REDD Plus Governance Needs a Driver and More Fuel. the Case of Quintana Roo, Mexico

REDD plus governance needs a driver and more fuel. The case of Quintana Roo, Mexico

Lissel Hernandez-Gongora

A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph

In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Rural Studies

Guelph, Ontario, Canada

ABSTRACT

REDD+ GOVERNANCE NEEDS A DRIVER AND MORE FUEL THE CASE OF QUINTANA ROO, MEXICO

Lissel Hernandez Gongora Advisor: University of Guelph, 2020 Dr. John Devlin

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is a mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest sector in developing countries. REDD+ has evolved from an original market approach that focused on buyers, sellers and a marketplace for carbon credits to a mechanism that also seeks to achieve non-carbon benefits such as biodiversity conservation and creation of socio-economic benefits. The sources of REDD+ financing have been public from both international donors and domestic sources. REDD+ now encourages land-use policies for addressing the underlying causes of deforestation external to the forest sector. REDD+ includes three phases: 1) readiness, during which national strategies are developed, forest reference levels are measured, and monitoring and safeguard systems are created; 2) early implementation, during which pilot activities are implemented to reduce deforestation at sub-national level and 3) results-based payments, which will provide financial compensation for verifiable results measured against forest reference levels.

REDD+ governance involves actors at multiple government levels and from multiple sectors. Using an evaluation framework derived from the polycentric governance model, this thesis assesses the quality of governance in

REDD+ in Quintana Roo, Mexico in terms of actors’ influence in decision-making,

information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution, and creation of trust. The researcher conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with members of the REDD+ Work Group (government officers), the

REDD+ Advisory Council (sector representatives) and ejidos (property regime where communities own collectively land and resources). The data were collected from July to December 2018.

This research concludes that REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo needs a driver and more fuel. The driver will be one or a few specific actors who will direct the decision-making and implementation processes while promoting actors’ influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. REDD+ early implementation (phase 2) also needs more fuel. In other words, more financial resources should be invested in activities to achieve significant results in reduction of deforestation and generating socio-economic benefits so the potential benefits of forest management can be more convincingly demonstrated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the participants in this study for dedicating time out of their regular activities to talk to me and share their wonderful insights on how to work together to conserve the valuable resource which is the Selva Maya

(Mayan tropical forest) of Quintana Roo, Mexico.

I am grateful to the Mexican government who financed my doctoral program and made it possible for me to spend four amazing years studying and living in Guelph.

I am also grateful to my advisor and the members of my committee for their patience and support in overcoming the obstacles I have faced through my research.

I would like to thank my fellow doctoral students, the staff at SEDRD and, in general, all the staff at the University of Guelph that have made my years as a PhD student a lifetime experience.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and my life in general.

TABLE OF CONTENT

Abstract………………………………………………………………….. ii Acknowledgments …....……………………………………………….. iv List of tables ……………………………………………………………. vi

List of figures …………………………………………………………... vii Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1. Climate change and REDD+ governance ...... 10

o What is governance? ...... 10

o Climate Change governance ...... 11

o The REDD+ mechanism ...... 16

o Multi-level and multi-sectoral approach in governance ...... 29

o The governance assessment framework ...... 40

o Mexico’s forest sector and REDD+ policies ...... 45 Chapter 2. Using the assessment framework in REDD+ governance cases ...... 57

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Brazil ...... 59

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Indonesia ...... 62

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Nepal ...... 64

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Peru ...... 66

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Tanzania ...... 69

o Quality of REDD+ Governance in Vietnam ...... 71 Chapter 3. Methodology ...... 78

o Study area ...... 79

o Case Study design, data collection and data analysis ...... 88 Chapter 4. Achievement of REDD+ goals in Quintana Roo ...... 95

o Reduction of Deforestation ...... 95

o Socio-economic benefits ...... 102 Chapter 5. Quality of REDD+ Governance in Quintana Roo ...... 114

o Quality of Governance in the REDD+ Work Group ...... 114

o Quality of Governance in the REDD+ Advisory Council ...... 133

o REDD+ in the Ejidos ...... 156 Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion ...... 179

o Explaining the performance of REDD+ in Quintana Roo ...... 179

o Policy recommendations for REDD+ implementation in Quintana Roo and Mexico ...... 189

o Contributions to the literature ...... 191

o Limitations of the research ...... 194

o Future research ...... 196 References ...... 197

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Conference of Parties ...... 14 Table 1.2. Safeguard defined in the 2010 COP 16 ...... 21 Table 1.3. Top five fund recipient from FCPF, UN-REDD and FIP (2008-2019) ...... 27 Table 1.4. Functions of polycentric governance ...... 41 Table 2.1(a) Quality of REDD+ governance in analyzed countries ...... 75 Table 2.1(b) Quality of REDD+ governance in analyzed countries...... 76 Table 3.1. REDD+ Work Group Members ...... 84 Table 3.2. Sector represented at the REDD+ Advisory Council ...... 86 Table 3.3. Specific research questions and Indicators ...... 89 Table 3.4 Interview summary ...... 91 Table 4.1. Quintana Roo's Tree Cover Loss and Deforestation ...... 96 Table 4.2. Drivers of gross global tree cover ...... 97 Table 4.3. Tree Cover Loss for Mexico and Quintana Roo ...... 98

Table 4.4. Absolute and relative tree cover loss in REDD+ and non-REDD+ municipalities ...... 102 Table 4.5. People with less income than the minimum required to buy the basic food basket in Quintana Roo ...... 103 Table 4.6. Percentage of population with less income than required to buy the Basic Food Basket and percentage of population with no access to food per municipality ...... 104 Table 4.7.Financial Resources from the Peninsula de Yucatan Special Program ...... 107 Table 4.8. Agroforestry projects supported by the REDD+ Special Program 109 Table 4.9. Degree of Social Lag in Quintana Roo and REDD+ municipalities 111 Table 4.10. Education and access to health services Quintana Roo and REDD+ municipalities in 2015 ...... 112 Table 4.11. Access to basic services in 2015 ...... 112

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 REDD+ Timeline ...... 18 Figure 1.2. REDD+ phases ...... 20 Figure 1.3. Governance Assessment Framework ...... 44 Figure 1.4. Forestry in Mexico in the 20th century ...... 47 Figure 1.5. Development of REDD+ in Mexico ...... 50 Figure 1.6. REDD+ institutional arrangements and planning instruments ...... 52 Figure 1.7. REDD+ financial architecture ...... 53 Figure 3.1. Location of Quintana Roo in Mexico...... 81 Figure 3.2. Quintana Roo’s REDD+ Intervention area...... 82 Figure 3.3. Location of the ejidos included in the study ...... 87 Figure 4.1. Tree cover loss in thousands of hectares by year in REDD+ early actions states ...... 99 Figure 4.2. Tree cover loss in hectares by year in Quintana Roo’s REDD+ municipalities ...... 100

vii

Figure 4.3. Average tree cover loss by year in REDD+ municipalities before and after REDD+2017 ...... 101 Figure 4.4. Distribution on resources from the REDD+ Special Program ...... 108

viii

Introduction

Deforestation and degradation of forests have been responsible for a third of the global carbon emissions generated by human activities from 1750 to

2011. Since introduced in 2005, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation) has been a main element in the agenda of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

REDD+ seeks to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the forest sector. REDD+ was designed to include three phases: 1) readiness, 2) early implementation, and 3) results-based payments. During the readiness phase a country will develop national strategies, define forest reference levels, as well as develop monitoring and safeguard systems. During the early implementation phase a country will pilot activities to reduce deforestation at the sub-national level. During the results-based payments phase financial compensation will be paid to the country for verifiable results in reduced and/or avoided deforestation measured against the previously defined forest reference level and expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. Over the years, REDD+ has evolved from its original market approach that focused on buyers, sellers and a marketplace for carbon credits to a mechanism that also seeks to achieve non- carbon benefits such as biodiversity conservation and the creation of socio- economic benefits. It also embraces international and domestic public investment for financing. In addition, it includes the promotion of land-use policies that intend to address the underlying causes of deforestation in sectors other than forestry in the participating developing countries. This landscape

1 approach brought attention to agriculture which is one of the main drivers of deforestation in tropical forests. The countries engaged in REDD+ have made progress in the readiness and early implementation phases, however in August

2019, none of them has as yet received results-based payments for reducing and/or avoiding deforestation and the associated carbon emissions. A decade after the introduction of REDD+, the developing countries engaged in this mechanism are still facing many challenges such as contrasting land-use interests, corruption, land tenure insecurity and marginalization of local actors from the decision-making process. In addition, the funds available for the early implementation phase have not been enough to finance activities that generate significant results in halting deforestation in the pilot projects areas therefore the effectiveness of REDD+ has not been demonstrated.

This research originally intended to assess the effectiveness of the

REDD+ multi-level and multi-sectoral governance approach for achieving reduction of deforestation and socio-economic benefits in the state of Quintana

Roo, Mexico. Quintana Roo was selected because the researcher was funded by the Mexican government to conduct a study in one of several relevant

Mexican policy sectors one of which was forestry. The researcher was a state government employee in Quintana Roo and as part of her duties, she was involved in REDD+ related activities in the period from 2011 to 2013. The initial research questions asked how effective the REDD+ program in Quintana Roo was and in what degree the governance arrangements influenced the REDD+ outcomes. As the researcher moved forward in the review of statistics, reports and the field work, it was evident that identifying the impacts of REDD+ on forest cover and socio-economic benefits was not possible because REDD+ in

Quintana Roo does not focus on specific pilot projects but is applied to large territorial areas such as municipalities. In such broad geographic areas, there are multiple factors affecting deforestation, income generation and creation of community benefits. Examples of these factors include natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes), and the existence of a large variety of government programs supporting economic activities and social services in rural areas.

As a result the researcher made the decision to focus on the REDD+ governance process instead of on the deforestation prevention and socio- economic effects. She proposed the following research questions: 1) What is the quality of REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo? 2) Is the REDD+ governance experience in Quintana Roo effective at mobilizing engagement of actors in activities that lead to the achievement of REDD+ goals? An assessment framework was developed based on the polycentric governance model which was used to answer these questions. This framework assesses the quality of governance in terms of actors’ participation and their influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution, and creation of trust.

In the first decade of the 21st century, Elinor Ostrom proposed polycentric governance as an effective approach to address global environmental problems such as climate change which include a wide array of stakeholders from different levels of government and representatives from multiple economic and social sectors. Based on the literature, the following definition was proposed by the researcher: Polycentric governance is a form of decision making that involves formal arrangements between representatives of

3 multiple levels of authority and representatives of multiple economic and social sectors with overlapping responsibilities, making decisions under a shared system of rules to regulate their relationships. Although ideally polycentric governance should generate non-hierarchical relationships among independent decision-making centers that are capable of self-organizing and making mutual adjustments, in practice, facilitation, coordination and ordering may be needed.

Specific actors that are more capable or motivated to become facilitators might operate as leaders, pioneers, orchestrators or governance entrepreneurs.

The research assessed the quality of REDD+ governance through interviews with participants in three institutional locations in Quintana Roo: 1) the REDD+ Work Group which includes government officers from the federal, state and municipal governments; 2) the REDD+ Advisory Council which includes representatives of farmers, ranchers, beekeepers, foresters, NGOs, academic and other private sector organizations; 3) Ejidos which are a form of social organization which collectively own land and natural resources. The researcher conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with members of these groups. The interviews were designed using the functions included in the polycentric assessment framework. Interviews were used as a tool to give a voice to the actors directly involved in REDD+ programming in Quintana Roo.

Observation of REDD+ related activities, analysis of official documents, minutes of meetings and reports regarding tree cover loss, socio-economic indicators and allocation of funds for REDD+ activities were included as part of the research methods. The data collection period was from July 2018 to December

2018.

The positionality of the researcher facilitated her access to information as she is a native Spanish speaker and is familiar with the structures, programs and processes at all levels of government in Mexico. The researcher has had professional relationships with some of the interviewees especially from the

Work Group and Advisory Council. This might have affected the responses provided by the interviewees, however, they openly discussed topics such as failures to conform to government policies, corruption, other actors’ lack of interest or passive participation in REDD+ activities. These examples show that the interviewees were comfortable speaking with the researcher and freely expressed their viewpoints. At the time of the study, the researcher did not have any work commitments with the state government nor any other organization in

Quintana Roo.

This study concludes that participants in the three groups participating in this research, the Work Group, the Advisory Council and the Ejidos, have had contrasting experiences regarding the quality of governance. Government officers from the Work Group perceived that the quality of governance within

REDD+ institutional arrangements was high while sector representatives from the Advisory Council perceived that the quality of governance was low. REDD+ has not had significant impacts on rural communities. The interviewees identified the National Forest Commission and the state Ministry of the

Environment as the most influential actors in REDD+ decision-making and implementation in Quintana Roo. Others, especially non-state actors have had passive and sporadic participation. Sector representatives perceived that they were not influencing decision-making which resulted in declining motivation to engage in REDD+ activities. They recognized that the lack of interest within

5 their own sectors and the lack of resources such as time and money to cover travel expenses also discouraged their active participation in REDD+.

Information sharing and knowledge exchange were facilitated by the National

Forest Commission and the Non-governmental organization (NGO) The Nature

Conservancy. These functions occurred horizontally among government officers, sector representatives and ejido members. Financial coordination has not been necessary in Quintana Roo because the government agencies involved in REDD+ utilize their own budgets. Non-state actors had received financial support from the government and some NGOs and had used their own funds to cover travel expenses to attend REDD+ meetings and events. The interviewees suggested that financial coordination should be not only about joint investment to support forest management and conservation but also about restricting subsidies that promote agriculture. Most of the REDD+ discussions in

Quintana Roo have been around the development of the state strategy and other planning tools. REDD+ programming has not restricted any activity and the ejido regime guaranteed that ejido members continued to make decisions regarding land-use within each ejido. Interviewees confirmed that there had not been any major conflict among stakeholders. They stated that the mechanism used to solve potential conflicts was dialogue. However non-state actors indicated that they can organize rallies, protests and file lawsuits against the government if needed. Despite the general efforts to encourage transparency that the government has made (e.g. transparency laws, access of information online tool, anonymous report line), non-state actors in Quintana Roo do not trust the government as a general rule. This is not specifically related to REDD+ but part of the cultural and historical context.

The experience of REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo has not resulted in the engagement of non-state actors in activities supporting the reduction of deforestation and generation of socio-economic benefits for rural people.

Although the tree cover in the REDD+ intervention area (municipalities of Felipe

Carrillo Puerto, Jose Maria Morelos, Bacalar and Othon P. Blanco) has been maintained from 2010 to 2017, there was not strong evidence that the REDD+ program in Quintana Roo has contributed to it. REDD+ has been only one of the many mechanisms to promote and support sustainable forest management and conservation. REDD+ has not engaged actors in activities to generate income and community benefits (schools, clinics, roads, social assistance). Ejidos in

Quintana Roo (as in Mexico overall) have not yet received results-based payments. The main source of financial support for REDD+ early actions in

Quintana Roo was the REDD+ Special Program which ran in parallel with other regular rural development, forest management and conservation programs, making it only one of the many sources of subsides that rural people have to support their livelihoods and incomes. REDD+ did not restrict the access to land and forest products meaning that rural people in Quintana Roo’s REDD+ intervention area continue to generate income through timber exploitation under management plans, beekeeping, charcoal production and agriculture, among other activities. Although REDD+ has not interfered with the agency of rural people to make land-use decisions, it has not created enough incentives to motivate people to choose forest management and/or conservation activities over agriculture.

From the analysis of REDD+ programming in Quintana Roo, this research proposes that 1) REDD+ governance needs a driver: one or a few

7 specific actors to direct the decision-making and implementation processes while promoting actors’ participation, influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. In addition the research proposes that 2) REDD+ phase 2

(early implementation) needs more fuel: In other words, more financial resources should be invested in activities to achieve significant reduction of deforestation and generation of socio-economic benefits for local people to demonstrate more convincingly the potential benefits of forest management efforts once results-based payments do begin.

The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter describes climate change governance, focusing on REDD+. It explains the evolution in time of polycentricity, provides a definition and describes the governance assessment framework used in this research. Finally, it provides the historical background of the Mexican forest sector and describes the current REDD+ policies in this country, as a context for the selected case study.

Chapter two provides examples of the application of the assessment framework to REDD+ case studies from the literature in several developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Chapter three describes the case study methodology utilized in this research. It explains the design of the case study, the characteristics of the study area, the data collection and analysis processes. This chapter also discusses the positionality of the researcher.

Chapter four presents quantitative data on deforestation reduction and socio-economic benefits for rural people in Quintana Roo. Data from the Global

Forest Watch, the Mexican Institute for Statistics and Geographical Information

(INEGI) and the Mexican Council for the Evaluation of Social Policies

(CONEVAL) were used to make this analysis.

Chapter five presents and discusses the perception of key informants from the three groups: REDD+ Work Group, REDD+ Advisory Council, ejido leaders and members, regarding the quality of governance in terms of actors participation and their influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. Finally, chapter six presents the conclusion and policy recommendations of this research. The limitations and proposals for future research are also presented.

Chapter 1. Climate change and REDD+ governance

What is governance?

In lay words, governance can be defined as how society or groups within it, organize to make decisions (Institute on Governance, 2019). Governance was not a focus of development programming until 1989 when the World Bank introduced this term in its report Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth (World Bank, 1994). In the World Bank definition governance encompasses “the state's institutional arrangements; the processes for formulating policy, decision-making, and implementation; information flows within government; and the overall relationship between citizens and government” (Woods, 2000, p. 824).

Rod Rhodes was one of the first authors proposing that governance is not the same as government (Kjaer, 2011). Rhodes (1996) suggests that

“central government is no longer supreme… we live in a centerless society” (p.

657). Social problems often “…transcend the boundaries of the public sector

(Jannsen and Estevez, 2013, p.1). There are multiple policy actors involved in specific policies such as local governments, the voluntary sector and the private sector. These actors interact, exchange resources and negotiate to make policies work. Governance is the result of these interactions and negotiations

(Rhodes, 1996).

For (Löffler, 2015), good governance,

“…assumes a multiple stakeholder scenario where collective problems

can no longer be solved only by public authorities but require the

cooperation of other players (citizens, business, voluntary sector, media,

etc.) – and in which practices such as mediation, arbitration and self-

regulation may often be even more effective than public action” (p.217).

In the global context where countries make agreements to pursuit common objectives (e.g, the Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015) that are not legally enforced by an overarching authority, governance is needed to facilitate coordination and partnerships between stakeholders from multiple sectors of the society while recognizing the relevance of national governments when implementing projects to achieve these goals (Dalby et al., 2019).

Governance occurs at transnational (Bulkeley et al., 2012), national

(Rhodes, 1996) and local levels (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998). Climate change governance is an example of the interactions and negotiations among the multiple stakeholders at international, national and local levels.

Climate Change governance

Climate change governance includes different administrative levels

(international, national and sub-national) and different sectoral participation

(public and private sector, NGOs, local communities) that pursue the internationally agreed upon common goal to limit global warming to less than

2°C above pre-industrial levels (Overman et al., 2019). Climate change

11 governance can be described as “a highly complex institutional environment” characterized by the “proliferation of organizations, rules, implementation mechanisms, financing arrangements, and operational activities” (Abbott, 2012, p.571). Keohane and Victor (2010) describe the complex landscape of climate change governance as a “Cambrian explosion” (p.9) where multiple and diverse institutions appear and engage in activities that are not hierarchically organized.

This large and diverse set of institutions might result in various governance challenges. Dorsch & Flachsland, (2017) point out that “the more the better” is not a general rule. Engaging a variety of actors to address climate change mitigation “comes with a high risk of uncoordinated, or even contradictory, policies and actions” (p.58). These authors also suggest that the institutional diversity does not guarantee the elimination of business-as-usual attitudes such as free-riding, resistance and opposition to change. The institutional diversity in climate change governance also has some advantages.

According to Ostrom (2010b), small-scale units such as national and sub- national actors have an important potential contribution to climate change mitigation. Bernstein and Hofmann, (2018) state that”…much of the actual work of decarbonization required will be undertaken or catalyzed by a wide array of other actors, including subnational (e.g., municipal, state/provincial) and non- state” (p.190). The efforts made by these actors to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are “cumulatively additive” (Ostrom, 2010b, p.553), meaning that one local action might not have a large impact but the combination of multiple local actions can significantly contribute to global climate change mitigation.

Moreover, if the strategies for climate change mitigation designed at

12 international level are not supported by national and sub-national actors, they are likely to fail (Cole, 2011).

Although it is not possible to list all the activities undertaken by sub- national actors, these are some examples mentioned at the Bonn-Fiji

Commitment of Local and Regional Leaders to Deliver the Paris Agreement At

All Levels (Climate Summit of Local and Regional Leaders, 2017),

“As of today, 1,019 local and regional governments from 86

countries, representing 804 million people, have reported their

emissions reduction targets on the carbon Climate Registry

[voluntary global reporting platform for cities, towns and regions] …

7,494 cities and local governments, representing over 680 million

people, committed to the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate &

Energy… Together, these governments could reduce GHG

emissions by 21.9 GtCO2e cumulatively (1.2 GtCO2e annually) by

2050… “(p. 2).

In addition, up to 1,500 private companies have made commitments regarding energy efficiency and emissions reductions and civil society organizations have invested up to $720 million dollars in green projects (Hsu,

2016).

Despite their active participation, sub-national actors are often limited in financial resources and jurisdictional scope, therefore, climate change efforts need a solid set of global policies in which the national and subnational initiatives for climate change mitigation are nested (Sunderlin et al., 2015; Hsu,

2016). International institutions, such as the United Nations’ Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have an important role in regulating, providing scientific knowledge and financing climate change mitigation initiatives (Keohane and Victor, 2010). The UNFCCC was created in

1992 at the Rio Earth Summit and ratified in 1994 with the goal to stabilize greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere (UNFCCC, 2019c). Currently, the

UNFCCC has 196 country members, also called Parties which meet every year to negotiate climate-related issues at the Conference of Parties (COP)

(UNREDD programme, 2015). Table 1.1 lists the COPs that have been held since COP 1 in 1995.

Table 1.1 Conference of Parties1

Source: UNFCCC, (2019b)

Year Session Location

1995 COP 1 Berlin, Germany

1996 COP 2 Geneva, Switzerland

1997 COP 3 Kyoto, Japan

1998 COP 4 Buenos Aires, Argentina

1999 COP 5 Bonn, Germany

2000 COP 6 The Hague, Netherlands

2001 COP 7 Marrakech, Morocco

2002 COP 8 New Delhi, India

2003 COP 9 Milan, Italy

2004 COP 10 Buenos Aires, Argentina

2005 COP 11 Montreal, Canada

2006 COP 12 Nairobi, Kenya

2007 COP 13 Bali, Indonesia

2008 COP 14 Poznan, Poland

Table 1.1 Conference of Parties1

Source: UNFCCC, (2019b)

Year Session Location

2009 COP 15 Copenhagen, Denmark

2010 COP 16 Cancun, Mexico

2011 COP 17 Durban, South Africa

2012 COP 18 Doha, Qatar

2013 COP 19 Warsaw, Poland

2014 COP 20 Lima, Peru

2015 COP 21 Paris, France

2016 COP 22 Marrakech, Morocco

2017 COP 23 Bonn, Germany

2018 COP 24 Katowice, Poland

From the creation of the UNFCCC in 1992, several mechanisms for climate change mitigation have been developed. One of these mechanisms is

REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) introduced at the COP 11 in 2005 (UN-REDD programme, 2015). According to

Cole (2011), Long (2013) and Korhonen-Kurki et al. (2014), REDD+ recognizes the importance of multi-level and multi-sectoral actors in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the forest sector. The evolution and challenges of this mechanism will be discussed in the following section.

The REDD+ mechanism

According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, deforestation and degradation of forests are responsible for a third of the global carbon emissions generated by human activities from 1750 to 2011 (Smith et al., 2014). During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in the

1990’s and the first half of the 2000’s, the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) created by deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries gained attention. In 2005, at the COP11 in Montreal, the governments of Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal to include efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation in climate negotiations (Špirić, 2016). A forest- based climate change mitigation approach called REDD was introduced “as a mechanism that provides incentives for forest conservation in developing countries” (Loaiza-Lange, 2017, p. 8). At this early stage, community development outcomes were considered secondary REDD benefits (Newton et al., 2015).

Two years later, as part of the Bali Action Plan, the word “plus” was added creating the “REDD-plus” acronym which was substituted by “REDD+” in

2010 at the COP 16 in Cancun (Špirić, 2016). This plus sign refers to the inclusion of forest conservation, improvements in forest management, and enhancement of carbon stocks as objectives (Cadman and Maraseni, 2011;

Kronenberg et al. 2015). In 2009, at the COP 15 in Copenhagen, developed countries guaranteed more than 3.5 billion US dollars in support for REDD+

“...where finance and activities would focus initially on REDD+

strategy development, capacity building activities, implementation of

policies and measures, and move towards results-based

demonstration activities and verified emissions reductions” (Norman

et al., 2015, p.3).

In 2010, during the COP16 in Cancun, five activities defining the “scope” of REDD+ were established: 1) Reduction of emissions from deforestation; 2)

Reduction of emissions from forest degradation; 3) Conservation of forest carbon stocks; 4) Sustainable management of forests; 5) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The UNFCCC has not defined these activities. Instead, it allows each country to utilize their own interpretation of what these activities imply in their particular context (UN-REDD Programme, 2016). This has resulted in ambiguity in the interpretation of REDD+ activities (Bucki et al., 2012). In general, deforestation can be understood as clearing forest areas to use the land for other activities (e.g agriculture, opening new roads). This results in a permanent land-use change (UN-REDD Programme, 2016). Degradation is the transition from intact or unmanaged forests to non-intact forest due to activities such as logging, without changing the land use (Mollicone et al., 2007).

Conservation of carbon stocks implies efforts towards the permanence of forest areas in the long-term (Herold and Skutsch, 2011). Sustainable forest management is related to the harvesting of timber and non-timber products at volumes that do not go beyond the ability of the forests to renew themselves

(The Montreal Process, 2015). Enhancement of carbon stocks can translate as reforestation or restoration of forest areas, in other words reverse deforestation or reverse degradation (Bucki et al., 2012).

The Cancun Agreements defined the three phases for REDD+ development. The phases were: 1) readiness, 2) implementation and 3) results- based payments. The required elements were: a National Strategy or Action

Plan; a National Forestry Monitoring System; a Safeguard Information System; and identification of Forest Reference Emission Levels and/or Forest Reference

Levels (FREL/FRL) (UN-REDD Programme, 2015). The REDD+ phases and elements will be explained in detail in the next section.

The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ adopted at COP19 in 2013, also known as the REDD+ Rulebook, sets out the process that developing countries must follow to receive results-based payments for REDD+ actions. This document also provides recommendations for enhancing coordination through institutional arrangements, the timing and the frequency of presentations of information regarding safeguards, the guidelines for the technical assessment of submissions on forest reference emission levels, the modalities for measuring, reporting and verifying forest related emissions, and the recommendations for addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (UNFCCC, 2019a).

At the Paris COP 21 in 2015 the international negotiations centered on:

1) Procedures and approaches (safeguards) that can help to ensure that

1Figure 1.1 REDD+ Timeline

REDD+ activities enhance non-carbon benefits (economic, social, cultural and environmental benefits other than carbon emissions reduction); and 2)

Alternative non-market approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests. The adoption of the Warsaw Framework decisions in

2013 and the Paris outcomes in 2015 closed the negotiations regarding REDD+ methodologies and guidance (CIFOR, 2015; UN-REDD Programme, 2016).

Figure 1.1 summarizes the historical development of REDD+.

REDD+ phases and elements

Paragraph 73 of the decision 1, adopted at the COP16 in 2010 states that REDD+ has three phases

“...beginning with the development of national strategies or action plans,

policies and measures, and capacity-building, followed by the

implementation of national policies and measures and national strategies

or action plans that could involve further capacity-building, technology

development and transfer and results-based demonstration activities,

and evolving into results-based actions that should be fully measured,

reported and verified” (UFCCC, 2011, p.13).

Figure 1.2 shows some of the activities included in each of the three REDD+ phases.

2Figure 1.2. REDD+ phases

The main elements required for REDD+ that should be developed and implemented in phases 1 and 2 are (UNREDD programme, 2016):

National strategy/action plan: These strategic documents are country specific, however, in general, they should address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land-conversion trends, REDD+ intervention areas and their scale, land tenure, governance and gender issues. The construction of the strategic documents requires the participation of all relevant stakeholders including Indigenous peoples and local communities (FAO, 2019; UNFCCC,

2019a).

National Forestry Monitoring System: Countries engaged in REDD+ need to be able to measure, report and verify the impacts of the implemented

REDD+ activities. To do so, they need to create a National Forestry Monitoring

System. This system should follow the technical guidelines provided by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change regarding the estimations of GHG

emissions caused by human activities in the forest sector. The system should

use both remote sensing and on-the-ground tools to develop forest inventories.

The estimations should be accurate, transparent and include all types of forest

in the country. Finally, local and/or Indigenous people should be involved in

monitoring and reporting activities (Ochieng et al., 2016).

Safeguard Information System: In the COP 16 in 2010 the UNFCCC

parties agreed on a set of principles or safeguards, to address the risks that

REDD+ might pose, especially to local and/or Indigenous people such as

involuntary displacement, lack of access to benefits, or marginalization from

decision-making (Arhin, 2014). These safeguards are listed in Table 1.2. The

term safeguard in the REDD+ context implies a rights-based approach meaning

that safeguards “go beyond merely ensuring that investments do no harm to

vulnerable people and ecosystems, and require positive actions to

operationalize the rights to which they refer…” (Rey et al. 2013, p.18). Countries

engaged in REDD+ should develop a system which provides transparent and

consistent information on how these safeguards are being promoted and

supported according to each country’s particular context (UNFCCC, 2019a).

Table 1.2. Safeguard defined in the 2010 COP 16 2 (Source: UNFCCC, 2019a) 1. Actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty 1. Respect for the knowledge and rights of Indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws

Table 1.2. Safeguard defined in the 2010 COP 16 2 (Source: UNFCCC, 2019a) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular Indigenous peoples and local communities Actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity and used to incentivize the protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits, taking into account the need for sustainable livelihoods of Indigenous peoples and local communities and their interdependence on forests 1. Actions to address the risks of reversals Actions to reduce displacement of emissions

Forest Reference Emission Levels/Forest Reference Levels

(FREL/FRL): FREL/FRLs are used as a benchmark “to measure the impact of

REDD+ policies and actions and to define emission reductions, which are the

difference between realised emissions and the [reference level]” (Herold et al.,

2012, p.282). Although the UNFCCC provides some general guidance on how

countries should define and submit their FREL/FRLs, there is not a universal

methodology in place. Countries use historical data regarding average annual

deforestation rates and simulation models to predict future deforestation and the

resulting GHG emissions (Climate Focus, 2015).

Phase 2 includes activities that are implemented in the field. These are

“activities implemented in a particular sub-national region or unit…with the

intention of reducing deforestation or forest degradation in that particular area”

(Cerbu et al, 2011, p.170). These actions are known as early implementation

(Ekawati et al., 2019), demonstration activities or pilot projects (Minang et al.,

2014). The activities included in phases 1 and 2 can occur simultaneously

(Green Climate Fund, 2019b). For example, a country can start piloting

activities to reduce deforestation while its national strategy, monitoring system

22 and/or safeguard system are still in construction (Lujan et al., 2018). In addition to the development of the four elements described above and the implementation of pilot projects, REDD+ phases 1 and 2 include capacity building, institutional and policy development to enhance participation of stakeholders, provide legal and technical support, and address tenure issues, among others (Minang et al., 2014).

The developing countries engaged in REDD+ are at different stages of the readiness and implementation phases. The Green Climate Fund Secretariat conducted a survey from January to April 2019 where 55 developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America participated. The results of this survey showed that 28 countries have defined their FERL/FRL, 26 countries have completed their National REDD+ strategies, 19 countries have developed their forest monitoring systems and 14 countries have developed their safeguards information systems. From the participant countries, only 5, Brazil, Chile,

Ecuador, Mexico and Vietnam, have completed all these elements needed for

REDD+ implementation and future results-based payments (Green Climate

Fund, 2019b).

REDD+ phase 3. Results-based payments

Results-based payments are expected to occur when a country reaches the REDD+ phase 3. This financial approach is not exclusive to the REDD+ mechanism. Results-based aid has been used by donor agencies such as the

World Bank to finance projects in other sectors such as health. This approach can be defined as a contract between two parties, the donor and the recipient, that establishes incentives to obtain verifiable results (Angelson, 2017). In the

23 context of REDD+ the objective of the results-based payments is to incentivise developing countries to reduce GHG emissions from the forest sector. The results are measured against a previously defined FERL/FRL and expressed in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year (Lujan et al., 2018). The results- based payments are an “ex-post reward” meaning that the countries engaged in

REDD+ will receive these funds only after implementing the actions included in phases 1 and 2 and verifying their results in terms of reduction of GHG emissions. Therefore, in order to receive results-based payments these countries need to invest funds (international and domestic) to develop their national strategies, FERL/FRL, monitoring systems, safeguards systems and implement actions to reduce deforestation that will ultimately result in reducing

GHG emissions (Climate Focus, 2015). Wong et al. (2016) suggest that to motivate the participation of stakeholders, REDD+ requires a mixed approach to allocate financial incentives which includes upfront and non-results-based payments in addition to the results-based payments.

As of early 2019, only one proposal for results-based payments has been approved. The Green Climate Fund has agreed to pay Brazil $96.5 million dollars for the reduction of emissions from deforestation in the Amazon in 2014 and 2015 (Green Climate Fund, 2019a). Three other countries (Colombia,

Ecuador, and Malaysia), submitted information regarding results of REDD+ activities and a request for corresponding results-based payments to the

UNFCCC online platform Lima Information Hub (UNFCCC, 2019b). Four countries (Costa Rica, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mexico) were negotiating the terms for results-based payments with the Forest Carbon

Partnership Facility (FCPF) (Meyer, 2018). The results from the survey

24 conducted by the Green Climate Fund (2019b) showed that 25 of the 55 participant countries are planning to report their REDD+ results to obtain payment between 2019 and 2020. This indicates that although only 9% of the participant countries have completed all their REDD+ requirements, 45% of them have implemented pilot projects which generated results that might qualify for results-based payments.

Although countries engaged in REDD+ have made significant progress in

REDD+ readiness and early implementation, REDD+ has left “many early expectations unfulfilled” (Massarella et al., 2018, p. 376). Globally, the REDD+ pilot projects have achieved limited results in halting deforestation due to “low financing flows, with correspondingly low treatment intensities” (Duchelle et al.,

2018, p.138). Hodgdon et al. (2013) suggest that REDD+ should not be seen as

“a silver bullet” (p. 379) because it is unlikely that REDD+ payments will result in good forest management practices. Instead, these practices should be already in place to make possible the implementation of REDD+. Overman et al. (2019), suggest that “Ten years after its launch, REDD+ progress seems mired by problems of uncompetitiveness, risk of land grabbing, powerful business-as- usual interests and deserted by global results-based finance…” (p.24). This affects especially poor countries “…where governance is weak, corruption often prevalent and enforcement feeble” (Turnhout et al., 2017, p.14). In other words, it seems that REDD+ has not overcome the historical and cultural barriers that prevail in most of the developing countries such as corruption, land tenure insecurity and contrasting interests regarding land use.

Evolution of the REDD+ concept

According to Astuti et al. (2015), REDD+ “... is gradually evolving from its initial proposal to reduce emissions from land-use change and the forestry sector into a multifaceted scheme to govern human–forest relations” (p.21).

This evolution has resulted in three main changes to the REDD+ original concept (Angelsen, 2017; Turnhout et al., 2017):

1) REDD+ objectives changed from a single objective, reducing GHG emissions, to multiple additional objectives including biodiversity protection, poverty alleviation, generation of socio-economic benefits for local and

Indigenous people, and improvement of governance (Angelsen, 2017). As a result, livelihood benefits have come to be perceived as an important REDD+ goal (Newton et al., 2015). It is important to note that although most of the countries engaged in REDD+ have adopted this non-carbon benefits approach, the results-based payments continue to be an incentive that depends on the reduction of carbon emissions. The achievements in terms of other benefits such as biodiversity conservation or poverty alleviation will not be considered in calculating results-based payments (Turnhout et al., 2017).

2) REDD+ sources of funding changed from the carbon market to public funds (international and domestic). Originally, REDD+ was expected to attract private investment. However, most of the financial support for phases 1 and 2 of REDD+ has been provided by public funds from bilateral and multilateral agreements with developed countries (Norman et al., 2015). Domestic governments have also invested funds to support these REDD+ phases (Lujan et al., 2018). The UNFCCC made the decision in 2015 to adopt a mixed

26 financial approach for REDD+ that includes both public and private investments.

Countries that decide to pursue a non-market approach will only receive support from public funding (CIFOR, 2015). The main multilateral funding organizations for REDD+ phases 1 and 2 are: the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Forest Investment Programme (FIP) by the World Bank, and the UN-REDD

Programme (Recio, 2018). These organizations have invested $742 million

USD from 2008 to 2019 to support 53 developing countries. Norway, Germany and the United Kingdom are the top 3 donor countries to these organizations

(Green Climate Fund, 2019b). Table 1.3 shows the top 5 countries receiving funds from these sources.

Table 1.3. Top five fund recipient from FCPF, UN-REDD and FIP (2008-2019) 3 (Source: Green Climate Fund, 2019b) Country Funds received (million USD) Democratic Republic of the Congo 82.17 Brazil 79.50 Mexico 70.80 Ghana 64.48 Indonesia 52.18

3) REDD+ changed from a Payment for Ecological Services type of policies, which includes a quantifiable service, buyers, sellers and a marketplace, to broader land-use policies to harmonize competing land-uses and address the drivers of deforestation (Moeliono, et al., 2016; Angelsen,

2017; Wurtzebach et al., 2019). Recognizing that most of the deforestation drivers occur outside the forest sector (Weatherley-Singha and Gupta, 2017),

Nielsen (2016) suggests that“…sectorial approaches to land management are no longer sufficient to meet global challenges such as tropical deforestation,

27 biodiversity conservation or food production” (p.177). Instead, a single management mechanism that integrates the different land uses (e.g agriculture, food security, forest conservation) is needed. This is known as the landscape approach (Bastos-Lima et al., 2017). As a result of this approach, the agricultural sector, one of the main drivers of tropical deforestation, has gained relevance in REDD+ programming (Weatherley-Singha and Gupta, 2017).

These three changes have moved REDD+ away from a mechanism that will commodify avoided deforestation and the associated GHG emissions reduction by making them tradable in the carbon market (Stephan, 2012). Since

COP 21 in 2015, most of the REDD+ initiatives are pursuing non-carbon benefits, have received financial support from public funding and are adopting a landscape approach to address the drivers of deforestation (Turnhout et al.,

2017). However, these changes have increased the complexity in REDD+ governance by including actors at multiple levels and from multiple sectors other than forestry, in order to make decisions regarding the broader land-use sector and the sharing of co-benefits (Turnhout et al., 2017, Wurtzebach et al.,

2019). This multi-level and multi-sectoral approach might provide opportunities for countries to address their context-specific problems (e.g corruption, law enforcement, land tenure) by reducing policy failure, improving decision-making practices and promoting inclusive stakeholder participation (CIFOR, 2013;

FAO,2019). Alternatively it might lead to contrasting and/or overlapping policies

(Ekawati et al., 2019) and the marginalization of actors with “less-developed organizational or financial capacities” (Zelli et al., 2019, p.1) to participate and influence decision-making.

In summary, in the past decade, the UNFCCC parties have made progress in creating a mechanism for climate change mitigation in the forest sector that in addition takes into account non-carbon benefits as part of its goal, thus creating a non-market approach for financing and land-use policies that intend to address the underlying causes of deforestation in the participating developing countries. Although the developing countries engaged in REDD+ have made efforts to create their REDD+ national strategies, define their FRLs, develop their monitoring and safeguard systems and implement pilot projects, they are still facing many challenges. One of the main issues is the complexity in REDD+ governance. As with climate change, REDD+ governance might create opportunities for countries to adopt an inclusive multi-level and multi- sectoral approach in decision-making that facilitates REDD+ implementation.

But it might not be enough to overcome business-as-usual attitudes such as contrasting interests and marginalization of the actors with fewer resources from the decision-making process. The research asked if in the case of Quintana

Roo, Mexico, REDD+ governance has facilitated the engagement of actors from different levels of government and different sectors in decision-making and implementation of activities to reduce deforestation. The proposed framework to assess the effectiveness of REDD+ governance which is based on the theory of multi-level and multi-sectoral governance approaches is explained in the following section.

Multi-level and multi-sectoral approach in governance

Researchers have explained the complexity of climate change governance and REDD+ governance by using three governance approaches: polycentric governance (Ostrom, 2009a; Ostrom, 2010b; Nagendra and Ostrom,

2012; Long, 2013; Bushley, 2014; Jordan et al., 2015; Gallemore, 2017, Ba and

Galik, 2019), multi-level governance (Cifor, 2013; McDermott, 2013; Aicher;

2014; Rantala, Hajjar and Skutsch, 2014; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014) and fragmentation (Zelli and Van Asselt, 2013; Pattberg et al, 2014; Gupta et al.,

2016; Well et al., 2017). The definitions, main features and the similarities that these concepts share are presented next.

Polycentric governance

In the first decade of the 21st century, Elinor Ostrom (2010b) proposed polycentric governance as an effective approach to address global environmental problems such as climate change. According to the researchers in the Ostrom tradition, polycentric governance has the potential to achieve efficient production and provision of public and collective goods and reduce opportunistic behaviour (Ostrom, 2009b; Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012). Elinor

Ostrom’s ideas regarding polycentric governance were based on the earlier work of Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) who proposed that

“Polycentric connotes many centers of decision making that are formally

independent of each other. Whether they actually function

independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of

relations, is an empirical question in particular cases…” (cited in Ostrom,

2010a, p. 643).

Later, Vincent Ostrom (1999) expanded on the definition of polycentric order stating that it was

“One where many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments

for ordering their relationships with one another within a general system

of rules where each element acts with independence of other elements”

(cited in Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012, p. 115).

Other scholars revised the concept and proposed their own versions:

“...where large, medium, and small governmental and non-governmental

enterprises engage in diverse cooperative as well as competitive

relationships” (Ostrom, 2005, p.2).

“…complex, modular systems where differently sized governance units

with different purpose, organization, spatial location interact to form

together a largely self-organized governance regime” (Pahl-Wostl, 2009,

p.357).

“…complex combination of multiple levels and diverse types of

organizations drawn from the public, private, and voluntary sectors that

have overlapping realms of responsibility and functional capacities”

(McGinnis and Ostrom 2012, p. 15).)

“…institutional linkages between quasi-autonomous decision-making

units operating at multiple scales, complemented by modest overlaps in

authority and capability” (Bixler, 2014, p.159).

Although polycentricity moves away from the concept of top-down authority, this approach is also different from decentralized governance.

Polycentric governance does not focus on privatization or de-regulation but on the layers of relationships between local actors and the government (Andersson

31 and Ostrom, 2008). According to Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014) and Mccord et al. (2017), a key characteristic of polycentricity is the existence of rules or mechanisms to coordinate these relationships. Canel (2001), suggests that “a conservative view of decentralization” (p.26) proposes that the state must distribute functions and transfer responsibilities to the private and voluntary sectors while keeping the role of facilitator. This approach of decentralization shows similarities with the concept of polycentricity.

Multi-level governance

Multi-level governance was first proposed to describe the characteristic mode of governance of the European Union. According to Marks (1993), multi- level governance is “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional and local…” (p.392). Hooghe and Marks (2003) proposed two types of multi-level governance. Multi-level governance type I “is concerned with power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels… “and

“the memberships of jurisdictions at higher and lower tiers do not intersect”.

According to Liefferink and Wurzel (2018) multi-level governance type II

“…refers to flexible, task-specific, overlapping jurisdictions and shows strong resemblance with polycentricity” (p. 137).

Zen et al. (2019) suggest that the multi-level governance approach has moved beyond the area of European policy and was adopted in climate change governance to include “…inter-sectoral, multi-actor and multidimensional processes…” (p.4) to address climate change mitigation and adaptation. Zen et al. (2019) see multi-level governance as an adequate approach to coordinate

32 vertical and horizontal interactions among actors. Rantala et al. (2014) propose that the key elements that characterize multi-level governance are:

“the increased role and participation of non-state actors; transformation

of the role of the state; understanding decision making through complex

networks and negotiations in addition to hierarchically nested

jurisdictions; and challenging conventional notions of accountability of

democratic institutions” (p. 3148).

Multi-level governance type I and II are not different phenomena, instead they coexist as type I provides normative and financial support for type II, the same way that polycentricity and monocentricity are interrelated and “may be seen as ideal-typical opposite poles of the same analytical dimension”

(Liefferink and Wurzel, 2018, p. 137).

Fragmentation

Fragmentation is a term used in current international relations literature, defined as

“…a patchwork of international institutions that are different in their

character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their

constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to

global), and their subject matter (from specific policy fields to universal

concerns)” (Biermann et al., 2009, p.16).

The concept of fragmentation is very similar to that of polycentric governance but it often has a negative connotation, perhaps because of its association with the word “broken” (Van Asselt, 2014). Researchers claim that

33 fragmentation is “value free” (Zelli and Van Asselt, 2013) meaning that it does not imply any judgement about the quality of the governance. However, fragmentation is usually associated with disorganization, competition and conflict among institutions while polycentricity is associated with cooperation and synergistic interactions (Abbott, 2012; Van Asselt, 2014, Dlamini &

Montouroy, 2017). Researchers investigating fragmentation claim that one core actor or a few specific actors must have a predominant role in decision-making to avoid competing and/or contrasting policies (Biermann et al., 2009; Pattberg et al., 2014).

This research uses polycentric governance as the basis for a framework to assess the effectiveness of REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo because: 1) it is an encompassing concept that denotes the complexity of both horizontal and vertical interaction among actors from different levels of government and multiple sector representatives; 2) it emphasises the need for rules to regulate these relationships and 3) it has a positive connotation reflecting the opportunity to achieve good outcomes in decision-making and policy implementation. The historical background, challenges in the theory of polycentric governance and the framework proposed are discussed and described in the following sections.

Polycentric Governance historical background

The concept of polycentricity was used in the early 1950’s by Michael

Polanyi to describe science (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017).

He argued that scientific progress was based on the existence of organizations which gave scientists freedom to make individual contributions and to design their research based on their personal considerations instead of following a

34 strict pre-defined research agenda. Multiple opinions in scientific theory and practice were critical to achieve the common goal of objective truth. Polanyi suggested that an encompassing authority structure cannot impose such an abstract ideal. Polanyi stated that this concept also applied for arts and law which had their own ideals: beauty and justice (Aligica & Tarko, 2012, Dorsch &

Flachsland, 2017).

Parallel to Polanyi’s ideas Vincent and Elinor Ostrom applied the polycentric approach to address practical problems in the governance of metropolitan areas and the management of common-pool resources. In 1961

Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren argued that the public sector was a polycentric system and that a set of public and private organizations producing and distributing public goods in metropolitan areas was a potentially effective management arrangement (Ostrom, 2010a). For example, “...the State, through its budgetary capacity, could mainly act as the financier of public policies and control processes related to the quantity and quality in the provision of these policies. However, the production would be a specific task for the closest actors to the place where the public policy is needed” (Capelari et al., 2017, p.211). In the following years, Vincent Ostrom, Elinor Ostrom and other researchers from the University of Indiana conducted studies to assess the performance of water industries in the state of California. They found that multiple private and public organizations were able to provide water services at multiple scales in an organized and productive way (Capelari et al., 2017). In the 1970’s the water provision studies were extended to public safety in several American states.

The evidence also showed that smaller police departments had better outcomes than larger departments serving similar neighbourhoods demonstrating that in

35 metropolitan governance, complexity does not always mean chaos (Ostrom,

2010a). The concept of polycentric governance influenced Elinor Ostrom’s work on common pool resource management. Ostrom proposed that the governance of common pool resources included diverse, independent and interrelated stakeholders who created institutional arrangements at a local level to address collective action problems. These are situations that involve multiple individuals seeking to achieve common goals that benefit a large group of people while allowing for individuals to decide their level of participation in the process

(Ostrom, 2008).

In the 2000’s, Elinor Ostrom challenged the idea that climate change policies should be placed only in the hands of global organizations. She proposed that, in parallel with the earlier theory developed for metropolitan areas, the actions of smaller-units, including national governments, sub-national governments, companies and local communities, should also be recognized

(Ostrom, 2009a).

Polycentric governance: theory vs practice

Scholars investigating polycentric theory argue that there are gaps in the conceptualization of polycentric governance (Marshall, 2015, Jordan et al.,

2018; Morrison et al., 2019). The theorists of polycentricity in the Ostrom tradition have not provided a clear set of indicators to identify it (Jordan et al.,

2018). Terms such as polycentricity, polycentric arrangements and polycentric systems are used interchangeably in the literature (Marshall, 2015, Carlisle and

Gruby, 2017). Carlisle and Gruby (2017) note that the relationships among actors in polycentric governance are not “tidy and static” but “dense and

36 evolving” (p. 7). The authors state that some decision-making centres might be

“fixed” while others are “transitory”, meaning that polycentric governance is contextual and can be constantly changing. The literature suggests that governance is not binary (monocentric vs polycentric) but a continuum

(Liefferink and Wurzel, 2018) which implies that many types or degrees of polycentric governance may exist along this continuum (Pattberg et al., 2014).

From the combinations of various indicators Aligica and Tarko (2012) identified

288 possible types of polycentric governance although some of these types may not exist in practice. Galaz et al. (2012), argue that polycentricity can be strong or weak. Strong polycentricity requires formal partnerships and high levels of commitment between stakeholders while weak polycentricity implies

“loose relationships among actors” (p. 23).

One of the characteristics of polycentric governance that can be identified from the definitions presented above is that actors are capable of independent decision-making, self-organizing and making mutual adjustments.

Regarding independence of actors, the original definition by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren presented above (cited in Ostrom, 2010a) proposed “formal independence” as a characteristic of polycentric governance. However, the degree of autonomy among entities required for a system to be considered polycentric has not been established in the literature. Scholars have used phrases such as “considerable”, “substantive” “semi-autonomous” and “some degree of autonomy” (Carlisle & Gruby, 2017). Marshall (2015) argues that there might be a difference between how polycentric arrangements are supposed to operate and how they work in practice. In polycentric arrangements, actors have formal (de jure) autonomy. However, polycentric

37 arrangements do not automatically translate into actual (de facto) autonomy of actors. Marshall (2015) suggests that the central government might promote the creation of polycentric arrangements that give formal autonomy to non-state actors (e.g. NGOs, local communities) while maintaining actual centralized authority by establishing fiscal and/or regulatory policies that control decision- making and policy implementation. Another mechanism used by the government to retain authority is through financial incentives that lead local communities and other non-state actors to support top-down initiatives

(Lockwood and Davidson, 2010).

In terms of self-organization and mutual adjustments, Jordan et al.

(2018) reflect on how these functions occur in practice. Do they happen spontaneously or are they guided by specific actors? The authors argue that not all actors have the same capacity or motivation to self-organize and make mutual adjustments, therefore a facilitator might be needed. Abott (2018) proposes that polycentric governance needs “modest levels of coordination or ordering” (p. 188) to operate. Some authors argue that polycentric arrangements should have blurred hierarchies or non-hierarchical relationships

(Saito-Jensen, 2015; Dorsch & Flachsland, 2017; Morrison et al., 2017).

Torney (2019) states that “…polycentricity entails non-hierarchical governance arrangements in which it may be difficult to distinguish leaders from followers”

(p.168), however, the interconnections among actors might favour “leader- follower relations” (p.169). According to Wurzel et al. (2019), the polycentric approach opens the possibility for actors from any sector and at any level to become a leader or pioneer in a polycentric governance scheme. Lerum-

Boasson (2018) states that the complexity within polycentric governance

38 creates opportunities for governance entrepreneurship where some actors try to act beyond “merely do their job” (p. 119). Jordan et al. (2018) invite a re-thinking of the role of the state in polycentric governance: is it possible that in practice states are promoting polycentric governance by delegating responsibilities to non-state actors and engaging in orchestration? According to Abott (2018),

“Orchestration is an indirect mode of governance that relies on inducements and incentives rather than mandatory controls” (p.188). Although orchestration might be an effective approach to facilitate the achievement of the established goals in polycentric governance, it may reduce the democratic legitimacy

(Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017) and result in the re-gaining of power and control of the state (Pegram, 2015). Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez (2018), argue that this form of governance does not promote equality among actors because a few specific stakeholders with privileged positions influence decision-making. In contrast, Abbott et al. (2016) suggest that orchestration implies soft hierarchical relationships as the intermediaries are not obliged by any means to collaborate with the orchestrator. Jannsen and Estevez (2013) describe the orchestrator as a coach who creates the conditions for the other players to assume their roles.

The orchestrator catalyses, facilitates, supports and incentivises the intermediaries to achieve common goals (Abbott, 2018).

Summarizing, many authors have attempted to define and describe polycentric governance and there is a lack of clarity in terminology (e.g. the use of words such as many, multiple, some degree, considerable). There is a lack of a consolidated set of features to identify polycentric governance and there is overlapping with similar terms such as fragmentation and multi-level governance. However, researchers agree that in practice, polycentric

39 governance can be diverse because the relationships between multi-level and multi-sectoral stakeholders are contextual and dynamic. Therefore, many types or degrees of polycentric governance might exist. Although in theory polycentric governance should generate non-hierarchical relationships among independent decision-making centers that are capable to self-organizing and making mutual adjustments, in practice, facilitation, coordination and ordering may be needed. Scholars suggest that in some cases a few specific actors are more capable or motivated to become facilitators. These actors might operate as leaders, pioneers, orchestrators or governance entrepreneurs. It is important to note the relevance of the term polycentric arrangements. These arrangements give formal independence to actors. However, whether they are actually independent or not, is also contextual depending on the degree of control (financial, fiscal, and/or regulatory) over non-state actors exerted by the government.

The governance assessment framework

Based on the literature, the following definition has been adopted for the purposes of this research:

Polycentric governance is a form of decision making that involves formal

arrangements between representatives of multiple levels of authority and

representatives of multiple economic and social sectors with overlapping

responsibilities, making decisions under a shared system of rules to

regulate their relationships.

This definition asserts the necessity for the formalization of relationships between engaged actors. Formal arrangements might include regular meetings,

40 working groups, committees, or other arrangements that bring representatives together for decision-making. It has been established above that in practice, formal arrangements involving multiple levels of government and multiple sector representatives might lead to different outcomes regarding the relationships between the actors involved and their level of engagement in implementing activities that lead to the achievement of desired goals.

Polycentric governance can facilitate several functions that lead actors to work together toward the achievement of common goals (McGinnis, 2011;

Galaz et al. 2012; Cole, 2015). Using the model of polycentric governance as a starting point, a framework for assessing the quality of governance was developed. The framework proposed to assess the quality of governance in

REDD+ in terms of the performance of the functions listed in table 1.4.

Table 1.4. Functions of polycentric governance 4 Functions Authors Actors’ influence in decision-making McGinnis (2011), Carlisle & Gruby (2017) Information sharing McGinnis (2011), Galaz et al. (2012), Cole (2015), Hsu et al. (2017) Knowledge exchange Galaz et al. (2012), Cole (2015), Hsu et al. (2017) Financial coordination McGinnis (2011), Galaz et al. (2012), Hsu et al. (2017) Conflict resolution McGinnis (2011), Galaz et al. (2012), Carlisle & Gruby (2017) Creation of Trust Ostrom (2009b), Cole (2015)

The names of the six functions were proposed by the researcher and they encompass the various functions that are described in the literature. The characteristics of each of these functions are described as follows:

Actors’ influence in decision-making: Carlisle & Gruby (2017) state that in polycentricity, the words “many” or “multiplicity” are used to express the number of governance units acting in a particular domain. However, having a large number of actors is not an indicator of the quality of governance. The influence that they have in decision-making is more important than the actual number of actors. Therefore, it is important to assess whether and if appropriate which actors have influence in decision-making. Influence in decision-making can be defined as the capacity of actors to engage in deliberative processes, negotiate and arrive at consensus (Gelcich, 2014). According to Morrison et al.

(2017), it is possible to assess the perception of who has the power to influence decision-making through key informant interviews and other qualitative research methods.

Information sharing: Information is the most important resource to direct stakeholders to the achievement of shared goals (Hsu et al., 2017). Cole

(2015) proposes that communication and information exchange, promotes negotiation and increases cooperation. Information sharing is the gathering and dissemination of elements that might engage and create awareness among actors within the system (Andonova et al., 2009). Galaz et al. (2012) propose that information sharing is a simple function as it only requires the creation of shared platforms and processes for information dissemination. These elements are facilitated by the available technological tools (e.g. internet) and do not require significant commitment between actors.

Knowledge exchange: This function encompasses activities such as training to build technical capacities, and provision of expertise and/or

42 technologies, (Hsu et al., 2017), creating opportunities for policy experimentation and learning from observing trial and error (Cole, 2015).

Financial coordination: This function refers to joint investments to implement field projects or monitoring systems to mention a few examples. The main indicators for this function are who provides funding and who decides how funds are expended (Galaz et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2017).

Conflict resolution: Institutional arrangements including multiple actors with overlapping interest might generate conflict (Wagner, 2005). Conflict can create stress among actors and if left unresolved can lead to the breakdown of partnerships. Conflicts can be solved by interpreting and creating a shared understanding for complex problems (Galaz et al., 2011) and setting the mechanism to deal with the “inevitable disputes” (p.58) among actors

(McGinnis, 2011).

Creation of Trust: According to Ostrom’s behavioral theory of collective action, building trust and reciprocity is critical to address social-ecological problems. In other words, “if individuals trust that at least some others will reciprocate cooperation with cooperation… it may be possible to achieve substantial long-term benefits” (Ostrom, 2009b, p. 214). Because “trust is not the same as blind-faith” (Cole, 2015, p.115), the reputation of actors and transparency are needed to create trust and reciprocity.

The quality of polycentric governance in terms of the functions described above should facilitate the engagement of actors in the implementation of activities promoting the achievement of common goals. In addition, the evolution of these functions can be examined to determine if the quality of polycentric governance has improved, declined or been maintained over time.

Figure 1.3 provides the proposed governance assessment framework used to assess the quality of REDD+ governance, and the engagement of actors in activities promoting the achievement of goals.

3Figure 1.3. Governance Assessment Framework In summary, arrangements that bring together multi-level and multi- sectoral actors might result in different qualities of governance. The quality of governance can be assessed by determining which actors influence decision- making, what information is shared, what knowledge is exchanged, how financing is coordinated conflicts resolved, and trust created. These functions

44 may be interdependent. The quality of governance can influence the engagement of actors in activities seeking the achievement of common goals.

Mexico’s forest sector and REDD+ policies

The forest sector in Mexico has been under a social property regime as a result of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917). Land redistribution took place after the Revolution and remote forest areas were given to ejidos. The agrarian reform allocated 60% of Mexican forests as ejido property, even if this was not its original objective (Cronkleton et al., 2011).

Ejidos are legally recognized by article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.

According to articles 9 and 10 of the Mexican Agrarian Law, ejidos “have legal capacity, their own assets and they are the owners of the land that has been allocated to them... they operate according to their internal rules with no limitations other than following the law…” (Camara de Diputados del H.

Congreso de la Union, 2018, p.2). In practice, the word Ejido has three connotations in the Mexican context: 1) the resources: land, water, forests; 2)

The group of people that owns and manages the resources; 3) the property regime which implies collective ownership of land and resources (Ruiz-Massieu,

1987). A combination of the three elements is also an acceptable definition. For example, Johnson (2001) states that

“Ejidos are communities that own land communally and work it

under a system of permanent but non-transferable use rights.

The new legislation [agrarian reform of 1992] offers ejidos the

option to participate in voluntary titling programs and to receive

individual, private titles” (p. 292).

The ejido regime in its early days might have been created as a tool of political control over rural communities and was embedded into the bureaucratic

Mexican system (Trujilo Bautista, 1997). However, some scholars and policy makers propose that ejidos should be seen as cooperatives or social enterprises (Ruiz-Massieu, 1987). According to Morett-Sánchez and Cosío-Ruiz

(2017), ejidos are a modality of private property since “Their lands do not belong to the nation” (p.130). Not all rural people are ejido members. The avecindados do not have rights over land and forest, they do not attend ejido assemblies and do not get profits from income generating activities or government programs granted at ejido level (Skutsch & Balderas- Torres,

2016). However, they can become ejido members through authorization of the ejido assembly and if they fulfill the requirements established in the Agrarian

Law: being Mexican, over the age of 18 and have lived in the ejido for at least one year (Morett-Sánchez and Cosío-Ruiz, 2017).

From 1920 to 1940, the Mexican post-revolutionary government adopted a conservationist approach to protect Mexico’s forests (Merino-Perez et al.,

2007). This idea came from a group of Mexican scientists educated in Europe who were aware of the importance of forests from an environmental viewpoint and for the economy of the country. However, they believed that the Mexican peasants were uneducated and their practices were the main cause of deforestation in the country (Boyer, 2007). The Mexican government imposed policies and laws that restricted the use of forest products for rural people

(Merino-Perez et al., 2007). As a result, many ejidos decided to transform their forest areas to agricultural land in order to avoid the restrictions and be able to use their lands for their benefit (Boyer, 2007).

From 1940 to the 1980’s the Mexican laws allowed parastatal and private logging concessions in some areas. Rural communities received a fee for the trees logged in their forests. In the 1980’s, the pressure from some sectors of the government and the protests organized by rural people ended the concession period. The new Forestry Law of 1986 and the agrarian reform of

1992 gave ejidos ownership rights over forest products while establishing that the commercial exploitation of these products should obey the environmental laws (Bray, 2010). Currently, more than 60% of forest areas are owned by ejidos in Mexico (Siegmann and Afif, 2018). In terms of timber production, compared to the rest of the world, Mexico has the largest number of communities managing forests (Charnley & Poe, 2007). There are around 2,200 ejidos where most of the members are engaged in forestry activities such as rudimentary wood transformation, producing planks, charcoal production and sawmill operations (Morett-Sánchez and Cosío-Ruiz, 2017).

4Figure 1.4. Forestry in Mexico in the 20th century

In the 1990’s, Mexico was ranked among the countries with higher forest losses, together with Brazil, Indonesia and Colombia. In the following decades, deforestation rates decreased from an average annual forest loss of 0.53% in the period of 1990-2000 to 0.24% in the period of 2000-2005 (Comision

Nacional Forestal, 2015). The drivers of deforestation vary from region to region but most are related to the precarious economic situation in rural areas, which leads rural people towards non-sustainable activities that generate incomes over a shorter time period (e.g. agriculture, livestock raising, illegal logging) (Comision Nacional Forestal, 2017). Figure 1.4 presents the historical background of the Mexican forest sector in the 20th century.

Mexico is a pioneer in the first two REDD+ phases: readiness and implementation. In 2008, Mexico elaborated the Readiness Plan Information

Note, a preliminary document that compiled information on land use patterns and deforestation drivers. This document made Mexico the first country to join the World Bank’s Carbon Partnership Facility and it is considered the first step in the country’s REDD+ readiness process (Špirić, 2016). In 2010, at the

COP16 in Cancun, Mexico presented its REDD+ Vision document as the basis for the construction of the National REDD+ Strategy. The REDD+ vision contained five strategic lines: 1) institutional arrangements; 2) financial schemes; 3) monitoring, reporting and verification system; 4) capacity development and; 5) communication, transparency and community participation

(Comision Nacional Forestal, 2010). The country adopted the integrated landscape approach in its REDD+ policies, meaning that the main objective of

REDD+ is to promote actions to mitigate climate change while also contributing to the development of rural areas (Comision Nacional Forestal, 2017).

According to the Mexican REDD+ vision, sustainable rural development is the key to reducing deforestation and forest degradation (Carrillo-Fuentes, 2016).

In Mexico, rural is usually defined in terms of population, however, scholars and policy-makers recognize that there are no clear boundaries between rural and urban (Duncan and Reiss, 1976; Cloke, 1985; Hoggart, 1988; Bowler et al.,

2002). The National Institute of Statistics and Geographical Information considers all communities with 2,500 inhabitants or fewer to be rural. For the purpose of research and program evaluations, communities with fewer than

2,500 inhabitants are classified as rural dispersed and communities from 2,500 to 15,000 are considered rural semi-urban (OECD, 2007).

Since 2010, Mexico has completed the readiness and implementation phases of REDD+. The country developed and published the National REDD+

Strategy document; created national forest inventories used in REDD+ monitoring, reporting and verification; developed a national safeguards system including an institutional, legal and compliance framework for REDD+ (Vargas et al., 2017); implemented REDD+ early actions (a set of joint institutional efforts made locally to reverse the trend on forest land use change) in five states: Jalisco, Chiapas, Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatan; and designed

Mexico’s Emissions Reduction Initiative which includes the country’s reference level at 24,012,031 tCO2e/year (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2016). In

2015 at the COP 21 in Paris, Mexico made an international commitment to achieve a zero net deforestation rate as part of the strategy to reduce by 22% its annual GHG emissions by 2030 (Comision Nacional Forestal, 2015). The

Mexican presidential elections in 2018 and the following transition resulted in the realignment of REDD+ activities. The National Forest Commission decided

49 not to submit the updated FRL/FERL in January 2019 which might delay

Mexico’s access to results-based payments (UN-REDD programme, 2018).

Figure 1.5 presents the development of REDD+ in Mexico in the 21st century.

5Figure 1.5. Development of REDD+ in Mexico

In Mexico, the focus on rural development using the integrated landscape approach translates into REDD+ policies that do not restrict activities in the early action areas. Instead, activities are promoted that allow rural people to generate socio-economic benefits while also conserving and/or restoring forest areas (Comision Nacional Forestal, 2015). Examples of these activities are agroforestry, beekeeping and payment for ecological (hydrological or biodiversity) services (Benavides et al., 2016). REDD+, as well as other natural resource conservation policies, have not resulted in the loss of access to land for rural people in Mexico. As Kashwan, (2017) notes “…there have been few, if any, displacements or evictions due to the establishment of protected areas in

Mexico. On the contrary, the Mexican national government has often gone out

50 of its way to market nature conservation initiatives as a means to improve peasant welfare and promote rural development” (p.83). Interestingly, Kashwan uses the verb “market” to describe the way in which the Mexican government has made efforts to bring on board rural people when implementing environmental policies that involve decisions over land use. Due to the ejido property regime it would be impossible to implement these policies, REDD+ included, without the participation and consent of rural people.

International funding for REDD+ in Mexico ended in 2017, after a 5 year period. These funds, in addition to domestic investments, were used to create

REDD+ institutional arrangements, to develop planning documents (strategies, investment plans), for capacity development at institutional level and to finance

Early Actions directed to rural communities such as community forestry, restoration projects, agroforestry projects, payments for ecological services and technical studies among others (Deschamps Ramírez et al., 2015).

Mexico’s REDD+ system includes institutional arrangements to ensure multi-level and multi-sectoral participation. The National Technical Advisory

Council has representation from the different sectors involved in forest management and conservation such as NGOs, private sector firms, local communities and academics. The government participates in but does not lead the National Technical Advisory Council. The different government agencies involved in the land-use sector (Forest Commission, Agriculture Ministry, and

Environment Ministry) participate in the National REDD+ Work group. These groups have the responsibility to develop and review the REDD+ Strategy, the

Emissions reduction plan and to participate in the development and

51 implementation of the other elements of the REDD+ system. These two formal institutional arrangements are replicated at the state level. At the local level,

Public Associations for Territorial Development were created as decentralized public bodies of associated municipal governments. Their Advisory Councils include representatives from Federal, State, Municipal government, NGOs and academia. These groups have the responsibility to create the investment programs with local goals and work together with ejidos to develop activities for integral landscape management (Alianza REDD+ Mexico, 2017; Comision

Nacional Forestal, 2017). Figure 1.6 describes the institutional arrangements and planning instruments of the REDD+ system.

6Figure 1.6. REDD+ institutional arrangements and planning instruments

In terms of financial architecture, the national REDD+ fund will allow the country to receive results-based payments in the future. Regions and/or states have their own funds which might also receive results-based payments in the

52 future, as well as financial resources from the federal government, the carbon trade market or other sources such as bilateral aid or donations. At local level, the Public Associations for Territorial Development receive contributions from regional or state funds which are then used in ejidos for implementation of projects. The federal and state governments also continue to invest in regular programs for rural development providing financial support to ejidos and rural people. Figure 1.7 illustrates the REDD+ financial architecture. The REDD+ system also includes national and state safeguard plans to guarantee respect of the rights of rural and Indigenous people when implementing REDD+ activities.

The safeguard plans include mechanisms to address the REDD+ safeguards described in chapter 1 (see Table 1.2) according to the Mexican context

(Alianza REDD+ Mexico, 2017; Comision Nacional Forestal, 2017).

7Figure 1.7. REDD+ financial architecture

The Mexican government sees REDD+ as an inter-institutional and cross-sectoral coordination policy to reduce deforestation and forest degradation through sustainable rural development (Comision Nacional

Forestal, 2017). However, the question can be asked whether there are gaps between the policy and the practice that lead to low quality of governance within

Mexico’s REDD+ programming. Recent studies (Dechamps-Ramirez and

Larson, 2017; Trench et al., 2017) suggest that the leadership in the Mexican land-use sector remains in the hands of the federal government. The authors also identified low quality governance especially in terms of information sharing between local and federal actors, between the Forest Commission and the

Agricultural Ministry at the Federal level and lack of trust between rural people and the government. However, the researchers recognize that REDD+ institutional arrangements might contribute to an improvement in the quality of governance in the future.

Using the governance assessment framework described in the previous section (see figure 1.3), this research intends to answer the following general research questions:

1) What is the quality of REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo, Mexico?

2) Is the governance experience in Quintana Roo, Mexico effective at mobilizing actors to engage in activities that lead to the achievement of REDD+ goals?

The specific research questions are:

1) What is the experience of actors’ influence in decision-making in

REDD+ in Quintana Roo, Mexico?

2) What is the experience of information sharing in REDD+ in

Quintana Roo, Mexico?

3) What is the experience of knowledge exchange in REDD+ in

Quintana Roo, Mexico?

4) What is the experience of financial cooperation in REDD+ in

Quintana Roo, Mexico?

5) What is the experience of conflict resolution in REDD+ in

Quintana Roo, Mexico?

6) What is the experience of creation of trust in REDD+ in Quintana

Roo, Mexico?

7) Has REDD+ programming in Quintana Roo, Mexico been effective

at mobilizing actors to engage in activities that lead to the

reduction of deforestation?

8) Has REDD+ programming in Quintana Roo, Mexico been

effective at mobilizing actors to engage in activities that lead to the

generation of socio-economic benefits for rural people?

It is important to note that this research does not intend to make a judgment regarding whether REDD+ in Quintana Roo is an example of polycentric governance or not. As established in the previous section, the literature does not provide a clear set of features to make this assessment. The theory has been used only to create an evaluative framework to assess the quality of REDD+ governance.

The following chapter presents a review of the literature on REDD+ programming in several countries other than Mexico. These are reviewed to conduct an assessment of the quality of governance in REDD+ in these countries in terms of influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution, and creation of trust. The effectiveness of REDD+ governance in engaging actors in activities promoting the achievement of deforestation and/or GHG emissions reduction and/or socio-economic benefits for local people is also discussed. This chapter provides examples of the use of the governance assessment framework to assess the quality of governance in REDD+ in several countries.

Chapter 2. Using the assessment framework in REDD+ governance cases

REDD+ calls for a multi-level (global, national, regional/local) and multi- sectoral (public, private, civil organizations, local communities) decision-making process and there is a set of shared rules internationally negotiated. However, the literature suggests that when implemented at national and sub-national levels there can be inconsistencies between the policy and the practice. Milne et al. (2018) conducted a literature review of REDD+ projects around the world and a case study analysis of REDD+ projects in Southeast Asia. They found

“strong evidence of dissonance” (p. 8), in other words, gaps between REDD+ objectives and outcomes in implementation. The evidence showed tension and conflict among actors involved in REDD+ implementation in most of the analyzed cases.

In order to find empirical evidence illustrating the governance issues faced in REDD+ decision-making and implementation in Latin America, Asia and Africa, an article search was made in October 2018 through CAB Direct which is a research database for the applied sciences specialized in the areas of agriculture, forestry, global health, nutrition, and conservation. This database includes both academic articles and reports from international agencies (CAB

International, 2018). The search included terms for the different concepts that are similar to polycentric governance such as multilevel governance and fragmentation. The date of publication was set from 2010 (the year when the “+” sign was added to REDD) to 2018. The search generated 2,048 results for

REDD+; 377 results for REDD+ governance and 70 of these articles focused on the opportunities and challenges of the multi-level and multi-sectoral approach in REDD+ governance.

The abstracts of these 70 articles were reviewed to identify reports on

REDD+ governance in specific countries either as a single case or as part of multiple case studies. Some of the analyzed countries in the literature reviewed were: Indonesia (14 articles), Peru (7 articles), Tanzania (7 articles), Vietnam (7 articles), Brazil (6 articles) and Nepal (6 articles). The governance assessment framework (see figure 1.3) was applied to analyze the quality of REDD+ governance in these 6 countries, based on the literature reviewed. Not all the functions included in the governance assessment framework were mentioned in each country study because the research was not devoted specifically to the application of that framework. But there was enough information to provide an overview of the governance challenges these countries have faced with their

REDD+ programming.

Other countries mentioned in the literature were Cameroon, Central

African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, India,

LAOS, Papua New Guinea and Zambia. These countries were analyzed in fewer articles, therefore there was not enough information regarding REDD+ governance to apply the governance assessment framework. Mexico, where the case study for this research is located, was included in 5 of the reviewed articles. The history of the Mexican forest sector and the characteristics of the

Mexican REDD+ policies has already been presented and discussed in the previous chapter.

Although this is not an exhaustive review of REDD+ cases, the countries presented provide good examples of the complexity of the multi-level and multi- sectoral approach in REDD+ governance. The literature illustrates that the inclusion of multiple stakeholders does not guarantee an acceptable governance quality nor the effective engagement of actors in the implementation of REDD+ activities.

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Brazil

Actors’ influence in decision-making: Gebara et al. (2014) interviewed 65 organizations from different sectors involved in REDD+ in the Brazilian

Amazonia in 2010 and 2011.These authors show that the Federal Government and NGOs are the actors leading the REDD+ process in Brazil, while other actors such as the private sector and rural communities had a passive participation in REDD+ decision-making. Fifty-five percent of the organizations interviewed by Gebara et al. (2014) identified the lack of coordination among the state government, civil society and private companies as one of the challenges for the Brazilian REDD+ strategy. The authors argued that not having institutional arrangements to promote coordination among sectors was a weakness in the country’s REDD+ policy. Cenamo and Carrero (2012) studied the case of a pilot REDD project in Apuí, southern Amazonas. This pilot project was seen as innovative because it included the participation of multiple stakeholders such as the Government of Amazonas and its Secretariats, the environmental agencies, the National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian

Reform (INCRA in Portuguese) which regulates land tenure, local politicians and rural people, among others. The authors argue that local actors had an active participation in this pilot project.

Information sharing: Gebara et al. (2014) found that actors were communicating but the responsibility for information sharing was mainly in the hands of NGOs while government agencies were left as spectators in this process.

Knowledge exchange: Duchelle et al. (2014) conducted interviews with community leaders and members in four pilot projects in Brazil in 2010 and

2011. They identified technical and financial coordination among the municipal governments, state environmental and land agencies and NGOs in the four

REDD+ cases analyzed. The coordination intended to generate mechanisms for land tenure regularization, assure compliance with environmental laws, promote sustainable income generating activities and provide capacity development for local people. The authors argued that these partnerships were key elements to the success of the initiatives.

Conflict resolution: Clarity and security in land tenure were the main challenges for REDD+ implementation in Brazil. This issue generated conflict among local and Indigenous people with outsiders who tried to claim rights over local or

Indigenous land (Sunderlin et al., 2015). Some REDD+ initiatives found mechanisms to solve this conflict while others failed in the attempt. In the initiative studied by Cenamo and Carrero (2012), the lack of engagement of

INCRA (entity for land regulation) hampered the implementation of the project.

According to these authors, “INCRA’s superintendent of the Amazonas declared that only the headquarters in Brasília could separate or detach the landholdings from the Rural Settlement farm lots. Since mid-2008, the project has been waiting for INCRA’s headquarters to respond” (p. 454). Duchelle et al. (2014)

60 state that in the Acre region “aside from the pending lawsuits of a few non- resident claimants, there is no formal process to deal with conflicts during the land reform process” (p.60).

Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: According to Duchelle et al. (2014), one of the four REDD+ pilot projects that they analyzed was able to implement activities that resulted in deforestation reduction and income generating activities for local and Indigenous people: the Central Xingu REDD+ Pilot

Program in the Municipality of Sao Felix do Xingu. Although, the authors state that this project was led by a partnership between The Nature Conservancy and the municipal government of Sao Felix do Xingu, they recognize that due to the lack of financial resources, the government was not able to engage in the implementation of activities. Instead, The Nature Conservancy funded and organized most of the activities for land-use zoning, legal cattle ranching, restoration of forest areas and training for government agencies and farmers.

Other actors identified in this project were colonist settlers, Indigenous groups and landholders, who were recipients of funding and training. This resulted in an

85% reduction in the rate of deforestation in 2011 in relation to the average in the period of 2005–2008 in the area of the project. From six Brazilian initiatives included in the research done by Sunderlin et al. (2015), two had abandoned the REDD+ label by 2014 due to the market approach in REDD+ finances which made the trading of carbon credits the objective of the program.

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Indonesia

Actors’ influence in decision making: Gallemore (2017) analyzed the case of Central Kalimantan in Indonesia which became a REDD+ pilot project in

2010. At the beginning of the process multiple actors such as international donors, private and public organizations were involved, creating a chaotic environment where every actor had their own ideas and vision. In an attempt to establish order, the Governor of the province created a policy that gave him authority as the REDD+ single leader and designated the provincial REDD+ committee as the coordinator of all REDD+ activities in the area. However, in the following years REDD+ became a complex policy with multiple stakeholders involved, perceived as “...an airplane that was taking on so much baggage that it might never take off” (p. 649). In West Kalimantan, the REDD+ process also has a leading actor, which in this case was the district government (Myers et al.,

2016). According to Myers et al. (2016), in Central Kalimantan representatives of the district governments and lower levels of governments as well as local

NGOs perceived that they were marginalized from REDD+ decision-making.

Information sharing: Moeliono et al. (2014) conducted surveys and interviews with 64 actors involved in REDD+ in Indonesia in 2011 and early

2012, regarding information sharing. The authors found that the government was receiving information from most actors but not exchanging information with them. Government agencies were exchanging information only among themselves. There was information sharing between actors outside the government, especially among international organizations, donors and conservation associations. According to Gallemore, (2017), lack of information sharing and communication among stakeholders were obstacles for the design

62 of the REDD+ provincial strategy and for building trust between actors in

Central Kalimantan. To encourage communication and promote coordination, the government and other organizations implemented several workshops and conferences. Although these activities resulted in some improvement in information sharing, actors with contrasting interests could not agree on a common strategy.

Conflict resolution: Mulyani and Jepson (2013) interviewed 60 stakeholders from different institutions involved in REDD+ in Indonesia. Fifty- nine of the interviewees identified coordination issues among government agencies and between national and sub-national governments as one of the challenges for REDD+ implementation. The authors propose the term “ego- sectoral attitudes” to explain “how different Ministries argue that they each have better laws and interpret them based on their own interests” (p. 267).

Creation of Trust: Myers et al. (2016) found that local people lacked trust in the government and external actors such as the UN institutions. Myers et al.

(2016) highlight the importance of including customary authorities that exist in the majority of Indonesian villages, in the decision-making process to ensure legitimacy. However, they recognize that these customary authorities do not always represent the local communities as a whole, therefore, the decision- making process should not over-rely on community leaders assuming that including them will automatically result in creation of trust from local people.

Mulyani and Jepson (2013) state that corruption is a major risk for REDD+ in

Indonesia. Government officers are perceived to be corrupt, however, participants in the study conducted by these researchers see REDD+ as an

63 opportunity for transparency in the forest sector. In addition, international donors have contributed by putting in place rigorous reporting processes to prevent corruption.

Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: The majority of the REDD+ funds in Central Kalimantan were used to promote information sharing and coordination between stakeholders. This diminished the implementation of activities to reduce deforestation and generate benefits for local people.

(Gallemore, 2017). Local people that participated in the study conducted by

Myers et al. (2016) “considered the benefits they received to be inadequate compensation for the burdens” (p.29). Examples of these benefits are temporary jobs and training opportunities.

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Nepal

Actors’ influence in decision making: Bushley (2014) surveyed 34 organizations involved in REDD+ in Nepal in 2011. This author found that the most influential actors in REDD+ decision-making were government agencies, specifically agencies in the forest and conservation sector, some civil society organizations (community forest user groups) and some international NGOs.

Other actors such as academia, private companies and donors, were marginalized in the process. There are two groups in Nepal that attempt to bring together multilevel and multi-sectoral actors: The Work Group and the

Stakeholder Forum. However, according to Ojha et al. (2013) both groups are led by forest officers and NGO staff. Brockhaus et al. (2014), highlighted the influence of community forest user groups in the REDD+ discourse because

“Compared with other countries, community forest user groups in Nepal are

64 extremely well organised within a long-established federated structure with effective representation at the national level” (p. 29).

Information sharing: Bushley (2014) identified high levels of information sharing and collaboration among and within government agencies, civil society organizations and international NGOs. Ojha et al. (2013) reported an example illustrating issues of language in the information sharing process. In the consultation process of Nepal’s REDD+ national strategy, the document was written in complex English and was sent to participants only a few days before the meeting. As a result, only some experts were able to provide feedback on the proposal. In addition, most meetings and workshops were conducted in

Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. This limited the attendance of people from rural communities.

Financial coordination: Sharma et al. (2015) explain the financial coordination to implement experimental carbon payments in three Nepalese watersheds. In 2009, NORAD’s Climate and Forest initiative created the Forest

Carbon Trust Fund to transfer payments to 105 community forest user groups.

The fund distributed US $95,000 per year from 2011 to 2013. The financial resources were given to community committees to allocate them in compliance with a provided guideline. This guideline established that a percentage of the payments should go to support women, Indigenous and poor people.

Conflict resolution: Brockhaus et al. (2014) identified policies conflicting with REDD+ goals in Nepal such as agricultural modernization and development of hydropower infrastructure. Deficiencies in land-use distribution can potentially create conflict as the government allocates forest areas to

65 landless poor people. This land distribution has been incomplete and guided by political interests. The reliance on external experts for developing planning documents and technology for tracking changes in forest carbon caused conflict between the government and local communities. In 2010 the Ministry of

Forestry presented a draft of the REDD+ strategy created by consultants funded by the WWF. The government stated that the document was created using a participatory approach, however civil society groups argued that their viewpoint was not taken into account. The government decided to discard the document and started to re-design the strategy (Ojha et al., 2013).

Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: Sharma et al. (2015) recognized the relevance of community forest user groups (CFUGs) in managing and conserving forests in Nepal. However, these organizations existed prior to REDD+. The authors compared 9 REDD+ CFUGs to 9 Non-

REDD+ CFUGs and found that the first group did “…relatively better…in terms of forest conservation...” (p.7). These results show that the funding from REDD+ pilot projects contributed to enhance the forest management and conservation activities in which CFUGs were already engaged.

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Peru

Actors’ influence in decision making: Rodriguez-Ward et al. (2018) conducted 93 interviews in 2013 in the Madre de Dios region which was designated as one of the first REDD+ regions in Peru. The authors found multi- level authorities and multi-sectoral actors involved in REDD+: “private companies, concession owners, Indigenous communities, regional, national and international NGOs, Indigenous federations, land-user groups and associations,

66 national governmental agencies, and international donors” (p.108). However not all these actors equally participated nor had the same influence in decision- making. NGOs and private companies were leading REDD+ processes with some increasing engagement from the regional government. The most passive actors identified in this case were individual land owners, miners, farmers and

Indigenous associations. The authors found what they called “multi-hybrid” actors. These were people who changed job positions among government, private sector and NGOs. They were actively influencing the REDD+ processes not from the viewpoint of the organization that they represented but from their own personal ideals.

Information sharing: Rodriguez-Ward et al. (2018) and Kowler et al.

(2016) found that the REDD+ institutional arrangements in the Madre de Dios region of Peru promoted dialogue and communication among stakeholders.

However, the NGOs acting as project developers were holding back information from local people in order to avoid creating false expectations and confusion because of the complexity of REDD+ topics (Kowler et al., 2016).

Financial coordination: Hajek et al. (2011) analyzed 12 REDD+ initiatives in the Madre de Dios region and identified several examples of financial coordination. The project Amigos which seeks to reduce deforestation in the

Amigos River concession, had a joint investment from the NGO Amazon

Conservation Association ($7 million USD) and the company Bosques

Amazonicos Ltd ($1 million USD). The concessionaires of Peru’s Federation of

Brazil Nut Producers were providing working capital for two projects to reduce deforestation in the Brazil nut concessions, in coordination with Amazon

Conservation Association and Bosques Amazonicos Ltd. The funds invested in these partnerships were not specified. According to Peru’s REDD+ planning documents the country has a strong market approach for funding (Vijge, 2016).

This might motivate the interest of private companies in financing REDD+ initiatives as they are envisioning a share of the profit from carbon credit trades.

Conflict resolution: Kowler et al. (2016) identified conflict in land-use planning between government agencies. The agriculture and mining agencies had great influence in decisions regarding land-use as they were in charge of titling and assigning land uses. The environmental agencies did not have as much power as the other agencies in land-use issues resulting in challenges to the implementation of forest management and conservation programs.

Creation of Trust: Rodriguez-Ward et al. (2018) found that local actors did not trust NGOs. Local actors perceived that NGOs were only interested in being intermediaries in carbon-credit trades. NGOs were not perceived as advocates for local people’s well-being, were not elected as representatives and could not be voted out if needed. Participants in the study conducted by Kowler et al. (2016), perceived the existence of corruption in land-use decision-making.

Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: Of the 15 REDD+ projects in the

Madre de Dios region, 9 were suspended or terminated by 2013 because their funding depended on the sale of carbon credits. Participants in these projects were not able to complete the requirements to access the carbon market (e.g. demonstrate potential deforestation to Verified Carbon Standard) or were more interested in continuing with more profitable activities such as logging and mining (Rodriguez-Ward et al., 2018).

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Tanzania

Actors’ influence in decision making: Multiple actors from different levels of government and sectors are involved in REDD+ in Tanzania (Mbwambo,

2015). According to Rantala and Di Gregorio (2014), the government and domestic NGOs have the largest representation with the state departments of forestry and environment being the most influential actors in decision-making.

REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania are mostly funded by external donors and implemented by local communities (Kweka et al., 2015). Mbwambo, (2015) argues that the Forest Act in Tanzania gives local people the right to establish community forests and village forest reserves. The participatory forest management approach has promoted the creation of unions of villages “to protect the villages’ interests and to coordinate negotiations with district officials” (Mathur et al., 2014, p.51). However, in the case of the REDD+ project in the Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve analyzed by Mathur et al. (2014), the union rarely met because few members had the financial resources to travel to the designated location. As a result the interests of the elites in timber exploitation were imposed on the village unions.

Information sharing: Some of the issues identified by local people such as water and food scarcity, are not taken into account in the Tanzania’s national

REDD+ strategy (Mathur et al., 2014). This shows that there is a lack of bottom- up communication.

Knowledge exchange: Participants in the study conducted by Rantala and Di Gregorio (2014) identified lack of knowledge and lack of technical capacities among all levels and sectors among the main challenges for REDD+.

These deficiencies do not allow for exchanging successful stories and promote learning from each other’s experiences.

Financial coordination: Financial coordination has happened bilaterally.

Kweka et al. (2015) state that the Tanzania REDD+ Initiative is funded by the governments of Norway, Germany and Finland. The nine REDD+ sub-national pilot projects are all funded by the government of Norway. According to Mathur et al. (2014) the REDD+ project in the Angai Villages Land Forest Reserve aimed to support local people in managing the forest while improving community infrastructure. This initiative was funded by external donors which, according to the authors, jeopardizes the achievement of the desired outcomes once the external support ends. International NGOs (e.g. Clinton Climate

Initiative, WWF) have funded research institutions such as the Sokoine

University and the University of Dar es Salaam to develop diagnostic studies

(Kweka et al., 2015).

Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: The actors involved in

REDD+ in Tanzania have limited technical and financial resources to manage forests and they expect REDD+ to provide the funding needed ”… to support sustainable forest management aimed at reducing emissions and increasing forest carbon sequestration… “(Mbwambo, 2016, p.12). However, if the country does not have the capacity to implement forest management practices to reduce deforestation, in the first place, they will not be able to receive results- based payments.

Quality of REDD+ Governance in Vietnam

Actors’ influence in decision-making: Yang et al. (2016) analyzed 8 case studies in Vietnam and found that multiple actors are involved in the forest and land-use sectors: national and regional governments, state-owned companies

(e.g hydropower plants, rubber plantations), the private sector (paper mill company, small businesses) and smallholders. According to these authors the most influential actors in the forest and land-use sector were the national and provincial governments. The provincial government with authorization from the national government “can change the classification of natural forest, which has heavy restrictions on production, in order to increase use rights and allow harvesting” (p.21). According to Trung et al. (2015) people’s committees

(elected bodies) have gained influence in decision making as they participate in the approval of land-use plans. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has collaborated with the national government, provincial governments, people’s committees and villagers in Vietnam to implement REDD+ pilot projects. In the Dien Bien Province pilot project, the villagers have the option to decide whether or not to participate in REDD+ projects, they have the option to opt-out at any moment and they can choose which income generating activities they want to engage in, within several options provided (Yang et al., 2016).

Information sharing: According to Moeliono et al. (2016) government officers and village leaders inform local people in community meetings about government programs to support agriculture and forest conservation policies.

The participants of the study conducted by these authors perceived that people who had the power and financial resources to attend meetings at district level and then bring information back to the community were very influential actors.

Knowledge Exchange: The REDD+ pilot project in the Dien Bien

Province implemented from 2010 to 2015, provided 627 training courses for villagers and 48 for government officers. The first focused on income generating activities such as animal husbandry and tree planting while the latter focused on planning and monitoring capacities (Yang et al., 2016). The authors do not discuss if these training opportunities resulted in improvements in forest management, forest conservation and/or generating benefits for locals.

Conflict resolution: Yang et al. (2016), suggest that land tenure insecurity is a critical problem in Vietnam because of the lack of accurate and updated data on forest inventories that have resulted in the incompleteness of forest land allocation. The authors also found land tenure conflict between private companies and local people, conflicting interests and lack of coordination between the agencies in charge of the agricultural and forest sectors. The authors did not discuss how REDD+ in Vietnam is addressing these issues.

Regarding conflict resolution between local people and promoters of REDD+ pilot projects in the Dien Bien Province (government agencies and the Japan

International Cooperation Agency) the mechanisms for conflict resolution provided by REDD+ were negotiation and transparent information sharing in village meetings.

Creation of Trust: Moeliono et al. (2016) found that the villagers participating in their study trusted actors who have wealth and power (e.g former village leaders, shop owners) more than government representatives.

These powerful actors were perceived as people who could provide information

72 and knowledge to locals. In contrast, the government was perceived as restrictive and their policies were seen as a threat to local people’s livelihoods.

Engagement in REDD+ activities: According to Moeliono et al. (2016), land tenure influenced local people’s engagement in REDD+ in the studied cases. In an area where land tenure was insecure, 70% of the people were interested in participating in REDD+ hoping that the project would result in land allocation. In contrast, in another area were land was already allocated to locals, only 30% were interested in engaging in REDD+ activities. Reasons for the lack of motivation were: “forested areas are some distance away and transportation costs are high; there is not enough labour since young people have migrated...earlier programmes did not deliver continuous and significant benefits and sometimes payments were not received in full…” (p. 445). The

REDD+ pilot project in the Dien Bien Province was perceived as a creator of awareness among villagers regarding forest management and conservation.

Although it was early to obtain quantitative results, actors involved in this project perceived that at least a third of the households in the area of the project were receiving in-kind support and forest management was improving (Yang et al.,

2016). It is important to note that in Vietnam, REDD+ pilot projects ran in parallel with other government programs supporting forest management and conservation (Trung et al., 2015), therefore these programs have also contributed to improving forest management in the Dien Bien Province.

Summary

In summary, all the analyzed countries have included multi-level and multi-sectoral participation with a few specific actors leading and influencing

REDD+ decision-making. Usually the leaders were government agencies and/or

NGOs. The analyzed cases identified partnerships between levels of governments, NGOs, the private sector and local actors as key elements for the success of some pilot projects, however information sharing, knowledge exchange and financial coordination have been limited as a general rule.

Although land tenure insecurity was identified as a cause of conflict in most of the cases, the existence of clear mechanisms for conflict resolution was not discussed. Several cases reported lack of trust from local people towards external actors (e.g. government officers, NGOs staff). There is optimism among stakeholders regarding the potential of REDD+ to reduce GHG emissions, deforestation and create socio-economic benefits for local people however the analyzed cases presented limited evidence of the engagement of actors in implementing activities devoted to achieving these goals. Only a few specific pilot projects in Brazil, Nepal and Vietnam were able to reduce deforestation or improve forest management practices. The success and continuity of these pilot projects depended on the availability of funding meaning that when funding ended the pilot projects ended as well. In terms of socio- economic benefits for local people, the literature reviewed reported that REDD+ benefits were in most cases short-term job opportunities, in-kind support, training, legal and technical support. Tables 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) summarize the quality of governance of each of the analyzed countries in terms of actor’s influence in decision-making, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust.

Table 2.1(a) Quality of REDD+ governance in analyzed countries5

Brazil Indonesia Nepal

Actors’ Most influential Most influential actor: Most influential Influence in actors: Government Government. actors: decision and NGO’s. Government, making community forest users groups (CFUGs) and NGO’s.

Information Information was The government was Information shared sharing shared by NGOs to receiving information among and within other actors. from most actors but government not exchanging agencies, civil information with them. society organizations and international NGOs. Knowledge Technical Not discussed by the Not discussed by exchange coordination among literature. the literature. the government, NGOs and locals in some pilot projects. Financial Not discussed by the Not discussed by the Experimental coordination literature. literature. carbon payments transferred from international organizations to CFUGs. Conflict No clear mechanisms No clear mechanisms No clear resolution to solve the main to solve the main mechanisms to cause of conflict: land cause of conflict: solve causes of tenure insecurity. contrasting interests conflict: policies between national, conflicting with sub-national and REDD+ goals and government agencies. deficiencies in land-use distribution. Creation of Not discussed by the Local people lacked Not discussed by trust literature. trust in the the literature. government and external actors (e.g.UN institutions). Engagement Pilot projects were Lack of results in Funding for pilot in activities able to reduce reducing projects to achieve deforestation. Locals deforestation. Locals contributed to REDD+ received funding and received temporary enhance the forest goals training from NGOs. jobs and training management and opportunities. conservation activities in which CFUGs were already engaged.

Table 2.1(b) Quality of REDD+ governance in analyzed countries. 6

Peru Tanzania Vietnam

Actors’ Most influential Most influential Most influential Influence in actors: NGOs and actors: state actors: national and decision private companies. departments of provincial making forestry and governments. environment.

Information Dialogue and Poor bottom-up Government officers sharing communication communication. and village leaders among stakeholders. Important issues for share information locals (e.g. water and with local people in food scarcity) are not community meetings. included in the REDD+ national strategy. Knowledge Not discussed in the Lack of knowledge Pilot projects exchange literature. and technical provided training capacities among all courses to villagers levels and sectors. and government officers. Financial Several examples of REDD+ initiatives Not discussed in the coordination joint investment funded by external literature. between NGOs, donors. private companies and producers associations Conflict No clear mechanisms Not discussed in the Pilot projects resolution to solve the main literature. promoted negotiation cause of conflict: and discussion in contrasting interests meetings to solve in land-use between potential conflict government between villagers agencies. and project promoters. Creation of Lack of trust from Not discussed in the Villagers trust actors trust local people to NGOs literature. who have wealth and power (e.g former village leaders, shop owners) more than government officers.

Table 2.1(b) Quality of REDD+ governance in analyzed countries. 6

Peru Tanzania Vietnam

Engagement Most REDD+ projects Actors have limited Lack of motivation to in activities were terminated by technical and participate because to reduce 2013 because they financial resources to other programs have deforestation could not access the manage forests and not generated and/or carbon market for reduce deforestation. tangible results. generate funding. REDD+ pilot projects benefits for provided in- kind locals support for locals and contributed to improve forest management.

This evidence illustrates that bringing together multiple actors does not guarantee a good quality of governance in REDD+. The actors involved in

REDD+ had different capacities and motivations to influence decision-making.

Land tenure insecurity, conflicting interests in land-use and corruption were issues that the REDD+ program was not able to address. Except for a few specific pilot projects, the limited funding to implement activities to reduce deforestation and create socio-economic benefits resulted in the lack of significant evidence to prove the effectiveness of the REDD+ program in the analyzed countries. This negatively influenced the motivation of actors to engage in REDD+ activities as they did not know if they will ever get any tangible benefits.

The following chapter presents the methodology utilized to assess the quality of governance in REDD+ and the engagement of actors in activities toward the achievement of REDD+ goals in Quintana Roo, Mexico.

Chapter 3. Methodology

This research utilizes a case study method. This inquiry method can be used to explore, describe, understand and/or predict a case or cases by collecting detailed qualitative data from multiple sources such as observations, interviews, documents and audiovisual elements. A case can be a process, a person, a household, an organization, a group, a culture or a country (Creswell et al., 2007; Woodside, 2010). Case studies are often used as an evaluation method in international development because they are flexible, can be used to analyse several interventions, take into account the context in which the analyzed activities are implemented, have relatively low costs and short preparation time (USAID, 2013).

According to Harrison et al. (2017), case studies should be systems that are bounded by time, place and activities. However, the authors highlight the relevance of the connections between the case study and its context (e.g. political, economic, historical, social, cultural and organizational characteristics) which can make these boundaries blurry. The selected case study for this research was the state of Quintana Roo in Southeastern Mexico. The context of

Mexico as a whole, presented in chapter one, is relevant to fully understand this case.

Case studies can have different classifications according to their dimensions (Scholz and Tieje, 2002). This case study is: 1) evaluative as it intends to assess the quality of governance in REDD+ in Quintana Roo; 2) single and embedded in its design: It has Quintana Roo as its main unit but analyses three different arrangements as sub-units; 3) qualitative regarding its

78 data collection; and 4) intrinsic in its motivation: The researcher has a genuine interest in understanding this case as she participated in the creation and setting up of the REDD+ arrangements in Quintana Roo from 2011 to 2013. In addition, she is funded by the Mexican government to conduct research that is relevant for this country (Scholz and Tieje, 2002; Yin, 2003; Baxter and Jack,

2008; USAID, 2013; Creswell, 2014).

This research was cleared by the Research Ethics Board at the

University of Guelph in June 2018. The field work for this study which included interviews and observation of REDD+ related activities was conducted in

Quintana Roo from July to December 2018.

Study area

From the collapse of the ancient Maya civilization until the beginning of the 20th century, the Mexican state of Quintana Roo was a national territory almost entirely covered by tropical forest (Bray et al., 2004). In his book,

Micheal Peissel (1963) described Quintana Roo as a region "... covered with a dense jungle and no road penetrated that jungle... There were no towns and... the whole area was infested with bandits...Quintana Roo was considered a wild and savage spot about which nobody knew or cared (p.64)"

In the early 1940s, when the federal government transferred land rights to ejidos in Quintana Roo, they were legally obligated to manage and conserve the forest. In the 60’s and 70’s, the remaining land was given to new ejidos with no restrictions. This new policy contributed to the destruction of a large amount of forest but the first type of ejidos who were legally obligated to rationally manage and conserve the forest were able to conserve large forest blocks. In

1980, the end of a 30-year concession combined with the federal government’s encouragement of community forest management created an opportunity for the state government to work with ejidos in southern and central Quintana Roo on a project called Plan Piloto Forestal (Galletti, 1998).

As the Plan Piloto Forestal project developed, the ejidos reserved part of their land as permanent forest areas and ejido members engaged in timber extraction and other forest activities. In three years, the ejidos gained control of their own forest along with experience in commercial, administrative and technical activities (Galletti, 1998). As a result of the Plan Piloto Forestal project, 5 forestry unions were created, involving one-third of the rural population of the state and including Mayan Indigenous people. Ejidos reserved approximately 500,000 hectares of permanent forest areas that were under the surveillance of communities. In addition, they agreed to reduce logging volumes on the basis of participatory inventories (Bray et al., 2004).

Quintana Roo is one of the five REDD+ Mexican Early Action states.

Figure 3.1 shows the location of this state in southeastern Mexico. Quintana

Roo has created the instruments needed for REDD+ implementation (state strategy, state advisory committee and work group, investment program). In addition, communities in Quintana Roo have had access to subsidies for forest management and conservation from the REDD+ Special Program since 2012.

Quintana Roo has a collaboration agreement with the neighbouring states of

Campeche and Yucatan to implement REDD+ as a region. Qunintana Roo’s

REDD+ strategy, as well as the Mexican national strategy, follows the integrated landscape approach and focuses on creating co-benefits for rural

80 people. REDD+ in Quintana Roo does not restrict the access to land and forest products for rural people. Instead it promotes income generating activities that reduce the pressure on forest areas such as agroforestry, timber and non- timber exploitation under management plans, cattle grazing in forest areas, and reforestation activities, among others (Carrillo-Fuentes, 2015; CONAFOR,

2015; Benavides et al., 2016).

Figure 3.1. Location of Quintana Roo in Mexico

Figure 3.2 illustrates the location of Quintana Roo’s REDD+ intervention area which includes the municipalities of Othon P. Blanco, Bacalar, Felipe

Carrillo Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos at the central and southern part of the state. Approximately 70% of the state’s forests are located in these four municipalities (Forest Carbon Parternership Facility, 2016). There are 224 ejidos in the REDD+ intervention area: 51 in Othon P. Blanco, 54 in Bacalar, 56 in Felipe Carrillo Puerto and 63 in Jose Maria Morelos. Bacalar was part of the

81 municipality of Othon P. Blanco until 2011 when it became an independent municipality, therefore most of Othon P. Blanco’s environmental and socio- economic historical data presented in the next sections includes Bacalar. There are 224 ejidos in the REDD+ intervention area: 51 in Othon P. Blanco, 54 in

Bacalar, 56 in Felipe Carrillo Puerto and 63 in Jose Maria Morelos (Comision

Nacional Forestal, 2016).

9 Figure 3.2. Quintana Roo’s REDD+ Intervention area

Quintana Roo receives almost half of the tourists that arrive to Mexico each year (Secretaria de Turismo de Quintana Roo, 2019). In addition,

Quintana Roo is the Mexican state with most new jobs created per year

(Gobierno del Estado de Quintana Roo, 2017a). However, the main touristic destinations, Cancun and Riviera Maya, are located in the northern municipalities of Quintana Roo. Together these two destinations concentrate

85% of the tourists that arrive to the state (Secretaria de Turismo de Quintana

Roo, 2019). As a result, the northern municipalities have the largest percentage of employed/occupied population (72%) of the state. The majority of this occupied population work in the services sector (INEGI, 2017). It is important to note that most of the large tourism related businesses that exist in Quintana

Roo are not locally owned. Instead they are owned by transnational or national companies (Pi-Sunyer and Brooke, 2005). Neither the state government nor the municipal governments in the REDD+ intervention area significantly benefit from the tourism related taxes as these are federal, except for the property taxes which are municipal (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2018).

In the REDD+ municipalities 30% to 45% of the employed/occupied population work in primary activities, except for Othon P. Blanco where the state capital is located. In this municipality 56% of the occupied population work in services and only 11% work in the primary sector (INEGI, 2017). The main private company in the area, working in the primary sector, is the sugar mill San

Rafael de Pucte located in the municipality of Othon P, Blanco. This sugar mill, together with 10 others in the country, belongs to the Beta San Miguel Group.

The sugar mill provides employment for 462 people in the harvest season

(November to June). The sugarcane supply comes from 2,800 cane-growers in

83 the region who own 23,082 ha of sugarcane fields. Quintana Roo is not among the largest sugarcane producing Mexican states. Veracruz, the largest producer, has 270,000 ha of sugarcane fields (Aguilar-Rivera, 2012; Beta San

Miguel, 2019).

Quintana Roo has created the instruments needed for REDD+ implementation: state strategy, investment program, the Work Group and

Advisory Council. Created in 2011, the REDD+ Work Group is formed by government agencies at the federal, state and municipal level and related to the land-use sector: management and/or conservation of forest resources, biodiversity conservation, agriculture, and cattle-raising. The objective of this

Group is to coordinate, survey, and approve the actions needed for the decision-making and implementation of Quintana Roo’s REDD+ policies. The work group members that have participated in sessions during the period 2011-

2017 are listed in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. REDD+ Work Group Members 7 Name of the Agency - Spanish (ACRONYM)/English Level Sector Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA)/Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food Federal Agriculture Comisión Nacional Forestal (CONAFOR)/National Forest Commission Federal Forestry Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad (CONABIO)/National Biodiversity Commission Federal Biodiversity Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT)/ Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources Federal Conservation Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)/National Institute of Statistics and Geographic Geographic Information Federal information

Secretaria de Medio Ambiente (SEMA)/Ministry of Conservation + the Environment State forestry Secretaría de Desarrollo Agropecuario, Rural y Pesca (SEDARPE)/ Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries State Agriculture Instituto Quintanarroence de la Mujer (IQM)/ Institute for Women's issues State Gender issues Instituto de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos Personales de Quintana Roo (IDAITQROO)/Institute for Information access and Information data protection State access Municipio de Othon P. Blanco - Direccion de Ecologia (OPB)/ Othon P. Blanco Municipality - Department of Ecology Municipal Conservation Municipio de Bacalar - Direccion de Ecologia (BAC)/ Bacalar Municipality - Department of Ecology Municipal Conservation Municipio de Felipe Carrillo Puerto - Direccion de Ecologia (FCP)/ Felipe Carrillo Puerto Municipality - Department of Ecology Municipal Conservation Municipio de Jose Maria Morelos- Direccion de Ecologia (JMM)/ Jose Maria Morelos Municipality - Department of Ecology Municipal Conservation

The second unit is the Quintana Roo REDD+ Advisory Council. It is a consultative group founded in 2012 where sector representatives participate to promote and influence the design of Quintana Roo’s REDD+ strategy. The structure of the Advisory Council includes a President, a Vice-president, a technical secretary, one general member and one representative for each of the nine sectors listed in table 3.2. Each member has a substitute who attends meetings when the member is not able. From 2012 to 2013, the Advisory

Council had a facilitator provided by The Nature Conservancy Mexico to moderate meetings and support the Advisory Council president. This group remained practically inactive with only one meeting in early 2017 and a second one in August 2018.

Table 3.2. Sector represented at the REDD+ Advisory Council 8 Farmers Ranchers Beekeepers Foresters Producers of non-traditional products Indigenous people Private companies NGOs Academia

The ejidos included in this research are: 1) Noh-Bec: located in the municipality of Felipe Carrillo Puerto. This ejido is highly organized and it has been involved in forest management since the 1980's. In 2008 they ended a 25- year cycle of timber exploitation. Currently they have a 15-year forest management plan, they have a community enterprise with FSC certification that includes a sawmill and tree nursery. They also have a conservation area in which they have started promoting ecotourism. 2) Otilio Montaño: located in the municipality of Bacalar, this ejido started recently to get involved in forest management/conservation activities. Two years ago they received an authorization for timber exploitation. They have active reforestation projects and are producing charcoal to sell in the local and national market; 3) Puerto Arturo: located in the municipality of Jose Maria Morelos. This ejido is part of a net of

36 ejidos that provide ecological services. They have a conservation area that received payments for ecological services from the federal government for 5 years. Although the cycle ended, they kept the conservation area and are

86 maintaining it with their own resources. They also exploit "palizada" (thin logs generally used in construction) and timber to sell in the local and national market. Figure 3.3 shows the map of the study area where the red dots are the ejidos studied. The red square in the map shows the location of the mayor tourist destinations in Quintana Roo: Cancun and Riviera Maya.

10 Figure 3.3. Location of the ejidos included in the study

Case Study design, data collection and data analysis

This research uses the assessment framework described in chapter 1 to answer the following general research questions also presented in chapter 1:

What is the quality of REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo, Mexico? Is the governance experience in Quintana Roo, Mexico effective at mobilizing engagement of actors in activities that lead to the achievement of REDD+ goals? To address these questions, the researcher selected the state of

Quintana Roo as the main unit of analysis but focused on three institutional arrangements: the REDD+ Work Group, the REDD+ Advisory Council and

Ejidos. Semi-structured interviews (Longhurst, 2003) were designed using the functions included in the polycentric assessment framework which are: actors’ participation and influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution, and creation of trust. When designing the interview guide, the researcher defined a set of indicators to help interviewees describe their experience regarding each of these functions. These indicators are listed in Table 3.3. The interviewees were also asked to provide their perception of the influence of REDD+ programing on the improvement or decline of each function. The data collection period was from July 2018 to

December 2018.

Table 3.3. Specific research questions and Indicators 9

Specific research question Indicators

What is the experience of actors’ Diversity of actors participating, actors’ influence in decision-making in role (leaders, active participants, passive REDD+ in Quintana Roo, Mexico? participants), perception of actors’ influence in the decision-making and implementation processes

What is the experience of information Mechanisms to request information; sharing in REDD+ in Quintana Roo, forums to present progress/results; Mexico? online resources; printed resources

What is the experience of knowledge Participation in courses, exchange in REDD+ in Quintana Roo, workshops/training sessions, Mexico? implementation of best practices, learning from successful stories, collaboration in the development of planning documents, technological/scientific support

What is the experience of financial Joint investments for project/activities coordination in REDD+ in Quintana implementation Roo, Mexico?

What is the experience of conflict Forums for dialogue, mechanisms to resolution in REDD+ in Quintana Roo, make decisions (consensus, majority), Mexico? rules to solve potential conflicts, sanctions

What is the experience of creation of Perception of the degree of trust among trust in REDD+ in Quintana Roo, actors, reputation of actors, existence of Mexico? irregular behaviour such as corruption, abuse of power, violence and mechanisms to report them, mechanisms for transparency

Is the governance experience in Activities to avoid deforestation or to Quintana Roo, Mexico effective at increase tree cover (e.g mobilizing engagement of actors in reforestation). Knowledge and/or activities that lead to the reduction of perception of the current state of deforestation? forest resources

Is the governance experience in Sale of forest products, employment Quintana Roo, Mexico effective at (salaries), government programs mobilizing engagement of actors in (subsidies), infrastructure activities that lead to the generation of construction/maintenance, support to socio-economic benefits for rural community members (social assistance, people? scholarships

The researcher gathered qualitative data through 23 key informant interviews (Marshall, 1996) to members of the Quintana Roo’s REDD+ Work

Group and REDD+ Advisory Council. The researcher obtained the contact information of the members of the Work Group and Advisory Council from the state Ministry of the Environment. The contact information of the members of the Advisory Council was not updated, therefore the researcher was not able to contact all the members.

Also interviewed were Ejido presidents, forest promoters, forest field workers, sawmill workers, tree nursery workers, and ejido founders from Otilio

Montaño, Noh-Bec and Puerto Arturo. These three ejidos were proposed by the interviewees from the Work Group and Advisory Council. The researcher asked for suggestion according to the following criteria: 1) The ejidos should be in different REDD+ municipalities and 2) the ejidos should have different socio- economic background and levels of involvement in the forest sector. This diversity in the context allowed for responses that reflected the different interests on land-use. It is important to note that three of the interviewees from the Advisory Council identified themselves as ejido members from the ejidos

Carrillo Puerto, Laguna Om and Chacchoben. Therefore, their responses included both their experiences as members of the Advisory Council and ejido members.

The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to one hour. Two interviews were conducted by phone while the rest were in person. The interviews were conducted in Spanish and they were recorded. Table 3.4 summarizes the number of interviews from each of the three groups. Some interviewees,

90 especially in ejidos, did not want to participate in an individual interview, therefore some “group interviews” were conducted. As a result the number of interviews is smaller than the number of participants. The responses of all participants were taken into account in the data analysis.

Table 3.4 Interview summary 10

Institutional Total of Arrangement Description Interviews participants

REDD+ Work Government Group agencies 10 15

REDD+ Advisory Sectors’ Council representatives 7 7

Ejidos’ leaders and Ejidos members 6 12

Total 23 34

The observation of the following activities was also used as an inquiry method: REDD+ advisory council meeting on August 2nd, 2018 and two public events related to sustainable development and natural resource conservation that happened in July 2018. The analysis of official documents, minutes of meetings and reports regarding tree cover loss, socio-economic indicators, allocation of funds for REDD+ activities, opinions and/or experiences of rural people were included as part of the research methods. Official sources of this information were the National Institute of Information and Statistics, the National

Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy, the National Forest

Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture and other official reports. In addition,

91 reports from international agencies, NGO’s and academic literature investigating deforestation in Mexico and/or Quintana Roo were reviewed.

Positionality of the researcher

Muhammad et al. (2015) state that positionality includes the “societal ascribed and achieved identities” (p.1051) of the researchers and the relationship between the researchers and the participants of the study. The researcher was an official at the state government in Quintana Roo from 2011 to 2015. During this period she held the positions of Manager of Planning and

Evaluation at the Forestry Institute of Quintana Roo and Manager of Rural

Development at the state Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. As part of her duties, she was in charge of developing the forestry strategic plan

2011 – 2016, setting up a Forestry Information System, managing financial programs to support the conservation of natural resources and provide capacity development, setting up and participating in the REDD+ Work Group and

Advisory Council. The researcher has not been an official of the state government since August 2015 and does not have a contract or commitment to work with the government and/or any other Mexican organization in the near future.

The positionality of the researcher facilitated her access to information as she is a Spanish native speaker and is familiar with the structures, programs and processes at all levels of government in the state. She is also familiar with some of the work that NGOs, producer associations and research institutions have conducted in the rural communities in Quintana Roo. The researcher has had professional relationships with 8 of the 15 interviewees from the Work

Group and 6 of the 7 interviewees from the Advisory Council. Others were new to their positions and have not met the researcher in the past. However, knowing that the researcher was familiar with the context made them feel comfortable at the interviews. They constantly used phrases such as “you know how we…” or “you probably remember when we …” The researcher had not met the interviewees from the ejidos in the past. They were curious to learn about the background of the researcher so she told them about her previous experience working with the state government. Knowing this, the interviewees felt free to use common language without explaining themselves (e.g. naming government agencies and NGOs by their acronyms, naming tree species by their local names, mentioning other ejidos). The researcher considered the potential discomfort from the interviewees because of the previous professional relationships or the fact that she was a government officer in the past. However, the interviewees were comfortable speaking about corruption and disagreement with government policies which the researcher interpreted as topics that are only discussed in an open and safe environment.

Over all, the main advantage of the researcher’s positionality was to save time when contacting interviewees and arranging interviews, when looking for information at official websites from the government and when analysing the data gathered. Perhaps the main disadvantage was that the interviewees assumed that the researcher knew more about the context than she actually did. However, the researcher asked for clarification whenever was needed and the interviewees provided further information.

Data analysis

To conduct the data analysis, each interview was assigned an identifier starting with the initials of the group and a number that indicates the order in which the interview was conducted. For example, the first interview to a member of the Work Group is identified as “WG-1”. The interviews were transcribed and coded using the software NVivo. The researcher coded each of the three groups independently using the functions of the assessment framework as nodes (See figure 1.3). The coding was done in Spanish and the researcher reported the results translated to English. The notes from the meeting observed by the researcher were also coded on NVivo using the functions of polycentric governance as nodes.

The researcher reviewed the official documents listed above to confirm, support and/or complement the information provided by the interviewees. These documents were also used to conduct a detailed description on the state of the forest cover in Quintana Roo and its REDD+ intervention area and to review various socio-economic indicators in the context of REDD+ implementation. The data on forest cover and socio-economic indicators are presented in chapter 4 to provide a context to better understand the results of this research. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the findings from the data analysis regarding the quality of governance across the three groups: Work Group, Advisory Council and

Ejidos in terms of how they experience actors’ participation, influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust.

Chapter 4. Achievement of REDD+ goals in Quintana Roo

Reduction of Deforestation

Reduction of deforestation is one of the main goals of REDD+ in Mexico.

This section presents and analyses quantitative data on deforestation and tree cover loss in Quintana Roo to illustrate the state of forest resources before and during the REDD+ early implementation period (2012-2017). These data were obtained from Global Forest Watch, the National Institute of Statistics and

Geography, as well as from official reports and studies.

According to Quintana Roo’s forest inventory (CONAFOR, 2014a), 85% of the state surface is covered by tropical rainforest. This represents 3,773,023 hectares from which only 37% are primary (virgin, old-growth) forests while 62% have already being disturbed (secondary forests). However, nearly 86% of these secondary forests are in the last phase of the succession process (tree growing) and are thus close to maturity. These data are the result of the interactions between forests and human activities. The dynamics of forest loss and gain are linked to the common practice of traditional agriculture, milpa, which is “...an open-field polyculture centered on maize (Zea mays) that rotates with woodland vegetation in a cycle of around 10 to 25 years...embedded in diverse forest environment” (Nigh & Diemont, 2013). In addition, Quintana

Roo’s tropical forest is highly biodiverse with 840 species, corresponding to 428 genus (CONAFOR, 2014a). However, this state is not among the most biodiverse-rich of the country. The greatest biodiversity is found in Oaxaca

95 followed by Chiapas, Veracruz, Guerrero and Michoacán (The Economics of

Ecosystems and Biodiversity, 2019)

Estimations of deforestation and forest cover loss vary in the literature because of the use of different definitions, methods, time periods and scales of analysis (FCPF, 2016). Table 4.1 shows the difference between tree cover loss measured by Global Forest Watch, deforestation reported by the Mexican

National Institute of Statistics and Geographic Information (INEGI) and a study conducted by Ellis et al. (2015) estimating forest cover loss in Quintana Roo in similar periods of time. The data from Global Forest Watch is the most pessimistic with 315,883 ha lost between 2002 and 2012 and an average loss of 31,588 ha per year. However, it is the most updated as the data is available up to the year 2017. Therefore, this research will use data from the Global

Forest Watch to analyze and compare tree cover loss among REDD+ states and municipalities.

Table 4.1. Quintana Roo's Tree Cover Loss and Deforestation 11 Variable Tree cover loss Tree cover loss Deforestation Source Global Forest Watch Ellis et al. (2015) INEGI Period 2002-2012 2001-2013 2002-2012 Total loss (Ha) 315,883 279,152 172,857 Average loss per year (Ha/year) 31,588 23,263 17,286

It is important to note that tree cover loss does not always imply deforestation. Curtis et al. (2018) identified the five main drivers associated with gross global tree cover loss between 2001 and 2015 which are described in table 4.2. According to Ellis et al. (2015), in Quintana Roo there are four main drivers of forest cover loss for the period of 2001-2013: 1) Commodity driven,

42% (cattle-raising 35%, sugarcane 5%, mechanized agriculture 2%); 2)

Wildfires, 28%; 3) Subsistence agriculture, 14% and 4) Urbanization (human settlements/touristic infrastructure), 9%.

Table 4.2. Drivers of gross global tree cover 12 (Source: Curtis et al., 2018) Cause % Description Permanent conversion of forest for the Commodity- expansion of commodities (e.g. palm oil, soy, driven beef, minerals, oil and gas). These areas are deforestation 27 not likely to be reforested. Loss within managed forests and tree plantations, which are expected to regrow Forestry 26 after harvest. Forests are cleared and burned for short-term cultivation of subsistence crops. They may or may not grow back, depending on the Agriculture 24 cultivation practices. Loss from fires, where trees are likely to regenerate gradually over time. This loss was concentrated in the northern forests of Wildfires 23 Canada and Russia. Loss from urban expansion and considered permanent, this was concentrated mainly in Urbanization 0.6 the eastern United States.

Table 4.3 shows the tree cover loss in Mexico and Quintana Roo for three sequential 5-year periods from 2002 to 2017. While Mexico as a country has a tendency of increasing the amount of tree cover lost, in Quintana Roo tree cover has remained constant with a small increase in the amount of tree cover lost for the period 2007-2011 followed by a decrease in the amount of tree cover lost in the period 2012 to 2016. This last period corresponds to

REDD+ implementation, however the decrease of the amount of tree cover lost cannot be directly linked to REDD+ because other factors such as natural disasters might have played a role in tree cover loss. For example, Quintana

Roo was hit by category 5 (Saffir-Simpson scale) Hurricane Dean in 2007 affecting more than 900,000 ha of forest (Navarro-Martinez et al., 2012). In

97 addition, the number of wildfires in 2011 were particularly high with more than

79,000 ha burnt (INEGI, 2012). These events have influenced the increased rate of forest loss in the period 2007-2012.

Table 4.3. Tree Cover Loss for Mexico and Quintana Roo 13 (Source: Global Forest Watch) Mexico Quintana Roo Loss/year Loss Loss/year Period Loss (Ha) (Ha/year) (Ha) (Ha/year) 2002-2007 1,085,735 217,147 147,545 29,509 2007-2012 1,212,463 242,493 168,338 33,668 2012-2017 1,335,171 267,034 152,059 30,412

Figure 4.1 shows the hectares of tree cover lost by year (2001-2017) in four of the Mexican REDD+ early action states: Quintana Roo, Campeche,

Chiapas and Yucatan. REDD+ funding and activities started after 2010 (2011 in

Chiapas and 2012 in the other three states). Comparing the scenarios pre-

REDD+ and after the program began all four states have had different tree cover loss outcomes. Chiapas and Campeche have lost more tree cover in the

REDD+ years than in the pre-REDD+ period. The hectares of tree cover lost in

Quintana Roo is similar in both the pre-REDD+ and REDD+ periods. Yucatan is

98 the only state that has lost less hectares of tree cover in the REDD+ years compared to the pre-REDD+ period.

11Figure 4.1. Tree cover loss in thousands of hectares by year in REDD+ early actions states (Source: Global Forest Watch)

For the research area, Figure 4.2 shows the hectares of tree cover lost yearly from 2001 to 2017 in Othon P. Blanco (including Bacalar), Felipe Carrillo

Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos. Othon P. Blanco has lost more hectares of tree cover than the other two municipalities. In the years when the REDD+ Special

Program projects were implemented (2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016) the three municipalities lost less hectares of tree cover.

12 Figure 4.2. Tree cover loss in hectares by year in Quintana Roo’s REDD+ municipalities (Global Forest Watch, 2019)

The methodology used by Global Forest Watch recognizes that there may be some error in the tree cover loss assigned to each year. In other words, some tree cover loss counted in one year might actually have happened in the previous year, therefore, Global Forest Watch suggests using periods of several years for a more accurate analysis. Figure 4.3 presents a comparison on the average tree cover loss by year between the pre-REDD+ period (2001-2011) and the REDD+ period (2012-2017) for Othon P. Blanco (including Bacalar),

Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos. Othon P. Blanco increased its rate of tree cover loss by 5% while Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Jose Maria

Morelos decreased their rate of tree cover loss by 18% and 8% respectively in the REDD+ period.

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13 Figure 4.3. Average tree cover loss by year in REDD+ municipalities before and after REDD+2017 (Source: Global Forest Watch, 2019)

Table 4.4 presents the hectares of tree cover in 2010 and compares the percentage of tree cover loss in the REDD+ period (2012-2017) between the three REDD+ municipalities and two non-REDD+ municipalities in Quintana

Roo: Benito Juarez and Lazaro Cardenas. Benito Juarez, a mainly urban municipality where Cancun is located, had the least hectares of tree cover in

2010 and lost 16% of its tree cover from 2012-2017. The three REDD+ municipalities and Lazaro Cardenas, which are mainly rural, lost 3% to 6% of their tree cover from 2012-2017. It is important to note that although Lazaro

Cardenas is not an official REDD+ municipality, it has access to all the regular programs to support forest management and conservation other than the

REDD+ Special Program.

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Table 4.4. Absolute and relative tree cover loss in REDD+ and non- REDD+ municipalities 14 (Source: Global Forest Watch) Forest Forest loss cover 2012-2017 Percentag Municipality Type 2010 (Ha) (Ha) e of loss Benito Juarez Non-REDD+ 33,900 5,370 16% Othon P. Blanco (including Bacalar) REDD+ 869,000 53,520 6% Jose Maria Morelos REDD+ 434,000 22,890 5% Lazaro Cardenas Non-REDD+ 309,000 11,091 4% Felipe Carrillo Puerto REDD+ 973,000 31,120 3%

The data presented above show the different contexts between REDD+ municipalities. Felipe Carrillo Puerto has had good results in managing and conserving their forest areas as this municipality have lost only 3% of its tree cover from 2010 to 2017. For this municipality, REDD+ might provide incentives to continue with the good practices that they have followed since the 1980’s.

Jose Maria Morelos, Othon P. Blanco and Bacalar have had activities that cause tree cover loss such as agriculture, cattle-raising and wildfires

(Benavides et al., 2016). For these municipalities, REDD+ might have helped to slow down these activities, maintaining stability in the tree cover. But it is not possible to ascribe their performance to REDD+ given the number of other influences on tree cover loss.

Socio-economic benefits

Generating socio-economic benefits for rural communities is a second main goal of REDD+ in Mexico. This section presents and analyses indicators of income generation and social well-being in Quintana Roo and the municipalities in the REDD+ intervention area. These indicators are generated by the Mexican National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development

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Policies (CONEVAL) and the National Institute for Statistics and Geography

(INEGI). Minutes from meetings regarding REDD+ funding were also sources of data.

Income generation

According to the Mexican National Council for the Evaluation of Social

Development Policies (CONEVAL, 2018), the percentage of Quintana Roo’s population that did not generate enough income to buy the basic food basket

(BFB) decreased from 16.6% in 2012 to 9.3% in 2016 as shown in table 4.5.

Table 4.5. People with less income than the minimum required to buy the basic food basket in Quintana Roo 15 (Source: National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies, 2018) 2012 2014 2016

Inhabitants % of total Inhabitants % of total Inhabitants % of total (000s) population (000s) population (000s) population

240.5 16.6 220.4 14.3 151.2 9.3

Table 4.6 shows the data available for the four municipalities in the

REDD+ intervention area. Two indicators are relevant to describe income generation in these municipalities: 1) the percentage of people that do not generate enough income to buy the BFB and 2) the percentage of people that do not have access to food. Although the percentage of population without enough income to buy the BFB increased in Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Jose

Maria Morelos from 2010 to 2015, the percentage of people with no food access decreased in this period. In other words, in 2015 more people were not able to buy food but they were still able to eat. The food sources might be agriculture

103 and cattle raising for self-consumption, hunting, fishing and social assistance government programs (eg. community kitchens, school breakfasts). CONEVAL

(2019) measured the limitations in the access to food using the data from the national survey of income and spending in households and considered the frequency in which the household members were able to eat food from 12 different food groups (e.g. cereals, dairy, meat, vegetables). These food groups were weighted in terms of their provision of nutrients defined by the World Food

Programme. Using these criteria, the households were classified as severe food insecure, moderate food insecure, mild food insecure and food secure. Severe and moderate food insecure households were taken into account when calculating the percentage of people that do not have access to food in a municipality. Although, the increasing food access cannot be directly related to

REDD+, it is relevant to highlight that REDD+ policies in Quintana Roo do not restrict the access to land nor forest products for rural people. As explained in the previous section, Quintana Roo’s REDD+ state strategy supports income generating activities such as exploitation of timber and non-timber products under management plans, agroforestry, beekeeping and others.

Table 4.6. Percentage of population with less income than required to buy the BFB and percentage of population with no access to food per municipality 16 (Source: National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies, 2015) 2010 2015 Municipality Total Less No Total Less No population income access to population income access than food than to food required for (%) required for (%) the BFB the BFB (%) (%) Felipe 72,323 31.8 40.6 80,210 39.2 23.6 Carrillo Puerto

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Othon P. 264,815 16.8 26.3 242,523 12.8 23.1 Blanco Jose Maria 29,288 42.1 35.0 33,825 49.0 16.7 Morelos Bacalar NA NA NA 30,165 56.2 36.0

Subsides from the government are an important part of rural people’s subsistence. Moure- Peña (2013) interviewed ejido members in 4 ejidos in

Quintana Roo’s REDD+ intervention area and reported that the interviewees identified subsidies from the government as an important and reliable source of income, contrasting the income from agriculture and timber exploitation that depend on external factors such as market prices. According to Moure- Peña, the main programs that provide funding for rural people are Procampo,

Oportunidades (rebranded as Prospera in 2012) and Payments for Ecological

Services (PES). Procampo is a federal program that was created in 1993 to provide direct cash payments at planting time on a per hectare basis to growers of any legal crops (Garcia-Salazar et al., 2011). Prospera is one of the most important social assistance federal programs in Mexico which allocates

“…quarterly income transfers directly to mothers, with the condition that they send their children to school and attend regular health check-ups” (Ramirez,

2016, p.452). The monthly amount that a household receives varies depending on number of children and their ages, however the maximum monthly amount per household is fixed at $2,945 pesos (Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, 2016).

The PES program started in 2003 and is a voluntary transaction between the federal government that usually acts as the buyer of the environmental services

(there are a few cases were the buyer is an NGO or private company) and the ejidos that are the environmental service providers. The ejidos have to establish a specific area, apply for the program and when approved, the federal

105 government commits to provide a payment on per hectare basis for 5 years.

The payment intends to compensate for the restrictions on clear-cutting and hunting and obligations for surveillance and attending training sessions for ejido members in the PES area (Rico-Garcia et al., 2011). The diversity of criteria in the multiple government programs that exist in Mexico makes difficult to estimate the amount of income that rural households receives from these sources.

The main source of financial support for rural communities directly associated to REDD+ in Quintana Roo was the Peninsula the Yucatan Special

Program for REDD+ Early Action Areas (REDD+ Special Program) managed by the National Forest Commission which allocated resources in 2012, 2013 and

2014. The main objective of this program was “to provide support and incentives to boost sustainable rural development, exploit resources in forest ecosystems and contribute to reduce deforestation and forest degradation in

REDD+ early action areas in Campeche, Quintana Roo and Yucatan”

(CONAFOR, 2014b, p.1). The program paused in 2015 because of internal arrangements at the National Forest Commission and resumed in 2016 but was integrated into the general program supporting forest management and conservation. From 2012 to 2016, the National Forest Commission allocated more than 200 million pesos for REDD+ projects (Benavides et al., 2016). Table

4.7 shows the number of projects supported and the allocated amount per year.

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Table 4.7. Financial Resources from the Peninsula de Yucatan Special Program (Source: Minutes of the REDD+ Special program council meeting, 2015) 17 Year Number of Amount (Pesos) financed projects 2012 103 $11,759,614.95

2013 263 $16,864,607.94

2014 324 $31,386,591.00

2015 0 $0.00

2016 102 $157,357,600.00

Total $217,368,413.89

More than half of the allocated resources from the REDD+ Special

Program went to support income generating activities such as reforestation, payment for ecological services, agroforestry, cattle herding, tree nurseries and wildfire protection activities. Other financed activities were the development of planning documents/ technical studies and capacity development. In addition, the REDD+ Special program provided resources for communities to hire a forestry promoter. The forestry promoter is a person who lives in the ejido, receives training and a salary of 60,000 pesos per year to facilitate forest management and/or conservation activities. In 2014, there were 31 forestry promoters working in an equal number of ejidos (one promoter per ejido).Figure

4.4 shows the distribution in percentages of resources allocated by the REDD+

Special program into the various activities previously described.

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14 Figure 4.4. Distribution on resources from the REDD+ Special Program (Source: Minutes of the REDD+ Special program council meeting, 2015)

The financial resources from the REDD+ Special Program were additional to regular federal and state programs that supported forest management/conservation activities and rural development. The REDD+

Special program, as well as other forest management and conservation programs, granted financial resources to ejidos or individuals, depending on the rules of operations of the program. Some programs allowed both modalities, for example, some ejidos could receive funds to reforest a communal area and several individual plots in the same year.

Agroforestry was one of the activities financially supported by the REDD+

Special Program. As for 2016, almost 3,000 ha of agroforestry systems have been established benefitting 333 people in the four REDD+ municipalities as

Table 4.8 describes. The volumes and value of the agroforestry production are not available, however, beneficiaries of the program that participated in an

108 evaluation workshop in 2016 reported: “more than generating income,

[agroforestry] allows saving money because it provides [food items] for self- consumption”. Participants at this workshop reported that they had been able to sell only short-cycle produce (e.g. beans, cassava) which did not represent significant contributions on their income (Report of the workshop for beneficiaries of agroforestry projects organized by the National Biodiversity

Commission in May 2016).

Table 4.8. Agroforestry projects supported by the REDD+ Special Program 18 (Source: CONABIO) Year Number of Area (Ha) Payment/Ha beneficiaries (pesos) 2013 153 527 14,824.00 2014 104 1,031 5,600.00 2016 76 1,400 4,772.00 Total 333 2,958

The timber production in Quintana Roo has increased in both volume and value from 2011 to 2016 with Felipe Carrillo Puerto the top contributor to this production. The volume of timber production in this municipality grew from

18,243 m3 in 2011 to 33,440 m3 of timber in 2016, an increase of more than

80%. The number of valid authorizations for timber exploitation in the state also grew from 77 in 2011 to 113 in 2016. This means that in Quintana Roo 113 timber operations are under management plans. The reported volume of timber production has never exceeded the authorized volume under the existing forest management plans. For example, in Felipe Carrillo Puerto, the exploited timber volume represents less than 20% of the authorized volume in 2016. Illegal timber exploitation for commercial purposes was not mentioned in the literature

109 or by interviewees as a current practice in Quintana Roo. Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos produce more than 50% of Quintana Roo’s honey.

Honey production slightly increased from 2,268 tonnes in 2011 to 2,884 tonnes in 2016. However, the value of honey production increased almost 70%, from

62.2 million pesos in 2011 to 105.2 million pesos in 2016 (INEGI, 2012; INEGI,

2017).

In summary, REDD+ in Quintana Roo has not had a purely conservationist approach in which rural people are not allowed to harvest forest products for sale and/or for self-consumption. On the contrary, REDD+ has promoted income generating activities such as timber exploitation under management plans, beekeeping, agroforestry and ecotourism. Ejidos that choose to participate in conservation activities such as reforestation and provision of ecological services have also received financial support. The

REDD+ Special Program has allocated more than 200 million pesos in Quintana

Roo’s REDD+ intervention area. However, these funds were additional to the regular government programs for forest management and conservation and rural development that were operating before REDD+ and continued operating during the REDD+ years.

Community benefits

The Mexican National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development

Policies (CONEVAL,2015) has defined a social lag index that takes into account the following four issues: 1) literacy and access to education; 2) access to health services; 3) access to basic services (water, electricity, sewage) and 4) quality of housing. The degree of social lag is classified as very high, high, low

110 and very low. Table 4.9 shows the degree of social lag for Quintana Roo and the four REDD+ municipalities from 2000 to 2015. Since 2010, Quintana Roo’s social lag degree changed from medium to low which means that the conditions in terms of education, health services, basic services and quality of housing have improved in the past decade. However, the REDD+ municipalities have not had significant changes. Three of them are still classified as medium degree and one of them, Othon P. Blanco, is classified as very low degree since 2000.

Table 4.9. Degree of Social Lag in Quintana Roo and REDD+ municipalities 19 (Source: National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies, 2015)

2000 2005 2010 2015 Quintana Roo Medium Medium Low Low Felipe Carrillo Puerto Medium Medium Low Medium Othon P. Blanco Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Jose Maria Morelos Medium Medium Low Medium Bacalar NA NA NA Medium

Tables 4.10 presents the indicators of education and health services for

2015 for Quintana Roo and the REDD+ municipalities. In these municipalities, less than 15% of the adult population are illiterate, however, 3% or fewer children between 6 and 14 years old do not attend school. In addition, less than

15% of people in the REDD+ municipalities have no access to health services.

This percentage is lower than the average 18% for the state. It is important to note that neither of these indicators provide information about the quality of education or health services that people receive. As these municipalities are in rural areas it is reasonable to assume that deficiencies in school infrastructures, lack of teachers, lack of doctors/nurses and lack of medication might be among the common issues faced by these communities.

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Table 4.10. Education and access to health services Quintana Roo and REDD+ municipalities in 2015 20 (Source: National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies, 2015) % of population % of population % of illiterate that do not attend without access population school to health (age 15 or more) (6 to 14 years old) services Quintana Roo 3.87 3.36 18.81 Felipe Carrillo Puerto 11.69 1.7 9.02 Othon P. Blanco 4.45 2.51 12.55 Jose Maria Morelos 11.76 1.87 8.75 Bacalar 13 3 8

The percentages of houses without access to basic services such as water, electricity and sewage are presented in table 4.11. Less than 5% of houses in the REDD+ municipalities are without water supply and electricity.

Sewage is still an issue in Felipe Carrillo Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos where more than 20% of the houses do not have access to this service.

Table 4.11. Access to basic services in 2015 21 (Source: National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policies, 2015) % of houses % of houses without water without % of houses

supply electricity without sewage Quintana Roo 2.59 1.19 2.53 Felipe Carrillo Puerto 2.03 3.51 22.48 Othon P. Blanco 1.41 1.14 1.45 Jose Maria Morelos 4.17 3.49 19.07 Bacalar 3 3 6

In conclusion, there is no strong evidence that REDD+ has had significant impacts on community benefits such as education, health services, basic services, housing and community infrastructure. These services are usually provided by the government with different federal, state and municipal

112 programs not related to REDD+. The majority of people from the REDD+ municipalities have access to education, health services, water supply, electricity and sewage. Ejido members independently decide how to use the financial resources that they receive from REDD+ and other productive activities. Some of them allocate funds for community infrastructure and services while others divide the income among ejido members.

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Chapter 5. Quality of REDD+ Governance in Quintana Roo

The polycentric governance framework set out in Chapter I identifies the following functions to assess the quality of governance in REDD+: Influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. This section presents the opinions of three groups of interviewees: 1) members of the Work Group

(government officers), 2) members of the Advisory Council (sector representatives), and 3) ejido leaders and members, regarding the quality of

REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo. In the concluding chapter, the responses of the three groups will be compared.

Quality of Governance in the REDD+ Work Group

Actors’ influence in decision-making in the Work Group

Government officers who are members of the Work Group identified both the Work Group and the Advisory Council as inclusive spaces where everybody’s opinions are welcomed, they recognized the ongoing collaborative efforts and the involvement of multiple actors such as NGOs, academia and ejidos:

“Everybody participates a lot. The University of Quintana Roo, the

INIFAP [research institution] they all contribute when a proposal is made.

Also, a lot of farmers want to conserve forest areas. There are many

actors participating” (GW-10).

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“In the past, it was CONAFOR’s [National Forest Commission] job, now

other agencies and NGOs have joined” (WG-4).

There was a consensus among Work Group interviewees regarding the leadership of the State Ministry of the Environment and the National Forest

Commission in Quintana Roo’s REDD+ planning and implementation processes. Some interviewees also mentioned the National Biodiversity

Commission as part of the leading team. This leadership is not perceived as an imposition but rather as the correct institutional procedure according to the public administration regulations. Some of the comments were “There are certain outstanding leadership ...in general, the state and federal agencies directly involved in the forest sector” (WG-2); “The law gives them the faculty [to lead the REDD+ processes]” (WG-9). One interviewee highlighted the importance of having leaders by stating “There must exist leadership to guarantee operability and order” (WG-8).

As a result of the existing institutional structure, not all government agencies participate equally in the REDD+ processes. Instead, they have specific roles. One interviewee explained:

“Some [actors] are active and others are passive, they are observers,

they help by giving suggestions. For example, the Women’s Institute

gives recommendations on how to include women, the National Institute

for Statistics and Geographical Information provides tools for decision-

making, others, such as the federal and state agriculture ministries, are

more active, although in the past they didn’t know that the programs that

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they implement could contribute to the reduction of [GHG] emissions”

(WG-4).

Other members of the Work Group believe that they play an important role in the planning process as they provide information on agriculture and cattle raising (which are among the main drivers of deforestation), geographical information, statistics, and strategies to include vulnerable sectors in REDD+ projects. They recognize that they do not actively participate in REDD+ implementation because the agencies that they represent do not have the mandate to implement forest management and/or conservation projects. Some interviewees spoke about their own participation as follows:

“SAGARPA [Federal Agriculture Ministry] actively participates by

providing data regarding agricultural areas...I believe our participation

has been valuable” (WG-3).

“We are not that active, but we are there whenever it is needed, INEGI

[National Institute for Statistics and Geographical Information] has always

contributed in compliance with its capacities. It participates by providing

information, capacity development… it provides tools so the agencies in

charge of measuring deforestation can do it. (WG-9).

“We are participating by providing information. It would be complicated to

create new strategies, adapt our work and implement new activities in

compliance with REDD+. We should try to contribute with what we

already do.” (WG-6).

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There were some different perceptions of participation of the various government levels. Representatives of the federal government recognize that the state government should have the last say on decision-making as they are responsible for the future of Quintana Roo’s people and resources. One interviewee said:

“The state government should be the most interested, the federal

government is just a support. The state government should be the one

pushing and telling federal agencies which are the state’s priorities” (WG-

3).

The federal government is in charge of REDD+ national policies and should support the state government in developing and implementing their own policies. However, one interviewee from the federal government expressed concerns regarding the lack of “political willingness” from the state government to put forest management and conservation above economic development policies. The strategic plan developed by the state government for the period

2016 to 2022 includes program 28 that promotes sustainability in Quintana Roo.

The action 5.28.26 of this program proposes to follow up on Quintana Roo’s

REDD+ strategy (Gobierno del Estado de Quintana Roo, 2017a). However, the first annual report of activities that the state Governor presented in 2017 did not include any activity specifically related to REDD+. The only investment reported in the forest sector was 4 million pesos to control wildfires. In contrast, this report of activities included 28 million pesos to support agriculture and fishery

(Gobierno del Estado de Quintana Roo, 2017b).

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One interviewee commented that the municipal governments do not participate actively enough as their representatives only “come to listen and do not participate”. One representative of the municipal government said “The participation of the municipality does not appear to be very active but it implements lots of activities and generates information such as databases and maps that allow to track forests and affected areas” (WG-10).

A couple of work group members highlighted other issues affecting participation:

“There has been a continuity issue, there is no long-term plan... the

agenda for actors should be clearer, it is a solid group because multiple

actors participate but at the same time it makes it difficult. One weakness

is that it has been sporadic. There is a lot of motivation but it has not

been consistent” (WG-3).

“Occasionally, the usual representatives do not attend the meetings

which results in duplication of effort or not being able to follow up with the

agreements. This can happen because of internal organization issues or

because of external factors, such as a short time notice for a meeting”

(WG-2).

This last comment makes reference to the fact that the top authority (e.g. the Ministry) of each of the agencies which are members of the Work Group, officially assigns a public servant to attend and follow up on REDD+ meetings and activities. Usually this officer is not exclusively in charge of REDD+ therefore has other responsibilities that might limit their attendance and participation in REDD+ activities.

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Information sharing in the Work Group.

Most participants identified the Work Group sessions as the usual forum to request information and present progress and results. Other fora identified were the Advisory Council meetings and workshops where multiple stakeholders participate (e.g. the workshops for the development of REDD+

Investment Plan).

As for the information sharing mechanisms, there was a range of different responses going from informal mechanisms such as direct phone calls and/or emails, to formal mechanisms such as session agreements recorded in minutes and official letters requesting information. However, the formal methods were usually needed when requesting very specific or recent information, otherwise most information related to REDD+ is public. The interviewees recognized that among the Work Group members the channels for communication are always open, regardless of the method used to request information.

According to the Work Group interviewees, not only the Work Group members but any citizen can ask for information, the transparency laws oblige public servants to disclose information. Examples of these laws are the General

Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information and the Law of

Transparency and Access to Public Information for the state of Quintana Roo.

These federal and state laws guarantee access to the information possessed by any authority or entity of the executive, legislative and judicial power. In

Quintana Roo, the Institute for Transparency and Access to Public Information is responsible for gathering information and replying to the formal requests for

119 information made by any citizen. These requests can be made by open letter, filling a form (can be sent in paper or by email) or online at infomexqroo.org.mx

Interviewees agreed that online resources are the most used tools for information sharing. Some examples mentioned are: institutional websites, dropbox, email, youtube videos, thematic websites such as the Agri-food and

Fisheries Information System (www.gob.mx/siap), the Mayan Forest

Observatory (www.observatorioselvamaya.org.mx), Peninsula de Yucatan

Climate Change Strategy (www.ccpy.gob.mx), and the National Transparency

Platform (www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx). Federal agencies have paper versions of some of their online materials and they often print infographics, booklets or manuals when needed for training sessions or workshops.

Knowledge exchange in the Work Group.

There have been multiple knowledge exchange examples such as courses, workshops, training sessions, sharing of good practices, successful stories, field trips, publications, development of strategies, plans and new methodologies. Most of them were organized by the federal government, specifically the National Forest Commission and the Biodiversity Commission with some participation of research institutions and NGOs. In some cases, the knowledge exchange resulted in the improvement of policies and/or actions.

Some examples are described by the interviewees as follows:

“I just came back from a course organized by the National Forest

Commission where the USA Forest Service participated as well. It was

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about how to make compatible the information from the National Institute

of Statistics and Geographical Information with the reports from the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (WG-9).

“There was an experience exchange between government institutions

from Quintana Roo and Jalisco. We wanted to bring the experience from

Jalisco related to the coordinated work between environmental agencies

and agricultural agencies. They are implementing mechanisms to support

farmers that want to have cattle-herding areas but also conserve forest

areas… as a result of this exchange we could work together in a similar

project in Quintana Roo” (WG-4).

“As a result of a diploma course, a new methodology for tropical forest

management was developed. It is called ``Peninsular Silvicultural

Method” (WG-4).

The courses and training sessions were not only provided to public servants but also to other actors. One interviewee mentioned that “there were courses for government officers, groups of women, farmers, with topics such as agriculture diversification, conservation of natural resources… communities in

Quintana Roo are taking the example from Calakmul [in the state of Campeche] to promote ecotourism” (WG-10).

The development of planning documents such as the REDD+ national strategy, the Quintana Roo strategy and investment plan are recognized as knowledge exchange efforts. Interviewees said: “The workshops that we did to develop the REDD+ investment plan were useful to learn what other actors are doing” (WG-5).” “We printed booklets summarizing the REDD+ national strategy

121 and we used them for the public consultation. In Quintana Roo, we did six sessions” (WG-4).

The renewed structure of the work group includes subgroups that were created for the purpose of knowledge exchange and technical cooperation in specific REDD+ related topics. One member explained: “The subgroups have their own agenda with specific topics from the state strategy such as safeguards, monitoring, and distribution of benefits” (WG-4).

The newest members of the group were planning to offer training sessions in their areas of expertise:

“We are planning to give a presentation about transparency to all the

members of the work group so they can learn how the national

transparency system works. Our main contribution to the group is the

technical advice in terms of transparency, access to information and also

protection to personal contact information of beneficiaries” (WG-8).

Financial coordination in the Work Group.

Financial coordination has happened in very few and specific cases. One of these cases was the cattle-herding project implemented in 2013 as a result of a knowledge exchange experience between Quintana Roo and Jalisco: “The

National Institute for Social Economy provided funds for community enterprises to build infrastructure such as electrical fences. The National Forest

Commission provided tree plants for feeding cattle and create green fences.

The Federal Ministry of Agriculture provided funds to buy cattle in the first year.”

(WG-4).

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Usually agencies at different levels work with their own assigned budget, including REDD+ funds which were assigned to the National Forest

Commission. Interviewees mentioned “These are not resources that flow between agencies but they are exercised directly by each government entity”

(WG-1). “We have focused resources from our programs orienting them towards common objectives in compliance with the REDD+ strategy” (WG-2).

International funds are also assigned to one organization to manage as explained in the following statement: “They just approved 7.5 million pesos for

REDD+ capacity development through the Governors’ Climate and Forest Task

Force, this money comes from Norway and will be assigned to The Nature

Conservancy Mexico. The state government will have a say in how to apply it”

(WG-1).

Some agencies, because of the nature of their participation, do not plan to invest any financial resources in REDD+ related projects. They only provided information and advice in specific topics such as geographical information, statistics, transparency procedures, or inclusion of vulnerable sectors.

However, the base for a future financial coordination has been developed as some interviewees explained:

“The platform and the legal framework for financial coordination already

exists...There is the Peninsula de Yucatan Fund which is a trust fund for

receiving financial resources… In 2016, a national agreement between

SAGARPA [Federal ministry of agriculture] and SEMARNAT [Federal

Ministry of the Environment] was signed. This agreement has a lot of

potential but we still need to define how it will work at state level” (WG-5).

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The agreement mentioned in the last comment does not pledge financial resources. Instead, it intends to restrict the subsidies and/or loans for the agricultural sector whenever there is an intention to change the land use from forests to agriculture, as at national level, the available funds to support the agricultural sector are higher than the ones to support forest management and/or conservation. However, as the interviewee noted, as of July 2018, this agreement had not been implemented in Quintana Roo.

Another instrument for financial coordination is an inter-municipal association called AMUSUR which

“…includes four municipalities, Othon P. Blanco, Bacalar Felipe Carrillo

Puerto and Jose Maria Morelos. It was created in 2013 but [interviewees

indicated that] it was not operating. In 2017, the association members

had their first meeting… in 2018 the association was registered in the

Revenue Agency... all four municipalities recognized AMUSUR as an

organization to address issues of climate change and they gave

authorization to invest 30 thousand pesos each to have a joint budget of

120 thousand pesos… we still need to open a bank account and

designate a manager” (WG-10).

Conflict resolution in the Work Group.

Most Work Group interviewees agreed that there has not been any conflict among members. They usually discuss all topics in the work group meetings until they reach a consensus. Interviewees said:

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“There has not been conflicts neither at personal level nor at work

level… everybody’s opinions are taken into account” (WG-3).

“If there are disagreements, we discuss them and we solve them in the

group” (WG-4);

“In the meetings that I have attended, we have always reached

consensus, I do not remember a divided vote” (WG-2);

“So far, I have never observed any conflict. Each one has their own

viewpoint but that is precisely the objective of having a work group, to

hear the voices so we can move forward” (WG-9).

Most members acknowledged the existence of internal regulations for the functionality of the group. Interviewees mentioned that some topics included in these regulations are membership, attendance and sanctions:

“There is a rulebook for the operability of the group where the functions,

the participants, the substitutes are established, in other words, the

group’s organization” (WG-10).

“There are internal regulations which establish that the attendance of the

majority of the members is mandatory for a meeting to happen” (WG-8).

“There are not sanctions, for example if someone does not attend a

meeting. If there were sanctions, probably no one would participate. But

there is a commitment to attend the meetings” (WG-9).

One interviewee recognized that the political context had influenced the presence of conflict at a general level, with potential repercussions in the

125 environmental and rural sector, as the interviews were conducted a few weeks after the 2018 Mexican presidential elections.

“The tone and topics of conflict had increased in the last six months due

to the current political scenario. Maybe this will change in the following

months. There are genuine conflicts and conflicts made-out by people

with particular agendas” (WG-1).

It is important to note that since its creation, the discussions in the Work

Group have been around the design of both the national and state REDD+ strategies. As these strategies do not restrict activities or have had a negative influence on the budgets of any agency, it seems reasonable to believe that there has not been potential causes of conflict among government agencies at federal, state and municipal levels. As discussed in the section on financial cooperation, each agency has their own budgets and do what they can to contribute to REDD+, however most agencies only contribute by providing information and/or technical support.

Creation of trust in the Work Group.

Transparency and accountability are elements of Quintana Roo’s REDD+ safeguards plan. All government agencies participating in REDD+ are regulated by transparency federal and state laws. One interviewee explained the existing regulatory framework as follows:

“Mexico is one of the most advanced countries in terms of normativity of

transparency and access to public information. However, the

implementation needs to be improved. There is a General Index of

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Transparency that evaluates the percentage of information that each

government entity has uploaded to the transparency system [online

platform]. The law also establishes that everything that is uploaded to the

transparency platform has to be available on institutional websites” (WG-

8).

Work Group members also mentioned that there are mechanisms in place for citizens to report irregular behaviour such as violence, abuse and corruption. These mechanisms are not exclusive to REDD+ but general to the government at any level. The government at all levels has comptrollers. The state government has a platform for citizens to anonymously report irregular behavior from government officers by phone or online (denuncia.qroo.gob.mx).

In addition to the regulatory framework, one member identified the advisory council as a mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability

“...they also are watchdogs, they are the eyes of civil society, they are very critical” (WG-1).

Most interviewees perceived a high level of trust among members of the work group as the following comments illustrate:

“I am certain that everybody follows the law” (WG-7)

“The environment is good, all participants are experienced and

responsible public servants” (WG-8).

“The level of trust is high. All participants are well prepared, they have

knowledge about the topics that we discuss, they are good at analysing

issues” (WG-9).

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“The level of trust is high. No one hides information, all topics are

discussed with transparency, everything is public… that allows for

information sharing and coordination of activities (WG-10).

“The work group meetings are meetings among friends. There is

willingness to participate, we all know each other very well, the decisions

are made fast and without bureaucracy” (WG-4).

Key informants from the Work Group were asked to rank their perception of the improvement of the quality of governance as a consequence of the

REDD+ institutional arrangements. The majority of participants strongly agreed or agreed to the statements that information sharing, knowledge exchange, conflict resolution and levels of trust have improved. They neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that financial cooperation has improved.

Summarizing, the government officers that are part of the work group, perceived that REDD+ has promoted a good quality of governance among levels and sectors. Although not all government agencies equally influence

REDD+ decision-making, the leadership and active participation of the state

Ministry of the Environment and the National Forest Commission was perceived as a correct administrative procedure. The main fora for information sharing were the meetings for both the Work Group and the Advisory Council. Most information is available online and government officers, sector representatives and regular citizens can access it. There have been multiple knowledge exchange opportunities such as workshops, training sessions, courses, field trips, exchange of experiences and best practices. These opportunities were available for all involved actors, including ejido member. Government officers

128 identified financial coordination as the only factor that has not improved as joint investments between REDD+ actors in Quintana Roo have been minimal. The work group members perceived that there has not been conflict among them as all topics are openly discussed in the meetings and after hearing all opinions, they reach agreements. The work group members reported a high level of trust among members. All participants from the work group recognized their colleagues as professionals with high expertise in their specific topics and from their viewpoint, agencies involved in REDD+ have always acted in compliance with the existing regulatory framework for transparency and access to public information.

Engagement of the Work Group members in activities seeking the achievement of REDD+ goals

The government officers from the REDD+ Work Group were asked about their perception of the impact of REDD+ on the reduction of deforestation. The majority of the interviewees said that they neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that REDD+ governance had contributed to decreased deforestation.

Most participants mentioned that they did not know if deforestation has been reduced in Quintana Roo or they did not have information confirming that

REDD+ implementation has led to reduced deforestation. Some participants stated that REDD+ is contributing to the reduction of deforestation but it is too soon to have evidence. They believe that more tangible results will be found in the long-term. As for the drivers of deforestation, interviewees identified urbanization (housing and touristic developments) and wildfires as drivers.

Agriculture and cattle raising were also mentioned as possible drivers of deforestation from the participants’ viewpoint.

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Several interviewees agreed that the main REDD+ activity contributing to the reduction of deforestation had been efforts creating awareness among actors about their responsibility to halt deforestation because it should not only be the responsibility of the forest and environmental agencies. Interviewees also recognized that there is still a lot of work to be done to address the multiple and diverse drivers of deforestation in Quintana Roo. One interviewee from an agency in charge of agricultural programs said

“We have to follow the rules of operation of our programs, if farmers

comply with these rules we cannot deny them the subsidies. We do need

more coordination to make sure that farmers do not intend to cause

deforestation before providing them with financial support [for

agriculture]” (WG-5).

Interviewees suggested the creation of more regulations to avoid deforestation and make sure that they are followed. According to some interviewees, these regulations should apply not only in the rural areas but also in the cities.

Regarding the generation of socio-economic benefits, the majority of the interviewees neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that REDD+ governance has increased the generation of income and/or community benefits for rural people in Quintana Roo. However, the interviewees identified some of the activities promoted by the Quintana Roo’s REDD+ strategy such as agroforestry, beekeeping and ecotourism as important sources of income generation for rural people.

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“The ecotourism is more profitable than clear cutting trees. People

[tourists] pay to come and see the deer, the gallinolas [Fulica Americana]

and the jaguars. I went to the ejido Laguna Om, they have designated a

[voluntary] conservation area in ejido land. I saw how a group of tourists

from the Hotel Kohunlich [resort owned by the national company Grupo

Posadas, located in Othon P. Blanco] was visiting the area to see the

wildlife. The ejido built trails and has installed cameras to photograph the

wildlife. The ejido Chacchoben has also installed cameras and they

upload videos of the wildlife that people can see in their forest areas on

their Facebook page” (WG-10).

This interviewee clarified that rural people have received funds for ecotourism and other activities such as beekeeping from programs other than the REDD+ Special Program, but these programs also contribute to the achievement of REDD+ goals.

One interviewee pointed out that it is difficult for rural people to know if the funds and/or other support (e.g. equipment, training) come from or are related to REDD+ as they mainly identify the National Forest Commission as the only agency supporting the forest sector. He explained

“I have never heard a rural person saying I am getting more money

because of REDD+… I doubt that they identify the support that they

receive from agricultural agencies as part of REDD+ although sometimes

they are [contributing to REDD+ goals] (WG-5).

The fact that results-based payments are still not available either in

Mexico or in Quintana Roo was explained by one interview as follows:

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“The most evident mechanism for [economic] benefits are the results-

based payments. These payments won’t be available until 2020… What

it is important now is to maintain the enthusiasm in rural communities,

knowing that in the future they will get these benefits” (WG-1).

The interviewees recognized that the decisions on the use of financial resources from the REDD+ Special Program, other programs for forest management and conservation and profits from income generating activities vary from one ejido to another. One interviewee explained:

“ Some ejidos use part of their [financial] resources for water purifying

equipment, building roads, bridges and observation towers for

ecotourism, maintenance to the casa ejidal [community building],

equipment for wildfire combat… Sometimes ejidos donate timber to make

school buildings or school furniture” (WG-4).

Most of the interviewees stated that water provision, road building and road maintenance, among others, are funded by government agencies that are not involved in REDD+. Examples of these agencies were the federal Ministry of

Transportation and the state Ministry of Infrastructure. The municipal governments have also provided road maintenance.

In summary, the government officers from the Work Group have not engaged in new REDD+ activities seeking to reduce deforestation and/or generate socio-economic benefits for rural people. Instead, they have kept managing the usual government programs in their agencies but they perceived that some of these programs have contributed to achieve the REDD+ goals.

However, they recognized that more needs to be done to have a significant

132 impact, specifically in halting deforestation. Some of the suggested actions were restricting agricultural subsidies, creating more regulations in both rural and urban areas and ensuring compliance with these regulations. Most of the interviewees agreed on the fact that in Quintana Roo the provision of public services and the building and maintenance of roads are funded by government agencies through programs not related to REDD+.

Quality of Governance in the REDD+ Advisory Council

The Quintana Roo REDD+ Advisory Council is a consultative group where representatives of the following sectors participate: farmers, ranchers, beekeepers, foresters, non-traditional producers, Indigenous people, NGOs, academia and the private sector.

Actors’ influence on decision-making in the Advisory Council

There was a consensus regarding the current lack of motivation of

Advisory Council sector representatives to continue participating in REDD+ related meetings and activities as the following comments illustrate:

“In the past, we met 3 to 4 times a year… the interest decreased to the

point where almost no one attended the meetings” (AC-2).

“In the last two years, we have met sporadically” (AC-6)

“We haven’t met as regularly as we should, because of that we haven’t

been able to exchange ideas” (AC-4).

“Recently, they called to invite us [to a meeting]. The truth is I didn’t go, I

stopped participating” (AC-7).

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The interviewees mentioned multiple causes for this lack of motivation.

These can be grouped into the following categories: 1) They did not believe they were influencing decision-making; 2) They did not have support or interest from their sectors; 3) They were spending their own resources (time, travel expenses) and not receiving benefits.

In terms of influence on decision-making, most interviewees stated that they wanted to have an active role by making impacts in REDD+. However, they explained that they were only a consultative body:

“We have not been able to do anything but listen and give opinions on

the work that has already been done… they [the National Forest

Commission and the state Ministry of the Environment] tell us: look, we

did this study, we need an Advisory Council meeting for you to validate it

and tan-tan that’s it. We give feedback and comments but at the end we

never know if they took them into account... we wanted to do lots of

things but it didn’t happen. We did the planning but nothing ever became

reality. That is why the Advisory Council members said: it is better to

work independently in our own sectors...I feel like it was a waste of time”

(AC-1).

“The government was hiring some consultancy jobs to generate some

information that was missing… most times they were already hired and

we were only reviewing what was already done. But the information was

not always what we considered was needed, neither we believed that the

consultants [hired] were the right choice… what ended the motivation

was that they were using us just to validate things.” (AC-7).

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Another element hampering motivation was the lack of interest within the sectors as some interviewees explained:

“Participation was active between sector representatives but not within

the organizations… the topics were complex… sometimes other

members of my organization participated but usually it was just me. And

if I noticed that there was any mechanism for consultation or any benefit

for them, only then I would let them know. Otherwise I would not, what

for? It happened the same in other sectors” (AC-7).

“I, as a sector representative, made the call for several meetings [with

members of my sector]. We were 12 to 15, only once the majority came.

Then we couldn’t hold the meetings because only one or two people

would show up… I started to lose interest because I put my effort and

they didn’t attend. I decided to just send out the information but even

then, they didn’t give any feedback. ” (AC-6).

The lack of resources (time, financial) or the cost-benefit of investing their own resources was among the causes of lack of motivation. Two interviewees spoke about this issue:

“We were not receiving any salary, we didn’t have any benefits, our

participation was voluntary… and if our opinions were not taken into

account, it was not worth it” (AC-7).

“I hate the meetings where you only go to waste your time, to give ideas

that are not taken into account. And most people feel this way.” (AC-6).

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Several interviewees mentioned that they wanted to transform the

Advisory Council into a not-for-profit organization to be able to obtain financial resources and gain autonomy to operate. However, this has not happened.

Only one interviewee expressed interest in participating regardless of the lack of benefits:

“I am an advisory council member because of my own willingness, with

no interest in having benefits of my own. I am not very clear in which are

my duties but I am quintanarroense [from Quintana Roo], I am concerned

about the [natural] resources and I am concerned about what is

happening with the ecosystems… [my participation] was active. I always

brought topics of interest to the Advisory Council meetings… I always

gave my opinion and will keep giving it” (AC-3).

Most members identified the government, specifically the National Forest

Commission and the State Ministry of the Environment as the leaders of the

REDD+ processes. In contrast to the perception among government officers in the Work Group, the sector representatives in the Advisory Council perceived these leading institutions as dominant and controlling. However, some interviewees recognized that a possible cause of this domination is the apathy within sectors and the passive role of sector representatives as expressed in the following statements:

”... we are used to the fact that government agencies are the ones that

make the calls even if it is our responsibility. The government… when

they see that there is no way for us to do things, then they develop

everything. And we are left as spectators...it has been a very comfortable

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position where government agencies say this is what we are doing” (AC-

5).

“We needed to put more effort in consolidating the Advisory Council, to

identify the tasks that each one was supposed to do, assume our own

responsibilities” (AC-4).

“The Advisory Council needs to be more proactive, to participate more, to

be more organized, we need the sectors representatives to be more

involved. I don’t know what is going to happen in the future but we need

the council members to take their assigned roles” (AC-2).

Information sharing in the Advisory Council.

The advisory council meetings were the main platform for information sharing among members. The advisory council has a technical secretary who has the responsibility for sending out invitations, agendas and the material to discuss in the meetings; writing and distributing minutes of meetings; and follow up on the agreements taken in the meetings. These resources were usually distributed by email. Emails were also the tool to share studies made by consultants and other documents for members to read, analyse and give feedback. In addition, there was a dropbox set to share presentations, documents and pictures among members. The members usually communicated by email and/or phone calls.

One member expressed his concerns about the use of technology as the primary tool for communication as follows:

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“Government agencies and communities speak a different

language...first of all, I don’t know how to use the internet. There is

internet in my town but other towns don’t have it.... The technological

progress has not reached rural communities. This thing [smartphone] I

barely know how to use it. Sometimes they tell me that they sent me

emails and I say okay, just because I am ashamed. My grandson is 12

years old, he knows how to use this thing [smartphone]. But they [young

people] are not connected to the social issues. Unfortunately, they as

chamacos [youngsters] use technology for other matters” (AC-5).

Some members thought that the information sharing process needed to improve as the following statements show:

”We haven’t gotten a platform to share information generated by the

government and the different sectors...Although some activities are

already classified as REDD+, the early actions, not all sector

representatives have participated in developing these actions and we

don’t know them. We don’t know what is being done, why it is done or

who created these actions. Then, I cannot talk about benefits for rural

communities because we don’t know either if there is a program that

evaluates the benefits or that informs us about the activities that are

already implemented” (AC-2).

“... sometimes there was a consultation and we were not well

informed...we did not receive information on time… or we received it the

same day of the consultation to discuss and analyze results. That caused

delays in the meetings and in decision-making” (AC-7).

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Despite the perception of lack of access to information, Advisory Council members have a good understanding of what REDD+ is and how it should work, according to the state strategy:

“I think that all rural productive activities should implement techniques to

prevent deforestation and forest degradation… the idea was that the rural

people would tell us, from their experience in their own activities, which

practices are the ones that cause deforestation and together, we could

come out with techniques and practices oriented to prevent

deforestation” (AC-1).

“We will keep working in the different productive activities with rural

communities but we will provide technical advising to them so they follow

the REDD+ strategy guidelines” (AC-2).

“... I am convinced that forest management should be under a well-

balanced scheme [including] economics, science and culture...we should

create interest among people, give a tangible value to the benefits from

forest areas… we need to socialize knowledge such as the raising of

temperatures, the erratic distribution of storms, large periods of

droughts...” (AC-7).

The use of Mayan, which is an Indigenous language spoken in Quintana

Roo, was discussed in the Advisory Council meeting that the researcher attended as an observer. One participant proposed to translate information regarding REDD+ from Spanish to Mayan. Another participant highlighted that

Mayan speakers do not read or write this language, Mayan is only spoken.

Therefore the participant considered a good idea to translate the information but

139 suggested the use of radio broadcasts to transmit it to Mayan speakers in rural communities. Another issue discussed was to find a translator but one of the attendees offered to do the translation himself. According to the 2015 inter- census survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and

Geographical Information, in Quintana Roo, only 2.7% of the population speak exclusively an Indigenous language, with Mayan being the most spoken.

Knowledge exchange in the Advisory Council

The advisory council has not promoted knowledge exchange initiatives.

Instead the council members participated either as a group or individually in courses, workshops, field trips or training sessions promoted by other actors, usually the federal government and NGOs.

The interviewees tried to list and describe the training that they had as precisely as possible, even though this training happened during the first years of activities (2012-2013).

“There were several state and regional gatherings to talk about

interesting topics such as carbon capture, drivers of deforestation… I am

trying to remember others…” (AC-3).

“I participated in two courses. They were part of the REDD+ capacity

development process. One was about the process to calculate carbon in

different ecosystems. We had specialists from Costa Rica and Colombia.

The other one was about satellite images analysis to describe and

quantify forest ecosystems. It was taught by officers from the National

Forest Commission” (AC-2).

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Some interviews mentioned that they were part of a group called

Learning Communities that was created for the three states in the Peninsula de

Yucatan (Campeche, Quintana Roo, Yucatan). This group started in 2012 and was supported by Alianza Mexico REDD+ where several NGOs such as The

Nature Conservancy and Rainforest Alliance participate. Interviewees described the objective and activities in the Learning Communities as follows:

“Different organization representatives participated, we exchanged

experiences, we visited other communities....there were two lines:

sustainable forest management and sustainable agriculture. We have

applied some of these practices in the ejidos and communities where we

work” (AC-2).

“We met in a place, for example Calakmul [in Campeche] and then we

had a field trip to visit a successful case… at the beginning, all expenses

were covered, then they limited the support”. (AC-6).

Several advisory council members spoke about what they have done individually in terms of technical coordination and knowledge exchange as follows:

“Together with the National Forest Commission, I developed several

projects for community land planning which included conservation areas

in Othon P. Blanco and Bacalar. We were 7 ejidos and together had

around 15 thousand hectares for conservation… as part of the REDD+

Special Program and other federal programs, we did lots of workshops

promoting beekeeping. Until today, we keep doing meetings where we

141

tell people: Look, if you want to make a living from the forest, you can

generate income through honey [production]” (AC-3).

“I work in Bacalar with 29 communities...Before REDD+, we created an

agroforestry model that was ready for implementation. We were using

Ramon [Brosimum alicastrum] as a timber species, for cattle and human

consumption, together with other species that people introduced and

combined with fruit trees and short-cycle species... The model that we

developed was adopted by the National Forest Commission. The officers

saw value in it and integrated it into the REDD+ Special Program… I was

individually invited, not as an Advisory Council member but as a

professional. We were able to improve the model and use it in other

communities” (AC-7)

“We have been working permanently with the people, the timber

producers, this is our duty. We train them in conservation, restoration,

sustainable forest management and exploitation… we are trying to raise

awareness so people don’t burn, don’t clear-cut, don’t cause

deforestation... we hold meetings with the members of our association,

we also go to their communities and bring this training to them” (AC-4).

“The Nature Conservancy did a compilation of successful stories, they

were interested in my restoration project, they sent people over, they

took video, they asked for an abstract. The document was published

online” (AC-6).

Other examples of knowledge exchange were attendance at the national and regional advisory council meetings representing Quintana Roo, research

142 done by graduate students and consultancy work done by research institutions and NGOs.

Although most advisory council members were somehow involved in knowledge exchange, the impact of these initiatives were a concern among some interviewees. One interviewee explained that people that attended training sessions, found that it was very difficult to understand the topics that were addressed:

“We went to ejidos in Chiapas and Campeche to learn about carbon

sequestration… the attendees listened to the presentation, but they can’t

apply anything. No one knows what the carbon is, you don’t see it, you

don’t smell it, nothing. They say that it is in the wood but it is difficult to

understand” (AC-5).

In addition, this key informant expressed concerns about the fact that sometimes the people who attend workshops or training sessions are not the ones directly involved in the specific topic: “I went to a course about corn crops but I am not a farmer, I don’t grow corn” (AC-5); or no one is interested in participating in the knowledge exchange opportunities: “ The ejido president said that there were four spaces available for this course, we are more than 200 ejido members and couldn’t find 4 people that wanted to go” (AC-5). The interviewee added that sometimes people that travel to attend workshops go as tourists only to visit a new place.

Other interviewees made comments regarding the insufficient exchange among council members in Quintana Roo with council members in the neighboring states in order to share good practices. They highlighted the need

143 for more training to develop their capacities as council members not only to share information but to implement projects with the rural people that they work with.

Financial Coordination in the Advisory Council.

In parallel with knowledge exchange, advisory council members have not engaged in any joint investments. Instead they were recipients of financial support from other entities. All interviewees explained that so far they have only invested time and travel expenses to go to meetings and other activities. Most interviewees identified The Nature Conservancy and the National Forest

Commission as the main organizations providing financial support.

The Nature Conservancy financed the advisory councils at Campeche,

Yucatan and Quintana Roo in the first years of their operations. In Quintana

Roo these resources were used to hire a facilitator, conduct diagnostic studies and pay logistic expenses for meetings and workshops. The Nature

Conservancy also financed “the design of booklets, the design of a logo for the advisory council and the creation of radio spots. Unfortunately, there were not additional resources to print the booklets and air the radio spots” (AC-1). One interviewee stated that “The Nature Conservancy stopped providing financial support and we just stood by” (AC-2).

Most interviewees identified the National Forest Commission as the main source of financial support, not only for REDD+ but for all forest management and conservation programs. Some examples mentioned were the REDD+

Special Program, the Payments for Ecological Services program and a restoration program called Environmental Compensation.

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Some interviewees have the perception that the National Forest

Commission has used most of the REDD+ financial resources for planning activities and little money has found its way to rural communities. One of them expressed disagreement regarding the allocation of REDD+ funds as follows:

“The National Forest Commission spent money to create institutional

arrangements for REDD+ administration. Maybe this was not necessary,

they could use the money for something more tangible” (AC-6)

Despite this opinion the same participant also recognized that “the World

Bank or whoever provides funds, needs these arrangements” and “since the beginning we were told that REDD+ was a strategy, that we were creating the platform, that in other countries it also took time” (AC-6).

Conflict Resolution in the Advisory Council.

Conflict was a difficult topic to discuss, perhaps because people see this word as a very harsh and negative one. Several interviewees stated that they were seen as troublemakers, especially by government officers, because they openly expressed their opinions. This perception might be linked to the belief that the government always dislikes and censures anyone who disagrees with its viewpoint.

The lack of flexibility in the rules of federal programs when applied at local level was mentioned as a potential cause of conflict between the government and the sector representatives as explained in the following statement:

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“Most agencies have the argument that the rules of programs are written

in central offices and cannot change. Then, if they cannot change what is

the point of discussing about that? [They say] we will change it next

year. And they never changed it … in 2015 or 2016 we had a program

called rehabilitation of prairies… what did beneficiaries get? Five boxes

of weed-killer. We told the officer from SAGARPA [Federal Ministry of

Agriculture], look sir, here the scheme for management of prairies is with

cattle-herd systems [planting tree species that cattle eats] but not with

agrochemicals… but they said weed-killer is what we will provide” (AC-3).

The previous comment shows concerns regarding the programs offered by the federal government acting as incentives for people in Quintana Roo to choose activities that result in deforestation over others that help to maintain the tree cover. The rules of operation of the programs of the federal government are developed yearly by the federal agencies in charge of these programs. These rules establish the objective of the program, the type of support that the program provides (e.g. scholarship, equipment, training, and payment for delivering a product/service), the characteristics of the eligible population, the maximum subsidy that a beneficiary can receive and the procedure to apply to the program. Rural people in Quintana Roo and other Mexican states are eligible to apply for multiple programs from different agencies such as the

Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Social Development, the National Forest

Commission, among others. As these programs are applied nationally, it is difficult to reflect all the particular circumstances from each of the many and diverse regions of the country, therefore they are seen as inflexible. However

146 rural people are free to decide not to apply for a program that does not contribute to the vision that they have for the development of their community.

Other Advisory Council members mentioned some conflict with the government because they felt like many decisions were previously arranged and they were using the Advisory Council only to follow a protocol for approval.

Examples of this were the hiring of consultants, the election of the council’s president and vice-president and the proposal for new members in the council.

One member said that he did not think that the decisions were wrong but was upset about the way these decisions were made. Another interviewee explained that he made multiple comments in the meetings about his disagreement with some decisions but nothing ever changed. One council member stated that he did not want the conflict to escalate but if needed “I have the strength from people, we could make a rally, block government offices as others have done in the past” (AC-4).

Conflict among sectors and within ejidos were also identified by Council members. One interviewee explained

“Among sugarcane growers, corn growers, ranchers, beekeepers, in one

hand we have the ones that cause it [deforestation] and in the other, the

ones who conserve [forests]. Sometimes we have conflict. In the past,

when we didn’t know much about this topic, we were all okay. Now, as

we get more information, there is more tension among us” (AC-3).

The fact that financial support for forest management and conservation is usually granted collectively at ejido level and not individually was also identified

147 as a cause of conflict. The issue with this policy was explained by one interviewee as follows:

“The money is granted to the ejido and the ejido is a chaos. Everybody

wants everything but no one wants to make an effort. They say that the

ejido belongs to everybody and nobody at the same time. It belongs to

everybody when there is money to share but it belongs to no one when

there is work to do” (AC-4).

Creation of Trust in the Advisory Council

Some interviewees have the perception that there is trust among sector representatives, as they know each other and have been working together not only in REDD+ activities but in other rural development activities. They also believe that they cannot trust the government as a general rule. This is expressed in the following statements:

“Between us, the Advisory Council members, we know each other and

trust each other, we talk to each other when there is a conflict, we have a

good relationship and can talk to each other about the things that

happen. With the government, they already have their own networks

among organizations that usually work with them… REDD+ has divided

[actors]” (AC-1).

“Trustworthiness among sector representatives has improved...” but

“There has been a total lack of trust towards the state and federal

government, in the past five years, not because of REDD+ but in general.

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We have zero trust in the governor, zero trust on the government officers,

zero trust in the federal government and its representatives” (AC-3).

Most council members perceived lack of transparency in the amount of funds invested in REDD+ and in the rules for allocations of these funds as the following comments illustrate:

“Government agencies allocate funds and we don’t know to who and for

what reason. There was lack of transparency because we should decide

who the eligible people to receive financial support are. That is the

transparency that should exist” (AC-4).

“Most people don’t know what happened, if there were funds, if they were

used to create the institutional arrangements. The financial resources

were directed to few people, without a consensus” (AC-6).

Other interviewees believe that trust has not been created even among sector representatives.

“I feel like there is a low level of trust. I see it that way because not even

among us, the sector representatives, can reach agreements or organize

or share information” (AC-2).

“The trust is created when we know each other. For example I know 2 or

3 people [from the Advisory Council], there is certain familiarity among us

and even if we do not always agree, I can openly tell them: you know

what, you are wrong. And they can also say that to me. But that happens

when you get to know someone. Then, for trust to exist, we need

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continuity and that has not happened. People who attend one meeting

might not be the same who attend the next one” (AC-5).

This last comment was made in reference to the changes that might exist in government agencies, NGOs or academia, where people move from one position to another and new personnel comes in.

When talking about irregular behaviour such as corruption, interviewees explained:

“The management of corruption is so subtle and diplomatic that it is hard

to report it because you would not have evidence to demonstrate that

corruption happened. We are all accomplices in the country” (AC-3).

“There is some [corruption], it is difficult to detect because everybody

tries to make it not evident...it makes it difficult to report” (AC-6).

“The ejidos have internal rules that prevent people going to the forest

and clear cutting. But if someone wants to cut palizada [thin logs used for

construction] and they don’t want to go all the way to the area where it is

permitted, then they go [to the restricted areas] trying to avoid that others

notice them. Or they buy beer for the ejido president [to be allowed to cut

where it is prohibited]” (AC-5).

Key informants from the Advisory Council ranked their perception on the improvement of the quality of governance as a consequence of the REDD+ institutional arrangements. The opinions were divided for information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial cooperation and conflict resolution with some interviewees stating that they agreed that there had been improvement of these

150 functions while others disagreed. The majority of participants disagreed with the statement that the levels of trust among actors have improved.

Summarizing, the Advisory Council members believe that REDD+ implementation has not improved the quality of governance among sectors. The advisory council is trapped in a paradox where members do not actively participate because they are not influencing decision-making in REDD+ but they cannot make impacts because their participation is passive. Some interviewees expressed concerns about not having mechanisms to receive clear and updated information when needed. However, they have a very good understanding about what REDD+ is and how it should be implemented at local level. The members of the Advisory Council have participated in several knowledge exchange opportunities usually organized by the National Forest Commission and The Nature Conservancy and have received financial support from these organizations. Some interviewees expressed concerns regarding the lack of interest of Ejido members in taking advantage of these opportunities and the need of more focused and practical training to promote REDD+ implementation.

The interviewees identified the presence of conflict with the government and between sectors. Among the potential causes of conflict were the lack of flexibility in the rules of federal programs when applied at local level and the perception that the council meetings are only used to validate pre-arranged decisions. Regarding the mechanism to solve conflict, a range of activities were mentioned from discussions at the Advisory Council meetings to the possibility to promote rallies and massive protests if needed. Sector representatives do not trust the government, not because of REDD+ but in general and perhaps as a result of old-time cultural beliefs. The level of trust was described as high

151 among members that knew each other but low towards actors that participated sporadically or were new to the group. Interviewees recognized that corruption is very common at all levels and sectors but it is difficult to report as actors involved try to make it not evident.

Engagement of the Advisory Council members in activities promoting the achievement of REDD+ goals

Interviewees from the Advisory Council reported that they disagreed with the statement that REDD+ governance has influenced deforestation reduction and socio-economic benefits for rural people. They mentioned that there have not been evaluations to prove the impacts, if any, that REDD+ has had in

Quintana Roo. One interview explained:

“I think there has not been measurements on REDD+ [impacts] and that

has contributed to the low interest [of Advisory Council members]. It was

never clear if there was any impact [on reducing deforestation and/or

generating socio-economic benefits]… We needed to say government

agencies are working this way together to promote cattle herding

systems [planting tree species that cattle can eat]. Then we are going to

capture carbon, we are going to fix nitrogen, we are going to feed the

cows” (AC-3).

They also mentioned their concern regarding government programs promoting activities that contribute to deforestation. One interviewee from the

Advisory Council, who is also an ejido member described:

“My ejido has 18,630 ha. 8,000 ha were designated [by the ejido] as

permanent forest areas, those are untouchable. The remaining 10,630 ha

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are the largest part of the ejido. We utilize 3,000 ha for agriculture. Then

we have around 7,000 ha that are losing tree cover little by little because

there are no projects from CONAFOR [National Forest Commission] to

help ejido members individually to conserve these areas. But SAGARPA

[Federal Ministry of Agriculture] does provide individual subsidies, then

they [ejido members] ask [for subsidies] to grow pineapples or to do

cattle raising” (AC-4).

The same interviewee highlighted the important relationship between generating income from forest products and conserving the forest. He said:

“In the moment that the forest stops being productive then rural people

are not going to protect it…There are ejidos that do not have too many

forest resources but they still have permanent forest areas. They do not

have the main timber [species] which is mahogany. Mahogany has the

best price in the market. They have other hard timber species but those

have low prices in the market…Those are the ejidos that need more

[financial] support because they are making an effort to conserve the

forest and not transform it into agricultural land. The ejidos that have

good volumes of mahogany can support themselves. The others can’t

support themselves then there is a permanent risk [of changing forest

areas to other land use] (AC-4).

The previous comments show that the members of the Advisory Council expect government agencies to be the ones engaging in activities supporting the achievement of REDD+ goals by increasing the subsidies for forest management and conservation while decreasing the programs that promote

153 agriculture. However, they highlighted that for their sectors they are contributing to raising awareness of the importance of forest resources and the activities that rural people can pursue to generate income while maintaining the tree cover.

Examples of these activities mentioned by the interviewees are agroforestry and beekeeping as explained in the following comments:

“We need that they [rural people] have in the same area food and

surplus to sell. Then other areas are left as wildlife reserves or for

beekeeping, or charcoal production. And we support the functionality of

the ecosystem” (AC-7).

“...since the first year they [people practicing agroforestry] can harvest

vegetables, from the third year, they can harvest fruits to support

themselves while they wait to harvest forest species which are long-term”

(AC-4).

One member of the Advisory Council commented on the fact that

Quintana Roo has not received results-based payments and how this has created the perception that REDD+ is not generating benefits for rural people.

This interviewee was the only one aware that results-based payments might be granted in the future:

“We are waiting for the results-based payment [that will be granted] to

people that demonstrate that they have restored [forest areas]... I

understand it [that results-based payment will come in the future] but

rural people don’t. For them the benefits never came” (AC-6).

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Interviewees from the Advisory Council, who are also ejido members, described the importance of subsides from the government to rural people’s livelihoods and the attitude of people in contributing to improving community services:

“For example, a family of five. The father has Procampo, the mother has

Prospera, and the kids have scholarships. And what do they produce?

They have 2 or 3 sheep, 2 or 3 beehives. I mean, they don’t worry about

being productive. Most people are like this family. The government itself

has made them dependant” (AC-4).

“In the past, it [engagement of people to generate community benefits]

was more frequent, not because of the environment but because of

solidarity. For example, the schools, the government provides the

cafeteria, the furniture, everything. Even the school yards sometimes are

dreary. In the past, people would organize to clean them. They

collaborated more because the government wouldn’t do it. Now, people

would say, do it yourself, you are the government or the candidate” (AC-

5).

The same interviewee also commented on how his ejido organizes to utilize the financial resources that they receive from government agencies:

“We [the ejido] have received payment for ecological services twice…

we divided the money that we received equally among ejido members.

We also divided the tasks [cleaning, building trails for surveillance and

wildfire prevention] that we were required to do among ejido members.

Each one decided if they do their assigned tasks by themselves or hire

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someone to do them…we do not use the money for repairing or building

[community infrastructure]” (AC-5).

In summary, the sector representatives that are members of the Advisory

Council believe that rural people need to be financially supported and directed to activities that generate income while maintaining tree cover. They perceived that from their own sectors, they have contributed to raising awareness and providing technical support to rural people to engage in some of these activities, for example, agroforestry. However, they suggested that the coordination of government agencies to increase subsidies for forest management and conservation while decreasing subsidies to promote agriculture is key to achieving the goals of REDD+. They advised that these activities need to be monitored and their impacts must be evaluated to prove that REDD+ is working.

They highlighted that even though ejidos receive financial benefits from REDD+ and/or other programs, they might not use them to provide community benefits.

REDD+ in the Ejidos

Before describing the quality of governance, the historical background and current socio-economic situation of the three ejidos participating in this research is presented to provide context. The foundation of the ejidos and how they began to get involved in forest management and conservation is explained by the interviewees as follows:

NohBec was founded in 1936 by a group of chicleros (gum harvesters).

They came from the state of Veracruz, on the Gulf of Mexico coast, looking for the best areas to harvest the chicozapote (Manilkara zapota) sap that was used to make bubble gum. In the 1950’s the government gave a concession to the

156 parastatal company Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo to exploit mahogany in the area. During these years, ejido members were unskilled labourers at the company and disagreed with the company’s unsustainable harvesting. One interviewee explained: “The minimum diameter for harvesting was 65 cm, the smaller trees were not useful to them because of the lathe that they had. They were processing around 1,000 m3 of mahogany per day. It was a monster company” (EL&M-2). In the following years, a rebellious group formed a committee to go to Mexico City and protest against the concession.

Finally, the concession was removed. In the 1980s, after 25 years of concession, the Plan Piloto Forestal helped ejidos, including NohBec, to organize and manage their forests. NohBec developed a 25-year management plan that was supposed to end in 2008. NohBec and several other ejidos created the civil society organization for foresters called Sociedad de

Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo, that exists until today. In the mid-1990s, NohBec decided to separate from the civil society organization and created its own forestry office. NohBec had a FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) certification for the periods of 1991-2000 and 2005 to 2007, when the hurricane

Dean hit the area and caused damages in the forest resources and infrastructure. After the hurricane, NohBec’s management plan was suspended as well as its FSC certification. Currently, NohBec is still recovering from the damages caused by the hurricane, the ejido has a management plan for timber exploitation for 15 years (2016-2024). In 2015 the FSC certification was obtained again. They sell mahogany, chicozapote (Manilkara zapota) and other timber species. The ejido owns a sawmill, a tree nursery, a conservation area where they promote ecotourism and a bird sanctuary. According to the

157 interviewees, forestry is the main economic activity, the community enterprise generates 110 permanent jobs in the different forest activities. In addition, they have 30 temporary job positions that are given to people, including women, for reforestation and other conservation activities. NohBec is part of an association of 5 ejidos called Alianza Selva Maya. The surface of the ejido is 24,122 ha and there are 216 ejido members.

Puerto Arturo was originally a settlement for chicleros (gum harvesters) established near a body of water in the municipality of Jose Maria Morelos in the 1960s. In 1974 the ejido was created including 8,300 ha of land. The founding families came from the neighbouring state of Yucatan and central

Mexico. In 2000, the ejido decided to establish an area for timber exploitation developing a management plan for 25 years. However, because of technical and administrative difficulties, the ejido was not able to exploit and sell timber.

Instead, they focused in palizada (thin logs) which they have been extracting and selling for the past 18 years. In 2010, a civil society organization of providers of ecological services was created with 36 ejidos, including Puerto

Arturo. All together, these ejidos sustainably manage more than 250,000 ha of forest. In 2016, Puerto Arturo re-engaged in sustainable timber exploitation and is currently selling species such as Jabin (Piscidia piscipula), Viga (Caesalpinia platyloba), Tzalam (Lysiloma bahamense) and Chechen (Metopium brownei).

Only 6 people work in timber exploitation and 20 to 25 people work in the extraction of palizada. There are additional temporary jobs in the tree nursery where usually young people and women are involved. In addition, the ejido members practice other income generating activities such as agriculture, cattle raising and beekeeping. Interviewees from Puerto Arturo stated that there are

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105 ejido members but only 92 are currently active. The inactive members are retired or deceased and their membership rights need to be reassigned. The town has approximately 750 inhabitants.

Otilio Montaño was founded in the late 1970’s by people who emigrated from central Mexico. According to the ejido president, there are 95 ejido members and approximately 500 inhabitants in the town. The Ejido members have relied on agriculture and cattle raising as a way of living. They had a permit to exploit small volumes of timber used for railroad ties (sleepers) in the early 2000s. In 2016, they engaged again in forest management activities for timber exploitation and charcoal production. By 2018, charcoal production was the main income generating activity in the ejido. The interviewees explained that currently 20 people are directly involved in the sale of wood and charcoal through intermediaries who distribute these products at the national market.

There are around 40 additional people hired to help in cutting and transporting wood to the oven and storage areas. The charcoal producers want to negotiate a better price for their product because the current price generates income “only enough to survive” (EL&M-1).

Actors’ influence in decision-making in Ejidos

The ejido assembly is the main forum for ejido members to make organizational, administrative and financial decisions, including the ones related to forest management and conservation. The comisariado ejidal (ejido board) includes a president, a secretary and a treasurer. The interviewees identified the ejido president as a key actor to coordinate the internal organization, to

159 represent the ejido and act as a link between the ejido and other external stakeholders such as government agencies and NGOs.

One interviewee explained that “the first Sunday of each month we have a general assembly. The assembly is the maximum organism where all important topics are discussed. The ejido board identifies the topics and puts them in the agenda for the day. They read the agenda and start discussing the topics” (EL&M-3).

Not all ejido members participate actively in the assembly as one interviewee observed: “Here the assembly is moved by 5 to 10 people. They are always the same people. The others just listen, they are shy, they don’t want to give their opinions” (EL&M-2). In addition, only people who have ejido rights, who are usually adult men, can vote when a decision is made.

The ejido assembly gives responsibilities to ejido members in the forest management operations. Depending on the complexity of the operation, there might be one person in charge or multiple people managing the different areas

(e.g. field, sawmill, tree nursery, machine shop). One interviewee explained “the idea is that the field managers can also get in the game, not only the ejido president, there are other characters that are participating, we delegate the responsibilities” (EL&M-6).

At the time of the research, the three ejidos had forest promoters, who received training in forest management and conservation and get a salary paid by the National Forest Commission to act as technical advisors and as a link between this agency and the Ejido.

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NohBec and Puerto Arturo are part of second level ejido organizations for forest management and conservation where the presidents get together to negotiate and make decisions relevant for each of the members.

NohBec and Puerto Arturo reported having regular interactions with external stakeholders. From the government, they identified the National Forest

Commission and the Federal Ministry of the Environment as the main actors involved in promoting and regulating forest management and conservation.

They also identified NGOs such as The Nature Conservancy, Consejo Civil de

Silvicultura Comunitaria and Reforestemos Mexico as facilitators for capacity development and financial support for forest management and conservation projects in their communities. In addition, interviewees from NohBec reported that they regularly interact with researchers from state, national and international universities that conduct field work in this ejido and once a year they receive the FSC certification auditors. In contrast, interviewees from Otilio

Montaño only identified the National Forest Commission and the Federal

Ministry of the Environment as relevant stakeholders for forest management and conservation. The key informants from the three ejidos agreed on the fact that both the state and municipal governments have had very little involvement in the forestry sector and they interact occasionally with them to address other issues such as roads maintenance.

Only one interviewee from the ejidos reported being involved in REDD+ decision making as he has participated in the state, regional and national

Advisory Council meetings, he has met with congress members and was involved in the planning and design of a new project financed by the World

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Bank that intends to support rural communities and Indigenous people involved in activities to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. He spoke about his participation and influence in decision making as follows:

“I was part of REDD+ Mexico [National], at the Peninsula [regional] and

in Quintana Roo. I have been in the regional Advisory Council and in

Quintana Roo’s Advisory Council…I have been in the congress

discussing REDD+, the environment and climate change. I told

them…you don’t see the social and community development part…the

government says we need to protect the forest. No, the forest, we need

to manage it…the public policies should comply with the needs that each

territory have… we do argue with them because we have been in those

forums” (EL&M-6).

Information Sharing in Ejidos

Key informants identified the ejido assembly as the main forum to share information within the ejido. When external actors want to provide information to ejido members, they first approach the ejido president who decides whether the president can share the information in the next assembly or they need to call for a specific meeting where the external actors can directly address ejido members.

When the ejido wants to receive information regarding topics such as government programs that they can participate in, interviewees reported that they contact the agencies in charge asking to have an officer sent to the ejido to explain the programs. The agencies usually send officers according to their availability. The interviewees agreed that in-person presentations are the best

162 way to share information at the local communities. Other useful tools are radio broadcasts and webpages.

One interviewee explained that despite not having written agreements with academic institutions, researchers that conduct field work in the ejido usually provide the results of their studies once they are done. He said “we ask them to leave a copy [of the study] to use when making decisions in the future.

This is valuable information that might be useful for us” (EL&M-3).

When asked about REDD+ and/or climate change, interviewees had different responses. Some of them said that they have never heard about these topics or that they have heard about them but do not remember what they are.

In general, ejido leaders had a better understanding on what REDD+ and/or climate change is and how it affects their daily lives as key informants explained:

“I have information about REDD+ at the international level and national

level as well…I use email, I download information from the regional

organization, I read about what happens outside…we are in contact with

people from other areas of the country, we don’t see each other but we

share information…There has been a lot of discussion, it started in the

1980’s when it was first proposed that deforestation will cause

catastrophes. From there, this initiative was created, it has had many

names before REDD, and then they added the plus sign. But still it is not

very tangible. For me as a farmer it is clear…we are living it. We cannot

talk about the climate changing in the future, it is happening now. We

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have sporadic, isolated rains…I already lost 500 ha of corn crops”

(EL&M-6).

“It is true that each year the forests are devastated and [global] warming

affects us. Right now [September] we were supposed to have the rain

season, however, it is so warm and dry. In the past, it was different. This

affects our crops, there are more plagues. And the drought. In the past,

you grew something and you were certain that you will harvest it. Now,

you grow something and cannot be sure if you will harvest” (EL&M-1).

This last comment made reference to the fact that most farmers in

Quintana Roo do not have irrigation systems, they rely on the rain to water their crops.

Ejido leaders recognized that they know about REDD+, climate change and forest conservation because of the training that they have received (e.g. university degree, forest promoter course, workshops) but more is needed to share this information and create awareness among ejido members.

“There is not enough information dissemination, I know about it

[REDD+/climate change] because I have participated in several

meetings, I learned about it. But what about the people [ejido

members]?” (EL&M-2).

“Ejido members have received information but we need to create

awareness because lots of people think: the government tells me to

protect the forest but they do not give me anything in exchange. And if

they give me a little, it is only once a year. Then, they think, it is better to

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do my milpa [traditional agriculture] and obtain benefits…it is not that

they don’t know but they don’t understand” (EL&M-1).

“This topic [REDD+/climate change] we need to share the information

with people but we have to do it constantly, otherwise, you tell them

about it today and next year they won’t remember it” (EL&M-6).

Knowledge Exchange in Ejidos

The key informants identified several knowledge exchange opportunities related to forest management and conservation in which they have participated.

The majority of these opportunities were promoted by the National Forest

Commission and the NGO The Nature Conservancy. Examples of knowledge exchange were described by the interviewees as follows:

“I have participated in the workshops to develop the national [REDD+]

strategy…We designed strategies to present to the federal government

so they can take into account how we live in our region, how things are in

Jose Maria Morelos, how things are in Quintana Roo, how we look for

alternatives to reduce [GHG] emissions from deforestation and forest

degradation. One of the topics that we discussed was the safeguards for

the Indigenous communities and the most complicated topic was about

aligning public policy” (EL&M-6).

The reference to the difficulties in aligning public policies show that this interviewee believes that the government has contrasting policies that result in the environmental agencies promoting forest management and conservation while other agencies promote agricultural expansion and infrastructure building.

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Other examples of knowledge exchange regarding improvements in the technology used for timber extraction and charcoal production were described by interviewees as follows:

“Last year they [The Nature Conservancy] made a proposal to modify the

extractive machine [equipment used by the ejido in their timber operation]

to minimize its impacts. What we did was to elevate the tower, we

elevated it 1.5 meters and put like 30 or 40 meters of cable, so the

machine doesn’t get to the tree trunk, instead it parks at 20 to 30 meters

and from there it pulls the tree, as if it was a fish. We did this so instead

of clearing a 3 meters road which was what the machine usually needed,

we cleared a 1 meter road. That decreases the damage to the forest. We

did a trial with this” (EL&M-2).

The interviewees reported that the trial explained in the last comment was good in terms of reducing the impacts in the forest but was also making the extractive process slower than usual. So far, the ejido has not adopted the modified extractive machine in their regular timber operation.

“Our technical advisor [forest extensionist] taught people how they have

to do it, which tree species they should harvest... For the charcoal

[production], the advisor requested a course from CONAFOR [National

Forest Commission]. It was theory and practice. In the theoretical part we

learned how to cut the logs, how to store them. The second part was to

build the oven. We are getting another training to learn how to calculate

the volume in cubic meters of a tree.” (EL&M-1).

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The ejido NohBec has been an “instructor community” since 2011. The forest promoters from other communities receive training there.

“In NohBec we received training for forest promoters and we saw how

they work. You know that they have their community enterprise, sawmill,

they have everything well organized, their areas are well divided, they

promote ecotourism. There, we were taught how to work in timber

[exploitation]” (EL&M-1).

Financial Coordination in Ejidos

The interviewees identified the National Forest Commission as the main actor financially supporting forest management and conservation projects.

Other federal agencies providing funds were the National Biodiversity

Commission and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.

“We do some things with our own resources but the reforestation,

restoration and payment for ecological services are financed by the

National Forest Commission” (EL&M-3).

One interviewee reported that the state government has provided resources when fighting a large wildfire in 2011:

“The state government sent a helicopter and heavy machinery, even then

we couldn’t control the fire” (EL&M-2).

Several NGOs were also identified as partners with ejidos to implementing forest management, conservation and agricultural projects.

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“We are about to receive funds from the World Bank. We have had

funding from the National Forest Commission, Consejo Civil para la

Silvicultura Comunitaria [NGO], The Nature Conservancy. Kellogg’s

Foundation supported people who work in back gardens” (EL&M-6).

Conflict Resolution in Ejidos

The ejido assembly was identified as the main forum to discuss issues of potential conflict. Interviewees explained that the issues are discussed until everybody’s questions are answered. Usually, when a proposal results in benefits for the community, the ejido members will support it. To make a decision the ejido members vote and “the majority rules” (EL&M-5).

The three participant ejidos have internal regulations in which sanctions are established. Another regulatory instrument mentioned is the community land-use plan.

“The ejido has a land-use plan that says how much we want to expand

agriculture and cattle raising areas. The ejido has its own regulations that

must be followed. The management of the territory, as mentioned at the

[Mexican] Constitution, is ours, we are the ones who define what we want

to do and how we want to do it…We want REDD+ to adopt all these

community policies. We always criticize the federal government because

we have a neighbouring protected area and we see how it is neglected.

They say it is protected but actually the ejido is more protected. The ejido

has its regulations and it is difficult for people from the outside to come

and make a mess because we are here to guard it. Instead, there [in the

protected area] everyone comes and goes” (EL&M-6).

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The key informants identified two sanctions for ejido members that do not follow the established regulations: 1) Fines that are directly deducted from the ejido member profits and 2) Loss of ejido rights such as attending assemblies, voting and getting a share from the profits made by the ejido.

“Some people go ahead and hunt a deer. But it is regulated. It must be

for self-consumption. If they want to sell it, we have rules. And if

someone doesn’t follow the rules, the ejido will give them a first and

second warning but the third time they are out of the ejido. These are the

rules. The whole community follows them” (EL&M-6).

“…if a board member in a given moment diverted funds then the missing

amount is charged to their account. The funds are discounted to their

share of the profits from the timber sale. That is the sanction that they

receive. But if they do something worse, then the sanction could be that

they will no longer be recognized as an ejido member” (EL&M-3).

“…That is why people who owe more than 500 thousand pesos won’t

receive any profits for the rest of their life. There are 4 or 5 [people] who

are in that situation. I feel bad for them because sometimes no one would

even give them a job. They kind of get marginalized from the community”

(EL&M-2).

This last comment shows that in addition to the sanctions established in the internal regulations, people violating the rules might also be socially marginalized.

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Interviewees reported conflict among external actors such as other ejidos, the forest extensionists and the government. Among the issues causing conflict were the price for timber sold, the length of paperwork and over- regulation from the federal government:

“Alianza Selva Maya is an association of 5 ejidos… we were the ones

promoting the creation of the association… After the hurricane, the price

of timber fell. We wanted to sell timber at the regular price but we noticed

that the other ejidos were selling at a very low price. That was bad for us,

the clients came, asked for prices and went to buy to the other

ejidos…we decided to contact the other ejido presidents, we talked about

this and they agreed [on selling at a fixed price]” (EL&M-2).

“With the advisor [forest extensionist] not all is sweet or bitter, it varies,

but if there is conflict, we as the [ejido] authority get together, we talk to

the advisor, we tell him let’s do this and that and we solve it before it gets

worse, we talk and solve things, we are doing pretty well” (EL&M-1).

“We will always have some claims and discontents. Especially with

SEMARNAT [Federal Ministry of the Environment] because they take a

lot to process paperwork. The problem is that if we don’t have the forest

[exploitation] permits, our finances are affected as we need to sell

[timber]. The law says that it takes 10 days to processing paperwork but

it doesn’t take 10 days, sometimes it takes a month. We try to solve

things without too much fuss, without making a rally… we try to do

everything peacefully, through dialog. As far as I know our ejido has

never made a rally or protest at SEMARNAT’s offices” (EL&M-3).

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“We say it is not possible that we have a General Forestry Act when we

know that our country has many different types of ecosystems…It is

difficult for the ejidos, we are over-regulated when we could have more

flexible laws according to the needs of each region…We know that they

put the cedro (Cedrela Odorata), in the NOM-059 [Official Mexican

Standard for environmental protection. List of species at risk]. We can

take a walk in our town and all the houses have cedros … there are good

volumes [of cedro] in the forest. What happens is that the public policies

have resulted in over-regulation” (EL&M-6).

One interviewee spoke about potential conflict directly related to REDD+ policies. The following statement shows the concern of ejido leaders and members in relation to a purely conservationist approach in REDD+:

“…we know that Mexico has signed many international agreements, it

has made many commitments. We think, who is advising the President to

make such a big commitment? They say that by 2030 we won’t be able

to cut a single tree… the mangroves regulate the temperature of the

ocean. Currently, the mangroves in our state are converted to hotels,

they have disappeared. However, they say to me that I can’t cut a single

tree. I am sustainably managing [the forest] because I live here, I obtain

resources from the forest and so my community does…the government

doesn’t see this” (EL&M-6).

The last comment illustrates the ambiguity of the concept of deforestation. Mexico as a country made a commitment to achieve zero deforestation, however this does not mean that rural people will not be able to

171 cut a single tree. Deforestation refers to the permanent change of land-use from forest to non-forest. Several interviewees, not only from ejidos, were not certain about the actual meaning of deforestation.

The same interviewee explained how government agencies have failed at defining tangible actions to reduce deforestation and how large infrastructure projects promoted by the government might contribute to damage natural resources:

“We have had difficulties because the government agencies are not

aligned, they don’t say let’s make a project that works, everything is done

in dribs and drabs, we don’t see something tangible, something that we

can tell the people, this works, let’s do it” (EL&M-6).

“Yesterday we were talking about the well-known Mayan Train project.

Since we knew about it, we said what is going to happen with the

biodiversity? They [the government] have already decided that they are

going to invest in this project. It is a good business for tourism but they

are not thinking about the well-being of the rural communities. What we

protected for years might be damaged... Sometimes government

programs, instead of helping, they come to ruin everything…The Mayan

Train project, we have to review it. Actually, we, at the civil society

organization, have lawyers that work on these issues…” (EL&M-6).

The mention of lawyers makes reference to the fact that in the past other ejidos in the region have sued the government. In 2014, two ejidos in

Campeche won an appeal to the permit that the Federal Ministry of Agriculture gave to Monsanto to grow genetically modified soybeans in the area. Recently,

172 in Quintana Roo, the ejido Dzuiche was successful in the annulment of a natural protected area decree which included ejido lands without the ejido authorization

(Santana, 2014; Varilla, 2019).

Creation of Trust in Ejidos

Within the ejido, the levels of trust are high as ejido members are not only neighbours and colleagues but family. However, one interviewee recognized that this familiarity might lead to irregular behaviour: “In the past, a treasurer ended his period owing “X” amount of money. They said, he must pay it with his share of the profits but he never did it because he was a family member. They didn’t apply the sanctions established in the internal regulations.

That encouraged them [board members] to take money [from the ejido]” (EL&M-

2).

Interviewees recognized that they do not trust stakeholders outside the ejido especially the government. The lack of continuity in public policies and the rumors of international funds for REDD+, forest management and conservation are among the factors leading to lack of trust as the following statements illustrates:

“Let’s say that it is difficult to trust the government agencies…there is no

trust to outside actors, we should trust them but it is difficult” (EL&M-3).

“The problem is that one government administration starts something

and the following administration comes and says we are not interested in

that. This always happens. We want continuity” (EL&M-6).

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“We have heard that there is a lot of financial support but here we have

never received anything” (EL&M-1).

In summary, the quality of governance within the ejidos has not been influenced by REDD+. The ejidos have well established mechanisms for decision-making and information sharing that were in place before REDD+ implementation. The ejidos have received training and financial support for forest management and conservation from other actors, especially the federal government and NGOs. However, only ejido leaders know and understand what climate change and REDD+ are and how they impact rural communities.

REDD+ has not facilitated conflict resolution and creation of trust between ejidos and other stakeholders. Interviewees reported lack of trust towards the government. Although the participants identified dialogue as the tool that they have used to address disagreements with the government, they also recognized that rallies, protests and lawsuits are also mechanisms that can be used if needed. Only one interviewee was directly involved in REDD+ decision-making as he has participated in the national, regional and state Advisory Council meetings. He has also contributed to the design of the national REDD+ strategy and specific REDD+ projects. This ejido leader is against a purely conservationist approach in REDD+ policies. He believes that the forest must be sustainably managed by ejidos. The REDD+ policies of Mexico and

Quintana Roo comply with this viewpoint.

Engagement of ejido leaders and members in activities promoting

the achievement of REDD+ goals

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All the key informants from ejidos perceived that their ejidos have not lost forest cover because of their sustainable forest management practices and community land-use planning:

“I don’t want to brag but Otilio Montaño has conserved its forest areas. I

have seen other ejidos that had been consumed by wildfires. Year after

year, they burn. Here, we have been careful when we use fire to prepare

our fields, we control it. There has not been wildfires in years… because

of the management plan that we have, we cut trees but only the ones

that are selected, we do not clear-cut” (EL&M-1).

“The forest cover has maintained and maybe even enriched. We have

the commitment to give back to the forest more than what we harvest…

in the future we will have 3 or 4 times more. Also, we enrich the forest

with species that we don’t harvest… If we see the best mahogany tree,

we will leave it there, from each 4 trees we leave one and harvest 3.

Then we try to leave the best so it can naturally disperse its seeds. We

georeference them [the uncut trees] so we know where they are and we

can collect seeds” (EL&M-3).

“The ejido Noh-Bec does not have issues of tree cover loss. We have

been told that from 1995 nothing has changed… We are producing 25 to

30 thousand tree plants in our nursery that each year we are planting in

the harvesting area. We are contributing to climate change [mitigation]

because we take care of our forest areas. We sustainably manage them.

The fact that we are certified is a guaranty that we are in compliance with

the FSC criteria. If we were doing things badly, they would take away our

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certification. We will have our third audit, they come and say you are

doing this well but you need to change this and that. And we do the

changes…I don’t think there is deforestation here.” (EL&M-2).

“We want to work in a sustainable way... if we work only in the forest

sector we are not going to eat wood, we eat fruits, we need the farmers

to produce food… the farmers know where they can and where they

cannot practice agriculture…” (EL&M-6).

In terms of their motivation to manage and conserve the forest areas, most of the interviewees from ejidos expressed their intention to use and benefit from forest products. Law enforcement was also mentioned.

“People know that we have to take care of it [the forest] to have more

[forest products]” (EL&M-3).

“It is true that it [the forest] gets damaged [because of the timber

operation]. But in the damaged areas, we reforest. It’s not that we care,

the law says that we have to reforest. Reforestation is a fuerzas (an

obligation)”. (EL&M-5).

Interviewees also mentioned that they would like to get compensated when conserving forest areas, as explained in the following comments.

“In the area of ecological services [not currently receiving any payment],

the ejido members are doing volunteer surveillance work, we are looking

for new projects [to get funds] to keep that conservation area…” (EL&M-

6).

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“Most people are conserving their forest even if they are not paid for it.

They would like to get payments for ecological services but individually,

to conserve their own areas” (EL&M-1).

It is important to note that in the case of individual plots that have forest cover, this conservation has happened almost accidentally because the person in charge of the plot has not had the chance to develop any other activity. One interviewee said:

“In our ejido we get [a plot of] 35 ha assigned to do agriculture. But it has

timber [species]. I never cleared my plot, now I am 60 years old. If I didn’t

clear it in the past why would I do it now?” (EL&M-5).

According to the interviewees, the ejido NohBec is responsible for the water distribution in the town and also provides internet service. Other community benefits that they provide are financial support for sick/injured and elderly people. The casa ejidal (community building) is very well kept and is equipped with windows and furniture made out of wood from their forest operation. However, this is an isolated case as most basic infrastructure, education and health services are provided by federal, state and municipal governments.

In summary, ejido members were engaged in forest management and conservation because they see forest resources as valuable to sustain their livelihoods. They believe that their activities have contributed to maintaining the forest cover and perceived that they should be compensated to keep protecting the forest areas. From the viewpoint of the interviewees from the three ejidos, forest conservation and income generation are not independent goals as they

177 know that they can organize their land to have assigned areas for agriculture, timber exploitation and forest conservation. They are also aware that timber exploitation should occur under a management plan that includes restoration activities. Only one of the three ejidos included in this study was allocating funds for providing community benefits for its members such as water service, internet service, financial support for ill, injured and elderly people.

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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion

Explaining the performance of REDD+ in Quintana Roo

The three different groups participating in this research, the Work Group, the Advisory Council and the Ejidos, have had contrasting experiences regarding the quality of REDD+ governance. Government officers from the

Work Group perceived that the quality of governance within REDD+ institutional arrangements is high while sector representatives from the Advisory Council perceived that the quality of governance is low. REDD+ has not created any specific institutional units at the ejido level.

The quality of governance was assessed in terms of actors’ influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. The finding for each of these functions are summarized as follows:

Actors’ influence in decision making: There were a variety of actors participating in REDD+ activities: government officers from federal and state agencies involved in multiple sectors (environment, forest agriculture, statistics and geographical information, women’s issues), municipal government officers, sector representatives (academia, NGOs, foresters, beekeepers, farmers) and ejido leaders. The level of engagement of these actors varied. Some actors actively participated while others were passive or participated only sporadically.

Private companies have been completely absent from REDD+ decision-making and implementation in Quintana Roo. The National Forest Commission and the state Ministry of the Environment were leading REDD+ decision-making and implementation. Government officers perceived these agencies as the

179 appropriate actors to lead REDD+ processes. In contrast, sector representatives perceived that the government was using the Advisory Council only to validate pre-arranged decisions. This was one of the main reasons causing the lack of motivation of sector representatives to keep actively participating in REDD+ activities. The apathy within sectors was also a contributor to the government’s more active direction. Ejidos have been the main governance institution in rural communities and ejido board members were the most influential actors in decision-making in the ejidos. From the 12 ejido members and leaders participating in this study, only one person has been directly involved in REDD+ decision-making as a member of the Advisory

Council. Ejidos were recipients of training and funding for forest management and conservation but this did not constitute an active role in decision-making as these activities were offered to them by external actors such as government agencies and NGOs. The existence of the ejido property regime in Quintana

Roo guaranties that ejido members have the agency to make decisions regarding land-use, therefore the government and some NGOs have made efforts to bring them on board to follow the REDD+ strategy by promoting forest management and conservation. However, ejidos still can choose to practice agriculture and they have access to government programs to support this activity. The limited and passive participation of non-state actors in REDD+ needs to be understood in the broader Mexican context. In general citizens’ participation and volunteerism are not common practices in the Mexican culture and REDD+ is not an exception.

Information Sharing: Information regarding REDD+ has been constantly shared among actors in Quintana Roo. The information has been

180 shared top down from the government to the non-state actors and horizontally among sector representatives and ejido members. There is no evidence of the existence of regular mechanisms to share information from bottom-up. Rural people have participated in consultation processes but they are usually organized by the government agencies. For example, the six workshops that the National Forest Commission organized to consult on the REDD+ National

Strategy in Quintana Roo. The main mechanisms for sharing information were the discussions in meetings and online tools such as websites, email and dropbox. Although the use of online tools has helped to make information available to all citizens, not all rural people are used to dealing with technology such as internet, computers, or smartphones on a daily basis. Ejido assemblies were identified as the main mechanism for information sharing within ejidos.

The experience of information sharing in Quintana Roo corresponds with the description proposed by Galaz et al. (2012) where the mechanisms for information dissemination exist but this has not resulted in the engagement of actors in activities promoting the achievement of REDD+ goals. However, information sharing among actors had contributed to creating awareness on the relationship between deforestation and changes in the rainy season, or longer and more severe droughts, and the potential of sectors other than forestry to contribute to halting deforestation. The creation of awareness on its own does not result in the achievement of REDD+ goals but constitutes an important contributor as people who are sceptical or uncertain about the existence, causes and effects of climate change are less likely to act on it (Spence et al.,

2012).

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Knowledge exchange: REDD+ programing has created multiple knowledge exchange opportunities promoted mainly by the National Forest

Commission and the NGO The Nature Conservancy Mexico. Knowledge exchange occurred through workshops, courses, research, training sessions, sharing good practices, and cooperating to develop planning documents. These opportunities were available to all actors involved in REDD+, including ejido members. Some knowledge exchange experiences resulted in learning used to develop new projects or improve what was already being done, such as the

REDD+ agroforestry and cattle-herding projects which were developed based on previous successful experiences in Quintana Roo and best practices implemented in the state of Jalisco. In these specific cases, the experience of knowledge exchange has been used for policy experimentation and has resulted in learning from each other through trial and error as proposed by Cole

(2015). Sector representatives have facilitated knowledge exchange among rural people not as a result of REDD+ negotiations but as part of their daily activities in their own organizations. Knowledge exchange has occurred from the government to non-state actors and from sector representatives to the government agencies as the expertise of sector representatives was taken into account by the National Forest Commission when designing the REDD+

Special Program. Knowledge exchange was also experienced horizontally between sector representatives and between ejido members through the learning communities and the instructor community initiatives. Government officers from environmental agencies, sector representatives and ejido leaders have a good understanding of what REDD+ is and how it should be

182 implemented at local level. These ideas correspond to Quintana Roo’s REDD+ strategy.

Financial coordination: This function was not fully developed as there has been few joint investments between actors involved in REDD+. Most

REDD+, forest management and conservation funds are managed by the

National Forest Commission. Sector representatives from the Advisory Council have invested their time and some financial resources to cover travel expenses to attend REDD+ related activities. Ejidos have received funding from the

REDD+ Special Program and other government programs to implement forest management and/or conservation projects. They have received financial support from some NGOs as well. However, the financial mechanisms such as regional trust funds, that already exist, have the potential to facilitate financial coordination in the future when (or if) Quintana Roo receives results-based payments. Even though the literature (Galaz et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2017) proposes that financial coordination refers to funding for joint investments to support forest management and conservation, the findings from this study suggest that it should also take into account restricting the financial resources destined to promote activities that result in deforestation such as agriculture.

Conflict resolution: As REDD+ in Quintana Roo has not restricted any activities nor allocated significant amounts of funding, it is reasonable to believe that there has not been any conflict among actors generated by the REDD+ program. There was tension between non-state actors and government agencies because of lack of flexibility in the rules of federal programs when applied at a local level, as some of these programs can encourage rural people

183 to convert forest areas to agricultural land. The array of government programs available for rural people includes both subsides that promote agriculture and subsides that support forest management and/or conservation. Rural people can freely choose to apply (or not apply) to any of these programs. Other causes of discontent were over-regulation and deficiencies in processing permits that are not directly related to REDD+. None of these issues has escalated to the level of conflict. Non-state actors usually address disagreements with the government through dialogue but they know that they can organize protests or file lawsuits if needed.

Creation of Trust: Government officers expressed a high level of trust with each other. Their reputation of being professional, knowledgeable, transparent and trustworthy was noted. As a general rule, non-state actors do not trust the government at any level, perhaps because of the reputation of politicians for being controlling, intolerant and corrupt. However, corruption happens in all levels and sectors and it is difficult to report. The efforts of the government regarding transparency, such as the transparency laws, the national transparency platform and the mechanisms to anonymously report corruption, have not been enough to overcome the historical lack of trust among non-state actors toward the government. This is associated to reputation more than to actual facts related to REDD+. The non-state actors involved in REDD+ in Quintana Roo do not trust that others will reciprocate cooperation with cooperation, therefore as predicted by Ostrom’s (2009) behavioural theory of collective action they have not engaged in long-term activities to achieve the goals of REDD+.

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Engagement of actors in REDD+ activities: REDD+ programing in

Quintana Roo has not resulted in any significant engagement of actors in activities promoting the achievement of the REDD+ goals for reduction of deforestation and generation of socio-economic benefits for rural people.

Although the tree cover in the REDD+ intervention area (municipalities of Felipe

Carrillo Puerto, Jose Maria Morelos, Bacalar and Othon P. Blanco) has been maintained from 2010 to 2017, there is no strong evidence that REDD+ has contributed to it. REDD+ has been only one of the many mechanisms seeking to promote and support sustainable forest management and conservation.

Some ejidos in Quintana Roo, especially in the central part of the state, were practicing sustainable forest management since the 1980’s before REDD+ was introduced and have kept doing so until today. The main motivation to engage in these practices were to keep generating benefits from the use and sale of forest products and the potential opportunity to receive compensation for conserving forest areas. Ejidos in Quintana Roo (as in Mexico overall) have not yet received results-based payments. The main source of financial support for

REDD+ early actions in Quintana Roo was the REDD+ Special Program. But this program ran in parallel with other regular rural development, forest management and conservation programs, making it only one of the many subsides that rural people already have to support their livelihoods. The

National Forest Commission has promoted and financially supported forest management and conservation since its creation in the early 2000’s with important investment in reforestation programs and payment for ecological services in Quintana Roo, independently from REDD+. NGOs have contributed by facilitating sustainable forest management and conservation projects not

185 directly related to REDD+, for example, the FSC certification. This certification provides credible assurance that the timber sold by certified ejidos was not harvested by threatening the ecological value of the forest nor the human rights of local people (Forest Stewardship Certification, n.d.). The majority of the population in Quintana Roo’s REDD+ municipalities have access to education, health and basic services. These services are provided by the government through programs not related to REDD+.

In sum, from the findings of this study, three factors influencing REDD+ performance has been identified: leadership, funding and cultural context.

Leadership

Many analysts suggest that multi-level and multi-sectoral governance requires some kind of direction from one or a few actors (Abbott, 2018, Jordan et al., 2018; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2018; Lerum-Boasson, 2018; Wurzel et al.,

2019) and the results of this study are consistent with this position. When this research was conducted, the leadership in REDD+ was held by the National

Forest Commission with some contributions from the state Ministry of the

Environment in Quintana Roo. The leaders have not promoted active participation of non-state actors because they have not created actual opportunities for these actors to influence decision-making. The National Forest

Commission, with contributions of some NGOs had facilitated information sharing and knowledge exchange but these functions have not led to the engagement of non-state actors in REDD+ activities. Although financial instruments have been created, the REDD+ leading agencies have not

186 promoted negotiations to enhance joint investments while restricting subsidies that promote deforestation. Although there was no conflict among stakeholders involved in REDD+, the leading agencies have not promoted the creation of mechanisms for conflict resolution to be used if needed in the future. Despite the transparency efforts, non-state actors do not trust the REDD+ leaders because they belong to the government. In conclusion the leadership in REDD+ in Quintana Roo needs to apply strategies to enhance these governance functions in order to bring on board non-state actors in REDD+ activities.

Funding for readiness and early implementation

The National Forest Commission managed the REDD+ Special Program which was the only source of financial support for rural people directly related to

REDD+ in Quintana Roo. However, there was limited evidence that the funds allocated by this program has generated significant impacts in reducing deforestation and creating socio-economic benefits for rural people. The

REDD+ Special Program targeted a large territorial area including four municipalities in central and southern Quintana Roo, therefore the activities promoted by this program were scattered throughout this large geographical area. This has made it difficult to identify significant impacts on halting deforestation or prove that the incentives provided through this program were enough to motivate ejido members to choose forest management and/or conservation over agriculture. The lack of sufficient funding during the REDD+ readiness and early implementation phases has influenced the quality of governance, creating a loop that connects these two factors: The limited funds available for implementation of activities resulted in the lack of significant

187 impacts on reducing deforestation and generating socio-economic benefits for rural people. And the lack of tangible results led non-state actors to lose interest in participating in REDD+ activities. Therefore, these actors have had limited influence in REDD+ decision-making. This is consistent with Wong et al. (2016) who state that “...payments based exclusively on ex post results might lead to high rates of non-participation…” (p.3).

Cultural context influencing participation and trust

In addition to the lack of tangible results in achieving the REDD+ goals, the disengagement of non-state actors, and the resulting leadership of the government in REDD+ readiness and implementation phases, can be explained by the fact that citizens’ participation and voluntarism are not strong features in the Mexican culture. According to the national survey of political culture and citizens’ practices (Secretaria de Gobierno, 2012), 62% of Mexicans are little or not interested at all in the issues faced by their communities, 50% of Mexicans believe that social problems should be solved by the government, 44% of

Mexicans believe that it is difficult or very difficult to organize with other citizens to achieve a common goal. The results of this survey show that having non- state actors organizing, investing time and resources to participate in REDD+ activities as volunteers, without receiving any compensation, is unlikely.

Interestingly, even though Mexicans believe that the government is responsible for solving social problems, non-state actors have limited trust in the government which is common in the Mexican culture and was reflected in

REDD+ governance in Quintana Roo.

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Policy recommendations for REDD+ implementation in Quintana Roo and Mexico

In REDD+, as in other conservation initiatives, the Mexican government has to make efforts to motivate and bring on board non-state actors (Kashwan,

2017). These actors can be motivated if they have opportunities to actually influence decision-making and are financially compensated for their time and effort when participating in REDD+ meetings and activities. Efforts should be made to identify and keep engaged the individuals that have been involved in

REDD+ in Quintana Roo since the first steps taken almost a decade ago. This can contribute to enhancing the decision-making and implementation processes. These “multi-hybrid” actors (Rodriguez-Ward et al., 2018) have moved across positions, levels and sectors, have knowledge and recognize the relevance of REDD+, sustainable forest management and conservation for climate change mitigation. In addition, engaging private companies in REDD+ implementation represents an opportunity for Quintana Roo. The transnational and national tourism companies in Cancun and Riviera Maya, can contribute to support forest management and conservation projects in the REDD+ intervention area by making donations to the regional REDD+ trust fund. These companies can advertise their financial commitment to REDD+ as part of their strategies for social responsibility. In doing this, they might attract customers interested in supporting these initiatives.

REDD+ early actions in Quintana Roo have targeted large geographical areas such as municipalities rather than pilot projects in specific smaller territorial areas. As a result, the activities promoted by the REDD+ Special

Programs were scattered throughout these large areas and impacts are diluted.

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To make significant positive impacts on halting deforestation and generating socio-economic benefits for rural people, REDD+ in Quintana Roo must target specific pilot projects within the larger intervention areas, providing enough funding to obtain tangible and quantifiable results in terms of REDD+ goals.

These results will provide evidence that such improvements can be made and can be the source of future results-based payments. This will motivate actors to continue participating in REDD+ activities. Deciding which communities, which activities, how much funding and how to allocate them among people involved in these pilot projects should include consultation with ejido leaders and members and discussions in the Work Group and Advisory Council. These pilot projects should not be seen as the only tools to achieve significant results in reducing deforestation but as stories that can be shared to learn about best practices and challenges in implementation. Although pilot projects are usually short-term, depending on the duration of funding, the learning from these projects will be the most valuable outcome. This learning can be applied when implementing long-term activities in larger areas of the state.

The evidence presented in this research suggests that subsides from government programs play a key role in the decisions regarding land-use that rural people make. Therefore, the government agencies involved in REDD+ should not only allocate financial resources to support forest management and conservation but also restrict subsides that promote forest clearing for agriculture. This does not mean that rural people cannot choose to practice agriculture in their land but they will have to invest their own funds if they decide to do it. Although it is important to continue to raise awareness among rural people about the importance of conserving forest resources because of their

190 environmental benefits, it is also important to recognize that they are stewards of a very valuable resource in terms of its potential to mitigate climate change, therefore, they deserve to be compensated when deciding to practice forest management and/or conservation activities. For example, if a rural person has the option to practice regular agriculture versus agroforestry on their land, knowing that they will receive financial support to adopt agroforestry will incentivise them to decide engaging in this activity and reward them for this decision.

Although Mexico is a diverse country in terms of ecosystems and socio- economic characteristics, these policy recommendations made for Quintana

Roo can be applied to other REDD+ early action states by adapting them to the specific contexts of each of these states.

Contributions to the literature This research proposes contributions to two areas of the literature: 1)

Polycentric governance and 2) REDD+ as a global program. These contributions are described as follows:

Contributions to the Polycentric Governance literature

The findings of this research suggest that having equal influence in decision-making and complete non-hierarchical relations among multiple actors with different capacities and interests will be very difficult, if not impossible. The role of the most resourceful actors as orchestrators (Abbott et al., 2016; Abbott,

2018), leaders (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2018; Torney, 2019) pioneers (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2018; Wurzel et al., 2019) or governance entrepreneurs (Lerum-

Boasson, 2018) is critical to move forward in decision making and

191 implementation in contexts where multiple levels of authorities and multiple sector representatives are involved governance. The presence of consultation bodies provide an opportunity for actors other than the government to take a leading role. This happened in the Peruvian case where NGOs and private companies have been acting as leaders in REDD+. However, it is important to recognize that in developing countries, usually the government is the actor controlling the most resources and therefore, it is the most likely leader or orchestrator. This must not be judged as a failure or low quality of governance, as long as the leading agencies encourage the participation of non-state actors and allow them an influence in decision-making. Good leadership will facilitate information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust. The last two functions, conflict resolution and creation of trust, may be difficult to develop or improve, depending on the historical and cultural context of each country.

Contributions to the REDD+ literature

After the COP 21 in 2015 most of the REDD+ countries have been moving towards the landscape approach to address the underlying causes of deforestation, such as agricultural expansion. These countries have focused on co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation and socio-economic benefits for locals (Turnhout et al., 2017). Mexico adopted this approach from the beginning in 2010 when the country started to engage in REDD+. Therefore the findings of this research contribute to the literature because they help to understand the governance challenges within the renewed REDD+ mechanism that has moved away from a purely market approach that focused on sellers, buyers and a marketplace for carbon credits. From the analysis of REDD+ governance in

192

Quintana Roo, this research proposes that 1) REDD+ needs one or a few specific actors to direct the decision-making and implementation processes while promoting actors’ influence in decision-making, information sharing, knowledge exchange, financial coordination, conflict resolution and creation of trust; 2) REDD+ phase 2 (early implementation) needs more financial resources invested in activities to achieve significant results in reduction of deforestation and generating socio-economic benefits for local people in order to demonstrate the potential for achievement of these goals.

The tools to encourage engagement in activities promoting the achievement of REDD+ goals might look different from case to case. In cases like Brazil, Nepal and Mexico where the civil society and producer groups are well organized, giving them opportunities to have influence in decision making can encourage their active participation. Some kind of compensation for sector representatives might be useful as well, acknowledging that they usually voluntarily participate in REDD+ related activities, taking time out of their regular occupations. The availability of funds from international agencies and/or domestic governments to support REDD+ early implementation programming will promote more participation of stakeholders in decision-making and implementation of projects. In contrast, if financial resources in the REDD+ countries depend only on results-based payments, there is a risk of losing all the previous investment and work during the implementation phase when these efforts fail to generate financial benefits for local actors. Countries that are not able to measure and report reduced and/or avoided deforestation might end up completely abandoning the REDD+ mechanism.

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Adopting the analogy presented by Gallemore (2017), REDD+ governance should not be seen as an airplane with so much baggage that it cannot take off but as a train with enough seats to accommodate all the involved actors, a driver and plenty of fuel to get it to its destination. The train will leave even if not all the seats are taken but it can make several stops along its journey so anyone can get on or off. In other words, REDD+ governance needs leaders that provide the space for multi-level and multi-sectoral actors to engage, understanding that their involvement will be dynamic: changing between consistent and sporadic. There is a potential risk that leadership may become just an alternative form of centralization, however, when dealing with issues as urgent and vital as climate change, it might be worth the risk. REDD+ governance also needs financial resources prior to the flow of results-based payments to support forest management and conservation and to motivate the engagement of actors in making forest management and conservation decisions that will demonstrate their effectiveness in protecting forest cover and generating socio-economic benefits.

Limitations of the research

This research was limited by the following issues:

Mexico is a diverse country, not only in terms of ecosystems but also in socio-economic aspects. The findings regarding the achievement of REDD+ goals in Quintana Roo might not be automatically translated to Mexico as a whole. While in Quintana Roo less than 35% of the inhabitants were considered poor in 2016, in Chiapas, one of the poorest Mexican states, more than 65% of the population was poor in the same year (Coneval, 2017). Even though both

194 are among the REDD+ early action states, these specific contexts might generate different outcomes when implementing REDD+.

From 2011 to 2015, the researcher was a state government employee in

Quintana Roo. As part of her duties, she was involved in REDD+ related activities in the period from 2011 to 2013. During this time the researcher had professional relationships with some of the participants of this study from the

Work Group and Advisory Council. This might have affected the responses provided by the interviewees from the Advisory Council and ejidos as they explained that they do not trust government officers. However, they recognized the researcher as an academic and openly discussed topics such as the divergences from some government policies, corruption and perceptions of other actors’ lack of interest or passive participation in REDD+ activities. These examples show that the interviewees were comfortable speaking with the researcher and freely expressed their viewpoints. It is important to note that at the time of the study, the researcher did not have any work commitments with the state government nor any other organization in Quintana Roo.

The fact that sector representatives from the Advisory Council had met sporadically since 2013 made it difficult to contact them as key informants. The answers from the seven people from this group that participated in this study, also may not be completely accurate as they were recollections of what happened in 2012 and 2013 which were the active years of the Advisory

Council but five years prior to the period of field work.

The interviewees from rural communities were ejido leaders and members. This research did not capture the viewpoint of other rural people who

195 are not ejido members such as avecindados, women and young people.

However, as the results showed that among 12 interviewees only one ejido leader was actively involved in REDD+ decision-making, it is possible that the majority of rural people are equally disengaged in REDD+.

The field work for this research was conducted a few weeks after the

2018 Mexican presidential elections. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the elected president from a left wing political party, started functions in December

2018. This might represent significant changes in the federal policies regarding rural development, the forest sector and REDD+ in Mexico. As a result, some of the information reported in this study, especially regarding the federal government, might not be applicable in the future.

Future research

Several countries, including Mexico, are currently negotiating REDD+ results-based payments for the first time. The flow of funds for countries that have reached the third phase of REDD+ programming might result in the re- engagement of non-state actors in REDD+ decision-making and implementation of projects. The results-based payments may also contribute to more tangible results in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and generating socio-economic benefits for local people. Continued monitoring and analysis of the Mexican REDD+ case when (or if) they begin to receive REDD+ results-based payments can contribute to better understand the effectiveness

(or failure) of this mechanism.

The case of REDD+ implementation in Quintana Roo is linked to the past long history of community forest management that started in the 1980’s with the

196

Plan Piloto Forestal. The case of Quintana Roo shows similar characteristics in terms of community organization and engagement in forest management with other REDD+ areas in countries such as Nepal. Conducting comparative case study research (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008) between Quintana Roo and some

Nepalese regions can be a subject for future research to explore the contribution of community forest management to REDD+, forest conservation and climate change mitigation.

This study found that the multiple government programs currently overlap with the REDD+ program in ejidos in Quintana Roo. As ejido members have agency to make decisions regarding the use of ejido land, conducting comparative case study research (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008) focused on the ejido level in Quintana Roo and other Mexican states can contribute to understand how the various government policies and programs, REDD+ included, influence the land-use decisions that ejido members make.

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