Canadian Military History
Volume 19 Issue 4 Article 2
2010
“But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003
Timothy Sayle
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Recommended Citation Timothy Sayle "“But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003." Canadian Military History 19, 4 (2010)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003
“But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003
Timothy A. Sayle
n Hans Christian Andersen’s Canada must be prepared to deal with fable The Emperor’s New Clothes, Abstract: In March 2003, Canada a United States whose international I abstained from participating in the an emperor is swindled into buying invasion of Iraq. Despite international outlook was coloured only in black a new wardrobe. The wardrobe, pressure from Canada’s close allies, and white. Although Afghanistan of course, does not really exist and the United States and Great Britain, and would undoubtedly be the first target the emperor appears publicly in the against the urging of some domestic of the American response, Kergin nude. He and his courtiers, convinced lobby groups and the Official Opposition, knew that American retaliation Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose not only the worthy can see the garments, to provide military or political support for was not likely to be limited to one 1 are unwilling to admit they see the invasion. Chrétien’s decision was a country. In the mean time, while wholly through the new clothes. In controversial one, but one made early Afghanistan was the only front in Andersen’s version, one young child in the crisis and before the outbreak of the response to the terrorist attacks, loudly exclaimed the emperor was war. Although Canadian public opinion Canadian policy easily matched that and the professional advice of Canadian naked. In 2003, a similar drama – diplomats and intelligence officials expected by the Americans. Jean though with far greater consequences counselled against participation in Chrétien honoured those killed in – played on the world stage. the war, these arguments served only the attacks, publicly supported the In the lead-up to the invasion to buttress Chrétien’s initial negative United States at the United Nations of Iraq, France and other states reaction and his desire to work within and dispatched special operations the United Nations. called out shrilly that they could see forces, naval assets and later a battle through the American case for war. group to Afghanistan.2 Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, too, relevant player in the United Nations As American and allied operations noticed early the United States’ case debate. When international approval in Afghanistan began in earnest for war was built on a faulty premise, had not been gained by the eve of war, in the autumn of 2001, it became but he avoided the adversarial tones the prime minister stood fast with the increasingly obvious that the United adopted by the French. Rather than position he had communicated to States was considering a second publicly embarrass the Americans, both Bush and British Prime Minister target.3 Soon after 11 September 2001, Chrétien told President George W. Tony Blair in the late summer of 2002, Canadian officials noticed American Bush that Canada would support and kept Canada out of the war. intelligence reports paying special military action against Iraq if the Shortly after 11 September 2001, attention to Iraq, isolating it from lists United States could convince Canadian ambassador to the United of other countries and noting Iraq’s the international community an States Michael Kergin arrived in failure to express sympathy with the invasion was necessary. By basing Ottawa to brief the government on Americans.4 Around the same time, his test of support on overwhelming the ramifications of the terrorist Chrétien was alarmed by a television international approval – and not attacks. He described the Manichean interview with United States Senator ruling out Canadian participation worldview Washington had adopted Jesse Helms calling for an invasion – Chrétien ensured Canada was a in the wake of the attack, and warned of Iraq. 5 It was not long before the
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American press started reporting on captured the two main elements in agreement between Canada and intelligence leaks that linked Saddam Chrétien’s conception of the crisis. the United States. By all accounts, Hussein to Al-Qaeda, and by January Only weeks after Himelfarb’s the relationship between Chrétien 2002 Kergin was fielding questions warning, Chrétien informed Blair and Bush was a friendly one with from reporters curious if Canada and Bush of Canada’s position on good personal chemistry aided by would support an invasion of Iraq.6 war with Iraq. The prime minister’s a mutual interest in baseball and By August 2002, there was no comments to Bush and Blair would golf.10 It was strange for all observers, doubt in Ottawa that the United States set the approach Canada would however, when the two men opted would target Iraq. Expanding the follow through the difficult months to meet in private before their “War on Terror” beyond Afghanistan to come. While meeting with Blair announcement, without the usual was not something Canada in Johannesburg in early September, retinue of staffers to hear or record would agree to without careful Chrétien expressed his discomfort their conversation.11 After the half- consideration. On 14 August, Clerk with regime change in Iraq. He hour meeting, Chrétien de-briefed of the Privy Council Alex Himelfarb warned of the dangers of “getting Kergin, telling him he had expressed sent Chrétien a memorandum stating in to the business of replacing concern over the impending invasion bluntly: “U.S. action against Iraq leaders we don’t like” without of Iraq. Chrétien had told Bush the to implement regime change is being covered “under the flag of international community would not a question of when, not if, using the UN.”8 No country, Chrétien told accept an invasion of Iraq without the justification that the Iraqi Blair, could invade Iraq without credible evidence of weapons of mass government is a sponsor of terrorism UN authorization. Clearly, Chrétien destruction. Chrétien had also made and a developer of weapons of mass believed any military action would clear the United Nations Security destruction (WMD).”7 Himelfarb not simply be a continuation of Council was extremely important to noted the international community United Nations pressure on Iraq to Canada, and Canada would require was deeply split on the issue, but disarm, but part of a new American its approval to participate in a war.12 the Canadian position “has centred concept of national security that Chrétien left the meeting highly on the return of UN arms inspectors threatened to undermine the sceptical of the American evidence to Iraq to resolve the disarmament international structures Canada had for war, but still on good terms with question and to address the issues worked to create. 9 Bush.13 of terrorism when clear evidence is On 9 September 2002, less Chrétien’s comments in Detroit available.” The memorandum’s faith than a week after meeting with came to serve as the speaking points in the United Nations inspectors Blair, Chrétien and Bush met in for the Canadian government. and disapproval of regime change Detroit to announce a new border Kergin returned to Washington equipped with the prime minister’s position; from now on his standard response to any inquiries on Canada’s participation in an invasion would stress the importance of the Security Council. Across the Atlantic, Canada’s high commissioner to the United
(AP Photo/Doug Mills) (AP Photo/Doug Kingdom, Mel Cappe, informed the British that Canada sought agreement
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien salutes members of the US Border Patrol as President George W. Bush looks on after the two leaders watch a Free and Secure Trade “Fast” Lane demonstration, at the Ambassador’s Bridge, Fort Street Cargo Facility, in Detroit, 9 September 2002. Bush spent the day making his case to Chrétien, who said the previous week he has yet to see evidence that would justify Canadian support for a military campaign against Iraq.
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President George W. Bush addresses the UN General Assembly in New York City.
among the international community before military action, preferably through a Security Council Resolution at the United Nations.14 Deputy Prime Minister John Manley told the press that Canada had not “signed on” to “going in and changing the regime” in Iraq.15 Underlying this standard message, however, was the prime minister’s scepticism of American motives. Chrétien already assumed the goal of military intervention was regime change. Warnings from Paul Heinbecker, Canada’s ambassador The confusion inherent in 1441, help.” Concerned by this, Graham to the United Nations, stressed a and Blair’s promise, led to further told Powell that if the United States new American security strategy intense negotiations in New York. did not gain another resolution, with emphasis on unilateral military During the negotiations, Chrétien “we’re not going to be there, other intervention reinforced his concern.16 frequently called President Vincente people won’t be there either, it won’t Just days after the Detroit meeting, Fox of Mexico and President Ricardo be good for the UN and in the end it Bush appeared before the United Lagos of Chile, both of whose nations won’t be good for you.”21 Nations General Assembly and were represented on the Security A significant Canadian troop argued for increased international Council. Noticing the stress these presence in Iraq was a moot point pressure on Iraq to ensure Saddam men were facing, Chrétien remarked after a 9 January 2003 meeting Hussein complied with his to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill in Washington between Defence obligations to disarm. A month Graham that although Canada Minister John McCallum and Secretary later, in November 2002, the Security constantly sought a seat on the of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the Council passed Resolution 1441, Security Council, holding a seat was meeting, Rumsfeld made clear he declaring Iraq “in material breach a mixed blessing. At times like this, it was not seeking Canadian troops of its obligations [to disarm]” and would bring enormous pressure like for Iraq, and preferred Canada affording Iraq “a final opportunity that faced by Mexico and Chile. While focus on Afghanistan. Neither to comply with its disarmament free of the Security Council, Canada the Pentagon nor the Office of the obligations.”17 The resolution was was able to operate at the United Secretary of Defense intimated to achieved by intense negotiation, and Nations with fewer constraints.20 the Canadian embassy they would contained contradictory elements. Despite not having a seat on the require Canadian troops in Iraq, or It did not directly authorize the Council, Graham was in constant that they were upset when Canada use of force, and the “serious contact with his European and did not send troops. During a visit consequences” threatened were American colleagues; Dominique de to Central Command Headquarters variously interpreted. For those Villepin of France, Javier Solana of in Tampa, Florida, and in meetings who interpreted the resolution as the European Union, but much less with General Tommy Franks, Kergin authorizing force, a lack of time with British Foreign Minister Jack never received a message Canada limits resulted in further confusion.18 Straw. Graham’s closest contact was ought to be involved in the military In Britain, the ambiguity of 1441 Secretary of State Colin Powell, with component of the invasion.22 But to and the looming war caused a rift whom Graham enjoyed a relationship suggest, as Janice Gross Stein and in the governing Labour caucus that allowed for frank discussion. Eugene Lang do, that Canada’s and a major crisis for Tony Blair. In December 2002, Graham told decision to commit almost two To assuage his critics and his party, Powell that Canadians were trying thousand troops to Afghanistan Blair promised to seek a second, to help the Americans obtain a new got Canada “off the hook in Iraq” less ambiguous, resolution from the resolution. Powell said the Americans misconstrues the American pressure Security Council.19 “really would rather not have your on Canada in the lead up to war.23
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The mild rebuke generated reports of divisions in Chrétien’s cabinet. Although the Cabinet frequently discussed Iraq, it was never a specific agenda item but instead was treated under “General Business.” Minister of the Environment David Anderson recalls that knowledge of the Middle East was slight in Cabinet, and even knowledge of the geography surrounding Iraq was limited. For some, the limited understanding of the region was coloured by information from the Israeli government, passed on by constituents with whom a US Department of Defense photo 030109-D-2987S-002 US Department photo of Defense minister or MP had reason to keep on friendly terms.27 Overall, the Cabinet was largely sceptical of war, and conversation concerned Canadian- American relations, not Iraq itself. To differ with the Americans on an international issue was not in itself surprising or necessarily problematic, but the American rhetoric linking Iraq with the vital interests of the United States made this an exceptionally NATO Photo b021122e.jpg Photo NATO difficult situation.28 Two members of Cabinet, Manley and Secretary of State for International Financial Institutions Maurizio Bevilacqua, were later reported to have argued in favour of the war, fearing a political and economic backlash from the United States if Canada did not support its ally.29 Top: Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham (left) talking with US Secretary Although no straw poll or of State Colin Powell, 22 November 2002. other count of opinion was taken Bottom: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld escorts Canadian Minister of National in Cabinet, the prime minister did Defence John McCallum into the Pentagon on 9 January 2003. The two defence leaders consult key cabinet ministers in met to discuss security issues of mutual interest. private discussions. Ministers such as Graham and McCallum were asked Although there was strong desire Immediately following the to weigh in, as were Ambassadors
from elements in the Canadian Rumsfeld-McCallum meeting, Heinbecker and Kergin. The prime Joint Imagery Centre AP2002-5412 Canadian Forces military and Department of National McCallum announced Canada minister also kept the pulse of his Defence for Canada to participate would participate if the United parliamentary caucus, the views of in the invasion, it was the White Nations granted approval for an which “were a significant factor in House, not the Pentagon, who sought invasion.25 If, on the other hand, UN the final decision.”30 Many Liberal the Canadian flag and the political authorization were not forthcoming, members were responding to cover it granted an invasion.24 The Canada would still have a choice to concerns of their constituents who decision to take a command rotation make. Chrétien quickly corrected collected signatures for petitions in Afghanistan alleviated none of McCallum, declaring: “on matters of against the war. The caucus was the pressure on Canada to publicly peace and security, the international nearly unanimous in opposition support the legitimacy of an invasion community must speak and act to war without the support of the of Iraq. through the UN Security Council.”26 United Nations, save one lone voice.31
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David Pratt, Liberal chairman of Security Council overwhelmingly much more coherent on the Kosovo the Commons defence committee, approved a military action but a issue.”35 In early 2003, it was clear argued that basing a Canadian Russian or Chinese veto prohibited just how incoherent the international decision on the will of the United a resolution. 33 It is by this reasoning community had become. Nations was an “abdication of that Chrétien could argue Resolution Towards the end of January, national responsibility.”32 1441 did not necessarily need to be Blair called Chrétien to tell him a Given the overwhelming support augmented by another resolution successive resolution was going of caucus and Cabinet for Chrétien’s to authorize an invasion, and that to pass in the Security Council position, McCallum’s comments the Canadian position in 2003 was and Canada should lend it moral in early January did not reveal a consistent with its 1999 participation support. Paul Heinbecker, who was rupture in government opinion. in the NATO bombing of Serbia. in frequent telephone contact with Instead, Chrétien’s correction of The seeming discrepancy between Chrétien from late January until mid- McCallum’s remarks demonstrates the two situations was a point of March, told him Blair was wrong and his carefully managed strategy of criticism made by many, including the British and Americans would not avoiding direct disagreement with American ambassador to Canada get a second resolution authorizing the United States. The Canadians Paul Cellucci.34 David Anderson, war. Heinbecker, from New York, ensured, through careful choice of who sat in the Cabinet during both told Chrétien “People here just don’t words in press conferences and in the 1999 and 2003 decisions, notes believe they’ve made the case.”36 the House, that a door was left open the “difference was primarily that the On 30 January 2003, Bill Graham for Canadian participation if the international community was simply met with Colin Powell in Washington
High in the mountains of Afghanistan, soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battlegroup disembark from a US Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter, 7 May 2002. They are involved in a Canadian-led mission to search the Tora Bora caves for Al-Qaeda materiel, documents and bodies, and then to destroy the caves to prevent Al-Qaeda fighters from operating in the region. The 3 PPCLI Battlegroup was deployed to Afghanistan on Operation APOLLO, Canada's military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism. Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre AP2002-5412 Canadian Forces
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“like you’ve already made up your mind to go whether you get one or not. If you get it it’s a cover, if not, ‘to hell with it,’ is sort of what you’re saying.” Powell did not reply, but his body language indicated to Graham he had understood the situation perfectly. In the press conference that followed, Graham insisted four times that Canada would want any war with Iraq to be sanctioned by the UN.38 Graham’s repeated reference to the United Nations reflected
© Action Press gmbh & co kg © Action [2002] all rights reserved Canadian public thinking on the issue. Two days after Graham’s meeting with Powell, an Ipsos-Reid poll found 36 percent of Canadians against war altogether, with 46 percent supporting war only with United Nations backing. A mere 10 percent of Canadians supported military action without the backing of the United Nations. The resistance of Canadians to any military action, UN-authorized or not, was strong nation-wide. In Quebec, 46 percent were against any military action. 35 percent of Ontarians, 34 percent of Atlantic Canadians, 28 percent of British Columbians and 27 percent of those in Alberta Manitoba and Saskatchewan were against the war even if a Security Council resolution was obtained.39 Nonetheless, as evidenced by Graham’s comment A high-level meeting of the UN Security Council took place on 5 February 2003 to hear a statement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell (shown here holding a model in Washington, the government vial of anthrax). He briefed the council on his country’s evidence of the Iraqi weapons was willing, at least publicly, to programme, including the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass entertain the idea of supporting destruction. an invasion with Security Council approval but without a resolution. and was shown some of the evidence but after you’ve been there a little For Cappe in London, it seemed that Powell would present to the Security while the people are going to hate by remaining somewhat ambivalent Council the following week. In you, and you’re going to get hated and ambiguous, the Canadians another frank discussion, Graham by everybody. You think it’s going forced the Americans to take them told Powell war would “be a terrible to be a big love-in but you risk being seriously as a potential partner. This problem for the United States and for perceived as an occupier. 37 ensured Canada would be listened everybody.” Graham went on: to in New York and Washington Powell disagreed, saying “this will while negotiations on a further UN as far as I can see your problem is be all over quickly.” He told Graham resolution continued.40 going to be, if you go in there and a resolution was a good thing, but On January 27, Hans Blix updated it’s not universally accepted, you’re should be achieved before February. the Security Council on the inspection going to be an invader, and you Graham, quick to see the implications of Iraq’s weapons programs. Blix, as think you’re going in as a liberator, of this remark, told Powell it sounded the executive chairman of the United
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Nations Monitoring, Verification, and in Iraq and centuries more to regain weapons programs, including the Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) America’s reputation in the region. intelligence behind Tony Blair’s was tasked with verifying Iraq’s Canadian officials had their own claim that Iraq had weapons of mass disarmament. He reported to the reason to question the intelligence destruction that could be deployed Council “Iraq appears not to have presented by Powell. They had in 45 minutes. The Canadians also come to a genuine acceptance… access to the same information, and received intelligence passed along of the disarmament which was had already found it wanting. In from the Iraqi defector “Curveball,” demanded of it.” This rebuke had autumn 2002, Bush had offered to the informant responsible for Colin a double-edged effect, spurring send intelligence experts to Ottawa Powell’s claims of mobile weapons the Iraqis to increase co-operation to brief the prime minister, and production vehicles. Despite the while the United States held up later offered to come and brief amount of circumstantial or indirect Blix’s comments as independent Chrétien personally. Chrétien and intelligence reporting that suggested verification of their claims that his advisors agreed that it would be an active WMD program, the lack of Saddam would not disarm.41 particularly uncomfortable to dispute any direct intelligence led the IAS to The next week, on 5 February, the president’s evidence in person, assess repeatedly that there was no Powell appeared before the Council and decided information should be evidence Iraq had an active WMD and presented a number of photos and passed to Canada through regular program, or had developed the sound recordings of the threat posed intelligence-sharing channels. necessary delivery capacity.44 by Saddam. Powell’s presentation, Eddie Goldenberg, always The Canadians came close to not according to Heinbecker, “was a sceptical of intelligence, recalls that receiving some of the intelligence at load of crap, the best case that could intelligence was not a factor in all. Some in the upper echelons of be pieced together, but evidently the Canadian decision on Iraq.43 the Bush administration considered full of problems and inconsistent in Intriguingly, however, it seems that dropping Canada from the shared several cases with what the UN had Canadian intelligence officials made pool of information, wanting to reported from the ground.” 42 Photos one of the most successful analyses restrict circulation to states that had of a fighter jet spraying poison gas of the Iraqi weapons program guaranteed support to the Americans. were dated from the war against among Canada’s traditional allies. The Canadian embassy worked Iran. Satellite photos purporting to During the lead up to the war, the hard to ensure this did not happen, show chemical weapons sites, later International Assessments Staff (IAS) arguing that Canada deserved access disproved, were “pretty evidently in the Privy Council Office (PCO) to the common pool due to their bogus at the time,” while accounts served as the intelligence assessment contribution in Afghanistan and their of intercepted conversations were so branch for both Foreign Affairs and promise to help rebuild Iraq if war unspecific “they could be taken to PCO. Through its established links came.45 mean almost anything.” Heinbecker with other intelligence communities, Perhaps one of the most important was astonished that this was the the IAS received large quantities pieces of intelligence collected by best the Americans had to offer, of information on supposed Iraqi the Canadian government did not and felt few were persuaded. Due to the eminence of the presenter, the Council was packed with onlookers, some of whom took the opportunity afterwards to share their frustration. Heinbecker and the Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations had an opportunity to speak to Powell. The Egyptian ambassador warned the Americans that while the invasion might succeed easily the US could face decades of conflict
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at a North Atlantic Council Meeting
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concern the working of Saddam everyone more time to work out a declared both the government and Hussein’s government, but the Bush diplomatic solution.”49 To publicly people of Canada believed a peaceful administration. In the months before clarify Canada’s position on the war, resolution remained possible. 52 the war, the intelligence liaison Chrétien delivered a speech to the In the days following officer at the Canadian embassy Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Heinbecker’s speech, Graham took in Washington received regular on 13 February. He declared: “if the floor in the House of Commons briefings from the CIA, but was also it must come to war, I argue that to explain Canada was working at made aware of frustrations in the the world should respond through the UN “to avert war by clarifying American intelligence community. the United Nations.” Chrétien the situation.”53 Graham explained As a result, the Canadians were aware commended Bush for approaching the two Canadian objectives: first, the CIA was under political pressure the United Nations in the fall of by suggesting a resolution with to produce information confirming 2002, and urged the United States a timeframe, the international Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and knew not to give up on the world body. community could communicate to a debate over the accuracy of the “The long-term interests of the Saddam Hussein that his failure to American intelligence was raging United States,” suggested Chrétien, comply could not drag on further. The secretly in Washington.46 “will be better served by acting second objective was to demonstrate Nonetheless, the Americans through the United Nations than by to the international community a UN had presented their intelligence at acting alone.”50 Chrétien followed solution was possible and desirable.54 the Security Council, and Powell up on his speech with calls to world Back at the United Nations, on was continuing efforts at the United leaders seeking their support for 24 February, Heinbecker circulated Nations. In the week following a compromise position at the UN a discussion paper suggesting: Powell’s presentation to the Security – a compromise that could repair “A defined process for a specific Council, after a Cabinet meeting the valued multilateral institution period of time to address the Iraq where the issue was discussed, torn asunder by its membership’s situation.”55 The proposal, explained Heinbecker and Assistant Deputy debate over the looming invasion. Graham, was intended to “close Minister James Wright discussed Two days after Chrétien’s speech, the gap between the radical French the situation in the hallway. Neither Canadians demonstrated loudly position and that of the Americans.” 56 man liked having “to choose between against the impending war. 100,000 The Americans, initially silent on the our neighbour superpower and our protesters took to the streets in Canadian proposal, expressed their foreign policy and the international Montreal, with protests in the tens of disapproval when it became obvious community.”47 Heinbecker knew no thousands occurring simultaneously it would divert votes from a new compromise was possible between in Vancouver, Toronto and Edmonton American-drafted resolution.57 The the hard positions of yes or no on and ranging from the hundreds to next day the United States, United war. But if the decision-making was the thousands in other provincial Kingdom and Spain introduced a elongated in time, with Iraq facing capitals.51 draft resolution stating “Iraq has a set timeline and a simple pass or On 19 February, Heinbecker failed to take the final opportunity fail disarmament test, agreement brought the Canadian compromise afforded to it in Resolution 1441.”58 might be reached at the Security position before the Security Council The draft was abandoned when it Council. This was the next logical with a stirring speech. He reminded became clear it would not receive step in a series of resolutions that the Council of the many voices calling the necessary votes in the Security had increasingly turned up the heat for peace around the world, but Council. on Iraq. The Canadian plan could acknowledged important questions From Ottawa, Prime Minister assure the Americans “the diplomatic remained about Iraq’s weapons Chrétien maintained telephone process wasn’t going to last forever, programs. He suggested the Security contact with Lagos and Fox. Both and the Europeans and the rest of the Council direct Hans Blix to establish were under pressure from the international community would have a list of “key remaining disarmament Americans to join the coalition, but the assurance that it wasn’t going to tasks,” in order of urgency, and to both men told Chrétien that they be straight off to war.”48 present the list to Iraq with a deadline would not participate if Canada Chrétien backed Heinbecker’s for compliance. While a failure would refuse as well.59 Decision time plan, hoping “if we could get an to find common ground would was looming for all nations involved. extra six to eight weeks, the U.S. have “profound consequences” for In the House of Commons on 25 military strategists would have to international peace and security and February, Chrétien said he expected delay their plans long enough to give the future of the United Nations, he “a vote before the second week of
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March.”60 Chrétien told the House the a rapprochement between the French a similar Chilean one, as being best means of achieving peace was and American positions.64 Besides a “non-starter.”70 The Americans “working discreetly and effectively, certain British officials, there were were careful not to appear too ham- as our ambassador to the United even “some Americans who hoped handed, however, and did not go Nations is doing.” for compromise that might avoid a far in opposing the Canadian idea Indeed, Heinbecker continued potentially fateful adventure that publicly. It appeared to Kergin in to work the backrooms and lacked international sanction.”65 Washington that the United States corridors of the United Nations, The Canadian position might had taken a calculated look at the seeking a compromise. On 11 March, have succeeded by two means. If the positions in the Security Council and Heinbecker once again was recognized French had accepted the compromise, had realized the French were too far to speak in the Security Council. He the British would have had to accept committed to an anti-war position to underscored the importance of the and the Americans would have agree to a resolution that allowed the deliberations, proclaiming: “Peace had to commit to the compromise possible use of force.71 The Americans and war hang in the balance.”61 or face war without the support of anticipated correctly, and a lack of Heinbecker acknowledged the Iraqis its closest ally. If Washington had French support eliminated hope had only co-operated as a result agreed to the compromise, the French for the compromise.72 It is striking, of outside pressure, but urged the position would have lost all basis for however, that one of the results of the Council to avoid creating “doubt complaint. 66 Heinbecker recalls, “it Canadian compromise position could as to whether war were indeed was actually a very good idea. The have resulted in United Nations the last resort.” In addition to the only thing wrong with it, of course, approval for war. This would have threats to international security was that the Americans had made up placed Chrétien in a much worse he had noted in February, he told their mind and wanted a war. War position, with a commitment to the the Council it risked undermining was not the final recourse for them.”67 United Nations process in direct international law and the Security The Americans had also decided opposition to Canadian public Council as an institution. Heinbecker to adopt a rather undiplomatic opinion and his own instincts. reiterated his call for a clear list approach towards those who Four days after Heinbecker’s of disarmament objectives to be disagreed with them at the United impassioned speech at the United completed by Iraq before the Council Nations. The US “hardball” approach Nations, the Canadian public once took “all necessary means to force resulted in the removal of the again took to the streets. On 15 March compliance.”62 Rather than six weeks, Mexican, Chilean and Costa Rican 2003, large protests swept provincial Heinbecker shortened the suggested ambassadors and an attempt to have capitals, Ottawa, and smaller cities. deadline for Iraqi compliance to the German ambassador removed. This time, over 200,000 protesters three weeks. By compromising on The Americans also undertook took to the street in Montreal, boosted a resolution, Heinbecker told the a campaign against Heinbecker. by calls from the Quebec Federation Council, “disarmament of Iraq can Having been informed by Heinbecker of Labour urging its half-million be had without a shot being fired.” that the Americans were complaining strong membership to participate. The Canadian delegation loudly about his actions, Chrétien In Vancouver, there were 10,000 opted not to put direct pressure responded in his own unique style. protesters, 5,000 in Toronto, 2,000 on the Americans to accept the “You’re a big guy aren’t you?” in London, 1,500 in Ottawa, and compromise, but instead attempted Chrétien asked Heinbecker. “You hundreds in Edmonton, Winnipeg to persuade the Security Council as know what big guys do, they just and Halifax. 73 a whole. Heinbecker was sure the ignore that stuff.” 68 Despite this outpouring of Americans would ignore a direct Despite Chrétien’s backing, anti-war sentiment, the Canadian Canadian appeal that advised a Heinbecker had little expectation of government never attributed any compromise.63 The only chance was success. But the circumstances were of its decisions to public opinion. through the gathered strength of so grave, and “the consequences of According to David Anderson, countries that agreed with Canada. failure were such, that if you made demonstrations are only taken into Canada had recently served on the a 100% effort on the 5% chance, you account if they “confirm an existing Security Council, and was familiar might find some traction.” 69 The position or are a real surprise.” When with its politics. They were able to Canadians were disappointed, but they do confirm a position, they are generate some momentum for a not surprised, when White House a political boon to a government. 74 compromise, helped particularly by Spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed In the case of Iraq, the protests and the British delegation, frantic to reach the Canadian compromise, and public polling results demonstrated
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Prime Minister Jean Chretien receives a standing ovation after defending the government’s stand on the war in Iraq in a speech in the House of Commons in Ottawa, 8 April 2003.
to Chrétien and his Cabinet that anti-war opinion.” For his part, Eddie were concerned that failure to Canadians were opposed to the war, Goldenberg remembers no reference comply with the United States would and particularly so if military action to Quebec in his discussions on Iraq adversely affect their bottom line. was not sanctioned by the Security with the prime minister or with Kergin doubted the likelihood of such Council. But this only confirmed Cabinet, though it was well known punishment, believing Canadian- the position Chrétien had given where Quebeckers stood.76 And American trade relations were the Bush in September 2002. Indeed, the Quebeckers stood, largely, in support product of economic, rather than timing supports Eddie Goldenberg’s of the conclusions that Chretien had political, interests.78 Graham thought argument the decision was based on begun to draw in 2002. With Quebec the business lobby was overreacting principle – not public opinion.75 public opinion aligned with the prime to possible US retaliation and failed Although there were protests minister’s opinions, there was little to recognize war requires assent from across the country in March, the largest need to discuss Quebec in Cabinet. As the population. He refused to equate demonstrations were in Quebec. The Quebec public opinion continued to the decision for war with business strong anti-war sentiment in Montreal support the government, there never transactions.79 Anderson found the has led the noted historian Jack came a time to consider the impact of business community’s behaviour Granatstein to greatly overestimate a decision that might place Ottawa at just as abhorrent. He rejected the the role of Quebec public opinion in odds with the province.77 notion that commercial relations Chrétien’s decision not to participate Certainly not all Canadians were should impact a decision to go to war, in the invasion. For Granatstein, against participation in a war with refusing to measure loss of sales with who views the decision as part of Iraq, and some loudly called for loss of life. Furthermore, Anderson a larger historical trend of Quebec war. Business lobbyists, notably the knew Canada had “a few cards up determining Canadian foreign and Canadian Council of Chief Executives our sleeve” if the United States chose defence policy, the “key” to the Iraq and the Canadian Manufacturers to punish Canada economically. decision “was Quebec’s vehement and Exporters Association of Canada Challenges to oil sands development
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projects, or decisions concerning position on softwood lumber.83 There urging the expeditious withdrawal pipelines and other energy facilities is no evidence of such a quid pro quo of Blix’s inspectors from Iraq.85 War could get the Americans’ attention.80 being offered by the United States. was imminent. Overall, however, neither Kergin in Upon further analysis, Fawn later The next day, on 17 March, a Washington nor Anderson, Graham conceded that the trade statistics morning telephone call from the or Goldenberg in Ottawa saw serious demonstrated “no serious politically British government put a pointed evidence the Americans would motivated economic retaliation request to Ottawa.86 The British retaliate. occurred.”84 call posed four questions to the The economic data confirms that After months of diplomacy, government, asking whether Canada there were no significant changes the Americans and British clumsily would provide political or military to Canada’s economic position vis- abandoned the United Nations, support for the invasion and if à-vis the U.S. In 2003, Canada’s forcing Canada to refuse to participate Canada would make its assistance merchandise trade balance with the in the coming invasion. On 15 and 16 public.87 United States was at the lowest point March, while the leaders of Spain, Immediately, Heinbecker was of a decline begun in 2001. Following Portugal, Britain and the United telephoned in New York, and Canada’s refusal to join the invasion, States met in the Azores, the British he reported no UN resolution the Canadian trade balance actually made a last unsuccessful effort to authorizing the use of force would improved.81 American foreign direct convince the Security Council to succeed. Chrétien, his foreign investment in Canada, which had adopt a new resolution authorizing policy advisor Claude Laverdure, steadily increased since the 1990s, force. Hans Blix would later recall Goldenberg and Heinbecker were all continued to grow after the Iraq of March 16 that his inspection opposed to supporting an invasion.88 invasion.82 After the war analysts was operating at full strength, In Chretien’s office, Goldenberg including Rick Fawn speculated that and “Iraq seemed determined to insisted the prime minister make his by not joining the war Canada had give [UNMOVIC] prompt access response in the House of Commons foregone economic opportunities everywhere.” That day, he took a before informing Cellucci or any including a more conciliatory US call from a United States diplomat other foreign government. The
A Sea King from HMCS Vancouver hovers over the merchant vessel MV Zakat, which has suffered a major engine breakdown. Despite the six-degree list to port, HMCS Vancouver’s boarding party took control of ship and crew, then conducted a thorough search. The Canadians found evidence of smuggling, including documents, communications and repair equipment, technical facilities and a full load of Iraqi oil. The Zakat was towed into the Arabian Gulf by HMCS Vancouver and handed over to other coalition forces for further investigation. HMCS Vancouver was conducting maritime interdiction operations in the north Arabian Sea as part of Operation APOLLO, Canada’s military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism.
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British and American delegations his ministers and backbenchers – all achieved.” Overall, said Chrétien, in Ottawa were informed at noon live on American television.90 “it is better not to have war as the the prime minister would provide Over the next two days, Chrétien first instance but as the last instance an answer to the British questions explained his position to the House, …[The Americans and British] had in the House around 1415 hours. noting the issues that had concerned not made a case for the necessity of By the time Chrétien spoke, the him in September 2002. Chrétien waging war on Iraq at this time.” Cable News Network (CNN) had reminded Parliament he had “spoken Still, the decision was not without been informed by the Americans very clearly that the position of significant risk. Days after Chrétien’s that breaking news was about to be changing of regimes in different announcement, with the invasion made and carried Question Period countries is not a policy that is underway, President of the Treasury live.89 Chrétien’s stood in the House desirable any time.”91 He turned Board Lucienne Robillard raised an and announced: “If military action the focus back to weapons of mass ominous question in Cabinet: “What proceeds without a new resolution of destruction, arguing “Saddam if [the Americans] find WMD?” No the Security Council, Canada will not Hussein was disarming…I am one could answer her question, and participate.” His remarks were met still of the view, given some more a tense wait followed Chrétien’s with loud cheers and an ovation from weeks, disarmament could have been decision to abstain from the
US Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and personnel from the 1st Armored Division pose for a photo under the “Hands of Victory” in Ceremony Square, Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Hands of Victory monument was built at the end of the Iran-Iraq war and marks the entrance to a large parade ground in central Baghdad. The hand and arm are modelled after former dictator Saddam Hussein’s own and are surrounded with thousands of Iranian helmets taken from the battlefield. The swords are made from the guns of dead Iraqi soldiers, melted and recast into the 24-ton blades. US Air Force Photo US Air Force
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coalition.92 While the ground assault an undiplomatic spectacle in the designed to spite Canada, including against Iraq unfolded rapidly with House of Commons later regretted refusal to buy Canadian maple syrup, early success, the Canadian as well by some. Kergin, who believed the there was no large-scale punishment as French and German governments courtesy of a communiqué should meted out and no major contracts were uneasy. They continued to have been extended to the United lost. It was determined that there privately pressure the British on States, says the decision resulted was no economic consequence to their claims of the reputed weapons in some unnecessary bad will. The Canada’s decision. 104 At a speech of mass destruction.93 It would be difficulties derived more from a lack by Graham to the Chicago Council months before the Canadians had the of acceptable practice, rather than of Foreign Relations in November grim satisfaction of knowing they had from the substance of the decision.99 2003, during the question and answer made a wise choice. Later comments from Chrétien and period, the audience suggested two The raucous approval Chrétien his staffers further distanced Bush reasons Canada was insulated from received in the House pained from Chrétien. Bush cancelled a an economic backlash: first, Canada Cellucci, who suffered “truly bitter state visit planned for May 2003, had made its decision without what disappointment” Canada did not and at the end of that month, Rice was perceived as the self-righteous join in the invasion.94 Cellucci had called Laverdure to tell him the two attitude of the French. Second, the not taken care to cultivate close leaders’ relationship was “irreparably American business community had relationships with a broad cross- broken.”100 significant investments in Canada section of officials in Ottawa, and Some in the Canadian business and the notion that Americans could isolated himself from senior Canadian community were incensed by punish Canadian businesses without political advisors. 95 He seems to have the decision not to support the harming themselves was a chimera. been convinced by some Canadian Americans. Businessmen stopped It was clear to Graham that economic public servants that Canada would Graham in airports, and none-too- integration worked in Canada’s join the American invasion and either politely made clear their views on favour.105 informed his masters of Canada’s his decision. Provincial premiers Graham and Powell continued likelihood of joining, or failed to Ralph Klein, Ernie Eves and Gordon to work closely on issues of joint suggest the possibility of Canada Campbell were quick to criticize importance, including Haiti and not joining. Either way, he looked the Canadian policy, obviously Afghanistan, and this cooperation foolish when Canada did not join the concerned the decision would affect softened any backlash at the coalition, and he took his anger out on provincial economies. Neither was diplomatic level. In Washington, the Graham during a “very cool” dinner the federal cabinet opinion fully Canadian Embassy was not sidelined at the Lester B. Pearson Building.96 unanimous.101 Secretary of State for from updates on the war after the Although Stein and Lang claim International Financial Institutions invasion. Instead, senior Canadian the “Americans were more than a Maurizio Bevilacqua was furious with diplomats were invited to attend little surprised” by the Canadian the government’s position, arguing briefings given by Rumsfeld to the decision, it had been clear to many that it was crazy to disagree with the “coalition of the willing” partners. in Washington that Canada would United States.102 In the overwrought Canadians received updates on not participate barring Security hyperbole of the House of Commons, Operation Iraqi Freedom until the war Council approval. Kergin received Leader of the Opposition Stephen became increasingly complicated and stiff comments from administration Harper compared the Canadian Rumsfeld reduced the frequency of officials and outright contemptuous decision not to participate with the the meetings.106 None of the Canadian
US Air Force Photo US Air Force remarks from Congressmen, but the failure to confront Nazi Germany in troops serving on exchange with the American government was not taken the 1930’s.103 American, British and Australian by surprise.97 Chief of Staff Andrew Despite the overblown rhetoric of forces were killed, and the uproar Card told Chrétien “you told us the government’s critics, Canadian- created by the Opposition in the right from the beginning what you American trade and diplomatic prelude to war largely disappeared intended to do…We should have relations remained strong. Following from memory. believed you.”98 the invasion, Kergin directed The prime minister’s appreciation The decision not to inform the Canadian consulates to undertake a of the situation, made so early, resulted Americans but instead to announce major study to determine if anything from what his colleagues describe as in the House of Commons – with had changed in US-Canadian an uncanny intuition. It stemmed the government caucus standing to business relations. Although some from his ability to see through the loudly cheer the decision – created individual consumers made choices flattering and cajoling of the United
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States, to understand the Americans facultypages/EdMoise/iraqbib.html> 25. In October 2002, a Canadian defence (accessed August 31, 2010). analyst had observed how ill prepared had not proven their case, but largely, 4. Greg Fyffe, interview by author, 31 March the Canadian Forces were for the “fast- Anderson suspects, because “it 2008, Toronto, ON. moving conventional conflict” that was offended every nerve in his body.”107 5. Jean Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister. expected in Iraq. David Rudd, “Is the (USA: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007). Cupboard Bare? The Canadian Forces Both Graham and Anderson identify p.306. in Iraq,” CISS Commentary, 2002, https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss4/218 14 Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd 14 1/24/2011 12:27:48 PM : “But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003 13 February 2003, Chicago, Illinois, 79. Graham interview. decision in the morning before the prime Available online from the Privy Council 80. Anderson interview. minister’s House of Commons speech, of Office, Government of Canada Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010 19 15 Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd 15 1/24/2011 12:27:49 PM