Asenath Barzani Asenath Barzani (* 1590, † 1670 ) Was a Kurdish Jewish Woman in Mosul (Ottoman Empire) Survived

Daf Ditty Eruvin 67: Gentile/ Sabbath/ Asenath

The Gemara now relates that there was once a certain baby whose warm water, which had been prepared for his Shabbat circumcision, spilled. Rabba said to them: Let them bring warm water for him from my house. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish an eiruv in the courtyard, so it is prohibited to carry the water.

Despite the fact that it is generally prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform work for Jews on Shabbat, the commandment of circumcision is important enough to override the halakhot of Shabbat. Therefore, in this case of a rabbinic prohibition, e.g., telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor, it is proper to violate the rabbinic decree in order to fulfill this mitzva.

Rabba said to him: Let us rely on the merging of alleyways, which may serve in place of a joining of courtyards in pressing circumstances such as these. Abaye said to him: But we did not establish a merging of alleyways either. Rabba replied: If so, let them instruct a gentile to bring the warm water for him, even though it is generally prohibited to instruct a gentile to perform labor for a Jew that involves a desecration of Shabbat.

3 objection to a proposed action, we must first clarify the matter and only then may we proceed. However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we first perform an act and then we raise objections.

the equivalent of which , נברד ן רוסיא הוצמ ךרוצל Rav Yosef answered that indeed we may not do an מא י הר . .if a Jew did it אד ו ר י י את הכאלמ to heat the water, which would be a ירכנ would be, telling the which is in , בוריע to carry without an ירכנ a is That In our case, we are telling the דח ברד נ ן of ירכנל which is . - בשד ו ת בש ו ת in Halachah referred to as - נברד ן יתרת This is a . נברד ן א י ס ו ר itself only an רתומ ךרוצל הוצמ ךרוצל רתומ

Afterward, when they had brought the water, Rav Yosef said to Abaye: What objection did you wish to raise against the Master, Rabba? He said to him: As it was taught in a baraita: Sprinkling the water of purification on an impure person on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law; rather, it is only a rabbinic decree to enhance the character of Shabbat as a day of rest. And telling a gentile to perform a Shabbat labor on behalf of a Jew is likewise only a rabbinic decree.

Abaye gave the example of sprinkling, as that is a case where the activity is required for the sake of a mitzva. Furthermore, the purposeful neglect of this mitzva causes the individual to incur karet, as in the case of the Pascal lamb. In the case of sprinkling, the Sages nonetheless reinforced their rulings and did not permit the violation of the rabbinic prohibition. In the case discussed here, where one would not be abrogating the mitzva of circumcision entirely, but merely postponing it, it is certainly possible to insist on observance of the rabbinic prohibition (Rosh).

Just as sprinkling the water of purification is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat, even for the purpose of a mitzva, so too, telling a gentile to perform a prohibited labor Shabbat is prohibited by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. How, then, could Rabba suggest that they instruct a gentile and thus transgress a rabbinic decree?

Rav Yosef said to him: But do you not differentiate between a rabbinic decree that involves an action and a rabbinic decree that does not involve an action? As the Master, Rabba, did not say to the gentile: Go and heat water on Shabbat, but only told him to transfer something from one domain to another, which does not involve an action and is therefore less severe.

RAMBAM: Hil Shabbat 6:1

How is this? The Jew says to the gentile on Shabbat to climb a tree or swim on the face of the waters in order to bring him a shofar (to blow on Rosh Hashanah), or a knife for a circumcision; or to bring him water from [one] courtyard to [another] courtyard, that does not have aneruv

7 [connecting] them, to wash an infant or someone in pain. And likewise, anything that is similar to this.

Halacha

Orach Chayim 331:6

Tools for the circumcision that could have been procured on Friday do not supersede Shabbat. Therefore, if they forgot to bring the knife on Friday they should not bring it on Shabbat, even in a place where this will only result in a rabbinic prohibition [i.e., there is an eruv], because the rabbis insisted that their laws be followed, because it involves karet. Regarding telling a non-Jew to procure the tools, if it is something that were a Jew to do it, it would only be a rabbinic violation, one can tell a non-Jew to procure them, but if it is something for which it is Toraitically forbidden for the Jew to do, one cannot tell the non-Jew to do it (And see above chapter 307).

Orach Chayim 328:11

A sick person who is in bed with his illness but is not in danger Rem"a: Or if he has a pain that is bothering him and his whole body pains him, even if he still walks, he is similar to someone bedridden (HaMagid Chapter 2), we tell a non-Jew to provide medical treatment, but we do not violate Toraitic Shabbat prohibitions even if he has an endangered body part.

Regarding a Jew actively breaking a rabbinic prohibition, there are some who allow it even if he does not have an endangered body part. There are those who say that if he has an endangered body part we break and if he doesn't, we do not break. There are those who say that if he doesn't have an endangered body part, we desecrate with a slight change, and if he has an endangered body part, we break without a change.

And there are those who say that even if he has an endangered body part, we do not break any prohibition that is related to a Toraitic labor, and things that have no connection, we do even if he does not have an endangered body part. This third position is right.

Rem"a:

9 It is permitted to tell a non-Jew to cook something for a child that has nothing to eat, because the needs of a child are comparable to a non-endangered sick person. And everything that is forbidden for a Jew to do is also forbidden for the sick person himself to do, but if a non-Jew is doing something, the sick person is allowed to help a bit, because aiding is not considered substantial.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:1

The Gemara tells a story about a brit mila (circumcision) that was taking place on Shabbat, where the hot water that had been prepared – and were essential to doing the brit properly – spilled. Rabba ordered that more water be brought from the house into the courtyard, but his student, Abaye, argued that a proper eiruv had not been made. Faced with that issue, Rabba suggested that a non- Jew be asked to bring the water. Asking a non-Jew to perform a forbidden act on Shabbat – Amira la-Akum - is, itself, Rabbinically forbidden. The Rosh explains that Rabba suggested making use of the non-Jew only in this case of a circumcision. Since a brit mila has the unique status of pushing aside Shabbat (see Massekhet Shabbat), it is logical that we would permit an act forbidden by the Sages, as well.

Abaye said: I wanted to raise an objection against the Master, Rabba, but Rav Yosef would not let me do so, as Rav Yosef said that Rav Kahana said: When we were in Rav Yehuda’s house, he would say to us when we were presented with a halakhic difficulty: With regard to a Torah law, we first raise objections and then we perform an act, i.e., if someone has an objection to a proposed action, we must first clarify the matter and only then may we proceed. However, with regard to rabbinic laws, we first perform an act and then we raise objections.

After the water had been brought and the circumcision performed, Abaye was asked to present his question. He asked why completing the ritual to purify someone who had become tame (ritually impure) - which is forbidden on Shabbat by the Sages - cannot be performed even if it is necessary to perform a mitzva (e.g. to sacrifice and eat the Passover sacrifice), yet in our case, asking a non- Jew to bring water for the brit is permitted?

Abaye's question is particularly powerful because missing the opportunity to participate in the Passover sacrifice was punishable by karet (being cut off from the community), which is also the punishment for neglecting the commandment of circumcision. If anything, we would have anticipated that there is more reason to try and accommodate the person who wants to bring the sacrifice on Passover, since he has to do it on one particular day – the 14th of Nissan – while a child who is not circumcised on the eighth day can have the brit later on, as well.

The Gemara's response to Abaye's question is that we distinguish between an "active" Rabbinic prohibition and a "passive" one. In our case, Amira la-Akum is passive, so we are more comfortable pushing it aside when necessary.

1 https://www.steinsaltz-center.org/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=68446

10 WHEN IS AMIRAH L'NOCHRI PERMITTED FOR MITZVOS?2

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:

Our Daf discusses a case occurred in which the hot water prepared for a baby spilled. Rabah told people 'bring hot water from my house'! . Abaye: There is no Eruv [in the Chatzer] or Shituf [in the Mavoy]! . Rabah: Tell a Nochri to bring the water from my house. . Question (Abaye): Haza'ah (sprinkling Mei Chatas to Metaher) is Shevus [forbidden mid'Rabanan on Shabbos], just like Amirah l'Nochri (telling him to do something forbidden to Yisraelim];

Just like we may not do Haza'ah on Shabbos [even if needed to bring Korban Pesach], similarly we may not tell a Nochri [to bring water without an Eruv for the sake of Milah]!

Answer (Rav Yosef): We distinguish Shevus with an action from Shevus without an action;

Rabah did not tell a Nochri to heat water!

RISHONIM

Rif (Shabbos 55b): If the hot water spilled after the Bris, we heat up more, due to danger. Bahag says that if they brought a knife before Shabbos, but it was stolen or dented, before the Bris, they may tell a Nochri to make or bring another knife.

Rif (ibid.) and Rosh (Shabbos 19:2): Rav Yosef distinguishes Shevus in which one tells the Nochri to do a Melachah, from an Amirah without a Melachah. Amirah l'Nochri is Shevus when he tells him to do Melachah. One may not tell a Nochri to make a knife or bring one through Reshus ha'Rabim.

Ran (DH v'Nimtza): Bahag permits Amirah l'Nochri even for a proper Melachah for Machshirei [matters needed to enable] Milah. If we would equate other Mitzvos to Milah, like the Rambam does, according to his opinion, we would permit Amirah l'Nochri of Melachah for all Mitzvos. It seems that Ba'al ha'Itur, who permits telling a Nochri to light a lamp for the sake of Seudas Shabbos, holds like this.

Ran (DH Aval): The Rif permits Amirah l'Nochri only for matters that if a Yisrael would do them, they are only Shevus. The Rambam (Hilchos Milah 2:9) agrees. He permits Shevus d'Shevus, i.e. Amirah l'Nochri to do Shevus, for Machshirei Lulav and Shofar. The Ramban permits only for Milah, since it overrides Shabbos. Other Mitzvos do not override Shabbos, so they do not override even Shevus d'Shevus, for we do not permit Shevus d'Shevus to avoid a loss. This is why one may

2 https://dafyomi.co.il/eruvin/halachah/ev-hl-068.htm

11 not tell a Nochri to extinguish, even though extinguishing is Shevus, for it is a Melachah she'Einah Tzerichah l'Gufah.

Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 6:9): Something that is not a Melachah, and it is forbidden on Shabbos only due to Shevus, one may tell a Nochri to do it on Shabbos for a Mitzvah.

Rambam (10): A Yisrael may tell a Nochri to climb a tree or swim in order to bring a Shofar or a knife for Milah, or to bring from one Chatzer to another without an Eruv.

Tosfos (Gitin 8b DH Af): Even though Amirah l'Nochri is Shevus, it is permitted for the sake of Yishuv (settling) Eretz Yisrael. They do not permit Amirah l'Nochri of Melachah mid'Oraisa for other Mitzvos. One may not tell him to do an Isur Torah. One may not tell a Nochri to bring a Sefer Torah through Karmelis. We permit only for the sake of Milah, for Milah itself overrides Shabbos. Bahag permits telling a Nochri to do a Torah Isur for the sake of Milah. He must say that she was within seven days [and a Yisrael would heat for her]. However, in such a case one may not heat extra! We decree that healthy people may not eat what was cooked for a Choleh on Shabbos, lest they cook extra! Perhaps one may heat extra only for Bris Milah, but not for other needs, even though a Nochri.

POSKIM

Shulchan Aruch (OC 307:5): Something that is not a Melachah, and it is forbidden on Shabbos only due to Shevus, one may tell a Nochri to do it on Shabbos for a Mitzvah.

Beis Yosef (DH Kasav): The Magid Mishneh says that the Ge'onim agree that Machshirei Milah override Shevus d'Shevus, even though Machshirei Milah are not Docheh Shabbos. The Rambam learns to all Mitzvos. Some permit only for Milah, for it overrides Shabbos. Avi ha'Ezri, brought in Mordechai Shabbos 474, holds like the Rambam.

Mishnah Berurah: One may not tell a Nochri to do a Melachah even for a Mitzvah (331:6), e.g. to light a lamp to enable learning or praying.

Kaf Hachaim: In some places, when Yom Tov is on Motza'ei Shabbos, or on Yom Kipur before Ne'ilah, they tell a Nochri to light Neros in the Beis ha'Keneses. Birkei Yosef (514:3) said that if he could, he would stop this, for most Poskim do not permit proper Melachah. The Acharonim were stringent, and said not to rely on the lenient opinion even for a great need (276:2), especially for us [Sephardim], who accepted the Mechaber's rulings. The Mechaber permits Amirah l'Nochri only for Shevus. The Birkei Yosef solidly rejected those who defend the custom. Also the Noda bi'Yehudah (OC 34) denounced this, and abolished the custom in his locale. However, the Ben Ish Chai (Rav Pe'alim 2:43) gave ways in which it is permitted.

Beis Yosef (DH Aval): The Tur holds like Tosfos. In Siman 338, he said that Avi ha'Ezri permits telling a Nochri to play instruments at a Chupah, but the Tur permits only for Mitzvos that override Shabbos. It seems that the Rashba (1:297) agrees. He says that we do not compare Shevusim.

12 Chachamim did not allow Amirah l'Nochri of Melachah for the sake of Milah, but they permitted it for buying a house in Eretz Yisrael (310:4)! Only what Chachamim permitted is permitted.

Magen Avraham: This opinion permits Shevus d'Shevus only for Bris Milah, which overrides Shabbos. On 91a, we say that they used to take a Sefer Torah from the roof to the Chatzer to read in it. This shows that one may carry outside the Eruv for Keri'as ha'Torah! We cannot compare Shevusim to each other.

Gra (DH v'Yesh): Since we needed to say that it was permitted for Yishuv Eretz Yisrael, this shows that it is forbidden for other Mitzvos. The distinction between different Shevusim is only regarding Bris Milah.

Brit Mila on Shabbat Rav David Brovsky writes:3

The mishna (Shabbat 128b) teaches:

R. Yosei says: One may even cut the umbilical cord. And all the requirements of circumcision may be performed on Shabbat.

3 https://www.etzion.org.il/en/brit-mila-shabbat-cesarean-section-iui-and-ivf-forceps

Another mishna (ibid. 133a) teaches:

One performs all the necessities of the circumcision, even on Shabbat: One circumcises the foreskin (mila), uncovers the skin by removing the thin membrane beneath the foreskin (peria), and sucks the blood from the wound, and places on it both a bandage (ispelanit) and cumin as a salve.

The rabbis offer three sources to explain why a circumcision is performed on Shabbat, even though it entails melakhot usually forbidden on Shabbat. The Talmud (Shabbat 132a) first derives this law from a gezeira shava (analogy by common term).

R. Elazar said: This halakha is derived [by means of a verbal analogy between the word] sign (ot) [that appears with regard to circumcision: “And you shall be circumcised in the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a sign of the covenant between Me and you” (Bereishit 17:11), and sign that appears with regard to Shabbat: “However, you shall keep My Shabbatot, for it is a sign between Me and you throughout your generations” (Shemot 31:13). From this verbal analogy, it is derived that circumcision, which is a sign, may be performed even on Shabbat, which is itself a sign].

R. Nachman further qualifies this derivation:

This halakha is derived not from one common word alone, but based on the three words sign (ot), covenant (brit), and generations (dorot) that appear with regard to circumcision, and sign, covenant, and generations that appear with regard to Shabbat – to the exclusion of ritual fringes and phylacteries, that with regard to each of them, one of these is written, but not all three words together.

R. Yochanan offers a second explanation:

The verse says: “And on the eighth day…shall be circumcised” (Vayikra 12:3); this means that the child is circumcised on the eighth day whenever it occurs, even on Shabbat.

In addition to these three views in the Talmud, the Mekhilta (31:16) teaches:

"And the children of Israel shall keep the Shabbat to observe the Shabbat for their generations, an everlasting covenant" (Shemot 31:16)… R. Eliezer says ["to observe on Shabbat"] that which seals the covenant — circumcision.

In addition to the three sources cited above, some (Shabbat ibid.) suggest this it is a law transmitted from generation to generation from Moshe Rabbeinu, a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai.

It appears that the three sources cited above reflect different understandings of this halakha.

On the one hand, there are certain mitzvot that override others. For example, certain sacrifices were offered in the Beit Ha-Mikdash on Shabbat. Similarly, R. Yochanan appears to believe that it is

14 crucial that the circumcision is performed on the eighth day, even if that entails the violation of the Shabbat.

On the other hand, according to R. Eliezer (cited in the Mekhilta), performing a circumcision on Shabbat is actually a fulfillment of the observance of Shabbat, as one is fulfilling the "covenant" (brit). The observance of Shabbat affirms the covenant between God the Jewish People, and the performance of a circumcision on Shabbat is the ultimate expression of the affirmation of the covenant. Therefore, mila does not really override Shabbat; rather, it is a fulfillment of Shabbat in the fullest manner.

Finally, R. Nachman appears to maintain that the performance of brit mila on Shabbat is not rooted in the nature of mila or Shabbat, but rather relates to the origin of brit mila – the circumcision of Avraham Avinu (where the word ot appears in relation to mila). The covenant between God and Avraham, the ancestral covenant, transcends the Torah and mitzvot that were given only later at Sinai. In other words, brit mila, in a sense, is above the mitzvot, and it is therefore performed even on Shabbat.

Brit Mila on Shabbat

If the brit is not performed on the eighth day, it is considered to be a mila she-lo be-zmena, and it is not performed on Shabbat (see Shabbat 132a). The Acharonim discuss whether the brit is still valid in such a case if the brit mila was performed on Shabbat, or if it is necessary to draw blood (hatafat dam) from the child (see Pitchei Teshuva 266:1; R. Akiva Eiger 177).

The Talmud mentions other cases in which brit mila is not performed on Shabbat. For example, if the child is born without a foreskin (Shabbat 135), blood is not drawn on Shabbat. Similarly, in a case of doubt, such as a child who is a "tumtum" or "androgynous," or if the child is born during twilight (bein ha-shemashot) and the exact date of birth is unclear, the brit is delayed until Sunday (Shabbat 134b).

The Talmud cites a debate regarding whether only those acts that are central to the mitzva of brit mila (i.e., mila and peria) are performed on Shabbat, or even preparatory actions (makhshirei mila). For example, the mishna (ibid. 13a) cites the view of R. Eliezer:

R. Eliezer says: If he did not bring an implement [for circumcising the child] on Shabbat eve, he brings it on Shabbat itself uncovered [so that it will be clear to all that he is bringing a circumcision scalpel]… And furthermore, R. Eliezer said with regard to this issue: One may even cut down trees to prepare charcoal in order to fashion iron tools [for the purpose of circumcision].

However, the halakha is in accordance with the view of R. Akiva, who rules:

Any prohibited labor that can be performed on Shabbat eve does not override Shabbat [including transporting the circumcision scalpel]. However, any prohibited labor involved in the mitzva of circumcision itself that cannot be performed on Shabbat eve overrides Shabbat.

15 In light of R. Akiva's view, the Talmud discusses what to do if the preparations for the brit mila were not performed before Shabbat. For example, one of the central sources for the topic of amira le-nakhri (asking a non-Jew to perform a prohibited labor on Shabbat) is taught in this context. Based on the gemara (Eiruvin 67b), the Rishonim disagree as to whether one may ask a non-Jew only to carry the hot water needed for the circumcision through a public domain for the purpose of a brit mila, which already sets aside the laws of Shabbat (Ramban ibid.), or whether a non-Jew may be asked to perform any biblically prohibited labor for a mitzva (Behag), or whether a non-Jews may only be asked to violate a rabbinic prohibition in order to enable the performance of a mitzva (Rambam, Hilkhot Mila 2:9; see Shulchan Arukh, OC 307:5 and Rema 266).

The Manner of Conception: IUI and IVF

The Acharonim discuss whether the manner of conception may also determine whether the circumcision is held on Shabbat. What if the child is not conceived in the "normal" manner? In recent years, halakhic authorities have grappled with new questions and applications based upon this principle.

Many children are now conceived either through Intrauterine Insemination (IUI), during which the husband's (or a donor's) sperm is placed inside a woman’s uterus to facilitate fertilization. Alternatively, some children are conceived during In Vitro Fertilization, during which extracted eggs are fertilized outside of the body, and the embryo(s) is then transferred to the uterus.

Some Acharonim note that the Talmud relates to a case in which the child is conceived without sexual relations. The gemara (Chagiga 16a) discusses a case in a woman became pregnant in a bathhouse, i.e., by semen floating in the water. Rabbeinu Channanel explains:

This is a miraculous act, and a woman does not become ritually impure through this type of conception because it does not meet the specifications of the verse (Vayikra 12:1), “When a woman conceives and gives birth.”

R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Noam 5718 [1958]; see also Minchat Shlomo 3:98:4) rules, based upon Rabbenu Chananel, that a child conceived through IUI should not be circumcised on Shabbat. He explains that Rabbeinu Chananel refers to a child conceived in an unconventional manner (not necessarily miraculously). Since artificial insemination is not considered to be the common manner of impregnation, the circumcision is not held on Shabbat. This view is held by R. Hershel Schachter as well. R. J. David Bleich (Tradition 35:2, Summer 2001) notes that in this case, the parents may lie about the reason why the brit mila is delayed, in order to protect the family's privacy.

Interestingly, the Nishmat Avraham (third edition, p. 584) cites R. Azriel Auerbach, son of R. Shlomo Auerbach, who relates that although is father-in-law, R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, concurred with this ruling, his father, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, changed his mind and ruled that since these methods had become so common, they are no longer considered to be "maaseh nissim" (i.e., rare), and the circumcision therefore may and should be held on Shabbat. Similarly, R. Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, YD 7:24:5; Nishmat Avraham, vol. 4, p. 226) rules that one may

16 perform a brit on Shabbat on a baby conceived through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization. R. Asher Weiss also insists that in this case the brit mila must be held on Shabbat (see also Shevet Ha-Levi 9 YD 209).

Interestingly. R. Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvot Ve-Hanhagot 2:224) distinguishes between a child conceived through IUI – which he views as a conventional form of conception, such that the brit mila is held on Shabbat – and a child conceived though IVF, regarding whom he believes the circumcision should be delayed until Sunday.

Source of Amirah LeNochri – Torah or Rabbinic Prohibition?

Our Daf describes a scenario in which the hot water necessary for a baby spilled. In this case, however, hot water was not available elsewhere. In this case, Rava ruled that if the baby's mother (a woman is regarded as a Choleh for thirty days subsequent to childbirth, Shabbat 129a) needed hot water, a non-Jew could be instructed to heat water for the mother, and some of this hot water could be used for the baby boy. Tosafot (s.v. Ee Tzricha and Gittin 8b s.v. Af Al Gav), supported by most Rishonim, explain that this passage is speaking only of hot water necessary for Brit Milah.

All agree that one is Biblically forbidden to ask his Canaanite slave to do Melacha (forbidden labor) for him on Shabbat. This prohibition is stated unambiguously in the Aseret Hadibrot (Shemot 20:10). The prohibition concerning all other non-Jews is subject to a dispute. A minority view, presented in the Mechilta to Shemot 12:16, believes that it is a Torah prohibition for one to request any non-Jew to do Melacha for the former's benefit. This view emerges from the fact that the prohibition of engaging in Melacha on the Yom Tov of Pesach is articulated in the passive voice (“Kol Melacha Lo Yeiaseh Vahem”), indicating that no work may be done for a Jew on Yom Tov, even that which is done on his behalf by a non-Jew.

The dominant view, however, is that it is a Rabbinic-level prohibition to ask a non-Jew to engage in Melacha on Shabbat or Yom Tov. The Babylonian Talmud refers to this prohibition as a Rabbinically forbidden activity – Amirah LeNochri Shevut (see Shabbat 150a and Bava Metzia 90a). Thus, it is not surprising to see the Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 6:1) articulate the accepted view that Amirah LeNochri is a Rabbinic-level prohibition. We regard the Talmud Bavli as our authoritative text (see the Rambam’s introduction to the Mishneh Torah), and texts such as the Mechilta are not followed when in conflict with the Talmud Bavli (also see the Rosh to Chullin 2:6). The Rambam writes that the Rabbis prohibited Amirah LeNochri "in order that the Shabbat not be taken lightly, which would lead to a Jew performing Melacha himself."

17 The Nature of the Prohibition

Rashi presents two different approaches to define the nature of the prohibition of Amirah LeNochri. He indicates (Shabbat 153a s.v. Mai Ta’ama) that a non-Jew who performs Melacha on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat is considered the Jew's Shaliach (agent). Since the Halacha asserts that “Shelucho Shel Adam Kemoto”- the agent is considered as if he were the individual who appointed him as the agent (Kiddushin 41)- the forbidden act of labor performed by the non-Jew is related to the Jew who asked him to do the Melacha.

Even though ordinarily we say that “Ein Shelichut LeNochri,” the rules of agency do not apply to non-Jews (Bava Metzia 71b), Rashi nevertheless apparently believes that on a Rabbinic level we say “Yeish Shelichut LeNochri LeChumrah,” the rules of agency apply to a non-Jew when the ramifications are strict (i.e. he is considered to be an agent only to one's detriment, but not to one’s benefit). Rashi presents a similar approach regarding the laws of Ribbit (prohibition of charging interest) in a celebrated comment to Bava Metzia 71b (s.v. Bishlama Seifa; see also the Hagahot Maimoniot Hilchot Shabbat 6:2 who explicitly articulates the idea of Yeish Shelichut LeNchri LeChumrah in this context.)

Rashi in Avoda Zara 15a (s.v. Keivan DeZavna) presents a different approach to the nature of the prohibition of Amirah LeNochri. He teaches that the prohibition is because of the restriction of VeDabeir Davar (based on the verse in Yeshayahu 58:13), “Shelo Yehei Diburcha BeShabbat KeDiburcha BeChol,” that one's conversations on Shabbat should differ from his weekday conversations. Just as one may not perform the Melacha on Shabbat, he is forbidden to speak about the Melacha. Thus, VeDabeir Davar forbids Amirah LeNochri, since when one asks a Nochri to perform a Melacha, he actually speaks about the Melacha.

A specific ramification that emerges from these different approaches might be the two conflicting opinions cited by the Mishna Berura 307:24, regarding whether Amirah LeAmirah LeNochri- asking one non-Jew to ask another non-Jew to do Melacha- is forbidden. Although the reason of VeDabeir Davar would apply since he speaks about Melacha, the reason of Shelichut does not apply. This is because “Mili Lo Mimseran LeShliach”, agency applies only when one appoints the agent to perform an action (such as marriage or divorce), but not when one is asked merely to appoint a second agent.

The Mishna Berura concludes his discussion of this issue by citing the Sefer HaChaim, who rules that in cases of serious monetary loss one may rely on the lenient view of the Chavot Yair who permits Amirah LeAmirah. He cautions, however, that all agree that in such a case a Jew may not benefit on Shabbat itself from the work performed by the non-Jew. We will discuss, in a subsequent issue, the prohibition of benefiting from work performed by a Nochri on behalf of a Jew on Shabbat.

It should be noted, however, that Rav Yosef Adler reports that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik did not subscribe to this leniency and did not see any validity in this approach to permit Amirah LeAmirah LeNochri. (For further discussion of the Chavot Yair’s ruling, see Rav Hershel Schachter’s B’ikvei Hatzon p. 52.) In addition, Rav Schachter rules (ad. loc. p.57) that one should not rely upon the ruling of the Chavot Yair or even of the Chatam Sofer that we will cite in the

18 next paragraph. Rav Schachter rules that it is forbidden to pay for an ad in a newspaper owned by non-Jews that will appear in the Saturday edition of the paper, since in effect one is instructing a non-Jew to print his ad when the paper will be printed on Friday night. Rav Schachter does not regard the facts that the Jew placed the order before Shabbat and that the Jew did not actually instruct the non-Jews who will print the paper as sufficient to warrant a leniency.

There is possibly more room to be lenient regarding asking a non-Jew prior to Shabbat to ask a second non-Jew to do Melacha on Shabbat. Although Amirah LeNochri is forbidden even when the Jew speaks to the non-Jew prior to Shabbat (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 307:2), this is because of the problem of Shelichut. When the non-Jew does the Melacha he acts as the Jew's Shaliach. However, when one asks one non-Jew to ask a second non-Jew to do Melacha on Shabbat, the problem of Shelichut is avoided. Moreover, the issue of VeDabeir Davar is not relevant when the request to do Melacha takes places prior to Shabbat. Thus, the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot O.C. 60) permits asking a non-Jew prior to Shabbat to ask a second non-Jew to do Melacha on Shabbat.

This ruling might be relevant in a workplace situation where on Friday one must ask a delivery company to deliver a package on Saturday. The Biur Halacha (307:2 s.v. VeAfilu) appears to reject relying on this Teshuva of the Chatam Sofer, since there is a Teshuva from the Rashba that the Biur Halacha believes contradicts the Chatam Sofer’s approach (The Rashba carries more clout than the Chatam Sofer because the Rashba was a Rishon whereas the Chatam Sofer was an Acharon.) On the other hand, the Mishna Berura (307:24) seems inclined to rely on the Chavot Yair in case of great need.

I would suggest a compromise to resolve the apparent contradiction between the Mishna Berura’s ruling that one may rely on the Chavot Yair in case of a serious financial loss and the Biur Halacha’s seeming rejection of the Chatam Sofer. Perhaps in the Mishna Berura the Chafetz Chaim does not permit relying on the Chavot Yair except for cases of serious financial need. In the Biur Halacha, however, it seems that the Chafetz Chaim expresses great reservations about the Chatam Sofer’s approach, but does not rule out relying on the Chatam Sofer (or the Chavot Yair) in case of great need, such as a serious financial loss. However, Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Schachter seem to reject relying on the Chavot Yair’s leniency even in case of great need. Accordingly, one should consult his Rav for a ruling regarding this matter.

Conclusion

The prohibition of Amirah LeNochri is observed differently in the age of technology than it was in the earlier generations. While many of our grandparents and great grandparents found it necessary to rely on lenient options regarding this matter, we have much less reason to do so.

When it is permitted:

19 What are the circumstances in which we are permitted to ask a non-Jew to perform Melachah for us on Shabbat. We will discuss the situations of Choleh (a sick individual), Tzaar Baalei Chaim (alleviating the suffering of animals), Pesik Reisha (which we will define later), and Remizah (hinting).

Choleh – A Sick Person

We mentioned last week that the Gemara in Shabbat 129a states one may ask a non-Jew to do Melachah on behalf of a sick individual even if the latter is not dangerously ill (provided that he is confined to bed or cannot function normally). The Rama (Orach Chaim 276:1) writes that this rule applies to all Ketanim (children), as the Halacha accords even healthy children the status of a Choleh. The Mishnah Berurah (276:6) limits this rule to a situation where there is considerable need for Melachah to be done on behalf of a child.

Dr. Abraham S. Abraham (Nishmat Avraham 328:54) cites quite a range of opinions among twentieth-century authorities regarding up to what age is a child defined as a Choleh. Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 1:78) seeks to demonstrate that a child up to age nine is defined as a Choleh. Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 8:15:12:7) disagrees with Dayan Weisz’s proof and suggests that a child has the status of a Choleh only until age six. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (in an oral communication to Dr. Abraham) rules that a child is regarded as a Choleh only until age two or three. Dr. Abraham suggests that this question may depend on the relative strength of the individual child, which can vary greatly. One should consult his Rav for guidance regarding this issue.

Air Conditioning and Heating

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 276:5) rules that in “cold lands” one may ask a non-Jew to light a fire if the house is exceedingly cold (and, if there are children present, even if it is “merely cold” and not exceedingly cold). The Shulchan Aruch asserts that the basis for this ruling is that “Hakol Cholim Eitzel Tzinah,” everyone has the status of a Choleh (or potential Choleh) regarding the cold. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe 3:24) applies this rule to a situation where an air conditioner was left on for Shabbat and the weather turned very cold. In such a case, Rav Moshe permits asking a non-Jew to turn off the air conditioner.

Interestingly, Dayan Weisz (Minchat Yitzchak 3:23) rules that it is permissible to ask a non- Jew to turn on an air conditioner on an exceedingly hot day. He considers a concept parallel to that mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch, namely “Hakol Cholim Eitzel Chom,” that everyone is considered a Choleh (or potential Choleh) in a situation of extreme heat. In his lenient ruling, Dayan Weisz primarily utilizes Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s opinion (Teshuvot Minchat Shlomo 1:9) that completing a circuit is not a Torah prohibition if no filament is thereby heated until it glows. He permits asking a non-Jew to turn on the air conditioner since only a rabbinic prohibition is involved, and the Shulchan Aruch rules (as we discussed last week) that one may ask a non-Jew to perform an act that is rabbinically prohibited in case of considerable suffering. Rav Mendel Silber (Teshuvot Moznei Tzedek 2:16), who serves as the Av Beit Din

20 of the Satmar Beit Din in Brooklyn, adds that one may certainly be lenient if the reason for turning on the air conditioner is LeTzorech Mitzvah – if one is unable to study Torah or Daven in a place that is extremely hot. Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchatah (13:34) codifies Dayan Weisz’ ruling and cites no dissenting opinion (see, however, Teshuvot Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:47:2). Rav Silber emphasizes, though, that one may be lenient only if one is very uncomfortable because of the heat.

Tzaar Baalei Chaim

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 503:02) rules that one may ask a non-Jew to milk an animal on Shabbat to alleviate the suffering of the animal. (The issue of milking an animal on Shabbat is particularly relevant in Israel, and is discussed extensively in Gray Matter 1 pp. 200-214.) The source of this ruling is the Rosh (Shabbat 18:3) citing the Maharam of Rothenberg. Its basis is a Talmudic passage (Shabbat 128b) that records that one may take non-Muktzah items such as pillows to support an animal that has fallen into a water ditch. This is permitted despite the fact that he renders the pillow “Muktzah,” thereby violating the rabbinic prohibition of Mevatel Kli MeiHachino (causing a vessel which is not Muktzah to become Muktzah). Rashi explains that this is rabbinically prohibited because it appears as if he is destroying the item (Soteir, destryoing, is one of the thirty-nine forbidden categories of Melachah), as he is rendering it useless as far as Shabbat is concerned.

The Maharam of Rothenberg deduces from this Gemara the following principle: since it is a Torah level obligation to alleviate the suffering of an animal, one may violate a rabbinic prohibition to alleviate the suffering of a living creature. Thus, one may violate the rabbinic prohibition of asking a non-Jew to do Melachah for us on Shabbat in order to aid a suffering animal. Therefore, one may ask a non-Jew to summon a non-Jewish veterinarian to help a suffering pet.

Pesik Reisha

The background to the category of Pesik Reisha is discussed in several places in the Gemara. If one performs a permitted act which might cause a prohibited act to occur (the Talmudic example is one who drags a chair along a dirt floor, which may create a furrow), the action is permitted as long as he did not intend for the forbidden act to occur (Davar SheEino Mitkavein). However, is the secondary act will inevitably occur (Pesik Reisha), the primary act is forbidden despite the fact that he did not intend the forbidden action to occur. Thus, one may not open a refrigerator door on Shabbat in which the light bulb is activated, despite the fact that his intention is not to turn on the light bulb, since it will inevitably be lit as a result of his opening the door.

However, most authorities permit asking a non-Jew to do an act that is forbidden for Jews due to the Pesik Reisha principle (see Mishnah Berurah 277:15, Igrot Moshe O. C. 2:68, and Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchatah 31:1 and footnote 1). Thus, one may ask a non-Jew to open a refrigerator door even though the light will go on. Similarly, one may ask a non-Jew to turn on hot water even if it will inevitably cause the boiler to heat more water. Rav Mordechai Willig

21 (Beit Yitzchak 22:90-91) offers an explanation for this ruling. As we mentioned two weeks ago, the prohibition of Amirah LeNochri is either because the non-Jew is viewed as acting as our Shaliach or because of the prohibition to even mention Melachah on Shabbat (VeDabeir Davar). Accordingly, when one asks a non-Jew to do an act that is permitted, the non-Jew is acting as one’s agent to do the permissible intended action and not the resultant forbidden act. Similarly, when one asks the non-Jew to perform the permissible act, he has still not spoken about the proscribed activity on Shabbat. See Rav Mordechai Willig’s essay for further elaboration on this issue and why in certain cases this should be done only if there is considerable need.

Remiza – Hinting

The Rama (O.C. 307:22) cites the Ohr Zarua (2:85) who rules that “it is forbidden to hint to a non-Jew on Shabbat to do anything that one may not ask a non-Jew in a straightforward manner to do on Shabbat.” The Ohr Zarua, as a source for his ruling, cites the Gemara in Shabbat 121a (which we mentioned last week) that only permits one to declare to a non-Jew, “Whoever extinguishes the fire will not lose financially.” This passage indicates that only in dire circumstances may one hint to a non-Jew to do work on Shabbat.

The Mishnah Berurah (307:76) notes that hinting is prohibited only when one hints in the form of a command. The example he gives is that one may not ask a non-Jew to “clean his nose” when the non-Jew understands that to mean, “Remove the carbon from the top of the candle” (so the candle will burn brighter). However, if one avoids hinting in a manner that uses the form of a command (Lashon Tzivui), he does not violate the Amirah LeNochri prohibition. For example, one may state to a non-Jew, “The candle is not emitting light properly,” or “I cannot read in this light.”

It is necessary to present a strong word of caution at this point. The aforementioned case is not one in which Amirah LeNochri is permissible. Rather, hinting in this manner merely avoids violation of the Amirah LeNochri prohibition. When Amirah LeNochri is permissible, one may benefit from the work done for a Jew by a non-Jew. When one may ask a non-Jew to do Melachah (such as for the needs of a Choleh), the prohibition to benefit from the non-Jew’s Melachah is also waived. However, even if one avoids the Amirah LeNochri prohibition, he still may not benefit from the Melachah done by a non-Jew on his behalf (see Shabbat 122a; Tosafot ad. loc. s.v. VeIm explains that Chazal prohibited benefiting from the non-Jew’s actions to discourage one from violating the prohibition of asking the non-Jew to perform Melachah). In the Mishnah Berurah’s example regarding the candle wax, one may benefit from the non-Jew’s fixing the candle because one could have read with difficulty despite the poor lighting. Similarly, if one tells a non-Jew, “It is quite difficult to sleep in a room with the light on,” and the non-Jew subsequently extinguishes the light, one may sleep in the room. One is not considered to have benefited from the non-Jew’s action as he has not created something to benefit from. He merely removes the light which then makes it possible to sleep more readily (see the aforementioned Tosafot for further explanation).

22 Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:47:2) points out that if one says “It is very hot in the house” and a non-Jew then turns on the air conditioner, one may not benefit from the air conditioning. (Rav Moshe is presumably not addressing a situation which warrants straightforward Amirah LeNochri, as we discussed earlier.) Rav Moshe explains that this case is not comparable to the Mishnah Berurah’s case of being able to read without the non-Jew’s adjusting the candle, because one could have read from the candle before the non-Jew adjusted it on Shabbat. Thus, the same activity could have been performed even without the non-Jew’s intervention. However, if the air conditioner was off before the gentile intervened, one could not have benefited from the air conditioner before the non-Jew turned it on.

Nevertheless, one might add that if the air conditioner was on and functioning minimally and one commented to a non-Jew that “the air conditioner is not working properly,” and the non-Jew then fixes the air conditioner to provide maximum comfort, it might be permissible to benefit from the non-Jew’s action. Similarly, if it is somewhat cold in the room and someone comments to a non-Jew, “It is certainly cold in the room,” and the gentile turns off the air conditioner, one may benefit from the absence of air conditioning in the room. In essence, one is forbidden to benefit from a positive, new contribution made by a non-Jew on Shabbat, such as if the non-Jew cooked a specific item. On the other hand, there is no prohibition if the non-Jew has merely eliminated a negative phenomenon (such as if he extinguished a fire or an unwanted light).

JOSEPH AND ASENATH,

Is an pseudepigraphic work – the story of how Asenath, daughter of Pentephres, priest of Heliopolis, converted to the worship of the God of Israel and married Joseph. The tenuous basis of this anecdote is one verse in Genesis (41:45).

The marriage of the chaste and pious Joseph to the pagan Asenath was problematic for strictly observant Jews. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan solves the problem by making Asenath the daughter of Dinah, who was raped by Shechem (Gen. 34:1–3). The author of Joseph and Asenath is clearly aware of the theory of Asenath's Jewish origin, but implicitly rejects it. He makes Asenath an Egyptian who converts to Judaismin order to marry Joseph. Joseph and Asenath is extant in Greek as well as in Slavonic, Syriac, Armenian, and Latin versions and, in common with other hagiographic texts, has passed through the hands of many editors. There appear to be one short

24 and three long recensions. The short recension is the oldest and is witnessed to by two Greek manuscripts and the Slavonic version.

The original text is Greek and most of the Hebraisms it contains are derived from the Septuagint. Joseph and Asenath should be classified among the pseudepigraphs of the Bible. It provides some interesting points of similarity with the Testaments of the Twelve *Patriarchs. Just as each of the Testaments illustrates a particular virtue, Joseph and Asenath can be held to illustrate the virtue of repentance. The book can also be compared with certain Greek and Latin romances. It contains the stock situations of ancient romantic literature, such as the exceptional beauty of the hero and heroine (1:6; 6:7), love at first sight (6:1), lovesickness (7:4), the kiss (19:3), the separation (26:1), the unscrupulous rival (24), and the hero's virginity (8:2).

The author had no intention, however, of writing a frivolous romance, but rather a puritan story designed for Jewish readers, while using a literary style alien to their spirit. Joseph and Asenath presents the precise social situation of Jews and Egyptians confronting each other. One of the aims of the story is to demonstrate the mutual repulsion and attraction of these two groups. The emergence of a third group, the proselytes, is one result of these tensions. Although the author's style is restricted, the literary structure of Joseph and Asenath is sophisticated. The plot contains three elements.

The first of these is the missionary story. Asenath is the prototype of the proselyte, who, through repentance, passes "from shadow to light, from error to truth, from death to life" (8:10). Then there is the roman à clef; the author has realized that the Egyptian name Asenath means "belonging to Neith." Many almost imperceptible details of the story can only be explained as referring to the goddess of Sais, such as, for example, the fact that the heroine is hermaphrodite (15:1). These references show an extensive knowledge of late Egyptian theology.

Finally, there is the mystic element, which is more complex in structure. It contains an astrological allegory, in which Joseph represents the Sun and Asenath the Moon, their marriage being the "hieros gamos" of Helios and Selene. There is also the gnostic drama, Joseph representing the Savior and Asenath, Fallen Wisdom.

Here, there is a foretaste of Valentinian gnosticism. The text contains a liturgy of initiation comparable in many ways to that of the mystery cults. The entry of the proselyte into the community is marked by a sacred feast. The neophyte eats "the bread of life," drinks from "the cup of immortality," and is annointed with the "unction of incorruptibility" (15:4). He is then "renewed," "reformed," and "revivified" (8:11; 15:4).

Joseph and Asenath is thus seen to be valuable evidence for the "mystical Judaism," whose existence has been the subject of much controversy. The short recension of Joseph and Asenath is a Jewish version. It contains no trace of Christian modification or interpolation. The text is certainly the product of Egyptian Jewry, but is not necessarily the work of a Therapeut (Essene). The author may have been an Egyptian of the Chora ("region," i.e., outside of Alexandria) converted to Judaism, or, more probably, the Jewish issue of a mixed marriage. Joseph and Asenath must have been composed shortly before the Jewish revolt against Trajan.

25 Joseph and Asenath is also of interest, since the story is repeated in the passions of Saint Barbara, Saint Christine, and Saint Irene. Joseph and Asenath is also the basis for the Persian tale Yūsufo Zuleikhā. There is an English translation by E.W. Brooks, Joseph and Asenath (1918).

Below I have included a review of a serious feminist scholar who uses the midrashic collection on the figure of Asenath as a starting point to determine the role of circumcision as a tool of self- identity in the late antique period.

I love the way she marries cultural studies with midrashic narratives to suggest the role of circumcision and suppression of narratives that did not fit the theological and political narratives of the time.

I always felt drawn to this character: Aseneth does not speak. She does not act. Her only contribution to the plot is bearing children. And while in real life childbirth is no simple endeavor, Genesis reports the arrival of Joseph’s progeny matter-of-factly, with no reflection on the woman who, we might note, produced two of the tribes of Israel (Gen 48:5). She disappears from the story, eclipsed by the legacy of her husband and sons.

I love her central question:

What new possibilities open up for understanding Aseneth’s tale when we suspend Jewishness as the primary category of belonging and circumcision as the central marker of inclusion?

Covenant without Circumcision? What to Do with a Woman

28 Jill Hicks-Keeton writes:4

Circumcision, famously, is understood by ancient Israelites and Jews as a central marker of belonging, the sign of the covenant forged with their God. Some adherents to the God of Israel in the Second Temple period reasoned that gentiles too could choose to worship this God. If they surrendered their foreskins, they gained inclusion. But what of those 5whose bodies did not have penises and were therefore erased from the conversation entirely? What of the unequipped, unqualified? What about, for example, women?

The biblical character Ruth is a natural starting place for such a question. The Moabitess, we’ll remember, adheres ultimately to the people, land, and deity of her Judean mother-in-law Naomi. As Cynthia Baker has recently shown, modern scholars who bifurcate religion from ethnicity as a way of explaining the historical origins of conversion to Judaism struggle to account for Ruth. She encapsulates, for them, a “problem about women.”6 If she cannot be circumcised, can she convert? Does she even need to? If not, does her inclusion matter? The androcentric categories that frame these questions make them impossible to answer. On the face of it, Ruth is neither Israelite nor convert, but “in” nevertheless. Square peg, round hole. Fashioned in a context of male concerns about belonging, Ruth does not fit.

An alternative way into this conversation is through the story of a character from Israel’s scriptures who is so obscure that she's barely a character at all. In the book of Genesis, a woman named Aseneth, the daughter of an Egyptian priest, is given in marriage to the patriarch Joseph. She becomes the mother of his sons, Manasseh and Ephraim. Her three stylized appearances afford her a slim profile: she is wife and mother. Aseneth does not speak. She does not act. Her only contribution to the plot is bearing children. And while in real life childbirth is no simple endeavor, Genesis reports the arrival of Joseph’s progeny matter-of-factly, with no reflection on the woman who, we might note, produced two of the tribes of Israel (Gen 48:5). She disappears from the story, eclipsed by the legacy of her husband and sons.

4 https://www.ancientjewreview.com/articles/2018/7/28/arguing-with-aseneth 5 Others disagreed: see Contesting Conversion: Genealogy, Circumcision, and Identity in Ancient Judaism and Christianity Matthew Thiessen, Oxford University Press, 2011

6 Doing like jews or becoming a jew? Josephus on women converts to Judaism In: Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World, Daniel R. Schwartz, Brill 2007

29 A later anonymous author (or authors) took up the character of Aseneth to propel a new narrative, molding her after the beautiful, virginal female leads of ancient Greek romances, weaving a story of love sparked, thwarted, and finally consummated with her marriage to Joseph. While the tradition’s provenance is unknown, many scholars, including myself, understand the tale to be a literary product of Greek-speaking Judaism in Egypt from around the turn of the era. Joseph and Aseneth, as it is now commonly known (hereafter, Jos. Asen.), imagines a pre-history of Aseneth’s marriage to Joseph and expands upon her role in the family’s subsequent escapades. Aseneth forsakes her native Egyptian gods and turns toward exclusive worship of Joseph’s God. We read along as she also encounters a mysterious angel and mischievous honeybees and as she joins the family of Jacob in some riveting post-nuptial misadventures. The narrative presents her, ultimately, as a mythic protector of future penitents, including “many nations,” who (re)turn to sole veneration of Israel’s God. At its heart, Jos. Asen. is a tale of transformation.

Yet Aseneth’s story is simultaneously a transformative tale. For Second Temple-period thinkers, the national epic of the Jewish people recounted in scriptural texts was a story that invited interpretation, interruption, and even intervention. Jos. Asen. participates in a broader literary phenomenon in Jewish antiquity wherein authors took up figures from Israel’s mythic past and crafted new stories, often as a means of explaining their own present and of envisioning, in competing ways, collective futures.

In my book Arguing with Aseneth, I suggest that this fanciful narrative is best understood in the context of the debates that swirled within Second Temple Judaism about the (im)possibilities of gentile inclusion. Jos. Asen. explores how its heroine, an utterly obscure character in the Genesis story—an Egyptian woman no less—matters for the self-understanding of the people belonging to Israel’s God. The text magnifies Aseneth’s transformation, marriage, and motherhood to a cosmically-significant scale, inscribing into Israel’s history a precedent for gentile inclusion. With its creative myth of origins that writes gentiles into Israel’s story through a female character, Jos. Asen. offers a distinctive argument within the larger landscape of ancient debates about the relationship of Jews and gentiles. Aseneth is a square peg in a round hole that transforms gentiles into God's people.

Rembrandt’s Jacob Blessing the Children of Joseph gives a prominent place to Jacob’s daughter-in-law Asenath. Joseph is Jacob’s son. He is just to the right of the elderly Jacob in the painting. Standing a little apart from the two men is Asenath. She is Joseph’s wife and the mother of Joseph’s two sons Manasseh and Ephraim.

Historically, Aseneth’s relationship to Jewishness has formed a principal frame within which questions about her tale are asked and answered. She is alternately conceived by modern scholars as (1) coming up shy of full conversion because she fails to become socially integrated (in contrast to, say, penis-wielding Achior in the book of Judith, whose two-sentence conversion scene moves swiftly from belief to circumcision to joining the “house of Israel”), and (2) becoming so integrated through symbolic circumcision that she is conceived as having undergone “gene therapy” that results in her becoming genealogically Jewish. Both of these conclusions about Aseneth are conditioned by the shared goal of determining whether Aseneth has become a Jew. The telos of

31 inclusion is Jewishness; “crossing the boundary” is made synonymous with “becoming a Jew.” But in Jos. Asen., post-transformational Aseneth, like Ruth in the book bearing her name, is not once given the moniker “Jew” (or “Israelite” or “Hebrew”).

What new possibilities open up for understanding Aseneth’s tale when we suspend Jewishness as the primary category of belonging and circumcision as the central marker of inclusion? Is there a different way in which Aseneth can participate that nevertheless signifies full incorporation? More pointedly, can we rescue Aseneth from questions about belonging that are usually asked by and are only answerable for males? Can we talk about Aseneth’s inclusion in the covenant without granting her a metaphorical penis?

I think we can, and I think the place to start is with the language used by Jos. Asen. to describe her transformation. She is said to receive life anew from Joseph’s “living God.” The heroine moves from outsider to insider, from foreigner to familiar, from one excluded to one embraced, and—in the idiom of the narrative itself—“from death to life.” Such language, I suggest, engages a theological repertoire inherited from Israel’s election scene in Deuteronomy LXX that was widely deployed by a variety of ancient Jewish storytellers: the distinction of life and death as a way of organizing who is good and bad, blessed and cursed, in and out (Deut 4:32-33; 5:34-35 LXX). Only Israel’s God lives—along with those who belong to this God. Aseneth’s receipt of life anew marks her as a participant in the covenantal blessings associated with those who worship this “living God.”

Not all ancient Jewish thinkers would have agreed with the position developed in Jos. Asen. To take two famous examples: the book of Jubilees denies all access by gentiles (conceived as anyone not genealogically linked to Jacob) and therefore would reject Jos. Asen.’s very conclusions. The apostle Paul, on the other hand, shares with Jos. Asen. the view that gentiles can—and should— abandon their native gods and turn to sole veneration of the Jewish God. Notably, Paul, like Jos. Asen., uses a character from Genesis to negotiate entry for gentiles. The apostle creatively reworks gentiles’ genealogy as he constructs for his gentiles-in-Christ a kinship link with Abraham (Gal 3; Rom 4).

Both Paul and Jos. Asen. endeavor to incorporate gentiles in their own present by intervening in Israel’s mythic past. Unlike Paul’s Abraham, however, Aseneth is not reconceived in the first instance as an ancestor, a physical progenitor to whom kinship is traced. Jos. Asen. portrays her as special to gentile penitents in a different way: the narrative uses city imagery to imagine Aseneth as a mythic protector of the “many nations” who, like Aseneth, turn to Israel’s God and there find mercy, refuge, and life. Thus, while Paul and Jos. Asen. both invoke reworked characters from

32 Genesis to make space for gentile inclusion, their appropriations of these characters take strikingly different routes to their goal. Patrilineal lines of descent and physical conceptions of ancestry are fundamental to the apostle’s mythmaking. Those who have been “baptized into Christ,” for Paul, have become sons of Abraham (Gal 3:27, 29). Gentile inclusion comes through a male figure and is described as the miraculous granting of genealogical descent to those who otherwise would have no claim to biological filiation with the ancient Israelites.

It is perhaps no accident that Jos. Asen. has chosen a female character, ineligible for covenantal circumcision, through which to develop its case for gentile inclusion. Rather than make her story cohere with that of a circumcised male, Jos. Asen. exploits the ambiguity that results from the choice of a figure whose body requires incorporation without circumcision. The ambiguity is not a problem; it’s a solution. Aseneth becomes a potential model for any uncircumcised person who turns to Israel’s God. More than Ruth, moreover, Aseneth is spectacularly fashioned as a mythic mediator of God’s mercy to those whom the narrative expects to make such a turn. This marks Jos. Asen. as having an extreme position within the discourse of gentile inclusion in Second Temple Judaism: gentiles can be incorporated as gentiles by expressing fidelity to the God of Israel. I venture to say, then, that the apostle Paul is not, to play a bit with Daniel Boyarin’s suggestive title, the most “radical Jew” in antiquity–or at least not the only one.

This reading of Jos. Asen. shows us that we need to expand our categories of inclusion if we want to capture accurately the full range of ways in which ancient Jewish thinkers wrestled with questions of belonging. We miss just how significant Jos. Asen.’s contribution to this ancient argument is if we accept only Ioudaios as the end goal of gentile inclusion or, correspondingly, circumcision as the premiere mechanism of accomplishing incorporation. Much as it is today, Jewishness was a contested category in antiquity. Our extant evidence reveals diversity among definitions of what it meant to be “a Jew.” Scholars have imagined something of a sliding scale on which individual Jewish authors may be located: the greater the emphasis on Jewishness as biological filiation, the less permeable the boundary between Jew and gentile, and, conversely, the greater the emphasis on Jewishness as religious practice, the more permeable the boundary between Jew and gentile. While Jubilees and Paul, to take two examples discussed here, perhaps belong on such a scale, Jos. Asen. does not. Aseneth does not become circumcised. She does not convert. She does not become Ioudaios. (She cannot.) She becomes revivified, a metaphor for covenantal incorporation that does not rely on androcentric metrics of inclusion.

The character of Aseneth becomes transformed from material mother of the sons of Joseph to mythic mother-figure for the tribes of Israel and penitent nations who join in worshiping Israel’s

33 God. She has become, in this ancient tale, a productive site of intervention in Israel’s story—a matriarch who matters in the history of and for the future of God’s covenanted community.

Asenath Barzani Asenath Barzani (* 1590, † 1670 ) was a Kurdish Jewish woman in Mosul (Ottoman Empire) survived. She was one of the first women who received a rabbinic title ( Tanna'it ).

The life of Asenath Barzani Barzani was given the title Tanna'it ( teacher, master, not to be confused with the technical term Tanna, which is limited in the strict sense of the rabbinical teachers of the first three centuries AD ). Up to modernity very few women received this item. After Tanna'it Barzani died, many Jews made pilgrimages to her grave in Amediye in Iraqi Kurdistan. Asenath Barzani was the daughter

34 of Rabbi Samuel Barzani, who headed a yeshiva throughout his life and whose authority in Kurdistan was absolute. He was a master of Kabbalah, and it is said that he taught the secrets of the Kabbalah his daughter. She admired her father and looked at him as king of Israel. He was her most important teacher, and after his death she took over many of his duties. It served not only as a rabbi, but also became the head of the Yeshiva in Mosul and was probably at the top teacher of Torah in Kurdistan. In another source said that Asenath Barzani implored the Torah scholars of Amediye in Kurdistan of the 16th century to support the yeshiva, which her husband had established in Mosul, until her young son would accept it.

The legend of the angel - throng Barzani was a poet and expert on Jewish literature and circulate many Kurdish legends about its wonders such as the called a host of angels. After Rabbi Samuel died, he often appeared in the dreams of his daughter. He would warn them of dangers and to show her how one can prevent them and save many lives in this way. On one occasion, she encouraged and inspired by her father, the Jews Amediyes, Rosh Chodesh, despite the threat posed by enemies celebrate out in the open. As they continued with the celebrations, we heard screams and saw flames rising into the sky. The synagogue was infected, but because the community had been outside the synagogue, no one was hurt. Since Tanna'it Asenath whispered a secret name which she had learned from her father. The man then saw a host of angels, which rose on the roof of the synagogue down. The Angels beat the flames with their wings until the last spark went out. Then she rose like a white flock of doves into the sky and disappeared. When the smoke cleared, they saw another miracle: the synagogue was intact and had the fire can not harm it. No single point of Torah scrolls had been touched by the flames. And the people were the Tanna'it Asenath so grateful that they named the new synagogue after her. The synagogue is still standing today.

Status as Rabbi Some modern researchers see Barzani's title and its role as head of the yeshiva as a rabbi at equivalent and therefore consider them as a rare example of a female rabbi in traditional Judaism.

Asenath Barzani (1590–1670), was a renowned Kurdish and Jewish woman who lived in Iraq. Her writings demonstrate her mastery of Hebrew, Torah, Talmud, Midrash, and Kabbalah. She is considered the first female rabbi of Jewish history by some scholars, as well as one of the first recorded Kurdish women. In her lifetime, Asenath Barzani was referred to by the title tanna’it rather than “rabbi”, however, though the denomination tanna’it is a rabbinical title, it is not identical to the title of rabbi. Nevertheless, since her father who was also a rabbi and was himself labeled Tannai (the male noun of Tanna’it) and not by the title rabbi, it is clear that in the Kurdistan of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the rabbi usually performed as Tannai, so it was determined likely that Asenath Barzani was therefore the first woman rabbi, while Hannah Rochel Verbermacher (1815– 1888) was the first woman consulted as a Rebbe, and Regina Jonas (1902-1942) was the first woman who was called a Rabbi.

Barzani was the daughter of Rabbi Samuel ben Nethanel HaLevi Barzani, a rabbinic scholar, whose authority was absolute though he held no official position. He had founded several yeshivot and was head of the yeshivah in Mosul. He lived in great poverty and was regarded as a saint. He had no sons, and he was his daughter's primary teacher. A master of Kabbalah, he was said to have taught his daughter the secrets of Kabbalah. Barzani adored her father, and regarded him as a King of Israel.[citation needed] In a letter, she described her upbringing: I never left the entrance to my house or went outside; I was like a princess of Israel ... I grew up on the laps of scholars, anchored to my father of blessed memory. I was never taught any work but sacred study.[6]

36 Barzani was married to one of her father's best students and nephew,[7] her cousin Rabbi Jacob Mizrahi, who promised her father that she would do no domestic work and could spend her time as a Torah scholar. After her father's death, her husband became head of the yeshivah in Mosul. He was so involved in his studies that she essentially taught the yeshivah students and provided them with rabbinic training. Following her husband's death, the leadership of the yeshivah passed to her naturally, and eventually she became known as the chief teacher of Torah. As neither her father nor her husband had been successful fundraisers, the yeshivah was always in financial difficulties, and Barzani wrote a number of letters requesting funds in which she described her and her children's difficult situation. Her home and belongings had been confiscated, including her books, but she felt that as a woman it was inappropriate for her to travel in search of financial support Barzani wrote: “And he [my father] made my husband swear that he would not make me perform work, and he did as he had commanded him. From the beginning, the Rabbi [Mizrahi] was busy with his studies and had no time to teach the pupils; but I taught them in his stead, I was a helpmate for him... [Begging for support for] the sake of Father... and the Rabbi... so that their Torah and names should not be brought to naught in these communities; for I remain the teacher of Torah...” In spite of the financial problems, she successfully ran the yeshivah which continued to produce serious scholars, including her son, whom she sent to Baghdad, where he continued the dynasty of rabbinic scholars. Her few extant writings demonstrate a complete mastery of Hebrew, Torah, Talmud, Midrash, as well as Kabbalah, and her letters are not only erudite, but also lyrical.[5] After her death, many Jews made pilgrimages to her grave in Amadiyah in Northern Iraq, where her father is also buried. Barzani was also known as a poet. She is said to have authored a piyut (liturgical poem) in Kurdish, called Ga’agua L’Zion (Longing for Zion).