Governorates of Iraq (International Organization for Migration, 2019). In 2019, the Hungarian government will provide 196.3 million HUF under the Hungary Helps Program to support of the repatriation of the Yazidis who had to leave the region or were forced to live in internally displaced persons’ camps, by supporting the reconstruction of Sinjar and the maintenance of an internal refugee camp in Khanke to prevent further emigration of the Yazidi population.11 This also assists Yazidi victims of sexual slavery by helping their recovery of, increasing their resilience, launching livelihood projects and education. With the involvement of the Hungarian Interchurch Aid Organization, Yazidi homes in Sinjar can be rebuilt, returning refugees can take part in training which will help them on the labour market, and the reconstruction of the Sheikh Hassan Temple can start. The presence of Hungarian funds will enable the creation of a women’s centre within an internally displaced persons’ camp for Yazidis at Khanke, Kurdistan. This facility will provide holistic assistance to the reintegration of severely traumatized women. As part of this, the same framework women will take part in sewing, knitting and handicraft training and they will also improve their digital literacy skills, which will greatly help them to become self-sufficient. A bakery will also be set up to provide work for women and girls. A children’s centre and an orphanage will be set up within the camp as well, where school activities, foreign language teaching and skills development can be started. The Hungarian Government also supports several humanitarian projects of the Erbil Archdiocese of the Chaldean Catholic Church with rehabilitation of Yazidi women who have become victims. Here professionals will assist women who are suffering from social, emotional and psychological distress by counselling, work and therapy for their final settlement.

11 Government resolution 1510/2019. (VIII. 23.) on the implementation of the projects designed to aid the local progress and repatriation of Yazidi refugees in Iraq and their funding under the Hungary Helps Program.

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10. Supporting Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq (Hungarian Interchurch Aid)

Between 2017 and 2019, the Hungarian Government provided a total of 535 million HUF in funds under the Hungary Helps Program, and with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Hungarian Interchurch Aid Organization for projects which assist North Iraqi refugees. The organization’s project office in Erbil was opened from 35 million HUF, which greatly alleviated the local organization challenges and the execution of day-to-day activities. The agency mainly deals with the distribution of food, hygiene and health- related donations and provides psycho-social assistance. A total of 125 million HUF was spent on the partial reconstruction of 55 residential buildings in the city of Qaraqosh, the reconstruction of 2 schools in Bashiqa and the reconstruction of a water network serving 2,500 people in Alqosh. As part of a 375 million HUF project, a few severely damaged schools are being rebuilt in Karemlash, Bashiqa, Qaraqosh and Tell Kaif. Also, the drinking water network will be reconstructed in Qaraqosh, which will provide water to 26,500 people. The project’s outstanding element is the provision of psycho-social assistance, which can be used by families in distress in a newly opened community centre in Qaraqosh.

IV. Scholarship Program for Christian Youths

In the fall of 2017, the Government established a Scholarship Programme for Christian Young People (SCYP) under the Government Decree 120/2017 (VI.1.), for persecuted, discriminated young people, and those threatened by terrorist organizations who are excluded from higher education in their country because of their Christian faith. The program provides higher education (basic, master’s, PhD) training opportunities in Hungarian higher education institutions in key occupations so that they become qualified nurses, pharmacists, civil engineers, agricultural engineers, and food safety experts. Theprogram expects students to return to their home countries and use the expertise they acquired in Hungary to strengthen their communities and participate in post-conflict reconstruction activities. At the time of writing this study, at the beginning of September 2019, approximately 150 young Christians studying at Hungarian higher education institutions under the Scholarship Program, 8 of whom are students from Iraq. In the 2019/2020 school year, another 100 young people are expected to arrive in Hungary with these scholarships, including 7 from Iraq. The total budget of the scholarship program from 2016 to the end of 2019 has been 1.381 billion HUF.

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V. Results

Between December 2016 and August 2019, the Hungarian Government provided approximately 9.8 billion HUF in humanitarian and development aid to Christian communities and other religious minorities in the world who have been persecuted and are in need, through the Hungary Helps Program. According to conservatively estimates the program enabled at least 50,000 people worldwide to either stay at their homelands or to return home to restart their lives. So far, the projects of the Hungary Helps Program in Northern Iraq have received 2.94 billion HUF financial support. In October 2018, Pope Francis himself commended the Hungary Helps Program and the State scholarship program for Christian youth, marking the achievements and the international success of our efforts. The Holy Father was deeply touched by the solidarity and altruism of Hungary towards the communities persecuted for their Christian faith. The significance of our country’s activities has been recognised by Donald Trump, the President of the United States who, in May 2019, expressed that “Hungary has done a great job working towards [persecuted] Christian communities”, which the United States greatly appreciates. Beyond individual engagement, Hungary considers it essential to act jointly with governments of like-minded countries. To this end, in December 2018, the Government of Hungary and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the protection and assistance of persecuted Christians. Based on this agreement a joint US-Hungarian humanitarian and development project will start soon in northern Iraq. In June 2018 Poland and Hungary also signed Memorandum of Understanding about jointly supporting a Syrian Orthodox orphanage in Homs, Syria. In addition to bilateral intergovernmental cooperation, Hungary is committed to developing a broad platform for international cooperation, so more countries will assist these persecuted communities. To this end, a working meeting of high-level representatives from five like-minded countries – the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Hungary - took place on 18 July 2019 in Washington at the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.

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Literature

1088/2018. (III. 13.) Korm. határozat az Erbíli Káld Katolikus Érsekség által alapított Szent József Kórház gyógyszerellátásának további támogatásáról. 1157/2016 (IV. 5.) Korm. határozat a közel-keleti térségben menekültként élő keresztény gyermekek oktatásának támogatásáról. 1162/2017. (III. 27.) Korm. határozat a közel-keleti térségben élő üldöztetést szenvedő keresztények támogatásáról. 1170/2018. (III. 27.) Korm. határozat az Asszír Keleti Egyház projektjeinek támogatásáról. 1242/2018. (III. 13.) Korm. határozat az Erbíli Káld Katolikus Érsekség Alkos-i iskolaépítési projektjének támogatásáról. 1510/2019. (VIII. 23.) Korm. határozat az iraki jezidi menekültek helyben maradását és hazatérését támogató projektek megvalósításáról és a Hungary Helps Program keretében történő támogatásáról. 1663/2018. (XII. 6.) Korm. határozat a moszuli szír katolikus és szír ortodox érsekség projektjeinek támogatásáról. 1829/2016. (XII. 23.) Korm. határozat az üldözött keresztények megsegítéséért felelős helyettes államtitkárság egyes feladatairól és az ahhoz szükséges források biztosításáról. 2018. évi CXX. törvény a Hungary Helps Programról. Kihirdetve: 2018. december 20. 244/2017. (VIII. 28.) Korm. rendelet a Hungary Helps Programról. Kóré, András (2019): A keresztények biztonsági helyzete Irakban és Szíriában a 2018-as évben. In Kaló József és Ujházi Lóránd (szerk.): Budapest-jelentés a keresztényüldözésről 2018. Budapest, Dialóg Campus. Mounstephen, Philip (2019): Bishop of Truro’s Independent Review for the Foreign Secretary of FCO Support for Persecuted Christians: Final Report and Recommendations. https://christianpersecutionreview.org.uk/report/ (web: 5 September 2019). Nemzetközi Migrációs Szervezet [International Organization for Migration] (2019): Understanding Ethnoreligious Groups in Iraq: Displacement and Return. Bagdad, IOM Iraq. https://iraq.iom.int/publications/understanding- ethno-religious-groups-iraq-displacement-and-return-report (web: 19 September 2019). Ninivei Újjáépítési Bizottság [Nineveh Reconstruction Committee] (2019): An Overview of Events in Mosul and the Nineveh Plains and the Situation of the Christian Population Forced out of the Area (from 2014 to the Spring of 2017). https://www.nrciraq.org/an-overview-of-events-in-mosul-and-the-nineveh-plains-from-2014-to-the- spring-of-2017/ (web: 5 September 2019). Open Doors USA (2018): Iraq – Final World Watch List 2019 Country Dossier. https://www.opendoorsusa.org/ christian-persecution/world-watch-list/iraq/ (web: 18 September 2019).

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István Resperger1

METHODS OF MILITANT ISLAM IN THE ISLAMIST STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

In our era, the most important security policy threats include various crises, conflicts and terrorism. This is highlighted by the fact that between 1945 and 2019 only 26 days were completely peaceful and passed without a single shot being fired in anger. Based on the latest available figures, the most peaceful and curese countries have been: Iceland, Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Slovenia, Finland. On the other hand, Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Central African Republic, Ukraine, Libya, Sudan, Pakistan lead the list of the least peaceful countries. (Global Peace index 2018) The umbern of casualties who died in armed conflicts rose from 19,601 to 101,406 in the period between 2008 and 2016. (Global Peace index 2018) UN organizations have 57 million refugees on their registries in 2016. The size, intensity fo recent armed conflicts is illustrated by the fact that 2,238 million people were killed between 1989 and 2016. 1,29 million people died in state-based conflicts, while 160,940 people perished in non-state-based conflicts and finally the death toll in one-sided conflicts was 786,620 people. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2019) Table 1 Number of state-based, non-state-based and one-sided conflicts Number of state- Number of non- Number of one-sided Total number of Ye a r based conflicts state-based conflicts conflicts conflicts 1973 30 – – 30 1991 40 27 – 67 2000 49 19 37 105 2005 32 30 35 97 2010 31 28 21 80 2015 42 61 26 129 2016 66 53 28 147 2017 84 50 33 167 2018 77 52 33 162 Uppsala Conflict Data Program Department of Peace and Conflict Research

1 National University of Public Service, Institute for National Security.

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The available forecasts until 2040 project several complex, multipolar, complicated conflicts. These threaten several dimensions of security within one region at the same time. These type of events are extremely challenging for the security forces and non-governmental organisations responsible for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

Graphic 1 Multiple stress conflict zones in 2040 (Ministry of Defense/b n.a. 69)

IS not only trigger a crisis, but the result was also a multi-layered crisis in the wake of a power vacuum. Between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 11 September 2001, the hegemony of the United States was an unquestionable fact in the international system. However, the United States was not omnipotent as the only

56 METHODS OF MILITANT ISLAM IN THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM TERROR ORGANIZATIONS global superpower. This is illustrated by the fact that despite conducting multiple military interventions in North Africa and the Middle East, the US was unable to establish stable states in these regions. This is true in Libya, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq too. We now live in a world where not only the greatest powers possess the power to change the status quo, but many newly created terrorist organizations have similar ambitions. According to many experts, the crisis of the nation-state model lies at the heart of the current crises in the Middle East. The phenomenon is not new. The idea of the nation-state was forced upon eth inhabitants of this region. This idea developed organically in Europe yet it was fundamentally alien to the societies of the Islamic world. Most states in the Middle East are artificial formations without any real social legitimacy. Their citizens today are not necessarily loyal to the state but they are much more closely connected to their religious denominations, broader communities, tribes, families or clans. (Hermann 2015, 27) Terrorism, as a major global threat, has a very significant impact on our contemporary global society. But if we examine the root causes of terrorism, we will find that it is a very complex phenomenon.Terrorism has been strongly influenced by multiple different dimensions, like demographics, religious affiliation, economics, food and water supply. To understand why two terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, could have had a major impact on geopolitics, geostrategy, and on the development of military science which led to the emergence of asymmetric and hybrid warfare, we also have to study the above-mentioned areas.

Demographic explosion and its consequences

Global challenges include a quick increase in the global population. In 2017, our planet will have 7.5 billion inhabitants. (Kaiser 2011) By 2050, the population on Earth is expected to grow to 9.8 billion, and by 2100 this number may rise to as high as 11 billion. (Central Statistical Office 2019) The biggest problems in demographics are linked to the very rapid demographic growth of Africa and South Asia, while the population of Europe is shrinking and ageing. The demographically fast-developing countries are shown in Table 1: a few more countries are entering a period of quick demographic growth such as Iran, India and Brazil. (Ministry of Defense n. a., 3–11)

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Table 2 Demographic development of countries

Demographic Country Average age in 2010 (year) Average age in 2030 (year) development phase Brazil 29 35 2000–2030 India 26 32 2015–2050 China 35 43 1990–2025 Iran 26 37 2005–2040 Russia 39 44 1950–2015 USA 37 39 1970–2010 (European Strategy and Policy and Analysis system 2015, 17–23)

Population growth affects different continents in different ways. Theulation pop of the African continent has increased 5.5 times since 1950, while in Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Oceania the increase was more than threefold. Meanwhile, the population of North America has only doubled. The smallest growth was recorded in Europe, with just a 1.4-fold increase. (Central Statistical Office 2019) By 2050, the population of the more advanced world is expected to be close to the levels of 2000, while developing countries will have at least 7,8 billion inhabitants. (So a 1:6.5 ratio can be predicted.) (Kaiser 2011) In 1950 Europe accounted for more than one-fifth of the global population, while today about one out every ten people on the planet lives in Europe, which is 742 million people. The combined share of the other three continents (Latin America and the Caribbean, North America and Oceania) remained unchanged at 14%. The world’s two most populous countries, China and India, account for 19% (1,4 billion) and 18% (1,3 billion) of the Earth’s population. This means that more people live in these two Asian countries than in the three smallest continents combined. (Kaiser 2011)

The religious dimension

In terms of religious data and proportions, the world population will be distributed as outlined in Table 2, and these proportions may change.

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Table 3 The number and percentage of followers of larger religious groups within the global population

2010 2050 2070 2100 2,16 billion people 2,91 billion people Christians 31,4% 31,4% 32,3% 33,8% 1,6 billion people 2,76 billion people Muslims 23,2% 29,7% 32,3% 34,9% 1,13 billion people 1,23 billion people Without religion –– 16,4% 13,2% 1,03 billion people 1,38 billion people Hindus –– 15% 14,9% 487,76 million people 486,27 million people Buddhists –– 7,1% 5,2% 404,69 million people 449,14 million people Tribal religions –– 5,9% 4,8% 13,86 million people 16,09 million people Jews –– 0,2% 0,2% Total global 6,895 billion people 9,307 billion people –– population 100% 100% Pew Research Center 2015.

To illustrate all this, if we reduced humanity to a village of 100 people, and preserve the proportion of nations, the village would look like this: • 57 Asian, 21 European, 14 American (North and South American), 8 African people; • gender ratio: 52 women to 48 men; • 70 non-white people and 30 white people; • 70 non-Christians and 30 Christians would live in the village; • 80 would not have satisfactory housing conditions; • 30 would be malnourished; • 20 would have a computer; • 1 would have a degree. (Smith – Shelag 2018)

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Food Shortage

Due to the demographic explosion, feeding this ever-increasing population is a growing concern. It is projected that by 2030 the world’s subsistence, fodder and fibre demand will increase by 60%. (A world perspective no food shortages) According to the World Bank, the world needs to produce 50% more food to feed humanity by 2050. Climate change can reduce crop yields by more than 25%. (A world perspective on food shortages) As a result, 700-800 million people in Asia and Africa will be malnourished. (Smith – Shelag 2018)

Graphic 2 Lack of food security between 2010-2045 (Ministry of Defense n. a. 36)

Water Shortage

Closely related to the issue of nutrition is the issue of exploration and distribution of global drinking water reserves. As the population of the Earth grows, so does the demand for drinking water because water use has increased twice as fast as the rate of the population growth over the last hundred years. Today, almost half of the world’s river systems are damaged to some extent, and some rivers no longer reach the ocean and are drying up.

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To date, the water flow of almost 70% of the rivers worldwide has reduced by various mount.a Climate change, which alters the distribution of precipitation and increases evaporation, is one of the reasons for the drying up of rivers and lakes. The demand for drinking water will be 30% higher than our exploitable reserves by 2040 according to the UN’s estimates. Producing one kilogram of rice requires at least 5,000 litres of water, while coffee requires 22,000 litres of water. (Kaiser 2011) Only 2.5% of the planet’s water resources is freshwater which is potable for humans. 69% of this reserve is stored in glaciers, polar snow and ice, and another 30% is located in underground water aquifers which we can not access due to technological or financial restraints. By 2025, between 2,4 and 3,4 billion people will live in a water-stressed country, which can provide less than 1,700 cubic meters of water per person per year to their citizens. These countries are mostly in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and North China. (See areas shown in red in Graphic 3.) Two or more states share 200 major river systems worldwide, most of which are subject to water distribution disputes. Rivers in the Middle East (the Jordan, the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates) are good examples of conflicts linked to the distribution of water resources. (Ministry of Defense n. a. 3–11)

Graphic 3 Water security in 2045 (MINISTRY OF DEFENSE N. A., 36) This is also 204

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Terrorism

“It is a fact that not every Muslim is a terrorist, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims ” (SHAPIRO 2018)

The latest terrorism databases support the idea behind the motto of this section. Between 2008 and 2016, the number of deaths from terrorist incidents increased by 286% (from 8,466 to 32,175) (Global Peace Index 2019) while between 2008 and 2017, this same indicator was 247%. (Ibid.) The number of refugees in 2017 was 63.9 million, and humanity spent 12,6% of the world’s GDP on armed conflicts and violence. tI cost $ 5.4 a day person for the entire world population. The number of deaths was 32,175, which shows a steady increase over the last 10 years. The number of terrorist incidents in 2014 was 13,000. 80% of these terrorist incidents occurred between 2013 and 2014. (Ibid.) Most of the problems in 2017, according to the available data was caused by international terrorist organizations, like the Islamic State (270 attacks, 1986 dead), Boko Haram (63 attacks, 317 dead), Taliban (62 attacks, 764 dead), al-Shabab (48 attacks, 318 dead), al-Qaeda (31 attacks, 258 dead), Kurdish terrorist organizations (18 attacks, 27 dead) and other similar organizations (232 attacks, 989 dead). (Global Terrorism Index 2018). Terrorism-related deaths in OECD countries show a 650% increase compared to 2015. The global cost of terrorism in 2015 was estimated at $ 89.6 billion. Global( Terrorism Index 2018). The probability of someone becoming a victim of a terrorist attack in the United States is 1:46,000. (Ibid.) As Carl von Clausewitz puts it, “War, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.” (Clausewitz 2014) Let us look at the concept of terrorism by the analogy of this statement. ‘Terrorism: The action of terrorists (individuals or groups), to force their will on an opponent, to achieve political ends, particularly by conducting operations against the civilian population, (Resperger – Kis – Somkúti 2013)2 Common features of the concepts are: • political, religious, ideological motivation; • the use of violence; • intention to provoke fear; • disruption of the operation of government and society.

2 For the definition of terrorism see: “ The threat or use of violence by non-state actors.” (Thamm 2002, 86) Or: ”Terrorism is deliberate, systematic violence upon the civilian population to reach political ends through the fear it creates.” (Netanyahu 1995, 20.)

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Terrorism is driven by Muslims

“It is a fact that not every Muslim is a terrorist, but it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims.” (Shapiro 2018) These are the words of Abdel Rahman al-Rashed a famous religious scholar about terrorism. The rationale behind our investigation of religious ( Islamist) terrorism is driven by our need to understand why so many fanatical, religiously motivated individuals and groups are ready to commit bloody acts of violence. One of the major threats today is the Islamic State’s international terrorist network. Although the world has achieved a lot in the fight against terrorism, we can not ignore that the network still has significant reserves.

Formation, activities and structure of the Islamic State

The organization was able to expand the number of its combat troops very rapidly, and the Islamic State controlled as much territory in Iraq and Syria as Rommel in North Africa during the Second World War. At its peak IS had about 22000 - 25000 km2 under its control and, most importantly, it also enjoyed the support of the local population. This was only possible because the 9 million Iraqi Sunni Muslims have been marginalized after the 2003 American occupation of Iraq. Development of the Islamic State: • 2005: 1,000 people, • 2006: 1,100 people, • 2011: 1,000 – 2,000 people, • 2014: 6,000 – 10,000 people, • 2014: 11,000 ( 6,000 people in Iraq, 3,000 – 5,000 people in Syria), • 2015: 20,000 – 315,000 people. (Tilghman 2007) The leader of this organization is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who is the chairman of Shura Council (13 members), the Military Council (13 members), and the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Council. Besides, the other pillar of IS is the Religious Council and a subordinated Religious Police. They are always ready to protect the foundations of Islam by executing anyone on the spot who have violated these foundations. Baghdadi calls himself the Caliph of the state. He has two lieutenants who are the governors of Iraq and Syria. Besides them, there are those governors who control the occupied territories of the 13 provinces of Syria and Iraq. Besides them, the IS employs about one thousand middle managers, who receive between $

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300 and $ 2,000 a month as leadership benefits, plus financial contributions depending on theumber n of their wives and children. (Terrill 2014) The real strength of Islamic State is their cadre of foreign fighters. The jihadists come from nearly 80 countries and their number is about 20,000. (Ruzsbaczky 2015) What does IS offer them? Above all, the possibility to experience violence nda brutality. This is a great opportunity for a Muslim fighter, who had to go through many defeats and humiliation before emerging as victorious warriors reshaping the destiny of the Middle East. The Islamic State, which is not just a terrorist organization but a well-functioning social and political organisation, with several long term plans. Their planning methods and levels include great strategic planning, on the political level, and selecting their military-strategic level objectives, and the appropriate tactical-level methods, applications, and procedures. It is no coincidence that an IS spokesman stated that the IS had no reason to follow any al-Qaeda directive since al-Qaeda is no more than a mere terrorist organization – while they are a state. (Reuter 2016, 370) IS intends to use the tools of hard power to achieve the following objectives at the highest strategic, political level: • to overthrow the governments of Iraq and Syria and taking over political power; • to establish the Islamic State and protect it from external threats; • expand the territory of the Islamic State and unite the larger Muslim community (ummah). By using hard power, they understand that their attacks are a partial scourge on unbelievers, which is becoming more widespread in the region, in the cities. (Lewis 2015) In addition to the general operations of a terrorist organization, IS intentionally targeted Christians and other religious minorities. They would like to direct their activities in the Caliphate following the guidance of a Caliph who governs the state according to the regulations of the Quran and Sharia law.3 They interpret the Sharia literally so they separate women from men, everyone is required to pray five times a day, while the consumption of alcohol and tobacco is forbidden. Men are obliged to wear beards. Those non-Sunnis who cannot escape have to pay a tax, protection money. The IS marks the houses of Christians with the letter (N) for Nasserani while the houses of Shiites are marked by the letter ( R ) which refers to the pejorative word RAID which is used by extremist Sunnis to describe Shiites. IS’s

3 „In the interpretation of Muslims, Sharia is ”the realization of the person to his fullest”, it controls every sphere of human life. It distinguishes acts which are explicitly forbidden ethically (haram), which are explicitly obligatory (wajib), disapproved but not prohibited (makruh), recommended but not obligatory (mandub), indifferent (mubah). There are only a few things which are explicitly prohibited, obligatory, most activities of everyday life are in the category of mubah. Everything that is outside the category of haram (forbidden) is allowed.” (Rostoványi 1983, 66)

64 METHODS OF MILITANT ISLAM IN THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM TERROR ORGANIZATIONS civilian staff is responsible for power generation and electricity and cooking gas, distribution. Hospitals are said to be free, they also have free kitchens and consumer protection authorities control the quality of the goods. They also operate retirement homes for the elderly, religious schools for the young and other similar social facilities. They also issue personal documents, money, flag so they behave like a pseudo, fake, state. Their attempts to create a Caliphate was met possibly by the deficiencies and incompetence of the Iraqi security forces, the events of the Syrian civil war and marginalisation of Sunnis in Iraq. IS engages in classical terrorist attacks against certain groups of enemies of the organization, killing as many people as possible while creating the greatest level of fear they can. Targeted murders and executions serve to deter the enemy like those murders which are committed by the first subunits in every city they conquer. The members of this subunit immediately conduct a few arbitrary executions on the main square of the settlement, which, in addition to arousing fear, also serves to drive a part of the population away. As the Islamic State’s propaganda department distributes the videos of these massacres, the population of the areas they intend to capture knows what to expect. (Winter 29–36) The other face of the organization is the activities which protect the health and well-being of their subjects. For example, IS have launched an anti-polio vaccination campaign in the territories they controlled. Essentially, they followed a version of the old American strategy of “Shock and Awe” with a strategy of shock and decapitation. Their recruits are trained in camps. Such camps exist in every major city which is controlled by the Islamic State. Jihadists have a deep belief that if they fall, they will become “martyrs” (shahids), so they will surely enter Paradise and be immortalized by their death. The fact that they are ready to die in the process of killing ‘infidels’ makes any kind of dialogue with them impossible. They have lost their capacity for empathy and grief; they find unscrupulous violence beautiful, even if they have to behead children and omen.w The second reason for the survival of the Islamic State is its effective military organization. buA Bakr al-Baghdadi started recruiting former Iraqi officers who had been locked up in prison during the American occupation: they know the classical warfare, deception and subversion. These officers who were dismissed in 2003 were onlycepted ac by Islamic State if they repented and made a pledge of allegiance. They also hired former al-Qaeda operatives who were skilled in guerrilla warfare. (Winter 29–36) When they were planning their activities, they learned from the experiences of the former Soviet / Russian school’s operations, tactical principles, subversive and long-distance operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres of war. In addition to using every element of asymmetric and regular warfare, by using infantry, armoured and artillery units, they also utilised light weapon units, irregular troops, information warfare and social media. The issue of suicide bombings is an interesting topic for long-time terrorism researchers. The Islamic State has already made the use of this method compulsory at the tactical level.

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Reuter focused on primary sources since the religious explanations, fatwas, of the Islam are not uniform the influence of different eras, political circumstances and operational environment were also decisive. According to Reuter the Quran prohibits suicide bombings, for whoever does so will withdraw himself from the power of God. (Reuter 2016, 358) However, the invention of explosives and the hopeless struggle against the occupying Israelis gave birth to a different interpretation. The logic of this interpretation is that suicide bombing is permissible if it causes the death of as many enemies as possible. (Reuter 2016, 358) The other approach tried to explain suicide attacks committed by women. The suicide attack, in the context of holy war, according to Sheikh Abdel Azzi, is that when Palestinians blowing themselves up is the greatest accomplishment of jihad. According to Muhammad al-Tantawi, the great Imam of the Azhar University in Cairo, anyone who blows himself up is a martyr. But luckily he added a kind of restriction to the explanation: “Martyrs are those who blast those to death who are combatants. Anyone who kills defenceless women, children, and elders cannot be called a venerable martyr. “ Abdel Rahman al-Adawi, a professor of Islamic law in Cairo, says that since the enemy is fighting us using every available tool, so suicide bombing is permissible. In the case of women, he states that it is a form of self- defence, a way to reach God. There is no difference between a man and a woman when pursuing jihad.n I peacetime, the woman’s place is in the house and one of her most important aspirations is to fulfil the Mecca pilgrimage.” (Thamm 2002, 97) We can say that Islam has proceeded from the prohibition of suicide to equal rights for women in the field of suicide bombing. In terms of methods, genocide has also appeared on the organization’s palette. The actions against the Yazidis in the Sindh Mountains showed the world the organization’s total intolerance. Their cruelty was also manifested in the abduction and enslavement of Yazidi women. Their genocidal actions were sped up due to het existence of accurate records which enabled them to quickly separate Arabs from Yazidis in the territories under their control. They had precise information about which houses they ought to visit in the opeh of finding wealth and slaves. Loudspeakers ordered everyone to surrender, but then they opened fire indiscriminately. There were corpses everywhere although they mostly targeted men. They knew who had to be killed firstf i they wanted to reduce the resistance of their enemies. When the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters withdrew from an area after they were suddenly attacked from three directions. The Yazidis then tried to ask for help, but their please were not answered. Most of them fled to the mountains, with very little food and drinking water. Then an IS detachment arrived with seventy-eighty vehicles and constantly firing on every moving target. They were equipped with tactical-technical equipment, off-road vehicles, and even some artillery ieces,p which they captured in Mosul.

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According to IS methods, suicide bombers made up the vanguard of their columns who were by the main forces. They also had good logistical capabilities which enabled their rapid strikes and operations. Nearly 50,000 people were trapped in the mountains. The Kurds and American special forces attempted to rescue all of them but only 15,000 people were evacuated in vehicles collected by refugee camp leaders. The biggest problem for refugees was that it would be very difficult for them to live with other minorities in thisrea, a as some of them also supported IS previously. The situation of the women was especially terrible. Violence, forced marriage or slavery characterized their lives in IS captivity. (Reuter 2016, 371–403) The IS earned a great deal of power and influence through the media, with broadcasting beheadings of the hostages and mass executions sought to achieve a philosophy that “whoever cuts heads off will be trusted.” Breaking the resistance of their enemy was their main goal. Demonstrating success in their areas, and even in areas that have not yet conquered sent one clear message: be afraid the IS is coming. Unfortunately, nowadays social media and the internet can enable terrorist organizations that their communication will reach every intended recipient. IS had a conscious, well-structured multi-purpose information and communication strategy, which wanted to: • showcase their successes; • persuade and influence the Muslim population of the world; • to persuade and influence the populations of other more remote Muslim countries; • to promote and disseminate the results of successful IS actions to Western societies; • to convince smaller terrorist organizations and potential individual perpetrators around the world to join them by the events presented; • to have a global media presence that allows a continuous and organized recruitment campaign. When we examine the relationship between terrorism and media activity, we can not afford to ignore the opinion of Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, Carlos: “Beyond any military or political purpose, the immediate, primary effect of a terrorist act, is raising awareness… it is publicity, advertising.” (Liszkai 2018, 5) The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu says: “Terrorism is intentional and systematic violence against citizens that seeks to achieve its political ends through creating fear.” (Netanyahu 1995, 20) Following Clausewitz’s dictum, the IS’s media strategy is strategic and tactical communication by terrorists, by individuals or groups who use every available channel, written, electronic or social) to achieve a political, strategic, military or civilian goal and to influence every soldier and citizen, their own, the neutrals and the enemy, as they intend to, in support of their operations. IS’s media activities are controlled by a central organization. It controls subordinate organizations by supporting various foundations and radios. Geographically, the organization encompasses the Sinai Peninsula, West Africa,

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Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Caucasus. All major provinces have their own media centres. These are located in Raqqa, or Aleppo, Hama, Homs and other important cities. Their spokesman is the Syrian Abu Mohamed al-Adnani al-Shami (originally Taha Subhi Falaha). (Barrett 29) The IS media also have 38 provincial-level media centres. Also, the central media controls a further 7 media centres which are dedicated to the preparation and assistance of religious mobilization. (Kaaman 2016) The rapid emergence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has placed greater emphasis on the brutality of the organization. Their graphic videos which portrayed violence in an extremely explicit manner, such as the beheading of American and British hostages, have caused tremendous indignation and anger in the western world. However, such videos represented only 2% of the IS’s media activity. (Kaaman 2016) The mainstream media’s selective reporting on the terrible actions of the Islamic State has also contributed to the commonly accepted belief that people simply joined the group because they wanted to kill or rob the infidels. The dual image of the IS was also marked by its significant humanitarian or relief efforts, often associated with other terrorist organizations. These acts were also eagerly promoted: • giving children colouring books, • caring for the elderly, • collecting taxes for the poor, • running a school for women, • promoting agricultural production, • doing justice, • administering of anti-polio injections, (Rainer 2015, 25) • providing free hospital care, • ability to pursue just legal proceedings, • economic prosperity. Through videos, photos, articles, religious music, religious training of warriors they sought to recruit as many people as possible. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does not accidentally act as a caliph when he tries to convince the Islamic world, which was always on the losing side during the Cold War, that they can be victorious. “O Muslims, hurry to your country! This is your state ... This is my advice to you. If you persevere, uyo can conquer Rome and by the will of Allah you will rule the world.” (Napoleoni 2015, 125) After two months of military training, new media officers were introduced into the media world. They were given a daily task on a simpleiece p of paper, which also enabled them to cross IS checkpoints. Once they have completed their daily mission, they save the recordings on a laptop, copy it to a memory card, and send the card to a designated addressee.

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Meanwhile, the existence of decentralized provincial-level media centres protected them from being destroyed in one swoop. This was because their media organization also exists as a system of unconnected networks and, parallel structures like the main IS terrorist organization. Each IS video is accompanied by at least one or two religious hymns that praise and eulogise the warriors. Adding songs to IS videos has become very popular both with fighters and their sympathisers. Fighters sing these tunes during training, even in the frontlines. IS publishes more than 30 such hymns of the kind every year. IS distributes its videos on CDs, DVDs, and/or USB drives to locals from vehicles, or stands. Their main target audience is children and young teens. IS released a total of 892 discrete media products which is an average of 30 unique items per day. Strictly speaking, IS is an unmatched master manipulator. No other Islamic group has been able to produce so much content so regularly. During this period, 77% of IS produced content was a photo album. (Kaaman 2016) An in-depth analysis of every IS media releases highlighted four fundamental topics: Utopia, war, sacrifice and brutality. The most important topic according to this study is utopia which appears in 53% of their productions. More than half of the content they have released created and cultivated the image of the possibility of living a normal, peaceful life in the Caliphate. Statehood is the group’s main appeal so it is not surprising that so many photo essays and videos are dedicated to depicting busy markets, the enforcement of sharia law, religious activities, elements of governance (infrastructural improvements, hygiene, health care, education), and a variety of landscapes and nature pictures. (Kaaman 2016) War activities only appeared on 37% of their media library. Of course, battles are important since war is the key tool of change and a means of fighting the enemy. Victims only appear in 7% of the available IS videos. The graphic representation of damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties of airstrikes launched by either the coalition or by the Russian, Iraqi, Syrian governments, serves two roles. Firstly they use these casualties to justify their most adverse actions and the existence of IS itself. The purpose of recording the executions of spies or enemy soldiers is to intimidate the enemy and to prevent the authorities from controlling areas which are nominally under their control. In the fight against IS Internet presence, the US administration has been exerting ressurep on social media companies (especially Twitter) to remove IS accounts. However, the deleted accounts reappeared very soon in the cyberspace after every removal. Given the size and commitment of the IS’s media team and the availability of so many social media platforms, negative measures such as censorship seem futile. We have already seen the geographical location of the IS, but the rapid delivery of IS messages on Twitter has also been an interesting phenomenon. The concept of a Twitter “stream” was started by IS fighters, sympathizers and their regional media, which was copied by the global media. (Chatfield-Reddick-Brajawidagda 2015)

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Boko Haram terror-organization

“I’m not afraid because I think the worst has happened - ... I have nothing left to be attacked” (Smith 2017, 42)

The philosophy of the organization is well illustrated by the translation of their name: “Western education is a sin.” The spiritual leader of the terrorist organization, which was established in 2002, is Mohammed Yusuf while the alleged leader Abubakar Shekau. The organization has more than 10,000 terrorists in its anks.r (Griffin- London-Babin 2016) It is one of the most effective and deadly organizations on Earth since ti increased its death toll by 300% between 2013 and 2014 to nearly 7,000 in their terror attacks. (Griffin-London-Babin 2016) Perhaps the organization’s most spectacular and media-focused action was the abduction of 276 schoolgirls in 2014. (Smith 2017, 17) Although the organization has only left behind the horrors of massacre and destruction, they still found it necessary to direct the attention of the world on their organization through this radical operation. The statements by the organization’s head, perhaps make the kind fo hatred and radical ideas much clearer: “Destroy the whole world rather than shed the blood of one single Muslim.” (Smith 2017, 17) The speech and the influence of their leader were extremely influential when he proclaimedhat t they rose up against the corrupt Nigerian government and security forces. The uprising in northern Nigeria was primarily directed against law enforcement forces. But the response to these attacks was also very rapid, and the security forces deployed 200 armoured vehicles to the area. The mosques of the city of Maiduguri, which is the religious centre of northern Nigeria, have been destroyed. The security forces were also able to apturec the leader of Boko Haram who was executed immediately. After his demise, the new leader decided to spread his radical ideas online. He found a large number of sympathisers online since out of Nigeria’s nearly 170 million citizens many live on less than $ 1 a day. (Smith 2017, 30) The situation is made worse that corruption is endemic, level of fraud is and people will try selling everything including real estate, and cars to survive 4 In this system, it is “normal” for an organization to shoot at security officials and tizensci from motorcyclists with AK-47 assault rifles. Continued radicalization led to attacks on Christian churches, followed by action against an editorial office in the capital city. The example is interesting because just like in Europe, there was

4 The best-known example are the ”fraud 419” emails which request money mainly originated in Nigeria. (You have won the jackpot, inherited money) and they want a down payment in advance. The number alludes to the Nigerian Criminal Code as § 419 of this law deals with fraud. Terrorist organizations collected 20-30 million USD through e-mails. (Maras 2016, 180)

70 METHODS OF MILITANT ISLAM IN THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM TERROR ORGANIZATIONS an even opportunity to attack editorial offices, Christian churches, priests dan nuns, in this corrupt security environment. After these scattered attacks, Boko Haram followed up with an attack against the northeastern Nigerian territories. This forced the President to impose a state of emergency in the region. Then the organization kidnapped a seven-member family from France and slaughtered dozens of students in attacks their schools. (Smith 2017, 33) The high number of personnel in the organization is supported by easy recruitment. The average income in Nigeria is low and the rate of radicalization is high. “Recruitment is based on religion, which is why they can find so many people, but many people sign up and stay for the money they receive from Boko Haram. So there is money to be made, and these people used to live on the streets where they wouldn’t know what would happen to them the following day. Here, somebody pays their bills, feeds them and even give them some money, (…) and their actions have little legal consequences. They can get away with anything without any penalty. The military was unable to respond in a way that would deter them from continuing this path. ” (Smith 2017, 40) Their leader has based his recruitment on poverty and vulnerability, Mohammed Yusuf gave his interrogators his basic principles, the manual of his organization, both of these focus on the formulation of hate through faith.

“Do you say western education is forbidden? Yes, western education is forbidden. What about the western style pants you are wearing? There are many reasons why western education is prohibited. The pants are cotton and the cotton is the property of Allah. (…) Western education is westernization.” (Smith 2017, 86)

In his theory, the world is flat. The geographical idea that the earth is convex is eth product of western research so it must be null and void. (Smith 2017, 116) Yusuf ’s religious leaders turned to face him and said, “You are not a prophet. You have not proven your faith or your moral character before your neighbours ... And how many years have you preached before you started to classify Muslims as unbelievers because they received western education or because they worked for the government? You don’t have enough knowledge about religion and you don’t have a general education either.” (Smith 2017, 123–124) Let us consider the following, the leader of this organisation is an uneducated preacher, who has not received any religious or secular training. Yet his religious teachings are sold in markets and transmitted to his sympathizers in the cyberspace. He commands a group, which is large even by European standards. His organisation has close to 10,000 members, who commit horrific massacres and abductions without any scruples. The radicalized masses follow his instructions: “He

71 METHODS OF MILITANT ISLAM IN THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE BOKO HARAM TERROR ORGANIZATIONS plants fear in your mind. Fear that you or anyone you know can be imprisoned, beaten, killed by the security forces. They may burn you all, use tear gas against you, but whatever they do to you, you must not leave your religion.” (Smith 2017, 126) He emphasizes everywhere that no one can insult Islam, those who do so must be punished. He argues that it is pointless to set fire to churches and destroy them arbitrarily. If Boko Haram is successful, then you can turn these churches into something useful purpose. If the leaders of non-Muslims are removed from these places then the Muslims will gain more space, and unbelieving Christians will not be able to return to their churches: “If someone insults Islam, go find and kill the leader of those people. Every person involved in the insult must be killed. If you only kill only a few of the leaders, they will stop the insult. You don’t have to worry about burning and destroying a church because the person who built the church lives. Nothing is achieved by burning churches. ... Don’t be tempted to set churches on fire, after jihad they can be used as storage spaces. Remove the leaders of unbelievers, because they are not decent if you want them to stop shaming your religion.” (Smith 2017, 127–128)

Summary

Although the procedures of the two terrorist organizations were influenced by het number of their personnel yet their freedom of action was determined by the preparedness and strength of the security forces of the respective countries. But in any case, we have to admit that their influence far outstrips their narrow spheres of armed operations and they were able to export their methods around the world. If we take into account car bombings, knife and box cutter murders, bombing attacks there may be some terrorists amongst the migrants who have arrived in Europe during the current migration crisis. Now we understand why we have to ensure that our security agencies, law enforcement and defence organizations alert, training their staff ready to face the newest challenges. In addition to offensive operations by terrorist organisations, we must be counter their media activities on multiple social media platforms which they use to spread their propaganda to their sympathisers and to intimidate their opponents. Religious terrorist organizations focus their aims against non-Muslim people who follow other religions, like Christians, and they destroy their churches, assassinate their religious leaders, and kidnap civilians.

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Hoffman, Frank: “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the Rocks, (28 July 2014), http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybrid- threats/> (web: 28 July 2019) Lewis, D. Jessica (2014): The Islamic State: a Counter-Strategy for a Counter-State. Middle East Security Report, 7. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Lewis-Center%20of%20gravity.pdf (web: 15 August 2019) Kaaman, Hugo (2016): Media is half the battle – An overview of the Islamic State’s media apparatus. https:// hugokaaman.com/2016/04/26/media-is-half-the-battle-an-overview-of-the-islamic-states-media- apparatus/ (web: 2 September 2019) Kaiser, Ferenc (2011): A túlnépesedés és globális biztonsági kihívásai. Nemzet és Biztonság, 8. 27–36, http:// www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/kaiser_ferenc-a_tulnepesedes_es_globalis_biztonsagi_kihivasai.pdf. (web: 23 August 2019) Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2019): A világ népessége kontinensek szerint. (Forrás: ENSZ World Population Prospects 2019). www.ksh.hu/interaktiv/grafikonok/vilag_nepessege.html (23 July 2019) Liszkai, László (2017): Carlos szerint a világ. Szemtől szemben a Sakállal. Budapest, Pauker-Holding Kft. Maras, Marie Helen (2016): A terrorizmus elmélete és gyakorlata. Budapest, Tudásközpont Tankönyvműhely. Ministry of Defense (n. a.): Strategic Trends Programme Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045. http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2014/global-strategic-trends-2045_uk-mod.pdf. (web: 25 January 2017) Ministry of Defense/b (n. a.): Strategic Trends Programme Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040. https:// www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/Real-World/gst4_update9_Feb10.pdf. (web: 2 September 2019) Napoleoni, Loretta (2015): Az iszlamista főnix. Budapest, HVG könyvek. Netanjahu, Benjamin (1995): Harc a terrorizmus ellen. Budapest, Alexandra Kiadó. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (2013): The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation. New York, United Nations. (https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/WorkingPaper-1_ SixGraveViolationsLegalFoundation.pdf (web: 28 July 2019) Pew Research center (2015): The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050. https://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010–2050/ (web: 21 August 2019)

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Péter Wagner – Péter Zelei

THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Introduction

The situation of Christians in Iraq has undergone a radical transformation in recent years. Although the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave them the theoretical freedom of religion and politics, yet the reality was not as positive. Since the new Shiite political majority incorporated Islamic principles into the Iraqi constitution and the actions of Sunni forces fighting the American occupation were threatening the safety of Christians religious-ethnic minorities. Not surprisingly the minorities were soon targeted by both groups, even though systematic persecution did not start until 2014. The demolition of churches, the murder of Church leaders, and the kidnapping of Christian businessmen for ransom all became part of the everyday reality for Christians. Their reactions were simple, emigration from Iraq. The emergence of the Islamic State terrorist organization, which view Christians from Libya to Iraq as its enemies, opened a totally new chapter in the persecution of indigenous Christian communities. The terrorist campaign of August 2014 forced the Christians living around Mosul and the Nineveh Plateau to flee. After the fall of the Islamic State, some Christian communities that fled to Kurdistan, Lebanon or Jordan have returned to their destroyed settlements and have begun the reconstruction of their lives with the significant help of their Churches, NGOs and the Hungarian Government (Hungary Helps). Although a few steps have been taken to guarantee the survival of Christian settlements in northern Iraq, yet the future of Christianity in the region is still not certain. The Nineveh Plateau is more secure today than it was 3-4 years ago, but the political and security situation remains unstable. Although the Islamic State has been militarily defeated in Iraq and Syria, in reality, the terrorist organization has split up into self-serving, cell-based, semi-autonomous groups that continue their policy of violence and intimidation. Along with the dissolution of the terrorist organization, new actors have emerged in northern Iraq under the guise of Iranian- backed militias, who may guarantee the security of the region, but their presence is not always beneficial for Christian communities.

77 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

In the first part of this analysis, the authors review the political trends relevant to the Christian community of Iraq and the results of reconstruction activities. Then they will examine the current security challenges which influence the repatriation process. They review the reorganization of the Islamic State and the presence of Shiite militias. At present, neither group is a serious threat to the security of Christian communities, but this will only remain true in the future if the Iraqi state can exercise control over both groups and guarantee security. In addition to a survey of the literature, the authours also incorporated the experience of their research trips and interviews in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Nineveh Plateau into this analysis paper. They would especially like to thank pastor Róbert Kótai, who spent half a year as a Catholic chaplain in Iraq in 2017 who also assisted their research with his knowledge and local contacts.

The situation in Iraq 2018–2019

After the recapture of Mosul and subsequent offensives on the Nineveh Plateau and in the western and northwestern provinces of Iraq (Anbar, Sinjar, Tal Afar), Islamic State, which has been present in Iraq since June 2014, lost its territorial holdings by the end of 2017. This marked a new period in the country’s history, characterized mainly by the instability of the security situation, the difficulties of reconstruction and an intensifying struggle between internal political forces. Accordingly, the main challenges of the past two years have been the weakness of government forces, the prominent presence of non-state actors, and their foreign supporters, and the re-emergence of some radical organizations. Although about 4.3 million IDPs have returned to their original homes so far since 2017, yet there are still more than one and a half million internally displaced persons inside Iraq and the rate of return is steadily slowing down. (Iom 2109) The survey published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees examines the perceptions of returning internally displaced people. The majority of respondents (37%) believe they can not return home because their homes have either been damaged or destroyed. The second most important reason which prevents their return is that they do not have sufficient financial means (30%). However, almost as many people said (29%) the lack of public security is the main obstacle in the way of their return. (Unhcr 2019) These challenges are particularly serious for the Christian communities of Iraq. According to local Church leaders, their situation is still unsatisfactory even though the civil war has ended because many factors still hinder the repatriation of Christian families and the rebuilding of their infrastructure. According to the leaders of Christian Churches in Iraq, Chaldean Catholic Church, Syrian Catholic Church, Syrian Orthodox Church,

78 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ out of the nearly 14,000 houses have been registered for renovation in 2017 in a “Call for Action” document, only 5,746 have been completely renovated. More worryingly, only 45 per cent of Christian families have returned to their ancient settlements on the Nineveh Plateau, and the return of another 2,000 Christian families is hindered by the challenges we have already outlined. (Acn 2019a) Religious leaders agree that the establishment of good material conditions is not sufficient in itself. There is a need for a positive vision of the future which can motivate people to return home. In addition to security guarantees, we must create reintegration projects, which include the development of education and by assisting local small and medium-sized enterprises to build up the service sector in these regions of Iraq. (Catholic Herald 2019)

Christian-related affairs of the Iraqi government

Another condition for the survival of Christianity in Iraq is finding the modus vivendi with the majority of Muslim society. The new Iraqi parliament, which is set to open in 2018, will have vefi Christian representatives. This is because there is a quota in the Iraqi constitution which sets aside certain seats for minorities. However, the vulnerability of the quota system is illustrated by the fact that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Iranian-backed Shiite Badr organization, which has transformed from a military organisation into a political party, have managed to secure two Christian mandates by organizing Christian proxy movements and mobilizing thousands of their own supporters. (Assyrian Policy Institute 2018a, 8–9.) Other Kurdish parties (PKU / PUK, Goorran / Gorran) also used similar tactics in the Kurdistan elections, held on 30 September 2018, where Kurdish candidates captured four of the five mandates reservedby a quota for the representatives of Christians. (Assyrian Policy Institute 2018, 87.) Not only does this make it extremely hard for Christians to participate in the political system, and they were extremely underrepresented in the quota system anyway, but it also creates conflicts between various Christian political parties. Against this political background, as a symbol of their return of Christians, the only Christian member of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) swore his oath of office on 10 July 2019 using Bible which was partially destroyed by ISIS. (Rudaw 2019a) The main problem in the relationship between the central state and Christian minorities, apart from the lack of security guarantees, is the lack of legal security. Although the Iraqi constitution, on paper, guarantees both the freedom of religious practice and equality before the law. Christians and other religious minorities could have not practise these rights peacefully and are frequently discriminated against by the Muslim majority society. (Unhcr 2018) Christians are underrepresented on a national, regional and local level. Therefore the government

79 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ can pass rules, like the ban on alcohol sales in 2016, which can cause serious harm, in the case of prohibition a sensitive economic loss, for the Christians. (US Department of State 2017, 20–21.) Then there is the example of the law which regulates mixed marriages between Christians and Muslims, which prohibits marriage without conversion to Islam, is clearly unconstitutional. (Acn 2019b) In recent years, especially in Baghdad, the number of Christians has declined significantly. This is leading to the closure of several churches, and the public celebration of major Christian holidays, like Christmas, Easter, has caused considerable tension. One example of Muslim social pressure is that in some districts of Baghdad, Christian women have to wear veils and follow other forms of Muslim (predominantly Shiite) behavioural norms, otherwise, they are subject to threats and reprisals. (Unhcr 2018) For Christians in Iraq, there is great concern about the risk of court radicalization. This worry is based upon a bill introduced to the Iraqi legislation during the summer of 2019 which will receive a vote in the fall. (Christianpersecution 2019) If the bill passes it would be supplemented the Supreme Court’s 13 justices with a panel of 4 Muslim jurists (mullahs), who would oversee compatibility of laws adopted by the Parliament with Islamic jurisprudence. (Chaldeannews 2019) Although many MPs oppose the proposal, because they want to protect their political powers we cannot rule out that this bill will pass. The passage of similar legislation will undermine the fragile Iraqi democracy and can ultimately destroy the confidence of minority communities in the central government and its institutions. The situation could be improved by the establishment of a ministry for minority affairs, and Rihan Hanna Ayoub, a Christian MP of Kirkuk and Nineveh Provinces, has promised to prepare draft legislation. (Asianews 2019a)

The chances for the return of the Islamic State

The terrorist organization lost its last territories in March 2019 and tried to adapt to the changes in its circumstances. The leader of the “Caliphate” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is likely to be in the desert areas along the Iraq and Syria border, although sources close to the ISIS leadership say that he feels safer in Iraq because of his Iraqi origin. (The Guardian 2019) According to a July 2019 report by the UN Security Council: “ISIL is adapting, consolidating and creating conditions for an eventual resurgence in its Iraqi and Syrian heartlands. This process is more advanced in Iraq, where Abu Bakr l-Baghdadia and most of the ISIL leadership are now based. Others are elsewhere in the former “caliphate” area and parts of the immediate neighbourhood. This dispersal and the difficult security conditions make communication difficult, and authority is increasingly

80 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ delegated. Meanwhile, for survival purposes, ISIL has prioritized the survival of its leading figures and its Syrian and Iraqi fighters. Most foreign terrorist fighters are seen as dispensableand are left to fend for themselves.” (UN Security Council 2019) The analysis also notes the transformation of the terrorist organization in Iraq, which began as early as the second half of 2017, after the loss of Mosul. ISIS still has a significant number of militant and other sympathizers in Syria and Iraq, thousands of people, who can move and organize freely in Iraq and Syria. They also occasionally attack government forces or, for intimidation purposes, local leaders. According to a UN report, the organization had begun the transition to terrorist warfare even before its compleat defeat. This transition included reallocation a significant amount of financial resources, between 50–300 million dollars, for this period. At present, these funds come from kidnappings and local taxes. A study by the American Institute for the Study of War, ISIS’s second comeback, gives a similarly alarming picture describing the return of the Islamic State. (Understanding war 2019) The analysis has identified 11 geographical regions north of Baghdad and south of Kurdistan where terrorists may have found refuge and could reorganize themselves. The formerly Christian city of Tel Kaif is within one of these areas and this city now has been turned into an internment camp for former ISIS members, with about 1,400 to 1,800 men and family members. (restore Nineveh now 2019) Two areas which are infected with ISIS presence are directly adjacent to the Christian settlements on the Nineveh Plateau. (Understanding war 2019) The report on the US Army’s Syrian and Iraqi operations for the second quarter of 2019 Lead( Inspector General’s quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR)) analyzes the military operations which were carried out in the presence of an international coalition. The report concludes that “the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) carried out nearly 1,000 operations against ISIS during the second quarter, which resulted in the death or capture of more than 550 suspected ISIS insurgents.” This document also proves that the perationso of the ISF against the terrorist organization in Iraq have not stopped. (U.s. Department of Defense 2019) However, according to the analysis, the ISF suffers from weak reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, which makes it hard for them to monitor the activities of the Islamic State. The report also states that the terrorist organization is keen to re-establish itself in areas which are considered to be no man’s land between the ISF and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Such locations include the Makhmour Mountains, in the vicinity of the Nineveh Plateau, which forms a kind of boundary between the two military forces. An interview with an officer at the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center in Erbil on 11 June 2019 highlights the problem: “The Iraqi forces’ authority extends to the southern foot of the mountains, while the

81 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ presence of Kurdish forces begins only north of the mountain range, which allows the terrorist organization to freely reorganize itself in higher, hard-to-reach areas of this area.” The threat posed by the Islamic State to Christian communities is still moderate. During the summer, some rumours circulated on the Nineveh Plateau that the terrorist organization may have been behind the burning of agricultural land, but that was just one of the many possible explanations. None of the three analyses quoted here mention Iraqi Christians and even the Nineveh Plateau is only rarely mentioned. There is still a very serious military and paramilitary presence (in the form of Hashd and Peshmerga) in Christian settlements and their surroundings, which can act as a deterrent. However, we can not ignore the fact that now the Islamic State is focusing on two things, reorganising themselves and rebuilding their influence in the regions where they can succeed by investing fewer resources.

Relationship between Popular Mobilization Forces and Christians in Northern Iraq

In addition to the social problems, security statistics have not improved significantly since the official end of the fight against ISIS. (Szalai–Wagner 2018) The first and most important reason for this is that, ise th weakness of the central government, while non-governmental paramilitary organizations, collectively called Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi, or Hashd in short) are still strong and well-equipped. Although the name alludes to the existence of a well organized paramilitary force, the reality quite different because this term simply refers to a loose umbrella organization over several smaller or larger militias, the manpower of which is estimated to reach 140,000. The People’s Mobilization Forces are classified by the international media as a Shiite, Iranian-backed force. This approach is partially true since many Shiite militias were established in Iraq in 2014 after Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the religious leader of Iran issued a fatwa for this purpose. It is important to note, that about 30,000 Sunni people also belong to this organization, and this umbrella organisation also contains Shabak (30th Brigade), Christian (50th or Babylon Brigade), Turkmen (53rd Brigade), and the Yazidi militias. (Frenzel 2017) The People’s Mobilization Units have strengthened significantly during the htfig against ISIS, as military operations against the terrorist organization were only successful due to the involvement of several military units not under the control of the central government, while the lack of coordination between government units became apparent. (Witty 2016) Former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi attempted to order the withdrawal of Hashd forces from Mosul and the Nineveh Plateau and place them under the Nineveh Command of the

82 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Iraqi Army but this effort failed due to militia resistance. (Assyrian Policy Institute 2018b) Abdul-Mahdi, Abadi’s successor, who formed his government after the 2018 elections, has also tried to consolidate the PMU (Al-Monitor 2109a), (Rudaw 2019b), whether he will succeed is debatable. However the new Prime Minister is not doing this without allies since, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the largest parliamentary coalition, an influential background lobbyist supports his plan. (Rudaw 2019b) However, consolidating the PMU is not easy. The units are well-equipped with weapons, have several bases around Mosul, and exercise control over the region with roadside checkpoints. (Mecra 2019) The Shabak militia refused to join the Iraqi army in the summer of 2019, following major protests and setting up roadblocks. They argue that the strength of their militias is the only guarantee of stability which can prevent the region from resurgent of ISIS and a Kurdish an expansion. (Al-Monitor 2019b) The success or failure of the consolidation of the People’s Mobilization Units will be a key test of the power of the Mahdi Government and highlights the uncertain future of northern Iraq. In this context, weakened Christian communities are particularly vulnerable: since they will be caught in the crossfire if there is armed conflict between the militias, the Kurds, the central government. Also, the drastic decline in the number of their communities has led to a change in the demographics of the ancient Christian settlements of the region (Bartella, Karemlash, Qaraqosh). (Voa 2019) For example, in Bartella. which was a wholly Christian town 30 years ago, with about 3,800 families (Asianews 2019b). Now Shabaks have blocked Christian families from returning with their armed militias. (Rudaw 2019c) Similar tendencies are starting to appear in other Christian settlements of the Nineveh Plateau.

Conclusions

In Northern Iraq the security of Christian settlements is fragile. Although the situation has improved a lot since the expulsion of the Islamic State, and the physical security of Christian communities is now guaranteed, the future still contains several new challenges. The key question is whether the Iraqi overnmentg can consolidate its power over the settlements of the Nineveh Plateau. Extending Baghdad’s influence is currently being challenged by two sides. On the one hand, the reorganization of the Islamic State terrorist organization is a clear problem for the Iraqi Security Forces. Since the recapture of Mosul in 2017, the terrorist organization has been constantly trying to reorganize its presence in the areas north of Baghdad. This fforte is probably supported by those financial reserves and weapons caches which they have deposited in areas which heyt regarded as crucial to

83 THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ enable is a future resurgence. Another reason which can enable the gradual strengthening of ISIS is that it could exploit the divisions between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga, and set its foot in regions which both sides treat as a “no man’s land.” The presence of various Iran backed Shiite militias on the Nineveh Plateau is a different kind of challenge for the Iraqi government and the Christian communities alike. When the fighting around Mosul ended, the Iraqi army withdrew its forces from the area and entrusted policing tasks to these force. However, the state exercises only partial control over these armed paramilitary groups, which is clearly illustrated by the fact that some units defied the prime ministerial instructions to remove their checkpoints for the inevehN Plateau. The only viable option for the Christian communities in Iraq is if the Iraqi overnmentg can expand its influence over areas populated by Christians. In this present paper the authors have illustrated that since the liberation of Mosul and the defeat of the Islamic State, there have been two trends in northern Iraq which constantly undermined government presence. In the coming years, it will be crucial to monitor how Baghdad can fight against those organizations which question its authority, and undermine the power of the government from the inside, and thus question the security of Christians.

Literature

ACN (2019a): Iraq: Christian leaders call for more support for the Christians of Nineveh. https://acninternational.org/ news/iraq-christian-leaders-call-for-more-support-for-the-christians-of-nineveh/ (web: 6 September 2019) ACN (2019b): Iraqi Christians fear appointment of Islamic judges to country’s highest court. https://www. churchinneed.org/iraqi-christians-fear-appointment-of-islamic-judges-to-countrys-highest-court/ (web: 6 September 2019) Al-Monitor (2019a): Former Iraqi premier opens up about PMU, new PM, Iran. https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2019/08/haider-abadi-adel-abdul-mahdi-pmu-us-iran.html. (web: 6 September 2019) Al-Monitor (2019b): Iraqi decision to remove Shabak PMU from Ninevah Plains stirs conflict. https://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/iraq-mosul-shabak-pmu-nineveh-plains.html#ixzz5yiyDdsGM (web: 6 September 2019) Asianews (2019a): A new Christian lawmaker wants a Minorities Ministry set up. http://www.asianews.it/news- en/A-new-Christian-lawmaker-wants-a-Minorities-Ministry-set-up-45240.html (web: 6 September 2019)

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Asianews (2019b): After ISIS, Nineveh’s Christians now face new threat from Shabak Shiite militias. http:// www.asianews.it/news-en/After-ISIS,-Nineveh%E2%80%99s-Christians-now-face-new-threat-from- Shabak-Shiite-militias--46250.html (web: 6 September 2019) Assyrian policy institute (2018a): Iraq’s Stolen Election: How Assyrian Representation Became Assyrian Repression. http://www.aina.org/reports/ise.pdf (web: 6 September 2019) Assyrian policy institute (2018b): Iraqi Prime Minister Orders Changes to Security in the Nineveh Plain. https://www.assyrianpolicy.org/post/iraqi-prime-minister-orders-changes-to-security-in-the-nineveh-plain (web: 6 September 2019) Catholic Herald (2019): The harsh truth about Iraqi Christianity.https://catholicherald.co.uk/magazine/ the-harsh-truth-about-iraqi-christianity/ (web: 6 September 2019) Chaldeannews (2019): Christians fear changes to Iraq’s Supreme Court. https://www.chaldeannews.com/ iraq-today/2019/9/3/christians-fear-changes-to-iraqs-supreme-court (web: 6 September 2019) Christianpersecution (2019): Iraq: Christians fear proposals that “will make Iraq like a theocracy” and make Christianity in Iraq “just a memory.” https://www.christianpersecution.com/iraq/iraq-christians-fear- proposals-that-will-make-iraq-like-a-theocracy-and-make-christianity-in-iraq-just-a-memory/ (web: 6 September 2019) Frentzel, Kari (2017): The Future Role of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq – Key Influencers of Post-ISIS Politics?https:// www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=302a6843-d86e-0724-b9d0-c0f50ea7c9df&groupId=252038 (web: 6 September 2019) Iom(2019): Displacement Tracking Matrix. http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ (web: 6 September 2019) Mecra (2019): Tensions Follow Iraqi Government Decision to Withdraw the Hashd Al-Shaabi from the Nineveh Plain. Middle East Center for Reporting an Analysis. https://www.mideastcenter.org/post/tensions-follow-iraqi- government-decision-to-withdraw-the-hashd-al-shaabi-from-the-nineveh-plain (web: 6 September 2019) Restore nineveh now (2019): Why are the Assyrian IDPs not Returning to Tel Kaif? http://www. restoreninevehnow.org/?p=1510 (web: 14 September 2019) Rudaw (2019a): Only Christian KRG minister swears in on Bible burned by ISIS. https://www.rudaw.net/ english/people-places/10072019 (web: 6 September 2019) Rudaw (2019b): Shiite politicians okay with Abdul-Mahdi deadline to rein in Iraq’s Hashd. https://www.rudaw. net/english/middleeast/iraq/02072019 (web: 6 September 2019)

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Rudaw (2019c): Iraqi PM assures eventual Hashd al-Shaabi withdrawal from Nineveh Plains https://www. rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/10082019 (web: 6 September 2019) Szalai, Máté – Wagner, Péter (2018): Irak Moszul után, a választások előtt (1.) A biztonsági helyzet és az újjáépítés kérdései. Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet Elemzések. https://kki.hu/assets/upload/13_KKI- elemzes_IRQ_Szalai_Wagner_20180405.pdf (web: 6 September 2019) The Guardian (2019): Female Isis captive reveals role in helping CIA hunt for Baghdadi. https://www. theguardian.com/world/2019/may/31/isis-wife-reveals-role-in-helping-cia-hunt-for-baghdadi (web: 14 September 2019) Understandingwar (2019): Isis’s Second Comeback Assessing the Next Isis Insurgency. June 2019. http://www. understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/isw%20report%20-%20isis%27s%20second%20comeback%20 -%20june%202019.pdf (web: 14 September 2019) Unhcr (2019): Intentions Survey February 2019. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69464 (web: 6 September 2019) Unhcr (2018): Situation of Christians in Baghdad. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a66f80e4.pdf (web: 6 September 2019) UN Security Council (2019): Twenty-fourth Report of the ISIL & Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Monitoring Te a m . July 15, 2019. (S/2019/570). https://undocs.org/S/2019/570 (web: 14 September 2019) U.S. Department of Defense (2019): Operation Inherent Resolve. Lead Inspector General Report to the United States. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019. https:// media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/06/2002167167/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT. PDF (web: 14 September 2019) US Department of State (2017): 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom – Iraq, 15 August 2017. https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ (web: 6 September 2019) Voa (2019): Iraq’s Top Catholic Cleric Concerned About Future of Country’s Christians. https://www.voanews. com/middle-east/iraqs-top-catholic-cleric-concerned-about-future-countrys-christians (web: 6 September 2019) Witty, David (2016): The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service. Brookings, Center for Middle East Policy. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf (web: 6 September 2019)

86 András Kóré 1

THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND ITS EFFORTS IN THE PRESENT IN SUPPORTING CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA

Hungary specified in its basic law that Christian tradition and culture are the solid foundations of the Hungarian State: “We are proud that our king Saint Stephen built the Hungarian State on solid ground and made our country a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago.” (Fundamental Law of Hungary, National Creed)The Fundamental Law also declared that it’s a constitutional obligation of the State to protect the Christian faith: “The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” (Fundamental Law, 4. Article R) The sheer fact in itself that the National Assembly of Hungary declared the preservation of the Christian religion in a legal regulation, which is on the foundation of its legal hierarchy, is considered a decision of historic importance, as other European constitutions do not contain similar statements. Besides legislation, Hungary has recently made considerable steps to turn these legal rules into part of its practical public policy as well, as it is the only state in the world which protects Christian communities through a governmental department. As the first step of this process in 2016, the Hungarian government decided to form a ewn department, the State Secretariat for Aiding Persecuted Christians.

The historical engagement of Hungary

21st century Hungary takes the roots and traditions of its endeavours from its history. The organization of the statehood of the Hungarian people is closely related to the Christian religion. By joining the Roman Catholic Church St. Stephen transformed a nomadic society which was nothing more than a loose tribal union into the

1 Prime Minister’s Office, National University of Public Service

87 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... independent medieval Kingdom of Hungary. This country was built on solid Christian foundations which is one of the secrets of its longevity. The Hungarian Kingdom becamea hub of the missionary activities in the Central, Eastern and Southern Europe region and contributed a lot to the elimination of paganism. As a result of its geographical position, being located between the Holy Roman Empire, Western Christianity and the Balkan Peninsula, Hungary, throughout its 1000-year long history had a special task. Its main mission was to act the protective bastion of Christianity against invaders and to provide shelter and protection for persecuted Christians. During the advance of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, Orthodox Christians fleeing from the Serbian Kingdom found refuge in Hungary. Then, the line of castles on the southern border of Hungary became the most important protective shield of Europe. After the collapse of the medieval Kingdom in 1526, Hungary became a buffer zone which protected many Central European countries and the Holy Roman Empire. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Hungary was torn into three parts: the Hungarian Kingdom, the Principality of Transylvania, which preserved the continuity of the Hungarian statehood, while the central areas of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The Principality of Transylvania became a safe haven for Protestant denominations, who fled persecution during the decades of European religious conflicts and the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), whichwere contemporaneously conducted with military campaigns from the south. In the Principality of Transylvania, a law passed by the Transylvanian Diet, which provided unlimited freedom of religion and conscience in 1568, which was the first such law in Europe.

The protective bastion of Christianity

Only about 400 years passed after the foundation of the Christian Hungarian Kingdomwhen a dangerous new enemy appeared on fringes of Europe, the Ottoman Empire. The legitimacy of this Empire, just like every other contemporary empire in Europe, was rooted in its religion. The reason why every people from this the multi- ethnic empire decided to fight on the frontlines of the Balkans, was to spread Islam and fight a holy war against Christianity. After the Kingdom of Serbia was decisively defeated by Ottomans at the Battle Kosovo Polje in 1389, the evident danger was recognized by the Pope, many European monarchs and their nobility. Following the battle, the Kingdom of Hungary became a haven for many Orthodox Christians fleeing the Ottoman invasion. Then of King Sigismund, who later as German and Bohemian King and Holy Roman Emperor became a major player in European politics, issued a royal charter which summarized his reasons for taking up

88 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... the fight against the Ottoman Empire. In this charter, it is clear that he understood the consequences of an Ottoman expansion for the Christian world. Furthermore, this charter is the first document which expresses the sentiment that Hungary must be compassionate towards those who have suffered a lot under the Turks. This document is also important because it mentions two more responsibilities for Sigismund’s kingdom. The first is an obligation to defend Christendom, while the second describes Hungary had done to alleviate the grievances of the Savior and the Christians. As a result of Sigismund’s activities, in 1410 Pope John XXII awarded him a new title that Hungary was “The shield and protective wall of Christianity” (scutum atque murus). (Fodor 1997) After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, more and more European monarchs realized the seriousness of the Ottoman threat. Therefore Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, summoned the mperialI Diet in Wiener Neustadt. At this Diet János Vitéz, the representative of Hungary, made the following speech: “Having conquered the Eastern Empire, it targeted the crowns of the Roman Kingdom, having occupied all the regions of Europe up to the Danube river, it is preparing to destroy long-besieged Hungary, after that it will try to run you down... Believe me, it does not only try to harm only a part of Christianity but wants to harm the very foundations of the Catholic religion.” With the fall of Hungary the entire southern flank of the olyH Roman Empire, including the entire territory of present-day Austria, Bohemia and the southern part of Poland would have become vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, the above-mentioned phrase that Hungary was the faith and shield of Christendom suddenly included the entire territory of the country with all its inhabitants. That is how our country became the protective bastion of Christianity, propugnaculum et antemurale Christianitatis, in the eyes of European. In the Battle of Mohács in 1526, our Kingdom was defeated by the biggest military power of Early Modern Europe. However, the heroic performance of Hungarian soldiers, a good example is the Battle of Mohács where 27,000 Hungarian soldiers fought against 60,000–70,000 strong Ottoman army, stopped the impetus of Sultan Suleiman I, who he wanted to conquer entire Europe. Then in 1566 the defence of Szigetvár and once and for all, it derailed the big Sultan’s plan to conquer the whole world. The enormity of this achievement is illustrated by the fact that the garrison of Szigetvár was by an approximately 2,000–3,000 strong who were able to humble a 100,000 strong Ottoman army. The Sultan himself was also killed in the battle. After the capture of Buda in 1540, Hungary was divided into three parts for the next 150 years, and its territory became a buffer zone, which we often called as an in-between country in security theory. During this time, seven major wars were fought in this regen, all started by the Ottoman Empire to capture the Vienna. Castle ruins in the central and northern regions of Hungary are visible mementoes of those battles which prevented Ottoman Empire from conquering the southern part of the Holy Roman Empire. (Padányi–Négyesi–Nagy 2018, 241–253.)

89 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS...

15th–16th centuries

Every country has to allow its citizens to enjoy the freedom of thought, conscience and religion if they want to be described as a constitutional state. In 16th, 17th and 18th century Europe, when the continent was grappling with the consequences of reformation to reduce interreligious conflict many countries introduced religious tolerance laws which enabled the peaceful coexistence of their subjects. The roblemp was that the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, and their followers, mutually distrusted each other and often resorted to open hostility. This distrust also included accusations of heresy, faithlessness and idolatry. As late as the end of the 17th century, John Locke focused on the theoretical, philosophical aspects of free practice of religion in his “A Letter Concerning Toleration” and did not discuss the practical challenges of this issue at all. Nevertheless, the Principality of Transylvania, which preserved the idea of Hungarian statehood even after the division of the Kingdom of Hungary, became the first country in the world to pass an edict granting full religious tolerance to its inhabitants in its Diet. (Fazekas 2008, 125.) After the reformation, the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 was the first attempt to end religious conflicts in Europe. According to this treaty, which only applied to just the Roman Catholic and the Lutheran Churches, and only the rulers of states were granted the right to choose the religious affiliation of eirth countries and provinces. The subjects of states who did not want to follow the religion chosen by their liege had the right to emigrate to a territory which adopted their religion. The Peace of Westphalia also granted recognized church status to the Calvinist or Reformed Churches. This treaty also extended the freedom of choosing their beliefs to every lord, but the principle of one religion in one territory had not been altered. Thanks to these settlements, major religious blocks were formed in Europe. Spain and the Apennine Peninsula remained Catholic, while the northern countries adopted Protestantism, and the Holy Roman Empire was divided by the religious fault lines. Contrast these tensions with the example of the Principality of Transylvania. This principality first welcomed persecuted Hussites in the 15th century and during the 16th century almost every branch of Protestantism was practised in the country. The fact that the country was multi-ethnic also contributed to this diversity: the Hungarians were either Roman Catholics or Calvinists, a lot of Germans were Lutherans, while the Romanians followed the tenets of Orthodox Christianity. A country with such a diverse mix of nationalities and denominations could have been the scene of a series of civil wars. Yet the edict passed in 1568 by the Diet at Torda2 prevented this threat by abolishing the principle

2 Now Turda in Romania

90 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... that each lord can choose the religion of the territory which is under his control. Instead, the new law empowered the individual to make independent decisions about their religious affiliation. The edict also banned violence against priests and ministers when it declared that: “In every settlement, the preachers may evangelize according to their own interpretation, and if the community likes it it is fine, but if they od not, they should not be forced to accept it. Everybody can have a preacher whose teachings he/she accepts...Therefore, the preacher cannot be harmed or harassed because of his denomination, no one can be threatened with arrest or banishment, as the faith is a gift from God, as the faith originates in hearing, and the hearing is by the word of God.” (The text above is the author’s transcript of the original Hungarian version of the edict.) (Benda 1993) The 1568 Edict of Torda remained in effect throughout the following century. This is especially remarkable since this was the period of Thirty Years’ War when every adversary utilised religious fundamentalism to validate its power. A tragic example of the sectarian hatred of the age is the Magdeburg Wedding in 1631 when the mercenaries of Imperial army sacked the Protestant city of Magdeburg. Once the sack was over only 5,000 – 6,000 people were alive in Magdeburg out of the pre-siege population of 35,000. The cruelty of the mercenaries is best illustrated by the piles of dead women in front of the churches, who had been raped and then killed during the sack. While these horrific events were happening in Europe and the Imperial troops were celebrating the demise of a heretic nest the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational Principality of Transylvania lived in domestic peace. This was mainly due to the fact that the princes of this territory, like Gábor Bethlen, stuck to the religious policy of treating the four accepted religions (Catholic, Reformed, Evangelical, Unitarian) as equals and allowing every other denomination, like the Orthodox Church, enjoyed the right to practise their beliefs freely (Pásztori-Kupán 2009, 252). There were multiple reasons for the religious tolerance of Prince Gábor Bethlen. For example, his father was Calvinist and his mother Druzsina Lázár was a Catholic. He grew up in Transylvania under the tutelage of András Lázár a Reformed preacher infamous for his anti-Catholic fanaticism. Lázár ousted Catholic priests from their churches, destroyed altars and holy pictures of the churches. These experiences taught Bethlen that religious fanaticism is a dead end. Furthermore, his love for his mother also influenced him to tolerate the existence of Catholicism in a Protestant majority country. When he selected his officials, he ignored their religious affiliation and only cared about theirkills s and expertise to ensure that the people he selected have the ability to successfully manage public affairs. R.( Várkonyi 2013, 9–11.)

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Hungary in the 21st century

After the tragic events of 2015, the Government of Hungary decided to set up a Deputy State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians in 2016 which was a watershed event in international politics. What was the rationale behind this decision? In 2015 7,100 Christians were executed because of their faith, in comparison this number was just 4,344 in 2014. Besides the huge number of murders, perpetrators also carried out 2,406 bombing and arson attacks against churches, places of worship and other Christian institutions. The most infamous actor was the Islamic State which killed and decapitated a large number of Christians. All in all 2015 was the year when the Islamic State reached its highest point. Its brutality shocked the world since everybody could watch these horrors online because of the terror propaganda of ISIS like the video footage which recorded the beheading of 22 Egyptian Coptic guest workers on a Tunisian beach. (Ujházi 2019 80–82) Al-Shabab and Boko Haram also carried out successful bombings in Nigeria, Kenya and Libya. Their most brutal act happened on Holy Thursday in 2015 when Al-Shabab executed 147 Christian university students at Garissa University in Kenya. The Hungarian Government understood the nature of the danger threatening the security of Hungary and Europe. These included religiously motivated aggression and terrorist activities which threaten the religious traditions of Hungary and the wider world. Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, met Church leaders from the Middle East at an international conference for Christian politicians in Frascati, Italy, who directly informed him about the persecution of their Churches, and requested help for their flocks from our country. Following that, the Hungarian National Assembly passed a unanimous resolution titled “On the condemnation of Christian persecution and the genocide in the Middle East and Africa, as well as on the support of the persecuted.” [National Assembly resolution 36/2016. (XII. 19.)] After the meeting in Frascati the Hungarian Government decided to establish (Government decree 1513/2016) a State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians, which concentrates its efforts on two essential areas:

1 to provide humanitarian support for persecuted and negatively discriminated Christian communities of the Middle East and Africa, to meet their demands to ensure that they can remain in their homelands where they have been living for centuries or millennia; 2 and to analyze the phenomenon of increasing Christian persecution, to inform the public about their findings in the West, thus convincing foreign governments and international organizations to take action against Christian persecution.

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Hungary as a member of the European Union possesses every tool required by the post-modern understanding of security so it enforces its interests, in harmony with its humanitarian policy, it can also participate directly in peacebuilding activities. However, the consequences of armed conflicts forced the Government to do extra tasks, since Hungary has to be able to help people living in conflict zones during and after the conflicts. This includes aiding the population to return to a normal lifestyle by the rehabilitation and maintenance of their settlements. (Farkas–Horváth,–Padányi–Petruska 2017 159–177). Out of the multiple elements of the peace support operations, preventive diplomacy, peace implementation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, Hungary is focusing its resources on peacebuilding through the Hungary Helps Program. This Program tries to enable Christian minorities to live a normal life in their homelands, improve their living conditions and to promote balanced interreligious dialogue. (Török 2018, 203–211) Besides participating in peace support operations and other humanitarian activities, Hungary also actively responds in international politics to the consequences of civil wars other unwanted phenomena in various conflict zones. Resperger( 2013 5–37) For example, Hungary attended the Ministerial Conference to Advance Religious Freedom in Washington D.C. in 2018 and 2019 and was one of the co-signatories of the following three important statements: Statement on Blasphemy/Apostasy Laws, Statement on Respect for Religion or Belief and the Statement on Respect for Religion or Belief.

Assistance to Catholic Christians in Nigeria in the Maiduguri Diocese through the Hungary Helps Program

Oliver Dashe Doeme, the Bishop of the Diocese of Maiduguri in Nigeria, visited Budapest between 16th -19 th July 2016. This diocese is important because this is located in a region which has frequently targeted by Boko Haram terrorist. During his visit, Bishop Doeme met Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and other dignitaries and gave a presentation at Pázmány Péter Catholic University. In this presentation, Bishop Doeme described the serious attacks committed by members and sympathisers of Boko Haram, which is a radical Islamist terrorist organization trying to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria, in his diocese. Furthermore, he also expressed that since Boko Haram started its attacks in Western African refugees started leaving Nigeria. Boko Haram’s anti-Christian attacks are so extensive that they destroyed 67 out of the 72 parish churches in the Diocese of Maiduguri. Besides the destruction of these religious building Boko Haram also targeted many essential educational and medical facilities, which created extreme challenges within the diocese and the wider region. Most Christians decided to flee the diocese as internally displaced people (IDP) to other parts of Nigeria. These people can not return until the risk of Boko Haram is reduced and the destroyed infrastructure is rebuilt to enable normal lifestyle.

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The reconstruction of the educational and medical infrastructure, as well as the rebuilding of the Seminary in the Diocese of Maiduguri through the Hungary Helps Program

The Government of Hungary provided 310 million HUF in aid, Government resolution 809/2017. (XI.8.), to the Diocese of Maiduguri. This money was used to reconstruct educational and medical infrastructure destroyed by Boko Haram and to rebuild the Seminary. By reconstructing these facilities which are necessary for a normal life, the Program assists the efforts of the Nigerian Catholic Church. The Hungarian aid also financed the reconstruction of St. Joseph Seminary, the opening of the Bishop O’Donnell Memorial secondary school, the establishment of St. Stephen College, and the renovation of the Bishop Timothy Cotter Memorial hospital. The primary purpose of every project funded by the Hungary Helps Program is to reduce the number of refugees from Nigeria by the reconstruction of institutions vital to everyday life. This process can convince refugees to return to their homelands.

The reconstruction of the St. Joseph Seminary

The Ecclesiastical Seminary operating in the town of Shuwa in Adamawa State teaches its students to serve the Church and the society with their work. A lot of students also work as doctors, engineers, nurses, lawyers and teachers, besides their clerical commitments. The seminary was destroyed by Boko Haram in 2014 which forced the institute to close down for more than three years. The funds provided yb the Hungary Helps Program enabled the reconstruction of the main educational building, the laboratory, the library, and two hostels.

The opening of the Bishop O’Donnell Memorial Secondary School

The diocese is opening a new high school in the town of Kuzum which has a sizeable Christian population. The lack of quality education is a cause for serious concern in the region since public schools are in a very poor condition and the quality of education and training provided there is rather poor. That is why opening a new boarding school in a Christian-populated region would offer many opportunities for local youth to climb the social ladder which will be a major step forward for everyone. Like elsewhere in the world, good training and education are also the best way to stop the growing influence of terrorist organizations in Northern Nigeria: Schools which both Christian and Muslim children can attend are also excellent tools if we want to create

94 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... tolerance, inter-religious dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Support from the Hungarian government covers the construction costs of the school’s central education building, classrooms, library, IT laboratory, dining room, sports field and student dormitories.

Establishment of St. Stephen’s College

The diocese has long been planning to establish an educational institution which can train well-qualified teachers for private and public schools alike. Most teachers in public schools in Nigeria only have secondary school qualifications, without a college-level teacher’s degree. eTh improvement of education will substantially improve the material and social conditions of the community. The reason for the establishment of the college is that there are not any other institutions of higher education in the diocese. Better education can also contribute to the alleviation of interreligious conflicts since St. Stephen College admits students from Christian, Muslim or traditional backgrounds thus it can enable reconciliation and acceptance among Nigerian youth. The project, which funded by the Hungarian Government, supports the construction of auditoriums, administrative buildings, student hostels, a laboratory, a library and an IT laboratory.

The renovation of the Bishop Timothy Cotter Memorial ospitalH

TheM emorial Hospital which is named after late Bishop Timothy Cotter, operates in the town of Mubib, and provides medical services for the entire population of the Adamawa. In 2014, the Boko Haram terrorist organization occupied this region for several months and in this period the hospital suffered a substantial amount of damage. The sisters of the religious congregation which operated this medical institution, the Daughters of Mary Mother of Mercy (DMMM), were also forced to escape. In 2015, after the Nigerian army recaptured the region from Boko Haram the local population started to return. However, the hospital has not been reconstructed, so there were no adequate medical service providers in the region. Thanks to the funds provided by the Hungarian Government the hospital is being renovated. This includes the establishment of female and male wards, an emergency room, a laboratory, consultation rooms, staff facilities. The hospital is going to be one of the most important medical facilities in the whole region.

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Helping Protestant Christians in Nigeria through the Hungary Helps Program

From 12th to 14th May 2019, Dr Dacholom Datiri, Pastor President of the Church of Christ in Nations, visited Budapest. He met Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, State Secretary Tristan Azbej and István Bogárdi-Szabó, Bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary’s of the Danubian Church District. Dr Datiri delivered a lecture on the situation of Nigerian Christians at Pázmány Péter Catholic University. In his talk at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, President Datiri described the activities of his Church, their losses, and the situation of Christians in Nigeria. In his presentation, he explained that the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), formerly the Church of Christ in Nigeria, works in Plateau State in central Nigeria. this church is a member church of the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC). The majority of the Church’s 5 million believers live in remote, hard-to-reach areas and they live mostly as self-sustaining farmers. Since its foundation in 1904, the Church has played a prominent role in the eradication of poverty in Nigeria by providing essential health, education and food services. In practice, they take over a significant amount of public services from the state. The Church operates several renowned educational institutions, which educated several prominent Nigerian personalities over the last hundred years. The school portfolio of this church includes schools for girls ‘and boys’ alike. They also operate teacher training institutions and seminars around the Plateau State. Besides the Reformed Theological Institute of its own and the church previously also had nursing school too. One of the most interesting institutions run by this church is the COBATI Zamko College, which provides agricultural training for pastors who work in the remote parts of Nigeria. Besides their practical courses, students also receive biblical education too. The ETC Theological Institute of this church provides tertiary education to thousands of students nationwide through specialized distance education projects. This church also runs several hospitals, including the famous Vom Christian Hospital which provides important services for the population of Northern Nigeria, a leprosy hospital in Mangu, and a hospital specializing in the treatment of disabled patients in Sabon Layin. The headquarters of the Church is Plateau State, which is a federal state in Central Nigeria. This state lies in an area which is located between Muslim-majority states of Northern Nigeria and Christian-majority states of Southern Nigeria. Due to its geographical location and ethnic diversity, religious and tribal attacks have become increasingly common in the last two decades. Every year there are hundreds of physical attacks on Christian communities in Nigeria. According to this year’s report of the Open Doors International, between November 2017 and November 2018, approximately

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3,730 Christians were murdered in Nigeria in more than 21,800 attacks and this figure is based upon reported and registered cases only. Besides the murders, 570 churches and 29,500 Christian homes and businesses were also attacked. According to certain estimates about 60 per cent of COCIN followers were affected in some way during the expansion of Boko Haram. this includes the murder of 3,000 church members and 49 pastors, injuring 2,500 other Christians and 100,000 people had to flee. During these attacks, more than 50,000 homes were destroyed and 8,500 agricultural plots were also rendered unusable. As a result of these predations, 2,000 women became widows and 1,500 children orphans. Attacks by Fulani tribesmen also took many lives and destroyed entire villages.

Supporting the return of Christian refugees and creating self-sufficient agricultural activities in cooperation with the Church of Christ in Nations

Hungary also supports agricultural projects through the Protestant Church of Christ in Nations. The Hungarian Government approved a grant which is worth 162 million HUF, Government Decree 1352/2019 (VI. 11). To enable the aim of these agricultural projects is to facilitate the return of Christian refugees by the restoration of their livelihoods. The main aim is to prevent, and if possible eradicate, malnutrition amongst families which decided to return to their homes. The grant also provides funds for the purchase of building materials, to rebuild homes destroyed by the Boko Haram terrorists, seeds, insecticides, herbicides, agricultural equipment and livestock for farmers. The project assists some1,800 internally displaced families in the villages of Gwoza (in Borno State), Mubi (in Adamawa State) and Barkin Ladi (in Plateau State).

Support for refugees returning home

Boko Haram attacks forced about 100,000 people to flee their homes, most of homw found refuge either in remote IDP or refugee camps. Many refugees returned to their homeland, but due to the destruction of their homes and lands, and the loss of their livelihoods, this dream is not yet possible. Besides, the risk of famine and epidemics is still high. If we want to rebuild Christian communities suffering from persecution in Nigeria we have to supply them with basic housing, water and sanitation first. Funding from the Government of Hungary covers the purchase of basic building materials, such as cement and roofing, the construction of 30 water wells and the reconstruction of 3 destroyed medical clinics. Due to this project, about 1,800 households will be able to return to their homeland to begin the long process of rebuilding their lives.

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Support for agricultural activities

In the light of recent hardship, it is of paramount importance to secure the livelihood of the local population, which will prevent their emigration and the dissolution of entire Christian communities. There is a need to improve local agricultural activities by continuously improving their conditions, increasing the efficiency of their operations, eliminating or alleviating hunger, epidemics and premature mortality. Funding from the Government of Hungary funds the purchase and distribution of herbicides, insecticides, fertilizers, seeds and livestock to resurrect destroyed rural agricultural communities. The necessary training and knowledge transfer can be organized more efficiently through the establishment of smaller cooperatives. The project pays special attention to the families who lost their breadwinner so they can also benefit from the opportunities provided by this project. It is estimated that around 1,800 households will benefit from these proposals.

Helping Nigerian Catholic Christians in the Diocese of Sokoto under the Hungary Helps Program

Matthew Hassan Kukah, the Bishop of Sokoto, visited Budapest between 12th to 14th May 2019. The Bishop met Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and State Secretary Tristan Azbej, and gave a presentation on the situation of Nigerian Christians at Pázmány Péter Catholic University. In his lecture at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Bishop Kukah, described the activities of his church, their losses, and the situation of Nigerian Christians as a whole. The Nigerian Catholic Bishops’ Conference is a Latin Rite Catholic Church which is part of the Universal Catholic Church. The Conference is based in Lagos, Southwest Nigeria. Christianity appeared within the present-day territory of Nigeria due to the activity of Catholic priests who arrived with Portuguese explorers around the end of the 15th century. Nowadays Nigeria has one of the fastest-growing Catholic communities on the African continent. Although the Catholic Church is present in every Nigerian state, the largest Catholic communities live in the eastern states of the country. The Catholic community is growing rapidly, yet this growth has to overcome several challenges. In recent years, attacks by Boko Haram, have caused significant damage to the Catholic Church’s religious infrastructure. In the Borno State alone Boko Haram destroyed 200 filial churches, 10 parish churches, 10 vicarages, 2 monasteries, 2 mission hospitals, a primary and secondary school run by missionaries, 5 seminaries, and 7 religious education centres were destroyed. The destruction was even larger within Diocese of Maiduguri where they destroyed 67 out of the 72 parishes. Significant numbers of Catholics have been forced to leave their homeland. The tribal division also poses a challenge to the Church. The main problem is connected to the fact that Nigeria is an ethnically, religiously and linguistically

98 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... heterogeneous federal country in West Africa. This country has no historical antecedent which was created from the various colonial holdings of the United Kingdom in the region. For this reason, we cannot speak of a Nigerian nation, and tribal affiliation plays a much more important role than the fact that everyone is the citizen of Nigeria and the member of a Nigerian nation.

Improving health and education infrastructure in the Sokoto Diocese

Hungary provides 324 million HUF, with Government Decree 1352/2019. (VI. 11.), for the improvement of the educational and health care infrastructure within the territory of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. The purpose of the project is to provide education and health care services to the local population by improving the infrastructure of these two key fields. Because good quality ealthh care and education providers are indispensable for the survival of Christian communities living in Northern Nigeria. This investment will help to increase the security of local Christians and also significantly reduce the migration process from the region. Part of the project is the construction of a new state-of-the-art hospital and a new Church high school with a dormitory for girls in the town of Sokoto.

Improvement of the health care infrastructure

Bishop Kukah estimates that in the 19 states of Northern Nigeria, which is the most area of origin for migrants, 80 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. The Christian minority in this region is the victim of frequent attacks. Public hospitals have an extremely low standard of care, while private hospitals are unaffordable for the vast majority of the people. The latter is a result of the emigration of doctors which led to the deterioration of health care infrastructure. The collapse of Nigeria’s health care system forced many people to leave their homeland because they had to seek medical treatment abroad. In July 2018, the Diocese of Sokoto, in collaboration with a group of Christian doctors, held a two-day free clinic. The doctors worked through the nights to provide care to their patients who came from distant regions after the news about the availability of free medical care spread within the region. In two days about 800 people received medical care at the free clinic. Muslim patients were quite surprised that the Catholic Church provided them with free care which they did not receive from their institutions. The Dominican Nurse Ann An-Iko, the head of health care at the Diocese of Sokoto, says that the most effective way of evangelization is done through Christian love, with the provision of health care and education which symbolise the “healing and preaching” acts of Christ.

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The financial support of the Hungarian Government saved thousands of lives and played a role in convincing people to remain at their homeland. The establishment of a modern, well-equipped, state-of-the-art hospital, will play a significantly larger role in hampering emigration from this region. The construction of the new hospital will strengthen Christian communities in a Muslim-majority environment and will also build bridges between local Christians and Muslims.

Improvement of educational infrastructure

The level of development of Muslim-majority in the northern parts of Nigeria is well below the national average. In the northern states of the country, where Sharia has been instituted as a main body of civil and criminal law, polygamy is legal, men can have up to four wives and sometimes as many as thirty children. Furthermore, many people who live in this part of the country reject “western education”. It is not surprising then that 90 per cent of the 13 million uneducated Nigerian children live in Northern Nigeria accounts for about. These children are also more exposed to religious radicalization and the recruitment activities of terrorist organizations, as is the case in other parts of Africa. Even where schools actually function, there are very few qualified teachers, and only 15–20 per cent of the students can pass the national examinations. In Sokoto State, public schools treat Christian children inhumanely because Christianity is treated as a second class religion and Christian children are classified as inferior citizens. Thus, Christian Religious Education lessons cannot take place in schools and schools cannot employ Christian teachers. In some schools, Christian girls are forced to wear the Muslim hijab, and they are also under pressure to convert to Islam faith. Very few students are admitted to institutions of higher education institutions, and many remain trapped in street crime and drug usage, and they remain at the periphery of society. There are millions of drug users amongst Northern Nigeria’s children. The value of education is priceless and despite its limited resources, the Catholic Church operates 22 kindergartens, elementary and secondary schools in the Diocese of Sokoto, which is in religious authority over the federal states of Sokoto, Zamfara, Kebbi and Katsina. Hungarian government funds will allow the construction of a new secondary school in Sokoto, which is the capital of Sokoto State. The new Catholic secondary school could become the main Christian educational institution of the region. Currently, about 1,000 Christian students studying at the Church’s sole high school in the city. However, this number will rise to 3,000 over the next few years, once the new secondary school, which has been supported by Hungarian Government’s funds, opens. The new institution will play an important

100 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... role in strengthening the local Christian community since parents will be able to provide high-quality Christian education for their children locally without being forced to sending them either to remote Christian schools or to local Muslim schools. Child marriages can also be prevented by setting up dormitories for girls which provide a safe environment for study. Besides, boarding school style education will create strong bonds of friendship between pupils which will strengthen the feeling that they belong to a new Christian generation. Furthermore, the school will give its students a better chance to succeed in Sokoto despite their exclusion from the Muslim majority society. Ultimately, the new educational institution will also deepen the Church’s roots and its presence in Sokoto and throughout Northern Nigeria.

The role of the Hungarian state in protecting Ethiopian Christian communities

From 17th to 19th June 2019, Cardinal Archbishop Berhaneyesus D. Souraphiel, the Archbishop of Addis Ababa, the Chief Executive Officer of the Child and Family Affairs Organization of e th Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church, and Girma Borishie Bati, the President of the Place of Jesus Ethiopian Evangelical Church Development Committee, visited Budapest. These leaders had meetings with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, State Secretary Tristan Azbej and Cardinal Péter Erdő. During the Budapest trip, they deliver lectures about the challenges of Ethiopian Churches and the refugee crisis in Ethiopia at Pázmány Péter Catholic University. In their lectures, the Church leaders first depicted the general situation in Ethiopia and then talked about the activities of their Churches. They informed their audience that about one million refugees and economic immigrants are staying in Ethiopia which is a significant burden on the country’s social welfare system. It is only through the broad involvement of Churches that the state can provide health and education in the country at all. The country’s 26 refugee camps are expanding in size, while their conditions remain extremely poor. The masses entering the country may include many individuals who are security risks worsening the security challenges of the country. The biggest threat is the possibility of the proliferation of Islamic radicalism and the frequency of attacks on Christians. Ethiopia’s Muslim population is getting increasingly radicalized. A growing number of migrants from neighbouring Somalia and Sudan are arriving in the country, including a significant number of extremist Muslims. The Al-Shabab terrorist organization in Somalia frequently targets Ethiopian soldiers and civilians living in border areas. Similarly to other East African countries, such as Kenya, the Islamist terrorist organizations in Ethiopia are also recruiting poor, illiterate Muslim boys from the east of the country, youngsters to reinforce their ranks. (Marsai 2018, 101–107)

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The Ethiopian Catholic Church today

Today, the Ethiopian Catholic Church has a congregation of around 1.3 million believers, which is about 1.2% of the population and 2% of Christians living in Ethiopia. Most Catholics are scattered throughout the southern federal states and around Adigrat in Tigray National Regional State. All Irob shepherds who live in the mountains are also Catholic. The present leader of the Church is Cardinal Berhaneyesus Demerew Souraphiel, Archbishop of Addis Ababa. The language of its liturgy is the ancient, Geez language which is not in everyday use anymore and its rite belongs to the Alexandrian rite family. The Ethiopian Catholic Church is currently the second-largest education provider in the country after the state and has given the country several higher education institutions in the last seven decades. The Church founded the first University of Ethiopia, the Addis Ababa University in 1950, and eight years later the Combon Sisters founded the University of Asmara. In 2005, Cardinal Souraphiel founded the Ethiopian Catholic University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Addis Ababa. Besides providing educational opportunities, the Ethiopian Catholic Church has been a consistent advocate of peace and national unity. In February 2016, Pope Francis met Patriarch Abune Matthias I, leader of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church, in the Vatican. At the meeting, the Pope urged the churches to unite against the growing persecution of Christians, citing the fraternal relationship which exists between the two churches.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church today

Ethiopian Tewahido Orthodox Church is a member of the World Council of Churches. Today, the number of its faithful is about 42 million, or 40% of the population of Ethiopia. Their proportion is decreasing steadily (1994: 50.6%; 2007: 43.7%). From an ethnic point of view, their believers mainly belong to the population of the Amharic and Tigrinya Highlands. The overwhelming majority of the Orthodox population practices their religion seriously. Prayer, temple duties, fasting, they have more than 250 fasting days per year, are the definitive elements of their daily lives. According to a Pew Research Center survey from 2017, 78% of Ethiopian Orthodox population attend church weekly, and about 98% considers the religion highly important. The present-day leaders of the Church are co-Patriarchs Matthias Abune I and Abune Mercorios. The language of their liturgy, for about one and a half millennia, has been the now extinct, ancient Geez language. The Church is present in Sudan and Djibouti, but they also have eight overseas bishoprics in Jerusalem, Europe, in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and North and South America. The Church

102 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... maintains several schools nationwide, including six seminaries and a theological institute. Besides, their Sunday School program has been very popular for years. The family and child welfare organization of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church is the Child and Family Affairs Organization (CFAO), which works extensively throughout the country to strengthen families and to improve the living conditions of poor children and orphans. The CFAO runs a hospital in Addis Ababa and focuses on providing mental health treatments for children in need, as well as providing direct local support to Christian communities in the country.

The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus

Today, the number of believers in the Church is about 8.8 million. They make up 8% of the population of Ethiopia,13.7% of the country’s Christian community, and almost half of Protestants living in the country belong to this church. The Protestants live mostly in the western and southern parts of the country, including Gambela; Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region; Oromia; and the Federal States of Benishangul-Gumuz. In Gambela, more than 70% of the population belongs to the Mekane Yesus Church. Since 2017 Reverend Yonas Yigezu Dibisi has been the president of this Church. This Church was founded in 1959 continuing the work of earlier Anglo-Saxon missionary activity. The Mekane Yesus Church received state recognition only in 1969 when it was registered as an independent Lutheran Church. The church was named after the first church congregation which was founded in Addis Ababa, meaning “the place of Jesus.” After a name change in 1979 Mekane Yesus still functions as an Ethiopian Evangelical Church. The Mekane Yesus Church mainly expanded in the remote and peripheral areas in the southern and western regions of the country where the influence of Orthodox and Catholic Churches was much smaller. The Church’s evangelization work was greatly assisted by the completion of the first Oromo translation of the Bible in 1899 by the great Ethiopian Evangelist, Onesimos Nesib, so that he could read the Gospel to the largest ethnic group in the country in his native language. The Church’s theology is still defined by its former Secretary-General and theologian Gudina Tumsa. He was also called the “Dietrich Bonhoeffer of Africa” he was executed in 1979 by Derg. Tumsa after he strongly defended the organizational independence of the Mekane Yesus Church, while asserting that it must not be separated from the worldwide fraternity of Lutheran Churches. As a Church leader, he worked to create a holistic theological approach which we may describe as a socially sensitive “Ethiopian Lutheranism.” This preaches the word of the Gospel through social engagement and social

103 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS... work successfully evangelizing entire communities. This is why the Church’s chose the following motto in the seventies: “Serving the Whole Person.” In this spirit, the Church continues to do extensive education, health and community rehabilitation projects, and through the work of its church “Peace and Justice” committee, the Church actively seeks to contribute to national reconciliation and unity.

Supporting the maintenance and development of the Mai-Aini Refugee Camp (Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church, Ethiopian Catholic Church, Place of Jesus Ethiopian Evangelical Church)

Hungary Provided 483 million HUF, Government Decree 1381/2019 (VI. 26), to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido, Ethiopian Catholic and Jesus Christ (Mekane Yesus) Ethiopian Evangelical Churches for the maintenance and development of Mai-Aini refugee camp near the town of Shire in Tigray National Regional State. This camp provides shelter and basic care to some 34,000 Eritrean, Somali, Sudanese and South Sudanese refugees. The infrastructure of the camp is extremely modest and inadequate, water supplies are intermittent and depend on the weather, sanitation is pure, food supplies and education are inadequate and creating an ever- worsening humanitarian crisis. With the support of the Hungarian Government, it is possible to improve the camp’s infrastructure so that its inhabitants have enough drinking water and that refugees and their children can access organized education, psychological assistance and other types of necessary care.

Developing the Mai-Aini Refugee Camp in Tigray National Regional State, near the town of Shire, through the Hungary Helps Program

Significant numbers of civilians are staying in refugee camps in the northern and eastern border regions of Ethiopia. These people are fleeing armed conflicts in neighbouringtates s like Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. According to a UNHCR report published on 30th September 2017, there were 883,546 registered asylum seekers in Ethiopia. Most of these refugees, about 416,886 people, came from South Sudan the second largest group are the 252,497 Somali refugees. The number of Eritrean refugees is 163,281, while the number of Sudanese refugees is 43,251. There are hundreds of thousands of persecuted Christians amongst the refugees in Ethiopia. According to UN figures, 5,000 people a month cross the Ethiopian border from Eritrea alone. It seems unlikely that this tendency can be reversed or that the numbers of refugees will decrease. Moreover, every political, religious and environmental crisis will further increase the number of people arriving in Ethiopia.

104 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS...

Located about 70 kilometres from the town of Shire, the Mai-Aini Refugee Camp provides shelter and basic care to about half of the 60,200 refugees in the Tigray National Regional State. Out of the camps in this region, Mai-Aini receives the greatest number of refugees. The Mai-Aini Refugee Camp is jointly run by the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church. Running such a large refugee camp places a significant burden on the three churches. Nevertheless, thanks to their ecumenical effort, tens of thousands of people can remain in the vicinity of their homeland, and the combined humanitarian activities of the churches significantly curb Europe-bound migration from East Africa and also increase the chances that these people will return to their homes in the future. The Hungarian Government was encouraged to support this inter-denominational humanitarian project through the Hungary Helps Program. It is appropriate to provide these churches with as much funding, as they request for this humanitarian project. The three Churches submitted a joint funding request to the Hungarian Government in March 2018. Their estimates included the costs of building infrastructure which can distribute safe drinking water for the camp, organizing educational opportunities for refugee children, and providing psychological assistance and other types of care for refugees. The most important segment of this project is the need ot drill new wells which will supply the camp with safe drinking water. Besides the provision of potable water, the improvement of cooking facilities is also extremely important because it can prevent malnutrition within the camp. An added befit of having better cooking facilities and ample drinking supply in the camp will be the improvement of hygiene. Besides providing funds Hungarian experts can also assist the Ethiopian churches with their expertise. The project will require 1,500,000 Euros until 2020 and is expected to benefit 22,000 people.

Supporting the development of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church’s Migbare-Senay Hospital For the Poor in Addis Ababa through the framework of the Hungary Helps Program

Originally established as a pediatric hospital in 1993, Migbare-Senay General Hospital is now a major health centre in Addis Ababa. The institution provides affordable, comprehensive health care to patients and it also providing free treatment to poor families. Due to insufficient resources, eth hospital needs outside support in the field of medication supplies, human resources development and technical equipment. There is a pressing need for a new diagnostic facility. And as a medium-term project, they have to build a new hospital wing as well.

105 THE HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT OF HUNGARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS...

The Government of Hungary approved 161 million HUF, Government Decree 1381/2019 (VI. 26), worth of development aid for the development of the Migbare-Senay Hospital For the Poor in Addis Ababa which is maintained by The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church’s Child and Family Affairs Organization. In recent years this ecclesiastical institution became more and more popular with patients but it could not easily to cope with the rapid increase in the number of patients. The Hungarian Government supports the hospital with medications and technical equipment, training opportunities for staff embersm and, and with the construction of a new diagnostic facility. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church’s Child and Family Affairs Organization is the Child and Family Affairs Organization (CFAO) conducts extensive social work throughout the country to strengthen families and improve the living conditions of the poor children and orphans. The CFAO also has a hospital in Addis Ababa provides mental health services for children, and the CFAO also provides direct local support to Christian communities in the country.

Literature

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108 Gergely Salát1

CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA

„If you want to trust in a deity, trust the deity of Korea!” Kim Il-Sung

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) is one of the most epressiver dictatorships in the world, which does not provide its citizens with even minimal level of freedom of religion. The system is harder against Christians than to other religions, and the country is usually international rankings on the extent of the persecution of Christians. Although the freedom of religion is enshrined in the country’s constitution, it is not respected in practice. At the same time, Christianity is affected by the anti-religious communist traditions of the North Korean regime. According to the nationalist state ideology, Christians are a foreign element in the country, and the religious cult of the Kim family, which leaves no room for other beliefs. When young Kim Jong-un (1984-) came to power and the country’s diplomatic activity intensified in 2018, many hoped that the situation of the North Korean population would improve, the country’s isolation from the world would ease, which would be beneficial for Christians. So far we have not seen any positive change and there is no indication that repression will ease in the future.

Methodological problems

It is a serious problem when examining the situation of Christianity in North Korea that we do not have reliable sources at all. The authorities in Pyongyang do not publish much information on the number of believers, their composition or about any religious issues. Even if such official statements were made the very nature of the system would make this data incredible. Missionaries, who are primarily South Korean, who have credible information about North Korean Christianity do not share this information with anyone to protect

1 Pázmány Péter Catholic University

109 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA their flock’. Foreigners who visit the capital sometimes report that there are some churches there. But there is a strong suspicion that the main purpose of these churches exists to deceive the international public, and not to enable ordinary North Koreans to practice their beliefs. Most of the information we possess comes from North Korean refugees, but we have to ask how well do they represent the country’s society. How much information do they possess about processes which happen inside the DPRK? Do they tell the truth or they simply adjust their accounts to our perceived or real expectations? And finally, we have to examine the influence of South Korean governmental bodies on their accounts since Seoul has a clear interest in portraying the DPRK as negative colours as possible. International organizations or experts cannot carry out substantive investigations in-country, therefore the most official reports rely primarily on the personal accounts of the northern refugees. Because of the above-mentioned facts, we can not get an accurate estimate of the number of Christians living in the DPRK, the persecution they have to endure and any possible trends. However, all the information we possess points in the direction that the Christians of North Korea have to live tragic circumstance under a system which is extremely hostile to religion, where authorities regularly deploy multiple methods to prevent the rise or practice of Christianity.

Historical background

The first Christian documents reached the Korean peninsula from China in the th17 century, but missionary activity was severely restricted by the Hermit Kingdom of the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897). In the 18th–19th century, the Christian religion was banned multiple times, and those who converted to Christianity were persecuted by the state. The most significant anti-Christianity campaign took place in 1866 when about eight thousand Catholics were killed. As a result of these persecutions, Korea gave so many saints to the Catholic Church that the country occupies the fourth place on the list which ranks countries according to how many saints did they “produce.” (Pecknold 2013) From the end of the 19th century, when Western countries forced Korea to open its gates, a new period started for Christianity. Since after this change, Christian missionaries could finally operate openly in the country. So soon Protestant and Catholic missionaries established modern education and health care institutions in the country, and played an important role in the development of Korea. Schools, in particular, played a major role, since the children of the Korean elite, in the 20th century, studied in Christian institutions. Similarly to his parents, relatives and childhood friends Kim Il-Sung (1912–1994) also grew up as a Christian,

110 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA who attended church services, and the future communist leader also volunteered as a Sunday school teacher. (Ryu 2019, 1–5) The Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945 was important for this community since many Korean Christians participated in the national independence movement. Some Christian intellectuals participated in anti-Japanese activities, other Christians refused to attend Shinto ceremonies, while some did surrender to the Japanese. (Han 2017, 2–3) Christianity was especially widespread in the more industrialized and urbanized northern part of the country, and at the time Pyongyang was sometimes referred to as the “Jerusalem of the East.” When the Japanese left in 1945 about 2–3% of the population was Christian. An official statement from 1950 mentioned that about 200,000 Protestants and 57,000 Catholics lived in Korea (Collins 2012, 78). However, the ratio of Christians was much larger amongst the more educated and influential groups of the country. As a result, Christians had a much larger influence on Korean society, economy, and politics than what their percentage might predict. After the Second World War, the peninsula was divided into two zones of occupation which were occupied by the Soviets and Americans. Within a few years, these zones were transformed into two new states, the Republic of Korea in the south and the DPRK in the north. After the Korean War (1950-53), partially due to American influence, Christianity became even more popular in South Korea, as many associated Christianity with modernization and Westernization. This belief was supported by the fact that Christian denominations have established nearly 300 schools and 40 universities in Korea. (Grayson 2002, 169; Han 2017, 5–6) Currently, according to the 2015 South Korean census more than a quarter of the population of the Republic of Korea was Christian, 19.7% are Protestant and 7.9% Catholic. (Statistics Korea, 2016) South Korean Christians are extremely active missionaries at home and abroad, and after the US, South Korea sends the second-most missionaries in the world. Their zeal might make the North Korean regime even more hostile towards Christianity. In the northern part of the peninsula, where Christianity was originally much stronger than in the south (Park 2013, 28–29), the support of the Soviet Union turned Kim Il-Sung’s Korean Workers Party into a dominant political force within the Soviet zone of occupation. Finally, in 1948 Kim Il-Sung proclaimed the birth of a new state, the DPRK. For Christianity, these years were characterized by an interesting duality. On the one hand, the Korean Labor Party was a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party, and as such its ideology from the outset was anti-religious and anti-Christian. Since most North Korean Christians were landowners, well-off peasants, and city dwellers, they were amongst the first targets of theew n regime. Most of them emigrated to South Korea after they had been deprived of their livelihoods during the 1946 land reform and

111 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA nationalization campaign. The fate of Northern Christians worsened when a significant number of them openly opposed the new order, by boycotting the 1946 elections, which was held on a Sunday and many polling stations were located in churches. (Ryu 2019, 407–411) As a result, in the early years of the DPRK, the new authorities actively targeted Christians and followers of other religions, by launching multiple campaigns against superstitions and ordering the arrest of many church leaders. (Won 2011, 90) On the other hand, the situation in North Korea differed from European Communist countries and China in one key aspect. In Korea, Christianity did not have any connections with the overthrown regime. Instead, Christianity had strong ties with anti-Japanese resistance groups which the new regime has always classified as progressive and national. The participation of Christians in patriotic ovementsm was undeniable. For this reason, at least in official rhetoric, Christians were not classified abas ovo enemies of the regime to be exterminated, they had groups the regime found worthy of being integrated into the new system. (Won 2011 88–89) During the transitional period, Kim Il-Sung wanted to create a united front organisation which contained the representatives of every progressive force including some, properly controlled, representatives of various religions. One of the remnants of this era is the Chondoist Chongu Party, which was founded in 1946. The party, which is one of the three legal political parties in the DPRK, and its representatives take part in the work of Supreme People’s Congress, which is the North Korean legislature. The party originally represented the followers of the Religion of the Heavenly Way, which religion combines the teachings of 19th-century Korean neo-Confucian peasant movements with some Shamanistic elements. Some Christian personalities also took part in the activities of the “neo-democratic”, “anti-imperialist”, “anti- feudalistic” united front. The most important character from of these people was Kang Ryang-uk (1902-1983) a Presbyterian pastor, who was also Kim Il-Sung’s maternal uncle. He was the founder of the Korean Christian Federation of Protestants (KCFP) in 1946, and later, while he was still the president of the KCFP, he first held the posts of the secretary of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and then he became the deputy prime minister of the DPRK, nominally the second man in the country. His son Kang Yong Sop (1931-2012), who was a pastor like his father, also held many important government positions and, over time, he replaced his father as president of the KCFP too. (Weingartner 2012) Their careers highlight the contradictions of North Korean Christianity: while the party was persecuting most North Korean Christians, yet a Protestant minister could remain an influential member of the Kim family and occupy important government positions, for example, being Kim Il-Sung’s ambassador in Ceaușescu’s Romania. Thus, during the post World War II transition period, similarly to other communist countries, the existence of some Christian personalities and organizations were tolerated by the regime which merged these bodies into

112 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA a Communist-dominated people’s front organisation: once within the people’s front these actors establishing new official Christian organizations, which were lead by credible people. The continued existence of these organizations helps to convince the outside world that religious freedom is possible within the DPRK. Furthermore, the existence of these officially approved churches enables contacts with foreign churches, which is closely monitored by the regime. In practice, apart from these front organizations, every other Christian community have been systematically destroyed, which was made not as difficult as it might have been since large numbers of Christians fled to the south before the creation of the DPRK. In the few years after 1948, some regime friendly Christian organizations could still work, and the freedom of religion was enshrined in the country’s first constitution. It is worth noting that the DPRK’s first constitution did not mention the freedom of anti-religious propaganda which appeared in the Soviet constitution, which was the template for the North Korean constitution. (Ryu 2019, 413) However, as early as 1949, the party launched multiple anti-religious campaigns, nationalised church schools, and ordered the arrest of the remaining independent church leaders. A large number of captured Christians were subsequently executed. The Korean War (1950–1953) made religious life completely impossible. During the fighting, many temples and churches were destroyed, and the commitment of many Christians’ was weakened when those Americans were bombing their buildings, which were often crowded with refugees there, who have spread Christianity in Korea in the previous decades. (Ryu 2019, 415) The war caused another wave of migration towards the south so the exodus of Christians from the DPRK continued. Meanwhile, Pyongyang also initiated a new propaganda campaign which targeted Americans and other Christian missionaries who allegedly committed many atrocities, massacres and other crimes against humanity. During the war, the communist also launched large scale purges against anyone who might have had American contacts which automatically turned them into the enemies of the regime. These people were arrested by North Korean state security services and a lot of them were executed. In many cases, retreating northern troops massacred suspicious people like Christian leaders. According to some sources, 350 priests and pastors were murdered or arrested during the Korean War. By the end of the war, only 20 pastors remained in North Korea, for the 50,000 Protestant believers. (Won 2011, 92– 93) Some pro-regime Christian personalities and organizations supported Kim Il-Sung during the war, but public religious activity disappeared once the war was over. After the war, North Korean entered the period of a socialist revolution (1953–1972) which led to the establishment and consolidation of the Kim regime. Churches and religious institutions were omitted from the post-war reconstruction plans and the DPRK started to systematically remove religion from their country. (Park 2013, 30) However, until about 1958, the year when they announced the socialist transformation of production

113 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA conditions, the “religious people” phrase regularly appeared in Kim Il-Sung’s speeches and other political documents as one of those forces which are work for the success of the socialist revolution in the DPRK. (Ryu 2019, 419) Subsequently, believers were never mentioned in such a positive context, and the term religion was only used in a negative context, and the party launched multiple campaigns to destroy religions. (Won 2011, 94) From the 1960s onwards, they focused on the development of Juche, which is an all-encompassing universal ideology, the guiding principle for all actions, to be pursued by all, that left no room for religious practice. In 1967, apparently under the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the DPRK started another campaign against the enemies of the regime, which contained a strong anti-religious component. (Ryu 2019, 419–420) This was the period when they fully developed the current Songbun system. The Songbun system classifies citizens into three main categories (friendly, volatile and hostile) and 51 subcategories exist within these three large classes. The classification system uses multiple factors like an ancestor’s social tatuss before the liberation, so somebody’s pre- war status also influences the fate of their descendants. The categorisation of a person is extremely important which influences what type of jobs can someone do, how much food they get, who can they marry, are eligible for party membership, what schools they may attend, and so on. (Collins 2012; Won 2011, 95) Religious people, or more specifically those whose ancestors were considered religious, were placed in the lowest, hostile category, into special Protestant (37) and Catholic (39) sub-categories. According to Philo Kim, who is an expert in this field, 900 Protestant pastors and 300,000 believers were either killed or forced into apostasy when the system was introduced. According to Philo 260 Catholic priests and nuns and 50,000 laymen had to go through the same process and suffered the same fate. Collins( 2012, 80) It cannot be excluded that these numbers are exaggerated because these numbers seem higher than the total number of Christians in the country. Nevertheless, the remaining Christians are certainly at the bottom of the social hierarchy, not just because they are under constant close supervision, but they are forced to live the most backward districts of the country. In 1972, a new era began in the DPRK, when the state adopted a new socialist constitution. This implies that by 1972 the socialist transformation was complete, and in this new era, the country was ready to work for the complete victory of socialism. The constitution enshrined the central role of the Juche ideology and Kim Il- Sungism. By the 1970s Kim Il-Sung was revered as the great leader of the country with unlimited powers which was supported by a cult of personality. The new constitution guarantees the freedom of religious belief, but it also contains the freedom of anti-religious propaganda. Articles and films frequently criticized Christians. These attacks involved standard anti-American and Marxist panels like that religion is “opium of the people,” and homegrown criticism based upon the human-centric nature of Juche ideology. (Ryu 2019, 422–423) The

114 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA reason for the renewed anti-religious sentiments was probably not because religions were still a major anti- regime force in North Korea, but that the regime was already planning the invasion of South Korea and was getting ready to deal with the sizable religious communities there. In the 1980s, religion-related rhetoric once again began to change, which was possibly motivated by external factors. By then, South Korea became much more developed and richer than the North, which weakened the position of the DPRK. This situation turned into a full-scale crisis when the communist block collapsed in the second half of the decade. The increasingly isolated regime started using properly controlled Christianity as a tool to build links with West, thereby counteracting the loss of its allies. So in 1988, when the country was getting ready to host for the 1989 World Youth Festival they quickly built two new churches in Pyongyang, the Protestant Bongsu Church and Catholic Zhangung Church. Official religious organizations that had been inactive for decades restarted their activities, and in 1990 the Supreme People’s Congress had six religious representatives. (Won 2011, 97) This new policy also appeared in Kim Il-Sung’s memoirs, published in 1992, which portrays several patriotic Christians quite positively without even the hint of anti-Christian feeling. (Kim 1992) In 1992, the Korean Christian Federation and the Korean Catholic Association invited Billy Graham, the famous American evangelist, to preach at Bongsu Temple who also personally deliver US President Bill Clinton’s letter to Kim Il-Sung. (Ryu 2019, 427) Later, Graham’s son and wife also visited the country, and representatives of other Christian organizations have regularly visited North Korea since then, where they are often greeted with state grandeur. The leaders of North Korea’s official Christian organizations regularly attend many international conferences and events. During the famine of the 1990s, the DPRK was in dire need of humanitarian assistance from abroad so many South Korean Christian communities were actively raising funds for their northern brethren and many religious organizations provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. According to foreign experts, this new religious policy is free from honest religious content. They simply built these churches to deceive foreigners since the believers who attend the ceremonies in these buildings are centrally assigned cadres, the pastors are public servants, and Christian federations are part of the totalitarian state bureaucracy. Furthermore, the existence of these Potemkin-churches did not alleviate the hardship of real Christians who are still persecuted by the North Korean state. (Won 2011, 97–98) The fact that some foreign Christians can enter the DPRK is part of a clever international game played by the Kim regime to preserve the regime, and Christian organizations provide a decent amount of vital aid which keeps the regime alive. In the spirit of this policy, some Christian aid organizations have permission to operate in North Korea, but they are not allowed to carry out any activities of a missionary nature. (US Department of State 2019, 10)

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The leaders in Pyongyang manage Christian charities with ease, they open up the ountryc to foreign Christian organizations in milder periods, but then suddenly withdraw these concessions in more tense times. This clever policy is best illustrated through the story of a foreign Christian university in the northern capital. The Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST), is sole private university in the DPRK. This university was established in 2010 after Kim Jong-il (1941–2011) approved a proposal by South Korean, American and other Christian organizations to set up a private Christian university in Pyongyang. University teachers must not allowed to engage in public religious activities or talk about religion at all, and their students are children of the North Korean party elite, but it is a sign of openness to allow Christian teachers to live and teach in Pyongyang. (Kim 2014) However, the university is vulnerable to changes in international politics. For example, in 2017, when tensions between DPRK and the Western powers were extremely high, two foreign university instructors were suddenly arrested on charges of crimes against the state and they were only released a year later when the globe was getting ready for the first-ever North Korean – American summit. Sharma( 2018)

Ideological background

After outlining the historical background, we have to examine those ideological factors which influence the DPRK’s attitude towards Christians. Regardless of current political events and interests, they are constantly present and can be expected to persist in the long term. • Marxism is fundamentally atheistic, and Kim Il-Sung built his state on an extremely strict Stalinism. But by 2019 Marxism-Leninism has now been replaced with the indigenous Juche ideology, and in 2009 they removed every reference to communism from the DPRK’s constitution (Uscirf 2019, 67). However, this has not changed the atheistic and anti-religious nature of the system. • The Juche (‘self-reliance’) ideology which was conceived by Kim Il-Sung from the mid-1950s, formalized in the 1960s, and finalized by Kim Jong-il in the 1980s. This ideology emphasizes political and economic independence, the ability of the military to defend the country from aggression. According to Juche historical processes are influenced by human beings who can of shaping their environment, and not objective laws like production conditions and certainly not by some kind of deities. Because of its human-centeredness, Juche is opposed to every religion. (DPRK, year not specified)

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• Contrary to the original teachings of Marxism, Juche states that the masses of people cannot organize themselves, they need a “great leader” (suryong) who can successfully lead the masses. Obviously, this leader was Kim Il-Sung whose cult is still the strongest in the country. However, after his death, his descendants, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, have also been surrounded by extensive personality cults. Their pictures appear in Korean homes, workplaces and public spaces, their birthdays are public holidays, and countless institutions and public spaces are named after them. Juche was originally an atheistic and materialistic ideology, but after Kim Il-Sung‘s death, some quasi-religious elements have been introduced into Juche. (USCIRF 2019, 67) The founder of the state has been proclaimed as the perpetual president of the country and he is essentially worshipped as a god. They have been established pilgrimage centres at the most important places of his life, which are holy places within Juche. Official announcements never mention he died, they simply say that he “left his people.” A peculiar order of rituals have been established, his works have been canonized, and the desecration of his image is a serious crime. (Un hrc coi 2014, 7) The cult which surrounds the Kim family is, of course, incompatible with any notion that there is another power over man. Thus, the Christian concept of God is also unacceptable, you can not be loyal ot any other person than those who belong to the “Paektu bloodline”, that is, Kim Il-Sung and his descendants. • Similarly to other communist dictatorships, the North Korean party-state also does not tolerate the existence of those relationships and communities which are outside the party’s total control and because such groups can be used as cover by resistance groups or anti-state conspirators. Therefore, the existence of independent Christian communities is also unacceptable. • Christianity is handicapped by its foreign origins if we compare it with other indigenous or traditional Korean religions. Moreover, the DPRK has always been suspicious over the presence of foreign powers and organizations in North Korea, so they elevated Juche to the level of state ideology. The situation of Christianity was exacerbated by the fact that most Protestant missionaries in Korea were American, the representatives of the very country which had become North Korea‘s fiercest enemy since the Korean War. And since the 1950s the DPRK treats anyone who has ever associated with Americans as a hostile person, and the diplomatic detente of the last few years has not changed this approach yet. (ADF International 2019, 2) • Because Christianity is extremely successful in South Korea and the South Koreans are doing very extensive missionary activities, Noth Korea is worried that Christianity may serve as a vehicle of South Korean conquest, a spiritual ideological preparatory strike before a South-led unification. That is why northern authorities pay particular attention to it.

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These ideological factors are fundamental components of the system and ensure that as long as the Kim regime survives, the position of Christians in North Korea will not improve significantly. Some temporary mellowing may occur for tactical reasons, but the current DPRK regime is incompatible with Christianity, and free religious practice within a state governed by Juche is unthinkable.

Christians in today’s North Korea

The DPRK’s current constitution – just like previous versions - contains a clause guaranteeing freedom of religion. Article 68 reads: “Citizens shall be entitled to the freedom of religion. Based on this right, they can build religious buildings and hold religious ceremonies. Religion must not be used as a pretext for engaging with foreign forces or endangering public or social order.“ (US Department of State 2019, 3) As we have seen, even the passage of their constitution which guarantees religious freedom indicates a statement which proves that DPRK sees religion as a potential threat and a tool in the hands of foreign forces. The North Korean Criminal Code explicitly prohibits the possession of foreign religious material. (Uscirf 2019, 67, us department of state 2019, 3) in principle, freedom of religion is guaranteed by an international commitment, as the DPRK ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1981. International organizations dealing with the issue regularly state that the DPRK regularly violates the provisions of its own constitution, and the country’s international commitments and religious freedom in North Korea is severely restricted. (ADF International 2019, 1) It is hard to quantify how many Christians live in North Korea. According to international observers, this number is somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000, but these do not explain the sources behind their estimates. Some sources also add that about 50,000–70,000 thousand Christians are kept in labour camps, but once again this information is not supported by any reliable source or sources. (ADF International 2019, 2) Since the vast majority of Christians in North Korea can only practice their religion in secret, so obviously the authorities do not even know the actual number of believers, and even if they have an estimate, they will not disclose it with the world. The sole concrete piece of evidence is about how many people belonged to the official religious organizations. According to a more than 10-year-old government press release, there were 3,000 Catholics in North Korea, while the Korean Catholic Association itself told that it had about 800 believers (Allen 2006). While the Korean Christian Association, which is the official Protestant ganisationor of the

118 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA country, had about 10,000 North Korean Protestant members. (Tan 2015, 73) According to research done by a South Korean priest, the one only Catholic church in the north had about 3,000 believers. (Uscirf 2019, 69) However, we can not verify these numbers. A 2002 United Nations report put the number of Christians in North Korea between 200 and 400 thousand (Uscirf 2019, 67), and the UN has not published an updated estimate. South Korean religious organizations may have access to better estimates, but they do not disclose such information for understandable security reasons. The North Korean authorities usually take foreigners to visit one of the five Christian churches in Pyongyang. These are Bongsu, Chilgol, Jeil (Protestants), Changchung (Catholic) and the Holy Trinity (Orthodox). The latter is the newest church in the city, built by in the 2000s, to serve the pastoral needs of Russians who live and work in Pyongyang. The church, which the North Koreans describe as a Catholic Church, has no connection with the Holy See (Uscirf 2019, 69; US Department of State 2019, 8) which has been the case since the disappearance of last Bishop of Pyongyang in 1962. Ever since North Korean Catholics have, in principle, been under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Seoul, but this is of course just a bureaucratic position. (Allen 2006) The Chilgol Temple is dedicated to the memory of Kim Il-Sung’s mother, who was a Presbyterian deaconess. (US Department of State 2019, 7) All foreign sources assume that these temples just exist to serve the regime’s propaganda purposes, the ceremonies performed there are fake, that their believers who attend these services are simply doing a job. We, of course, can not prove or disprove these claims, but the nature of the system suggests that these suspicions are probably true. (McKay 2017; ADF International 2019, 2; US Department of State 2019, 7) We have to emphasize that there are other churches in the country besides the five churches in the capital and that the official churches can only operate in Pyongyang. (US Department of State 2019, 7) In 2002, the Pyongyang government reported to the UN that there were 500 “family prayer houses” in the country, but none of the tens of thousands of North Korean refugees has ever known about the existence of these alleged family prayer houses. (US Department of State 2019, 8) Legal religious activities can only be performed under the auspices of the officially recognized religious organizations. All of them are affiliated with the United Front of the Workers Party of Korea, which is the state party, and it is questionable whether they are really religious organizations or they simply exist to fulfil a political function. These include the Korean Christian Alliance and the Korean Catholic Alliance, but there is a separate alliance for the Buddhists as well while chondoism has its own party. These associations play an important role in the DPRK’s international relations, as they can have access to certain channels which are not open to government agencies. The role of these associations is also important in enabling the flow of foreign aid from religious charities into the country. These organizations also train future religious workers, and they run

119 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA religious study programs at Kim Il-Sung University. (US Department of State 2019, 9) There is no information about the content of these training projects. The religious life of non-official Christians, including everyone who lives outside Pyongyang, can only be captured through the accounts of refugees. Various organizations carry out many surveys, make interviews with those who have left the country, and ask about the experiences on religious life from those who have come from North Korea to South Korea or China. To protect relatives who remain at home, these statements contain little specific information, but virtually all of the accounts share the features described below: • Religious freedom is not a thing in the country, 99.6% of 12,625 refugees who were questioned between 2007–2018 refugees believed this to be the case. (US Department of State 2019, 6) • There are no churches, no communal worship or prayer are allowed. The practice of Christianity is only possible on an individual or family basis. There are rumours about is a network of underground Christian communities throughout the country which operates in covert churches, but the existence of such groups has not been confirmed by rural refugees while the people of Pyongyang have only hearsay evidence about the existence. (Uscirf 2019, 68) • Parents do not talk to their children about their Christian faith, or they only do so when they reach a certain age because a child might denounce the parents’ religious convictions to the authorities. At the same time, we are aware of some cases when Christian faith has survived for generations within families. (Park 2013, 31) • It is strictly forbidden to own or smuggle a Bible North Korea, so believers often keep split up their Bibles into multiple pieces. Many prayers and hymns are memorized. (Park 2013, 30–31) • If someone is arrested for participation in group prayer, for the possession of a Bible or other similar religious object, he/she has to face the most severe penalties. This can include some time in a risonp or labour camp, they have several kinds of camps or even execution. (McKay 2017; Uscirf 2019, 66; ADF International, 2019, 3, Un Hrc Coi 2014, 7) • It is also forbidden to make contact with foreign religious persons or listen to religious radio broadcasts from South Korea. (Uscirf 2019, 68) • North Korea also metes out collective punishment so if somebody has been caught committing a religious offence his whole family will be severely punished, even if they are not Christians. (ADF International 2019, 2; Uscirf 2019, 68) • There is an extensive system of agents who work to uncover Christian activity. Furthermore, and neighbours and family members are encouraged to keep an eye on each other and report any suspicious activities. For this reason, Christians must exercise extreme caution. (Uscirf 2019, 68, Un Hrc Coi 2014, 7)

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There are about 80,000–12,0000 political prisoners in North Korean labour camps, according to some estimates around 50,000 people are there because of their Christian beliefs. Workers in labour camps are tortured, and they have to deal with starvation and arbitrary executions. (Uscirf 2019, 66, 68) According to certain estimates, about 75% of Christians do not survive the camps. (ADF International 2019, 3) We cannot ignore the Christian communities of Northeast China are vital if we talk about North Korean Christianity because two million Chinese citizens of Korean descent, hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees and many South Korean businessmen live in this area, primarily in the Korean Autonomous Region of Jilin, Jenpien province. In this region, which is is not far from the China-North Korea border and they have close links with neighbouring Korean provinces. These links include people smuggling and migration across the China- North Korea border, which border is not closed for those who know how to cross it. For many south Korean Christian organizations, which are extremely active in missionary work, the conversion North Koreans living in Northern China is a priority, so many South Korean missionaries are active in this area (Park 2013, 32; US Department of State 2019,11). This area is the first stop on the northern migration route towards South Korea and Christians do a lot to help North Korean refugees Northern China. Many northern refugees convert to Christianity here, and according to some sources, 88% of them declare themselves as Christian when they arrive in the South. (Park, 2013, 32) Border traffic is two-way street since, alongside Chinese consumer goods and elements of South Korean pop culture, many religious materials like Bibles also reach North Korea from Northeast China. This means that Northeast China plays a key role in the evangelisation of North Korea. Many of the refugees in China will return to North Korea and through them, Christianity also infiltrates the country. Of course, due to the illegal nature of the process, makes it hard to quantify the importance of this process, Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that the Pyongyang regime sees this cross border activity as a serious security threat. This is illustrated, for example, by the brutal assassination ofa Chinese-Korean minister in 2016, possibly by the North Korean secret service (Kim–Shih 2018), and according to a source, in recent years no fewer than ten pastors died in mysterious circumstances in Northeastern China. (US Department of State 2019, 10)

Developments under Kim Jong-un

When Kim Jong-il died in 2011 and was replaced by his son, the young Kim Jong-un, many in the West hoped that the new leader would pursue a more moderate policy than his predecessors. This asw partially based on the fact that Kim Jong-un had once studied in a Swiss private school, so people expected that he would be more open

121 CHRISTIAN PERSECUTION IN NORTH KOREA towards Western ideas. The hopes turned out to be unfounded and there was no significant change in North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy. The only changes were temporary, an occasional appearance of Mickey Mouse in a Pyongyang show or Kim’s meetings with Dennis Rodman. Kim also restarted North Korea’s dormant nuclear program which increased the country’s isolation and then from 2018, there was a sudden flurry of diplomatic activity when he met the US, Chinese, South Korean and Russian Presidents. Experts also believe that the situation of North Korean citizens has not changed much. This also applies ot Christians: although the official Christian organizations participated in the diplomatic process, we do not know whether the circumstances of Christians improved under Kim Jong-un. In a 2018 survey, North Korean refugees and other well-informed whistleblowers were asked whether the situation of believers had improved or deteriorated compared to 2007. The results were quite interesting 24% reported deterioration, 13% unchanged condition, 6% felt that they had more freedom than earlier, while 57% were unable to respond. (US Department of State 2019, 3) The situation of religious freedom in North Korea is regularly reviewed by ariousv international organizations, and it is widely believed that the situation has not improved under Kim Jong-un. In 2013–2014, the UN Human Rights Council set up a Commission of Inquiry to carry out an extensive investigation into the human rights situation in North Korea, and their report revealed a total lack of religious freedom. (Un Hrc Coi 2014, 7) As a result of this report, the UN General Assembly in December 2014 condemned “long-standing and still serious human rights violations in the DPRK”, which includes “death penalty for political or religious offences.” (Un Ga 2014, 4) Each year the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) publishes a comprehensive report on the state of religious freedom in many troubled countries, with a separate chapter devoted to the DPRK. As in previous years’ reports, the 2019 document, which summarizes developments in the previous year, states that apart from the five official churches, religion can only be practised in secret, persons who are caught conducting religious activities have face severe punishment, arrest, torture, labour camp, execution, and in 2018, the North Korean regime continued “systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of freedom of religion.” (uscirf 2019, 66–71) According to the report, there are 80,000–120,000 thousand political prisoners in the country, of whom 50,000 are Christians, who are treated with particular cruelty. The earliest USCIRF report available dates from 2006, this and all annual documents published since, contain the same findings. The US State Department’s recent Religious Freedom Report 2018 reveals similar findings. The document refers to information from a South Korean organization saying that, between March 2007 and March 2018, there were 1,341 cases of violation of religious freedom in the DPRK, including 120 executions, 90 disappearances and 48 physical assaults. (US Department of State 2019, 1, 4)

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Each year, the US classifies the DPRK as a “country of particular concern” Country( of Particular Concern, CPC) for violating religious freedom. (US Department of State 2019, 2.) Many appreciated that in October 2018, Kim Jong-un invited Pope Francis to North Korea. (USCIRF, 2019, p. 69) If the Holy Father accepts the invitation, it would be the firstpapal visit to the DPRK, but for the ideological- political reasons listed above, it is questionable whether this gesture would improve the position of believers. The North Korean government’s anti-Christian actions affect not only North Korean citizens but also, at times, foreigners operating within the DPRK or not far from the North Korean border. In recent years, the following cases have been reported in the international press: • In 2014, a China-based pastor named Jang Moon Seok was kidnapped by the Pyongyang State Security Department to the DPRK, where he was sentenced to 15 years in a labour camp. Three of his associates were publicly executed in 2015. • In 2015, Canadian-born Hyeon Soo Lim, who was on a humanitarian mission, was sentenced to life imprisonment on the charge of trying to overthrow the regime with the help of religion. In 2017, he was released due to his state of health. (Ling – Barton 2017; ADF International 2019, 3) • In 2015, a Korean-American pastor named Kim Dong-chul was charged with espionage for South Korea and sentenced to ten years of forced labour. He was released in 2018 ahead of the US-North Korea Summit. (Ji 2018) • In 2016, Han Chung-ryeol, a Chinese national who was helping North Korean refugees on the Chinese side of the North Korea – China border, left his church to answer a phone call and was brutally murdered. Later, the North Korean authorities announced that one of Han’s deacons had been sentenced to 15 years of forced labour. (Kim–Shih 2018; Voice of the Martyrs 2017; ADF International 2019, 3) • In 2017, two faculty members of Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, which is founded by foreign Christian organizations, were arrested and convicted on various charges. They were released before the US-North Korea Summit in 2018. (Sharma 2018) In the examples above, every victim was a foreigner, so their names and fates are known and publicised. Furthermore, citizens of Western countries may be released from captivity after a political bargain. On the other hand, many North Korean refugees reported the conviction, harassment and murder of North Korean Christians - who cannot hope in such a positive outcome. Witness testimonies often do not contain specific details, because that could unmask the informant, which could threaten the safety of their relatives who still live in North Korea. Therefore, most of these martyrs will forever remain anonymous.

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Summary

Despite the lack of reliable primary sources, we clearly stated that the DPRK is one of those countries in the world which persecutes Christianity most ruthlessly, where people who practise Christianity outside the confines of official organizations which collaborate with the regime is severely prosecuted. The persecution of North Korean Christians began before the DPRK has even been founded in 1948 and has been continued ever since. Although the North Korean government relaunched official Christian organizations in the 1980s and allowed the construction of some churches yet this did not indicate a major change in the religious policies of the DPRK. These steps were simple opportunistic moves to illustrate that religious freedom exists in the DPRK and to open secondary channels for diplomacy and receive aid from non-governmental sources. The constitution, on paper, guarantees freedom of religion, but it is a simple lie. The regime sees Christianity as a serious threat, because religious faith may undermine both the cult of the Kim family and the exclusivity within Juche ideology. Furthermore, the North Koreans are probably worried that Christianity might be a tool to increase American and South Korean influence in North Korea. Not surprisingly practising Christian belief is sometimes punished by the death penalty. The situation of Christians has not improved much either when KimJong-un became North Korea’s new leader in 2011 and nor when the DPRK’s launched its diplomatic offensive in 2018. Since eyewitnesses still talk about the regular abuse of believers. Thesongbun system still places the descendants of Christians at the bottom of the social hierarchy and accordingly provides them with very limited opportunities since they belong to a social class which is hostile towards the regime. Nonetheless, Christianity in general, and Protestantism particular has not disappeared from North Korea, and there is also a continuous illegal religious missionary through Northeast China. In North Korea, we can not expect any political and social reforms which would make the situation of Christians more bearable, since the North Korean leadership greatest worry is that any loosening would lead to the collapse of the regime. As a result, apart from some spectacular gestures which they do for some instantaneous political or material gain, it is unlikely that the life of Christians in North Korea will be substantially better in the future compared to their current living conditions.

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Literature

ADF International (2019): Universal Periodic Review – Third Cycle. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Submission to the 33rd session of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Working Group. Geneva, Switzerland. Allen, John L. Jr. (2006): Catholicism in North Korea survives in catacombs. https://www.ncronline.org/news/ catholicism-north-korea-survives-catacombs (web: 17 August 2019) Collins, Robert (2012): Marked for Life: Songbun. North Korea’s Social Classification System.Washington DC, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. DailyNK (2017): Christian missionary recounts escape from North Korea. https://www.dailynk.com/english/ christian-missionary-recounts-esca/ (web: 13 September 2019) DPRK (é. n.): Juche Ideology. https://www.korea-dpr.com/juche_ideology.html (web: 5 September 2019) Grayson, James H. (2002): Korea: A Religious History. New York, Routledge Curzon, Abingdon. Han, Hongkoo (2017): Korea, a Country without Religion? https://www.hkw.de/media/texte/ pdf/2017_2/2o3tiger/170615_2o3Tiger_PDF_HAN_press.pdf (web: 11 September 2019) Ji, Dagyum (2018): Returning detainee says he did ’a lot of labor work,’ fell ill in North Korea. https://www. nknews.org/2018/05/returning-detainee-says-he-did-a-lot-of-labor-work-fell-ill-in-north-korea/ (web: 1 September 2019) Kim Il-Sung (1992): Kim Il-Sung Memoirs: With the Century. Pyongyang, Korean Workers’ Party Press. Kim, Hyung-Jin – Shih, Gerry (2018): Missionaries at border spread Christianity to North Korea. ht t ps:// apnews.com/d04acf4a138545b692ebd530d832c218 (web: 11 September 2019) Kim, Suki (2014): Without You, There Is No Us; My Time with the Sons of North Korea’s. New York, Elite Crown. Ling, Philip – Barton, Rosemary (2017): Pastor Hyeon Soo Lim believes he wasn’t executed or tortured in North Korea because of Canadian citizenship. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/north-korea-pastor-lim-barton- interview-1.4261279 (web: 1 September 2019) McKay, Hollie (2017): North Korea: How Christians survive in the world’s most anti-Christian nation. ht t ps:// www.foxnews.com/world/north-korea-how-christians-survive-in-the-worlds-most-anti-christian-nation (web: 11 September 2019)

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Park, Sandra (2013): Rebuilding the “Jerusalem of the East”. North Korea’s Christian past, present, and future. The Midway Review, 8. évf., 3. sz. 27–34. Pecknold, Chad (2013): The Korean saints of undying spirit. https://catholicherald.co.uk/news/2013/09/12/ the-korean-saints-of-undying-spirit/ (web: 22 August 2019) Ryu, Dae Young (2019): Kim Il-Sung and Christianity in North Korea. In Journal of Church and State, Volume 61, Issue 3, Summer 2019, pp. 403–430. Sharma, Yojana (2018): US professors released from North Korean detention. https://www.universityworldnews. com/post.php?story=20180509163737927 (web: 2 September 2019) Statistics Korea (2016): Results of the 2015 Population and Housing Census. Population, Household, Religion, and Housing. Statistics Korea, Seoul. http://kostat.go.kr/ (web: 16 September 2019) Tan, Morse (2015): North Korea, International Law and the Dual Crises: Narrative and Constructive Engagement. Oxon, Routledge. UN GA (2014): UN General Assembly Resolution 69/188 – Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/UNGA_Resolution_69-188.pdf (web: 28 August 2019) UN HRC COI (2014): Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK. aspx (web: 10 September 2019) US Department of State (2019): 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KOREA-DEM-REP-2018- INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf (web: 10 September 2019) USCIRF (2019): Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Washington. https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf (web: 1 September 2019) Voice of the Martyrs (2017): Martyred by North Korean Assassins. https://vom.com.au/martyred-north- korean-assassins/ (web: 2 September 2019) Weingartner, Erich (2012): North Korean church leader Kang Yong Sop dies. https://vtncankor.wordpress. com/2012/01/23/north-korean-church-leader-kang-yong-sop-dies/ (web: 2 September 2019) Won, Jae-Chun (2011): Religious persecution in North Korea: process and phases of oppression 1945–2011. International Journal for Religious Freedom, 4. évf., 1. sz. 87–100.

126 Ramachandra Byrappa

THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA (STRUCTURAL RESILIENCE IN SOUTH ASIA)

“As an Indian Citizen and the Head of the Second Largest Church in India, with more than 4.5 Million members, most of them being dalits, Adivasis, poor farmers and fisherfolks, I hereby share the fear my people have under the rule of a Government that has become a nightmare to the poor and the minorities in India.” (David 2018) Bishop Most Revd Thomas K. Oommen (Moderator, Church of South India)

A. Abstract

St Thomas is supposed to have arrived in South India in the first century of our times, and Christianity prospered since then under the protection of local rulers who themselves were not Christian. The Maharaja of Mysore built one of the most magnificent and tallest cathedrals in the whole of Asia – the Cathedral of St. Joseph and St. Philomena (Mysuru), himself a devoted Hindu. It is therefore, surprising to witness recent upsurge in persecution and violence against Christians in South Asia. This is a culmination of old trends and the addition of new ones.

B. Introduction

The situation of Christians, along with all other minorities, has entered a critical phase in India. According to the Deccan Herald daily: “As many as 219 incidents of atrocities against Christians have been reported across the country between January and October 2018, with Uttar Pradesh recording the maximum of 71 violent incidents, followed by 37 in Tamil Nadu, 23 in Chhattisgarh and 20 in Jharkhand. Of these 219 incidents, only 12 FIRs were registered by the police, who have been playing a partisan role.” (Nathanael 2018) Open Doors International World Watch ranked India 15th among countries where Christians are persecuted the most in 2018. The same organization has now ranked India at the 10th place, just after Iran and before Syria which

127 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA stands at the 11th place; while surprisingly Communist China occupies a distant 27th place in the list (43 in 2018). At 46th place, the situation in Sri Lanka is not good but not as alarming as that of India (World Watch List 2019). Behind the violence and aggression against Christians, there is an underlying issue of feudalistic property rights, both material and immaterial. What is interesting, apart from the blatant aggression against Christians, is that States dominated by the Hindutva believe that minority groups that are targeted for conversion as being their property. The fight against conversion is a battle to defend a socio-religious perimeter, where a certain set of privileges and tacit property rights are implicated. This becomes statutory as this attitude is sponsored or given support by the political system at national and sub-national levels in the form of laws and regulations. In the words of the Deccan Herald newspaper: “The Act (Jharkhand Freedom of Religion Act 2017) leads one to believe that the government is of the opinion that women, the Dalits and the tribals do not have a mind of their own to think and can easily be led to conversion.” (Nathanael 2018) In an indirect manner the Hindutva want to defend a right that is similar to a feudal right. Parallel to the above trend to defining the scope of property rights there is a push to redefine Indianness. Bharat Bhushan, columnist of Business – Standard, thinks that certain forces “… are trying to change the meaning of being Indian.” (Bhushan 2014) Up to now India was a country with a civilizational heritage and all attempts to define Indians on a racial basis were forestalled. The international environment once again being in the grip of nationalist fever, especially with increased nationalistic build-up in China, there is a pressure on India to come-up with a solution. The attempt to fill in this void comes as an opportunity for North-West Indians like Hindutva to precipitately give a racial definition that makes South India and the East of India as secondary, racially non-Indian. (Scroll 2017) And as most Christians reside in these later areas, along with other religious minorities, they are target for a cumulative of social castigation, political hatred and physical violence. There is nothing surprising in all this. But what is surprising is the rapidity with which things are unfolding. What is happening to Christians and other religious minorities now could be identified in the structural movement of India’s history, in its multi-layered motion. These strands of discrimination against Christians comes from different historic trends and processes. From an analytical perspective, one can identify several issues. First is that Hindutva considers India as its premier market domain, the main customer base. The claim of the Hindutva fanatics is that American Pentecostalism is trying to convert their core believer community. Here again these fanatics are considering individuals as the property of their religious community. In any normal situation their reaction should have been peaceful. For example, making Hinduism a less divisive

128 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA religion, by being fair and accepting to the lower castes and tribal communities. Their reaction to American evangelism has been the opposite, it is increasingly more and more violent. What is devastating is that their anger and aggression is not directed against the American evangelism which is urban based and well protected but against the churches backed by the European Christianity, which are mainly in the rural areas. The reason for this is that the security and protection of the religious minorities in the remote rural areas is very arbitrary. The rule of law and impartial policing are very sparse in the countryside. And because the majority of Christians in India live in small and remote settlements, aggression and violence against them is easy for the fanatics, and it is expected to be on the increase. Especially, as Buddhism becomes the national norm in Sri Lanka and as Hindutva increasingly dominates the national state structure in India.

Prosecution of Christians in Sri Lanka: structure and trends

Structural issues are at the heart of communal tensions in Sri Lanka. In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious set- up the state plays the role of a paramount power in keeping peace between these various interests. The culture of political consensus that the country enjoyed no longer exists, which points towards a grim future for religious harmony. And as this study will show, Christians in Sri Lanka are coming under attack at several levels (ethnic, linguistic and religious) and if nothing is done to change things, it is almost certain that violence against Christians will be bloody and incremental. The terror attack against Sri Lankan Christians this April was a culmination of these treads, contrary to what the simple explanations revealed. To those who observe the structural evolution of Sri Lanka’s socio-political system the unfortunate events of April 2019 were not surprising: “Sri Lanka has a long and complex history of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence.” (Keenan 2019) In this, some trends are visibly new but others are anchored in traditional divisions. The majority Sinhalese population, with the fanatical core of radical Buddhist monks, perceives that it is a victim of a gross injustice due to the structural imbalance between itself and the minorities in a country of 21 million. The situation is as follows: “Sri Lanka’s population cannot be neatly divided by race, faith and language. Over 70 percent are Sinhalese, who are mostly Buddhist although a minority are Christian. A further 15 percent are Tamil, who are largely Hindu and Christian. Muslims comprise 10 percent and are considered ethnically distinct even though many speak Tamil.” (Gunasingham 2019, 8) This social construct is very revealing in the sense that the confrontation is not as multipolar as one perceives. Ethnically, the conflict is still bi-polar conflict, between the Sinhalese and the Tamil. The majority of the people from the minority religions

129 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA either come from the Tamil language community or are from the Tamil ethnicity. It was reported that the leader of the April terror action, Zahran Hashim “… was a highly charismatic radical ideologue known for his YouTube videos that articulated a hard-line interpretation of Islam, mainly in the Tamil language.” (Gunasingham 2019, 9) Although Portuguese took Christianity to Sri Lanka, it was under the Dutch and British that the religion expanded. One of the reason for this was that those who accompanied them to the island were Tamils, who were either already converted or were more open to conversion on their arrival. So violence against Christians can be seen as the continuation of the war against the biggest minority, the Tamils, by other means and in another sphere. For reason of political stability and economic imperatives the successive governments were averse to opening a new conflict with the established core Tamil community. The Sri Lankan government, dependent upon foreign aid and foreign capital, very much wants to be seen as implementing a process of reconciliation. So protecting the process was vital and the radical Buddhist monks realized this and turned their attention to the remaining segments of the Tamilness – Christians and Muslims. Reducing the influence of the Tamil socio- cultural sphere on the perimeter, meant reducing the political influence of the Christians on the political establishment and reducing the economic strength of the Muslims. Although it was not openly discussed by state organs, the perception was that money was collected abroad for the Tamil Tigers through Christian charities and Muslim commercial networks. Reducing the influence of the Christians and Muslims is part of the same strategy and battle, although it might vary in official declarations. And as the argument goes, because both prospered during British colonialism, their deconstruction is a real expression of attaining full sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, the State structure in Sri Lanka was still a colonial until the 1980s. Colonial in the sense that it was above the various religious and ethnic groups, in position of an impartial referee. Starting from the 1950s the Sri Lankan State was readjusted to accommodate the fact that ethnically the Sinhalese represented the majority, which in itself not negative policy. But it made sure that the state is anchored in a secular tradition in the colonial tradition. Today this posture is becoming increasingly non-secular in favour of the Buddhist religious community, guaranteeing it the “foremost place” in Sri Lankan society. (Woods 2012, 206) The reason for this is that the State is progressively sapped of all power by the Buddhist theology and organization. In a democracy, having influence is also having real power. So in the first phase, the Sri Lanka State was provided protection to the Christians due to the continuation of a colonial tradition of impartiality. In the second phase, the current phase, the state is unwilling to provide this protection. Experts are unanimous that the terrible attacks of April could have been avoided, if secular and pro-Buddhist elements had exchanged information in a normal way. In the final phase, if the trend continues and nothing is done to change t,i the state will openly

130 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA turn against Christians. And has to be said, in spite of the unprecedented April terror attacks, the fate of the Muslim community is connect to that of the Christians. (Green 2019) In the same manner as Christians having political influence, Muslims are also perceived as disproportionally controlling the economic levers of the country. Sri Lanka is still a constitutional democracy with a strong attachment to the rule of law. To circumvent this hurdle the preferred strategy of the Buddhist fanatics has been to use “disruption”, make it impossible for Muslim’s to undertake their business ventures. Before the deadly attacks of April 2019, Muslim business were regularly harassed, disrupted and burnt down in rural and interior parts of the country. But since the attacks Buddhist mobs have destroyed some 76 business or mosques in the more coastal and urban areas, according to the Washington Post. (Slater – Farisz 2019) Any excuse is good for pulling down the Muslim community and creating tensions with Christian community. What was before a platform for religious tolerance, mutual support and understanding has now become a potential arena for communal violence. In the 1980s it was about ethnic domination, this time round it will be religion. Willingly or unwillingly, Christianity will take a centre ground in the coming struggle. Since the 1980s Sri Lanka hardly had time to re-equilibrate from perceived historic injustices, it had to confront the dangers of the future that risked shattering not only its identity but the prospects for a peaceful development. Christianity and Islam enjoyed peaceful development until now. What has changed so suddenly? Why are the Sinhalese and Buddhists so anxious for their future? Some experts explain that the Sinhalese and Buddhists are angered and frustrated by the direct-marketing methods used by the American evangelists. (Matthews 2007, 457) But there are also signs that this panic is increased and exaggerated by the Buddhist and Sinhalese fanatics. They are using this fear as a pretext to attack Christians of all denominations, and this is a very dangerous amalgamation leading to increased violence against innocent people. There is absolutely no foundation to attribute any blame to the traditional Christian churches. Tamil Hindus are increasingly courting a type of Hindu fanaticism unheard of until recently (Ali 2018), and what is more alarming, on the Muslim side there is a noticeable penetration of Wahhabism inside Sri Lankan Islam, which was very mild and adapting until now. Of the 202 Madrasas 82% were opened since 1980. (Ali 2018) In conclusion we can say that the prosecution of Christians is due to structural reasons and the invasion of outside influences. Post-colonial adjustments were frozen or slowed by a colonial model of governance. This model is falling apart, as it loses legitimacy from the Sinhalese majority. In essence, the Buddhist majority sees no logical or moral reason to protect or support minorities that are engaged in expansive activity at the expense of the established majority. Both Christianity and Islam are expansive and highly organized religions. This in the context of globalization sends shivers through the Sinhalese society. Traditional borders that kept a status

131 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA quo and peace have been shattered by American Evangelism and Saudi Wahhabism. Faced with this perception, local Sinhalese are overwhelmed and do not see a peaceful coexistence on the horizon. The Sinhalese majority and the Buddhist clergy have moved into an active mode of resistance. Violence against Christians will intensify in Sri Lanka.

The persecution of Christians in India: old discriminations and new economics

The famous American author Kathrine Mayo, author ofMother India, is known to have described India “as a chamber of horrors.” (Clothey 2003, 3) The situation in India is quite similar but with an added extreme structural complexity. Until recently, in its large majority, Christianity had a mission, a function and was a catalyst for change – the betterment of humanity. Christianity offered practical help first and then followed it up with the Christian doctrine. Mayo in her very practical approach points out to a very important conundrum: Christianity offers a lot more than mere words but there are very few takers (Mayo 927,1 169). The reason for this is that Christianity generally prospered in the tribal regions and coastal areas but beyond that it has difficulties making inroads. There is a very simple reason for that. Christianity comes into opposition not with Hinduism as a religion but as a social system. This is the precise reason why Christianity had success in those regions where the population was not integrated into the caste system. This fact is often ignored. Changing religion means total extraction from the social roots. The result was that those onvertedc to Christianity did so with full knowledge of this eventuality. Conversion was slow and steady and this did not disturb the Catholic Church nor the European Protestant churches. World Watch List (Open Doors) estimates the number of Christians living in India to be 65 million but the official censusCensus ( Directorate 2011) puts the figure at 27,8 million or 2,3% of the total. (World Watch List 2019) If we take the official figures as the basis then the Christian population in India has proportionally remained constant, following the natural growth of the overall population. Not wanting to irritate Brahmins communities in the urban areas, the European missions focused their missionary work on remote areas where affiliation to Hinduism was relatively low, meaning rural communities and tribal strongholds. And the missionary work done was mostly practical, like building schools and rural clinics. There was no need for aggression or hatred of any kind, people in general were friendly and protective towards Christians. Since a decade this peaceful picture has suddenly turned sour and more recently things have become alarming. Not a week goes by without some kind of atrocity against Christians. The tragedy of the ituations is that

132 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA atrocities against other sections of the population are many times more, and the degree of cruelty outstrips that suffered by Christians. Hundreds of millions of Dalits and Tribal communities are persecuted every hour. Today, conflict, hatred and persecution against Christians is coming from three corners: a genuine sense of panic generated by American Evangelism; a drive to retain the Dalit community for political reasons; and finally bring the tribal resources-rich lands under Hindu influence for economic extraction and appropriation. From the 1990s onwards the American evangelists rapidly increased their presence in a very coordinated manner. In a one-to-one combative manner they targeted urban educated population of young Indians who were destined to be high earners. “Similarly, in the regions of India surveyed, 59% of pentecostals fall into the two higher-income groups, compared with only 39% of the general population.” (Pew Research Center 2006) This is the reverse in the United States where 60% of the recruits come from lower income brackets. Evangelism is therefore locked into a direct economic battle with the Hindu clergy, for which high-income families constitutes its core community. According to one expert on the subject: “There is certainly some truth to the assertion that Pentecostal proselytization is provocative, and that this provocation alone occasionally leads to violence.” (Bauman 2015, 70) The violence is therefore not against Christians in a strict sense but more against an economic activity that is targeting the preserve of the Brahmin caste. Tribal zones are synonymous with luxuriant natural habitat with high deposits of mineral resources. Let us take the example of Kandhamal district in the state of Odisha (east coast of India). The district is the greenest in the in the whole of Odisha and nicknamed “great forest.” The population density is only 91 while in Northern India it is above 1,000. It is reputed to contain large deposits of gemstones and bauxite among others. This was also its curse, as mining companies decided to take-over. The mining operations started in 2003 and soon the company realised that green forests and tribal people were impediments to its operations, both had to be cleared. (Hopkins 2009) Then suddenly in 2008, local Hindu extremists realised that there are Christians in the region, who have been there since the 18th century. Sometimes conversion of tribal people through deity integration happened much later. Through the pretext that four Hindu youngsters were harmed by Christians, a violent rampage against the local Christian community was released. There erew more than 100 deaths and as the Scroll (online in-depth news analysis) puts it: “More than 40 women were sexually assaulted and over 300 churches were vandalised. The violence spread to 600 villages. More than 6,000 homes were looted and burnt, and at least 56,000 people were displaced, according to various estimates. Many Christians were coerced to convert to Hinduism with the threat of violence.” (Scroll 2008) Those displaced never came back. There were clear signs that the objective was to root out the tribal population, Christianity was the nominal reason.

133 THE SITUATION OF THE PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA

The third source of violence and persecution against Christians is coming from the systematic persecution of the Dalit community. Rural communities, where mainly the Catholic Church is very active, a majority of the converts come from the Dalit community, almost 70% of the total. (Louis 2007, 1410) Suppression and exploitation of the Dalit population still yields economic benefits to the upper castes, especially in the northern states where caste discrimination is still untouched. This said, India is a emocracyd where numbers matter. The Dalit community has the potential to sway the results across the country, especially in the Hindi belt. What concerns the “New Hindu” political elite is that the Dalit, as the name indicates, remain suppressed; remain inconsequential as far as their democratic franchise is concerned. Christian missionaries “awakening” the Dalit or having access to the democratic power of the Dalit is considered dangerous. The official census of 2011 put the Dalit population at 200 million plus but it could be anywhere between 250-300 million, since many do not want to be labelled Dalit in certain violence-prone regions. In reality this means that the Dalit community is the biggest community and has huge political potential. Controlling this community becomes essential for Northern Indian control of the country. (Engineer 2004, 1379) In this sense by stopping conversion to Christianity or harassment of the 20 million Dalit converts is seen as exercising “property rights.” (Louis 2007, 1410) The tragedy with the Christian church hierarchy is that it has itself become victim to the caste hierarchy. There are divisions between the upper caste Christians and DalitChristians. (Gomes 2018) This sends a message that the immediate Church hierarchy is not willing to protect Dalit Christians; in a tragic way recognizing the property rights attitude of the “New Hindus.” In conclusion we can say that in India hatred, violence and persecution of Christians is not doctrinaire as elsewhere. In India, being Christian is an extra reason for being a victim of persecution, of those who are persecuting anyway, like the Tribal or Dalit population. Beyond this structural reason, economic struggle seems to be the driving force behind the mounting violence against local Christians, who generally come from tribal and rural areas where there are high deposits of mineral resources. And similar to Sri Lanka, if the state abandons its impartial posture then persecution of Christians could reach a massive scale. The huge state bureaucratic structure could become ideologically weaponized to harass Christians systematically and ever more violently.

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Zsigmond Tömösváry

THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN HELPING CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nowadays, when in some areas of the world people who profess to be Christian find themselves in a very difficult situation, the support given to Christian communities is of particular importance. This is especially true in those countries, like in the Middle East, where Christians not only live as a minority but are also subject to persecution. According to experts, Christians are persecuted in some countries of the region, and several African countries, at similar levels than in ancient Rome. The American-based Open Doors International Christian Human Rights Organization regularly produces and publishes statistics on the extent of Christian persecution. According to a 2015 summary report, Christians’ rights are grossly and severely violated and Christians are explicitly persecuted in 50 countries. Of these 50 countries, 14 are located in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, while 16 are African. The newer list, made in 2019, already lists 150 countries, of which 73 have exceptionally high or very high levels of Christian persecution. Nigeria leads the list because 90% of Christians who are murdered for their faith in the world today are killed by Boko Haram terrorists. In my paper, I focus in more detail with the cradle of Christianity, the Middle East, with particular reference to examine the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in helping persecuted Christians in the countries of the region. I will concentrate on three countries in the region, in particular, these are countries which have relatively large Christian communities, or rather they used to have big Christian communities because many of them had to flee because of persecution: So let us examine the situation in Iraq, Syria and Egypt.

In Iraq, Christian churches are represented by the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church of Antioch, the Jacobite Syrian1, the Syriac Catholic and the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church. In the early

1 The Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church is one of the six ancient churches which belong to „non-Chalcedonian” traditions of Christianity. The term ”orthodox” is, according to the theological tradition of the Syrian Church (like any other ancient Eastern Orthodox Church) is different from the Byzantine Church’s orthodox tradition, which bases its teaching on the decisions of the Chalcedon and three subsequent councils.

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2000s, there were about 1,5 million Christians in Iraq, representing 4–5% of the country’s population. By 2014, as a result of ongoing armed conflict and terrorist attacks by slamicI extremists, their numbers had fallen by 90 per cent to 150,000. For example, in June 2014, Islamic State terrorist groups captured Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, with about 35,000 Christians who lived there. The jihadists proclaimed Mosul the capital of the “Islamic Caliphate” and forced Christians to pay a special tax of $ 250 per month or convert to Islam. Otherwise, they would be executed. Subsequently, almost all Christians fled Mosul to seek refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. (Гонения на христиан в мире 2016) The survivors were either imprisoned or murdered with beastly cruelty. For example, some were crucified by the terrorists.

In Syria, Christian communities are represented by the Antioch and Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Orthodox Church, the Melkite Eastern (Byzantine) Catholic Church2, and the Maronite Church3. At the start of the civil war in Syria (2011), there were approximately 2 million Christians (about 10% of the total population). According to some experts, their proportion had already fallen below 8% in 2012, and between 2012-2014, about one million Christians left Syria. For example, the city of Homs was abandoned by its entire Christian population (about 140,000 people)! The few Christians who emainingr in the city were practically completely exterminated by Islamist extremist militias. In April 2013, the Bishop of the Orthodox Church of Antioch, Metropolitan Paul of Aleppo and the Bishop of the Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Gregorios Yohanna Ibrahim, were abducted by terrorists. In 2015, according to widespread news, they were executed. However, the abduction of 12 Orthodox nuns and their Mother Superior who were taken by gunmen from the St. Thekla Monastery in December 2013 finished in a more positively, since they were eventually released from captivity. Between March and June 2014, Islamic extremists occupied the Syrian town of Keshab, where mostly Armenian Christians lived. Thousands were forced to leave their homes. On 22 February 2015, Islamist extremists burned down dozens of residential buildings and two ancient temples in Tell Tamer, northwestern Syria, and brutally murdered the representatives of the Assyrian Christian

2 The Melkite Byzantine Catholic Church is an independent sub-church of the Eastern Catholic Church, fully integrated with the Roman Catholic Church. The Church was born in the Middle East, but nowadays Melkite Catholic communities are found throughout the world. It currently has around 1,5 million believers worldwide. (Гонения на христиан в мире 2016) 3 The Syriac Maronite Church is a Lebanese-based Eastern Catholic Church of Oriental rite that is in full communion with the Apostolic See. (Гонения на христиан в мире 2016)

140 THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN HELPING CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST community. According to the Russian Orthodox Church, some 400 Christian churches were destroyed by extremist militants during the Syrian Civil War. (Гонения на христиан в мире 2016)

In Egypt, violence against and persecution of Christians has become more common, in particular since January 2011, after the beginning of the so-called “Arab Spring.” This process extremely violent in 2013, when there were armed clashes between the forces loyal to the government forces Muslim Brotherhood4 fighters. More than 200 Christian community buildings were demolished between 2012 and 2013, which was a significant loss to the Coptic church in particular. In 2015, an organization calling itself the “Soldiers of the Province of Tripoli”, which had pledged its allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State, published a video about the execution of 21 Coptic Christians who had been captured in Libya. The changes brought about by the events of the “Arab Spring” posed major challenges for Christian communities in the region. The Russian Orthodox Church’s international ooperationc activities focus on supporting the persecuted Christians in the world and continuing to help their communities. They do this through political, diplomatic means and concrete, effective financialupport, s and through assistance in kind. The main organizer of this activity within the Orthodox Church is the Chairman fo the Department of External Church Relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokalamsky, Bishop of the Orthodox Church.5 His predecessor was Metropolitan Kirill, who today is the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia.

4 The ”Muslim Brotherhood” was founded in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna in Egypt as a religious, political and social movement. Its ideology was initially designed to bring back to Islam those who were ”corrupted” by Western ideas. However, their politics soon confronted the colonialist Western powers and later the secular government in the country. (Jászberényi 2017) 5 Metropolitan Hilarion Volokalamsky (civil name Grigory Valeryevich Alpheyev) was born on 24 July 1966. In 1996, he received his doctorate in philosophy at Oxford but he also studied in Paris, London and the USA, and was a guest lecturer. In 2002, he was appointed Bishop of Podolsk and became the representative of the Orthodox Church at international organizations in Brussels. In 2003, he was appointed the Bishop of the Orthodox Church in Vienna and Austria (also the supervisor of the Orthodox Church in Hungary and Budapest). Since 2009 he has been the Metropolitan of Volokalamsk, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow and a permanent member of the Holy Synod. Since 2015 he has been a representative of the Orthodox Church in the Interfaith Council of the Russian Federation. He is the author of more than 800 national and international publications, including the Greater Russian Encyclopedia and the Pravoslav Encyclopedia. His work as a composer and translator is also significant. He is an extremely versatile, educated high priest. (Материалы из Википедии)

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Metropolitan Hilarion Patriarch Kirill Source: Yandex.ru Source: Yandex. ru Web: 3 September 2019 Web: 3 September 2019

The Department of External Church Relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow Отдел( внешних церковных связей Московского Патриархата) was established on 4 April 1946, by the decision of the Holy Synod, to organize the international activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, and to coordinate its international and interchurch relations. It performs its duties based on the decisions of the high priests (bishops) and diocesan councils, the decisions of the Holy Synod and the orders of the Patriarch. This office is accountable to the Patriarch and the Holy Synod. The head of the department (president) has been a bishop – since the decision of 16 December 1961 – who is a permanent member of the Synod. Due to the nature of its mission, this organization became responsible for the organization and coordination of those activities which the Orthodox Church does to help persecuted Christians. The department responds promptly to every manifestation of Christian persecution and, following its opinion, the Patriarch, through Russian state organs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Presidential administration, spokesmen, ambassadors) make their voices heard in various international fora (UN, OSCE, European Parliament, at other international events, conferences, roundtables on Christian persecution). At the initiative

142 THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN HELPING CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST of the representatives of the Orthodox Church, the topic of Christian persecution has been included in the closing documents of several international conferences. Working to protect and assist the persecuted Christians of the world is one of the main priorities within the international activities of the Orthodox Church. This statement is not only true nowadays since from the 16th century onwards the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian state provided financial support for the Orthodox communities of the Middle East. In addition to financial aid, Tsarist Russia often assisted persecuted Christians in the region by exerting diplomatic pressure on the leaders of Middle Eastern countries in the. Arab children were taught free of charge in the schools of the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society, which was founded in 1882. In 1914, the Society operated more than 100 schools, further training courses and seminars in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Thus, Russia and the Russian (Orthodox) Church have, throughout history, demonstrated in countless cases that they kept persecuted Christians in their hearts. (Церковь и Время 2011) This is also illustrated by the fact that between 2009 and 2011 Kirill, Patriarch fo Moscow and Russia, for example, have personally visited several countries in the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and Israel. After his return to Moscow in 2011, the Patriarch appealed to the world to make every effort to put an end to the persecution of Christians, especially in the cradle of Christianity in the Middle East. This period essentially coincided with the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, when the political struggles only intensified tensions which have existed between religious groups. At the meetings between the head of the Russian Orthodox Church and state leaders, the issue of persecuted Christians in the Middle East is almost always on the agenda. Patriarch Kirill has repeatedly sent letters to leaders of Muslim countries where some detained Christians lives were in danger of executed and, in most cases, these letters saved their lives. In May 2011, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a document which not only condemned the persecution of Christians but also asked the world to join Russia in the fight against anti- Christian discrimination. In 2013 at the initiative and with the blessing of Patriarch Kirill, the Orthodox Church launched a universal and nationwide fundraiser to help Christians in the Middle East. There were also donations from Church districts, dioceses, monasteries and religious orders, as well as cities, individuals and social organizations. The donations which were collected during this event were distributed to needy Christian communities through inter-church relationships.

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The opportunity for humanitarian aid has gained new momentum following the 2016 meeting in Havana between Pope Francis, Head of the Roman Catholic Church, and Patriarch Kirill, Head of the Russian Orthodox Church. After this meeting, a joint Catholic-Orthodox delegation visited Syria and Lebanon. The delegation met leaders of local Christian communities and also visited a refugee camp. Following the visit, the participants compiled a list of Syrian churches which were destroyed by local extremists, and the two Churches wished to contribute jointly to their restoration. (Русская Православная Церковь 2019) The Orthodox Church cooperates with various state and social organizations in upports of persecuted Christians. As a result, the issue of assisting persecuted Christians is an important part of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. For example, in 2015, at the suggestion of the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Vatican and Lebanon, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a statement supporting the rights of Christians in the Middle East, resulting in a major breakthrough on the already delicate issue of persecution. (Following the meeting of the two Heads of Churches in Cuba, the United States recognized the genocide of Christians.) (Русская Православная Церковь 2019) In addition to the Catholic Church, the Russian Orthodox Church cooperates with other Churches and organizations to counter the persecution of Christians and these relationships produce some results. A good example of this is the May 10-13, 2017 World Summit in Washington, DC, organized by the Russian Orthodox Church and Billy Graham Evangelistic Association.6 The purpose of the meeting was to raise public awareness of the plight of persecuted Christians in Middle Eastern, African and other countries and the need for international cooperation on this crucial issue. On 8 November 2017, Justin Welby, Archbishop of Canterbury, visited Russia and signed a joint statement with Patriarch Kirill in defence of persecuted Christians. The issue of persecution of Christians in the Middle East was also raised during talks between Patriarch Kirill and the head of the Christian Church of Ethiopia, Abune Mathias, in May 2018. The summary report quoted earlier also mentions that the Russian Orthodox Church always raises the issue of the persecuted Christians in its dialogues with Muslim and Jewish religious communities, and seeks to win the religious and state leaders concerned to have a positive response and attitude to this important issue.

6 William Franklin ”Billy” Graham is an American evangelist who was in direct contact with 11 American presidents in his life. He enjoyed tremendous respect. He held impressive indoor and outdoor gatherings; his sermons were broadcast on radio and television, and some are still broadcast today. He was considered the most influential preacher of his time.

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Within Russia, the Orthodox Church is doing its best to win state leaders to participate in solving this extremely important problem. For example, in 2017, an Interfaith Working Group was set up within the Council on Religious Cooperation, which body is close to the President of the Russian Federation, to organize humanitarian assistance projects for the Syrian population. As a result of the efforts of the Working Group, a significant amount of humanitarian aid was sent to Syria. These aideliveries d were funded by donations gathered in the districts and churches of the Orthodox Church at the request of the Patriarch. Between 3rd–9th February 2018, the members of the Interfaith Working Group visited Syria and Lebanon. During the visit, they distributed 77 tons of humanitarian aid to the needy, with the help of local Christian and Muslim religious organizations. The curiosity of the issue was precisely the fact that these onationsd were distributed jointly by the representatives of Russian and local religious organizations in Christian churches and Muslim mosques! (Русская Православная Церковь 2019) The importance of decisive joint action against the persecution of Christians was the main topic of a conference held in Moscow in 2011 where Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow said: “I think we need to look at the issue of persecution of our brothers and sisters in the context of international cooperation between Christian churches. Christians of different denominations must work together to protect Christian minorities in countries where they are subject to persecution.” (Церковь и Время 2011) The Metropolitan also suggested that the Great Synod, planned for that year by the Orthodox Churches, should discuss the situation of Christians in different parts of the world and the possibilities of joint action against their discrimination. He believes that one possible way to fight persecution is through dialogue between different denominations and cultures, in which the Russian Orthodox Church can share its positive experiences since the Russian Federation is a very diverse country in which religious denominations coexist peacefully. Such dialogue with followers of other religions can not only help to resolve religious conflicts but it might also put an end to ethnic and, in some cases, regional political conflicts as well. “What can we do in this field to confront the cruelties in the terrible destruction of innocent people? – asked Metropolitan Hilarion. In spite of the differences in our beliefs, we must unite and express our solidarity with our persecuted brethren. We must find those groups among the followers ofthe Islamic religion who also believe that the current bloodshed is a disaster and tragedy. We must act together with them, because, even though international organizations issue various documents, they are ineffective. We, believers, are approaching this serious issue from a completely different angle! Against the manifestations of religious extremism, which seeks confrontation and conflict between different religious denominations, only together can we act effectively.” Церковь( и Время 2011)

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Metropolitan Hilarion raised yet another interesting problem in his lecture. He said: there is also a view that Christians who are being persecuted and do not feel secure in their lives should be allowed to emigrate to third countries. He underlined that this position should not be accepted, as it would serve the very purpose of the persecutors to expel Christians from their ancient lands. Every effort must be made to ensure that Christians feel secure in their ancestral lands and contribute to the prosperity of their country. In his closing remarks, he said: “All states must give their citizens the guaranteed opportunity to practice their religion, to freely raise their children in the Christian faith, to express their views freely, without therefore being subject to persecution.” (Церковь и Время 2011) Another event worthy of attention was a conference held at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies on 10 March 2016, titled “Current Persecution of Christians: Geopolitical Aspects.” In addition to the hosts, the event was attended by representatives of Church and social organizations from Serbia, Italy, Ukraine, Syria and Lebanon, representatives of research institutes and media experts. The conference also served as a preparation for a congress in October on a similar subject but with much broader participation, to which all religious denominations were invited. At the event, Ambassador Konstantin Dolgov, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that every month 3,22 Christians are killed, 214 churches are destroyed and various other forms of aggression against the faithful happen in 800 cases. The Christian population in the Middle East, which has been present for 2,000 years, has fallen to 1 million, threatening not only the religious and ethnic balance of the region but also its security, which is also an extremely destabilizing factor for world security. As a result of the crisis, tens of thousands of migrants have come to Europe and the two-thousand-year-old values of Christian culture are condemned to disappear. An important finding of the conference was that genocide againstChristians today is not an exaggeration, but a reality. In countries where there has been peaceful coexistence between different denominations of Christian and Islamic religions over the past centuries, the persecution of Christians, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, has intensified due to the very volatile situation in the Middle East. For this reason, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian foreign service must do everything they can in aid of persecuted Christians. (Международная Жизнь 2016) Some foreign experts believe that the Russian Orthodox Church, for example in Syria, is subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the opinion of Metropolitan Hilarion, however, the situation is reversed. He reiterated the view that the fall of President Bashar al-Assad would have placed the Christian communities in Syria in a much worse position. We ough to learning from the example of neighbouring Iraq, where tens of thousands of Christians were forced to flee their homes following the fall of Saddam Hussein. (Russian Foreign

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Ministry leaders also use this issue as an argument in their dialogue with their Western counterparts on Syrian issues. – Author’s note.) In addition to globalization, scientific and technical progress, the protection of Christian values must also be an integral part of a viable society. One of the internationally significant milestones happened when the UN Human Rights Council held a conference in Geneva on 7 March 2017, which was called “Mutual Respect and Peaceful Coexistence as a Condition of Interreligious Peace and Stability: Supporting Christians and Other Communities.” This event jointly organised by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, the Holy See, Armenia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon and Spain, and by NGOs from several countries.

(Source: “Гонения на христиан” в современном мире”, ТВ Царьград 2016 Interview of Loseva Elena with Dmitrij Pahomov, Foundation Director of “Христианская солидарность.” https://tsargrad.tv/articles/gonenija-na-hristian-v-sovremennom-mire_23802 (Web: 7 September 2019)

The opening speech of the conference was given by Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Patriarchate of Moscow.

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Metropolitan Hilarion speaks at the 7 March 2017 session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. (Source: Website of the Russian Orthodox Church: https://mospat.ru/ru/2017/03/08/news143320/ Web: 9 September 2019)

In his lecture, the Metropolitan analyzed extensively the subject of the persecution of Christians, with a particular focus on the brutal, bloody events that were intensifying in the Middle East. He outlined a possible a solution, this included references about his very positive experiences of the activities of the Interfaith Council of Russia, which played a key role in the peaceful coexistence of the various Churches in Russia, which has many religious denominations. Metropolitan Hilarion denied, among other things, the previously widely held belief that there is no persecution or genocide against Christians in the Middle East, and Christians are fleeing their ancient lands because of the civil wars in Iraq and Syria. He also denied that armed extremists in the area had committed atrocities as a result of their religious convictions: “In fact, this is not the case: neither Islam nor any other terrorist act occurs in the name of religion. No religion teaches its people to kill or commit evil or terrorist acts. This can be unanimously confirmed by Christian, Islamic andewish J leaders!” (Русская Православная Церковь Отдел Внешних Церковных Связей 2017)

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The Metropolitan also suggested that they could help the return of fleeing Christians by supporting the rebuilding of destroyed Christian churches because those are the places where people can practice their religion and which members of Christian religious communities can return. “Without functioning churches, it is hard to imagine the return of believers to the region” – he said. In his speech at the conference, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and his Croatian colleague also touched upon the topic. One of the lessons learned of the conference was the suggestion, which was shared by many contributors, that much more could be done in the field of intellectual life so that members of differenteligious r denominations could get to know more about each other’s lives and intentions. A good example of this was a charity piano concert, organized for the third time with the help of the Orthodox Church, for Christian and Muslim youths in Syria. This event provided an opportunity for meaningful dialogue between young people from two different denominations. (Федеральное Агенство Новостей 2018) At an international forum of Christian journalists about “Christianity in the Modern World” was held in Hungary between 4th and 6th September 2019. Metropolitan Hilarion Volokalamsky attended the forum and gave a speech, and as the Foreign Minister of the Russian Orthodox Church, he was also welcomed by Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary in an office call. Viktor Orbán expressed his appreciation towards Metropolitan Hilarion, saying that as the foreign affairs leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, he raised his voice to defend the victims of modern-day Christian persecution and pointed out the dangers of losing Christian roots at many really prestigious international forums. The meeting also addressed the issue of Patriarch Kirill’s planned visit ot Hungary, that they will hold a series of programmes called Russian Church Cultural Days in Hungary in November and December. Metropolitan Hilarion thanked the Prime Minister for the ongoing or planned renovation of Orthodox churches in Hungary. The meeting explored the potential for future co-operation to save and strengthen persecuted Christian communities. After the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén conferred upon the Metropolitan the Hungarian Order of Merit’s Commander’s Cross with Star. According to the citation, the church leader received the award “in recognition of his work as a church leader who tireless in explaining the history of Christianity, its unique values and community creating potential, he also reached out to younger generations, his diplomatic work was committed to the development of the international cooperation between Christian communities, and his supported Hungary’s policy of defending and supporting Christianity.” (Origo 2019)

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Literature

Kereszténység Katolicizmus Ortodoxia, Szerk: Nanovfszky György, Windsor Kiadó, Budapest, 1996 Onasch, Konrad – Cipin, Vlagyiszlav: Az orosz ortodox egyház története. Budapest, 1999, A Magyar Katolikus Püspöki Kar Egyháztörténeti Bizottsága. Материалы из Википедии (2019) Web: 3 September 2019 Гонения на христиан в мире. Досье (2016): https://tass.ru/info/1355736/amp Web: 3 September 2019 Jászberényi, Sándor (2017): Vissza az erőszakhoz! A Muzulmán Testvériség alkonya. 24.hu ht t ps://24.hu/ kulfold/2017/08/28/vissza-az-eroszakhoz-a-muzulman-testveriseg-alkonya/ Web: 3 September 2019 Церковь и Время (2011): Митрополит Волоколамский Илларион: Преследования и дискриминация христиан в современном мире: причины, масштабы, прогнозы на будущее. https://mospat.ru/ church-and-time/831 Web: 7 September 2019 Русская Православная Церковь (2019): Внутренняя жизнь и внешняя деятельность Русской Православной Церкви с 2009 года по 2019 год. http://www.patriarchia.ru Web: 5 September 2019 Международная Жизнь (2016): Гонения на христиан в современном мире: геополитический аспект. https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/14855 Web: 7 September 2019 Русская Православная Церковь Отдел Внешних Церковных Связей (2017): Митрополит Волоколамский Иларион выступил в ООН на конференции по защите христиан. https://mospat. ru/ru/2017/03/08/news143320/ Web: 8 September 2019 Федеральное Агенство Новостей (2018): Сирия: третья благотворительная встреча христианской и мусульманской молодежи прошла в Дамаске. https://riafan.ru/1086128-siriya-tretya-blagotvoritelnaya- vstrecha-khristianskoi-i-musulmanskoi-molodezhi-proshla-v-damaske Web: 8 September 2019. Origo (2019): Az Orosz Ortodox Egyház külügyi vezetőjét fogadta Orbán Viktor. https://www.origo.hu/ itthon/20190906-orban-viktor-hilarion-patriarka.html Web: 8 September 2019

150 Péter Forisek THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA

HEYDAY AND DECLINE

The North African region, from Gibraltar to the Sinai Peninsula, came under the rule of the Roman Empire in the 2nd–1st century BC. The region was inhabited by peoples of different languages and cultures who adopted Roman civilization over the centuries, thus, during the Roman Empire, it developed similarly to the rest of the Empire, and so did the peculiar features of Roman history in the area. Christianity appeared in the region right from the beginnings, and it is already mentioned in the books of the New Testament that there were Africans among the followers of Jesus and the followers of the first Apostles. (The best-known example is Simon of Cyrene who helped Jesus to carry the cross at Golgotha, Luke 23:26). In the 3rd century AD, the number of Christians and Christian communities increased, and in the late Imperial period, several Christian practices appeared in the area (e.g. Donatism in the Western Territories and Monophysitism in Egypt). The rich religious life of the Churches in North Africa is also indicated by the fact that many Church fathers came from this area. In the 3rd century AD, St. Clement and Origen are linked to Alexandria in Egypt, Tertullian and Saint Cyprian to Carthage, and Minucius Felix to Cirta, in the 4th century Arnobius of Sicca and his disciple Lactantius, Athanasius of Alexandria, the adversary of Arius and the Aryans, from Thagaste the famous bishop St. Augustine of Hippo Regius, and in the 5th century St. Cyril of Alexandria. Following the division of the Roman Empire in 395, the western territories of North Africa, present-day Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, became part of the Western Roman Empire, while the eastern territories, Libya and Egypt, became part of the Eastern Roman Empire. In the 6th century, during the conquests of Emperor Justinian, the entire North African coastline came under the control of an empire once again, often accompanied by the violent spread of Eastern Orthodoxy. The Eastern Roman / Byzantine conquest proved unsustainable, and due to weakening military, a deepening socio-economic crisis and religious clashes, the North African territories were soon occupied by the conquering Arabs. And the once flourishing Christian communities disappeared over the centuries.

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After the occupation of Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, conquering Islam turned towards the African region. Amr ibn al-Asa, the commander of Caliph Umar, conquered the Nile Valley in three years, between 640 and 642. During this early period of the conquest, the Caliphs and their governors placed great care in treating the conquered peoples fairly. They did not forcibly convert them ot Islam, they collected their jizya, a tax imposed on non-Muslim subjects. The inhabitants of the territories liberated from Byzantine rule often considered the Arab conquest as liberation, because the Byzantine Church strictly pursued doctrines contrary to Orthodoxy. Moreover, if we compare tax rates under the two empires we will find that the Arabian jizya was much lower than Byzantine taxes. In Egypt, the Copts were able to maintain their political segregation and to participate in the public administration for centuries using their own language. During Uthman’s (644-656) and then Ali’s Caliphate (656-661), due to the First Great War of Islam and the separation of Sunni and Shiite Islam, the Arab conquest of Africa slowed down, but it gained new strength under the Umayyad dynasty (661-750). In 698, they occupied Carthage, the most important stronghold in the western part of North Africa, thus bringing the region’s most important episcopal seat under Muslim rule. In 711 the Muslim forces crossed from Africa to Europe under the leadership of Tariq bin Ziyad. His name has been preserved by the name of Gibraltar up to this day (“Rocks of Tariq”). The Christian Visigothic Kingdom on the Iberian Peninsula also came under Muslim rule, and the Arab invasion of Europe was stopped in 732 by Charles Martell Majordomo of the Franks. In the present study, I am going to examine the fate of Christian communities in those five states that used to belong to or were influenced by the Roman Empire, and so, in the th4 century AD, when Christianity became the state religion, these areas also became Christian territories. However, shortly after the 7th-century Arab conquest, the vast majority of the population converted to the conquerors’ religion. These states, from east to west, are Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

Egypt

Egypt was the last Hellenistic monarchy that was conquered by Rome in 30 BC. The province played a prominent economic role in the Roman Emire, people called it the breadbasket of Rome due to the high grain production along the Nile. Egypt’s role did not change in the late Imperial period when it became the main source of food for Constantinople and all eastern cities. Because of this role, both the pagan and the Christian Roman emperors gave priority to the region. Christianity appeared in Egypt shortly after the birth of the

152 THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA religion which became one of its main centres in the 3rd century AD. The Christian ermith movement and the first monastic communities were formed in Egypt. The best-known representatives of the former were St. Paul the Hermit and St. Anthony the Hermit, while of the latter was St. Pachomius. Egyptian Christianity confronted both the papacy and the Church of Constantinople in the theological debates of the 4th–5th century AD on the divine and human nature of Christ. Due to the rejection of the dogmas of the 451 Council of Chalcedon, they formed an independent Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the largest Christian community in North Africa. Due to the religious-dogmatic debates of the Byzantine period, there was considerable tension between Alexandria and Constantinople. In modern times there were Catholic missions in Egypt, some Copts recognized the primacy of Rome, and they formed the Coptic Catholic Church. Egypt came under the rule of conquering Islam shortly after Mohammed’s death when the Byzantine province was occupied by Amr ibn al-Asa in 640. Most of the local population soon converted to the new religion, but the Copts have maintained their religious segregation up to this day. Egypt continued to play an important economic role during the Arab rule, but instead of Greek-Roman Alexandria, Cairo became the seat of the province. The Coptic Catholic Church is one of the Eastern Catholic Churches, which in 1741 separated from the Coptic Orthodox Church as a result of the Catholic mission.

Libya

Along with the indigenous Berber shepherd population of Libya, from the 7th century BC onwards, the Greeks appeared, establishing thriving colonial cities, the most prominent of which was Cyrene (alongside today’s Shahhat). The Romans established two provinces in the area, Cyrenaica, which included Cyrene and four other Greek colonies and lay along the western border of Egypt, and Tripolitania, west of Cyrenaica on the northern coast of Western Libya. Both regions had highly developed industries and were major trading centres. In 395 the area became part of the Eastern Roman Empire and, together with Egypt, was the other African province of the Empire. In the coastal areas west of Libya, a Germanic tribe, the Vandals, settled in the first half of the 5th century. The Vandals were Christian, but they adopted Arian Christianity which was declared a heresy at the Council of Nicaea in 325. As a result, there was great tension between them and the native Christians in the area not just because of the conquest, but also because of their religion. The Vandals learned from the Romans how to navigate the seas and attacked the Mediterranean coast several times with their fleets,

153 THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA taking and looting the city of Rome in 455 with a rapid attack. The coastal cities in Cyraenaica and Tripolitania were also regularly attacked. The area was also attacked regularly by Berbers from the south. The Byzantine government could not withstand the Vandal and Berber invasions, but the provinces were heavily taxed to boost the area’s defences (building fortifications, increasing military strength). The Arabs arriving in the second half of the 7th century occupied the region easily, without encountering any major resistance.

Tunisia

Tunisia was the centre of the Punic empire, with Carthage as its capital. Besides the Punics, Berber tribes lived in the area. The Romans defeated the Punics in three wars and turned their country into the province of Africa. Africa was an important agricultural area in the Roman era, just like Egypt, and the city of Rome was at one time supplied with the grain produced there. Christianity appeared soon after and became the dominant religion in the region in the 4th century. We saw earlier that many Christian saints and Church fathers came from here, including St. Augustine, who was the bishop of Hippo Regius for forty years, and in his old age protected the city from the aforementioned Vandal invasion. It was a typical phenomenon in the late antiquity, not only in Africa but also in the European provinces, that bishops took over the political control and military protection of an area in an era of collapsing Roman state power,. This was the case with Hippo Regius. However, the defence was doomed to fail, since the prevailing Vandals occupied the area and created the Vandal Kingdom of Africa. One hundred years later, East Roman Emperor Justinian launched several campaigns to reclaim the territories of the West. In 533/534, Belisarius, the Emperor’s warlord captured the Vandal Kingdom and organized it into a Byzantine province. Byzantines persecuted non-Orthodox Christians and, like in other provinces, imposed heavy taxes on the population to finance the burden of wars. That is why, like in Libya, the conquering Arabs did not face much resistance in the late 7th century.

Algeria, Morocco (and Mauritania)

Mauritania today and the ancient Roman province of Mauretania do not coincide geographically. Only the northern half of today’s Mauritania was accessible to the Romans, and ancient Mauretania actually consisted

154 THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA of two provinces: the Mediterranean coast, the former Mauretania Tingitana, which included the Atlantic coast to the west of Ceuta and today’s Moroccan coast, and the eastern Mauretania Caesariensis, which represented the western half of today’s Algerian coast. The Roman ally, King ubaJ of Numidia, was the first in the region to establish a state allied with Rome at the end of the 1st century BC. The area was difficult to access due to the Atlas Mountains which markedly separated the southern plateau from the northern coastal strip. Due to its geographical isolation, the latter was administratively part of the Spanish province during the late Imperial period. In the first half of the th5 century AD, the western part of the North African region came under the control of the Germanic Vandals and broke away from the Western Roman Empire. By the time of the 533/534 campaign of Belisarius, the coastal area came under the control of the Byzantines, and the inland areas were finally conquered by the Moors. This is why the inhabitants of the cities were Christians, while the Berbers preserved their ancient cults. In the 7th century, before the Arab conquest, there were eight Romano-Moorish kingdoms in the area, which a Christian queen (Dihya or Kahina) tried to unite against the conquerors, but she fell in a battle in 702. The conquering Arabs took over the role of the Byzantine and local leadership, while the conquered Berbers for decades resisted and then converted to Islam, and most of them assimilated with the conquerors and adopted the Arab culture and language. Until the modern era, the North African region used to belong to several Muslim formations, and at times local dynasties took over control. From the 16th century they belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the power of the sultans was strongest in Egypt, but this became more formal in the western areas. Local pashas engaged in lively pirate activity in the Mediterranean, which resulted in constant warfare with southern European states. European colonization reached North Africa in the first half of the 19th century. Today’s Mauritania and Ceuta were colonized by Spain, Algeria and Tunisia by France, Egypt became a British colony, while Italy was trying to colonize Libya. While both Catholic and Protestant Churches in Sub-Saharan Africa continued their missions, this was not the case in the North African region. There were differences in French and British colonial arrangements. In Algeria, in the fertile lands of the northern territories, European colonizers established large estates. They had privileges that their Muslim workers did not possess. In every state, colonists and their supporters became leaders. The majority Muslim society was marginalized, after the end of the colonial period, and upon the establishment of independent statehood, Islam became the state religion and the role of religion was strengthened not only in politics but also in everyday life.

155 THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA

Percentage of the faithful of Christian Churches among the population of North African states in 2010

Population of the Total number state of Christians Catholics Protestants Orthodox Other Christians (number of (number of people) people) Egypt 5.3% < 0.1% 0.4% 4.8% < 0.1% ~ 94,8 mill. ~ 5,02 mill. Libya 2.7% 1.5% < 0.1% 1.0% < 0.1% ~ 5.6,5 mill. ~ 152,550 Tunisia 0.2% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% ~ 10..9 mill. ~ 21,800 Algeria < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% ~ 35.6 mill. ~ 356,000 Morocco < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% < 0.1% ~ 36 mill. ~ 360,000 Sudan 5.4% 3.0% 2.1% 0.3% < 0.1% ~ 30.9 mill. ~ 1,66 mill. South Sudan 60.5% 39.7% 20.7% < 0.1% < 0.1% ~ 8.26 mill. ~ 4,99 mill. Source: https://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/table-christian-population-as-percentages-of-total-population-by-country/ (web: September 2019). The CIA database published similar figures: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/ (web: September 2019).

The number of Christians across the African continent has increased exponentially in just over a century. It increased from 10 million at the beginning of the 20th century to 550 million at the beginning of the 21st century. This is more than 40% of the continent’s total population. Besenyő( 2015) However, this growth was only to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa, not in North Africa. At present, when comparing the population figures for 2010 and the religious distribution, there are only6 million Christians in the area, which is only about 3.2% of the 183 million population. At the same time, their distribution is unequal, with the largest Coptic religious group alone accounting for almost ten times as many members as all the Christian communities in other countries. It is clear from the table that in the west of the North African region, there is a modest Christian minority, far below one percent, compared to the total population. Among the Maghreb countries, the Christian communities of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia together make up about 738,000, but that is miniscule compared

156 THE FIRST THOUSAND YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY IN NORTH AFRICA to the total population of 82.5 million. In the easternmost Maghreb country, Libya, the Catholics, the Orthodox and other Christians together make up 2.7% of the total population, but the country has a very small population, there are barely more than 150,000 people. I have also added Sudan and South Sudan to the table as it is fundamentally helpful in understanding the current situation in the region. Sudan has been an important link between the Egyptian civilization and North Africa and Central Africa since ancient times. The Kingdom of Meroe adopted several elements of Greek and Roman culture, so Christianity also appeared in the area and the inhabitants of the kingdom became Christians. Following the conquest of Egypt, the Arabs continued successful campaigns against Sudan, and in the northern half of the region, Islam became dominant. After the arrival of British colonists in the modern age, black people living in the southern areas were converted by Christian missionaries, and the southern part of the region developed similarly to the central and southern African regions. However, after the end of the colonial period, besides ethnic and economic conflict, Muslim-Christian conflict in Sudaned l to a series of civil wars. This led to South Sudan first becoming an autonomous province within Sudan and then independent in a referendum in 2011. Most Christians live in South Sudan, they account for over 60% of the 8.26 million population, but there is also a significant Christian minority in Sudan (1.66 million),although their percentage is small in comparison with the country’s Muslim majority.

Literature

Evans, G. R. – Chadwick, Henry (1999): A keresztény világ atlasza. Helikon Kiadó, Budapest Cornell, Tim – Matthews, John (1991): A római világ atlasza. Helikon Kiadó, Budapest Besenyő, János (2015): A kereszténység történelme és szerepe az afrikai kontinensen. Felderítő Szemle XIV. évfolyam 4. szám. (November 2015) 23–35. Goldziher, Ignác (1980): Az iszlám. Magvető Kiadó, Budapest Gray, Richard (1975): The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4. Cambridge University Press Hacket, Conrad – Grim, Brian J. (2019): Global Christianity. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Christian Population. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Washington, D.C. December 2011. https://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianity-exec/ (web: 15 September 2019)

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Isichei, Elizabeth (1995): A History of Christianity in Africa. From Antiquity to the Present. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995. Nanovfsky György (1996): Kereszténység – katolicizmus – ortodoxia. Windsor Kiadó, Budapest Roberson, Ronald G. (2019): The Eastern Catholic Churches 2017. Eastern Catholic Churches Statistics. atholicC Near East Welfare Association. http://www.cnewa.org/source-images/Roberson-eastcath-statistics/ eastcatholic-stat17.pdf (web: 15 September 2019) Sawyer, Kenneth – Youssef, Youhana (2007): Early Christianity in North Africa. In: KALU, Ogbu U. (2007): African Christianity. An African story. Africa World Press, Trenton, 2007, 45–74. Tabbernee, William (Ed.) (2014): Early Christian in Contexts. An Exploration Across Cultures and Continents. Baker Academic, 2014.

158 Viktor Marsai 1

THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

This chapter of the present volume examines the situation of Christians in Africa. The study builds on publications about similar topics in previous editions of the Budapest Report and focuses primarily on the changes that have occurred since the year. It does so considering that by 2015, according to Pew Research, most Christians, 600 million of them, were living in Africa, and as the demographic trends continue, the number and proportion of Christians in the world is steadily increasing. (MCClendon 2017) By 2060, six out of the world’s 10 most populous Christian communities are projected to live in African countries, in Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. This is closely linked to the fact that by 2050, half of the global population growth, more than one billion people will take place on the Black Continent. (Kazeem 2019) As explained in our previous article (Marsai 2019), there are basically three factors which influence the situation of Christians on the continent: on the one hand, the various political processes that affect a country’s stability and its capabilities to protect their citizens; the rise of jihadist groups which use attacks against Christians as important legitimizing elements ; and ongoing armed conflicts. Most of the political changes in 2018/19 have had a positive effect on Christian communities. The fall of longstanding authoritarian leaders in Algeria and Sudan has launched a process of democratization that will also benefit the Christian population. The same is true for the Ethiopian political reform process, which is crucial not only for the country but also for the wider East African region. This is particularly important for Eritrea, as the Ethiopian-Eritrean reconciliation, even if just a temporary occurrence, did not only open the borders between the two neighbours but also contributed to the reintegration of a formerly extremely isolated capital, Asmara, into the international community. Although there are no clear signs yet, many experts hope that the daily life of the Christian community in the country will become easier. (Khataza 2018) In the longer

1 National University of Public Service

159 THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT term, however, transitions also carry serious risks: if they fail, ethnic and religious minorities may become the primary targets of scapegoating. There is a much darker picture regarding the jihadist groups. A new wave of radical Islamists has significantly reshaped the African security scene since the first decade of the 2000s, and in recent years we have witnessed dramatic changes in both quality and quantity. An analysis by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies illustrates the extent of this process: Compared to 2009, the number of attacks perpetrated by extremists increased tenfold (from 288 to 3,050) by 2018. Although the number of casualties has dropped significantly from its peak in 2015 (from 18,856 to 9,744), but this decrease happened due to Boko Haram’s decline or transformation. Both Somali and Sahel organizations increased the intensity of their attacks and nearly twice as many people were killed by them in 2018 than in 2015. It is particularly worrying that we have more extremist groups which operate in a wider geographical area. This is clearly illustrated by the following data. In 2010 only five African countries had to suffer from regular assassinations in 2010, by 2018 this number has risen to 13 and the number of organizations nearly quintupled (from 5 to 24). (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2019) In the summer of 2019, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on the Congolese army, which was the first action linked to the organization in the country. Al-Jazeera( 2019) Jihadist attacks continued in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique, where former primitive tools (bush cutters, obsolete firearms) were replaced by more sophisticated improvised explosive devices. (Pirio-Pittelli-Adam 2019) All of this seriously affects Christian communities. Several analysts point out that radical groups tend to respond to local problems in an extreme way, the background of which is often based on ethnic, clan-based, or even political-economic rather than religious reasons (see UNDP 2017). At the same time, Christian and Western targets always have symbolic value for jihadists especially because, unlike attacks on the Muslim population, they fit well into the narrative of waging a “Holy War” against the “oppressive crusaders.” So, for example, while the vast majority of the victims of Somali as-Shabablocal Somali Muslims, their major attacks often target foreigners and Christians like as the January 2019 attack on the DusitD2 hotel complex in Nairobi (BBC 2019a) – followers of Jesus become the primary targets. Especially when jihadists are systematically trying to separate Muslims from Christians. Last but not least, we must mention that armed conflicts on the continent, also make Christian communities particularly vulnerable, where their fate is already difficult. From this point of view, Libya stands out, where, after a relative calm period, fighting between the parties resumed in April 2019. The great losers of the Third Civil War were those Christian migrants who came to the country partly from the surrounding North African

160 THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT states, primarily Egypt, and from sub-Saharan Africa. Their situation is aggravated by the presence of radical Islamists in the ranks of both the government forces and the rebel warlord Khalifa Haftar, who commit serious atrocities against Christians. (Open Doors 2019a) The situation in South Sudan, where the civil war has been going on since 2013, is similarly grave, with the paradox that many people are fleeing to Muslim majority Sudan in the hope of a better life. (The National 2018) These conflicts bring immense suffering to the population and further exacerbate existing social conflicts. With all this in mind, it is no coincidence that the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, embarked on his fourth African trip in September 2019 to Mozambique, Mauritius and Madagascar, and since 2013 the Holy Father has visited five more countries - Kenya, the Central African Republic, Morocco, Uganda. (BBC 2019b) After presenting general trends, the study will examine a number n African countries.

Burkina Faso

One of the important areas where jihadist groups are strengthening is Burkina Faso. The jihadist uprising in the country, which resulted in 300,000 refugees by mid-2019, has marked Christian communities as their number one targets. In April 2019, an attack on a Protestant temple in the north of the country resulted in the death of five people, including the pastor and his two sons. DW( 2019) By May 2019, atrocities against Christian temples, pastors and devotees had become an almost weekly occurrence, which claimed the lives of 23 people, including 5 clerics. (Lowry 2019) Most of these atrocities were committed by jihadist groups which have infiltrated the country from neighbouring, Mali and Niger, who flee due to the strong military pressure in those countries. Despite attempts at international cooperation, such as the G5 Sahel Initiative (Diplomatie 2019), it remains to be seen how to prevent the persecution of Christians.

Egypt

Over the past period, the Egyptian leadership has still failed to provide a meaningful response to radicalization and attacks on Christian groups in the country. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Egyptian economy continues to face serious structural challenges, which fuels the emergence and rise of extremist ideas. Also, various foreign policy complications, like the Libyan crisis, the regime change in Sudan, hijack the

161 THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT attention of the el-Sisi government. In November 2018, the Islamic State attacked a bus convoy carrying Coptic pilgrims in Minya Province, killing at least seven and wounding 19 pilgrims. (Guardian 2018) A month later, a policeman killed two Copts, also in Minya province. (Al-Arabiyya 2018) Although terrorists have not attacked a single Christian church in 2019, yet the atrocities against Coptic Christians and Christian migrants are still commonplace. The latter, in particular, are often beaten up, tortured, raped and become captured by organ traffickers, because they are extremely vulnerable. (Jászberényi 2019)

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has always been viewed by the ruling Habesha ethnic groups as one of the most ancient Christian states in the world. However, according to Muslim tradition, Islam appeared in the area in the Prophet’s lifetime. Over the centuries, followers of the two great monotheistic religions have usually coexisted peacefully, but conflicts have also occurred. The hostilities between the two denominations are fueled by the fact that some of the population believe that the Christian, and especially the Orthodox, Churches support of central power which has been suppressing of marginalized ethnic groups. Ethiopian national consciousness has been hit by two factors over the past year: on the one hand, the new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, is partly Muslim and represents the previously marginalized Oromo ethnic group. On the other hand, during the author’s travels to Ethiopia, several local sources mentioned that the proportion of the Muslim population in the past decade has approached, or even exceeded, 50%. The unrest since 2015 has intensified ethnic divides among the 80 ethnic groups in the country, sometimes with religious connotations, like the anti-Christian riots in the Somali region in August 2018. (Borkena 2018) In February 2019, the Christian churches in Halaba Kulito, which is a predominantly Muslim city in southern Ethiopia, were attacked. Although there were no deaths, several Christians were injured, and the ten churches were damaged or destroyed by a Muslim mobe while Bibles were burned on the street. At the same time, it is positive that the state authorities were able to prevent further damage and the churches came under police protection. (Persecution 2019) In the summer of 2019, an Ethiopian Church delegation visited Hungary to report on the situation, the difficulties of and the attacks on Ethiopian Christians. Theelegation d was also welcomed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. (Magyar Kurír 2019)

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The Central African Republic

Attacks against Christians in the Central African Republic (CAF) have continued in 2018/19. The conflict has been exacerbated by the emergence of superpower competition in recent years for the country’s natural resources (diamonds, timber, ivory), which provide the insurgents with financial resources. For this reason, we must agree with the Bishop of Bossangoa, Nestor-Désiré Nongo-Aziagbia that there is a political, not a religious conflict in the country. (Church in need 2019) Religiously organized Christian and Muslim militias often kill indiscriminately those who belong to other religions or ethnic groups. Sadly, both government forces and UN peacekeepers are powerless to stop or prevent attacks. So, hundreds of people have been killed in clashes in recent times. (South China Morning Post 2018)

Nigeria – Niger

Like in recent years, Nigeria remains the most important hub of Christian persecution in Africa. Christians are targeted for two different reasons: firstly, by various jihadist groups and, secondly in ethnic-religious-lifestyle conflicts. In 2018/19, Boko Haram, split in two, and continued its attacks against various targets, albeit at a much lower intensity than in 2014/15. At the same time, it is quite worrying development that a splinter group of Boko Haram was officially recognised as the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This has not only strengthened the legitimacy of this group but also promoted a tendency to “cleanse” the profile of the organization even further. (ICG 2019) In practice, this meant that, in contrast to the brutal tactics followed by Abubakr as- Shekau, who saw every non-sympathizer, including Muslims, as legitimate targets, ISWA sought to spare and then win over the local Muslim population to the cause and to only attack targets which are permissible in a jihad against “crusaders”. These include government forces, corrupt civil servants, and Christians. A further problem is the increasing regionalization of jihadist groups. ISWA and Boko Haram are increasingly attacking targets in neighbouring states, particularly in Niger and Cameroon. Here, too, the radicals primarily target Christian communities. In July 2019, a Christian woman was kidnapped from the village of Kintchendi in the Diffa province of Niger and was sent her back with the message that all Christians who remained in the area would be slaughtered. As a result of the threat, a significant number of Christian families left the area and tried to prosper in the safer capital city of Niamey. (Open Doors 2019b)

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Perhaps even more worrying is the fact that in the federal states of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, the struggles between Muslim livestock breeders and Christian farmers have been more violent than ever before. In the first half of 2018, 1,300 Christians were murdered in such clashes, which six times higher than the number of people killed in jihadist attacks. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that now Muslim Fulani shepherds have already set up their independent militias to carry out attacks against Christians, as a reply which many Christian groups, like the Bachama, have also created their illegal armed forces. These steps have contributed to the escalation of the fighting, to which the Nigerian state power has not yet been able to respond satisfactorily. (ICG 2018) Among all these developments, it is important to mention that there are some Muslims who protect Christians at their own risk. The most prominent of this group is Imam Abubakar Abdullahi, who hid 262 Christians in his mosque and in his house which is attached to the mosque. When the militants attempted to break into the complex, he stopped them by offering his own life in return for the sheltered Christians. However, the attackers did not attack the imam and withdrew from the mosque without any incident. He received the International Religious Freedom Award for his courage and self-sacrifice. Hiiraan( 2019)

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BBC (2019b): Pope Francis in Africa: Is the continent the Catholic Church’s great hope? https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-49564397 (web: 11 September 2019) Borkena (2018): Jijiga: 29 people killed and over ten Churches burned due to violence. https://borkena. com/2018/08/06/jijiga-29-people-killed-and-over-ten-churches-burned/ (web: 11 September 2019) Churchinneed (2019): Bishop: violence in Central African Republic is not driven by Muslim-Christian conflict. https://www.churchinneed.org/bishop-violence-in-central-african-republic-is-not-driven-by-muslim- christian-conflict/ (web: 11 September 2019) Diplomatie (2019): G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french- foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/crises-and-conflicts/g5-sahel-joint-force-and- the-sahel-alliance/ (web: 11 September 2019) DW (2019): Violence against Christians on the rise in Africa. https://www.dw.com/en/violence-againstchristians-on-the-rise-in-africa/a-49187879 (web: 11 September 2019) Guardian (2019): Egypt attack: Gunmen kill seven Coptic Christians in bus ambush. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2018/nov/03/egypt-attack-gunmen-kill-coptic-christians-bus-ambush (web: 11 September 2019) Hiiraan (2019): Muslim cleric who hid Christians during attacks honored in the US. https://hiiraan.com/ news4/2019/July/164830/muslim_cleric_who_hid_christians_during_attacks_honored_in_the_us. aspx (web: 18 September 2019) ICG (2018): Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence. https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront. net/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence.pdf (web: 18 September 2019) ICG (2019): Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province. https://d2071andvip0wj. cloudfront.net/273-facing-the-challenge.pdf (web: 18 September 2019) Jászberényi, Sándor (2019): „Két halott. A veséjük kimetszve” – helyi pap az egyiptomi keresztényüldözésről és szervkereskedelemről. https://www.valaszonline.hu/2019/06/07/egyiptomi-keresztenyek-menekultek- claude-ondogan/ (web: 11 September 2019) Khataza, Gondwe (2018): Does a thaw in relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia offer hope for Christians? https://www.christiantoday.com/article/does-a-thaw-in-relations-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia-offer- hope-for-christians/130016.htm (web: 11 September 2019) Kazeem, Yomi (2019): Africa is set to be the global center of Christianity for the next 50 years. https://qz.com/ africa/1587317/how-many-christians-live-in-africa/ (web: 11 September 2019)

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Lowry, Lindy (2019): Why Christians in Burkina Faso are in ‘a fight for survival’? https://www.opendoorsusa. org/christian-persecution/stories/why-christians-in-burkina-faso-are-in-a-fight-for-survival/ (web: 11 September 2019) Magyar Kurír (2019): Etióp keresztény vezetőkkel tárgyalt Orbán Viktor. https://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/ etiop-kereszteny-vezetokkel-targyalt-orban-viktor (web: 11 September 2019) Marsai, Viktor (2019): Keresztényüldözés az afrikai kontinensen. In: Kaló, József; Ujházi, Lóránd (szerk.) Budapest-jelentés a keresztényüldözésről 2018. Budapest, Magyarország: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, (2019) pp. 101–109. MCCLendon, David (2017): Sub-Saharan Africa will be home to growing shares of the world’s Christians and Muslims. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/19/sub-saharan-africa-will-be-home-to-growing-shares-of-the- worlds-christians-and-muslims/ (web: 11 September 2019) Open Doors (2019a): Libya. https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/libya/ (web: 11 September 2019) Open Doors (2019b): ‘Leave or Be Killed’–Boko Haram Issues Warning to Christians in Niger. https://www. opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/stories/leave-or-be-killed-boko-haram-issues-warning-to- christians-in-niger/ (web: 18 September 2019) Persecution (2019): 10 Churches in Ethiopia Targeted in Single Day. https://www.persecution. org/2019/03/23/10-churches-ethiopia-targeted-single-day/ (web: 11 September 2019) Pirio, Gregory – Pittelli, Robert – Adam, Yussuf (2019): The Many Drivers Enabling Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-many-drivers-enabling-violent-extremism- in-northern-mozambique/ (web: 11 September 2019) Reuters (2019): Gunmen raid Burkina Faso church, kill four. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-burkina-security- christians/gunmen-raid-burkina-faso-church-kill-four-idUSKCN1SW0S3 (web: 11 September 2019) South China Morning Post (2018): 37 dead as cycle of Muslim-Christian revenge attacks continues in Central African Republic. https://www.scmp.com/news/world/africa/article/2173695/37-dead-cycle-muslim- christian-revenge-attacks-continues-central (web: 11 September 2019) The National (2018): South Sudanese Christians seek refuge with an unlikely neighbour. https://www. thenational.ae/world/africa/south-sudanese-christians-seek-refuge-with-an-unlikely-neighbour-1.748290 (web: 11 September 2019) UNDP (2017): A Journey to Extremism. http://journey-to-extremism.undp.org/content/downloads/UNDP- JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf (web: 11 September 2019)

166 Basil Ekwunife

SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA OUTLINE

Abstract

This study focuses on the security situation of Christians in Nigeria. A critical look at our country Nigeria today simply portrays a nation beset by insecurity. The level of violent crimes in Nigeria is really overwhelming. Particularly, this work outlines the persecution of Christians in Nigeria. This is evidenced in the various attacks on Christians by Islamic groups and other political cum diplomatic strategies employed to extinguish non- Islamic religions. All these ills have made Nigeria the most unsecure country in West Africa, and have hindered the nation’s development in various sectors. Hence, the researcher proposed some solutions to the religious conflicts and the problem of insecurity in the nation.

Introduction

In 2018, more than a quarter of the world’s countries experienced a high incidence of hostilities motivated by religious hatred, mob violence related to religion, terrorism, and harassment of women for violating religious codes (Muggah–Velshi 2019) A report (which focuses mainly on Africa, Asia and Middle East) commissioned by the UK Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, and prepared by Anglican Bishop Philip Mounstephen, of Truro reveals that “around 215 million Christians faced persecution in 2018 and an average of 250 Christians were killed every month, according to the Foreign Office.” (Watkins 2019) The Holy See’s Under-Secretary for Relations with States, Msgr. Antoine Camilleri, reacting to this report and quoting Pope Francis, called persecution against Christians a “sort of genocide caused by general and collective indifference.” He lamented further that “We [Christians] have witnessed attacks upon individuals and groups of various religious backgrounds by terrorists, extremist groups and religious fanatics who have no respect for the lives of those

167 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA who have beliefs different from their own.” (Watkins 2019) This alludes chieflyo t the Islamic persecution of Christians and hits at the most fundamental human freedom, which is to choose freely a religion. Nigeria is the most populous African country with a population of about 200 million. (World population review) A majority of the scientific academic sources accept that the half of the population is Christian, the other half Muslim. (Canci – Odukoya 2016) Thus, Nigeria is a country with very large Christian and Muslim populations. Also, “although the general presumption is that ethnic identity is a more prominent and stable source of identity in Nigeria, some researchers have demonstrated that religion was more significant than ethnicity as a source of identity and conflict in Nigeria.” (Canci – Odukoya 2016) Nigeria has three major religious identities: Christian, Islam and traditional religions. Traditional religions are the most politically inactive of the three groups. On the other hand, Christian and Muslim identities have continued to be the backbone of religious disparity and conflict. Canci( – Odukoya 2016) Osaghae and Suberu report that, “most of these conflicts occur in the middle-belt and along the culturally borderline tatess of the predominantly Muslim North, and also take place between Hausa-Fulani groups and non-Muslim ethnic groups in the South.” (Canci – Odukoya 2016) Nigeria is undergoing various security challenges. The nation is plagued yb different sorts of conflicts, such as political conflicts, economic conflicts and religious conflicts. The most exasperating is the religious conflicts. Even the political and economic based violence have tended towards religion or have been religiously motivated. Politicians strategize and often employ violence in order to retain power. Recently such strategies have been chiefly obtained through instigating religious sentiments and disputes. Similarly, some economic policies are mainly religious missions or strategies. Take for instance, the grazing bill debate and the Ruga settlement dispute. The organized violent groups terrorizing the country with kidnappings and killings are mostly, if not all religious groups. Here, we mention some Islamic groups like Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen, etc.

The case of igeriaN

Nigeria is one of the recent countries experiencing Islamic violence and security threat. It is recorded that “December 25, 2011, was called Nigeria’s blackest Christmas ever.” In a number of coordinated jihadi operations, Reuters reported, Islamic terrorists bombed several churches during Christmas liturgies, killing at least thirty- eight people, “the majority dying on the steps of a Catholic church after celebrating Christmas Mass as blood pooled in dust from a massive explosion.” Charred bodies and dismembered limbs lay scattered around the

168 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA destroyed church. This attack was simply a reenactment of Christmas Eve one eary earlier, in 2010, when several other churches were set ablaze and Christians were attacked, also leaving nearly thirty-eight dead. There was no reprieve for Nigeria’s Christians when the next religious holiday came; some fifty Christians were killed “when explosives concealed in two cars went off near the Assemblies fo God’s Church during Easter Sunday services” in April 2012 in a predominantly Muslim region. According to the pastor, “We were in the Holy Communion service and I was exhorting my people and all of a sudden, we heard a loud noise that shattered all our windows and doors.” December 25, 2012, saw a repeat of the last few Christmases: in two separate attacks, Islamic gunmen shot and killed twelve Christian worshippers who had gathered for Christmas Eve church services, including one church’s pastor.” (Ibrahim 2013, 24) Similarly, “People of Sunnah for Islamic Propagation and Jihad” notoriously regarded as Boko Haram have increased the feeling of insecurity among Christians with their murderous attacks. For instance, “In October 2012, as many as thirty Christian university students were slaughtered when Boko Haram gunmen stormed the college and separated the Christian students from the Muslim students, addressed each victim by name, questioned them, and then proceeded to shoot them or slit their throat.” Before being massacred they were likely asked if they were Muslim, and, if not, if they were willing to convert.” (Weber 2012; Ibrahim 2013, 71) Likewise, the Islamic attacks on Christian churches in Nigeria have been catastrophic. “In April 2011, Muslims set fire to the Evangelical Winning All Church and some nearby Christian homes, displacing hundreds of local Christians. Several more churches were bombed in July 2011, including another Winning All church in an attack that damaged only the building. The day before, during a Sunday service, another church in the same area had been bombed and at least three worshippers killed and many more injured. Later in the month, two more churches were bombed, including a Church of Christ and a Baptist church no longer in use because of previous Muslim attacks. A few days later, when officials arrested Islamist leaders, a Catholic church was torched. On November 4, 2011, Muslims shouting “Allahu Akbar” carried out coordinated attacks on churches and police stations, in one case opening fire on a congregation of “mostly women and children,” killing 150 people.” (Ibrahim 2013, 71–72) “It is difficult even to keep track of how many churches have been destroyed in Nigeria. Not one Sunday passed in the month of June 2012 without churches being bombed and Christians killed. On June 17, Muslim militants bombed three separate churches, killing dozens of worshippers and critically wounding hundreds, including many children.” (World Watch Monitor 2012/a; Ibrahim 2013, 71) We recall that in January 2012, “Boko Haram issued an ultimatum giving Christians three days to evacuate the predominantly Muslim north of Nigeria – or die. Soon thereafter, armed Muslims stormed the Deeper Life Christian Ministry Church in Northern Nigeria and “opened fire on worshippers as their eyes were closed

169 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA in prayer,” killing six, including the pastor’s wife. On the following day, as friends and relatives gathered to mourn the deaths of those slain, Muslims screaming “Allahu Akbar” appeared and opened fire again—killing another twenty Christians, according to the Telegraph.” (Ibrahim 2013, 72) Also, several other churches were bombed, which includes the suicide bombing of Sunday, February 28, 2012, in a Church of Christ, which killed two women and an eighteen-month-old child; some fifty people were injured in the blast. (Barnabas Aid 2012; Ibrahim 2013, 72): “On the previous Sunday, Muslim terrorists had detonated a bomb outside the Christ Embassy Church, injuring five, one critically. On March 11, 2012, another Boko Haram suicide car bomber attacked a Catholic church, killing at least ten people. The bomb detonated as worshippers were attending Sunday Mass at St. Finbar’s Catholic Church in Jos, a city where thousands of Christians have died in the last decade as a result of Boko Haram’s jihad.” (Ibrahim 2013, 73) The next month, armed jihadis on motorcycles stormed Bayero University in the city of Kano on a Sunday morning during a Catholic Mass held in the school’s theater hall, throwing explosives and opening fire as people attempted to flee. The attack left at least 16 people dead. Garba( n.d., Ibrahim 2013, 73). “On August 7, 2012, Muslim gunmen stormed the Deeper Life Bible Church, where Christian worshippers were gathered in prayer, and surrounded the church in the middle of a worship service and opened fire with AK-47 assault rifles on the worshippers. At least nineteen people, including the pastor, were murdered. The following day, an unexploded bomb was discovered at Revival Church.” (Ibrahim 2013, 73) One month after gunmen opened fire inside Deeper Life Bible Church Stephen Imagejor, an assistant pastor lamented, “All of us are traumatized by this attack. [There is] no family in this church that is not affected by this incident. Many are now saying that they can no longer come to the church.” His wife, Ruth, was killed, and two daughters were shot and were hospitalized. In all, 19 died. (World Watch Monitor 2012/a; Ibrahim 2013, 73–74) But the jihad only rages on. “In September 2012 a suicide bomb attack on St. John’s Catholic Church claimed three lives, including those of a woman and a child; forty-four others were seriously injured. The following month, a renewed spate of church attacks caused thousands more people to flee. An Islamic suicide bomber rammed an SUV loaded with explosives into St. Rita Catholic Church during Sunday Mass, killing eight people and wounding more than a hundred…. Also in October, the Church of Brethren was raided by Islamic gunmen, who killed at least two people and set the church aflame. November 25 2012, was another bloody Sunday for churchgoers in the Muslim-majority north of Nigeria. The Protestant church of St. Andrew near Kaduna was attacked by two consecutive suicide bombings. Shortly after the service, one suicide bomber drove a minibus loaded with explosives into the church. Then, after soldiers and civilians had gathered on the spot, another jihadi detonated a car bomb, leaving a total of eleven dead and some thirty injured. Most of the victims

170 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA were members of the church choir. Separately, three more Christians were ambushed and killed as they were going to Mass in Kano. The next month at least four more churches were torched and ten Christians murdered “when the Islamic group members went on rampage and burned 20 houses and a church in the area,” as well as three more churches, all to cries of “Allahu Akbar!” After the Islamic invaders torched the churches, they used guns and machetes to slaughter their victims.” (Ibrahim 2013, 74-75) As of then, reports of growing numbers of Christians who began to skip church services increased, even as other reports suggest that some police are complicit in the attacks, often abandoning their watch in advance of the violence. (The Nation 2012; Ibrahim 2013, 71) There can be no clearer sign of insecurity among Christian believers than this. Also, if law enforcement agency like, the Police can react in this way, then the feeling of insecurity is bound to increase. Nonetheless, “the blame for these attacks does not rest entirely on Boko Haram. Sometimes local Muslims – who may have lived in neighborly peace with Christians in the same village for years – suddenly give violent expression to their anti-Christian sentiments.” (Ibrahim 2013, 72) A good example occurred “weeks before the Christmas Day church bombings of 2011, another jihadi attack, enabled by “local Muslims,” left five churches destroyed and several Christians killed.” According to eyewitnesses, “The Muslims in this town were going round town pointing out church buildings and shops owned by Christians to members of Boko Haram, and they in turn bombed these churches and shops.”(World Watch Monitor 2012/b; Ibrahim 2013, 72) “According to official sources from 15 February 2019, 66 bodies were discovered in eight villages of the Kajuru Local Government Area of the Kaduna state. According to Maisamari Dio, leader of the predominant Christian Adara ethnic group in the Kujuru region, Muslim Fulani attacked an Adara village and killed several people on 10 February 2019. The Adara had then made retaliatory attacks on Fulani. […] On 12 February 2019, fighters of the ISWA group (Islamic State in West Africa), a branch of the terrorist organisation Boko Haram, attacked the car convoy of the Governor of Borno, Kashim Shettima. He was travelling from Maiduguri on Dikwa- Ngala Street to an election campaign in Gamboru-Ngala (headquarters of the Ngala Local Government Area). According to Shettima’s spokesperson, three people were killed in the convoy during the attack. Some press reports say up to ten persons were killed and several were kidnapped. According to ISWA, who claimed responsibility for the attack on 13 February 2019, 42 persons were killed. ”(Ecoi.net 2019) “On the morning of 28 January 2019, Boko Haram insurgents captured the village of Rann without a fight (Borno State, administrative headquarters of the Kala Balge Local Government Area), located about seven kilometres from the Cameroonian border in the Lake Chad region. According to Amnesty International, they killed at least 60 residents and burned down hundreds of buildings as an analysis of satellite images indicates. The Nigerian army had left the city the day before the terrorist attack, after the Cameroonian units of the Multi-National

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Joint Task Force (MNJTF), also stationed in the city to protect the population, had been withdrawn shortly before. Boko Haram had already occupied the town of Rann which also houses a camp of tens of thousands of internally displaced people, for 24 hours on 14 January 2019 after fighting with the army. According to UN figures, a total of 35,000 civilians fled across the border to Cameroon in the wake of the two attacks by the Boko Haram on Rann.” (Ecoi.net 2019) From 2011 to 2016, roughly 2,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands have been displaced, mostly by Boko Haram activities. (Wikipedia 2019) According to the Bishop of Maiduguri, quoted in a 7 September 2014 article by the AFP, as of September 2014, more than 90,000 Catholics from the area had been displaced as a result of violence. (Agence France-Presse 2015) Sources report that Boko Haram deliberately kills Christians, especially those who do not convert. (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015) Agence France-Presse (AFP) reports that between 2009 and September 2014, more than 500 Catholics were killed by Boko Haram. (Agence France-Presse (2015/b). Also, it is estimated that violent conflict between largely Muslim Fulani herders and ethnically diverse farmers in predominantly Christian areas especially across the central belt and spreading southward, are killing some 2,500 people a year (International Crisis Group 2017)

Table: Some attacks on Christians by Boko Haram

Date Location of Attack Impact January, 2014 Catholic parish in Adamawa 22 killed May, 2014 A Christian neighbourhood of Kano 5 killed June, 2014 5 churches burned in Borno 30 killed July, 2014 A church burned in Kano 5 killed August, 2014 Madagali in Adamawa, destroyed churches and raided Many Christian men beheaded, and Christians in town women forced to convert and taken as wives November, 2014 Attack on Christians and Christian churches in Mubi, Hundreds killed, and thousands Adamawa rendered homeless July, 2015 Attack on a church in Potiskum 5 killed

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The political/diplomatic destruction of Christianity

Government interference with worship or other religious practices increased to 74% in 2012, up from 69% in 2011. Governments used force against religious groups or individuals in nearly half (48%) of the world’s countries in 2012, up from 41% in 2011 and 31% as of mid-2007. In April 2012 in Mauritania, for instance, the government arrested 12 anti-slavery activists and charged them with sacrilege and blasphemy, along with other civil charges, for publicly burning religious texts to denounce what the activists viewed as support for slavery in Islamic commentary and jurisprudence (Pew Research Center 2014). In Northern Mali, for example, Islamist extremists implemented harsh penalties under sharia law, including executions, amputations and flogging. They also destroyed churches and banned baptisms and circumcisions. Hundreds of Christians fled to the southern part of the country during the year (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015) There can be no denying of the fact that religion and politics are connected. Religion has some positive and negative influence on politics and vice versa. Here, we recall Mbiti’s assertion that the African is notoriously religious. Hence, Nigeria as an African nation can also be said to be notoriously religious. Religion has permeated every nook and crany of Nigeria socio-political system. Kukah rightly observes that “no one can aspire to, or hold political office in Nigeria without pretending to be religious” (Kukah 1993, 228). Thus, when politicians get into office, they make use of the power entrenched in religion,ot n only to achieve their aims, but also to subjugate their adversaries and to legitimatize their religion. “For this reason, the dominant religious groups, Islam and Christianity have been locked in a fierce battle for the political ontrolc of the country.” (Bujra-Igwe 2006; Afolabi 2015, 44) In addition, Afolabi agrees like Omoregbe that “there are three ways in which religion can influence politics, namely, by the direct involvement of religious men in politics, by fusing the two (religion and politics) as one and by subjecting politics or government to the doctrine or laws of religion, thereby carrying out politics or governance along the line of religious doctrine, ideals or laws.” (Omoregbe 2003, 309) All these are obvious in Nigerian politics and this marks the relationship between religion and politics. Significantly, we pinpoint the last way, which is subjecting politics or government to the doctrine or laws of religion. This has been the major way by which religion has been harmful to Nigerian politics, and is also the means by which Islamic leaders have used to tactfully oppress Christians in the nation. Firstly, “in the late 1960s, religion was one factor in the internal conflict that eventually erupted into Biafra war (1967 to 1970), during which about 600,000 people were killed. At the end of the civil war, despite Gowon’s declaration of no victor, no vanquished, the foreign missionaries who were working in the former Biafran

173 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA enclave were expelled from the country and all the mission schools in the East Central State were taken over by the government. This immediately put the Church into a position of opposition ot the government. In addition, other measures imposed by the Federal Government clearly placed the people of the former Biafra in a very difficult position. These measures included the introduction of the federal character in civil service appointment, the quota-system in the admission process into tertiary institutions and the setting up of Pilgrims’ Welfare Boards, specifically and exclusively for Muslims.”(Afolabi 2015, 45) The Nigerian federal government has been dominated with muslim,who have used their positions to promote their religion and carry out the ultimate plan of their religion, islamization of Nigeria. For instance, “in 1986, the then Muslim military ruler incorporated Nigeria into membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).” In 1979 northern delegates in the National Constitution-making Council yelled the slogan, “No Sharia, No Nigeria.” It was Babangida who smuggled Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Conference – now Cooperation (OIC) and proclaimed Nigeria an Islamic State against the collective will of the constituent parts of Nigeria. When Ebitu Ukiwe (Rtd) questioned why the matter was not discussed in the Supreme Military Council before implementation, president Babangida edged him out of his post as second in command in the country. This was in addition to the burning of churchesand mosques in the North, and loss of hundreds of lives. Sani Abacha, went even further, in flagrant disrespectof the feelings of the Southerners and non- Moslems all over the country, he smuggled Nigeria into the membership of the Islamic Economic Eight. (Ekineh – Ezeani 1998, 14) The former Secretary General of OIC, Habib Chatty of Tunisia, maintains explicitly that “the Organization seeks to propagate Islam and acquaint the rest of the world with Islam, its issues and aspirations. He concludes by quoting from the Declaration issued by the Third Islamic Summit (1981): Strict adherence to Islam and Islamic principles and values, as a way of life, constitutes the highest protection for Muslims against the dangers which confront them. Islam is the only path which can lead them to strength, dignity and prosperity and a better future. It is the powerful stimulant for both leaders and peoples in the struggle to liberate their holy places and to regain their rightful place in this world. (Q. 3:110).” (Kenny 1996, 351) Consequently, Kenny argues that “although its Charter professes that the OIC will not interfere in the domestic affairs of member states (art. 2,B,2), this Charter, nonetheless, has the binding force of a treaty, and its provisions are enforceable as law on all member countries, overriding even the Constitution in case of conflict. Moreover, by signing the Charter member countries commit themselves financially and politically to the aims and objectives of the OIC. It is clear, then, that any country that joins the OIC, even though it may profess to be secular by its constitution, is actually committing itself directly to the advancement of Islam. If it is a pluralistic country, this is derogatory

174 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA to the citizens who are members of other religious communities, since it is tantamount to making Islam the officially established religion of the state.”Kenny ( 1996) The above extract reveals why Nigeria’s membership to OIC is uncalled-for. Also, before such treaty was endorsed there was no public debate or open discussion. Similarly, the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) was informed that it has become part of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Commodity Exchange, an organ of the OIC, without any consultation. The President of NACCIMA, John Akin-George, however, said that his association will not accept membership. (Kenny 1996) Objections to withdraw from the associations were met with a lot of resistance from Islamic groups in the country. First, the Muslim Students Society, Ibadan branch, declared that ”any attempt to withdraw Nigeria from the OIC would be met with the stiffest resistance and an acceptance of the challenge of Christians to a religious war.” (Kenny 1996, 356) Also, “Ibrahim Dassuki, then secretary general of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, called on Muslims throughout the ountryc ‘to embark on a peaceful jihad to ensure that Christians and their leaders do not rape their right to association with the OIC.’ He said ‘it was imperative for all Muslims to resist the campaign by Christians calling on the Federal Government to withdraw from the OIC. All Muslims should therefore rise and demand our full rights not only to be entrenched in the Constitution but also to be respected.’ Various inflammatory statements were followed yb an attack on the Palm Sunday procession in Ilorin, in which a church was burnt and property destroyed. Not long afterwards an arson attack on the Chapel of the Resurrection at the University of Ibadan caused serious damage to a famous Nigerian carving of the Resurrection.” (Kenny 1996, 356) In Kano in November 1982 the Muslim Students Society burned eight churches and a bookshop. Their main target was the new Anglican church in Fagge, for which Archbishop Runcie of Canterbury had laid the cornerstone in April. The building was merely replacing an older structure which had been there since 1932, but the Muslims had built a mosque near it in the late 1970s. The State government’s olutions to the problem was to order the removal of the church. The next major clash came at Kafanchan on 6 March 1987. The Federation of Christian Students held a revival at the College of Education with a convert from Islam, Rev. Abubakar Bako, as guest speaker. The Muslim Students Society was prepared. As he quoted from the Qur’an to explain why he believed in Jesus as his Saviour, a Muslim girl grabbed the microphone and fighting started. A riot followed in the town, in which the Muslims and their mosques suffered most. Immediately Zaria, Kaduna, Funtua and Katsina erupted and Muslims burned up to 158 churches, and many died. On 6 March 1988, the anniversary of the Kafanchan riot, Muslim students at Kaduna Polytechnic destroyed the walls of the Christian chapel under construction on the compound. This was in spite of the fact that there were three

175 SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN NIGERIA mosques already on the Polytechnic compound. Then at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Muslim students attacked the place where counting was taking place of votes for the student presidency. It seemed that a Christian was winning and this the Muslim students could not accept. A general fracas ensued on 13 June 1988 which lasted about 10 hours, and a few students were killed. The situation was compounded by the attempted coup led by Major Gideon Orkar on 22 April 1990. He announced that five heavily Muslim states of the North would be expelled from the Nigerian Federation unless they renounced their Islamic fanaticism. The failure of the coup made Christians afraid of reprisals, but Muslim self-confidence was also shaken. Early in June 1990 trouble began in the Girls Science Secondary School in Bauchi town when the Muslim girls fought with their Christian school mates on the pretext that the Christian girls would not let the Muslim girls practice their religion. It seems preachers had come in and stirred up the Muslim girls. The riot spread to 10 schools in Bauchi state and resulted in the deaths of five students, while hundreds were injured. In the town of Tafawa Balewa in Bauchi state trouble broke out on 20 April 1991 between Fulani Muslims and Sayawa Christians or traditionalists over the latter’s use of the abattoir in contravention to Islamic law. On the 21st Sayawa from the surrounding villages attacked the Muslims. Many were killed, and 1,483 houses, churches and mosques were reported to have been burned. The next day, when a truck full of bodies for the mortuary arrived in Bauchi town, the Muslims gathered and attacked Christians. Thirty-seven churches were burnt in the town alone, while a total of 80 were burnt throughout the state. When Muslims tried to storm the army barracks to attack the Christians taking refuge inside, 69 were killed by the soldiers. According to unofficial estimates, 2,000 were killed in the whole episode, most of them Muslim. Many thousands of Christians from other parts of the country were made refugees. In October 1991 the Christian Association of Nigeria organized a revival led by the German evangelist Reinhard Bonnke. Announcements purporting to ‘claim Kano for Christ’ were distributed even in Arabic in the Muslim quarters; this was not long after the government had refused Sheikh Ahmad Dedat a visa to come to Kano because it was feared he would stir up trouble. Recognizing Muslim resentment, the State government withdrew permission for CAN to use the Race Course; they then took over the Catholic St. Thomas School compound, in spite of the protests fo the priest-principal to the government. On the 14th a large group of Muslims went to the emir’s palace to complain. Getting only vague assurances from a spokesman for the emir, they went on to Sabon Gari, where the Christians lived, and began killing, looting and burning, including 13 churches. The next day the Christians, particularly the Igbos, organized their defense and retaliated, burning many Muslim businesses and mosques. According to unofficial estimates, 2,000 died and 12,000 took refuge in the Bukavu army barracks and 10,000 in the Bompai police station. On 6 February 1992 at Zangon Kataf in southern Kaduna State, a quarrel developed between the local Kataf people and the

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Hausa Muslims who did not accept a change of the market site. Accounts differ as to who initiated hostilities, but in the end, while the majority of patients in the hospitals with gunshot wounds were Christians, the Hausa were for the most part burnt out of their houses. On the evening of the 17th in Kaduna, Muslim mobs, directed by certain people in Mercedes Benz cars, began a round of revenge that continued for the next two days. On Tuesday the riot spread to Zaria. Many churches were burned and four pastors killed, but the Christians more or less successfully defended themselves. The Muslims also suffered lossf o lives and property, including the headquarters of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam. (Kenny 1996, 358–359) The major problem is that the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria has proven to be one fo the major ways to subjugate Christians and if possible annihilate them. The Sharia has done the country no good, as it led to conflicts and violence. Thus, O. Afolabi laments that “the implementation ofharia S law brought about religious unrest, violence and annihilation of Christians, especially in the States that adopted Sharia law. During Obasanjo’s tenure, Christian-Muslim tensions deepened. Shortly after he assumed office in 1999, twelve states decided to apply Sharia to criminal cases, provoking considerable hostility from the Christians. At the same time, many Christian denominations stepped up evangelistic and missionary efforts in middle-belt and northern states thus, further heightened tensions. On this, Atubi (2007) remarks that: The anti-Sharia demonstration by Christians on 21 February 2000 led to a major conflict between the two groups, resulting in massive killings of people on both sides, the destruction of religious buildings, general arson, and destruction of property. The scale of the massacre and destruction was very high and thousands of people were reported to have been slaughtered like rams. The Kaduna conflict demonstrated the fundamentalroblem p created by the adoption of the Sharia legal system. There was insecurity of life among Christian minority groups in the state.” (Afolabi 2015, 45) To explain further that the Islamic oppression of Christians has been politically motivated. We take a look at the Coptic Solidarity’s third annual conference held at Washington, D.C., in June 2012. ”Before then, the position of the Obama administration has been see-no-Christian-persecution-by-Muslims. Nigerian lawyer Emmanuel Ogebe described the sheer carnage of thousands of Christians at the hands of Muslim militants and lamented that the Obama administration’s response was to pressure the Christian president of Nigeria to make more concessions – including building more mosques (the very places that “radicalize” Muslims against “infidel” Christians).” (Ibrahim 2013) Also, “despite Boko Haram’s self-declared goal of cleansing Nigeria of all Christian presence – and the countless churches intentionally bombed and burned, and thousands of Christians intentionally slaughtered, as recounted in the pages above – the Obama administration still refuses to designate the group as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO),” even as several U.S. politicians and NGOs pressure it to do so.” (Pecquet 2012)

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“Instead, in May 2012, the administration agreed to spend $600 million on a USAID initiative launched to ascertain the ‘true causes’ behind Boko Haram’s jihad – as if the organization has not been perfectly clear about its goals: the enforcement of Sharia law and elimination (or at least subjugation) of all infidels, chief among them Christians. The group has voiced its Islamic supremacism countless times and under many formulations. For example, in August 2012, Boko Haram leader Abu Bakar Shekau appeared on video ordering Nigeria’s Christian president Goodluck Jonathan to ‘repent and forsake Christianity,’ that is, convert to Islam; otherwise the jihad – which began in earnest after Jonathan, a Christian, won Nigeria’s fairest presidential elections to date – would continue. The fact that Boko Haram’s motives are clear-cut and obviously religious (according to Sharia, a non-Muslim like Jonathan may not rule over Muslims) has not stopped the Obama administration from pointing to anything and everything else to explain the violence in Nigeria. The very next day after Boko Haram bombed Christian churches celebrating Easter in April 2012, killing dozens. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson stressed that “religion is not driving extremist violence either in Jos or northern Nigeria where churches were and continue to be bombed. As far as former U.S. president Bill Clinton is concerned, ‘inequality’ and ‘poverty’ are ‘what’s fueling all this stuff’ – a reference to Boko Haram’s jihad to enforce Sharia and eliminate Christians. Clinton further called on Nigerians to ‘embrace their similarities,’ adding, ‘It is almost impossible to cure a problem based on violence with violence’ – apparently a suggestion that Nigeria’s government not retaliate with any severity in response to Boko Haram’s mass murderers.” (Ibrahim 2013, 240–241) Lord Lugard’s colonial administration enacted policies prohibiting missionary evangelization in the North. This served to protect the Hausa-Fulani tradition and religion, and as a means of restraint to Christian missions. The consequence of this restraint surfaces strongly in contemporary Nigeria. For instance, at the murder of the Nigerian female preacher in Abuja by Muslims, all the President did was to request Muslim fanatics not to call upon Allah while discharging their duty! Finally, the Court discharged and acquitted them of any wrong doing! Consequently, a greater percentage of the North has remained uneducated the Western way, just for this restraint. Incidentally, political figures, like Bill Clinton, unwittingly blamed Jonathan’s government for such a discrepancy in development between the North and the South, because he failed to grasp the root of the discrepancy and the emergence of Boko Haram. (Asbigue 2018) They have refused to accept the violence and security challenges Nigeria is undergoing is caused by a religious agenda. The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reports that, according to Christian leaders, the governments of northern states discriminate against Christians with regards to employment, access to education, representation in government, and in granting permission to build or repair churches. (Sampson

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2012). Also, the International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 indicates that local officials in northern states “used zoning regulations and title registrations to stop or slow the establishment of new churches”. (Sampson 2012) According to Open Doors, a UK-based religious organization “serving persecuted Christians and churches worldwide,” Christians in parts of Northern Nigeria face discrimination, are often denied access to secondary school and higher education, and their communities lack “basic facilities such as clean water and health clinics”. (Sampson 2012). In most northern states, the dominant Islamic religion denies the other religious groups access to certain privileges like land for locating worship houses or air time for transmitting religious messages. For instance, Christians have been denied access to electronic media in 16 northern states, while Islam monopolizes 24 hours for its broadcast in the same area, and every hour the Muslims broadcast provocative statements about Christianity. (Sampson 2012). Regarding protection for violence between Christians and Muslims in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, the USCIRF states that “[y]ears of inaction by Nigeria’s federal and state governments have created a climate of impunity” and that “[r]arely are perpetrators of sectarian violence held accountable”. (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2011). The International Religious Freedom Report for 2013 similarly states that there is a “lack of government protection for victims of religious violence” and that the authorities at all levels of government did not effectively address the problems leading to violence between Christian farmers and Muslim cattle herders in Central Nigeria. (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2011). ”Also, the Nigeria Constitution acknowledged the right of Nigerians to Shari’a justice in Section 275 (1) that: There shall be for any state that requires it a Shari’a Court of Appeal for that State. And in Section 260(1): There shall be a Shari’a Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.” (Afolabi 2015, 45) We recall that the use of Islamic law (Sharia) was incorporated into the country’s legal system, in the 1950s, while Nigeria was still under the British rule. Also, there has been a long debate on the adoption of Sharia in the National Assembly (between Christians and Muslims in the house) during the Obasanjo’s administration (1999). “After negotiations, a sub-committee was set up, which finally tabled a draft proposal orf the members to consider. This draft was accepted and duly inserted in the proposed constitution. It stated that, instead of having a separate Federal Sharia Court of Appeal, which might appear to be at par with the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court should comprise some members that are learned in Islamic law to hear appeals from State Sharia Courts of Appeal.” (Afolabi 2015, 45)

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Solutions to the problem of insecurity in Nigeria

Visionary leadership

”Nigeria will have to develop visionary leadership. A leadership that is detribalized and free from religious fanaticism. Such leaders should promote the ideal of common citizenship as the transcendent factor among all Nigerians, no matter the religion, tribe, and social status.” (Kofour 2012) It is such leaders that will take necessary measures to see to the various religions and ethnic groups co-exist peacefully.

Elimination of corruption and entrenchment of social justice

Corruption is one of the root cause of disaffection among Nigerians. If we emerge victorious in the war against corruption, we will enthrone an egalitarian society, where fairness, social justice and equal right for all will reign supreme; where there will be no preferential treatment based on tribe or religion; where there will be no discrimination or persecution of one group by the other. The principle of state neutrality must be strictly adhered to in Nigeria especially in respect to different religious traditions with their corresponding ways of life.

Advancement of a more efficient security strategy to counter crimes

Nigeria’s security agencies seems to be dependent on a lot of politics and politicking. This mars their efficiency at various levels. To enhance the efficiency of Nigerian security system there is need to establish or develop security agencies or institutional infrastructures that are independent of corrupt politicking. Also, Nigeria needs a more balanced security strategy to disarm the various terrorists and Islamic militant groups troubling the nation. We need a tremendous technological advancement and a computerized security system that can match and subdue these violent groups. (Achumba 2012) ”A major strategy in this regard is to identify and map out black spots on physical insecurity. This requires vigilance on our environment on the part of security agencies, particularly with terrorist attacks of the Boko Haram.” (Achumba 2012)

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Religious tolerance

Major religious groups in Nigeria (especially Islam and Christianity) have a major role to play in ensuring security in the country. The teachings of religious groups are one of the bases of value development in the contemporary world. It is a known fact that values govern behaviour. Religious groups should emphasize the values that promote fraternal co-existence and values that respect the fundamental human rights. No religious group should instigate their members to be violent or to engage in activities that can affect the peace of the country. (Adigwe 1986)

Education

It is through education that human beings are formed, nurtured and reformed. According to sources, “there is a large and pervasive gap in educational attainment between Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa. By all attainment measures, Muslim adults in the region – both women and men – are far less educated than their Christian counterparts. For instance, Muslims are more than twice as likely as Christians in sub-Saharan Africa to have no formal schooling (65% vs. 30%). Moreover, despite growth in the share of adults with any formal schooling in recent.

Inter-Religious Dialogue

“The need for inter-religious dialogue in a religiously pluralistic state like Nigeria is equally expedient. The aim of dialogue should not be to obliterate the identity of a participating religious group. Rather its objective should be to discuss the various aspects of the problem that pose as threat to the peaceful co-existence between different religious groups. The promotion of inter-religious dialogue in Nigeria, will therefore contribute a great deal in averting religious violence.”

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Conclusion

‘Live and let’s live’ is a famous African philosophy which designates a group of people committed to living in a tolerant society in peace and harmony. The Ujamaa philosophy of Julius Nyerere is another paradigm of what the world should be, a world with brotherly consciousness and interest especially in Africa where communalism is cherished above individualism. Religion is meant to better the lives of people and create the path of hope and understanding. Above all, the Christian religion is a religion of peace, tolerance, understanding and co-existence yet it still is the most persecuted religion in the world as we have seen above. Notwithstanding the many persecutions Christianity has encountered over the years, she still thrives in her quest for peace and harmony without physical retaliation or vengeance but with prayer and dialogues. It therefore becomes necessary that efforts be made to see to the fostering of peace amongst religious sects using the olutionss already proffered. This way, Christians in Nigeria would be relieved of the insecurity they face today and will also be free to practice their religion without fear that anything bad could happen anytime. Finally, bearing in mind that as far as men continue to live so would there be an endless stream of challenges to conquer. There may not be a time when there would be no problem especially in an untamed world. It is a call to more than ever embrace the principles of lasting peace as a panacea for the security challenges of Christianity in Nigeria.

Literature

Achumba, Ighomereho (2013): Nigeria: Imbalanced Development Causes Insecurity in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development. Adigwe, Hypolite (1986): Nigeria Joins the Organization of Islamic Conference, O.I.C. Onitsha, Onitsha Archdiocesan Press. Afolabi, Oluwaseun Olawale (2015): The Role of Religion in Nigerian Politics and its Sustainability for Political Development. Net Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 2. 42-49. Agence France-Presse (2015/a): Nigeria: Situation of Christians, Including those Living in Northern Cities, Lagos and Abuja; State Protection. (2011, October 2015) https://www.refworld.org/docid/565bfbc64.html (Accessed: 20 July 2019.)

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Agence France-Presse (2015/b): Nigeria’s Christians Fear Persecution from Boko Haram Rampage. (Factiva). Asiegbu, M (2018): Justice and Restructuring of Nigeria: Attempting the Presumably Impossible? In. Ekei, John (ed.): Self-Determination and Challenges of Nation-Building in Contemporary Africa, 13th Edition of Pope John Paul II Annual Memorial Lecture Series. Awka, Fab Press. 97–98 Barnabas Aid (2012): Suicide Bomber Strikes Nigerian Church during Service; Three Killed. ht t p:// barnabasfund.org/US/News/Archives/Suicide-bomber-strikes-Nigerian-church-duringservice-three- killed.html (Accessed: 20. July 2019) Bujra, Janet – Igwe, Leo (2006): Interview with a Nigerian humanist. In. Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 33, 740–743 Canci, Haldun – Odukoya, A. Opeyemi (2016): Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria. (2016), retrieved from https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Garba, Ibrahim (n.d.): At least 16 Nigerian Christians at prayer butchered after Islamists make good on threats. In: Jewish World Review, n.d., http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0412/nigeria_bombing.php3?printer_ friendly (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Ecoi.net (2019): Nigeria: Security Situation. https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/nigeria/featured-topics/ security-situation/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Ekineh, Aliyi – Ezeani, Geo’Ben (1998): Nigeria the Grave Mistake of 1914, the Only Hope for Southern Nigerians. Dartford, Veritas Lumen Publishers. Ibrahim, Raymond (2013): Crucified Again. Washington, DC., Regnery Publishing Inc. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2015): Nigeria: Situation of Christians, including those living in northern cities, Lagos and Abuja; state protection. https://www.refworld.org/docid/565bfbc64.html (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2011): Nigeria: Situation of Christians, including those living in northern cities, Lagos and Abuja; state protection. 2015, NGA105320.E, available at: https://www.refworld. org/docid/565bfbc64.html (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) International Crisis Group: Nigeria (2017): Growing Insecurity on Multiple Fronts. https://www.ecoi.net/ en/countries/nigeria/featured-topics/security-situation/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Kukah, Matthew Hassan (1993): Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan, Spectrum Books. Kenny, Joseph (1996): Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria: Islam and a ‘Secular’ State. In. Journal of Religion in Africa. Vol. 26, No. 4. 338–364.

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Kufour, John (2012): Imbalanced Development Causes Insecurity in Nigeria. Thisday Newspaper, Lagos. https://allafrica.com/stories/201209190753.html (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Muggah, Robert –Velshi, Ali (2019): Religious Violence is on the Rise. What Can Faith-based Communities Do about It?” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/how-should-faith-communities-halt-the-rise-in- religious-violence/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Pew Research Center (2014): Religious Hostilities Reach Six-Year High. https://www.pewforum. org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Pew Research Center (2016): Religion and Education around the World. https://www.pewforum. org/2016/12/13/religion-and-education-around-the-world/ (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) Sampson, Isaac Terwase (2012): Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causal Diagnoses and Strategic Recommendations to the State and Religious Communities. In: African Journal on Conflict Resolution. Vol. 12, No. 1. 103-133. Sulaiman, Kamal-deen Olawale (2016): Religious Violence in Contemporary Nigeria: Implications and Options for Peace and Stability Order. http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1011-76012016000100004 (Accessed: 20 July 2019.) The Nation (2012): We had prior information about Kaduna attacks. http://www.thenationonlineng. net/2011/index.php/news-update/50779-we-hadprior-information-about-kaduna-attacks-–-church- leaders.html (Accessed: 22 July 2019.) Watkins, Devin (2019): Persecution against Christians Happens even in Democracies. https://www.vaticannews. va/en/vatican-city/news/2019-07/vatican-camilleri-uk-persecuted-christians-review.html (Accessed: 16. July 2019.) Weber, Katherine (2012): Christian Students Executed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Believers Pray for Change of Heart. http://global.christianpost.com/news/christian-students-executed-by-boko-haram-innigeria-believers- pray-for-change-of-heart-82646/. (Accessed: 31 August 2019.) Wikipedia (2019): Communal conflicts in Nigeria. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communal_conflicts_in_ Nigeria (Accessed: 31 August 2019.) World Population Review (2019): Nigeria Population 2019. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ nigeria-population/ (Accessed: 31 July 2019.) World Watch Monitor (2012/a): Islamists Bomb Three Churches in Kaduna State, Nigeria. http://www. worldwatchmonitor.org/english/country/nigeria/article_1604845.html (Accessed: 31 July 2019.) World Watch Monitor (2012/b): Muslim Extremists Destroy Lives, Church Buildings in Nigeria. ht t p:// www.worldwatchmonitor.org/english/country/nigeria/article_123859.html. (Accessed: 31 July 2019.)

184 LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

Ferenc Petruska1

HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE

From the middle of the twentieth century, the democratic rule-of-law countries in Western Europe have unanimously and broadly guaranteed the freedom of conscience, religion and the autonomy of religious communities. However, the tragic events (Ujházi – Kaló 2018, 13–133; Global Terrorism Index. Vision of Humanity, 33–50) which happened in the last half-decade have made it clear that the looser regulations of religious freedom which have become more prevalent since the end of the Second World War also make it easier for some individuals to abuse these fundamental rights. Such abuse of rigths includes transforming places of worship into locations which spew hatred, violence or discrimination. Others spend the budget of their congregations on issues not connected with the religious or charitable activities of the community. Further groups can register their sham religions as official churches to take advantage of the various benefits of church status. This kind of behaviour is incompatible with Christian culture and may even worsen the judgment of those who live in the grace of faith. In the countries of the Middle East, religious life is governed by an extremely complex system of largely Islamic law (Bowker 2017b). The prominent role of Islam and its moral expectations is frequently reinforced in constitutional regulation. A common feature of current legislation in Muslim majority countries is that a large number of laws protect Islam, and those who violate certain tenets of this religion are subject to severe criminal sanctions: for example, blasphemy is punishable in all of these countries, of the only difference is the nature and severity of punishment. (Bowker 2017a) Apostasy and conversion, on the other hand, is rarely penalized. The punishment of apostasy is connected to two factors. One of these is how many non-Muslims live in the country and how radical Islam is practised there. (World Watch List 2019, 6, 13–15). (Bowker 2017a). Conversion from Islam to another religion is apostasy (ridda) according to Sharia law. (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions). Most Christians receive the same treatment as Muslims under civil law although in

1 National University of Public Service

187 HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE some territories some of these issued are adjudicated according to Christian religious rules by Christian authorities (Munif 2011, 527). The level of free practice of Christian religion varies greatly from country to country. (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom; 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom). In Hungary, the State and the Churches operate completely separately, and the latter is independent, and the detailed rules govern their activities is governed by pivotal laws, which can only be passed or amended with a two-thirds supermajority. (Article VII (5) Fundamental Law) In the Fundamental Law, Hungary is committed to treating religions and worldviews neutrally and that the state does not identify with any such ideology. However, within the limitations of the concept of neutrality wherever it possible the state tries to cooperate constructively with the religious communities (Article VII (4) of the Fundamental Law) and even with the recent amendment of the Fundamental Law ”The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” (Article R (4) of the Fundamental Law) In my study, I seek answers to two questions. On the one hand, how can Hungarian domestic legislation simultaneously guarantees the preservation of the concept of religious neutrality while fulfilling its duties created by Article R (4) of the Fundamental Law? On the other hand, I will explore what has the National Assembly of Hungary has done to protect persecuted Christians around the world.

The protection of Christian culture

Hungary has a long history of religious tolerance because when the Ancient Hungarian tribes conquering the Carpathianbasin they did not persecute the inhabitants of the territory who followed other religions. A century later when Latin Christianity became the state religion of the Kingdom of Hungary the rulers of Hungary permitted the Byzantine Christian and Jewish inhabitants of the country to practice their religions without any harassment. The policy of toleration is quite clear since Saint Stephen, King who created the medieval Hungarian encouraged his son to welcome strangers who arrive in Hungary.2 Furthermore, it is no coincidence that the World Religious Freedom Day is celebrated on 13th January because this was day when in 1568 the Diet of Torda3 passed an edict which granted the population of the Principality of Transylvania the rights of

2 King Saint Stephen’s remarks to Prince Imre, Chapter VI: on welcoming and patronizing guests. 3 Now Turda, Romania.

188 HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE freedom of conscience and religion. Although the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic (Act XX of 1949) formally separated the State and the Church, the communist authorities exercised very strict control over the activities of the Hungarian churches, so the church became fully subordinated to the government Although the churches tried to preserve their values the leadership of the dictatorship wanted to thwart these attempts by the promoting atheist worldview, dissolving various church organizations and nationalizing their properties. During the political transition of Hungary to democracy, the Parliament passed new legislation, Act IV of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience, Religion and Churches, which enabled people to exercise their freedoms of conscience and religion and to establish new churches. However, this law was was frequently abused and misused so stricter regulation was deemed to be necessary. The current law, hichw repealed the Act IV of 1990, is Act CCVI of 2011 on the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion and the Status of Churches, Religious Denominations and Religious Communities, is currently in force, was drafted to prevent well-known issues. The new Act prevents several earlier practices (§ 7, § 7/ A), without altering the legal status of religious communities (Sections § 9, § 9/D and § 9/G) for the worse. The Constitutional Court in 1993 resolutions 4/1993. (II. 12.), 8/1993. (II.27.) also confirmed that the State must be neutral in matters of religion and conscience. Under the right to religious freedom, the Hungarian state must guarantee the freedom of individual conviction, but that does not mean that the work of the Churches should be neglected. Public schools cannot be handed over to any religious organisation. Believers have the right to take part or not take part in religious organizations, to co-ordinate their religious activities, but they can not be exempted from any legal duties or given additional rights based on their religious affiliation. So religious freedom can be interpreted as a right, have individual and communal aspects. The reason for this duality is the people exercise religion in both forms, and the Hungarian State must protect those factors, legal and physical environment, goods, property rights and real estate, necessary for free religious practice. When the passing of the new Fundamental Law (25 April 2011), its Section VII. Article (1) states that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” which empower citizens the freedom to choose or change his beliefs or religious affiliation, to disclose, disregard, practice and teach one’s beliefs, whether by religious practices, ceremonies or otherwise, individually or in association with others, in public or in private.4 TheNational Creed also alludes to the role of Christianity in preserving the nation and the religious tolerance of Hungary. To protect these factors, the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law supplemented

4 Act CCVI of 2011 on the right to freedom of conscience and religion and the status of Churches, denominations and religious communities § 1-7 of the Act.

189 HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE the National Creed and added a new obligation to the Fundamental Law: ”The protection of the constitutional identity and Christian culture of Hungary shall be an obligation of every organ of the State.” [Article R (4) of the Fundamental Law], which may raise the question of whether the authority which created the Fundamental Law violated the requirement of religious neutrality or not. The answer to this question is negative since the Fundamental Law does not define Christianity as the established religion of Hungary, nor does the Fundamental Law commits the Hungarian state to the protection of the Christian religion or Christianity per se, but orders the authorities to protect the Christian roots of Hungarian culture. The bill which amended the Fundamental Law (Law T / 332.), clearly emphasised and the need to protect to the country’s cultural identity, which includes additional protections for the Christian elements within our cultural heritage which have already been described in the National Creed.5 Again, from a legal point of view, the Fundamental Law does not treat to Christianity or Christian law as a source of its laws. Furthermore, the Fundamental Law does not favour any Christian religious community over others, nor does it incorporate Christian jurisprudence into its legislation. It does not attach any legal sanction to apostasy or blasphemy. The Hungarian approach towards religions has been reinforced by the judgment of the appeal body of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) of March 2011 in the case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy case, in 11.9. of which it states that ”the crucifix in today’s societal context must be regarded not only as a result of historical and cultural development and as a symbol of national identity, but also as a symbol of a system of values that includes freedom, equality, human dignity, religious tolerance, which also coincide with our constitutional values” In this case, similarly to the Hungarian legal practice, plaintiffs were not forced to take part in any compulsory religious education, students who belonged to a different religion were allowed to attend the school where the crucifix was located, and the students did not have ot wear any religious symbol or religious clothing. During the investigation of the case, there was no evidence which would have proven that the crucifix was placed in a classroom to help conversion to Christianity.

5 The first part of the National Creed describes those intellectual links which connect Hungarians and ethnic minorities living with them, as well as the virtues strengthening the identity and cohesion of the nation: Hungary is part of Christian Europe and the struggle of our forebears for its existence, liberty, independence, Hungarian contribution to the retention and intellectual values of Europe; the role of Christianity in retaining the Hungarian nation, tolerance to other religions; the intellectual creations of Hungarians and their spiritual and intellectual unity, the recognition of minorities, the protection of the values of the Hungarian language, culture and the Carpathian basin, responsibility for the descendants, the conscientious utilization and preservation of intellectual and natural resources; the respect of the liberty and culture of other peoples and openness to cooperation.

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The protection of persecuted christians

”In Africa and the Middle East, many major religious communities have become extremely powerful policymakers. Even in countries which have a Sharia-based legal system, the concept of religious freedom is usually present these countries constitutions: however, these constitutions also enact clauses which defend the privileged position of Islam. In addition, Islamist political groups throughout the Muslim world are calling for the adoption of Sharia which would defend Muslims from Western cultural and economic influence and promote correct public morals and social justice. To this day, the Sharia has not lost its significance in Muslim majority countries and cannot be easily replaced or substituted with civil law. One of the reasons for the influence of Sharia is that Muslims believe that Sharia is a divinely ordered law.” erefore,Th the role of Islam in the actual enforcement is even more decisive. (Bowker 2017b) Christian communities in the East have a complex ecclesiastical and theological heritage. Some of them have merged with the Catholic Church after various councils (Chaldean Catholics), while others have always remained in the Catholic Church (Maronites). The others remain independent from Rome but recently even these churches started a serious ecumenical relationship with each other and with the Pope of Rome. (Ujházi 2016, 155–175) The history of these communities has been influenced by their historical past and the attitude of the authorities. Their history, by and large, was quite tragic in the 21st century since now they exist as small, frequently persecuted minorities in the Middle East. (Wágner 2019, 25–27) Over the past half-decade, Hungary has increased its involvement – in developing countries and crisis zones which have a large number with Christian minorities. The Hungarian assistance operations are governed by two laws: the first of them, Act XC of 2014 on International Development Cooperation and International Humanitarian Assistance, describes how Hungarian aid should be distributed. Most of this activity is carried out through the Hungarian Foreign Sevice. With Act CXX of 2018 on the Hungary Helps Program, the Hungarian Legislature established a framework which coordinates Hungary’s international relief and development efforts to ensure that these activities are done in a coordinated way and that aid will reach everyone who is in need regardless of his/her religious affiliation. This Hungary Helps program has three basic objectives: it wants to distribute humanitarian aid, prevent long- distance migration, and support religious freedom. This work includes studying the roots of humanitarian crises, creating conditions which enable people to remain in their homeland (migration prevention), and the restoration and preservation of a territory’s ethnic-religious composition. Hungarian humanitarian policy tries to preserve the

191 HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE spiritual foundations of Hungary and Christian culture and protects vulnerable religious minorities in the Middle East, Central and East Africa, South Asia and South America. Attacks by militant African groups against Christians have doubled since 2012, and shortly we have increased the amount of support we deliver to developing African countries which have a Christian religious minority. In the case of Nigeria, religious fault lines and violence are still present (al-Qaeda and Boko Haram), and in Ethiopia and Kenya, religious-based violence is still at large. While the Democratic Republic of Congo is fighting against the rise of Muslim fanaticism, the main problem will be connected to domestic political tensions in South Sudan the Central African Republic radical Islamist are also threatening Uganda. The size of radical Islamist threat is well illustrated by the fact that in 2018 these militant groups have launched 3,050 (!) attacks which is a tenfold increase over the last 10 years (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2019).

Summary and proposals

Although domestic legislation makes a clear distinction between the neutrality of worldview, especially if it is about religions and the neutrality of cultural values. In the field of legislation, Hungarian legislature absolutely does not intend to include any religious doctrine in its legislation. Therefore, religious neutrality is protected by domestic law and the fact that Hungary protects Christian cultural values and their role in constitutional recognition and protection. In the future, in addition to providing freedom of conscience to date, the protection of Christian culture may play a new role. The future of various Christian communities in Africa and the Middle East is in danger due to the rise of radical Islamist activity. The fact that the number of African militant Islamist groups has grown fivefold in a decade and the number of violent acts has increased by 1,000 per cent. The survival fo these Christian communities depends on two factors, their relationship with the majority population and effective external support which could convince them to remain at their homelands.

192 HUNGARIAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN PROTECTING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN CULTURE

Literature

Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2019): Frontlines in Flux in Battle against African Militant Islamist Groups. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fronts-fluctuate-in- battle-against-african-militant-islamist-groups/ (web: 2 September 2019) Bowker, John (2017a): Blasphemy Encyclopedia.com. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions. https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/other-religious-beliefs-and-general-terms/ religion-general/blasphemy (web: 22 August 2019) Bowker, John (2017b): Islamic Law Encyclopedia.com. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions. https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/islam/islam/islamic-law (web: 2 August 2019) Institute for Economics and Peace (2019): Global Terrorism Index. Vision of Humanity. ht t p:// visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018.pdf (web: 2 September 2019) Lautsi and Others vs. Italy (2011) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-95589%22]} (web: 11 September 2019) Munif, Abdul-Fattah (2011): Conversion to and from Islam in Islamic legislation. Conversio. Presentations at the Faculty of Eötvös Loránd University on 22-23 September 2011 at a religious studies conference. Open Doors (2019): World Watch List 2019. https://www.opendoorsusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ WWL2019_FullBooklet.pdf (web: 22 August 2019) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (2017): The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions Ujházi, Lóránd – Kaló József (szerk.) (2018): Budapest Report 2018 on Christian persecution. Dialog Campus Kiadó, Budapest. http://www.dialogcampus.hu/users/default/dialogcampus/ebooks/978-615-5945-11-3/ pdf/budapest_jelentes_a_keresztenyuldozesrol_kicsi.pdf (web: 7 August 2019) Ujházi, Lóránd (2016): Safety State of Iraqi Christians, “Change of Era” in Vatican Diplomacy. Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, 15. évf. 155–175 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. (2017): Respecting Rights? Measuring the World’s Blasphemy Laws United States Department of State (2019): 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom. ht t ps:// www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ (web: 22 July 2019) Wágner Péter (2019): A többség-kisebbség dinamika szerepe a közel-keleti konfliktusokban. Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, Budapest. https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/0726_kki_mena_tanulmanykotet_fin.pdf (web: 12 July 2019)

193

Gábor Csizmazia1

UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS

The foreign policy of the Trump administration and religion

Faith-based values have always played a prominent role in American public life, which can be seen on the one hand in the sense of exclusivity of the American nation, and on the other, in its international sense of mission. What is more, the religious foundations of the latter were laid long before the foundation of the United States in the 17th century by Puritan settlers, who imagined themselves as “a city built on that mountain, and all the peoples of the earth will hang their eyes upon them.” (Johnson 2016, 47) Not surprisingly, religion occupies a special place in American foreign policy, and some Protestant ideologies have a particularly decisive influence. According to Walter Russell Mead, an American foreign policy expert, there are three main trends in American Protestantism. The fundamentalists strictly adhere to their religious traditions, the liberal Christians who favour moral traditions, and the broader evangelical community. In their ideology, the main junctures are the relationship between true believers and non-believers and the international order, creating two extremes: while fundamentalists see a huge gap in the former and a pessimistic vision in the latter, liberals are more open to cooperation and accordingly they are also more optimistic.2 Between these two extremes are evangelical groups, which, contrary to the former two trends, are gaining more influence over American foreign policy (Mead 2006, 26–31). This can broadly be experienced, through the United States’ stance towards Israel, and in the form of protecting human rights, especially religious freedom and humanitarian aid, although the latter is

1 Gábor Csizmazia, American Studies Research Institute at the National University of Public Service. Contact: [email protected] 2 Fundamentalists reject cooperation with countries which act against the Christian religion, they are suspicious of international organizations and, through their image of judgement day, do not favour the peaceful world order between different religious groups. As liberal Christians, because of the universal nature of faith-based morality, see fewer differences between religions and are more positive about cooperation and its international institutions, consider it possible to build a peaceful world order (Mead, 2006, pp. 26−31.).

195 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS conceived through direct aid as they are distrustful of international institutions.3 Evangelical groups, along with other Church and non-governmental organizations, have played an important role in the passage of American laws such as the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, the Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking Act of 2000, or the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004.McMahon ( 2006) The Trump administration has found strong political support in evangelical circles, a January 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center reveals that President Trump’s job approval is much higher amongst Christians than amongst Jewish, Muslim, or non-religious communities, is more accepted, especially for white evangelical voters. (Schwadel & Smith 2019) The accomplishments of his foreign policy are consistent with above- mentioned evangelical ideas. Donald Trump supported moving of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, the recognition of the Israeli authority over the Golan Heights, he brought home pastor Andrew Brunson from Turkey, confirmed the interpretation of Islamic State’s atrocities against Christians as genocide, and emphasized the issue of religious freedom in general. At the same time, the close relationship between evangelical groups and the Trump administration raises several sensitive questions about the appropriate relationship between religion and politics. Critics of the Trump administration are worried about the increasing role of religion in US foreign policy, which has been much stronger than hitherto. They also have qualms aboutthe the Trump administration’s attempts to protect persecuted Christians, because they believe that this diverges from past American practise which focused on ignoring religious affiliation of persecuted people. The White House and the US Department of State reject these criticisms while Republican circles believe that raising awareness of the atrocities against Christians under the previous government has only been successful after months of political pressure in Washington, when they have not openly mentioned the persecution of Christians. (Toosi 2018)

The Trump administration and religious freedom

The diplomatic culmination of the US efforts to promote religious freedom is the State Department’s annual report on International Religious Freedom, which provides a global overview of religious freedom through data collected by US diplomatic missions. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 mandates the State Department to prepare an annual report for Congress which provides a detailed insight into religious freedom

3 As far as doctrines are concerned, this third trend tends to share the views of fundamentalists, but on a more positive and practical level: its followers believe in the choice of the righteous and the prophesied apocalypse, but at the same time, they place great emphasis on improving the world through interfaith cooperation, which, even if it ultimately fails, can produce favourable results in the shorter term (Mead, 2006, pp. 33−39.).

196 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS violations in each country, with particular reference to government policies and American diplomatic countermeasures.4 Another major initiative in US foreign policy in this area is holding international conferences on religious freedom, a practice introduced by the Trump administration in 2018. The second such conference was held in Washington, DC on 16–18 July 2019. More than 1,000 NGOs, representatives of various religious communities and more than 100 international delegations, including government representatives, researchers and experts attended this event. They, travelled to Washington D.C. to hear survivor testimonies and to discuss their practical experiences and options for promoting religious freedom.5 In addition to networking, these events are designed to raise awareness and promote the universal value of religious freedom. That is why the organizers of the first conference decided to publish the Potomac eclarationD and Plan of Action at the end of the event. The 2019 conference was also accompanied by a large number of statements demanding protections for free religious practice. These statements called for the protection of places of worship, condemned • anti-blasphemy and apostasy laws; • the harsh treatment of members of religious groups by non-state actors and including terrorists; • the repression of religious practices under the pretext of counter-terrorism; • the use of technology incompatible with freedom of religion; • the atrocities committed against religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar (Burma), the People’s Republic of China and Iran. (U.S. Department of State 2019b) Earlier calls have led to the appointment of special ambassadors for religious freedom in several countries, such as the United Kingdom or Germany. Multiple round table discussions on religious freedom were held under the auspices of the EU and the UN. (U.S. Department of State 2019a)On Poland’s initiative, they decided to institute an international day of remembrance when the world can mourn the victims of belief-based violence. The proposal was supported by 88 countries, including the United States, and later it received unanimous approval in the UN General Assembly. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2019) This International Day of Remembrance will be held on 22 August.

4 Given the overall nature and structure of the report, it does not specifically highlight the persecution of Christians but assesses each country individually based on the local state of religious freedom, through which it mentions recorded violations of all religious orientations. The country- specific report can be generated on the following page: U.S. Department of State: 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom. Build a Custom Report, U.S. Department of State, 2018, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ (14 September 2019) 5 In parallel to the conference, President Trump received more than twenty survivors of religious persecution in the White House, including Christians from North Korea and Iran, Yazidis from Iraq, Rohingya from Myanmar (Burma), Tibetans and Muslim Uyghurs from the People’s Republic of China, as well as Jewish Holocaust survivors (Nakamura, 17 July 2019).

197 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS

Another diplomatic innovation of the Trump administration was the establishment of the Commission on Unalienable Rights. The job of this bipartisan body of experts, activists and philosophers is to supply the US Secretary of State with human rights advice which is consistent with the principles of the American “Founding Fathers” and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The idea behind this initiative is that the reference to human rights of universal value and importance can, in certain cases, lead to controversial or abusive situations, especially when malicious forces make human rights collide or misinterpret their meaning. In other words, the Trump administration sees the proliferation of assumed human rights, which in practice has led to a dilution of the definition and has misled international institutions responsible for the protection of human rights. (u.s. department of State 2019) Foreign Minister Michael R. Pompeo’s announcement triggered mixed reactions echoing the conservative-liberal theoretical debate on the human rights and religious freedom dilemma: Tony Perkins, the leader of the Family Research Council, an extremely influential conservative Christian organisation, praised the initiative, which according to Perkins would promote international freedom of religion, which was the basis of every other human right. On the other hand, human rights organizations – including Amnesty International – and democratic politicians, who are more critical of the Trump administration, resented the administration’s intent to narrow the definition of human rights because this might hurt of LGBTQ individuals (Oprysko 2019) and the members of the international feminist movement, because the first chairperson of the commission was Mary Ann Glendon, a ell-knownw anti- abortion professor at Harvard University and a former US Ambassador to the Holy See. (Marino 2019)

American measures to protect Christians

The first Christian groups whom the US wanted to protect were the persecuted Christians of the Middle East, especially the Iraqi and Syrian victims of the Islamic State. Vice President Michael R. Pence made multiple promises that the United States would directly support persecuted religious communities in Iraq and Syria. However, the fulfilment of these promises was hindered by bureaucratic obstacles, as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was in charge of aid delivery, still relied on the UN and not local religious organizations in aid distribution. As a result, some of the promised aid did not reach, or only partially reached, to the Middle East, and according to Archbishop Bashar Warda, in Erbil, Kurdistan said that the news of state aid reduced the amount of incoming private donations. Mark Green, the leader of USAID, travelled to the area to reassure local communities that aid was on the way, but the situation was quite

198 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS disappointing in American political and civilian circles. (Shellnutt 2018) Shortly afterwards, in July 2018, the Trump administration created a special unit within the USAID to assist in the post-genocide reconstruction and to provide direct financial support to Iraqi households or individuals. Besides this the organizational innovation, the Trump administration has decided to send Max Primorac, a special envoy for USAID minority support programs, to Erbil to speed up the disbursement of US grants. (Picciotti-Bayer 2018) Vice President Michael R. Pence announced at the 2018 International Freedom of Religion Conference, that USAID has allocated $ 133 million by October 2018 to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi communities which can be used to supply them with drinking water, food, housing and health care services, to reconstruct their healthcare and educational institutions to start economic reorganization, and to introduce additional anti-atrocity precautions. The organization spent close to $ 37 million removing unexploded ordnance in the Nineveh area, and a further $ 8.5 million on psychological and legal assistance services to document evidence of abuse of human rights, and to represent children’s rights and minority rights at provincial political forums. Furthermore, USAID received $ 2 million to continue its earlier programs which protect minorities and cultural heritage of Northern Iraq (USAID Office of Press Relations 2018). USAID funding for the religious minorities of the Nineveh region has increased by another $ 27 million in 2019. This means that the total value of US relief programs which supported the religious minorities in Iraq was $ 373 million since the fiscal year 2017. (USAID Office of Press Relations 2019) The other side of the coin is the decline in the number of religious refugees in America: as a result of the Trump administration’s stricter immigration and asylum policies, the number of Christian refugees in the United States has also fallen from 37,521 in 2016 to an estimated 22,747 by the end of 2019. The number of Christian refugees from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Myanmar (Burma) and Pakistan is even worse than this average decline of about 39%: from Syria, for example, 68 Christian refugees may have settled in the United States in 2016, while in 2019 the number of Syrian Christians receiving asylum is expected to be 37. Instead of resettling religious refugees in the USA the Trump administration tries to stabilize the situation in the Middle East through its aid programmes. However, the upcoming the resettlement or return of Christians, and other minorities, to their homeland raises several questions about the security situation in the Middle East. The fact is, despite the military defeat of Islamic State, security conditions are still unfavourable both in Iraq and in Syria. Furthermore, the reception of the American support for Middle Eastern Christians is mixed. (Jenkins 2019) Another element of US efforts which help Christians in the Middle East is the Iraq and Syria Genocide Assistance and Accountability Act of 2018, which was approved by both Houses of the US Congress after 17 months of consultation with Christian organizations. President Trump signed the Act on 11 December 2018, in

199 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS the presence of Michael R. Pence, Vice President, Samuel D. Brownback, Ambassador-at-large for International Religious Freedom, Callista Gingrich, US Ambassador to the Holy See, Carl Anderson, Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus, which is a really influential American Catholic organisation and Chaldean Archbishop Bashar Warda among others. (Rousselle 2018) The law attests that between 2002 and 2017, the number of Christians in Iraq has fallen from 800,000 – 1,400,000 to less than 250,000 as a result of serious attacks by the Islamic State responsible for genocide, as in Syria, where the number of Christians, once accounting for 8-10% of the population (2010), also fell significantly. Under the law, the United tatesS provides humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid, including access to drinking water, food, sanitation and housing, as well as education, health, and psychological assistance. To those persecuted groups who need it the most, usually Christians, Yazidis, and Shiites. The law also calls on the United States to support the prosecution fo those members of the Islamic State who are responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes by encouraging cooperation between foreign governments, the US Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the US Intelligence Community. (Congress.gov 2018) That same day, the American Conference of Catholic Bishops also welcomed the passing and signing of a law that had been prepared for nearly two years. (United states conference of catholic bishops 2018) non-governmental Organisation, like the Knights of Columbus, played an extremely important role in the passing of the law. As early as 2015, in a hearing before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Carl Anderson called for the US to define the persecution of Christians, and other minorities, in Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State as genocide. Representatives of the Knights of Columbus accompanied Republican representative Chris Smith on his fact-finding mission to Iraq in 2016, who then submitted the above-mentioned bill. When signing the law, Carl Anderson noted that attempts to help persecuted Christians are in line with previous US efforts which assisted the victims of the Armenian genocide and the Jewish Shoah. In October 2018, the Knights of Columbus entered into a cooperation agreement with USAID to advise the USAID on how to help rebuild and stabilize religious minority communities. Besides this role the Knights of Columbus provided more than $ 20 million in food, clothing and housing assistance between 2014 and 2018, for Christians and other religious minorities in Iraq and Syria. This sum includes $ 2 million hichw were spent to rebuild the city of Karemlash, Iraq. (Cullen 2018) The USAID also signed a cooperation agreement with the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians of the Hungarian Government’s Prime Minister’s Office on 18 December 2018 to oordinating c humanitarian aid projects which benefit for Christians in the Middle East (Prime Minister’s Office, State Secretariat For The Aid Of Persecuted Christians And The Hungary Helps Program 2018) and in July 2019 USAID signed

200 UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO AID PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS another cooperation agreement, this time with the Catholic Community of Saint Giles (Comunità di Saint’Eigido) to enable better regional and national coordination of aid to the Middle East and Sub-Saharan regions (USAID Office of Press Relations 2019) At the same time, Christians in the Middle East still face major challenges: on the one hand, the commitment of the Trump administration, and in particular Vice President Pence is clear, but the impetus of USAID assistance projects has stalled in 2019, while the security situation in the Nineveh region is getting worse from a Christian point of view because the rise of Iran-backed forces, makes it impossible for Christians to re-populate historically Christian cities. (Crabtree 2019)

Conclusions

In 2018-2019, the United States has devoted increased attention to the issue of international religious freedom, which is demonstrated, on the one hand, the universal values of US foreign policy and preservation of the practice since the late 1990s and, on the other hand, a strong political determination even in the reflection the above. The emphasis on religious freedom is also in line with certain expectations of the Trump administration’s evangelical voting base, which also puts the issue at the crossfire of political-ideological debate. While the Trump administration may not favour any religious orientation, there has been a clear emphasis on assisting Middle Eastern Christians, primarily through the intervention of Vice President Michael R. Pence. Although the USA is investing a significant amount of political and financial capital in this area yet its effectiveness is still limited. Against this background, the United States could further intensify its efforts to help persecuted Christians, not only by expanding and fine- tuning its resources but also by sustained diplomatic effort and using its influence as a great power.

Literature

Miniszterelnökség Az üldözött keresztények megsegítéséért és a Hungary Helps Program megvalósításáért felelős államtitkárság (2018): Amerikai-magyar kormányzati együttműködési megállapodást kötöttek az üldözött keresztények védelmében. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/ az-uldozott-keresztenyek-megsegiteseert-es-a-hungary-helps-program-megvalositasaert-felelos- allamtitkar/hirek/amerikai-magyar-kormanyzati-egyuttmukodesi-megallapodast-kotottek-az-uldozott- keresztenyek-vedelmeben (web: 15 September 2019)

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Congress.gov (2018): H.R.390 – Iraq and Syria Genocide Relief and Accountability Act of 2018. https://www. congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/390/text (web: 6 September 2019) Crabtree, Susan (2019): Pence’s Efforts to Help Iraqi Christians Faces New Threat.RealClearPolitics . https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2019/05/25/pences_efforts_to_help_iraqi_christians_faces_ new_threat__140423.html (web: 15 September 2019) Cullen, Joseph (2018): President Signs Bill Championed by Knights of Columbus to Help Save Middle East Religious Minorities. https://www.kofc.org/en/news/media/president-signs-bill-championed-by-kofc.html (web :14 September 2019) G ovTr ack (2019): H.Res. 493: Condemning the persecution of Christians in China. https://www.govtrack.us/ congress/bills/116/hres493 (web: 15 September 2019) Jenkins, Jack (2019): Trump aims to protect persecuted Christians, but some aren’t sure he’s helping. Religion News Service. https://religionnews.com/2019/07/25/trump-aims-to-protect-persecuted-christians-but- some-arent-sure-hes-helping/ (web: 15 September 2019) Johnson, Paul (2016): Az amerikai nép története. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest. Marino, M. Katherine (2019): How Mike Pompeo’s new commission on ’unalienable rights’ butchers history. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/08/15/how-mike-pompeos-new- commission-unalienable-rights-butchers-history/ (web 15 September 2019) McMahon, Robert (2006): Christian Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christian-evangelicals-and-us-foreign-policy (web: 6 September 2019) Mead, Walter Russel (2006): God’s Country? Foreign Affairs, 85. évf., 5. sz. 24−43. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2019): Poland initiates the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion of Belief. https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/ poland-initiates-the-international-day-commemorating-the-victims-of-acts-of-violence-based-on-religion- or-belief (web: 15 September 2019) Nakamura, David (2019): In message to evangelical base, Trump holds White House meeting with foreign victims of religious persecution. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in- message-to-evangelical-base-trump-holds-meeting-with-foreign-religious-persecution-victims-at-white- house/2019/07/17/569a4a20-a8d4-11e9-9214-246e594de5d5_story.html (web: 15 September 2019) Oprysko, Caitlin (2019): Mike Pompeo unveils panel to examine ’unalienable rights’. Politico. https://www. politico.com/story/2019/07/08/pompeo-panel-unalienable-rights-1400023 (web: 15 September 2019)

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Picciotti-Bayer, Andrea (2018): US has made a genuine response to the plight of Iraq’s persecuted religious minorities. The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/419198-us-response-to-the-plight-of-iraqs- persecuted-religious-minorities-has (web: 14 September 2019) Rousselle, Christine (2018): Trump signs law to aid Christians in Iraq, Syria. Catholic News Agency. ht t ps:// www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/trump-signs-law-to-aid-christians-in-iraq-syria-85304 (web: 6 September 2019) Schwadel, Philip & Smith, Gregory A. (2019): Evangelical approval of Trump remains high, but other religious groups are less supportive. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact- tank/2019/03/18/evangelical-approval-of-trump-remains-high-but-other-religious-groups-are-less- supportive/ (web: 6 September 2019) Shellnutt, Kate (2018): US Tells Iraqi Christians Help Is on Its Way (For Real This Time). Christianity Today. https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2018/june/pence-usaid-iraqi-christians-help-persecuted. html (web: 14 September 2019) Toosi, Nahal (2018): Some see Christian First bias in Trump foreign policy. Politico. https://www.politico. com/story/2018/10/04/christian-bias-trump-foreign-policy-870853 (web: 6 September 2019) USAID Office of Press Relations (2018): Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Iraq. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/oct-16-2018-fact-sheet-us-assistance-ethnic- and-religious-minorities-iraq (web: 15 September 2019) USAID Office of Press Relations (2019a): U.S. Agency for International Development Announcements for the 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom. https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/ jul-19-2019-usaid-announcements-2019-ministerial-advance-religious-freedom (web: 15 September 2019) USAID Office of Press Relations (2019b): USAID Administrator Mark Green’s Meeting with the Head of International Relations for the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, Mauro Garofalo, Ph.D. https://www.usaid.gov/news- information/press-releases/jul-15-2019-mark-green-meeting-head-international-relations-comunita-sant- egidio (web: 15 September 2019) U.S. Department of State (2018): 2018 Report on International Religious Freedom. Build a Custom Report. https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/ (web: 14 September 2019) U.S. Department of State (2019): Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press. ht t ps:// translations.state.gov/2019/07/08/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press-7/ (web: 15 September 2019)

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U.S. Department of State (2019a): 2019 Ministerial To Advance Religious Freedom. https://www.state. gov/2019-ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom/ (web: 15 September 2019) U.S. Department of State (2019b): Statements of Concern: 2019 Ministerial To Advance Religious Freedom. https://www.state.gov/statements-of-concern-2019-ministerial-to-advance-religious-freedom/ (web: 15 September 2019) United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2018): U.S. Bishops’ Chairman Applauds Enactment of Iraq and Syria Genocide Relief and Accountability Act. http://usccb.org/news/2018/18-193.cfm (web: 14 September 2019)

204 Antal Birkás1

DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS – AWAKENING CONSCIENCE IN THE UK: THE TRURO REVIEW

Secular society – short introductory description of the situation

The United Kingdom is not a Christian country any more, this has been declared by several sociological papers since the end of the last millennium. We do not want to give the final answer to the question, whether the UK is a Christian country or not, but some of the changes are dramatic: besides the figures, which I will show a bit later, I would rather share a personal experience from 2001. Then I studied in London as a student and had attended Church services of the local Anglican congregation. Not far from this location a Christian denomination was selling its church which was bought by the followers of an Oriental religion. This event shocked me. Later when I investigated the problem in more depth, I realized that churches were being closed all over England, some of them were turned into hotels, entertainment venues, or into a place of worship for a non-Christian religion. Some data: according to the 2011 census, 59 per cent of the population describes himself as a Christian. For comparison this number was was 72 per cent in 2001!2 At the same time, both the Church of England has experienced a fall both in regular church attendance and in the number of parishioners.3 It is appropriate to know, the United Kingdom has a State Church system: besides the Anglican Church whose head is the Monarch, there is a Church of Scotland which is actually the Reformed (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland. These churches operate as State Churches while every other church operate as voluntary society and their wealth is managed by trusts.4

1 Prime Minister’s Office. 2 One-fifth of the people are „ without religion” - which was 15 per cent in 2001. 3 It is not accidental that many question the existence of the State Religion – among them, in 2018, was Keith Porteous Wood, spokesman of the National Secular Society. 4 However, it is important to note that English law does not recognize the concept of the public legal status of Churches. State Churches get Government funds, first of all, to maintain monumental buildings, in a limited number of cases and to a limited extent. However, the Anglican Church is present in several fields of public life, for example, several religious occasions, adoration even in the Parliament.

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The real social influence of churches is quickly shrinking due to strong secularization and the ageing congregations ( for example, only 130,000 baptisms were held in 2014, which is a 12 per cent decrease compared to 2004. Marriage and funeral data also support the weakening of the church’s position. 50,000 ecclesiastical weddings were held in 2014, in Britain, which is 20 per cent fewer than in 2004. Finally, the number of ecclesiastical funerals was just 146,000 which is just 71 per cent of the 2004 total. The latter figure is quite surprising, even if we compare the UK with the very heavily secularized societies of Scandinavian.5 A few years ago, the number of regular churchgoers dropped to below 2%; of the whole population. This means that only 760,000 believers regularly attend Sunday worship. The number of “official” members is also steadily decreasing, about 1% per annum since World War II – as it was pointed out by Archbishop Justin Welby. He explicitly points to the Antichrist culture, whether it be sexuality or the “beginning and the end of life.” However, some metropolitan congregations are experiencing significant revival. For example, an Islington based missionary Bishop has been appointed to reverse this trend and to establish new congregations.6 However, the secularization of the UK is unavoidable fact, and in many cases, British citizens are discriminated against because of their Christian faith and conviction. The supporters of this process are trying to push Christianity out of the public sphere into the personal sphere. (Higton 2019) However, it is worth taking a look at the political elite for a moment – citing examples from the past few years, as well as recent statements.

5 It should be added that the process of decrease - the gradual loss of influence of the Church, the secularization of society – did not begin today. For example, since the late 1950s, the number of church marriages, the number of church members in general, or the number of people who have been administered confirmation, has drastically decreased (this decline is particularly striking in the case of girls). 6 Seeing all that, it is not accidental that the Anglican Church – adapting to the situation – is making efforts to give new functions to its churches from which followers have disappeared, or to manage their situation in a way that is different from the legal status of traditional congregations e.g., what the most important aspect is: if possible, not to sell! What does this mean in practice? The answer is the so-called concept and institutional system of Festival Churches. Local communities are working to make their vacant temples accessible and open to the community. There are somewhere the diocese assumes this role: the Diocese of Exeter, for example, has added 90 such buildings to the ”FC” movement. They want for the ritual space not to disappear, but to continue serving the local community through various cultural events. Besides, the churches are still open for baptism, weddings and funerals. The doors of these temples are open during such and similar celebrations.

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Christianity is still a reference point for many – politicians who do not forget their roots

In the light of these trends, perhaps it is a bit surprising many prominent figures in contemporary British politics have sometimes referred to Christianity boldly and honestly in an explicit manner, or even to the role of their faith in politics and their policies. Politicians in general, even if they do it modestly, continue to engage in “Christian discourse”, emphasizing religious freedom and the respect towards other religions. David Cameron, like Angela Merkel, has repeatedly spoken quite openly and frankly about his Christian faith or England’s Christian roots and culture.7 Cameron also published a short article, ”My faith in the Church of England,” in the Church Times magazine. In this piece he expressed the following thoughts : “I believe we need to have more confidence that we are a Christian country. We need to be more ambitious in expanding the role of faith-based organizations; and I sincerely believe that the spirit of the gospel should be better served when it comes to our faith, which prompts us to stand up and help change people’s lives.“ He adds: “Responsibility, hard work, charity, compassion, humility, and love (…) are values that can be confidently embraced by non-believers and those of other religious beliefs.”

The present: awakening conscience – recent events

We can also see changes in the attitude towards of persecuted Christians. The subject is becoming more and more prominent in public opinion. This has partially happened because Philip Mounstephen, the Bishop of Truro, published the report of his committee on persecuted Christians. The Bishop was not acting on his own but he was assisting the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).8 This 176 pages long report provides an excellent global analysis, which, not only explores the issue but also makes several recommendations. The Review became quite influential in domestic politics.9 The latter was also due in part to the establishment of the Bishop-led committee, which did the hard work, by Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt among others. After the Review was published, Hunt also spoke publicly about the need to do something to help persecuted

7 Tony Blair did the same many times before. 8 An earlier version of the review was released in the spring at Easter, but then the report did not attract much attention. The July review became much more influential since it was released during a major political event. 9 The main findings of the Country Studies section of this review are briefly presented in this study.

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Christians.10 While all of these events were taking place, the Conservative Party was also electing its new leader who could replace Theresa May at 10 Downing Street. During the election campaign, both Jeremy Hunt and Boris Johnson talked about the importance of trying to protect persecuted Christians. For example, Boris Johnson, who eventually won the contest with a landslide against Jeremy Hunt, made a promise on Twitter that if he were elected as Prime Minister, he would also prioritize the matter. So it seems that the protection of persecuted Christians and religious freedom were important for him as well.

The Truro Review

It is worth briefly summarizing this voluminous review - which is the main purpose of my study. This review can play an extremely important role. It can be a tool which makes people learn more about persecuted Christians, a catalyst which can awaken the conscience of the general public. The focus on Christianity is justified by two arguments. Firstly that Christianity is global religion and secondly, the extent of persecution also warrants a thorough study. Because politics must not ignore dealing with certain issues just because they might violate our prejudices11. In the foreword of the report the Bishop of Truro expresses that he wanted to achieve two things with the report. First, document, on a global scale, the extent of the persecution of Christian, its nature and its most important characteristics. After the diagnosis, he wanted to make policy proposals which might help protect persecuted Christians. According to Bishop Philip Mounstephen besides climate change, the issue of religious freedom was the other issue which the world can not ignore. According to the Bishop of Truro, we are slowly addressing climate change so it was time to do something about the second issue as well. Referring to a previous interim study, the review addressed several methodological issues, and then presents the persecution of Christians at a global level in respective country reports. Generally speaking, persecution has multiple approaches, it is committed by a variety of actors, presenting specific cases, some of which even reach the level of genocide. And if we find the casualty numbers shocking, then the rate of their growth is simply brutal (see figures in the review referring to Open Doors, Pew, and Aid to the Church in Need).

10 Find the review at https://christianpersecutionreview.org.uk/storage/2019/07/final-report-and-recommendations.pdf 11 See page 6 of the review. The situation of Christians is also a benchmark. Where Christian communities are persecuted, other religious communities (minorities) are also persecuted – emphasizes the Bishop.

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The study focuses on seven regions. From these reports, we can learn that in many places, like in the so-called MENA region, which is the Middle East and North Africa, the exercise of religious freedom is either severely restricted, or hatred is instigated against religious minorities (primarily Christians) using state media. Examples in the review include Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In the latter country both the large-scale politics and the media have on several occasions have given place to anti-Christian “propaganda.” Christian churches and other sacred sites are frequently targeted in this region, and in some countries, like Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Algeria and Turkey, state authorities have also seized Church property. A significant proportion of Middle Eastern Christians have already left their homeland, an area where Christianity has been present for two millennia! Just one figure: before 2012, 60,0003 Christians lived in Aleppo. In 2019, just 25,000 remained in the same city. And Iraq has lost 90 per cent of its Christians population between 2004 and 2019. In South Asia anti-Christian prejudice and discrimination are quite pervasive in the region. A worrying trend is that in countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka this negative sentiment has morphed into full-fledged religious discrimination, turned into persecution in recent years, thanks to the rise of militant nationalism.12 What does this mean in practice? The persecution of church members and pastors, frequent disruption of worship, attacks against churches/houses of worship. In Pakistan and India, Christian girls are frequently abducted, raped. Forced apostasy, usually due to family pressure, is also very common. And in Nepal, several people were arrested on the charges of evangelism (May 2018). The story of Asia Bibi is quite well-known, she was first sentenced to death for blasphemy, then she had to spend 10 years in jail before her release in 201813. The 2019 bombings in Sri Lanka are also well known to everyone, these attacks were purely anti-Christian in their motivation. The review also examines the persecution of Christians in Sub-Saharan African countries and with the most frequent forms of anti-Christian prejudice. The first thing to note about thisegion r is that, according to the Review, this area was the scene of the most violent persecution of Christians in recent years. State and non-state actors systematically violate the rights of Christians.14

12 Intolerance against Christians and their persecution is a good indicator. It shows the position of other religious communities in „minority status”, the general application of religious freedom, its weaknesses. 13 Note: In many cases, ‘’blasphemous’’ Christians are executed by the masses - before their case reaches a ”fair” trial (blasphemy laws are in place in Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). 14 See page 31 of the Review. The most severe persecution was observed in Nigeria in the last 5 years: The Boko Haram organization has aimed at eradicating Christianity (as a monthly ”average” hundreds were killed in persecution; according to American Secret Service reports, 200,000

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Besides Nigeria probably Sudan is the second-most dangerous country for Christians in Africa. The Christians have endured constant harassment, the destruction of Church property, this includes the closure and dismantling of Church schools and libraries, arbitrary arrests by state authorities is still a great challenge. Finally, many non-Muslims have been punished for violations of Sharia law. Eritrea, persecution tar of non-registered communities, especially Protestants, is also taking place on a state- level and systematically. About 3,000 to 3,200 people were imprisoned specifically because of their religion. The review dedicates a separate chapter for the Far East which describes the situation in 9 East and Southeast Asian countries. One of the nine countries in this chapter is Communist North Korea which has occupied the top position of the list of the 50 most dangerous countries for 18 years in a row. So for a Christian, this is is the most dangerous place anywhere in the world.15 The reason for this, similarly to Laos, China and Vietnam, is the country’s communist ideology. I think that its features need not be explained to anyone in detail who knows Hungary’s history in the 20th century. The state persecutes Christian believers and also discriminates against them in more “subtle” ways.16 Christians, because of their religion – and their position in social stratification – together with those in the “lower” categories (51 layers are officially distinguished) are considered by the state to be enemies. For the state, Christians belong to the same category as political dissidents and agents, they are treated as enemies of the government.17 China passed a new ecclesiastical law in February 2018, with the clear aim of controlling their operations churches and their theological views under formation under communist leadership. The new law reinterprets the role of Christianity in China and to manage its strengthening in its own way. It seeks to enable the Sinicization of Christianity and to use patriotic Christians, loyal believers, in large and positive social processes. China wants to preserve strong state control over the churches in China, and those churches which do not register with the authorities. These so-called home congregations are heavily persecuted by the Chinese

Christian lives were in danger in 2015). The extent, extensiveness and intensity of the cases make them genocidal in size and character (page 32 of the Review). In Tanzania, Somalia and Kenya, Christian groups have also been persecuted by extreme groups. The Review also mentions the assassinations against Muslims, though the background – mostly the motivations – is not entirely clear (Central African Republic). 15 See the Open Doors reference of the Review (p. 34, first paragraph). 16 Extreme nationalism in Bhutan and Myanmar, while for example, in Indonesia and Malaysia militant Islam, is the main cause of persecution. The main actor is the State itself, but there are countries where anti-Christian sentiments are made stronger by forces of the civil society, in Indonesia especially. 17 Christianity is seen as a national risk, state leaders see believers as a community for the benefit of the United States, they are often accused of being agents. No wonder that believers, as an „underground” movement, can only practise their faith in secret - yet they often pay for their faith by being deprived of their freedom or their lives.

210 DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS - AWAKENING CONSCIENCE IN THE UK: THE TRURO REVIEW authorities. This persecution includes banning the use of religious symbols and the demolishing of certain religious buildings. In April 2019, the European Parliament highlighted the Chinese government violation of religious freedom and, among other things, they demanded the release of detained pastors. In Vietnam and Laos, the compulsory registration of religious communities also causes some problems. The communities that do not register, or whose registration is denied by the state, are targeted by the authorities: their members are arrested and their places of worship are destroyed. In both countries only registered Churches can hold religious services legally. It is also important to share the most important findings of the report about two Central Asian countries. So let us examine the situation of Christians in two Muslim majority countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Christians who live in those two countries have to suffer from many types of persecution. Perhaps the most brutal form of anti-Christian activities is forced marriage. In Turkmenistan the kidnapping of Christian girls it quite common that and then the kidnapped girls are forced to marry Muslim men and convert to Islam. Since 1999 the government of Uzbekistan has refused to register a single Christian Church, although in theory you only need the signatures of 50 people to achieve this goal. However, because people do not trust their government, they only practice their Christian faith in unregistered communities, which is also illegal.18 In Uzbekistan, the distribution of “Christian literature” is also against the law, in one case, a pastor had to pay a high fine for the dissemination Christian propaganda. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, several pastors have been imprisoned for the crime of public preaching. In South America, which is a surprise for most people, we are also witnessing massive persecution of Christians. But the nature of the persecution significantly different than on other continents.19 Some typical cases are: In many Central American countries, the Roman Catholic Church is persecuted by organised crime gangs because it tries to hinder the activities of these extremely powerful groups. Just one example: In Mexico 45 priests and 1 cardinal was murdered by criminal organizations in the past 30 years. What could have been the criminals’ rationale? The leader of powerful gangs view the Roman Catholic Church as rival.20 This is how even

18 For example, in the Navio region, an unregistered Baptist community and its church were closed, saying that religious practices are illegal for unregistered communities. 19 The Review mentions 7 countries: Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, enezuela,V Nicaragua and Bolivia. All of these countries have a Christian majority. Cuba itself would be worth a separate subchapter, but for reasons of brevity, I will not deal with it. See page 48 of the review. We are seeing similar persecution in Venezuela, where Christians are harassed by state authorities. (In the latter, churches and leaders who criticize the government are often forced to suffer persecution and their communities are severely restricted in exercising their religion.) 20 They consider the church as a rival because the church is seducing gang members by conversion. It means that the gang loses a member and the gang often kills Christians as retaliation and to dissuade churches from proselytisation.

211 DEVELOPMENTS TO PROTECT PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS - AWAKENING CONSCIENCE IN THE UK: THE TRURO REVIEW in a strongly Catholic country the dedicated followers of Christ, those who speak up for the poor and try to fight against violence and illegal activities? can become victims.21 Paramilitary groups also frequently attack Christian families or Christian schools and use these kidnapped children as reinforcements for their organizations.

The situation is serious – we need to act

Having seen and read all this, it is important to summarize the aspects of the content of the review and to ask ourselves what we can do. If somebody reads the country studies section of the Review, it becomes clear for the reader that Christianity is the most persecuted religion in the world. Christian believers are persecuted in many parts of the world by a variety of “actors”. Not knowing this, or not acknowledging it, is a big mistake. We need to know the reality, and the Truro Review is of great help and thorough work in getting to know it. But we must also do something, we must act! Besides Hungary, which has been helping the communities of persecuted Christians, primarily in the Middle East and in Africa, for years, other countries should also important. Since we now understand the seriousness of the situation, it is time to act!

Conclusion

The preface of the Review, contains a quotation from an old article, Spectators at the Carnage, which appeared in The Times five years earlier states: “Christianity is by most calculations the most persecuted religion of modern times. Yet Western politicians until now have been reluctant to speak out in support of Christians in peril.”22 We hope that, partly due to this Review. the policies of the United Kingdom and other countries will change in the future, however, for the sake of completeness, it is important to note that the government has never been „insensitive” to the problem. In many cases, persecuted Christians have been helped in Africa, but real reaching-out and even more dedicated commitment are still to come – and not just in the case of the UK.

21 For further reference – in connection with the other countries – see p.46 of the review. 22 „Yet the West must be ready to defend the Christian faith,” continues the Times article quoted in the report!

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Literature

BBC NEWS (2019): Jeremy Hunt backs stronger protections for Christians worldwide. BBC News. https://www. bbc.com/news/uk-politics-48907546. (web: 22 August 2019) Higton, Tony (2019): Is Britain anti-Christian? http://www.christianteaching.org.uk/isbritainantichristian. html. (web: 12 September 2019) Smith, Paul (2019): Bishop of Truro’s Independent Review for the Foreign Secretary of FCO Support for Persecuted Christians. https://christianpersecutionreview.org.uk/storage/2019/07/final-report-and-recommendations. pdf (web: 22 August 2019) Spectators at the Carnage. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spectators-at-the-carnage-hcx6v8kj8pt. (web: 22 August 2019)

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Eszter Petronella Soós

SECULARISM IN FRANCE: REGULATIONS FROM 1905

The 2018 analysis of the situation of Christianity in France Soós( 2018a) was actually ”stopped there” that the rhetoric of Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, showed interesting developments and novelties in the relationship with Churches and spirituality, especially in his 2018 speech before the Episcopal Conference. (Macron 2018) We added that in the President’s Church policy, substantive measures were expected later. Thus, since 2017, Church policy in France has focused, in principle, on the reform of Islam that Macron promised in France, but by 2019, it turned out to be more than just that: decisions which would overwrite the rules of secularization in France would affect not only Islam.

The key event of 2019 is that no changes have occurred

The main church policy development in France in 2019 is the lack of substantive development: neither the 1905 law, which governs the separation of the state and the church, has been amended, nor the previously promised reform measures related to Islam have been implemented. Moreover, in spring 2019, the President of the Republic clearly stated that he did not intend to change the content of the 1905 Act. (Corre 2019) However, by the end of 2018, the press had already written articles on the possible directions of change, and by early 2019 some newspapers had already known some sort of government-legislative timeline. (Sauvaget 2019a) At the same time, according to multiple press reports, the established Churches, such as Catholics and Protestants, protested against the amendment of the Law of 1905. The reason for their protests was the worry that they ouldw be the collateral victims in the fight to reform Islam in France. For the proposed amendments would have tightened former regulations. As the government and President Emmanuel Macron himself consulted with Churches earlier this year, the President announced a few weeks after the discussions that he did not want to touch the 1905 law, it is even conceivable that there is a cause and effect relationship between the two. Possibly the representatives of the Churches have persuaded him to take another direction because there was no support for amending the 1905

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Act. (Not to mention that in January, in response to the yellow vest movement, among the topics of the ”Big debate” and in the open letter of the President of the Republic to the French, there was the matter of the lay state, so the French people’s opinions and reactions could even have influenced decisions.) (Macron 2019)

Negotiations, then retreat

In January, the President, the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister received representatives of the churches in the Élysée Palace for a two-hour long visit. They talked aboutcautious reform intentions, but it became clear that they wanted to make the organization-association framework stated in the Act of 1905 more attractive, especially for Muslims who are more likely to establish organizations under the Act of 1901. (Bevilacqua et al. 2019) One of the fundamental questions of the reform would have been how to prevent or, at the very least, better inspect Islamic foreign funding by introducing government measures, such as reporting obligations. The idea of inspections is based on the pre-1905 French model, the concordat system, and Catholics put the government on its guard as early as the end of 2018 regarding inspections. (Tranié 2018) In early February, Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim leaders (Jewish leaders were not present at the last meeting) also voiced their concerns (AFP 2019) unanimously about the possibility of introducing tighter measures regarding finance and even content. By this time, the interesting situation was that Muslims, Catholics, and laypeople. Interestingly even the Freemasons were on the same platform, though not necessarily on the same line. Namely, the Grand Orient of France (the Grand Orient de France), the most influential lodge of Freemasonry in France, opposed the amendment of the Act of 1905, in a petition for laic-secularization. The petition included the views of 113 prominent personalities. (Huet 2019; Comité Laïcité République 2019). The President of the Republic finally announced in a conversation with intellectuals in Élysée Palace that the 1905 Act would remain unchanged. But he pointed out that the funding problem was still open and needed to be resolved, including the ”bypasses” of the 1901 Act. (Nadau 2019)

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Weakening Interior Minister, deteriorating relationship, fewer open partners

Thus, the reform of Islam in France, making funding more transparent as a political objective, has not been removed from the agenda, but the endorsement and implementation of substantive measures and even the announcement of them had not occurred until the present paper was written. However, funding is still the subject of much press coverage as well as its national security aspects. (One of the highlights of the year was the print volume [Chesnot-Malbrunot 2019], then a documentary [Hoffner 2019], which sought an answer to the question of Qatar’s legal financing of Islam, including mosques close to the Muslim Brotherhood, in Europe, France.) Although no concrete measures have been announced, Presidential rhetoric against Islamism, Muslim radicalism, and political Islam has intensified over the year. When the present paper was being written, President Macron was talking about the Islamist ”hydra” in the courtyard of the Paris police station, at a memorial service for the victims of the stabbing terror-attack. (Auffray 2019) One of the developments of 2019 is that the President now lacks a very important tool to reform Islam in France. As the Interior Minister is responsible for liaising with the Churches, it does matter what kind of politician holds this portfolio. But Interior Minister Christophe Castaner’s position is not the most comfortable. His situation is weakened by the exhaustion and dissatisfaction of the police forces, high suicide rates, by the expected impact of pension reform , the political debate over how the police managed the yellow vest movement, by the open questions about the drowning of Steve Maia Caniço of Nantes, or, most recently, the public treatment of the terrorist who stabbed his colleagues to death in the police headquarters. In this situation, the Minister of the Interior, in spite of being President Macron’s confidant, is not in a position to approach with authority the 1905 Act, which is considered to be the heart of the French Republic’s identity. Moreover, the political agenda is fundamentally different: at the beginning of the year, the first half of the year, the yellow vest movement and the European Parliament elections were among the French political and Presidential priorities, and in the second half, it was foreign policy and launching the long-promised pension reform. The latter topic in itself is capable of drawing basic political resources from the government. However, if we add that the government has put certain issues of bioethics on the agenda, we see that from a governmental point of view there are few arguments for changing 1905 law, an extremely explosive case. Such is the situation with the case of Islamic reform (some sources anonymously seem to confirm the now ”no priority” thesis.) (Airault – Trippenbach 2019)

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Otherwise, Muslims would not be unconditional partners in the reform: the relationship between the government and the Muslim umbrella organization, the CFCM (Conseil français du culte musulman), which was established during Nicolas Sarkozy’s interior ministry, deteriorated significantly during the year. For example, the government dealt with the Charter of the CFCM, which the organization regarded as interference into Church affairs; the Minister of the Interior conspicuously ignored the entralc holiday dinner at the end of the Ramadan; while there is an internal influence-debate over who and which organization ”truly” represents French Muslims. (For tensions and disputes, see: Soós 2018b; Soós 2019) Of course, the real issue is money. Whoever pays, orders the song, keeps the saying; but it also matters who manages the song fund and under what conditions. It is no coincidence that opponents, such as those 113 prominent personalities, argue that the money which finances Islam can be controlled without amending the 1905 law, and the government should strive to do so.

The French Catholic Church in 2019

Also, in 2019 the French Catholic Church was less concerned with the state than with its own internal organizational issues and problems. The Episcopal Conference sought ot clarify its internal organizational structure. (Le Priol 2019) In 2019 the Episcopal Conferencehad a new leadership. According to the new President of the Board (Eric de Moulins-Beaufort, Archbishop of Reims) in May 2019, paedophile cases were a systemic problem in the Church (L’Obs-AFP 2019a). This was an overt response to the fact that a court sentenced Philippe Barbarin, Archbishop of Lyon, to six months in prison earlier this year because he as a superior, had not reported to the authorities that he was aware of the illegal activities of a priest, who committed harassment. The case is currently under appeal. Although Pope Francis did not want to accept Cardinal Barbarin’s resignation, yet the latter decided to retire anyway. Thus, the Vatican had to intervene and appoint a transitional apostolic administrator. The Cardinal’s appeal hearing is expected to take place at the end of 2019 after these lines have been written, of course, with considerable media interest. (Sauvaget 2019b) It is also worth noting that French Catholics were most deeply affected by the fire on 15 April 2019 which hit the Notre-Dame Cathedral, the pearl of French Catholic heritage. Although not an internal or organizational matter, the tragic fire has certainly contributed to the visibility of Christian. The tragedy has mobilized huge sums of money and has sparked a political debate over why the wealthy are willing to pay hundreds of millions Euros for a significant building when they do not open their wallets for the people. At the time of writing the

218 SECULARISM IN FRANCE: REGULATIONS FROM 1905 present paper, the exact plans for rebuilding the burned-out building have not yet been finalised, but it can be said that there are sometimes ”wild” ideas circulating in the public sphere. However, the majority of the French people, who were interviewed, are in favour of an authentic restoration of the 19th-century conditions. (Le Figaro – AFP 2019)

Public debates ...

In 2019, political and social issues on which Churches wanted to make their voice heard have been on the agenda. One of these is the migration policy, which is important to mention now because, in the second half of 2019, President Macron promised further tightening in the subject. As early as in 2017, Christian non- governmental organizations, Protestants and Catholics expressed their concerns about the asylum restrictions for refugees that President Macron and the government had been pushing for and implementing at the time. (Gorce 2017) As the topic remains important to the President, it is likely to be addressed by Church organizations as well, but in 2020 this will be the subject of a deeper analysis. Due to the nature of the political agenda, bioethical issues are likely to have significant social repercussions and ecclesiastical-religious mobilization effects, as the latest bill on this topic began its parliamentary career in the fall of 2019. This topic has also been the subject of much interest in the ”prelude” for decades, since in 2019, after lengthy legal proceedings, Vincent Lambert was disconnected from the machines that were keeping him alive, as a result of which he deceased after living in a vegetative state for a decade. The Catholic bishop’s body, after the man’s death, opined that the young man was not at the end of his life, so there was no need to ”shut him down”. (Jaegy – AFP 2019)

… and bioethical debates

The 2012 election of François Hollande brought another heyday and significant mobilization of Catholic movements in France. In his election program, President Holland promised to legalize same-sex marriage, including the right to adoption (this promise became known as the ”marriage for all” bill). In response to this suggestion, the Manif pour Tous movement (”protest for everyone”) was created, which has been able to take hundreds of thousands of people to the streets. Although there is always a debate in France about how many

219 SECULARISM IN FRANCE: REGULATIONS FROM 1905 people attend a demonstration of course, the organizers always say more than independent observers, and usually much more than the Ministry of the Interior that is responsible for law enforcement it is certain that marital equality rallies have sometimes moved hundreds of thousands, according to organizers’ estimates, millions of people. Catholic organizations at that time were worried that gay marriage could be the forerunner of the process of extending artificial insemination to all women, including single and esbianl women (procréation médicalement assistée – PMA) or, further, the legalization of surrogacy (gestation pour autrui – GPA). The former, by the way, was also promised by Hollande in his presidential campaign, but eventually, he did not make it available. During this period, French public opinion was in favour of opening up the right to marriage, much less of surrogacy and adoption. (Bosse-Platière 2019) Emmanuel Macron was open during the 2017 presidential election to liberalize the issue of artificial insemination (PMA). At the same time, he promised widespread social consultation and hearing, because he believed that opponents of gay marriage had been humiliated during the debate on the bill. (Paulet 2019) A bill to expand access to artificial insemination was submitted as part of the ioethicsb package this year with parliamentary debates contemporaneous with writing the present paper (French legislation is much slower than Hungarian, two houses have to negotiate several interpretations of each material, reaching agreement, otherwise the National Assembly can decide, currently, the final endorsement is expected for summer 2020). The bill, in its original governmental state, is not only about making the PMA accessible to all but is going re-regulating a wide range of bioethical issues, from abortion to sperm donation. (Mazuir 2019) Concerning sperm donation, recipients will still not be able to select from donations by attributes, but a child born with the help of artificial insemination will have access to donor information if they wish to do so at the age of 18. That is, they can find out who their biological father is. For women, the possibility of reservingp egg cells is widening. DNA tests will continue to be available only for medical reasons in France. Again, it is important to stress that this is the first interpretation discussed by the National Assembly which( included inconveniences such that the House of Commons mistakenly voted in favour of automatic legal recognition of foreign-born children, which was quickly reversed with a government amendment.) (franceinfo-AFP 2019a)

220 SECULARISM IN FRANCE: REGULATIONS FROM 1905

Demonstration and mobilization: religion as a political actor?

On 6 October, a major demonstration took place in France, calling on organizations as well as organized by those that were also involved in the post-2012 anti-gay marriage mobilization. This demonstration mobilized tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people, according to the organizers, which is an interesting development if we know that the Republican movement, which has traditionally been able to reach out to Catholic-Conservative voters, achieved just 8.48% in the 2019 European parliamentary elections, which is a historic low. However, the size of the October 6th demonstration, in any case, suggests that there is still some social strength and vitality within these movements. How strong they are in reality will be the big question of the coming months and 2020. The Manif pour Tous movement has already announced four additional demonstration days, which will be on 1 December, 19 January, 8 March and 17 May, respectively. (franceinfo-AFP 2019b) In parallel, the question arises as to whether there will be local lists or movements in the local government elections due in March 2020 that will try to present themselves in a religious context, even if they mobilize people for bioethics law. As these rare movements tend to be Muslim community marches, they have received the opposition of the entire political elite so far (L’Obs-AFP 2019b), for such communalism, the representation of partial interests against national interests, is, in principle, alien to French thinking. (But then, there is an example that a Christian Democratic Party exists on paper in the vicinity of Republicans.) All this is still an open question, as will the impact of different mobilizations be on parliamentary legislative processes on bioethics. However, what is certain at this moment, is that the Macron administration is no longer interested in rewriting the basic rules of State-Church relations, which are still going to be regulated by the Act of 1905. This will certainly give the great Churches some satisfaction when they look back to 2019.

Sources:

AFP (2019): Laïcité : les responsables de cultes inquiets sur la révision de la loi de 1905. https://www.europe1.fr/ societe/laicite-les-responsables-de-cultes-inquiets-sur-la-revision-de-la-loi-de-1905-3852383) (web: 10 October 2019) Airault, Pascal – Trippenbach, Ivanne (2019): Islam en France: pourquoi Macron piétine. https://www. lopinion.fr/edition/politique/islam-en-france-pourquoi-macron-pietine-197748) (web: 10 October 2019)

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Auffray, Alain (2019): A la préfecture de police de Paris, Macron durcit le ton contre «l’hydre islamiste». ht t ps:// www.liberation.fr/politiques/2019/10/08/a-la-prefecture-de-police-de-paris-macron-durcit- le-ton-contre-l-hydre-islamiste_1756232) (web: 10 October 2019) Bevilacqua, Bernard et al. (2019): Réforme de la loi de 1905, l’exécutif affiche sa prudence. https://www.la- croix.com/Religion/Reforme-loi-1905-lexecutif-affiche-prudence-2019-01-10-1200994485.) (web: 10 October 2019) Bosse-Platiere, Raphaël (2014): Mariage homosexuel, adoption, GPA : les sondages confortent la Manif pour tous. https://www.rtl.fr/actu/mariage-homosexuel-adoption-gpa-les-sondages-confortent-la-manif-pour- tous-7769527643) (web: 10 October 2019) Chesnot, Christian – Malbrunot, Georges (2019): Quatar papers. Michel Lafon. Comité Laïcité République (2019): Appel des 113 : nous nous opposons aux modifications de la loi de 1905. https://www.marianne.net/debattons/tribunes/appel-des-113-nous-nous-opposons-aux-modifications-de- la-loi-de-1905) (web: 10 October 2019) Corre, Mikael (2019): Emmanuel Macron «ne souhaite pas qu’on change la loi de 1905». https://www.la-croix. com/France/Politique/Emmanuel-Macron-souhaite-pas-quon-change-loi-1905-2019-03-19- 1201009806) (web: 10 October 2019) Franceinfo – AFP (2019a): Loi de bioéthique : l’Assemblée revient sur la reconnaissance automatique de la filiation des enfants nés par GPA à l’étranger. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/loi-sur-la-famille/gestation- pour-autrui/bioethique-l-assemblee-revient-sur-la-reconnaissance-automatique-de-la-filiation-des-enfants- nes-par-gpa-a-l-etranger_3652677.html) (web: 10 October 2019) Franceinfo – AFP (2019b): Manif anti-PMA pour toutes : 74 500 personnes ont défilé à Paris, selon un comptage indépendant. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/loi-de-bioethique/manif-anti-pma-pour-toutes-74-500- personnes-ont-defile-a-paris-selon-un-comptage-independant_3647355.html) (web: 10 October 2019) Gorce, Bernard (2017): Migrants : catholiques et protestants dénoncent les mesures d’Emmanuel Macron. ht t ps:// www.la-croix.com/France/Immigration/Catholiques-protestants-denoncent-mesures-Macron- migrants-2017-12-19-1200900650) (web: 10 October 2019) Hoffner, Anne-Bénédicte (2019): Les précieux financements qatariens de l’islam en Europe. https://www.la- croix.com/Culture/TV-Radio/precieux-financements-qatariens-lislam-Europe-2019-09-24- 1201049590) (web: 10 October 2019)

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Huet, Anaïs (2019): Révision de la loi de 1905 : „L’édifice républicain peut être détricoté”, alerte le Grand Orient de France. https://www.europe1.fr/societe/revision-de-la-loi-de-1905-ledifice-republicain-peut-etre- detricote-alerte-le-grand-orient-de-france-3831959) (web: 10 October 2019) Jaegy, Alexandra – AFP (2019): Pour la Conférence des évêques, Vincent Lambert „n’était pas en fin de vie”. https://www.bfmtv.com/societe/pour-la-conference-des-eveques-vincent-lambert-n-etait-pas-en-fin-de- vie-1729088.html) (web: 10 October 2019) Le Figaro – AFP (2019): Notre-Dame: plus d’un Français sur deux pour reconstruire à l’identique, selon un sondage. https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/notre-dame-plus-d-un-francais-sur-deux-pour-reconstruire-a-l- identique-selon-un-sondage-20190430) (web: 10 October 2019) Le Priol, Mélinée (2019): Quelle organisation pour les évêques de France? https://www.la-croix.com/Religion/ Catholicisme/France/Quelle-organisation-eveques-France-2019-04-03-1201013237) (web: 10 October 2019) L’Obs – AFP (2019a): La pédophilie dans l’Eglise, un „problème systémique” pour la Conférence des évêques. https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20190507.AFP6012/la-pedophilie-dans-l-eglise-un-probleme- systemique-pour-la-conference-des-eveques.html) (web: 10 October 2019) L’Obs – AFP (2019b): Municipales 2020: faut-il interdire les „listes communautaristes”? https://www.nouvelobs. com/politique/20191004.AFP5948/municipales-2020-faut-il-interdire-les-listes-communautaristes.html) (web: 10 October 2019) Macron, Emmanuel (2018): Discours du Président de la République, Emmanuel Macron, à la Conférence des évêques de France au Collège des Bernardins. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/04/09/discours- du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a-la-conference-des-eveques-de-france-au-college-des- bernardins) (web: 10 October 2019) Macron, Emmanuel (2019): Lettre aux Français. https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/01/13/ lettre-aux-francais) (web: 10 October 2019) Mazuir, Valérie (2019): Ce que prévoit le projet de loi bioéthique. https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/ societe/ce-que-prevoit-le-projet-de-loi-bioethique-1040459) (web: 10 October 2019) Nadau, Louis (2019): Finalement, Emmanuel Macron ne touchera pas à la loi de 1905. https://www.marianne. net/politique/finalement-emmanuel-macron-ne-touchera-pas-la-loi-de-1905) (web: 10 October 2019)

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Paulet, Alicia (2019): Macron estime que les opposants au mariage pour tous ont été «humiliés». https://www. lefigaro.fr/elections/presidentielles/2017/02/17/35003-20170217ARTFIG00165-macron-estime-que-les- opposants-au-mariage-pour-tous-ont-ete-humilies.php) (web: 10 October 2019) Sauvaget, Bernadette (2019a): Un calendrier pour la révision de la loi de 1905. https://www.liberation.fr/ france/2019/01/16/un-calendrier-pour-la-revision-de-la-loi-de-1905_1703350) (web: 10 October 2019) Sauvaget, Bernadette (2019b): Affaire Barbarin : un évêque par intérim nommé au diocèse de Lyon. ht t ps:// www.liberation.fr/france/2019/06/24/affaire-barbarin-un-eveque-par-interim-nomme-au-diocese-de- lyon_1735858) (web: 10 October 2019) Soós Eszter Petronella (2018a): The Situation of Christianity in France: A Situational Picture and Debates, In: Kaló, József; Ujházi, Lóránd (szerk.) Budapest Report 2018 On Christian Persecution. Szent István Társulat, Dialóg Campus, Budapest, pp. 119-127. Soós Eszter Petronella (2018b): Lassan halad az iszlám franciaországi reformja. https://tev.hu/lassan-halad- az-iszlam-franciaorszagi-reformja/) (web: 10 October 2019) Soós Eszter Petronella (2019): Feszült a viszony a kormány és a francia muszlim ernyőszervezet között. https://tev. hu/feszult-a-viszony-a-kormany-es-a-francia-muszlim-ernyoszervezet-kozott/) (web: 10 October 2019) Tranié, Julien (2018): Révision de la loi de 1905, les catholiques plaident pour la prudence. https://www.la-croix.com/ Religion/Catholicisme/France/Revision-loi-1905-catholiques-plaident-prudence-2018-12-12-1200989093) (web: 10 October 2019)

224 Péter Tarcsay 1

HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS?

Today, it is almost commonplace to say that Christianity is the most persecuted religion in the world. It has always been so, it is enough to remember how Christians were persecuted in the days of Emperor Nero and Diocletian. But one must not forget the large scale secularization of the Enlightenment, the exclusion of the Church, the deportation of the priests, or the removal of the stones of Notre Dame in Paris, the beheading of the sculptures and the repeated plundering of the cathedral. (MTI 2019) And this attitude toward Christians has not changed by the dawn of the 21st century. According to recent figures, eighty per cent of people persecuted for their religion in the world today are Christian. (Kacsoh 2019) According to a 2017 study, there are approximately 65.6 million refugees in the world. Refugee refers to those who have had to leave their homes because of war, political or religious persecution, natural disasters, or threats to their life, health or physical freedom. So millions of so-called economic immigrants on their way to a better life are still adding to this number. (TVN 24 2019) Nowadays, there are two types of persecution of Christians: one that is experienced in Western Europe, which involves the relativization and removal of Christian values and, in many cases, the falsification of history. The other is the persecution of Eastern Christians, who suffer misery and other disadvantages in the area and exist as a Christian minority in the sea of the majority religion, often under attack by extremist groups. Hungary will speak against the former in every possible European forum. For the latter, it has set up a State Secretariat to help persecuted Christians, which has assisted about 50,000 people so far. (Semjén 2019) In this paper, we will deal with the second type of persecution of Christians, in particular, how Visegrád countries and their Catholic Episcopal Conferences try to help the Christians of the Middle East, either individually or collectively.

1 Esztergom-Budapest Archdiocese

225 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS?

The aforementioned dual persecution of Christianity was highlighted in 2018 by the way of the cross in Warsaw, the Polish capital. In the preceding Mass, it was emphasized that about 170,000 Christians die every year for their faith. This means that one person is executed about every three minutes just because the person belongs to Christ. (Catholic Information Agency 2019) But our Polish friends are also providing great financial assistance to our Syrian brothers. In the first half of 2019, between 1 January and 21 April 2019, in collaboration with Aid to the Church in Need (Kirche in Not hereinafter ACN 2019), they launched the ”Aleppo-package” project to deliver packages containing basic foodstuffs to war-torn Syria since 2011. Pkwp.org( 2018) Also, Lebanon, which is adjacent to Syria, where millions of refugees have been arriving, fleeing the war, due to its geographical proximity, has become a new priority country for Polish development cooperation. Here, Polish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) implement development programs, humanitarian operations, and support the initiatives of the Polish Embassy in Beirut by complementing and reinforcing them. Development assistance focuses on: 1. Supporting human capital by improving the quality of formal and informal learning at all levels of education, improving the conditions of education at all levels of education, and improving access to social services for people from groups at risk of exclusion. 2. Protecting the environment by improving waste and drinking water management, including better access to water and sewage infrastructure, improving access to renewable energy sources, limiting the impact of climate change and human activities, including deforestation, desertification or soil degradation processes. 3. Improving entrepreneurship and the private sector by enhancing entrepreneurial spirit, in particular among young people and women, and improving access to new jobs, high-quality technical education and vocational training, including conversion training to new qualifications, and improving the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation of producer groups, cooperatives especially in the agro-food industry. (Polskapomoc 2019) It is also worth mentioning the operation of the Polska Akcja Humanitarna-Polish Humanitarian Action, which has been continuously present in Idlib and Aleppo provinces of Syria since 2013. They help people who are displaced within the country to find shelter there. The camps provide drinking water by transporting it in tankers and contribute to the improvement of the living conditions of the sufferers through hygiene and food packages. To date, 50 refugee camps have been set up helping those in need. (Polska Akcja Humaitarna 2019) From the outset, Caritas Polska has been raising funds for its humanitarian mission in Syria. The funds provided by the donors help the sufferers to meet their basic needs: food, medicine, clothing. Not just Polish families join the program, but also companies and parish communities. Since October 2016, 8,700 families

226 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS? have been assisted, with more than PLN 40 million transferred by Poles via Caritas Polska. The programs virtually connect nearly 20,000 Polish donors with about 9,000 Syrian families. (Caritas Polska 2019) During their activities, the charity and the Saint Nicholas Foundation have completed several joint projects: providing scholarships to 200 students from Aleppo, rebuilding two club rooms, rebuilding the al-Kalima school’s sports field, and reconstructing the playground in the Aleppo Sakhour district. In addition, Caritas Polska bought winter clothes and fuel oil for those in need and also bought adult and baby clothes. (Caritas Polska 2018) At the end of June this year, the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, the Royal Polish Opera and the Royal Museum of Lazienki, Caritas Polska and SA Television organized a telethon they called “Poland Helps – Help for Syria”, during which viewers could donate money by sending text messages to help the Syrian people. (Ministertwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego 2019) The situation is similar in our northern neighbour. At its meeting in October 2017, the Slovak Episcopal Conference ordered all churches to collect donations for the benefit of Middle Eastern Christians, on 18 March 2018. This fundraising was a continuation of earlier 2015 and 2016 promotions. Erich Hulmann, the spokesman of the Episcopal Conference, said the aim was not only to provide humanitarian aid to people in need but also to encourage Christian communities to survive this difficult time and not leave their homes. The donations have helped some 42,000 people to remain in Iraq and Syria. During the fundraising drive, € 500,000 was donated by Slovakians to alleviate their brothers’ fate. (Konferencie Biskupov Slovenska 2019) Earlier fundraising enabled ACN’s action to restore 13 houses in the value of € 75,000 in Nineveh Plain in 2017. (Denník Postoj 2019) Also, the fundraising covered the cost of food and hygiene packages and the drilling of new wells. From the Slovakian donations, a gym, a pastoral centre, a nursery and a kindergarten have also been built in Iraq. (ACN Slovensko 2019) Furthermore, we have to mention the joint statement the Greek Catholic Bishops of the Visegrad Countries made on 25 April 2018: ”In addition to the growing political influence of the Visegrad Four, we, the Greek Catholic bishops of these countries, want to emphasize the importance of helping those in need while preserving the Christian identity of European countries. We support giving these Christian brothers the opportunity of a dignified human life. At the same time, the opportunity to return to and live in their own country must be promoted, so that they could preserve their identity in their own environment. (...)”(Denník Postoj Svet krest’anstva 2019) In the second half of 2017, Slovakia admitted 50 refugees from refugee camps in Greece and 10 refugees from Italy. Although the European Commission statistics tried to point out, it was not under the quota, but under a

227 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS? previous commitment of the Bratislava government. (Kokes 2017) Also, Slovakian Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini in early autumn 2018 envisaged that Slovakia could accommodate orphaned children from refugee camps in Greece. (Felvidék.ma 2018) It is also noticeable that Slovak newspapers report on Hungary’s activities in support of persecuted Christians regularly and in a commendable manner. Several newspapers reported that Cardinal Patriarch Bechara Boutros Rai had visited Budapest in 2017 and that the government supported the Syriac Catholic Church with € 1.5 million. (Stiftung Pro Oriente 2017) In early 2016, a group of 34 Iraqi and Syrian Christian families arrived in Prague. It is important to emphasize that this rescue operation was the result of a serious and exemplary collaboration. Thanks to the joint action and assistance of the government, churches and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 154 Christians have escaped the martyrdom that is likely to have awaited them. (Evangelical Focus 2016) Hungary has allocated 224 million HUF for intervention within the central budget of the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and the implementation of the Hungary Helps Program this year, and 620 million HUF for a scholarship program for persecuted Christians. (Net jogtár). In addition to this are the amounts awarded in the form of extraordinary government measures, based on an ad hoc government proposal, and the helping right hand of the Churches. Such was the joint action of the Bishops’ Conferences of Central and Eastern Europe in the spring of 2016 when they assisted Caritas Lebanon. (Katolikus.hu 2016) As a result of the cooperation between the Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference (85 million HUF raised), the Hungarian government (120 million HUF) and ACN, a secondary school was built in the Ankawa district of Erbil, Iraq. The opening ceremony of the school took place in 2017. Theschool has about 600 students, 18 classrooms, 2 well-equipped laboratories, a large hall and other service rooms, and is maintained by the Chaldean Catholic Diocese of Erbil. (Magyar Kurír 2017) Interestingly, the school also contain a copy of the statue of Our Lady of Csíksomlyó. (S4C News 2019) We can also mention the fundraising drives of the Hungarian Catholic Bishop’s Conference, between 2017 and June 2019, which contributed $ 500,000 to fund the reconstruction of the demolished houses in Batnaya, Iraq, through the Baghdad Nunciature2. (Hungary Today 2019) And, of course, we must not forget about individual actions of smaller communities, parishes, such as the Our Father Concert held in Budapest in the downtown Our Lady Parish in December 2017. (Aranyossy 2017), or a charity concert held by the Parish of The Exaltation of the Holy Cross in Budapest–Rákoskeresztúr in December 2018. (Rotunda énekegyüttes

2 The official representation, Embassy of the Apostolic Holy See

228 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS?

2018). These initiatives, though small in scope, do not always breach the “stimulus threshold” of the national media, but their presence shows that Hungarian Catholics at all levels, from bishops through downtown residents to faithful who live in the suburbs, try to help their persecuted Christian brothers. Collaboration with the ACN is currently an untapped opportunity. The main profile of the organization, recognized as a pontifical entity in 2011, is to help persecuted, oppressed churches in areas where these communities cannot sustain themselves alone. (Aid to the Church in Need 2019). As we have seen above, the Visegrad Countries have done their part, but ACN is a worldwide organization that exists exactly for this purpose. The organization’s website mentions that they are currently running several projects to help Middle Eastern Christians, and are expecting donations and help. It is clear from the above that the Visegrad countries have improved the lives of tens of thousands of persecuted Christians in parallel, separately, but in some cases with minimal coordination. The humanitarian aid they send, the cost of rebuilding houses, schools, churches, at first glance, may seem like a staggering amount, but it is worth considering that helping people where they live is still much more effective and cheaper than bringing them to Europe, because sooner or later they will necessarily lose their religious, cultural and national identity. For in Europe, they would break away from their cultural circles and would have little opportunity to practice their religion under their own rite, due to the absence of their priesthood. The aid provided through Visegrad countries’ approach helps all concerned to retain their identity and remain Syrian, Iraqi, Chaldean, Maronite. And the line of nationalities could go on an on. The point is that the direction we are pointing at is to help keep the Middle Eastern Christian traditions, which go back to almost two thousand years, alive during the period of a bloody storm. It is worth considering that if we can make the lives of so many people better ourselves, how much more we could do if the right people, initially the leaders of the Visegrad Four and, later on, those in charge of the European Union, actually sat down around the negotiating table and came forward with a solution that helps everyone with their own needs. In contrast, for example, only in 2017, the German government provided EUR 559 million for German language courses for 300,000 refugees and allocated an additional EUR 470 million for work-related courses for migrants. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie 2017) If we compare this with all the help of the Visegrad Four, it is still about a fraction of the former amount. How much more conflict-free would the world be if the German state were to spend this enormous amount of money on reconstruction, rather than on an integration program that does not promise a breakthrough, as the growing number of immigrants in Germany is becoming increasingly problematic. It is enough to think about those examples of large scale of harassment and abuse that happened in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015, or that migrants, for example, prefer

229 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS? to sit in smaller groups on the picturesque Rhine bank, which is very popular with tourists, even during working hours. In Cologne, there is a city decree that nothing can be higher than the 157-meter-high tower of the Dome, the city’s emblem. However, when the construction of the mosque began in the city, citizens of Cologne reported that a very narrow majority succeeded in enforcing the provision and forbidding the mosque to be taller. Or it is worth mentioning Italy, where Hungary has very often been referred to as a police state since the beginning of the migrant crisis. (Scheppele) Still, anyone who goes to Rome will not find a monument, a sight, or a tourist-friendly spot without armed soldiers and their vehicles to protect it from attacks. All you have to do is go to the Colosseum or Victor Emmanuel II Monument, often referred to as the “typewriter”, or try to get into one of the great basilicas in Rome without a security check ... We have seen that the principle of on-the-spot assistance, which is favoured and advertised by the Visegrad countries, works. That is, the opportunity is open to all governments, Churches, organizations and people of goodwill. Let’s take this opportunity because our brothers and sisters whose life has been fully ruined by the war have no other option to remain who they are: people preserving their Christian faith and their thousands of years old culture. However, to do so, we have to do more than merely post “thoughts and prayers” comment on social media, which is very popular in today’s world, or a temporary replacement of a profile picture to express solidarity. If we want to help, let’s do it!

Literature

ACN Slovensko (2019): Celoslovenská zbierka pomôže prenasledovaným kresťanom. https://acn-slovensko. org/prenasledovanym-krestanom-pomoze-celoslovenska-zbierka/ (web: 12 September 2019) Aid to the Church in Need (2019): What we do. https://acninternational.org/about-acn/ ((web: 12 September 2019) Aranyossy Mihály (2017): Szent Efrém - Miatyánk koncert a Budapest-Belvárosi Nagyboldogasszony Főplébánia- templomban 2017. december 16-án. http://www.belvarosiplebania.hu/tartalom/szent_efrem_-_miatyank_ koncert_a_budapest-belvarosi_nagyboldogasszony_foplebania-templomban_2017_december_16-an (web: 10 September 2019) Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2017): Geflüchtete Menschen erfolgreich integrieren: Maßnahmen und Initiativen. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Wirtschaft/fluechtlingspolitik. html (web: 10 September 2019)

230 HOW DO VISEGRAD COUNTRIES HELP PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS?

Caritas Polska (2018): Podsumowanie Działań Caritas Polska W Syrii 2018. https://caritas.pl/ blog/2018/12/15/podsumowanie-dzialan-caritas-polska-w-syrii-2018-2/ (web: 10 September 2019) Caritas Polska (2019): Syryjczycy: Nigdy nie zapomnimy o Waszej pomocy. Caritas Polska w Syrii. ht t ps:// caritas.pl/blog/2019/04/27/syryjczycy-nigdy-nie-zapomnimy-o-waszej-pomocy-caritas-polska-w-syrii/ (web: 4 September 2019) Catholic Information Agency (2019): Special intention: persecuted Christians. https://poland.pl/social- issues/social/special-intention-persecuted-christians/ (web: 4 September 2019) Denník Postoj (2019): Dnes je v kostoloch zbierka na podporu prenasledovaných kresťanov. https://www.postoj. sk/31593/dnes-je-v-kostoloch-zbierka-na-podporu-prenasledovanym-krestanom (web: 4 September 2019) Denník Postoj Svet krest’anstva (2019): Gréckokatolícki biskupi upozornili na prenasledovanie kresťanov. https://svetkrestanstva.postoj.sk/32703/greckokatolicki-biskupi-upozornili-na-prenasledovanie-krestanov (web: 4 September 2019) angolul https://www.tkkbs.sk/view.php?cisloclanku=20180425029 (web: 4 September 2019) Evangelical Focus (2016): Czech authorities, NGO and churches cooperate to welcome 34 Christian refugee families. http://evangelicalfocus.com/europe/1361/Cooperation_of_government_NGO_and_evangelical_ churches_bring_34_refugee_families_to_the_Czech_Republic http://evangelicalfocus.com/europe/1361/ Cooperation_of_government_NGO_and_evangelical_churches_bring_34_refugee_families_to_the_ Czech_Republic (web: 14 September 2019) Felvidék.ma (2018): Pellegrini: Szlovákia szír árvákat fogadhatna be. https://felvidek.ma/2018/09/pellegrini- szlovakia-szir-arvakat-fogadhatna-be/ / (web: 14 September 2019) Hungary Today (2019): Hungarian Catholic Church Donates $500,000 to Rebuild Homes in Iraq. ht t ps:// hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-catholic-church-donates-rebuild-homes-iraq/ / (web: 14 September 2019) Katolikus.hu (2016): Közösen támogatják Közép-Kelet Európa püspöki konferenciái a Libanoni Karitászt. https://katolikus.hu/cikk/archive-2483 / (web: 14 September 2019) Kokes János (2019): Szlovákia menekülteket fogad be, de nem a kvóták alapján. https://felvidek.ma/2017/08/ szlovakia-menekulteket-fogad-be-de-nem-a-kvotak-alapjan/ (web: 14 September 2019) Konferencie Biskupov Slovenska (2019): Prenasledovaným kresťanom pomôže zbierka, v kostoloch bude 18. marca. https://www.tkkbs.sk/view.php?cisloclanku=20180307030 (web: 14 September 2019) Magyar Kurír (2017): Célba ért a magyar hívek adománya az iraki Erbílben. https://www.magyarkurir.hu/ hirek/celba-ert-magyar-hivek-adomanya-az-iraki-erbilben (web: 14 September 2019)

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Kacsoh Dániel (2019): Ma a világ vallási üldözötteinek nyolcvan százaléka keresztény. Interjú Azbej Tristan államtitkárral. Magyar Nemzet. https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/20190905-ma-a-vilag-vallasi- uldozotteinek-nyolcvan-szazaleka-kereszteny (web: 14 September 2019) Ministertwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego (2019): Polska pomaga – Pomoc dla Syrii. ht t p:// mkidn.gov.pl/pages/posts/polska-pomaga---pomoc-dla-syrii-9209.php (2019. szeptember 12-i állapot) MTI: 180 évig épült a Notre Dame. https://mult-kor.hu/20121212_180_evig_epult_a_notre_dame (2019. szeptember 4-i állapot) Net Jogtár: 2018. évi L. törvény Magyarország 2019. évi központi költségvetéséről. https://net.jogtar.hu/ jogszabaly?docid=A1800050.TV (2019. szeptember 10-i állapot) Pkwp.org (2018): Paczka Dla Aleppo. https://pkwp.org/kampanie/paczka_dla_aleppo (web: 12 September 2019) Polska Akcja Humaitarna (2019): Pah W Syrii. https://www.pah.org.pl/syria web: 12 September 2019) Polskapomoc (2019): Liban: https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Liban,2846.html web: 12 September 2019) Rotunda énekegyüttes (2018): Jótékonysági koncert. http://www.rotunda.hu/images/rotunda/2018/2018-12-15. pdf web: 12 September 2019) S4C News (2019): Marya Mana – az iraki iskola, amire mi, magyarok is büszkék lehetünk. ht t ps://s4 c. news/2019/01/02/marya-mana-az-iraki-iskola-amire-mi-magyarok-is-buszkek-lehetunk/ web: 12 September 2019) Scheppele, Kim Lane (2019): Lo stato di polizia di Orban. https://www.dinamopress.it/news/lo-stato-di- polizia-di-orban/ (web: 12 September 2019) Semjén Zsolt (2019): Beszéde a Keresztény kommunikációs szakemberek budapesti fórumán, 2019. szeptember 4-én. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n61lG2mudEs (web: 4 October 2019) Stiftung Pro Oriente (2017): Ungarn subventioniert Restaurierung von Kirchen im Libanon. https://www. pro-oriente.at/?site=ne20180420131115. (web: 4 October 2019) TVN 24: Jak każdy z nas może pomóc uchodźcom – przewodnik. https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/jak- mozna-pomoc-uchodzcom-lista-organizacji,750709.html (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n61lG2mudEs (web: 4 October 2019)

232 RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES’ INVOLVEMENT TO PROMOTE THE SECURITY SITUATION OF CHRISTIANS

Lóránd Ujházi1

CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Numerous works have been published on the history of the Catholic Church in China, its security challenges, and the relationship between the state and the Church, including the “diplomatic” relationship between the Holy See and the People’s Republic. (Chu 2012; Chu 2014; Horst 2017, 59–70) This latter topic is of particular interest. Since the Communist takeover, there have been no diplomatic relations between the two parties. On 22 September 2018, the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China signed a temporal agreement. The most sensitive issue was the recognition of bishops and the method of their appointment. Also, on 28 June 2019, the Holy See issued a pastoral directive for the registration of Catholic bishops and priests with state authorities. (Vatican Press 2019) The Holy See issued a brief communiqué about the 2018 agreement – in Italian, English and Chinese – but did not publish the text of the agreement itself. Unlike the critics who believed that the signing of the convention was an act of surrender by the Holy See, on the other hand, Pope Francis highlighted the pastoral significance of the document. The biggest benefit of the agreement is that it offers a solution forose th bishops whose position was ecclesiastically unlawful since their appointment was not sanctioned by the pope. Thus, following this agreement the Holy See sees every Chinese bishop and priest as clerics who can validly and lawfully exercise their sanctifying, teaching, and administrative tasks. Many people complain about that secret nature of the agreement, so we can only speculate about the exact process which regulates the appointment of Chinese bishops? (Allen 2018) The papers focus on the nature of the politics and security related relationship between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China focus. However, if we do not answer several theological and canonical key questions we will only partially understand the problem. But what are these theological/canonical question? Firstly, did we have a schism between the official Church community which was recognized by the Chinese state and the

1 National University of Public Service.

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Universal Catholic Church? Secondly, how can someone receive as a Catholic in the state-recognized official Church? Finally, what was the canonical status of those bishops who were appointed without a Holy See permission? When analyzing the relationship between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China, one must not forget the current Pope’s foreign policy. Pope Francis is utilising the Holy See’s “soft power” to reconcile religious communities regionally and to promote world peace globally. Nor can the efforts of his predecessors be ignored. Saint John Paul II was working very hard to improve the Holy See’s relationship with China, but the circumstances were not quite ready for the signing of such a bilateral agreement. Pope Benedict XVI continued his predecessor’s approach and he expressed in multiple statements that he favoured dialogue with China. In this paper, we summarise the history of the Catholic Church in China, the relationship between the Holy See and the current Chinese leadership, and also give an overview of theological and canonical issues arising from the development of a “diplomatic” relationship between the two parties.

Schism or internal division in the Chinese Catholic Church

To understand the situation of the Chinese Catholic Church, we have to understand a few specific historical facts. First and foremost, we must not rely on European historical examples when we study the relationship between the Chinese state and the Catholic Church, and the role of the Catholic Church within Chinese society. Christianity has never been as deeply integrated into Chinese society as in most European countries. Although there were successful missionary attempts in the during the Tang dynasty in the 6th century by Nestorian Christians. The second period was the arrival of influential Catholic pastors with their missionaries. This includes Franciscan bishop Giovanni da Montecorvino in the 14th century and the much better-known example of Matteo Ricci the 16th century. Nevertheless, Christianity roots were so deep in China to ensure that their communities can not be swept away by dynastic changes and external influences. (Fazzini, Lazzarotto 2008) When Mao Zedong died in 1976, and the new Chinese political leaders stopped the Cultural Revolution, which was a period of persecution for the Churches, the Holy See wanted to clarify the canonical status of the Chinese Catholic Church. Also, Deng Xiaoping’s open gates reform policy was a clear sign that China was undergoing turbulent changes. And then the Catholic Church felt the time was ripe to apply the ideas of Second Vatican Council, about how can the Catholic Church talk to other cultures and state authorities, in

236 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA practice. So the Holy See decided to expand the width of dialogue with Communist China. Since both Paul VI, as expressed in Ecclesiam suam, 1964, and John Paul II were committed to the principles of the Council, as described by Ut unum sint, 1995. The fact that both the official and underground churches had to suffer a lot during the Cultural Revolution could have been a good basis for starting negotiations with the Chinese authorities. There were signs of the revival of the Catholic Church in China: in 1980, churches were reopening in major cities and many imprisoned bishops and priests were released from captivity. In Sheshan, they reopened the seminary where hundreds of priests could study theology. Several female religious orders, primarily engaged in charitable and educational activities, also reappeared. The Holy See worked actively to rebuild its contacts with the Chinese Catholic Church which had some state sanction since they permitted some foreign priests, bishops and cardinals to visit China, The Chinese government also sought some kind of cooperation since members of the official church attended multiple international conferences abroad. This policy was motivated by a Chinese government policy to paint a positive picture of the state of freedom of religion in China for the international community. (Chu 2014/b, 150–151, Petruska 2018, 169–176) Nevertheless, this post-1976 period was marked by frequent, and often unpredictable turns in China’s church policy, general uncertainty, and several misunderstood Church declarations. In 1979 the Religious Office of China was reorganized. The Patriotic Catholic Association set up its own “Episcopal Conference,” which never received Rome’s assent. People do not talk much about this organization and instead focus on the bishops of the Chinese Church. This is partly understandable because the Episcopal Conference is elativelyr recent innovation within the Catholic Church and these bodies are purely ecclesiastical in nature. Although these conferences possess real ecclesiastical authority, yet its role is secondary to a diocesan bishop. (Zhu 2017, 6) However, we have to briefly clarify the position of this institution in canon law. The regulations of the Chinese “Episcopal Conference” declare that the Conference is in unity with the Holy See in the field of Roman Catholic doctrine and dogmatics. (Zhu 2017, 6) This unilateral declaration may be relevant in the theological relationship between the Chinese Catholic Church and the Universal Church, but this not relevant in canon law. The “Episcopal Conference” exists without the approval of the Holy See. It is not a conference which is governed by Church law (canons 447–459, canons hereinafter referred to as “C.”), established by the Holy See (c. 449), and have a revised statute (c. 450). Also, some of its members, mainly those who have been appointed by state authorities, could not become members of such a conference under current Church law (C. 450). Furthermore, the Chinese Episcopal Conference also does not perform one of the most important public and private legal function of other Episcopal Conferences protecting the interests of the Church against the state.

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(Erdő 2006, 169–176) In a pastoral letter to the Chinese Church, Benedict XVI confirmed that the Episcopal Conference must not be under state control in the fields of faith and morals (fides et mores) and sacramental life. (Benedict XVI, 2007, 8) This letter confirms that the Chinese “Episcopal Conference” cannot be recognized as a real Conference of Bishops because its members include some bishops who are not in communion with the College of Bishops and the Chinese “Episcopal Conference” contain some rules in their regulations which are incompatible with Catholic teaching. (Benedict XVI, 2007, 8) Although the bishops were recognized by the Holy See with a bilateral agreement, however, this decision did not change the canonical status of the “Conference” since they have not changed their regulations. In the eighties, the situation was aggravated by the publication of several studies in the journal of the official Church which openly criticised the Holy See. After the appearance of these articles, the Vatican believed that the Catholic Christian community is being kept separated from the Holy See. Later we found out that the studies were untrue and did not reflect the views of the representatives of the Church. The development of a more sophisticated Holy See policy towards China was hindered by the fact that they had obtained information about China from representatives of the underground Church, who tried to highlight the suffering and ordeals of their community. On the other hand, the official Church could not communicate with the Holy See for a long time. (Heyndrickx 2017, 470) In the eighties, it seemed that the Holy See’s highest leadership, including Pope John Paul II, could not decide on a policy towards the Catholic Church in China, which was also acceptable for the Chinese state. (Heyndrickx 2017, 470) Clarifying this relationship was vital for the Church in Church. The canonical problems are also complex which is also true if we want negotiations with a community that, according to the Catholic Church either “has been cut off from the body because they did not recognise the Pope’s primacy,” (Erdő, 2003, 942) or although the community recognizes the primacy of the Pope yet it suffers from omes internal division. The latter situation was typical in communist countries, just remember the case of Hungary’s peace priesthood movement. Schism is an attack against the basic hierarchical structure of the Church. Under the Church’s legal system, this is treated as a crime against the unity of religion and the Church. (c. 1364) Disobedience to the Pope of Rome, which is a basis for schism, can take many forms. In the case of the Chinese Church, this typically involved the ordination of a bishop without a valid papal mandate. (De Paolis – Cito 2008, 296) However, a community can only be regarded as schismatic if it meets the basic prerequisites of canonical criminal law: sufficient use of intelligence (11 can.; 1322 can.; 1323 can. 1°),on-compulsion, n freedom of the human will (1323–1326 can.). The canonical literature and, as ew will see, the Holy See also classified the action of those bishops who participated in unauthorized bishop ordinations an attempt to protect either their

238 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA own lives or to defend their communities from persecution. This situation is uiteq different from the cases of those, predominantly Western European, bishops who also ordained bishops without papal authorisation where such compulsions were not present. (De Paolis – Cito, 2008, 296)2 As far as the Chinese state-recognized community is concerned, there the Holy See has never issued a formal declaration which would have stated that the Chinese (official) Catholic Church, led by bishops who were without a papal appointment, would be a schismatic community. Furthermore, one may reach the same conclusion as Cardinal Secretary of State Pietro Parolin. He said that after the 2018 partial agreement that there were not two Churches in China but instead we should talk about two communities of believers. (Magyar Kurír 2018) However, this has not always been the clear policy of the Holy See. Pius XII’s statements on the People’s Republic of China fit his general negative stance against communism. (Pius XII, 1952; 1954) He could not imagine any dialogue with the communists and condemned the “patriotic” movements in Communist countries. In his encyclical of Ad apostolorum principis, dated 29 June 1958, he generally states that bishop ordinations without a papal permit are invalid and such acts can be punished with excommunication by the Holy See. Criminal responsibility includes those who take part in this ordination and recipients of ordination themselves. However, the Pope did not specifically name anyone as guilty in this canonical crime. At the outset of the papacy of John XXIII, the Pope made a strong statement and described the situation in China as a schism. (John XXIII, 1958; 1959) Later, since he did not want to worsen the already tense situation, he spoke more circumspectly. The Pope also wanted to invite the bishops of the People’s Republic of China to the Second Vatican Council. This did not happen bishops who had previously left the country or had been expelled did attend the council. Despite every papal gesture, in 1962 the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association declared its full independence from Rome. In 1966, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, which included a total ban on religious and worship activities, the closure of places of worship, and the persecution of the entire Catholic Church. (Lombardi 2018, 12; Forgács 2017) Paul VI (1963–1978) adopted the dialogue-based policy of the Second Vatican Council. From some of its administrative measures, it seems that he did not classify the official Chinese Church as a schismatic community. This seems to be supported by the special document issued to the Chinese clergy and the faithful by the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples on 27 June 1978. The introduction of the document does not say anything about which “authority” is the addressee of this the mandate. Instead, it simply states that this

2 The best examples are the Bishop ordinations by Archbishop Lefebvre of France, where there was no external coercion from the state, and the schism occurred due to theological reasons.

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Holy See regulation gives special authority to any priest and believer who “live in difficult circumstances.” (Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, 1978) Essentially, the document granted the priests concessions in form and substance, in the celebration of the Eucharist, the material of the Eucharist, service of the sacrament of remission. Most importantly, however, the document also provided an opportunity for bishops to ordain priests who do not have the necessary theological qualifications orf ordination. Because of their special situation, they could be ordained if the devotee understands Catholic teaching and lived in priestly celibacy. Significantly, the text adds that the bishop may ordain anyone who is “faithful to Peter’s successor”. It cannot be inferred from this source that the priests of the official Catholic Church were not faithful to Peter ‘s successor. The supposition that the Holy See did not consider the “official Church” as a schismatic church is supported when the pope granted a special permit to Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding. Paul VI’s decision was only issued to facilitate the release of priests for ordination. However, when Bishop Fan Xueyan ordained three bishops without the Holy See’s permission, he cited the “difficult situation” part from his mandate as the rationale behind his decision. From a formal point of view, he committed the same violation of ecclesiastical law when the Patriotic Catholic Association ordains a bishop without the required papal recognition. In his letter to the Holy See, Bishop Fan Xueyan explained that he had carried out “illegal” bishop ordinations, because of the “plight of the Chinese Church.” Furthermore, he expressed that the consecration of these three bishops was beneficial for the community, and finally he was ready to face the canonical consequences of his action. Not only did John Paul II not condemn Bishop Fan Xueyan, but he also authorized him to appoint additional bishops without the prior Holy See consent, if he felt that such step was required. However, under the authority of John Paul II, not only Bishop Fan Xueyan but other older bishops, who were appointed by Pius XII, also carried out further “secret” bishop ordinations. Some of these ordained bishops then joined the state-recognized church. Later, John Paul II essentially extended the authority originally granted to one bishop to another “underground” bishop, and what is even more important, to one of the bishops of the state-recognized church as well, these bishops were appointed by Pius XII between 1949 and 1955. According to the declaration, the bishops who were ordained by these bishops were automatically recognized by the Holy See. This was equally important for the “underground” “official”urches Ch since now they had a number legally ordained bishops who were in full communion with the Pope of Rome. The declaration was also quite important theoretically since it made it crystal clear that according to John Paul II there was only a single Catholic Church in China and that the state-supported Church was also a part of the universal church. The difficulty was that some bishops of the official Church were ordained in secret, while other bishops ordination

240 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA was done in public ceremonies. In some cases, it was not certain if every formal and material condition of a bishop’s ordination was met. The official state-recognized community’s problems increased when hopBis Fan was released from his imprisonment in 1987, after five years’ imprisonment for “dealing with a oreignf country, reporting to the Vatican.” When he was free again he issued the declaration which became known as Bishop Fan Xueyan’s Thirteen Points. This document had an immense influence on the Catholic Church in China. The bishop’s thirteen points warned the faithful not to attend the Holy Masses of the official Church or to receiveMost Holy Eucharist. He said that those who attend a holy mass of the official Church commit a rtalmo sin. At the initiative of Bishop Fan, the underground church set up their own conference of bishops and he was elected as this body’s first president. These bishops and priests started toescribe d the other Catholic communities as schismatic. (Clarke 2018) According to some authors, this decision worsened the relationship between the two Catholic communities, confused the faithful and disregarded the specific circumstances of the People’s Republic of China. (Heyndrickx 2017, 470–475, Padányi 2019) A special envoy of Holy See issued an eight-point document on 25 August 1986 have tried to clarify the situation in China. The document was written after lengthy Vatican activity on China included the rejected two earlier drafts. (Heyndrickx 2017, 475) The document was also forwarded ot the representatives of the underground Church. (Leung, Liu 2004, 153) Although the “eight points” were born in the spirit of future reconciliation, the document did not fully clarify the relationship between the two Catholic communities in China. What is extremely important canonically in this document is that it confirms the principle that every canonically valid bishop belongs to the Catholic Church. It also states that the Holy See does not want to punish those who have cooperated with the communist state power, but it does not want to forget those who have suffered for the Catholic faith. In his letter of 27 May 2007, Benedict XVI painted a realistic picture of the relationship between the Catholic Church in China and the Universal Church. In the letter, which was written in the spirit of dialogue, unity, and generosity, the Pope made it clear that a Catholic Church, which independent from Rome is incompatible with Catholic teaching and tradition. (Benedict XVI, 2007, 8) The document also lays down some basic principles for about the sacraments and especially the Eucharist. For example, it permitted that state-appointed priests and bishops can concelebrate with bishops and priests who were in communion with the Pope of Rome. The letter also encourages believers to attend Holy Masses and liturgical events conducted by bishops and priests who, besides being publicly recognized, were also in communion with Peter’s successor. Finally, the letter deals with liturgical events performed by bishops who are not in communion with the Pope. The document reiterates

241 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA the theological principle that these Chinese bishops have valid ordinations. But their actions are unlawful since they are not in communion with the College of bishops and head of the college. Nevertheless, if the faithful can not attend services performed by clerics who are full communion with Rome without serious inconveniences they can also receive sacraments from only state-recognized clerics as well. (Benedict XVI, 2007, 10) Benedict XVI revoked every privilege which the bishops of the Chinese Church received from Paul VI and John Paul II. The Pope reasoned that the situation in China has changed significantly and the circumstances which justified the special mandates no longer applied and Pope Benedict’s ewn policy was to promote full unity. (Benedict XVI. 2007 18.) Although the Pope’s letter, like the 2018 agreement, has been heavily criticised in Church circles (Lam 2009), Benedict XVI has taken this step to create a clear situation both inside and outside the church. (Fazzini 2007, 40) In 2007, Benedict XVI decided to set up an inter-dicastery committee to study the situation of the Chinese Catholic Church.

General principles for the appointment and ordination of bishops for the Church and the State

The Second Vatican Council and subsequent Church legislation favour the free appointment of bishops. According to this policy, the ecclesiastical authority ought to select and appoints a person who is suitable for the Episcopal Chair, without any external state interference. (377 can., 1. §; Ujházi 2012, 715) The council opposed those state prerogatives which have developed throughout history, in certain cases with the full knowledge and consent of the Holy See. However, under the new era, “secular authorities no longer have any right or privilege in the election, appointment, presentation or appointment of bishops.” (377 can. 5. §) The prerogatives granted to the state authority before the Second Vatican Council were, in some respects, understandable and acceptable. In many countries, bishops held government and public offices or they were also members of legislative bodies. Thus, the state had a legitimate claim to be involved in the appointment of those ecclesiastical dignitaries who also influenced state affairs. At the same time, the Council and subsequent legislation also addressed the issue of the participation of clerics in politics. The new laws prohibit the participation of clerics, i.e. bishops, priests and deacons, in political and governmental activities. (285, can. 3. §; 287 can. 2. §) For this reason, since the mission of clerics is a non-political pastoral vocation. (LG 20; 375 can.), the Church demands that appointment of bishops should be free from any state intervention. John Paul II also highlighted the exclusively pastoral character of the bishop’s office, when he explained why he appointed

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Dominic Deng Yiming as the Archbishop of Guangzhou in 1999, without consulting the Chinese state authorities. And this principle was emphasized once again in Benedict XVI’s a letter to Chinese Catholics. (Benedict XVI, 2007, 7) However, it is not inconceivable that state authorities can be involved in the process of appointing a bishop. Current canon law allows the Holy See to grant derogations from its regulations in (3 can.). These differences can not involve issues of natural law, nor any fundamental theological or dogmatic truths, but only certain aspects of canonical and legal preferences. Thus, if the pastoral interest of the Church so requires, the Holy See may sign a bilateral agreement with a State which departs from the traditional order of the bishop’s appointment. In essence, this is what has happened in former socialist countries. The motivation behind this rule is that the continued presence of Church in a country and the pastoral needs of the believers is more important than the regulations of canon law. To achieve these goals the Holy See granted the Communist Parties of the rights of nomination, veto, or consultation. Also, there are some Church offices where either the nature of the position or national security considerations may justify consultation with the state authorities. One such office is the leader of a military ordinariate who is responsible for the pastoral care of the member of the armed forces. (Ujházi 2016, 388–401) People frequently compare the China - Vatican deal to the bilateral agreement between Vietnam and the Holy See. This agreement defers from the regulations of current canon law in the following areas: 1. The state presents a list of its candidates to the Holy See. 2. The Holy See selects one of the candidates from the list. 3. The Vietnamese government accepts the Holy See’s choice. 4. The Pope appoints eth bishop. Since the Holy See has not published the text of the agreement with China we can only speculate about the details of the agreement and powers of the Holy See and Chinese state authorities. This can only be inferred from later practice. (Cardinale 2018)

Specific elements which influence the appointment of Chinese bishops

According to Rachel Xiaohong Zhu, the appointment of bishops is primarily a political issue for the People’s Republic of China which is closely connected to the sovereignty of the country. While for the Holy See it is a predominantly religious issue connected to the universality and unity of the Church and the primacy of Peter. (Zhu 2017, 4–5) So the appointment of bishops is not just religious matter, but it is also social and thus a political issue. This theory is supported by those historical difficulties, like the investiture struggle, apostolic

243 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA royal privileges or the Vatican’s Ostpolitik etc, which were about the appointments of the bishop: When we talk about China, we must not forget that both the Christian missions and the Catholic Church in China had been led by Europeans. As a result, a large number of Chinese disliked Christianity and the Catholic Church. These people described the Catholics as a religious community which threatens the country’s sovereignty and promotes China’s colonization. After the First Opium War (1839–1842) when the Catholic mission in China was led by the French, the influence of France over the Catholic Church in China became even stronger after the Second Opium War (1856-1860). The Holy See understood the problem which became clear under the papacy of Leo XIII’s cautious Chinese policy as well, when he did not call for the upgrading of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This was due partially to French opposition and partially because the local Church hierarchy, which was still weak, was all afraid that such a decision would only create more difficulties for the Chinese mission. (Lombardi 2018, 7–8) The anti-Christians sentiment was most pronouncedduring the Boxing Rebellion (1900–1901). Then the struggle against the rising influence of European powers in China led to the outbreak of anti-Christian violence. According to some authors, approximately thirty thousand Catholics were murdered in this period. (Lombardi 2018, 7–8)These events made it clear that that operatingthe Catholic Church in China as a European protectorate hurts the interest of the whole operation. (La Civilta Cattolica 1904, 257–276) So the Holy See wanted to resolve this situation by giving the Catholic Church in China a complete Chinese hierarchy, which was one of the objectives of the Catholic Church in other mission areas anyway. Under Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) and Pius XI (1922–1939), this approach dominated the missionary activities of the Catholic Church in the region. Benedict XV’s encyclicals, like Maximum Illud (30th November 1919), which is the magna carta of Missionary Reform, has largely grown out of experiences in China. (Lombardi 2018, 9) Pius XI also tried to create an ethnically Chinese hierarchy within the Catholic Church in China. He wanted the mission to succeed and hoped that Chinese society will appreciate the Catholic Church as well. His encyclicals on missionary activity in China, like Rerum ecclesiae (28 February 1926) and Ab ispis Pontificatus (15 June 1926), also support this theory. So they organised the Shanghai Synod in 1924 which was chaired by the Celso Costantini, the Apostolic Delegate to China who was appointed in 1922.3 Subsequently, the Pope personally ordained the first six Chinese bishops in Rome on the Feast of Christ the King. (Clarke 2018) Pius XI also continued the policy of developing the Catholic Church in China without any Western protection since

3 His significance is signalled by his Ministry as Secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith between 1935 and 1955. (Lombardi 2018, 9)

244 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA the Chinese mission was a matter between two parties: the Catholic Church and China. They placed a greater emphasis on inculturation, which is considering local customs and culture while conducting missionary activities. The following major step was for Chinese Catholics and the government of the Church in China when, at the first Consistory after World War II, Pius XII appointed the first-ever Chinese cardinal, Thomas Tien Ken-sin. By 1946, we had a complete Catholic Church organization in China consisting of 20 archdioceses, 85 dioceses and 34 apostolic prefectures. (Annuario Pontificio, 1946) Between 1949 and 1955 the appointed ethically Chinese bishops - to fill vacant diocese. (Zhu 2017, 3) The efforts ofe th popes and every other gesture to build up a Chinese hierarchy seems to have been too late. Furthermore, the charge, that the Holy See acts as a foreign power which interferes in the domestic affairs of a sovereign China, has become a key element in the propaganda of communist China. The Constitution of the People’s Republic declared that religious communities and religious affairs must not be under the control of any foreign state while ensuring freedom of religion. The People’s Republic of China has consistently viewed the Vatican as another European state and not as a moral authority and leadership of the religious community. (Chu 2014/b, 148) They could not imagine Catholic believers being loyal to the Chinese state power and the Holy See at the same time. To counter this view Popes John Paul II, Benedict XVI Pope Francis warned Chinese Catholics to be good citizens of the state in several of their declarations on China,. The first two “unlawful” ordinations, at least in terms of ecclesiastical law, took place on 13 April 1958. By 1962, twenty more bishops were selected and ordained without the permission of the Holy See. Pope Pius XII made an important statement regarding the canonical evaluation of this situation in his encyclical of Ad Apostolorum Principis, dated 29 June 1958: Although non-papal ordinations are not permitted and unlawful yet they are still valid. (Pius XII, 1958) The condition for the theological and canonical validity of admission to the sacred order is low. If the ordination is performed by a validly ordained bishop and the service includes a prayer of ordination and the impositio manus, then the ordination of a baptized man, who is not under any irresistible compulsion and is mentally sound, is valid, even if the papal appointment is missing. (Ujházi 2008, 200–205) It is Chinese state practice to appoint suitable people to Church offices. The future bishops are selected by the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which was founded in 1957 as a political organization within the Church. However, their ordination is done by bishops who have already been ordained. Thus, neither current canon law nor legal tradition has any reason to question that, from the sacramental point of view, the ordination of Chinese bishops might be invalid. This fact was confirmed by Pope Benedict XVI in his pastoral letter to the Chinese Church. (Benedict XVI 2007 8) However, over the years a confusing situation has developed because some bishops are

245 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA only recognized by the Chinese state authorities, others only by the Holy See and the third group by both sides. (Clarke 2018) Furthermore, ordaining a bishop without a papal mandate, even if the ordination itself is valid, is a crime under ecclesiastical law. (1382 can.) Most of the conscientious ordinations were done before the Act became effective (27 November 1983). Therefore, when examining the ordinations which happened before 1983 we have to rely on the 1917 Code of Canon Law, and those pieces of legislation which governed the legality of consecration that was in force at the time of the ordination. (1917 CIC, 2370 can., Holy Office 1951, Doctrinal Congregation 1976, 1983) Unauthorized ordinations which happened after 1983 will be subject to the provisions of the new CIC. (King 1989, 69–94) The main legal punishment for a papally unsanctioned bishop ordination is self-excommunication. (1382 can.) Excommunication belongs to a major group of canonical penalties, which we call “censures.” (1331 can.) The main purpose of “censure,” or medicinal penalties, is to convince the sinner to cease his unlawful conduct, repair the damage, and atone with the Church. Therefore, “censure” can only be imposed for an indefinite period, until such conditions are met. (Innocent III. X, V 40, 20) The 1983 Code of Canon Law (1331–1333 can.) significantly simplified the old legislation when it only presents the legal consequences of censure. (Bernal, 2004, 348–324) The most obvious implication of excommunication is that the perpetrator is separated from the community. (Calabrese 2006, 108) However, the current law has retained, the division of excommunication into various categories. That excommunication can either be self-effective, latae sententiae, or maybe ex-post, ferendae sententiae. The 1983 Act lists six serious cases of self-excommunication in connection with unauthorized bishop ordination. In the case of self-excommunication, excommunication takes effect when the crime is committed. However, the full effect of the penalty only becomes public when a competent authority confirms the existence of the offence and declares the excommunication of the sinner. (1314 can.) Accordingly, the Code describes the legal consequences of a crime when excommunication has not been announced (1331 can. 1§), and also when such a declaration has been made. (1331 can. 1§) Regarding the general canonical status of persons who have ordained someone, or have been ordained without a papal appointment can not take part in the Eucharistic sacrifice and other worship services. This is their legal status irrespective whether they have been declared excommunicated or not. They can not receive the sacraments, administer any sacraments or sacramentals. They are also excluded from ”active” participation, e.g., mass celebration, reading, sacrifice, etc. (Communicationes 1977, 148) in the Mass. Furthermore, excommunicated people can not exercise any ecclesiastical office (145 can.), service, or government activity. The major difference between the revealed and unrevealed excommunication is illustrated in Canon 1331. One canon (1331 can. 1§)

246 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA uses the term “forbidden”. By doing so, the legislator indicates that canonical acts of the excommunicated are prohibited but not invalid per se. (De Paolis - Cito 2008, 201) Article 2 of the same contains a more strictly worded regulation about excommunication which applies is declared or severe cases of the crime: “he shall not be permitted to perform any liturgical event, and such liturgical events shall be interrupted.” There may be some difficulties in putting this law into practice. Thus, this formula of this canon is there to express the intent of the legislators. The excommunicated person cannot take part in church governance and his decisions are invalid. He is also banned from using any of their Church licenses, privileges, obtaining any valid office or other positions in the Church, and from receiving any income and remuneration which he was previously entitled to. The vast majority of Chinese bishops, who were ordained and canonized without a papal appointment, have not been formally excommunicated which was due to the particular historical and political situation of China. This is contrary to the situation of European bishops who carried out unauthorized bishop ordinations due to their theological convictions. The Chinese bishops underwent different treatment (Calabrese 2004, 513) because if the Holy See had attempted to fully enforce the relevant canonical sanctions, it would have worsened the situation of Catholics in China. (Calabrese 2006, 108) Furthermore, most bishops who have been ordained without papal appointment have tried to legalize their position with the Holy See. According to current Church discipline, “Remission of a censure cannot be granted unless the offender has withdrawn from contumacy.“ (1358 can.) This means that he has to truly regret their actions and sufficiently corrected the scandal, or at least promised to do so. (1347 can. 2§; Thériault 2004, 813–814; Chalmers 2004, 111–154; Hendriks 2003, 447) Again, the peculiar situation of China cannot be overlooked. If a bishop wants to repair the damage, his freedom of action is limited by authorities. The Holy See has been quite flexible towards every bishop who approached the Holy See order to legalize his position. Rome assumed that they wanted to be atoned to the leadership of the Universal Church. In 1979, when the first ordination of bishops happened following the Cultural evolution,R of course without a papal appointment, the Holy See did not declare this event as a crime. (Lam 1997, 56) Given the particulars of China, this remained the standard practice of the Holy See later on as well. Indeed, proclaiming the excommunication of certain bishops had had more disadvantages than advantages. In 2011, after the ordination of Lei Shiyin, the Bishop of Leshan, without a papal appointment, the Holy See officially declared, for the first time ever, that the bishop self-excommunicated himself because of his ordination happened without a papal appointment. The Holy See Declaration (4 July 2011) was based on the Communiqué of the Pontifitial Council for Legislative Text which was issued on 6 June 2011. (L’Osservatore Romano 2011) The Holy See explained that they acted to create clarity amongst Catholic believers about the identity of their bishop. Furthermore, the

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Holy See might have acted because it had serious reservations about Bishop Lei Shiyin who was an unsuitable person for ordination as a bishop. According to unofficial sources, the wording of the declaration might mean that the bishop could not fulfil his obligations of priestly celibacy. Veik( 2011) This seems to be supported by the fact that in the case of other ordained bishops and Declaration merely stated that “their actions have imposed severe sanctions on them.” (L’Osservatore Romano 2011) After the Holy See’s declaration, the Chinese authorities labelled the excommunication as a medieval holdover. Other consequences of Chinese displeasure were also clear. Priests with valid visas were denied entry and suddenly the Church was subject to more stringent controls than before. (Chu 2014/b, 160) The flexibility of canon law is illustrated by the fact that, despite the possible valid moral concerns, Bishop Lei Shiyin was amongst the first bishops whose sentences were waived by Pope Francis after the signature of the bilateral agreement and later he also confirmed Bishop Lei in his office. As far as the Chinese Catholic Church is concerned, we must not forget that, from a disciplinary point of view at least, excommunication does not mean that the he has to lose every link with the Church. An excommunicated person may still maintain unity with the creed, the sacraments, and the holy shepherds, and with the whole community with the Church. (209 can.; Marzoa 1992) Chinese bishops have indicated on many forums that they are in communion with the Pope of Rome and the Universal Church in terms of creed and Church discipline. They use Holy See approved translations of the liturgical books and the Bible. In other fields, the Holy See has not been consistent in applying ecclesiastical behavioural standards to Chinese bishops. In 1983, the Holy See confirmed the validity of its 1976 memorandum which stated that even if the Church accepted the validity of a disputed ordination, it would not accept a change to to an individuals Church status. His status, even if his punishment is abolished, remains the same as it was before the Episcopal ordination. A person whose ordination as a bishop is valid but not lawful can not hold a bishopric, even if he later repents, repairs, and reconciles with the Church he can not exercise the sacred powers of a bishop. This includes participation in liturgical activities, wearing Episcopal badges but he can participate in religious events according to his pre-ordination church status. (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1976, 1983) However, none of the Chinese bishops whose ordination was unauthorized was forced to return to their previous status after the removal of their canonical punishment. Instead, these bishops received direct or indirect confirmation from Rome. For example, in the last period of John Paul II’s papacy, the Pope had a dialogue with about forty “irregularly” ordained bishops, yet the issue of returning them into their original status was not even discussed. The Holy

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See recognized the validity and permissibility of such ecclesiastical activities to improve the unity of the Church and the work of dioceses in China. In his pastoral letter on 27 May 2007, Benedict XVI clarified this issue by arguing that every Chinese bishop has valid ordinations because of apostolic succession. Some bishops had already received either a papal approval or appointment. Others have sought recognition from the Holy See after their state appointment and unauthorized ordination as a bishop. Given the particular political situation in China, they were also given the legal mission to carry out a pastoral mission, sanctifying, teaching and governing the dioceses. The pastoral letter notes the fact that unfortunately, in most cases neither priests nor believers were aware that bishops needed a papal appointment before their ordination. Interestingly the bishops who possess papal recognition do not highlight this fact. It is understandable, therefore, that for some, conscientious cooperation with such bishops is an important matter of conscience. Finally, the papal letter alluded that there were a very small number of irregularly ordained bishops who did not seek the Holy See’s approval of. According to researchers this number never exceeded ten under the papacies of Benedict XVI and Francis. (Chu 2014/b, 161) The letter confirms that those pastors who were ordained bishops by a validly ordained bishop and were formally and materially suitable for the office could perform their duties as bishops in a valid but not legitimate way because they do not belong to the Episcopal College. Therefore, Benedict XVI urged them to seek recognition from the Holy See so they can be in full unity with the Catholic Church. (Benedict XVI 2007 8) When someone is ordained without a papal appointment, his excommunication is reserved for the Holy See which is entitled to either enforce or remit the penalty. Since the crime affects the unity of faith these issues fall under the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. (John Paul II 1988, 892) Occasionally, the Pope entrusted another dicastery, usually the Congregation of Bishops, with the process. In the rare cases when the crime happens in secret and therefore cannot be proven in an external forum, the person or his confessor may turn to the Apostolic Penitentiary for the remission of the sentence by concealing perpetrator’s name. However, these ordinations are almost unheard of in the Catholic Church in China, where most ordinations are done publicly. When the Roman Pope himself, under his supreme, full, direct, universal, and ordinary authority (331 can.), remits a crime than he also removes every segment of canonical punishment. He can do this even if the requirements for abolishing the canon’s punishment are not met. In self-proclaimed or undeclared excommunications, even if the perpetrator himself has not taken any steps to lift his excommunication, like

249 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA repentance, and adequately repairing the damage and scandal he may have caused, because the Pope of Rome as the supreme ecclesiastical authority may release their penalty too. In the People’s Republic of China, the situation of the Catholic Church is not yet ideal from a Church governance aspect. Pope Francis turned to bishops who were ordained without papal appointment and authorization and with prophetic confidence. As the possessor of the supreme ecclesiastical authority, he relieved their canonical punishment, and disregarding legal regulations, which require illegally ordained bishops to return to their original status within the Church, they were confirmed as bishops by the Pope. The partial agreement in 2018 has been criticized, but as a result of this deal, every Chinese bishop and priest is now in communion with the Pope of Rome and the Universal Church. This means that Pope Francis put an end to an often opaque situation. According to a purely law-positivist approach, this means that Canon Law is applied inconsistently. However, if we examine the deeper contexts and objectives of Canon Law, which considers the salvation of souls as it most important goal (1752 can.), a more flexible application or the non-application of certain legal regulation pint towards a deeper coherence.

Significance of the new partial agreement

Both the People’s Republic of China and the Holy See have a long-term interest in consolidating their relationship. It is not in the interest of either party to maintain an unsolved conflict. The Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association was created in a specific historical period, but the circumstances have changed a ot.l (Parolin 2018) The world’s most populous state, with an increasing number of Catholics, currently 12 million, can not ignore that the Catholic Church and the Holy See are the Sovereign entities under international law. The current agreement was prepared by long negotiations between the Holy See, the Chinese state and the leadership of the Catholic Church in China. Every pope in the second half of the twentieth century, without exception, made continuous efforts to improve Chinese – Vatican relations. Unfortunately, these efforts were not fruitful. Pope Francis’s spoke many times about his sincere respect for and appreciation of the Chinese people and culture. (Spadaro 2019) On his trip to South Korea in 2014, he sent President Xi Jinping good wishes when his plane entered Chinese airspace. He sent a similar message on his return trip too. Then, on 18 January 2015, when he travelled to the Philippines, he repeated this gesture. It was also symbolic that when Pope Francis

250 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA returned from the United States on 17 September 2015, he expressed his appreciation for Chinese people. He expressed his willingness to travel to China and would welcome a balanced relationship between the two parties. (Sapadro 2018) In 2017, when Pope Francis was returning home from Myanmar and Bangladesh, he talked about China’s role in the international arena and Southeast Asia. He stated that the countries he visited, as well as Laos and Cambodia, which surround China, should strive to establish good relations with China. China as a world power, the Pope said, can make a major contribution to change the circumstances in the region. One cannot imagine world peace without the involvement of China. The Holy See has been conducting formal negotiations with the People’s Republic of China since 1986 However, the 2018 partial agreement was the first concrete agreement between the two parties. By the agreement, the Holy See sought to improve the relationship between the Holy See and the state and Chinese Catholic communities. (Clarke 2018) The agreement was signed by Msgr. Antoine Camilleri, Under-Secretary for the Holy See’s Relations with States, Wang Chao Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. The agreement is “temporary” and deals only with the issue of the appointment of a bishop. The Holy See only issued a brief general communiqué about the circumstances and content of the agreement. (Segatti 2018) They hope that they can improve diplomatic relations between the two parties and they can resolve issues of mutual interest through dialogue in the future. However, the 2018 agreement, as confirmed by the Holy See in various forums, was signed to achieve an important pastoral goal. For example Beijing and Rome still they disagree about Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China has so far expressed two constant requirements towards the Holy See if the Holy See wanted to have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Firstly, the Holy See had to terminate its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Secondly, they have to recognize the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China. Thus, it is a great achievement by the Holy See that they could craft a partial agreement while the issue of Taiwan is still unresolved. Indeed, the first aspect mentioned above was always important for the Chinese side when the conflict between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China intensified. meSo authors note the unfair condition China expects from the Holy See about Taiwan. In the case of other countries, China was not disturbed that the other party had established diplomatic relations with Taiwan as well. (Criveller 2005) Moreover, when there was a somewhat “more consolidated” relationship between Taiwan and the People’s Republic, China did not demand so vehemently from the Holy See to end diplomatic relations. Besides, Vatican spokesman Greg Burke confirmed during a papal visit to Vilnius: “The objective of the accord isot n political but pastoral.” Thus, the Catholic Church can have bishops who are in common with the Universal Church and are recognized by

251 CANONICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APOSTOLIC HOLY SEE AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA the Chinese state authorities. However, the authors who point out that the agreement is called “pastoral” are right to say that the agreement does have political implications, given that it was concluded with a party with whom the Holy See has not had official diplomatic relations since 1951. (Clarke 18)20 One of the consequences of the agreement is that the Pope recognized thoseseven bishops who were selected and ordained without papal appointment by Beijing. Thus, at present, every bishop and priest within the Chinese Catholic Church is in communion with the Universal Catholic Church. They shall carry out their duties and pastoral duties legally. The 2018 agreement did not discuss how the Chinese authorities shall treat the priests and bishops of the Church. Immediately after the agreement, the leadership of the “official” Chinese Catholic Church assured the Chinese Communist Party of its loyalty. (Jourdan 2018) Under Chinese law, every bishop and priest have to formally register with the Chinese authorities. (Magyar Kurír 2019) Given that in some regions of the country priests have to sign registration documents which overemphasize the autonomy of the Chinese Church, which is problematic for many bishops and priests. This approach is, fo course, incompatible with the teaching of the Catholic Church. To clarify the issue, on June 6, 2019, the Holy See issued new pastoral guidelines to Chinese priests. (Vatican Press 2019) In these guidelines, the freedom of conscience is an extremely important element for the Holy See. No one can be forced to take any action which he does not want to take. The problem is not new anyway. Pope Benedict XVI has delegated the decision about the autonomy of the Chinese Church to the local bishops, given that they possess much more information about local circumstances and they better understood the consequences of any action. More specifically, the new pastoral directive proposes that bishops should ask state authorities the add a supplement to the oaths which states that the independence and autonomy of the local churches can only be understood in the light of Catholic teaching. Independence means political, administrative and pastoral autonomy, as it is the case in the rest of the world. The document recommends a flexible approach by offering an alternative if theuthorities a are unwilling to attach such a supplement to the registration documents. In this case, the bishop or the priest can verbally declare that he believes in the content of the supplement. He should make this pledge, if possible, in the presence of witnesses. The directive also requires priests to report to their ordinaries the content of their registration. (Vatican Press 2019) It is also clear from the statement that the Holy See is seeking a broader agreement with the state authorities about a long-term balanced relationship.

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Summary

The relationship between the Apostolic See and the People’s Republic of China is peculiar, and if you want to understand it it is not enough to be familiar with the history of China under communist rule. If we understand the history of the Catholic Church in China than we will understand why the Chinese state authorities the Vatican as a European country and not as a religious authority. The relationship between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China is not tatics but the last few years have seen a marked improvement. Both John Paul II and Benedict XVI did much in this field. Their efforts and opennessve ha prepared the ground for the partial agreement about the appointment of bishops which was signed in 2018. Although many people have criticized the agreement, one thing is certain: every Chinese bishop and priest is now in communion with Rome. This compromise is important because it ended the extremely opaque and uncertain situation of the Catholic Church in China. Since the text of the agreement has not been made public, we can only speculate how well the procedures which regulate the appointment bishops will work in practice. Pope Francis himself emphasized that the agreement is just a stepping stone towards greater unity and better understanding. There are still many difficulties in China because the compulsory state registration of priests and bishops causes many isssued of conscience for many. The Holy See is aware of these issues, which is indicated by its pastoral guidance for pastors in 2019.

Literature

XII. Pius (1952): Enc. Cupimus imprimis. 1952. I. 18. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 45. évf., 505. XII. Pius (1954): Enc. Ad sinarium gentem. 1954. X. 7. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 47. évf., 9. sz. 153. XII. Pius (1958): Enc. Ad apostolorum principis. Acta Apostolicae Sedis,51. évf. 601. XXIII. János (1958): Konzisztórium. 1958. XII. 15. XXIII. János (1959): Konzisztórium. 1959. I. 15. XXIII. János (1959): Konzisztórium. 1959. V. 17. II. János Pál (1988): Apostoli Konstitúció. Pastor Bonus, 1988.VI.28. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 80. évf. 841– 934.

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Allen, John (2018): Three quick take-aways on the Vatican’s deal with China. https://cruxnow.com/news- analysis/2018/09/22/three-quick-take-aways-on-the-vaticans-deal-with-china/ (web: 14 August 2019). Bernal, Jose (2004): Kommentár az 1331. kánonhoz. In Marzoa, Arias, Miras - Ocana, Rodrigues szerk.: Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Montreal, IV, 348-324. Calabrese, Antonio (2004): Kommentár az 1382. kánonhoz. In Marzoa, Arias, Miras, Ocana, Rodrigues szerk.: Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Montreal, IV/1, 513. Calabrese, Antonio (2006): Diritto penale canonico, Città del Vaticano. Cardinale, Tommaso (2019): Vescovi cinesi e chiesa cattolica. https://www.documentazione.info/vescovi- cinesi-e-chiesa-cattolica (web: 10 August 2019). Chalmers, Margaret (2004): The Remedy of Harm in accord with Canon 128, tudiaS Canonica, 38, 111–154. Chu, Cindy, Yik-Yi (2014): Catholicism in China, 1900-Present: The Development of the Chinese Church. Pallgrave. Clarke, Jeremy (2018): China needs more than Vatican diplomacy. https://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article/ china-needs-more-than-vatican-diplomacy#. (web 10 August 2019). Communicationes, 9 (1977) 148. Criveller, Gianni (2005): Pope John Paul II and China. Tripod Summer 2005 Vol. 25 - No. 137. De Paolis, Velasio – Cito, Davide (2008): Le sanzioni nella Chiesa. Commento al Codice di Diritto Canonico Libri VI. Roma: Urbaniana University Press. Erasmus (2019): China and the Holy SeeA step towards full diplomatic relations between China and the Vatican. https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2018/09/25/a-step-towards-full-diplomatic-relations-between- china-and-the-vatican (web: 29 July 2019). Erdő, Péter (2003): Szakadárság. In Diós István Katolikus Lexikon, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 942. Erdő Péter (2006): A püspöki kar szerepe a modern államban. In. Az élő egyház joga. Budapest: Szent István Társulat. 169–178. Ermis, Segatti: Nomina dei Vescovi, storico accordo fra Cina e Santa Sede. https://www.vocetempo.it/ vaticano-e-cina-accordo-vicino/. (web: 2 August 2019) Fazzini, Gerolamo – Lazzarotto, Angelo (2008): Cattolici in Cina- Una storia di fedeltà le sfide del futuro. Róma, San Paolo Edizioni. Fazzini, Gerolamo (2007): Una nuova stagione per i cristiani in Cina? Frontiere, 6, 39–45 Forgács Balázs (2017): Mao Ce-tung. In. Gőcze István (szerk.): Állam és katona. Budapest, Dialóg Campus. 195–206.

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Hendriks, Jan (2003): Canone 128: Riparazione del danno. Obblighi e responsabilità del Vescovo Diocesano, Ius Ecclesiae, 15, 427–457. Heyndrickx, Jeerom (2017): Updating the China Mission. Guided by Pope Benedict XVI and Pope Francis. In. Hoster Barbara ed.: Rooted in Hope New York. Monumenta Serica Monograph Series. 67/2. 467–480. Hittani Kongregáció (1976): Határozat. 1976. IX. 17, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 68, 623. Hittani Kongregáció (1983): Figyelmeztetés. 1983. III. 12, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 75, 392–393. Horst J. Helle (2017): China: Promise or Threat? In. Max Weber’s View of Religion in China. Leiden, Boston, Brill. 59–70. Incontro attraverso il dialogo. Intervista di Papa Francesco ad «Asia Times». 02 febbraio 2016. http://www. osservatoreromano.va/it/news/incontro-attraverso-il-dialogo. (web: 29 July 2019). Jourdan, Adam (2018): China’s Catholic Church pledges loyalty to Party after Vatican deal. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-pope-china/chinas-catholic-church-pledges-loyalty-to-party-after-vatican-deal- idUSKCN1M30E4. (web: 10 August 2019). King, Geoffrey (1989): The Catholic Church in China: A Canonical Evaluation. The Jurist, 49, 69–94. Lam, Annie (2009): The Church’s problems in China and Cardinal Bertone’s letter. http://www.asianews.it/ news-en/The-Church’s-problems-in-China-and-Cardinal-Bertone%E2%80%99s-letter-16901.html (2019. 08. 14.). Lam, Anthony (1997): The Catholic Church in Present-Day China: Through Darkness and Light. Leuven, Ferdinand Verbiest Foundation és a Hong Kong: Holy Spirit Study Centre. Leung, Beatrice, Liu T. William (2004): The Chinese Catholic Church in Conflict: 1949-2001. Boca Raton. Universal Publishers. Lombardi, Frederico (2018): The History of Relations between the Holy See and China. La Civilta Cattolica. English Edition. 12. 7–16. L’Osservatore Romano (2011): Illegitimate episcopal ordination in the Diocese of Leshan-http://www. osservatoreromano.va/en/news/illegitimate-episcopal-ordination-in-the-diocese-o (web: 26 August 2019) Magyar Kurír (2018): Történelmi egyezményt kötött az Apostoli Szentszék a Kínai Népköztársasággal. ht t ps:// www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/tortenelmi-egyezmenyt-kotott-az-apostoli-szentszek-kinai-nepkoztarsasaggal (web: 29 July 2019). Magyar Kurír (2018/2): Parolin: Kínában nem két egyház, hanem két hívő közösség van. https://www. magyarkurir.hu/hirek/parolin-kinaban-nem-ket-egyhaz-hanem-ket-hivo-kozosseg-van (web: 11 August 2019).

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Magyar Kurír (2019/2): A Szentszék pasztorális irányelvekkel segíti a kínai katolikus papságot. https://www. magyarkurir.hu/kitekinto/a-szentszek-pasztoralis-iranyelvekkel-segiti-kinai-katolikus-papsagot (web: 28 August 2019). Marzoa, Ángel (1992): Comunión y Derecho. Pamplona, Navarra Gráfica Ediciones. Müller, Hubert (1983): Die Ordination. In Listl, Joseph – Müller, Hubert – Schmitz, Heribert szerk.: Handbuch des katholischen Kirchenrechts. Regensburg, Verlag Friedrich Pustet. 721. N. Sz. Pietro Gaspari (1904): Il protettorato cattolico della Francia nell’Oriente e nell Estremo Oriente. La Civilta Cattolica. 4, 257–276 Népek Evangelizációjának Kongregációja (1978): Faculties Granted to the Church in China by the Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples. Prot. N. 3242/78. http://hsstudyc.org.hk/en/tripod_en/en_ tripod_163_03.html (web: 5 August 2019). Padányi, József (2019): Ókori kínai klasszikusok a háborúról. In: Gőcze István szerk.: Keresztény teoretikusok, államférfiak és katonák háborúelméletei. Budapest, Magyarország: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, NKE, 95–107. Parolin, Pietro (2018): Vatican Insider. 2018. febr. 3. Petruska, Ferenc (2018): The Framework of Religious Freedom in the East and in the West. In Kaló József – Ujházi Lóránd ed.: Budapest Report 2018 On Christian Persecution Budapest, Budapest, Dialóg Campus, 169–176. Phil, Pullella (2018): Chinese bishop excommunicated by Vatican takes part in ordination. https://www.reuters. com/article/us-china-vatican/chinese-bishop-excommunicated-by-vatican-takes-part-in-ordination- idUSKBN13Q4PJ (web: 26 August 2019). Sala Stampa del Vaticano: Bollettino: Comunicato circa la firma di un Accordo Provvisorio tra la Santa Sede e la Repubblica Popolare Cinese sulla nomina dei Vescovi. 22.09.2018. http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/ it/bollettino/pubblico/2018/09/22/0673/01468.html#ita (web: 2 August 2019). Spadaro, Antonio (2018): La Chiesa in Cina. Un futuro da scrivere. Roma. Ancora. Spadaro, Antonio (2019): L’accordo tra Cina e Santa Sede. In. La Civiltá Cattolica. 4 Szent Hivatal (1951): Határozat. 1951. IV. 9. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 18, 217-218. Thériault, Michel (2004): Kommentár a 128. kánonhoz. In Marzoa, Ángel – Miras, Jorge – Rodríguez- Ocaña, Rafael – Caparros, Ernest ed.: Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Montreal, IV, Vol., 813–814;

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Ujházi, Lóránd (2008): A szent rend gyakorlásának és felvételének szabálytalanságai és akadályai: irregularitások és impedimentumok. Studia Wesprimiensia, 10, 200–205. Ujházi, Lóránd (2008): A szent rend gyakorlásának és felvételének szabálytalanságai és akadályai: irregularitások és impedimentumok. Studia Wesprimiensia, 10, 200–205. Ujházi, Lóránd (2012): Raccolta e conservazione delle informazioni prima della nomina dei vescovi cattolici. Antonianum. 87, 4, 715–741. Ujházi, Lóránd (2012): Raccolta e conservazione delle informazioni prima della nomina dei vescovi cattolici. Antonianum. 87, 4, 715–741. Ujházi, Lóránd (2016): A katonai ordinárus „tábori püspök” kinevezésére vonatkozó sajátos egyházi és állami előírások. Hadtudományi Szemle. 9, 2, 378–401. Vatican announces deal with China on bishop appointment. The issue has for decades caused tensions between the Holy See and Beijing. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vatican-announces-deal-china- bishop-appointments-n912186. (web: 9 August 2019). Vatican condemns ordination of China bishop. https://catholicnews.sg/index.php?option=com_content&vi ew=article&id=6374:vatican-condemns-ordination-of-china-bishop&catid=278:july-17-2011-vol-61-no- 14&Itemid=473&lang=en. (web: 15 August 2019). Vatican Press (2019): Pastoral guidelines of the Holy See concerning the civil registration of clergy in China, 28.06.2019. http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/06/28/190628c. html (web: 26 August 2019). Vatican Press (2019): Pastoral guidelines of the Holy See concerning the civil registration of clergy in China, 28. 06. 2019. http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2019/06/28/190628c.html (web: 26 August 2019). Veik, Katherine (2011): Chinese bishops face excommunication for unapproved ordination. https://www. catholicnewsagency.com/news/chinese-bishops-face-excommunication-for-unapproved-ordination (web: 26 August 2019). Zhu, Xiaohong Rachel (2017): The Division of the Roman Catholic Church in Mainland China: History and Challenges. Religions, 2017 8, 39.

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Vilmos Fischl1 THE ROLE OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES IN HUNGARY IN AIDING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS

The mission of the Ecumenical Council of the Churches in Hungary

The Ecumenical Council of the Churches in Hungary (ECCH) was formed in 1943. tA present this body has 11 member Churches (the Reformed Church of Hungary, the Evangelical Church of Hungary, the Baptist Church of Hungary, the Pentecostal Church of Hungary, the Methodist Church of Hungary, the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Buda, the Universal Patriarchate of Constantinople – the Hungarian Orthodox Exarchate, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church of Hungary, The Romanian Orthodox Diocese of Hungary, The Hungarian Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church – Patriarchate of Moscow. Saint Margaret’s Anglican Episcopal Church), which work together with 20 other Churches and predominantly Church-related organizations, to do their brotherly work. The Hungarian Catholic Church (among others) is an observer- cooperating member of the Council. The members of the ECCH, having understood the prayer of Jesus Christ in which he promoted the unity of His followers (“that all of them may be one”) [John 17, 21], have formed the alliance to perform and harmonize their ministry in a more authentic way. The ECCH is a forum to assist cooperation between various Hungarian Churches and Church-related organizations, and its most important task is to promote the joint work of the Churches and the joint testimony of Jesus Christ. ECCH organizes several nationwide and regional conferences and other events, every year to achieve this goal. These include the Ecumenical Prayer Week held in every January, the Orthodox Christian Churches’ Day in April, and the National Protestant Days in October. The ECCH is the Hungarian national organization of the Geneva-based WCC (World Council of Churches), it is an associate member of the also Geneva-based CEC (Conference of European Churches), through which it participates in the work of the Representation of Churches of the European Union and the European Council.

1 National University of Public Service

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The ECCH maintains a wide range of international relations with various national Church Councils and international Church organizations on 5 continents, coordinates the international engagements of different Hungarian Churches and organizes several international events in Hungary. We are convinced that the message of the gospel can only be communicated authentically if different Churches can act as a brotherly community, representing the conviction of the faith that in Christ we are the members of one body (https://www.meot.hu/ index.php/meotrol-m/ Web: 01 September 2019). The Ecumenical Council of the Churches of Hungary also maintains relations with the Hungarian Government, and through its member Churches, it participates in aiding persecuted Christians.

Steps taken by the Hungarian Churches to establish security and to cooperate with the Government regarding the Christian communities in North Africa and the Middle East

There have been significant changes in security and defence policy in the last two decades. We hear more and more about the tensions between the West and Islam. In this paper, I intend to provide a comprehensive picture of the historical and present-day relations and conflicts ofIslam and the West, including Islamic fundamentalism, one of the most relevant challenges of our times. I intend to answer the question of how and why the hatred of the radical Islamic world towards the West and America has proliferated. Why is this hate covered in a religious disguise? Shall we take this character of their mission seriously? What extent is this an irrational threat, how can we stop these challenges by using our Western methods. And finally is Islam really the religion of peace? Most Muslim religious scholars and people would like to see it that way. How many Osama bin Ladens will attack, who find that the only remedial action to eradicate general poverty and other social problems is the ruthless destruction of the West? These issues are discussed in this paper. The cooperation between the Church and politics, or the Church and the state, or their utonomousa existence has always raised serious questions in the course of history. In different eras, the relations between Church and state and Church and politics have been different. This paper aims to investigate two issues. First, the possibilities of cooperation between religious communities and the state or the political sphere as a whole. Second, it attempts to analyse the tasks of Church and state, and Church and politics, and their activities in this relationship. What is the mission of the Church in the world? Should its activities be limited to preaching, salving and conducting charity service, or should it also be involved in shaping the political-ethical views of the society? Can the Church perform its ministry as its mission or can it only undertake as much and to be dictated

260 THE ROLE OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES IN HUNGARY IN AIDING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS by various interests? Should it perform its ministry in harmony with its identity or should it undertake as much and as the society asks for? The Church has always performed charitable, humanitarian tasks in its 2000-year long history from the very beginning. It is a direct interpretation of the message from Jesus, which calls for brotherly love. (Fischl 2019, 25–29, 5) Jesus’s teaching also implies that not just those are assisted who belong to His people, nation, cultural identity and religion, but everybody without exception, even His enemies. “Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you.” (Mt 5,44) Christianity is the most persecuted religion in the world. A report for Jeremy Hunt, then the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, published on 02 May 2019, states that the extent of Christian persecution in certain regions of the world almost reaches the internationally accepted criteria of genocide (https://www.magyarkurir.hu/kitekinto/brit-jelentes-keresztenyuldozes-merteke-kozel- all-nepirtashoz-vilag-egyes-reszein/ Web: 01 September 2019) “The decrease in the number of Christians was primarily due to the permanent confrontation with Islam, but there were other factors as well”. (Ujházi 2019, 85) I would like to highlight how the European Union could talk to North African, Middle Eastern, Asian Arab and Muslim countries. I want to emphasize the possibility of dialogue, with special attention to diplomatic negotiations. I also examine whether Hungary and the Hungarian Churches may have a special role in this process to improve the relations between the EU and North African, Middle East, Asian Arab and Muslim countries, and to take steps towards peace. In terms of migration policy Hungary and the EU are on totally different tracks. The EU emphasizes the integration of those migrants who have reached Europe, while Hungary favours improving living conditions in the countries where the migrants come from. The main point is solidarity since help can be given in various ways, and we have to respect different approaches to providing humanitarian assistance. The importance of the issue cannot be underestimated, given the events of the migration wave of 2015 since neither the European Union nor its member states like Hungary were prepared for such an immense migration wave. Most of those people who reached Europe in recent years were Muslim, and only a minority of them Christian, which posed yet another challenge for the experts during the crisis. The Hungarian Churches in cooperation with their Government assisted people entering and transiting Hungary. The destination of the migrants was not Hungary in the first place, but affluent Western and Northern European countries. This was the main reason why Hungary – in solidarity with Western European countries – decided to solve the problems where these arise through the framework of the Hungary Helps Program. The Hungarian Government was the first to establish a dedicated State Secretariat to help persecuted Christians. This State Secretariat runs several projects in the home countries of some migrants, like Egypt, Nigeria, Iraq, etc., where Christians are

261 THE ROLE OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES IN HUNGARY IN AIDING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS suffering from persecution. There are areas where the Hungarian Government provides humanitarian assistance through Churches since the Churches have well-established local Church contacts. To understand the underlying causes of the migrant crisis, we have to find out where people come from, which are the countries where people escape because their life is in danger. These include countries like Nigeria where Christians flee from because of the activities of Boko Haram. For my present paper, I selected a multidisciplinary method which includes elements of history, Church history, political science, Church policy, security policy, plus some legal and sociological considerations.

Relations between Arab countries and Hungary

For North Africa, the role of Europe – and Hungary – is unquestionably important due to security policy, economy (since this region is an important market and source of raw material for European countries) and tourism. In today’s globalized world once far-away conflicts seem closer, which may affect our region too. These security policy concerns are illustrated by the fact that some the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 were terrorists who were originally from countries of the Maghreb region. Is North Africa a real hotbed of terrorism? Is it true that local dictators trample on human rights? Is it really impossible to establish democratic institutions in these countries? I will answer these questions below. The Middle East is also an important economic and touristic partner for the EU and Hungary. Israel is highly important from geopolitical considerations since it is in her interest to be surrounded by friendly Arab governments in the region too. Regarding Asian countries, economic ties are more important than touristic ones, but there are a few important exceptions. I separate economic and touristic ties from a security policy approach since in countries dominated by business interests you will ”only” find businessmen in-country, who usually spend a couple of years there with their families. However, in countries which are important tourism destinations, the EU is exposed to a higher level of risk during a period of civil strife, since a considerable number of its citizens will be present in those countries at these periods. Let us not forget cultural ties either. Several EU countries have bilateral cultural and educational agreements with many Arab countries. For instance, Hungary maintains traditionally good relations with Egypt, through the Office of the Hungarian Cultural Counsellor. Our possibilities must be reassessed considering the present crisis. From now on Libya will be a different country, just like Tunisia and

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Egypt. The Gulf War changed Kuwait in 1991. The Emirate of Kuwait reassessed itself, and the losses made the leaders reassess the situation. In the first week of February 2019, Pope Francis paid an official visit to Abu Dhabi (Pope Francis celebrated a holy mass in Abu-Dhabi: May your communities be the oases of peace! https://www.magyarkurir.hu/ferenc-papa/ ferenc-papa-szentmiseje-abu-dzabiban-kozossegeitek-legyenek-beke-oazisai Web: 01 September 2019). The Pope during his 3-day visit to the United Arab Emirates highlighted the importance of interreligious dialogue, Muslim-Christian relations, and especially the need to follow the teachings of Jesus. Besides promoting the dialogue, the head of the Catholic Church did not ignore those several million Christians who were forced to leave this region. Pope Francis referred to Jesus’s Sermon on the Mount when emphasizing the idea that interreligious dialogue is vital in preventing international conflicts. On the last day of his visit, Pope Francis celebrated an open-air Holy Mass for 135,000 people in the biggest stadium of Abu Dhabi, the capital of a country situated on the Arabian Peninsula. Guest workers make up about 90% of the 9,5 million population of the United Arab Emirates. 2,5 million of this number are Catholics, most of them from the Philippines and India. Most probably, Pope Francis was talking to them when he spoke about the difficulties of living farway a from home and the love of their families, which is exacerbated by the uncertainties of their future. (Ferenc 2019) Europe must present a stable picture of itself. When we are discussing Europe, we often use the term West when we make comparisons with Islam. When we use the term West it does not only refers to Europe and the United States but also to Christianity. Although the Arab world is predominantly Muslim. Certainly, yet there are countries, like for example Egypt, Jordan, Syria, or Algeria, which have a relatively large Christian community. When we talk about the need to develop a new type of dialogue with this region we cannot ignore the importance of religion. Because Islam classifies Christians as “people of the book”. That implies a kind of respect towards Christianity on their part. Most people think that we have to approach the Arab world in a religiously neutral way which I believe is a big mistake! If I approach an Arab or Muslim partner as a Christian and my approach is based on Christian values, then he will respect that as we respect him. In my opinion, we must not think that just because we need oil, we have to do everything for that resource. This is clearly illustrated by the requests made by the new Libyan leadership. This kind of thinking is not the way ahead instead it condemns us to failure. Although Hungary is not a big country, traditionally it has had good relations with Arab countries. Why? The reason for this, in the first place, is provided by the way of thinking, and the expert professionalism of Hungarian people because there is special kind of empathy within the “Hungarian virtue”. People with the

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Arab mentality notice it and like it. According to the Secretary-General of NATO, the former communist countries of Central Europe can act as models for the nations of North Africa and the Middle East in their struggle for democracy and freedom of opinion. (NATO-Secretary General 2019) As a result, we can build links with the Arab world through politics, economy, culture, education, health care, sport, and the mutual respect for each others’ religious values. Our future relations with those Arab countries striving for new governance and democracy have to be established on these foundations. We must not be afraid of religion but have to come to terms with the fact that in Islam religious and political functions merge, as Islam is an organic religion. That is not the case in Europe anymore, which is unusual for the Arab world, owever,h we consider it strange that people want to have Shia and Sunni leaders in the Parliament and the government. I think that the people’s will is important and countries in North Africa and the Middle East must be given the chance to organize their lives. We have seen the consequences of the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which unfortunately meant that more people have died since the end of the war than under their respective dictatorships before the war and during war combined. That is exactly why foreign military intervention must only be used as a last resort. We should not forget that during military operations, despite the adoption of high precision weapons, the risk of innocent civilian fatalities still looms large. (Harai 2008, 7) The population of the Arab countries and the international community are all curious to see what the future holds once civil wars finish. Security is difficult to create but easy to lose. Hungary is making serious efforts to preserve its current level of security and to strengthen the citizens’ sense of security. It was obvious that during the migrant crisis this sense of security was threatened since a lot of people were apprehensive seeing the masses of people transiting Hungary on their way to the West in the hope of a better life. (Padányi 2017, 27)

Helping the Syrian Christians through the Hungary Helps Program of the Hungarian government

Hungary has financed the reconstruction of schools, hospitals, residential buildings through the Hungary Helps Program in Iraq and Syria. Hungary also provides the opportunity for young adults from persecuted Christian communities from the Middle East and Africa to study at Hungarian universities. For example, Hungary has provided 505 million HUF through the Hungary Helps Program for a Syrian humanitarian initiative called Open Hospitals. (Azbej 2019) Through this initiative, Hungary supports hospitals looking after the poorest people in those cities of Syria like Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, where people suffered the most.

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During the 8-year long war, 54% of the healthcare infrastructure in Syria was destroyed. As a result, more people die in Syria due to the lack of healthcare infrastructure than as a consequence of military operations. It can be argued that it is in the best interest of Hungary and the European Union as a whole to conduct a proportionate humanitarian policy both at our borders and outside Europe. This is why Hungary has decided to assist Syrian Christians through the Hungary Helps Program. By supporting the hospitals through the Syrian Churches, the Hungarian Government provides help for every Syrian people since Muslims, as well as Christians, can receive treatment at those hospitals. The Hungary Helps Program is an independent initiative of the Government of Hungary, which provides a framework for every Hungarian international humanitarian engagement which attempts to distribute support to people in need of aid in developing countries and crisis regions. One of its priorities of this programme is the protection of persecuted Christian communities. Helping persecuted Christians is based upon three important considerations namely humanitarian assistance, migration policy, and identity. The most important of these is the fact that the Hungarian government has realized that the persecution of Christians is the gravest humanitarian tragedy of our time since about 70–80% of all religious persecution is aimed against Christians. According to statistics, at least 80 countries are affected by Christian persecution but we do not know enough about this phenomenon of them. It is regrettable that despite this fact this issue is ignored in international politics, diplomacy and humanitarian assistance alike. Christians have to suffer from genocide-like persecution and other atrocities in at least 80 countries where their human rights, including the right to religious liberty, are often heavily restricted and they have suffered from serious discrimination. This is the fate of at least 215 million Christians. The persecution of Christians is supported by some estimates which say that in the last 10 years their population in Syria has dropped to less than half (from 2 million to 800,000); and in Iraq to its fifth (from 1,5 million to 300,000). (Hungarians for persecuted Christians. https://kepmas.hu/nemzeti-kuldetesunk-az-uldozott-keresztenyek-segitese Web: 1 September 2019). It was amongst the goals of the Islamic State to make Christian communities disappear from the Middle East. They did not succeed in this goal yet many young Christians are still emigrating from this region. There is a Hungarian scholarship program aimed at providing quality education in Europe with a proviso that the participants will return home to their communities after the completion of their training programmes. Currently, about 170 such students study subjects at Hungarian universities which can be successfully utilized in their countries. These include Iraqistudents who study Petroleum and Natural Gas Engineering at the University of Miskolc. One condition for prospective applicants is that they must receive a letter of recommendation from a local Church which proves their commitment to their communities and

265 THE ROLE OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES IN HUNGARY IN AIDING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS countries. Then the Hungarian grant is directly sent to the local churches without intermediaries. This is either achieved with a bank transfer from the Hungarian Treasury or through Hungarian charity organizations which are active in that country. For example, the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta in Syria and the Hungarian Ecumenical Charity Organization in Iraq are important partners in this process as they are permanently present in the two countries. (Hungarians for persecuted Christians. https://kepmas.hu/nemzeti- kuldetesunk-az-uldozott-keresztenyek-segitese Web: 2019. September 16) What can the Churches do in Hungary? The Churches have to continue their missions in the newly-developed migration situation in Europe. Migration is a real challenge for the Christian communities to accept and manage the differences. Acceptance means: to love people and take them seriously, make it possible for them to realize their dreams and not to feel threatened just because they are different from others. The Church has to act in the spirit of solidarity since this is part of its mission. Churches run several projects which help refugees arriving at European borders. Churches do not want to substitute the state, but they have to react to human suffering. However, we have to come to terms with the fact that all migration must be conducted through a legal and reasonable framework, otherwise, it endangers public order. (Fischl 2017)

The refugee mission of the Hungarian Reformed Church

The refugee mission of the Hungarian Reformed Church (HRC) integrates one undredh refugees into the Hungarian society every year. The mission which began in 2006 currently has three permanent employees, seventeen employees whose salaries are funded through various grants, and fifty-sixty volunteers. The members of this mission perform various tasks: they teach Hungarian language and culture courses, provide food and accommodation, provide legal assistance, find schools for the children of to mostly African migrants who already have been classified as refugees by the Hungarian authorities. After the completion of several courses, which last between one and four years, and when the refugees have adequate knowledge and experience, mission workers help them find a job. This work is not spectacular and cannot be done quickly, but according to data, generously provided by the mission, it is quite effective since 80-90%, or sometimes even 100% of the refugees can successfully integrate into the Hungarian society. They will not become criminals and the fact that Hungary is not a xenophobe country highlights the successful work of the mission. The refugees themselves say that Hungarians are helpful,

266 THE ROLE OF THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES IN HUNGARY IN AIDING PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS kind people. (Bogárdi 2019) Experts debate whether it is possible to raise the number of participants within this integration project. When only a couple of thousand people who arrived in Hungary were, and when there were already 40,000 of them who crossed the border, the number of those who received refugee status was from 300 to 500. One reason for this could be that it is very difficult to flee the places where people have to flee from. Moreover, these people arrive in Europe after several years of wandering. They first migrate to an jacentad country, for example from Afghanistan to Iran, where they often wait up to 2-3 years for news whether they can return home. Then they move on and on so within seven-eight years some migrants might have spent a year or two in four different countries. In such a short period they have to try to learn four different legal systems, customs, and four languages. There are a lot of Christians who are persecuted because of their religion amongst the refugees who reach Europe. However, they do not often reveal this fact to the authorities because when they arrive in Europe they experience that religiously persecuted Christians are not welcome. While the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 (Net Legal archives: http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=98900015.TVR Web: 2019 September 1) stipulates that religiously persecuted people can be classified as refugees, Western authorities at the European reception centres often advise asylum seekers not to refer to religious persecution. The European Union is silent about religious persecution.

The refugee mission of the Hungarian Evangelical Church

The Diocese Department of The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Hungary (ELCH) repares p and runs several projects which assist refugees. This church helps refugees by supporting their basic needs by supplying them with food and water, taking care of minors who arrived without adults. They do these tasks in cooperation with other charitable networks and spiritual caretakers. In another project, they collected clothes for the children of the refugees and they shared information about migrants and refugees in schools. They also played a role in preparing factsheets for refugees in different languages and took part in crisis intervention. They are getting ready to open a House of Integration. This will be an institution which will house and support refugee families with children, who wish to seek asylum in Hungary, for an entire year.

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The Diocese Department of ELCH also donated medications to refugee children through the Association of the Hungarian General Pediatricians. (Fabiny 2019) Several congregations and pastors participate in voluntary work. The ELCH has published a booklet for refugees in English, French, Persian, Urdu, and Arabic. Following the spirit of Luther’s teachings on Two Kingdoms, the Evangelical Church differentiates between secular and spiritual governance. Politicians are responsible for the former and Church leaders for the latter. If possible, they do not interfere with issues of secular policy.

The refugee policy of the Hungarian Catholic Church

As part of its refugee policy, The Hungarian Catholic Bishops’ Conference elpsh those who get to Hungary in a difficult situation. “We are happy and ready to follow the callor f the inclusion and support of refugees [Pope Francis], his words give us strength and encouragement in the work we commenced. We are grateful that he is leading the way in the Gospel and designates the direction for action!” (Erdő 2019) Concerning the present refugee crisis, we have to understand that the most important task of the Catholic Church is to provide spiritual care for Catholics who are away from their homes for any reason. The first Church documents and the activities of the various Church institutions support the above-mentioned hypothesis. Besides these activities, the Holy See and its local Churches also took several humanitarian and diplomatic measures to manage the refugee issue at global and the local levels. The high speed of the events forced the supreme leadership of the Church to make decisions on an „ad hoc” basis. However, the main aim of papal and Holy See communication strategy was to encourage and hearten the faithful. Therefore these Holy See communiques do not modify existing legal regulations, establish new institutions, or assignments new tasks to existing church bodies, but a basic attitude and the definition of moral guidelines. Instead, these messages are intended to be a source of guidance for those administrative bodies within the Roman Catholic Church which provide humanitarian and spiritual assistance to migrants. Another issue with these documents is that not every local Church has adequate infrastructure or material and human resources to follow through the spirit of these general guidelines. The issue of refugees also appears in the social teaching of the Church. In the past, Church documents have always reflected on those social phenomena which became important due to historical or economic reasons.

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Nowdays, when migration became a general world policy and security issue, the Holy See has to rethink its historical approach towards migration and migrants. The papal estimoniest which discuss the issue of emigration do this with varying level of thoroughness, they consider sometimes fewer and sometimes more factors.

Conclusion and achievements

The EU is making efforts to reach an adequate approach toward managing legal dan countering irregular migration. This involves the fair treatment of citizens of non-EU countries, who stay legally in member countries, the stepping up of the fight against irregular migration and the promoting cooperation with non-EU countries in every area. The objective of the EU is to create a legal framework defining the rights and obligations of legal immigrants, which is similar to those enjoyed by EU citizens. (Information booklet on the European Union http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/hu/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html Web: 01 September 2019.). What is meant by legal is the “only” remaining question? The principle of solidarity: the Lisbon Treaty contains a guideline that member states must equitably divide their burdens, this includes the financial costs of the European Union’s migration policy (Article 80. EUR-Lex). To conclude, I think that humanitarian representation is a condition of the long-term, efficient support of families in trouble, as well as of obtaining further international funds to realize it. Besides the humanitarian aspects, the aid program also includes training and development activities, which promote integration and long- term prosperity. The Ecumenical Charity Organization has been conducting aid operations on the ground which helped refugee families who had to flee due to the threat posed by the Islamic State. To help Hungary’s humanitarian and international development activities, the Ecumenical Aid Organization, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, set up a humanitarian mission in Erbil, Iraq in June 2016. The purpose of this office is to run humanitarian relief and other development programs using Hungarian and international funding to support internally displaced people and refugees living in Iraqi Kurdistan. The threats against Christians, which cannot be disputed, and the emergence of ewn extremist or radical organizations will only make the situation even more serious. Unfortunately, violent anti-Christian activities are not limited to crisis regions. So the various Hungarian religious communities, in close cooperation with their international counterparts and the Hungarian Government, are taking steps to improve their security, which means that they:

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• strengthen their domestic points of contact at training, conferences and with technical assets • strengthen their international and domestic denominational and governmental links • work together with the World Council of Churches and the Ecumenical Council of the Hungarian Churches to coordinate in the field of security and negotiate with high level Hungarian governmental officials • use their soft power about cultural, educational and ethical issues, like the just war theory • establish links and keep in constant contact with the crisis areas through various Church diplomacy • exploit the possibilities of the ecumenical and interreligious dialogue to promote peace • to improve their communications assets • control and supervise the ecumenical humanitarian organizations. The above system assumes cooperation between Churches, governmental and international partners. The main question is to what extent can the Hungarian Churches and the Hungarian Government work with other international governments and Churches to protect Christians. The Hungarian Churches are faced with the following dilemmas: • find ways to help the Christians of North Africa or the Middle East, so that it can satisfy those supporting, as well as those opposing migration • what can the Hungarian Churches do to synchronize the rhetoric of Hungarian and local Church leaders in various crisis areas [e.g. Ukraine (Subcarpathia), Syria, Iraq] • how can local Church leaders or theologists take part in intra- and interreligious cooperation, e.g. at local Church levels. In my opinion, the Christian Churches should do a lot more for their persecuted Christian brothers and sisters than what they are currently doing. Yet, we must acknowledge that the traditionally limited means of the Churches limit what they can achieve in crisis prevention and crisis management. The Ecumenical Council of the Hungarian Churches is making efforts to synchronize the diplomacy of the Hungarian Churches and to cooperate with governmental organizations. It is indispensable to understand the historical background behind these issues if we strive to understand the current security challenges. Christians living in different countries are facing different levels of threat. In certain cases, it is possible that we cannot find a unified position even within one region. That is why we have to empower Church and Government experts alike to research every sensitive area mentioned above to learn how to most efficiently support persecuted Christians communities.

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Literature

Antal-Ferenc, Ildikó (2019): Magyarok az üldözött keresztényekért. https://kepmas.hu/nemzeti-kuldetesunk- az-uldozott-keresztenyek-segitese (Web: 01 September 2019.) Azbej, Tristan (2019): A magyar kormány elsődleges feladata, hogy a magyar emberek boldogulását segítse. https://www.echotv.hu/hirek/2019/01/23/azbej-tristan-a-magyar-kormany-elsodleges-feladata-hogy- segitse-a-magyar-emberek-boldogulasat (Web: 01 September 2019.) Bogárdi, Szabó (2019): István református püspök nyilatkozata. http://kereszteny.mandiner.hu/cikk/20150714_ menekultek_szazait_integraljak_a_reformatusok (Web: 01 September 2019.) Erdő Péter bíboros nyilatkozata (2019): http://szemlelek.blog.hu/2016/12/21/mkpk_menekultek (Web: 01 September 2019.) Fact Sheets on the European Union. (2019): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/hu/displayFtu. html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html (Web: 01 September 2019.) Fabiny, Tamás evangélikus püspök nyilatkozata (2019): Az egyházak kísérik útjukon a menekülteket Magyarországon. https://www.oikoumene.org/en/press-centre/news-in-other-languages/the-churches-walk- with-refugees-in-hungary (Web: 01 September 2019.) Fischl, Vilmos (2017): A civil szervezetek és egyházak szerepe, különös tekintettel a protestáns egyházakra. In: Orbán Balázs (ed.) Budapest-jelentés a keresztényüldözésről Fischl, Vilmos (2019): Az ökumenikus segélyszervezetek működése és eredménye a konfliktusokkal terhelt területeken. In. Resperger István – Ujházi Lóránd ed. A vallási elemek jelentősége napjaink fegyveres konfliktusaiban és biztonsági kihívásiban. Budapest, Magyarország: Dialóg Campus Kiadó-Nordex Kft, Wolters Kluwer. 25–29. Ferenc pápa szentmiséje Abu-Dhabiban: Közösségeitek legyenek a béke oázisai! https://www.magyarkurir.hu/ ferenc-papa/ferenc-papa-szentmiseje-abu-dzabiban-kozossegeitek-legyenek-beke-oazisai (Web: 01 September 2019.) Ferenc pápa: A hit és a szeretet a keresztények legerősebb fegyvere. https://hu.euronews.com/2019/02/05/ ferenc-papa-a-hit-es-a-szeretet-a-keresztenyek-legerosebb-fegyvere (Web: 01 September 2019.) Harai, Dénes (2008): Az erőszak kultusza és a civilizáció védelme. A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem társadalmi, társadalomtudományi kérdései. Kézirat. Budapest, ZMNE, 2008. 7.

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Magyar Kurír (2019): Brit jelentés: A keresztényüldözés mértéke közel áll a népirtáshoz a világ egyes részei. https://www.magyarkurir.hu/kitekinto/brit-jelentes-keresztenyuldozes-merteke-kozel-all-nepirtashoz-vilag- egyes-reszein/ (Web: 01 September 2019.) Magyarországi Egyházak Ökumenikus Tanácsa (2019): A MEÖT-ről. https://www.meot.hu/index.php/ meotrol-m/ (Web: 01 September 2019.) Padányi, József (2017): Új típusú biztonsági fenyegetések, Magyarország biztonsága. In: Németh, Kornél; Péter, Erzsébet; Kiglics, Norbert (ed.) II. Turizmus és Biztonság Nemzetközi Tudományos Konferencia Nagykanizsa, Magyarország: Pannon Egyetem. Nagykanizsai Kampusz. 21–28. Stoltenberg, Jens (2019): Közép-Európa modellként szolgálhat Észak-Afrika számára. https://hvg.hu/ vilag/20110317_nato_fotitkar_eszak_afrika (Web: 01 September 2019.) Ujházi, Lóránd (2019): Az egyiptomi keresztények biztonsági helyzete. In. Resperger István – Ujházi Lóránd ed. A vallási elemek jelentősége napjaink fegyveres konfliktusaiban és biztonsági kihívásaiban. Budapest, Magyarország: Dialóg Campus Kiadó-Nordex Kft, Wolters Kluwer. 79–104. 1989. évi 15. törvényerejű rendelet a menekültek helyzetére vonatkozó 1951. évi július hó 28. napján elfogadott egyezmény valamint a menekültek helyzetére vonatkozóan az 1967. évi január hó 31. napján létrejött jegyzőkönyv kihirdetéséről. (1989). http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=98900015.TVR (Web: 01 September 2019.)

272 János Frivaldszky1

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How the practice of moral stigmatization appears in debates about mass migration

Concerning the social organization of European secular political thought, it is not a novelty that ethical aspects of social-political definitions are defined by left-wing-liberal intellectuals in a way which excludes, suppresses and discredits any other uses. Furthermore, these people often attempt to impose social sanctions against those scholars whose views they disapprove. Notions of peace, unity, and brotherhood among nations were abused, among other things, not just in communist countries, but also in Western Europe by revolutionary Marxist intellectuals. It is no coincidence that in the previous few decades these concepts have undergone an almost total loss of credit. To remove Marxist stereotypes, we have to return these hijacked concepts to their original Christian, that is Gospel-based, meanings. To this end, several theoretical efforts have been made by intellectuals, this included scientific researchers representing the Focolare Movement, hichw was formed in Trento in 1943 (Baggio 2007; Baggio 2012; Pizzolato 2012). On the international scene, the Community of Sant’Egidio has done sterling work, especially in the developing world, in preventing or ending conflicts. As long as only a relatively few refugees had to be rescued from the sea, every benevolent person, especially if they were Christians, agreed that helping the refugees was a moral obligation for the countries concerned. However, when a large number of migrants, most of them young men, landed on the shores of the old continent, these people came here in search of a better life, questions were being asked whether the policy of love, brotherhood and the inclusion towards foreigners was still the right approach. However, this issue could not be discussed openly in the public because mainstream media and most European politicians, put an ethical stigma on those who wanted to separate economic migrants, mostly young men,

1 Pázmány Peter Catholic University, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Department of Legal Philosophy

273 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS... arriving from other continents for a better livelihood and refugees, and recommended different treatment for each respective group in inclusion policy and general treatment. The novelty is that the policy of social stigma among Christians (calling each other “exclusionary”, “xenophobic”, “inhuman”, “heartless”, “un-Christian”, etc.) have emerged, instead of widely expanding the culture of attention to one another’s arguments in this field of topics and problems. Those who supported the mass inclusion of migrants from thero continents, by flaunting the altruism of their true European identity (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 57), started to attack those Christians who wanted to differentiate between refugees and economic migrants. These people also criticised their other view which argued that besides real refugees arriving in Europe we also had a duty of care towards our Middle Eastern Christian brothers and sisters, who have been forced to leave their homelands and live in exile as a result of war and faith-related persecution. However, a new phenomenon in public discourse is spreading throughout the Internet. The people who participate in this movement are mainly leftists or liberal Christians and non-Christians who want to thematize public discourse in order to create a new multicultural or inclusive society. (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 73) To achieve this they want to ensure that public discourse about migration is done in a “politically correct” “moralizing” way (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 61) Klaus–Weigl 2018, 73), and to maintain the validity of their arguments by using the hard-to-understand tools of morality (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 61), and to vigilantly control their dominance over public discourse. (Murray 2018, 221–222) Meanwhile, patriotic conservatives in Central Europe and elsewhere question in the name of common sense, practical experience, and conservative natural law principles, that underestimating or supporting the phenomenon of mass intercontinental immigration in the spirit of “sudden attack of altruism” and brotherly love. (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 25). They also argue that the cosmopolitan construction of a multicultural society contradicts our valuable historical knowledge derived from our practical experiences and common sense as well. (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 51, 74, 79–80) The gist of their criticism is that the already weakened Christian European culture is not only threatened by its self-denial but also with its disappearance in the not so distant future. Vaclav Klaus and Jiří Weigl also argue that “[the] mainstream argument of European politics, which drives millions of migrants towards Europe, is aggressive, it is based on a politically correct but completely hypocritical populism, ignoring the memory and intelligence of the public.” (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 46) They argue that the first duty of Christian politics is to love the fellow countrymen who are naturally entrusted to us. They also posit that if we allow mass intercontinental Muslim immigration into a weakening nation, which is still Christian in its roots and culture is a serious risk. No meaningful dialogue, no rational public debate is possible between the two different approaches and two social blocks since both parties label the other as “populists.” Some conservatives who adopt a more precautional

274 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS... and sceptical stance about this burning issue, have been marked as populists others receive even more pejorative labels like xenophobe or racist (in extreme cases some might be classified as Nazis ro fascists), due to irrational fears and prejudices of their critics. (Murray 2018, 237–238) There is a presumption of moral disbelief, or even malice against certain prominent conservative thinkers when they point out that “European cosmopolitan intellectuals”, while traditionally interested in “noble and abstract ideas, they maintain total, almost Rousseau- like, indifference towards actual human lives.” Klaus–Weigl( 2018, 18) And, we have not even spoken of their evil criticism of Pope Francis and his followers, of whom they merely say that he advocates the adoption of “hypocritically unlimited mercy” in refugee and migrant policy. (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 18) Meaningful and constructive dialogue between these two camps might not have taken place due to the practice of censoring, stigmatizing and excluding from the salons of social honour anyone who dares to disagree with certain moral concepts of social influence created by the eculars liberal leftist tradition since the eighteenth century. It is perhaps a historical novelty that some Christians, who classify themselves as “hypocritical” (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 73) or “progressive” (Klaus–Weigl 2018, 63) have joined the ranks of these groups. They may soon become captives of this highly dubious social practice. To understand the dangers of these practices, it is worthwhile to investigate the most important features of social sanctioning of public discourse censorship and the “moral deflection” from the politically correct.

The modern ideological-historical source of political censorship, or Rousseau on public opinion and the censor

Let us now turn to the study of the modern ideological history of the institution of social censorship! However, we wish to emphasize that, in this section, we will refer to Rousseau, who created the concepts of institutional judgment and the validation of good socially relevant morals. However, we do not intend to pass summary judgment on the personal ethical motives of the Geneva-born philosopher (Pethő 1994, 11–56), nor to make simplistic statements about his political philosophy. For example, we do not claim, that he wanted to impose his own “progressive” thoughts or values on the citizens of Geneva or any other location through the public censorship. However, we can clearly say that according to Rousseau stated public censorship was an effective political tool in the hands of a government to shape public morals. “How, then, can the government influence morals? My answer is this: by public opinion.” (Rousseau 1978, 387) however, he also points out, that it is not

275 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS... the authority of censorship that makes up the public opinion and that public censorship does not include direct coercion. The institutionalized theory of public sanctioning of public control of socio-politically acceptable public morals was first conceived by Rousseau, based on the example of the Marshal’s Court of Justice, which acted as the “Supreme Court of Honor” (Rousseau 1978, 387skk). The above-mentioned organisation was established to enable the suppression of duels in France. Following prominent Greek and Roman historical examples and the redefinition of the aforementioned French Marshal’s Courts of Honor, ousseauR proposed setting up a censor’s office that enforces public morals in disputes about the integrity and social morals of individuals. This institution is organically linked to his concepts about public will, law, and public opinion, and the logical consequence of his system of thought. As public will manifests itself through the law, he writes, “the public judges by the censor’s office.”Rousseau ( 1958, 266) And public opinion is “the form of law which the censor administers, and, like the prince, only applies to particular cases.” (Rousseau 1958, 266) According to Rousseau, the office of this censor would work to enforce an unwritten, yet “positively” existing moral norm, the moral law, which expressed through public opinion. Thus, the tribunal is not the body which creates the norms it supervises, but its merely an interpreter & executor of these rules: “The censorial tribunal, so far from being the arbiter of the people’s opinion, only declares it, and, as soon as the two-part company, its decisions are null and void.” (Rousseau 1958, 266) Thus, the censor is the guardian of positive moral standards in the public domain, which are valid as a social norm, as prescribed by law, and possibly sanctioned by him as a moral authority. Rousseau believed that people should be taught the right judgment and thinking and then morals would improve by themselves. Man – says the optimistic statement about the basic orientation – strives for good, but he often makes mistakes, therefore, his judgment must be “corrected” (Rousseau 1958, 266), and people “always want good, but do not always recognize it”. (Rousseau 1958, 138) Similarly to the former, the censor - who judges “honour” (Rousseau 1958, 267) – must pronounce the right judgment over morals based on public opinion. Consequently, Rousseau believed in the clarity and persuasiveness of the enlightened mind, and these assumptions influenced his political system on the public will and public pinion.o Bad morality - according to his theoretical system – exists due to a lack of moral “taste” clarity, which rationalists believe is not as serious offence as an error in judgment that requires rectification – even under coercion by social sanctions for clarity, Rousseau suggests. According to Rousseau governments can only influence morals through public piniono in the beginning,, and then they must seek to uphold them against the “natural tendency to distortion”, while a change in “coincidence” will continue to guide the judgement of public morals through public opinion. “If the government can have a

276 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS... great influence on morals, only when it is initially established; it no longer has the power to change them, and even takes great pains to keep them from attacking the inescapable chance and the natural tendency to distort them.” (Rousseau 1958, 394–395, 30) The morals-changing effects of the accidental must be channelled in the right direction by indirect pressure which includes the suppression or “eradication” of those prejudices which are considered to be harmful. “But what was the prejudice that had to be eradicated?” (Rousseau 1958, 394) Rousseau argues against the establishment of a theatrical establishment that can change the prejudices and opinions, and ultimately the morals, of his home town, his “small village,” by saying that “if the morals are right, the government (?) can only wisely prevent changes, to stop everything that can lead to change.” (Rousseau 1958, 395) Later in his treatise, the author discusses the eradication of a truly unreasonable habit of duelling. However, the question may well be raised as to what to do if the moral judgment of public morals is more up- to-date because it interprets dominant and correct public opinion in a political way, that is, to its taste. Rousseau wrote about two existing morality courts, the ‘Consistoire’ and ‘Chambre de la Réforme’. (Rousseau 1958, 395) The ‘Consistoire’, an institution mostly staffed by pastors, guarded theorals m of the citizens of Geneva why the latter was responsible for the enforcement of anti-luxury laws (Rousseau 1958, 787). Rousseau uses them as examples for effective moral tribunals which he also knew – e.g.: “this tribunal [...] can hardly preserve us as we are” (Rousseau 1958, 395) – thus, knowing the mechanism of influence of the institution, he considered ti to be established for political reasons. In Rousseau’s philosophy, the possibility that the censor’s office might not enforce the dominant public morality, public opinion, against the convictions of a recalcitrant minority, does not exist. He also does not discuss the possibility of exerting political moral conviction with its power of social honour in such a way which would contradict objective natural moral law. For Rousseau, moralized politics swallow the rights of the law in the broad sense. Law and public opinion are mutually reinforcing forces – in the broad sense – one in its narrower sense and the other in its broader sense – which – as it has been repeatedly cited – was the case in Sparta. (Rousseau 1958, 386–387). The activities of the Censor’s office serve the regulatory and societal function of laws, in the broad sense, by enforcing public morals and thereby securing public control. The latter is mainly achieved by preventing the degeneration of public opinion. (Rousseau 1958, 267, 32. lj.) Thus, the censor’s office or the court of honour, when they are not yet formed, can ectdir the moral opinions, shape them indirectly, bend them in the right direction by preventing the degeneration, and upholding the correct morals. However, Rousseau emphasizes that “public opinion cannot be coerced,” so the authorities must refrain from any such action. (Rousseau 1958, 268) On the other hand, the censor or the judge of a court of honour is expected to enforce good public morals through a compulsion to honour, social honour, or the

277 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS... censor. Those people who have been declared to be, even indirectly (Rousseau 1958, 268), immoral have lost their social honour. Similarly, the censor is not meant to enforce public morals by compulsion - a sanction of loss of honour - since it is merely an interpreter of the public will and not its creator. The censor’s fficeo or the court of honour is just the “stretched sword” of public opinion and it exerts the same effect as the ublicp itself, “by nature”, with its defamatory stigma and excommunication mechanism when it operates. (Rousseau 1958, 393, 30. lj.) Rousseau claims that “the views of a people are the result of its constitution”. (Rousseau 1958, 267., 32. lj.) It is not inconsiderable; therefore, what content is assigned to politically presentable human rights opinions under the pretext of “constitutional political correctness” by those who act like censors in our time. Whereas, according to Rousseau, the courts of jurisdiction of censors may use defamation or the loss of honour, which is a kind of civil-social “death penalty” issued by a court of honour, as their main weapons. (Rousseau 1958, 392–393, 30. lj.). Therefore, it is vital, even in our times, to identify who is empowered to interpret and apply, in a “politically correct” – “constitutional” or “democratic” – way, key issues like human rights. Another fundamental question is connected to the fact “no man can live as a citizen without his honour”, so it is crucial to define which violations are punishable by the “civic death penalty” when people are deprived of their of honour by the powerful censors of public opinion. “This court can have no other weapon than honour and disgrace […] who did not appear before the magistrates at the appointed time, admitted that he was unable to defend himself, that is to say, he had condemned himself. Which, of course, resulted in his being publicly deprived of his honour […].” (Rousseau 1958, 388) However, since every citizen is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Honor and “some should report their behaviour and actions, others their words and policies” while “everyone should expect to be praised or mocked based on the compliance or contradiction between their deeds and the Code of Honor of the nation.” (Rousseau 1958, 392) People must conform to the standards of reason and truth and public opinion but Rousseau adds (Rousseau, 1958, 392) an important proviso that the above-mentioned principles can be unobtrusively modified by the censoring authority. And if the censoring authority, as the vanguard of public opinion, can modify such principles, then the correctness of the content of the modified morality, and thus the legitimacy of this changing basis of judgment, is of paramount importance. These two questions do not even arise in Rousseau’s writings. If the censor’s office wants to change acts of public esteem, then judgments on emth must be changed, writes the philosopher. (Rousseau 1958, 392) So, in a sense, good moral consciousness coincides with the judgment of the public in the current judgment of the moral court, so that the “public” opinion most closely matches the views of the social elite that are represented by the moral court, which also enforces the norms of the elite.

278 EXPROPRIATED USE OF LOVE AND ACCEPTANCE TO ACCOMMODATE MIGRANTS IN LARGE NUMBERS...

However, its sentences are imposed predominantly against the members of those classes whose members are most vulnerable to defamation. (Rousseau 1958, 392) The main target of the censors are the elites who live their lives in the public eye, and if the institution functions well, they must “tremble at the mere name of the court of honour.” (Rousseau 1958, 392) If, on the other hand, the court of honour is not about “individual disorientation,” but a fight against minorities which disagree with majority on a given issue, then in our view the political situation may arise that “nothing is more independent of the supreme power than the general public.” (Rousseau 1958, 388) Therefore, the bearers of the dominant public, are the “queens of the world” (Rousseau 1958, 394) and their activities carry the sanction of the court of honour to influence public opinion against the minority and their influencers whose judgement, in their opinion, is faulty. This struggle will most likely end with the victory of the elite which can dominate public opinion and their moral judgment, shown as dominant, is supported by the system of sanctions of the Court of Honor. Contemporary social circumstances are conducive to censorship, as, in today’s big cities, there is virtually no moral community order due to the disintegration of former traditional public control, while in smaller settlements people “live in public and are born censors of one another.” (Rousseau 1958, 378) Therefore, the self-proclaimed censors of our period appoint themselves and then they enforce those morally- politically correct order of values which they believe to be morally necessary.

Public practice of stigmatizing Christians and morals

Returning to the problem at the beginning of our analysis, we have to raise the question how Christians, who disagree with their fellow-Christians disagree with them about mass European migration, are ready to morally stigmatize their opinions or even to socially sanction those morally, besides labelling those ethically. We believe that there is an urgent need, in the context of this issue, for an honest and constructive dialogue, based on the values of the Gospels, the social teaching of the Catholic Church. During this dialogue opinions must be based on facts and arguments. As part of this discussion, we have defined love in an organized way which makes sense in this context. If the discourse is done this way then the concepts of inclusion and brotherhood, as well as unity, can be incorporated into a jointly developed nation and inclusion policy.

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Literature

Baggio, Antonio Maria (2007): Il principio dimenticato, la fraternità nella riflessione politologica contemporanea. Roma, Città Nuova. Baggio, Antonio Maria (2012): Caino e i suoi fratelli. Il fondamento relazionale nella politica e nel diritto. Roma, Città Nuova. Václav, Klaus – Weigl, Jiří (2018): Népvándorlás – Útmutató a jelenlegi migrációs válság megértéséhez. Budapest, Századvég. Murray, Douglas (2018): Európa furcsa halála. Bevándorlás, identitás, iszlám. Mit tartogat számunkra a jövő? Pécs, Alexandra. Pethő, Bertalan (1994): A deviancia történelmi konstrukciója – Derrida Rousseau-olvasata nyomán. In Lendvai L. Ferenc (ed.): Társadalomtudomány és filozófia. Áron, Budapest. Pizzolato, Filippo (2012): Il principio costituzionale di fraternità. Itinerario di ricerca a partire dalla Costituzione italiana. Roma, Città Nuova. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1978): Levél d’Alambert-nek. In: Bence György – Ludassy Mária (ed.): Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Értekezések és filozófiai levelek. Budapest, Magyar Helikon. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1958): A társadalmi szerződés. ford. Mikó Imre. Bibliotheca, Kolozsvár.

280 METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS TO STUDY THE SITUATION OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIANS

Péter Krisztián Zachar1

THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUALS IN AID OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

The ideal of a Christian intellectual presents us with an image of a citizen at the beginning of the 21st century, who is bound by values which transcend historical eras and cultural boundaries. These values include personal dignity, freedom, justice and human rights, and a responsibility. And all this can be acted on by a modern citizen if he/she actively participates in the community by volunteering and community building. Many contemporary thinkers dispute the existence of a Christian system of values, while it is clear that for Christians those universal and eternal values (laws) that apply to our earthly reality can be deduced from a dynamic relationship with God. In addition to dogmas, the living apostolic tradition illustrates those traditional values that Christian intellectuals adhere to throughout their lives. These values created a framework which is the two thousand years of European Christian civilization. All these facts mean that Christian intellectuals are responsible for the public affairs since the message of Christ goes beyond individuals, since it affects the community as a whole, and thus individual Christian communities have a great responsibility not only to their membership but also to the world around them. However, these present us with basically concentric tasks: the command of brotherly solidarity must be in harmony with the protection and defence of the nearest responsibility, the faith in God, the family, the nation. To this end, Christian citizens create institutions and organizations that help not only in economic development but also in the experience of political freedom, as well as the moral and cultural commitment to human progress. One of the most important forums for the involvement and organization of Hungarian Christian intellectuals since the transition to democracy has been the Federation of Christian Intellectuals (KÉSZ), which celebrates its thirtieth anniversary this year. Responding to the extreme social demand KÉSZ was founded in 1989 as one of the first non-governmental organizations in Hungary and is still the largest ecumenical, religious evangelizing non-governmental organization in Hungary, which according to its founders’ intent is an

1 National University of Public Service

283 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUALS IN AID OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES organisation for Christian intellectuals. This goal was clearly expressed, by Béla Csanád one of the founding members of the organisation, who was a theologian, priest, poet and a Professor at the Academy of Theology. He wanted to form a new organization from the intellectuals of the Adalbertinum Evangelization Center. From the outset, KÉSZ has defined itself as an evangelization organization, which seeks primarily to rejuvenate Hungarian society, which has been liberated from the state-socialist oppression and coercion, with the help of the Gospels. According to Béla Csanád, “no reform, economic or political change can be truly successful without the inner, spiritual-moral and cultural transformations of the individual.” This quote appeared in the first issue of the organization’s journal, Jel (Sign) so we might interpret it as the KÉSZ’s mission statement. (Csanád 1989 1) Meanwhile, KÉSZ has wanted to restore the definition of the intelligentsia to its original meaning after decades of repression, silence, and oppression. “We want to take great care to clarify concepts that have been ruined and questioned over the past decades, but are still relevant today, and to restore the appreciation of the Christian system of values” – wrote the founder. (Csanád 1989 1.) However, the founders of the association did not equate being intellectual did not depend on the number of academic degrees or the tasks and functions somebody might perform in society. Rather, they adopted the following definition: “Intellectuals are those people, who embrace this peculiar way of life, a demanding inner, spiritual and intellectual life, possess the appropriate self-consciousness and mission consciousness, who are aware of their faith, and want to live it on a community, social level.” (Új Ember, 1998/19.) According to this, the objective of the association towards the society formulated the mission: to present Christian solutions to those who are seeking guidance and support in key areas of life. This mission transcends traditional religious frameworks, parish or congregational boundaries. And the activities of this body should be done in the spirit of the Ecumene to renew Christianity and Hungarians after decades of dictatorship. The task of public activity, cultural creation, the protection of the created world is rooted in the gospel. Thus, it is not surprising that the membership of KÉSZ, who are Christian writers, poets, artists, and scholars, are “exploring the social and cultural roles and responsibilities of Christianity, developing and documenting Christian positions” and “consciously undertake the mission of Christian evangelization” in a broadly defined public sphere. (Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége 1989) Linked to this objective is the need to understand those international political challenges that have become increasingly prominent in recent years and try to find answers to those fundamental issues that determine our lives. As an element of this, KÉSZ, in cooperation with other organizations dedicated to civic values, intellectual responsibility, Christian public discourse, launched a wide-ranging dialogue and discussion about its various issues. This joint social project between KÉSZ and the Hungarian Association for Civic Cooperation and the

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Batthyány Circle of Professors has been named The Signs of the Time. The three organizations analyzed the situation of Hungarian society, public life and politics on a Christian basis. They examined the most important social issues are in Hungary today and tried to identify the most appropriate Christian answers for them. Balázs Barsi, László Bíró, Gábor Náray-Szabó, György Velkey, Miklós Kásler, Miklós Maróth, Ágoston Mráz, András Lánczi, Magdolna Csath, Laura Sarolta, Banitz, Miklós Vecsei, Emőke Bagoly, Judit Czakó, Petra Aczél and many others partcipated in this great work. The cooperating organisation published the first discussion paper on 30 October 2015 at the Italian Cultural Institute in Budapest. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attended and spoke at the presentation, Zoltán Balog, Endre Gyulai, László Tőkéczki, Zoltán Osztie, Gábor Náray-Szabó and János Martonyi gave presentations. The discussion paper and a collection of studies which were published together with the results of these process outlined what happened in Hungary in the previous twenty-five years and what were the main challenges in contemporary ungarianH society. So, this volume analyzed in detail Hungary’s place in the global world, its national character and national policy, church life, family, demography, economy, rural development, healthcare, education and social affairs. Keresztény( Értelmiségiek Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Együttműködés Egyesület – Professzorok Batthyány Köre 2015) In the course of all this study, the issues of sustainable development, the decline of Europe’s population, the accompanying migration pressure, and the worldwide persecution of Christians have appeared in many papers. As early as 2015 the Christian intellectuals were doing their best to highlight that solidarity towards the world has always been an irrefutable and unshakable Christian principle, and the Hungarian State has always done its fair share in this field. The analyses have shown that, following the principlef o pacta sunt servanda, it is the responsibility of every government to accept those asylum seekers who are fleeing because of a sudden emergency in the spirit of Christian charity. However, this process must follow the rules of procedure to ensure that only those people receive support who are not trying the game the system. Furthermore, the government can not ignore the dangers of mass migration which is frequently accompanied by the rise of human trafficking, corruption, violence and terrorism. On 5 September 2015, the organization held its 10th National Congress titled “Justice, Righteousness, Freedom” in the Upper House Chamber of the Parliament. The event was intended to respond to the tragic events of our day, wars, genocides, acts of terrorism, attacks on national sovereignty, and to address the challenges of moral relativism, aggression disguised as a democracy, and unbridled, liberalism. With the conference, KÉSZ sought to protect human dignity, which is a gift from God, and for the freedom that comes from it, which builds society and justice, which can only be established on Christian foundations. The following

285 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUALS IN AID OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES people spoke at this event Archbishop Balázs Bábel; Attila Horváth, a constitutional lawyer; Károly Fekete, a Bishop of the Reformed Church in Hungary; Konrad Sutarski, a Polish writer; Tamás Wetzel, Deputy Secretary of State for National Policy; András Babály, parish priest; Archdeacon Sándor Kovács; Tamás Korhecz, Professor Emeritus, former President of the Hungarian National Council of Vojvodina, Serbia. (Rochlitz 2015) The worldwide persecution of Christians was also on the agenda of the Congress, and KÉSZ, in cooperation with other NGOs regularly spoke about the subject. On 16 June 2015, the Hungarian Association for Civic Cooperation and the Batthyány Circle of Professors initiated the “Light a Candle – Walk for Persecuted Christians” program and the issue became an important topic at the KÉSZ’s forums and prayer session. Dr. Erzsébet Lanczendorfer, the honorary president of the KÉSZ organization in Győr, organized a series of nation-wide round-table discussions in a new form, that have been decisive in the life of KÉSZ and have been going on for decades. In 2015–2016, talks were held at two dozen locations with political scientists, ministers and state secretaries on the topic of “Hungarian solutions for the problems of Europe”, focusing on the issue of migration and the global persecution of Christians. KÉSZ also continued The Signs of the Time program: in 2016, they held ten conferences to raise awareness across the country about these issues. This project ended with a two-day closing conference in Siófok. The 2016 edition of The Signs of the Time summarized the debate and provided new perspectives. The participating experts concluded that European solutions about the persecution of Christians and migration are often one- sided and do not provide a valid and comprehensive solution. When we address this issue with a Christian heart, we cannot be content with superficial explanations. We can not be satisfied with the constant expression of solidarity but ignoring the responsibility to protect European Christian culture, for the continent as a whole, and the respect of human dignity. (Baritz 2016, 94–97) Thus, following its main mission, evangelization, KÉSZ organised a national pilgrimage with the following motto: “Like Dobó on the Bastion,” on 19 March 2016 in Eger. The pilgrimage was a community prayer for Christians, Christian Europe, and the Mother of Sorrows. In the midst of growing debate in Europe, the Federation of Christian Intellectuals (KÉSZ) published an open letter in October 2016, in which it clearly stated that Western and Eastern Europe, because of their different historical experiences, have a diverging views on migration, human trafficking, the persecution of Christians and crises, therefore the Federation urged European society to consistently adhere to Christ and the renew its faith. So KÉSZ’s 11th Congress, “Defenders and Builders – Hungarians in Christian Europe”, which was held in the Upper House Chamber of the Parliament on 16 September 2017 focused on the above-mentioned issues.

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The opening lectures were given by Cardinal Péter Erdő and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The other speakers of the Congress included József Steinbach, Bishop of the Transdanubian District of the Hungarian Reformed Church, Tamás Fabiny, Bishop of the Northern Church District, the Hungarian Evangelical Lutheran Church, Kinga Gál Member of the European Parliament; Tamás Török, Deputy State Secretary for the Aid of Persecuted Christians; Péter Krisztián Zahar, historian; and Benvin Sebastian SVD, Director of Pontifical Mission Societies. Their presentations explore crucial historical issues and the current condition of Christianity. Deputy Secretary of State Tamás Török not only spoke about the intellectual background of the establishment of the Secretariat but also made it clear that facilitating the implementation of humanitarian and development programs on the spot was an essential element of the assistance. The resiliency fo persecuted Churches in their homeland is of the utmost importance, and in particular, the reconstruction of homes, the improvement of health care, scholarship programs and the keeping the public informed about these issues. (Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége 2017 77–87.) In connection with this latest thought, KÉSZ created a travelling exhibition called “Cross-Fire”. The exhibition uses documents, pictures and video footage of Christian persecution in the Middle East. This exhibition was th result of a collaboration between the Hungarian National Museum, the Migration Research Institute and the Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, and the Assistant State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians also helped the birth of this exhibition with professional and financial assistance. The impact of the exhibition was probably as strong as the “The Kingdom of Heaven is Theirs” documentary, which depicted the fate of persecuted Christians in Northern Iraq and the work of the Christian Churches there. It is also worth pointing out that through its involvement and proactive engagement in the process, KÉSZ also contributed to the success of the international consultation on Christian persecution which was launched by the Ministry of Human Capabilities in October 2017, and made efforts ot find the appropriate responses to this crisis. The statement which concluded the international consultation was the participants did not only care about persecuted Christians. At the same time, they also condemned religious atrocities and the crimes of terrorist organizations and called on world political decision-makers to promote the free practice of religions in crisis regions and to seek long-term solutions to the problem of persecution. Currently there 75 KÉSZ groups in the country hold many events dedicated to the persecution of Christians with the participation of people like

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Azbej Tristan, State Secretary for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and the Implementation of the Hungary Helps Program; Gyula Márfi, the Archbishop of Veszprém; György Hölvényi, Member of the European Parliament, Co-chair of the Interreligious Working Group of the European People’s Party; Bianka Speidl, orientalist, Middle East expert of the Migration Research Institute; Georg Spöttle, security policy specialist and Zoltán Kiszelly, political scientist. In the run-up to the 2018 parliamentary elections by publishing the Ten questions to ten parties, KÉSZ devoted prominent space to Christianity’s power and its role in preserving the nation. Besides, KÉSZ also asked the parties running in the elections what they were going to do to protect Christianity. The responses received reflected the conceptual differences of the various political organisations. That is why the organization considered it important to direct the attention of the political leadership to the four cornerstone virtues of Christianity and closing The Signs of Timeprogram. The 2018 debates and the closing volume of the program “We call it by the name again - Virtues in Public Life?” reviewed Hungarian public life, the most important trends in Hungarian society. The ceremonial presentation of the last volume was held on 25 April 2018, where Minister Zoltán Balog appreciated the joint work of the three partner organisation. During the evening, they not only presented a new discussion paper but they also premiered a film demonstrated the four cornerstone virtues, justice, moderation, spiritual strength and cleverness, in a new, exciting way. Directors Dezső Krisztics and Lackó Szögi focused their film no everyday Christianity, personal responsibility and community sacrifice. The film has since been made availablen o KÉSZ’s website. The clear result and success of this four-year-long project besides its members KÉSZ could also demonstrate to the general public its values, its solutions for the great issues of our time ideas. It developed attracted considerable attention even in the circles of soc. In December 2018 the Presidency of KÉSZ participated in a roundtable dedicated to the topic of the persecution of Christians. At this event besides raising awareness, the participant learned a lot about the activities, achievements and future mission of the newly created State Secretariat and the Hungarian Helps Program. Throughout 2018, KÉSZ has worked together with CitizenGo, which is a pan-European non-governmental organization based in Madrid, to draw the attention to online petitions about the protection of human life, family and free religious practice. One of the most important objectives was the creation of a petition in 2018 which asked two things from Ahmed Shaheed, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief. First, to legally acknowledge that Christian’s were subject to a genocide in the Middle East and Africa. Second, to ensure that the UN was taking appropriate measures to protect persecuted Christians. Similarly, at the

288 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUALS IN AID OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES beginning of 2019, they launched another petition to achieve the appointment of an EU special envoy, with appropriate authorisation, for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union. In 2019, the most prominent Hungarian organizations of Christian intellectuals set up a relationship with Christian Solidarity International (CSI). The CSI is a Christian human rights organization which also strives for freedom of religion and human dignity by pointing out that these are essential prerequisites for the worthy exercise of faith. Established in Zurich in 1977, this organisation documents and publicise cases of anti-Christian torture, persecution and genocide. Besides this activity, CSI also provides financial support to victims of religious bias by distributing food aid and medicines and works to prevent the oppression of vulnerable children and women. Society always expects intellectuals to be at the forefront of issues to point out problems and propose solutions. Indifference and resignation cannot overcome Christian intellectuals, the burdens of everyday life and any distressing problems must not divert energies from the service of the community, the pursuit of spiritual life, and the future of Christianity. Christian teaching is still about a set of fundamental spiritual and intellectual values, about God, man, and the relationship between the two. It is the mission of every Christian intellectuals to warn about dangers and extremes which threaten the nation, the Christian Churches and values. These values are based upon the highest spiritual freedom which are the teachings of the Scripture, and to help people towards these values. Thus, it is essential in the future to continue the work that has already begun. Within the framework of KÉSZ this is done by local group presentations, annual pilgrimages, and biennial congresses. At these events, they always examine the current issues of Christianity, including the various types of Christian persecution. The travelling exhibition prepared by the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians is an appropriate tool to achieve this goal. The KÉSZ network and its wide-ranging roaderb Carpathian Basin network of contacts, as well as Hungarian Catholic Christian – Reformed Christian partner organizations abroad, can provide an appropriate framework for the presentation of the travelling exhibition. Also, it is worth inviting experts and leaders of religious denominations to participate in roundtables, talks, lectures, and then disseminate knowledge through the press. KÉSZ and its intellectual partner organizations are also involved in charitable activity and fundraising. Once this is done Christian intellectuals can make it clear that the donations will be distributed worldwide. Intellectuals also have to refute those views which express that Christianity, Christian values, and a culture rooted in Christianity are unnecessary. Lastly, we must confront the tendencies which, connected to the previous principle, lead to violent anti-Christian activities. Hungary and Central Europe offer a new deal to Europe which includes the determination to fight against the persecution of Christians and a new approach towards humanitarian intervention in the world’s crisis

289 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN INTELLECTUALS IN AID OF PERSECUTED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES regions. It is the task of each Christian intellectual to sincerely examine how can he/she strengthen local communities, and how can we reverse the process which gradually displacing the values of the gospel from daily life. Through stronger communities, we can support Christianity in the world, and with our strong faith, we can protect persecuted Christians worldwide. Literature

Az Adalbertinum első évtizede (1998): Új Ember, 54. évf. 19. sz. Baritz, Sarolta Laura (2016): Van-e helye az erkölcsnek a gazdaságban? Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Együttműködés Egyesület – Professzorok Batthyány Köre (ed.):. Az idők jelei. Budapest, Kairosz Kiadó. Bodnár, Dániel (2019): Evangéliumi értékek mentén cselekvő és gondolkodó egyesület – Beszélgetés Makláry Ákos parókussal. https://www.magyarkurir.hu/hirek/evangeliumi-ertekek-menten-cselekvo-es-gondolkodo-egyesulet- beszelgetes-maklary-akos-parokussal (web: 14 August 2019). Csanád, Béla (1989): Lectori salutem. Jel, 1–2. szám. 1. Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége (1989) Alapszabály. Jel, 1. évf. 1–2. sz. 62–63. Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Együttműködés Egyesület – Professzorok Batthyány Köre (2016): Az idők jelei – Tanulmánykötet. Budapest, Lexica kiadó. Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Együttműködés Egyesület – Professzorok Batthyány Köre (2018): Újra néven nevezzük – Erények a közéletben? Az idők jelei 2018. Budapest, StratComm Kft. Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége (2017): Védők és építők. Budapest. 77–87. Igazság, igazságosság, szabadság. http://www.jelujsag.hu/igazsag-igazsagossag-szabadsag (web: 12 July 2019) Makláry, Ákos: Az egyháznak helye van a közéletben. https://www.keesz.hu/maklary-akos-az-egyhaznak- helye-van-a-kozeletben (web: 14 August 2019) Szemlélek (2019): Tíz kérdés tíz párthoz 2018. https://www.keesz.hu/a-partok-valaszai-a-kesz-tiz-kerdesere---frissitve (web: 10 August 2019) Ujbuda (2018): Válaszúton – Interjú Osztie Zoltán plébánossal. https://ujbuda.hu/ujbuda/valaszuton-interju- osztie-zoltan-plebanossal (web: 8 August 2019)

290 Klára Siposné Kecskeméthy1 CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIANITY IN OUR DAYS

Introduction

Before we can present the changes which occurred in religious geography and the geographical distribution of Christianity we have to review the place, definition and role of religious geography in scientific taxonomy and the geographical position of Christianity. Religious geography studies the spatial connections of religion and geography. It aims to learn and review the evolution and history of world religions up to the present day. Modern religious geography is an interdisciplinary field of science which studies the religious distribution of people globally. It also examines the religious relations of different areas, regions, countries, the interrelations, connections and regional aspects of natural-social phenomena and religions. Religious geography is the connection, an interface of geography, religious studies/ theology since cannot study any religious, or ethnic, phenomenon without discussing its geographical aspects and spatiality. (Hunyadi 2014, 216.) In Hungary, religious geography has a relatively limited literature and just a small number of researchers study it. In the past decades, the work of László Hunyadi has become synonymous with religious geography. (Siposné Kecskeméthy-Sipos 1994) His book of crucial importance, titled “A világ vallásföldrajza”(The religious geography of the world) was published in 1995. (Hunyadi 1995) László Hunyadi emphasizes the interdisciplinary connections and nature of religious geography, according to which, religious geography belongs to cultural geography and is the special cross-disciplinary science of geography and religious studies (theology). It also has connections with other fields of sciencelike ethnography, philosophy, political science, economics, sociology, history, statistics etc. (Hunyadi 2002, 369–381)

1 National University of Public Service

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Religious geography can be divided into general, branch and regional religious geography. (Hunyadi 2014, 216.) General religious geography studies the impact of the geographical environment on religions, their evolution, changes, religious rules, customs, liturgy and religious scripts. It also deals with the impact of religions on the geographical environment, civilizations and the economic-social relationships of regions. Branch religious geography studies the geographical distribution of religions, the organizational structure and character of religions. It emphasizes those factors that affect the connections related to the natural environment, social- economic life. Regional religious geography studies the religious geographic phenomena of the continents, regions and countries in a complex way, including the denominational distribution of the population, the relationships between religions and the status of religions. It describes the underlying ethnic, linguistic, cultural etc. characteristics and connections of various natural conditions, the social-economic-political systems and the population. (Pete 2004) József Pete described the manifold connections of religious geography within other branches of geography. Besides population-, settlement- and economic-geographical, cultural and touristic geographical connections, several other geographical (auxiliary) disciplines (political geography, election geography, public administration geography, behavioural geography, historical geography) are also connected to religious geography. (Pete 2009, 17–22.)

The spatial presence of Christianity

In the last centuries, Christianity has become the most widespread religion in the world. The Age of Discovery and the subsequent colonialism, emigration, the annihilation of many ancient civilizations, cultures (Maya, Inca, Aztec), and the Christian conversion of the indigenous peoples, also played an important role in this process. The religious distribution in the world has changed a lot in the last decades, in 1966 32.3% of the world’s population was Christian, 8.5% Muslim, 13.6%Hindu, 13% Chinese Universalist, and 6% Buddhist. (Hunyadi 2014) In 2005, Christians made up 33%, while the share of Muslims has risen to 21% of the global population. (List of the major world religions 2005) According to the data of the Pew Research Center in 2015, Christians were the still the largest religious community (33.2%), but the proportion of Muslim believers shows an increasing tendency (24.1%). (PEW Research Center 2015) In 2018-according to the data of the CIA World Factbook, 31.4% of the global population were Christians while the share Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists were 23.2% 15% 7.1% respectively. (CIA World Factbook 2019)

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Let us take a non-exhaustive look at the presence of Christianity on the continents. In the last two thousand years, the religious map of Europe has changed several times. Besides the Catholics, the various Protestant denominations and Orthodox Christians Islam is also present on the continent. In the following countries in Europe, the share of Catholics is above 80% of the population in Malta 90%, in Croatia 86.3%, in Poland 85.9%, in Portugal 81%, in Italy 83.3%. Catholics also make up more than 70% or close: in Ireland 78.3%, in Lithuania 77.2%, in Austria 73.8%, in Luxembourg 70.4%, in Spain 68.9%, in France 66%, in Slovakia 62%, in Slovenia 57.8%, in Belgium 50%. On the other hand in the following countries the vast majority of the population is Protestant: Denmark 74.7%, Norway 70.6%, Finland 69.8%, Iceland 67.2%, Sweden 60.2%. (CIA World Factbook 2019) In the rest of the continent’s countries, the population is either mixed denomination-wise or certain religions have a relative majority. Geographically North-North Western Europe is the Protestant region, while West- South Western Europe (except for Great Britain), or the Central European region, like Poland, is the heart of Catholic Europe. In the intermediate zone, we find countries with mixed denominations (Catholic, Protestant). In the following countries the vast majority of the population is Orthodox: Greece 90%; Cyprus 89.1%, Serbia 84.6%, Romania 81.9%, Montenegro 72.1%, Bulgaria 59.4%. Within the Orthodox religious territory of South- Eastern and Eastern Europe, in the Balkans Islam is also present. The share Islam is illustrated by the following figures: in Kosovo 95.6%, in Albania 56.7%, in Bosnia and Hercegovina 50.7%, in North Macedonia 33.3%, in Montenegro 19.1%. In the Caucasus region and Azerbaijan, they make up 96.9% of the population. In 1990, Muslims made up 2.95% of the European population, (Hunyadi 1995, 276), but according to data from 2016 that figure grew to almost 5%. (Pew Research Center 2016) Besides, in several North and Western European countries, Muslims are also present in increasing numbers (France 7–9%, Denmark 5.5%, Germany 5%, Belgium 5%, Luxembourg 2.3%, Norway 3.2%). Africa can be divided into White and Black Africa from an ethnic point of view. Arabs, Berbers and Ethiopians, who belong to the Europid great race live in the northern and north-eastern part. On the other hand, Black Africa, the vast majority of the people belong to the Negroid great race. The African continent is heterogeneous from a religious point of view. Christianity took its roots in North Africa between the 2nd-4th centuries, but in the 7th-8th centuries, it was displaced by Islam almost everywhere. The only exceptions are the Egyptian and Ethiopian Coptic Christian religious islands. In Egypt, 10% of the population is Christian (Coptic, Armenian, Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox and Anglican) while 90% of the population is Sunni Muslim. In Ethiopia, 43.5% of the population is Coptic Christian, 33.9% Muslim and 18.5% Protestant. (CIA World Factbook 2019) The vast majority of the population in North

293 CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIANITY IN OUR DAYS and North Eastern Africa is Muslim which has an increasing influence and is quickly spreading in Africa. The spread of Christianity was linked to missionary activity which began in the 16th century. Christians constitute the majority of the population in the southern part of the continent: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (29.9% Catholic, 26.7% Protestant, 36.5% other Christians), Angola (41.1% Catholic, 38.1% Protestant), Zambia (75.3% Protestant, 20.2% Catholic), Zimbabwe (74.8% Protestant, 7.3% Catholic), Botswana (79.1% Christian) and Namibia (80–90% Christian). (CIA World Factbook 2019) After 1960 when the African countries became independent, the Catholic Church had an especially quick expansion. In 1990, 45.7% of the African population was Christian and 41.3% Muslim. (Hunyadi 1995, 303) By 2015 the proportion of Christians grew even further and reached 51%. Asia was the cradle of every major religion. The various ancient religions and beliefs like Shamanism, the belief in ghosts (Animism) and Totemism have all been displaced in Central and North Asia. This was achieved by Islam from the 16th century, Christianity from the 17th century, Buddhism from the 18th century, and atheism in the 20th century. In South, South Eastern and East Asia, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism are still present. Christians in Asia are a minority group constituting about 5% of the entire population. (Hunyadi 1995, 293) The cradle of Judaism and Christianity is ancient Palestine. Judaism is the religion of the vast majority of the people in the territory of present-day Israel (6.2 million, 74.7%), Christianity is the religion of the vast majority in the Philippines (94 million, 80.6% Catholic, 8.2% Protestant. (CIA World Factbook 2019) The New World was conquered after the discovery of America, the indigenous people were thrust into the background by the influx of the conquerors and had to live in an ever-diminishing area. The assimilated Indians, who live in towns, belong to one of the Christian religions, but the lifestyle and culture of the Indians living in reservations have also been completely transformed. Christianity arrived in the region with the European immigrants. 87% of the North American population is Christian, other religions are insignificant. (Hunyadi 1995, 321) Three major Indian peoples lived in Central and South America before 492:1 the Aztecs in Mexico, the Maya in Central America and the Inca in the territory of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia. The Spanish and Portuguese conquerors forced the Indians into their colonial system in a violent way. European immigrant flow into South America started in the second half of the 19th century, 90% of them were Catholic. At the same time, Protestantism also appeared in Latin America and slowly gained ground. 91% of the population was Christian in 1990 and 85% of this number Catholic. However, after this date, the proportion of Catholics has been continuously diminishing. (Hunyadi 1995, 325)

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European settlement on the Australian continent started at the end of the 18th century. This was accompanied by colonization and missionary activities. A part of the Australian indigenous people (Aboriginals) did assimilate into the white society and converted to Christianity, while others live in tribal groups, reservations and around towns. Even smaller groups of the Aboriginals cling to their ancient way of life and wander in the central and northern scrubland of Australia. (Marlo 2016) Many ancient religious beliefs like Totemism and Magic are still prevalent among the groups. The vast majority ofAustralians are Christians, the number of those following Judaism, Islam and Buddhism are insignificant. (Hunyadi 1995, 336)

Tendencies in the changes of the religious geography of Christianity

To understand the changes in the religious geography of Christianity, it is indispensable to study the theories of Richard Hartshorne concerning whether states and borders can stand the test of time. According to Hartshorne, the resiliency of states, as well as of their borders is the resultant of unifying (centripetal) and dividing (centrifugal) forces. (Hartshorne 1950) Based on that model, unifying forces in a state are the common language, culture, religion, longstanding and peaceful coexistence, the central presence of a strong economic and power centre, the natural boundaries (seacoast, mountain ranges, rivers, deserts), and the sparsely populated border areas. Dividing forces are the linguistic, cultural diversity, sizeable minority groups, short co-existence, the lack of a strong economic and power centre, or its polarized state, artificial boundaries and densely populated border areas. In the post-bipolar era, the number of international conflicts drastically decreased while internal conflicts became more visible. These conflicts are usually connected to religious d/oran ethnic differences which fuel further tension. Nowadays many different religious and ethnic groups are engaged in armed conflict all over the world. Throughout history, innumerable ethnic groups have been forced to live between artificial borders, colonization. The process of decolonization with its artificial borders have caused a whole spate of new, unsolved conflicts in the postcolonial world. The African continent provides a series of explicit examples for such conflicts. When the borders were drawn, the driving factor was the division of the continent into areas of influence for the European colonizers while, the power relations of the regions including ethnic, religious and tribal affiliations did not matter at all. The result was an extremely diverse ethnic make-up by forcing the various tribes of Black Africa, who often belonged to different ethnicities and religions, to live within artificial borders. This colonial decision has been the source of many contemporary conflicts up to this day. (Selján 2008)

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The different forms and practices of persecution, like cultural isolation,estriction r of free practice of religion, discrimination, intimidation, violence, and physical annihilation all play a significant role in the changing/ decreasing the number and proportion of certain Christian groups. Attacks on religious symbols and buildings are also a part of the persecution. To present and understand the changes in the religious geography of Christianity, the annual report in the World Watch List of the Open Doors International foundation can be considered as a guideline. The World Watch List is a report on Christian persecution which enumerates the 50 most important countries where Christians are persecuted for their faith.2 (World Watch List 2019) The first ten countries on the list are North Korea, Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, Pakistan, Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Iran and India. In seven out of the ten countries, violent Islamist oppression is the main cause of Christian persecution, but religious nationalism and communist oppression are also present. According to the 2018 report, 245 million Christians suffered from persecution globally, which is a significant increase erov the previous year (215 million). 1,266 Christian religious symbols and churches were also attacked. The conclusions of the 2018 Religious Freedom Report of the Aid to the Church in Need organization, are also an important source if we want to understand changes in the religious geography of Christianity. (Religious Freedom Report 2018) The report studies and evaluates the religious situation of every country in the world over a two-year-long period until June 2018. The makers of the report realized that religious freedom cannot be adequately accessed without examining the complicated connections between religion and other related factors like politics, economics, and education. 196 countries were studied and evaluated with special attention to the presence of religious freedom in their constitutions and other laws, the individual cases and the tendencies which can be anticipated in a country. They focused on countries where attacks no religious freedom exceeds the relatively slight forms of intolerance and reach the level of violation of human rights. The countries where severe violation of law occur can be divided into two categories: discrimination and persecution. Discrimination encompasses the institutionalization of intolerance, which is usually accomplished at different levels by the state or its representatives, against individual groups or religious communities. Whereas, in the case of discrimination the state is classified as the sole oppressor of while when we talk about the persecution the state loses its monopoly of discrimination and is joined by terrorist groups and other non- governmental entities. The tools of oppression include violence, murder, unlawful detention and forced exile,

2 The World Watch List ranking is based on data from local employees and independent specialists and is used to globally identify and evaluate persecution. The countries are ranked according to the severity of Christian persecution, considering the level of violent persecution and the pressure experienced in the five spheres of life (church, nation, community, family, individual). For the methodology of ranking see https://www. opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/world-watch-list/about-the-ranking/ (web: 10 August 2019).

296 CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIANITY IN OUR DAYS the violation of property rights. Persecution is a more serious category than discrimination as it naturally includes various forms of negative discrimination besides the violation of religious freedom. As for the report, religious freedom was significantly impinged in 38 countries (19.3%): These countries were then studied in detail, and the following conclusions were drawn: 21 countries (55%) met the criteria of persecution and the remaining 17 countries (45%) consequently belong to the discrimination category. Globally, 11% of the countries fell into the persecution and 9% into the discrimination categories (graphic 1). According to the report, the state of religious freedom has deteriorated in 18 out of the 38 countries (47.5%), relatively evenly distributed between persecution and discrimination. From 2016 to 2018, 18 (47.5%) of the 38 countries did not show any visible signs of change. The conditions of religious freedom improved in two countries (5%), in Iraq and Syria, which in 2016 were classified as top violators of religious freedom. It is worth noting the fact that in Russia and Kyrgyzstan the situation of religious freedom deteriorated so much since 2016 that 2018 was the first year when the two countries were first mentioned the discrimination category. The significant reduction of militant Islamist violence in Tanzania and Kenya meant that these countries were not classified in either of the categories at all.

graphic 1. Countries where religious freedom is severely violated Source: Religious Freedom Report 2018. https://religious-freedom-report.org/#case_studies (web: 11 September 2018)

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Although the conclusions of 2018 are similar to those made in 2016. Yet from several aspects, there is one important difference. This is a significant increase in the number of countries where the state of religious freedom has deteriorated. In 2018 the situation worsened in 18 countries which is a bigger deterioration than what happened in the previous period. It is a significant drop, which illustrates that state actors pose an ever higher threat to religious freedom in countries like Myanmar, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey. The facts also support the hypothesis that the threat of Islamism will probably increase in the coming decade. The same is true about state actors since the level fo religious freedom worsened in several countries. These include several countries which are regional and global powers and are governed by authoritarian regimes since 2016. The situation is especially worrying in India, which is not just the second-most populous country in the world, where severe violent actions occurred and the obvious motive for these crimes is religious hatred. The report examines China separately, where the position of every religious group becomes endangered if they fight against the more and more authoritarian approach dictated by the party leadership. During the period discussed in the report, President Xi Jinping made aggressive steps against religious groups which tried to resist the Chinese communist authorities. North Korea is one of those countries globally where there is no religious freedom at all, where basic human rights are almost totally denied, and all the freedoms specified in the universal manifestation of human rights are systematically violated. (Religious Freedom Report North Korea 2018) Violence against Christians, Muslims and other minorities also illustrates the threats created by the most aggressive forms of nationalism, which regards minorities as a mortal threat for the nation-state. As a consequence, these regimes often initiate aggressive policies against minorities which are designed to make them give up their identity or force them out of the country. Lately, the role and significance of a geographic bridge have emerged several times and in a lot of contexts. For example, Ernő Nyáry the former Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baghdad, (Nyári 2014) served in a country which tried to combine Arab nationalism and socialism; where Christians and Muslims lived their everyday lives peacefully side by side. He served in Baghdad for 32 years, and during his tenure, he built many bridges between religions, ethnicities, nationalities. In pre-2003 Iraq, Muslims considered it natural that they live in a country where Christians can have churches where they can hold their religious services. (Jakus 2017). The Middle East is highly divided in terms of geography, ethnicity, religion, economy and public administration. The war inflicted serious damage on the Christian communities in Iraq and Syria (Assyrian, Chaldean, Syrian Catholic and Orthodox, Armenian denominations). (Kótai 2017). According to His Holiness Mar Gewargis III, Universal

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Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East: “the deterioration of the security situation is accompanied by the strengthening of extremist feelings, attacks on Christian churches. The anti-Christian wave of violence, persecution and organized massacres on the Nineveh Plains and in the villages around Mosul make the situation totally impossible for Christians to exist.” (Pope Francis, Mar Gewargis III. 2018) The rise of violence after the American invasion in 2003 and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria led to a spree of targeted murders and persecution against the Christians in Iraq. Millions of people, including hundreds of thousands of Christians, were forced to flee their homes. Many fled to Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and others became internally displaced. (Györfi 2015) By the middle of 2018, the events showed an improving tendency in Northern Iraq as well. Until June 2018, 25,650 Christians returned to Qaraqosh on the Nineveh Plains (Halemba 2018). (Religious Freedom Report Iraq 2018) During its occupation, the Islamic State inflicted so much damage in the area that people did not even feel the desire to return to Erbil. (Pontifex 2017) Many people, who were previously forced to leave, returned to their homes in the Yazidi and Christian towns and villages, including Bartela, Karemlash and Teleskof, moving into houses renovated and reconstructed by the Church, charity organizations and a few foreign governments. (Niniveh Plains 2019) If these organizations had not helped, the Christian community of the region would have disappeared. These two companies were the main targets of the Islamic State’s genocide. The liberation of territories previously occupied by extremist groups is also a victory for religious freedom. The majority of the population in Syria are Sunni Muslims. The Alawites, the Christians and the Druze are the other pieces in the traditional religious mosaic of the country. The Kurds are the largest non-Arab ethnic group of the country, most of them being Sunni Muslim. Since 2011, religious freedom has seriously deteriorated in the country. Before the war, Christians made up about 10 per cent of the population. Most of them belong to two Eastern Christian Churches: the Melkite Greek Catholic Church and the Syrian Orthodox Church. Church leaders praised the tolerant atmosphere, which was a key characteristic of pre-war Syria. Since many Christians lived in a few strategically important areas which were hit hardest by the war. Due to these events, many Christians had to flee the country in large numbers while others became internally displaced in other regions of the country. (Religious Freedom Report Syria 2018) Due to the unsolved nature of the 8-year long conflict, the humanitarian crisis the situation of religious freedom is not going to improve in the short run in Syria. In June 2008, the World Watch Monitor published a comprehensive study about the Syrian Armenians. Since then out of the 100,000 Armenians, 70,000 have left Syria during the war, and only very few of them have returned home. That is the reality for other religious minorities too. (Savarian 2018)

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The Religious Freedom 2018 report concluded that the radicalization of certain parts of the Muslim community poses a danger not only to those who do not follow Islam. There are growing tensions and the violence between Sunnis and Shias too. The threat of militant Islam extended far beyond Asia and Africa according to the study. In that period, the terrorist attacks were committed in multiple European locations like Manchester, Berlin, Barcelona, Paris. These events proved once again that the threat posed by extremists is universal. One of the main motivations for the attacks was revenge against the western military intervention in Syria. The secondary motives also included explicit religious motivation, namely that the perpetrators deeply despise liberal western society and its values including the principle of religious freedom. In certain cases, it also turned out that the perpetrators directly targeted symbolic buildings of Christianity. While investigating the events connected to the extremist attack in Las Ramblas, Barcelona in August 2017, it turned out that the Islamist perpetrators were originally planning to attack the iconic Basilica de la Sagrada Familia. (Religious Freedom Report Spain 2018) Persecution always occurs when there is no law and order in a country and during such periods of unrest minorities are always perfect as scapegoats. The bridgebuildingrole of Ernő Nyáry, a former Archbishop of Baghdad, can take us closer to peace in our everyday lives. The peaceful coexistence, the dialogue between the Muslim and Christian worlds and the stability of the Middle East are not mere geostrategic issues.

Summary

Modern religious geography is a field of science which studies the religious distribution of the population on the earth, the religious make-up of different regions, countries, as well as the interaction, relations, regional problems of natural-social phenomena and religions. The present paper reviewed the place, definition, subject, division of religious geography in the scientific taxonomy, and the tendencies in the changing religious geography of Christianity. To describe the changes in the religious geography of Christianity, the paper used the most important conclusions of the World Watch List, which is an annual report published by the Open Doors International foundation, and the 2018 annual Religious Freedom Report issued by the Aid to the Church in Need organization. According to the World Watch List, 245 million Christians were persecuted globally, which is a significant rise over the previous year’s 215 million people. From the 196 countries discussed in the 2018 Religious Freedom report, there were 38 countries where there were serious violations of religious freedom

300 CHANGES IN THE RELIGIOUS GEOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIANITY IN OUR DAYS which the report divided into two categories which they describe as persecution discrimination. The number of countries which severely violate the religious freedoms of its citizens has also increased to 18 countries. This country contains countries like Myanmar, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey. However, there is some hope for the future since the conditions of religious freedom have improved in Iraq and Syria.

Literature

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Massimo Pampaloni, sj1

THE PONTIFICAL ORIENTAL INSTITUTE AT THE SERVICE OF THE CHRISTIAN EAST

The Pontifical Oriental Institute

The Pontifical Oriental Institute (PIO) is an academic institution of the Catholic Church, founded on 15 October 1917 by Pope Benedict XV (1914–1922) in Rome. The idea of founding thisinstitute did not arise out of nothing, as even a quick glance at the founding date might suggest. At the height of the World War I, “the pointless massacre” (Benedict XV 1917a) during which he was exercising his pontificate, the Pope was preoccupied with a reawakening of hope for the Catholic East.2 The evident dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had already for some time preoccupied the Church with respect to the fate of Christians in those countries. Furthermore, the news from Russia was not auguring anything good, especially after the events of 23 February 1917 (Julian Calendar), the prelude to the famous “October Revolution” of 24–25 October 1917 (Julian Calendar) (cf., Farrugia 2017, p. 508–9). For this reason, Benedict XV, following a history of solicitude evident from the time of Leo XIII toward the East, thought to aid the Christians of that region in a far-sighted manner. First of all, in May 1917 he separated the responsibility for the Eastern Catholic Churches from the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, founding an apposite and independent Congregation for the Eastern Church – which in 1967 became “for the Eastern Churches.” In doing so, he gave a clear signal that the territories where these Churches laboured, the Christian East, were not at all mission territories. Subsequently, in the month of October, with a motu proprio (the above cited Orientis catholici) the Pope established the Pontifical Oriental Institute, three weeks before the irruption of the October Revolution. With this Institute he wished to promote “higher studies regarding Oriental questions”– proprium altiorum domcilium de rebus Orientalibus (Benedict XV 1917b, p. 531–2). Especially in the beginning, the primary aim of the Institute vacillated between a kind of seminary to prepare future competent missionaries for engagement with

1 Pontifical Oriental Institute 2 «Orientis catholici ad spem veteris prosperitatis excitandi causa…». (Benedict XV 1917b)

305 THE PONTIFICAL ORIENTAL INSTITUTE AT THE SERVICE OF THE CHRISTIAN EAST the Orthodox and an institute of high specialization regarding oriental matters. The direction that the PIO took in the end was that of an institute of research and of academic formation. From that time, the PIO has represented a place of study of all of the traditions of the Christian East from the point of view of history, canons, theology, and liturgy. Furthermore, it has always been open to the Orthodox world, welcoming students from its churches, and has contributed in making known the treasures of the oriental traditions to the Latin world. The farsightedness of Pope Benedict XV, his reading and truly prophetic vision of the contemporary reality regarding the importance the East would have in the unfolding of history, manifested itself precisely in the moment in which Christians were about to enter a new period of martyrdom and persecution. This was due to two factors: first, the immediate taking of power by a delusion both gnostic and fiercely antichristian (communism); second, in an incubation slower but constant, that gave birth to radical Islam, which in the fear of losing its proper identity following the dissolution of the Califate, found in al-Hasan al-Bannā’, Sayyd Qtub and their organization, some of the former mentors of the current extremism. What did the PIO mean for Eastern Christians in such conditions? It was a place where their memory and identity would be studied and preserved. A setting where, after the darkness of persecution, they could recover the fundaments of their liturgy and history. A haven where they knew they would not be forgotten, nor their presence or significance for history and for the Church. As was said by Benedict XVI to the academic community of the PIO at his audience for the ninetieth anniversary of the Institute, “Difficult times have sometimes put these ecclesial communities to a bitter test that, although physically far from Rome, always remained close through their fidelity to the Chair of Peter. Their progress and steadfastness in difficulties would have been unthinkable without the constant support that they were able to obtain from the oasis of peace and study that is the Pontifical Oriental Institute, meeting point of various scholars, professors, writers and editors, among the most knowledgeable about the Christian East.” (Benedict XVI 2007, 1064)

The Pontifical Oriental Institute Today

Having recently celebrated the centennial of its founding, the PIO today finds itself in a curious situation. On the one hand, as is written in the preamble of the mission statement elaborated by the PIO academic community on the occasion of its centenary, “it is in plain view that, looking back to 1917 and the beginning of the Institutes, the world in which the Oriental Churches live today has changed profoundly. The Ottoman Empire exists no

306 THE PONTIFICAL ORIENTAL INSTITUTE AT THE SERVICE OF THE CHRISTIAN EAST longer, nor the subsequent system of western protectorates on the lands of the East. The Soviet Union has come and gone. India gained independence from Great Britain some time ago. Ethiopia and Eritrea are no longer colonies of Italy.” (“The Pontifical Oriental Institutes: a new century, a new Mission,” 2016, 159) However, at the same time and much like one hundred years ago, the PIO finds itself again at the crossroads of events that marked world history in recent years. With 1989 and the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall, the PIO found itself welcoming a pressing request from John Paul II, preoccupied as he was by the formation of Christians of the former Soviet block, in large part Oriental. And the PIO took on the task of offering its professors and its treasure of knowledge of the Churches that were coming out of the nightmare of persecution. Today’s situation is no better as the Institute finds itself again on the front lines. We recall the Russian- Ukrainian conflict, which involves the most numerous Greek-Catholic community, the Ukrainian, in a conflict where politics, history, and Christian confession are terribly interwoven. There is open persecution in many countries dominated by islamicist regimes, with segregation and persecution less overt in others. It is these Christians who have always preoccupied the PIO and continues to do so today. Looking at map of the Christian persecution, such as the World Watch List offered by Open Doors (available athttps://tinify.ir/G42LFT , last updated 14 August 2019), one sees immediately that among the first fifty countries where persecution is worst, the vast majority is of Islamic or communist origin. Very many of these countries are those from which come our students and professors or they are countries whose churches are subjects of our research and our mission.

The Mission of the Pontifical Oriental Institute

The current situation of the PIO in the contemporary international context ecallsr in many ways that of its foundation. Fundamentally, therefore, it is not surprising to note that the very mission of the PIO remains current, adding, if anything, the need for renewed attention due to the fact that these last hundred years have seen such technological and IT advances that, should these conflicts continue, we could all be led into a frightening level of tragedy. The fundamental engagement of the Institute is the study and research of the Christian East in all its components. This is a specific characteristic of the PIO. There are many other centres of research of high level that today are interested in the Christian East, above all from literary, historical, and archeological perspectives. However, the approach of the PIO remains irreplaceable. Not only for its precious library, but also because a particular attention is there cultivated toward the integral aspect of the East, especially through its theology.

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One of the consequences of the birth of many centres of study of the materials of Christian East is that this patrimony today is studied in places where the explicit option of faith is not always foreseen nor shared. For the creation of a critical text and its publication this may not signify much. However, when one passes to its interpretation, the theology that underlies it is essential. A theology studied without Christian experience remains defective, hostage, even the target of a misleading or ideological reading, following the thought of Bauer in the systematic application of artificial concepts such as gender, or dismissing a theological dialectic though some reductionism whether Marxist, deconstructionist, constructionist, and so on. The PIO has sought in these years to remain faithful to its initial mission, giving to its studies a wise balance among theology, spirituality, canons, and history that one hundred years have shown to be vital, as also St. John Paul II recalled to the PIO on the occasion of its 75th anniversary: “Work such that Liturgy might call on the Fathers, the Fathers might help a re-reading of Holy Scripture, and Theology might be the contemplative synthesis of this life in Christ, closely connected, as a unified experience, with spirituality, according to the happy model that is common to the East and the West.” (John Paul II 2016) It would be illusory, however, to think that the analogy situations of the time of the founding and the current historical moment could simply require the status quo. Also because, to return to the theme of this paper, while at the time of the birth of the PIO the persecutions were in potentia and Christianity was seen as a unified and solid reality, in our time persecution is by now in actu, and the ideological venom instilled during decades even within the Church itself, has led to internal fractures that are evident for all to see. This suffices to indicate that the fundamental lines of its mission remain but must adapt to the historical moment in which we live. A few examples might help make plain what we are saying.

1. The study and research of the treasures of the Christian East, especially in those regions where it is persecuted and at risk of physical extinction, serve to preserve their memory and identity, as we have noted several times. This is what we have long done. Furthermore, today, organizing conferences and study days regarding these patrimonies become occasions for saving from oblivion conflicts forgotten or deliberately ignored. One example is the International Conference organized by the PIO in 2011 on “The Ways of Knowledge in Syro-Mesopotamia from the 3rd-9th centuries.” The theme seemed, and indeed was, highly specialized. An opportune communication of the event, in the days when churches in Iraq and Egypt were being blown up, with the weight of the seriousness recognized by the PIO, those arguments made it possible for a series of events on the sidelines of the main conference to refocus attention on what was becoming routine journalism.

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2. Making known the treasures of the Christian East to Latins and westerners in general: this has always been considered among the principal objectives of the PIO. (Pius XI 2016, 140) Today, it acquires the added dimension of making known the real situation of Christians in lands of persecution, since mainstream western media is generally less a vehicle of information and more an agent of transformation at the service, by turn, of various globalist agencies. A place like the PIO can count on the actual experience of its students and professors, who become a primary and precious source for knowing the lived reality of the situations under study.

3. Publications of a high scientific level, such as the notedOrientalia Christiana Periodica (OCP) and Orientalia Christiana Analecta (OCA), the series Anaphorae Syriacae and Kanonika (of the Faculty of Eastern Canon Law), continue to be occasions of encounter and of publications of the works of specialists, as they have always done. The current times require an added attention to the current context, as in the case of the profound study of the Armenian question, a publication in seven volumes of all of the documents preserved in the Archives of the Holy See relative to the troubled years 1896–1925. The PIO has gone a step further in its attention to the present with the decision to initiate a Faculty Publications Series to help promote studies and essays in a more flexible and immediate manner on questions related to the Christian East, including the political and strategic spheres, placing the experience and competency unique to the PIO at the service of a broader public.

4. The ecumenical vocation of the PIO, which since the beginning has animated tsi studies and, especially after Vatican II has become one of the guiding principles of its teaching, acquires today a particular urgency in the context of persecution. Persecution at its core is “antichristic”, as H. Urs von Balthasar would say. The persecutor makes no distinction of confession. The objective is to eliminate Christ from the heart of people. Thus, the ecumenical dimension acquires, beyond the primary fundament of the Lord’s desire ut unum sint, a valence of aid and resistance against the persecutor. Nothing so much as the divisions in the Christian sphere, as history sadly teaches, has had the capacity to allow and promote persecution so effectively: the particular interests of the nobles of European courts in face of the Ottoman menace of the XV–XVII centuries, the European religious wars of the XVI–XVII centuries, the complicity and current silence before the killing of thousands and thousands of Christians for their faith in Jesus Christ. The PIO is a place of study and mutual understanding, a “safe place” to meet, as seen in the recent conference on autocephaly organized by the PIO whereby Ukrainians and Russians (Catholic and Orthodox) sat together and discussed at an historical and ecclesiological level that which has come to be used by others as seeds of discord and division.

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5. Beyond that which the PIO “has always been doing,” it is now a question of accepting new challenges. The geopolitical dimensions of the Christian East, which in the first hundred years were not areas of urgent study at the Institute, today are impossible to ignore. The main reasons have been noted above. One would want only to underscore the fact that the PIO, more and more in recent years, finds itself sought out by diplomats of the countries from which our students hail, making requests that it put at broader disposal its patrimony and its potential as a contribution to peace and international relations. And this provides further aid for persecuted Christians such that they might have a voice in a world which, it seems, seeks to silence them.

6. Finally, the theological dimension is of note. For the first hundred years, theology done at the PIO was at first concentrated on discussions with Orthodoxy, that it might “scrutinize the truth in depth, setting aside all preconceived opinions” (Benedict XV 1917b, 531). Then, with the passing of years, especially following Vatican II, theology at the PIO became almost exclusively a theology in oratione obliqua, as the Scholastics would say. This had real value and, indeed, was necessary in the context of historical theology. However, a theology that confronts the current reality is something to which we are called by that very reality. During the preparations for the Centenary, an Armenian bishop from Syria requested of the Rector, Rev. David Nazar, SJ, that the PIO help the church reflect on its theological response to the dilemma of war and persecution. Is it to defend oneself with arms, turn the other cheek, etc.? The PIO welcomed the request and it was very ignificants that the closing conference of the centennial year was dedicated precisely to this theological question, which aimed to reopen paths of reflection precisely on the theme of martyrdom,3 passing on to the theological dimension in oratione recta. In conclusion, I would like to cite an allusion made by Fr. Edward Farrugia, SJ made in respect of Benedict XV, “the unknown pope.” (Pollard 1999) Although his famous appeal to end the war, that “pointless massacre,” did not meet with the success which the Pope had sought, nevertheless there are three “monuments” that recall his commitment. First is his statue in Istanbul in the Pancaldi Quarter, to which the Sultan himself, Mehmet VI made a contribution; second, the statue of Regina Pacis e Sovrana del Mondo, which the pope erected in 1918 in the Basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome. The third, in the piazza of Santa Maria Maggiore, is the Pontifical Oriental Institute itself: a monument first and remostfo of living stone, which may be considered a bridge toward the Christian East. (Farrugia 2017, 519)

3 The result was the bookParole strappate all’orrore (Pampaloni 2019).

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The desire is that these monuments, just as we recall the vigorous commitment to peace of Benedict XV, might continue to be for us an inspiration to apply our efforts on behalf of persecuted Christians. In his prophetic vision of dedicating a Pontifical Institute to the Oriental realities in times in which new persecutions were on the rise, let us find the spirit and impetus to face our times in which they are ever more brazenly unleashed.

Literature

Benedict XV (1917a.): Aux chefs des peuples belligérantes. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. 17, No. 3. 417–20. Benedict XV (1917b.): Orientis catholici. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. 17, No. 11. 531–33. Benedict XVI. (2007): Discorso a una delegazione del Pontificio Istituto Orientale in occasione eld 90°anniversario di fondazione. Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vol. 99, No. 12. 1063–65. Farrugia, Edward G. (2017): Il centenario del Pontificio Istituto Orientale (1917–2017). La Civiltà Cattolica, Vol. 168. 507–19. John Paul II. (2016): Discorso in occasione del 75° dell’Istituto Orientale (12 dicembre 1993). In: Pontificio Istituto Orientale eds.: Ordo Anni Academici 2016–2017. Roma, Edizioni Valore Italiano. 149–50. John Paul II. (2016): Il Pontificio Istituto Orientale: un nuovo secolo, una nuova Missione. In: Ordo Anni Academici 2016–2017. In Pontificio Istituto Orientale eds.: Roma, Edizioni Valore Italiano. 159. Pampaloni, Massimo, a c. di. (2019): Parole strappate all’orrore. Criteri teologici per il martirio del Medio Oriente. Roma, Orientalia Christiana-Valore Italiano. Pius XI. (2016): Lettera al P. Volodimiro Ledóchowski, Preposito Generale della Compagnia di Gesù, sull’unione dell’Istituto Orientale con l’Istituto Biblico. In: Pontificio Istituto Orientale eds.: Ordo Anni Academici 2016–2017. Roma, Edizioni Valore Italiano. 140–41. Pollard, John F. (1999): The Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914–1922) and the Pursuit of Peace. London, G. Chapman.

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Thomas Muller1

MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL AND THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND IT

While arguably freedom of religion and belief is one of the most contested human rights in the world today2 and Christians are widely reported as being the most persecuted group for faith-related reasons, the question arises how these claims can be substantiated and how persecution or – with a broader formulation – limitation of freedom of religion and belief for Christians looks like and can be measured. This article3 aims to give an overview from the perspective of the possibly most comprehensive effort in this field, eth World Watch List, and is meant as a contribution to an ongoing debate.

Who is Open Doors?

Open Doors is an international Christian ministry, serving persecuted Christians around the world. Its mission is to strengthen and equip the body of Christ living under or facing restriction and persecution because of their faith in Jesus Christ, and to encourage their involvement in world evangelism by:

1 Persecution Analyst World Watch Research Open Doors International 2 A few keywords as a reminder have to be sufficient here: the questions of missions or proselytization, conversion and apostasy, blasphemy or restricting Freedom of religion and belief to the forum internum for converts in asylum cases. 3 The article is based on a lecture the author delivered on 11 April 2019 at a conference on the situation of Christians worldwide, organized by the National University of Public Service (NKE) and the State Secretariat for the Aid of Persecuted Christians and for the Hungary Helps Program, in Budapest. It is slightly extended in order to give a better understanding of the methodology Open Doors is following. The author is Persecution Analyst for Open Doors with a focus on Asia. He helped to develop the questionnaire and the methodology of the World Watch List. He holds a PhD in International Law/Human Rights Law and is specialized on these topics as well as on European Law. He can be reached by research@ od.org.

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• Providing Bibles and literature, media, leadership training, socio-economic development and through intercessory prayer; • Preparing the body of Christ living in threatened or unstable areas to face persecution and suffering; and • Educating and mobilizing the body of Christ living in the free world to identify with threatened and persecuted Christians and be actively involved in assisting them.

This is our calling as Open Doors, because we believe that when one member suffers, all members suffer (1 Corinthians 12:26), all doors are open, and God enables His body to go into all the world and preach the gospel. Open Doors started in 1955, when a young Dutch Christian, now best known under his nickname “Brother Andrew”, visited Warsaw and discovered the persecuted church there. He asked for their needs and learned that Bibles were in very short supply. So, he started to bring Bibles behind the Iron Curtain, what quickly earned him the name “God`s Smuggler”4. Our guiding verse in all our work was and is Revelation 3.2:

“Wake up! Strengthen what remains and is about to die…”

Today, Open Doors is active in around 65 countries with partly severe limitations on freedom of religion and belief as well as in 25 countries in the “free world”5, advocating for the situation of persecuted Christians and bridging the gap between them and churches in Europe, the United States, Brazil, South Africa and beyond. Like the coordinator for the Bible Lands bible societies, Labib Madanat, once said: “It is Satan`s lie to make us belief that there are two churches, one under persecution and one in holiday. The body of Christ is undivided.”

The World Watch List

Being a Christian relief ministry, Open Doors nevertheless puts emphasis on research as the basis for action and decision-making. Therefore, it tasked a team with doing research about the situation of Christians and in restrictions and persecution they are facing worldwide and to come up with an annual list of countries, in which Christians are suffering the most, the World Watch List. This list was originally started in 1991 as a purely

4 https://www.opendoorsuk.org/about/our-history/; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 5 https://www.opendoors.org/; last accessed on 12 August 2019.

314 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... internal planning tool but developed into a comprehensive way of raising awareness and making Christians around the world understand where and what their brothers and sisters are suffering. It was first published externally and for a broader host of recipients in 2003 and increasingly enjoyed recognition and reception not just from a Christian audience, but also from decision-makers around the world, such as politicians and journalists. To broaden the database and to make the list more accessible and comprehendible, the method of gathering the data for the World Watch List was completely overhauled, extended and its methodology published for the first time in 20126. Critics of publishing a list claim that this format is only good for catching attention and raising funds. Whereas it is certainly true that lists are catching an audience`s attention7, this is not its original intention and our research goes far beyond the mere list, as will be shown in this article8. Of course, the list should and will catch attention, but what Open Doors would like to see happening after that initial alert, in accordance with its calling described above is the following: Taking the Maldives as a random example, someone discovers that on the WWL 2019, the Maldives is on rank 14, a country he knows because he just spent vacation or even his honeymoon there. He is surprised, but this finding makes him curious and so he starts to investigate and discovers that there is much more beyond the mere ranking of the list, as he reads our country dossier on the Maldives9. Reading this profile will make him discover quickly that if you decide to reject Islam and follow Jesus Christ now or have no religion at all, you are not just in deep trouble from family, friends and neighbors – the law says you will also be stripped of your citizenship. Like with the Maldives, for all countries, we provide rather extensive dossiers on how Christians are doing10, including the political context, a PREST analysis11 and an outlook.

6 It can be found in its latest, updated version from November 2017, here: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/WWL- 2018-Methodology-LONG-VERSION-November-2017.pdf, password: freedom; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 7 More and even much more famous lists are published without ever drawing flak from critics, such as the Press Freedom Index of Reporters without Borders, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International or diverse rankings organizations like Freedom House are doing, to name but a few. 8 On the question if and how freedom of religion can be measured and a comparison of different options, see: Anja Hoffmann, 2017: “Measuring Freedom of Religion: An Analysis of Religious Freedom Indexes”, Master Thesis, University Vienna. 9 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Maldives-WWR-COUNTRY-DOSSIER-January-2019-update.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 10 In case of the Maldives, the dossier has 22 pages, some dossiers may be shorter, but others are considerably more extensive, like the one on China. 11 From WWL 2020 on, focused on how Christians are affected, “PREST” being an acronym for political, religious, economic, social and technological landscapes.

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Beyond the World Watch List

Before taking a closer look at how the ranking of the World Watch List is done and what the list is talking about, it is worth mentioning that Open Doors World Watch Research (WWR) provides information beyond this. While the World Watch List for practical reasons is limited to the fifty countries where persecution of Christians is strongest, WWR produces Country Dossiers (or Profiles) for many more countries12. Those countries are called “Persecution Watch Countries”, but in fact, Open Doors watches countries even beyond these group of countries13. When the annual list is published, several explanatory articles about trends, violence, gender-related questions and statistics are published, too. But Open Doors publishes reports on specific topics and/or specific countries/regions as well, either alone or with partners. These comprise for example reports on mapping Islamic militancy in Africa and what this means for Christians14, on the (religious) conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo15, Organized Corruption and Crime in Latin America and its implications for Christians16 or a report on the structural vulnerabilities Christian women are facing because of their faith in Nigeria17. The latter country is the focus of a whole series of reports, detailing the situation Christians are facing in specific states fo Nigeria. Still ground-breaking in this respect is the report “Crushed but not defeated”, published by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Open Doors in 201418. Another research report currently in the making deals with the portrayal of Christians in education curricula and school textbooks in the Middle East.

12 All countries scoring more than 41 points, defined in the methodology as “High persecution” (see methodology, page 49); for the WWL 2019, this meant dossiers for 73 countries were available. 13 E.g. countries like the Philippines, where persecution of Christians, especially converts is strong in one smaller part of the country. As the list looks at and scores complete countries, such situations are not mirrored in it. 14 July 2019: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Africa-Mapping-Islamic-militancy-July-2019-FINAL.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 15 October 2018: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DRC-Mapping-the-conflict-WWR-2018.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 16 May 2018: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Latin-America-Organized-corruption-and-crime-2018.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 17 April 2019: http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/NIGERIA-Compound-structural-vulnerabilities-for-Christian- women-FINAL.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019. 18 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Crushed-but-not-defeated-Full-Report-1.pdf; last accessed on 12 August 2019.

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Finally, WWR comments political and other developments worldwide from the perspective what it may mean for Christians in the country in focus.19 Of course, Open Doors provides a full archive of all documents, including materials of former World Watch Lists, as well.

Methodology: How is the scoring of the World Watch List done?

Keeping in mind that there is much more than just the mere list, the question remains how the ranking is produced and more specific, how the scoring for the list is done. After all, each country not just obtains a rank, but has a scoring as well. What is the methodology behind it? The remainder of this article will explain this but will necessarily need to remain restrained by space limitations.

Sources

A first and frequently asked question is how Open Doors gets its information for compiling the list. Basically, all sources can be split in three categories: the first one is what we call “field”. As already said, Open Doors serves persecuted Christians in around sixty-five countries worldwide, in many cases already for decades. Mostly, this means Open Doors is partnering with and equipping local, indigenous Christians (and not Westerners or even researchers from the West). Those locally and regionally rooted Christians are strongly based in their communities and have networks on the grassroots level. They know hatw is happening on the ground and therefore, their contribution in form of a questionnaire is one strong input for the list. A second important stream is the contribution made by external experts. They are called external as they are not connected to Open Doors. Those experts come from a broad variety of backgrounds. external experts have different professional backgrounds:

• Legal scholars with extensive experience in the field of human rights, constitutional law and governance. • Public policy researchers.

19 E.g. http://opendoorsanalytical.org/indonesia-study-shows-universities-are-hotbeds-for-islamic-radicalization/, those short analyses can be subscribed to on www.opendoorsanalytical.org; last accessed on 12 August 2019.

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• International development experts. • Lecturers for different disciplines (some are professors at universities). • International security experts. • Christian ministry workers (missionaries, some of them with many years of experience in the country). • Heads of Christian NGOs in the country. • Staff of national or international human rights organizations dealing with freedom of religion or belief.

Ideally, for each country at least three external experts should be found, whose findings and results can then be cross-checked against the field stream. In practice, however, depending on the country this number of experts is sometimes very difficult to find20. As a third stream, the persecution analyst collects reports and articles mostly from publicly available sources21 throughout the year, categorizes it and processes it into a database. The analyst also checks the contributions of the first two streams, clarifies and challenges them, when necessary and works towards a final version of the questionnaire. So, it is fair to say that the results are expert opinion based, like those of many other lists as well.

Background for the questionnaire

How does this information look like and in which way is it organized? In order to get the most complete picture of the complex situation Christians live in many countries and in an effort to mirror the details and shades of how persecution and discrimination look like, Open Doors developed a questionnaire with 126 question22. This questionnaire is sent to all streams mentioned before annually and forms the basis on which the World Watch List is compiled. It is available online and offline, its main language is English, but an Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish version is available as well as a Bahasa Indonesia version. Translations into more languages are planned for, e.g. into Suaheli and Mandarin.

20 Meaning that World Watch Research is constantly on the look for more experts, especially for less well-known countries. 21 Christian and secular sources are used alike. 22 http://opendoorsanalytical.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/WWL-2018-Methodology-Appendices-Part-2.pdf, last accessed on 12 August 2019. Although the questionnaire may be adapted slightly in order to clarify misunderstandings or emphasis topics – like including more questions on the gender effects of persecution – the questionnaire stands basically unchanged each year.

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Each question provides a space for commenting and thus giving additional information. As the scoring of each question follows the same grid and in many countries, more than one persecution engine is active, all respondents – field, external experts or persecution analysts – start with thinking about persecution engines, drivers and communities of Christians first, before detailing how the spheres of life for Christians look like. As not all respondents are able to fill in the full questionnaire or are knowledgeable just about a part of the country or a certain topic (churches, children, women…), it is also possible to send them simplified (without scoring) or customized (only certain spheres of life, see below) versions. However, the analysts aim to get as much information as possible, so the full version is the preferred and most frequently used one. The following sections will briefly introduce the topics and range of questions asked and, in this way, tries to give an impression of what Open Doors asks of respondents and uses as a basis for compiling the information for the annual World Watch List.

Persecution engines

As already said, in many countries, more than one persecution engine is active and many times, these engines can overlap and be blended, but as well co-exist and mutually enforce each other. Open Doors identified eight persecution engines which can be grouped into three different `impulses`. Open Doors believes that, from a Christian point of view, we are living in a broken world, so not every suffering of Christians can be called persecution. Diagram 1 tries to visualize this. The WWL methodology considers the Diagram 2 Diagram 1 Power impulses and persecution engines „Brokenness” of the world ‘brokenness’ of the world insofar as it operates as a background to the persecution of Christians. Persecution often takes place in disturbed, difficult and de-stabilized contexts such as war, ethnic tensions, religious

319 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... tensions, ideological tensions, political conflicts, social conflicts, corruption, environmental degradation and natural disasters, poverty, (severe) psychological problems, illness and domestic violence. This backdrop influences the resilience of Christians negatively when they are targeted by the drivers of one or more persecution engines. Persecution is a part of this whole picture. It means that Christians and their communities experience specific pressure and/or violence in this situation of ‘brokenness’, forcing them to comply with the drivers of the persecution dynamics prevalent in their environment. The WWL methodology groups these dynamics into three different ‘impulses’. These impulses fuel eight different persecution engines and are driven by specific actors or drivers of persecution. As can be seen in Diagram 2, all three impulses – the secularist, exploitative and exclusivist impulse – are impulses striving for absolute power and the persecution engines can be described by linking them to the different power impulses.

Exclusivist impulse

Theexclusivist impulse has to do with a very exclusive group formation. The ‘other’ who is not part of one’s own group, is considered to be an inferior human being or infidel. It is considered permissible to deal with such a person in bizarre, amoral ways that would never be allowed in one’s own group without compromising one’s own moral standards. Theexclusivist impulse is always related to a strong religious presence. The exclusivist impulse often develops a very strong emphasis on obtaining absolute, exclusive power to the detriment of ‘others’. The ‘others’ are forced to either bend or crack. The persecution engines directly related to the exclusivist impulse are Islamic oppression23, Religious nationalism24 and Ethnic antagonism25. The ‘others’ can also be Christians and/or churches who are socially and politically excluded, sometimes eliminated, by Christians and/or churches from another category of Christianity. If this happens, the dominating church is driving the persecution engine termed Denominational protectionism26.

23 On the World Watch List 2019, this has been the main engine or a (strong) secondary engine in at least 36 out of 50 countries. Brother Andrew, the founder of Open Doors says that he spells Islam as “I Sincerely Love All Muslims”, in this way we as a Christian ministry understand our biblical calling of Christians. 24 Mainly in the forms of Hindu nationalism and Buddhist nationalism. 25 Usually in its animistic form like in Laos, often this is a secondary engine. 26 Playing a role in countries like Ethiopia and Russia.

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The main drivers of these persecution engines are social groups putting pressure on governments, the governments themselves on all levels, fanatical or violent movements, but also one`s own family. Once the engines are fully developed, both government and society are involved but the emphasis is normally on society because personal religious commitment is essential for these persecution engines to function.

Secularist impulse

The secularist impulse relates to putting severe pressure on individuals or groups that do not adhere to the dominant ideology which is always anti-religious or skeptical of organized religion to some degree. The ideologies inspiring thesecularist impulse do not have to have the same emphasis; the main focus can vary from the ‘revolutionary potential of the working class’ to the launch of a very liberal sexual agenda. What counts is that humans or nature are the sole source of all norms and values, without divine inspiration or guidance. Like the exclusivist impulse, the secularist impulse also often develops a very strong emphasis on obtaining absolute, exclusive power. This oppressive power can be eryv tangible or more subtle. Nevertheless, the aim is the same. The main persecution engines related to the secularist impulse are Communist and post- Communist oppression27 and Secular intolerance28. The main drivers of these persecution engines are governments Communist( and post-Communist oppression) or social groups putting pressure on governments (Secular intolerance). Once the engines are fully developed, both government and society are involved. Nevertheless, the emphasis is normally on the government because state control is essential for these persecution engines to function.

Exploitative impulse

Theexploitative impulse relates to plain greed: getting as many resources as possible for oneself and one’s small, favorite social environment, legally or illegally. Everything is allowed. Power in the context of the exploitative impulse is more a means than a goal. While in the context of the exclusivist and secularist impulses power is actively sought to signify the supremacy of one’s religion or ideology,

27 Strongly felt for instance in China and Vietnam. 28 Mostly a secondary engine in the Top 50 of the World Watch List, it is already strongly felt in countries like Mexico and Colombia.

321 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... the exploitative impulse needs power to safeguard its interests. The exploitative impulse relates to two persecution engines: Organized corruption and crime and Dictatorial paranoia. The main drivers of Organized corruption and crime operate in the shadow of those driving other persecution engines and/or manipulate them to achieve their own goals. One of its main mechanisms is to illegally co-opt government officials and social agents into their agenda. While government and society as such are not driving this persecution engine, co-opted elements within their ranks are essential to it. Christians, who in many countries are a small minority without any access to rule of law or protection, are doubly vulnerable to this engine, which normally affects the whole country. For Dictatorial paranoia the situation is different. The main drivers of this persecution engine are government officials at any Diagram 3 level from local to national. Societal power dynamic striving for absolute power Not every suffering is seen as persecution and likewise, not all power dynamics necessarily result in persecution – or the descriptive motive behind it, a persecution engine. However, if the driver behind the power dynamic cannot get Christians on board by means of temptation, very often he will switch to more coercive and often violent means. This dynamic is shown in Diagram 293 . Respondents of the questionnaire have to think about the situation in their country. Of course, they do not need to have all the more philosophical background about impulses in mind, but they should think about the different persecution engines and how they play out and interact in the whole country or in a part of it and in how far the engines are developed or blended. Once they have made up their minds, for each engine, they are choosing from six options between “Not at all” to “Very strong” and give a brief explanation about the situation and their choice in the comments section. In that way, it becomes clear on which engines the respondent is focusing and knowledgeable about.

29 A more comprehensive explanation with examples can be found in the methodology, pages 8–17.

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Drivers of Persecution

In a second step, respondents answer about the drivers of persecution active therein. This is arguably one of the most dynamic parts of persecution as it is ever changing. Traditionally, the main – and often only – driver of persecution were the authorities, the government. When in ancient Rome Christians were tortured and killed in the arena, this was a decision of the rulers, although often times much supported by society. And in many cases, nowadays governments and authorities on all levels of the state are still among the main drivers. But this picture is changing and getting much more varied. In the modern and inter-connected world, we are living today, rulers understand that persecuting minorities like Christians gives a bad image and even poses the risk of being seen and treated as international pariah or exposed to sanctions. While some rulers do not seem to care about such consequences at all, most do. Therefore, they prefer to use indirect means as stirring up sentiments against minorities, may they be nationalistic30 or religious. Some governments more or less tacitly support officially independent groups or organizations, which act against Christians and claim their innocence and even helplessness, when challenged by other states or even claiming that actions of such groups enjoy human rights protection. In other cases, governments are in fact fighting extremist and violent groups, hichw spiraled out of control and target Christians, often in trying to “clean” a certain territory or even a whole country from them. Especially for converts, the much closer drivers of persecution are family, friends and neighbors. Whereas the death penalty may be written in the law and be a real threat for so-called “apostates”, in several countries, its implementation is far from sure and the family is putting daily pressure on them, which normally is much more felt than rather abstract dangers. Still, most converts prefer to keep their decision as private and hidden as possible. Therefore, society cannot be underestimated as a driver of society as well. Open Doors identified twelve different drivers of persecution. They are:

Government officials at any level from local to national E.g. teachers, police, local officials, presidents, dictators. Ethnic group leaders E.g. tribal chiefs.

30 Like in Vietnam, where the perception is still widespread that Catholics relate to the French colonial power, while Protestants are related to the US-American forces.

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Non-Christian religious leaders at any level from local to national E.g. imams, rabbis, senior Buddhist monks. Christian religious leaders at any level from local to national E.g. popes, patriarchs, bishops, priests, pastors. Violent religious groups E.g. Boko Haram (Nigeria), Hamas (Palestinian Territories), Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and the Sinhala Ravaya (SR) (both in Sri Lanka). Ideological pressure groups: Fanatical movements E.g. LGBTI rights groups, Abortion Rights UK, National Secular Society. Normal citizens (people from the general public), including mobs E.g. students, neighbors, shopkeepers, mobs. Extended family E.g. one’s direct family members or the wider circle of kinsmen. Political parties at any level from local to national E.g. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, AKP in Turkey. Revolutionaries or paramilitary groups E.g. FARC. Organized crime cartels or networks E.g. There are several cartels in Latin America, Italy and other parts of the world. Multilateral organizations (e.g. UN) and embassies E.g. UN organizations pushing for compulsory sexual education programs contrary to Christian values, OIC pushing for Islamization of the African continent.

Often more than one driver is active in and around one or more persecution engines. Respondents are again asked to choose for each category an option from “Not at all” to “Very strong” and to explain it in the comments sections.

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Categories of Christian communities

Before answering the more detailed questions on persecution, in a last step, respondents are asked to think about the body of Christ in a country. Open Doors opted for using a rather broad definition of the ermt “Christian” when it comes to persecution. According to it, Christian is “anyone who self-identifies as a Christian and/or someone belonging to a Christian community as defined by the church’s historic creeds.” In order to make the fact tangible that drivers of persecution often tend to treat different kinds of Christians in different ways, Open Doors decided not to order according to denominations or theological categories, but rather to try and reflect the broader situation in almost all countries. Therefore, a distinction is made in four categories, namely “expatriate Christians/ migrant workers”, “historical communities”, “converts” and “non-traditional communities”.

Expatriate Christians/migrant workers

This category means all members of an expatriate community in any given country, be they members of the diplomatic corps, international troops of any kind or migrant workers. The latter group is much more numerous in certain regions, as in the Middle East like the Gulf region, where scores of migrant workers from India, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia and other countries are working as nannies, maids, cooks, drivers, construction workers etc. Many of those workers are Christian. However, Open Doors decided to give one important qualification for this group: they are only counted as an extra group in terms of persecution when they are involuntarily isolated from the local Christian community. This eansm that they are not allowed or able to attend local churches. Situations like in Afghanistan, where Christian members of the diplomatic corps or the international troops can worship within their heavily fortified compounds and embassies are also not considered for this category, as they do not have anything to do with the real situation in the country.

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Historical and/or government-controlled churches

What constitutes „historical churches“, varies per country31. Government-controlled churches are typical for Communist countries and for the engine Dictatorial Paranoia. One example would be the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in China, which is also affected by the most recent and continuing crackdown, although not- registered churches are affected even stronger. Another example would be the Laos Evangelical Church, although this is hybrid as it also contains non-traditional elements and therefore could be counted under category four as well.

Communities of converts to Christianity

A frequently overlooked category is the sometimes very small community of converts32. Arguably, they frequently bear the brunt of persecution in many countries. For their choice is not just despised by the state, but even more so by their own family and society, up to death threats and killings. Here we have the human face of the politically hot international human rights debates on proselytizing and apostasy. According to its calling, Open Doors serves with a focus on this community, especially as in many countries more established churches, no matter if Catholic or Protestant, do not dare to support them as apostates are seen as enemies of society33. This is not only true in many Islamic countries, but in Hinduist and Buddhist countries as well. Help for Christians must always consider how to help them as well, as they are paying the highest prize for their decision.

Non-traditional Christian communities and others

The last category covers independent churches. This includes the scores of non-affiliated and independent churches, often connected to protestant churches, many of Pentecostal variety. It also includes renewal

31 In many countries, Catholic and Orthodox churches are part of this category, but in Myanmar for example, Baptists belong here as well. On the other hand, in Bhutan there are no historical churches, even though there is a very small Catholic community. 32 ‘Cross-denominational converts’ can be part of this category as well, meaning that someone changed from one category of Christianity – often the majority category – to another. But they typically make up only a small number. 33 Cf. the in-depth study of this issue in Christine Schirrmacher, 2016: “Let there be no compulsion in religion (Sura 2:256) – Apostasy from Islam as judged by contemporary Islamic theologians”, VKW Publishers Bonn, post-doctoral thesis, University Bonn.

326 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... movements for example in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church or in the Catholic Church. In China and elsewhere, they are often called „underground“ or „house churches“, which can be misleading as those churches do often have broad networks with thousands of members. For all categories, respondents are asked to answer with “Yes” or “No”, if they are facing persecution in the country. If the answer is affirmative, the level should be qualified, again choosing between “Not at all” and “very strong” and comments should explain the choice.

The scoring grid

With this information, the framework for the questionnaire is in place. The ecisiond on categories of Christians affected for example has an immediate effect on the scoring grid of thequestionnaire, as the first part of the grid asks which categories of Christians are affected by a certain situation. Depending on the number of categories of Christians the respondents has given, the first part of the scoring grid will score between 1 and 434. The second part of the scoring grid asks for the proportion of the general population living in the territory affected by persecution, reflecting that not necessarily the whole countrywill be affected or affected in a similar way. Respondents are asked to make a choice out of 4 (up to 25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, more than 75%) and explain it in the comments. The third part of the grid asks about the intensity of a given situation (Low, medium, high, very high) and the fourth about the frequency (Sporadic, quite frequent, frequent, permanent). All in all, this gives a 4x4 scoring grid and leads to 255 possible options (1-1-1-1 to 4-4-4-4), but just to 13 options in scoring, as each part of the grid contributes equally to the scores35.

The spheres of life

The questionnaire is organized in so-called “spheres of life” and covers all parts of Article 18 UDHR resp. CCPR. It starts with „Private Life“ (roughly equal with the forum internum in FoRB terminology). Extending into Family and Community Life, it broadens to include National Life (where questions on law and media are

34 Of course, it is also possible to answer with “No”, then the question is not scored at all. 35 A detailed example is given in the Methodology, pp. 32.

327 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... asked, among others). This covers the forum externum. The Church Life is the foundation of a Christian life as living as a Christian is unthinkable without this collective dimension of FoRB36. Violence against Christians is covered as well, it cuts like a knife through and affects all these spheres.

Diagram 4 WWL Spheres of life and violence Image by courtesy of Prof. Dr. Christof Sauer, IIRF

Whereas the Private life deals more with the individual freedom of religion and belief in asking among others about the possibility of reading the bible on your own without risk (Question 1.2) or meeting other Christians (1.9), the Family life widens the view beyond the individual. In it, questions are asked about the possibility to

36 About the guiding question for each sphere, see Methodology, pp. 18.

328 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... hold Christian weddings, baptisms and funerals (2.3-5) as well as questions if children are discriminated against because of their or their parents` faith (2.8-9) or if custody and inheritance have been a problem after conversion (2.12-13). The Community life continues to broaden the view and asks among others about Christians being monitored by their neighborhood or private groups (3.2) and if they have been hindered in using shared community resources (3.5). Disadvantages in education (3.9) and being fined orf faith-related reasons (3.12) is also asked here. The National life focuses on Christian in the relation with the state they are living in. Consequently, questions on national or regional laws (4.1) are asked, but also what Christians experience when they have to deal with the court system (4.13-16; including a question on blasphemy laws). As media plays an ever-increasing role in society, especially in the exponential growth of social media, questions if there have been smear campaigns or biased media reporting against Christians (4.10-11) are asked as well. As already mentioned, Christianity is not thinkable without the collective dimension, the possibility to worship together, to build churches and organizations and to unite as a public expression of one`s faith. Therefore, questions about the registration of churches (5.2) are asked, but also about building the physical structures and meeting in- or outside the places (5.3-5). The possibility ot produce, import and distribute bibles and Christian materials (5.12-15) is asked as well as the possibility to meet with the worldwide body of Christ (5.19) or if pastors and church leaders could be trained without being harassed (5.10). All these questions help in getting a picture of how Christians are doing in a certain country and how free they are to live according to their faith. However, those five spheres focus on what Open Doors calls the “squeeze” Christians experience. Whereas in the long term, this pressure can be much more devastating and destructive for a church, in the short term, sheer violence (or “smash”) can have more immediate effects37. The violence is therefore measured differently, as a count of incidents in the reporting period, which runs from 1 November to 31 October. Killings and church buildings destroyed (6.1-2) are arguably affecting Christians in the strongest possible way, therefore as far as the scoring is concerned, each incident is weighed stronger, but only up to a total number of ten. This capping was introduced in order not to over-emphasize violence and avoid the volatile effects of violence on the scores38. Although it is still true that international media almost exclusively

37 Methodology, pp. 17. 38 One case illustrating this point sadly happened after the presentation in Budapest was given. The suicide attacks against churches and hotels on Easter Sunday 2019 in Sri Lanka with reportedly 258 killings came as a surprise to all observers of the country and did not fit intoits “traditional” persecution pattern. If the World Watch List methodology would not cap the scoring of violence, the country`s rank would strongly jump one year and then drop the subsequent year. The capping is limiting this effect.

329 MEASURING PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS WORLDWIDE – THE WORLD WATCH LIST OF OPEN DOORS INTERNATIONAL... reports on persecution, when violence is involved, sometimes experiencing violence is a shame issue as well and so it is very difficult to get reports about the abduction, sexual abuse and forced conversion of young Christian girls and women (Questions 6.5-6). Like all the other spheres, violence contributes 1/6 to a country`s score.